The report analyzes the VAT gap in the EU-28 member states in 2018. It finds that the total VAT gap in the EU was an estimated €137 billion, representing 12.2% of the total VAT liability. This is an increase compared to 2017, when the gap was €117 billion or 11.2% of the total liability. The report examines VAT revenue, total VAT liability, and VAT gap estimates for each member state from 2014 to 2018. It also conducts econometric analysis to identify factors influencing VAT gap levels across countries.
This analysis serves as the Final Report for the DG TAXUD Project 2015/CC/131, “Study and Reports on the VAT Gap in the EU-28 Member States”, which is a follow up to the reports published in 2013, 2014, and 2015.
In this report, we present estimates of the VAT Gap and the Policy Gap for the year 2014, as well as revised estimates for the years 2010-2013 due the transmission of Eurostat national accounts from the ESA95 to the ESA10. This update covers Croatia, which was not included in the previous updates. While it was hoped that the update would also cover Cyprus, it has not been possible due to incomplete national accounts data.
The VAT Gap is a measure of VAT compliance and enforcement that provides an estimate of revenue loss due to fraud and evasion, tax avoidance, bankruptcies, financial insolvencies, as well as miscalculations. It is defined as the difference between the amount of VAT collected and the VAT Total Tax Liability (VTTL), which is expressed in the report in both absolute and relative terms. The VTTL is the theoretical tax liability according to tax law, and is estimated using a “top-down” approach.
In the last decade, advanced economies, including the euro area, experienced deflationary pressures caused by the global financial crisis of 2007-2009 and the anti-crisis policies that followed—in particular, the new financial regulations (which led to a deep decline in the money multiplier). However, there are numerous signs in both the real and financial spheres that these pressures are disappearing. The largest advanced economies are growing up to their potential, unemployment is systematically decreasing, the financial sector is more eager to lend, and its clients—to borrow. Rapidly growing asset prices signal the possibility of similar developments in other segments of the economy. In this new macroeconomic environment, central banks should cease unconventional monetary policies and prepare themselves to head off potential inflationary pressures.
This Report has been prepared for the European Commission, DG TAXUD under contract TAXUD/2017/DE/329, “Study and Reports on the VAT Gap in the EU-28 Member States” and serves as a follow-up to the six reports published between 2013 and 2018.
This Study contains new estimates of the Value Added Tax (VAT) Gap for 2017, as well as updated estimates for 2013-2016. As a novelty in this series of reports, so called “fast VAT Gap estimates” are also presented the year immediately preceding the analysis, namely for 2018. In addition, the study reports the results of the econometric analysis of VAT Gap determinants initiated and initially reported in the 2018 Report (Poniatowski et al., 2018). It also scrutinises the Policy Gap in 2017 as well as the contribution that reduced rates and exemptions made to the theoretical VAT revenue losses.
Economic effects of a potential secession of Catalonia from Spain and paths f...Miqui Mel
Scenarios of Macro-economic Development for Catalonia on Horizon 2030: Economic effects of a potential secession of Catalonia from Spain and paths for integration with the EU
Source: CEPS & CIDOB
Date: July 2015.
The 17th edition of Social policy in the European Union: state of play reports on recent EU and national social policymaking, with contributions from leading scholars pointing to a ‘crisis’, the best word to characterize 2015. Tensions in the EU reached an unprecedented level: the migration crisis showed the EU the limits of its decision-making capacity, economic weakness continued to prevail, austerity policies and the badly handled socioeconomic Greek crisis turned populations against the EU – and then came the Brexit vote.
This book argues that the centrifugal pressures within the EU and the EMU can be handled through a process of managed integration and disintegration. It maintains that the EU’s renewed focus on long-term unemployment is biased towards a ‘jobs first’ approach, contributing to the EU’s Janus-faced approach to the social dimension. It demonstrates that the austerity dogma has led to an erosion of social rights and makes a plea in favour of going ‘back to basics’ with regard to worker’s protection. Reflection and down-to-earth debate on the long-term integration of both EU migrants and refugees is required.
The political reality of 2015 demonstrates that the EU project has been too narrowly focused on reciprocity, instead of solidarity. The harsh reality is that the European project can no longer be considered irreversible. The EU’s core values must therefore be reaffirmed with a view to creating a new common sense of purpose, including a more explicit commitment to equitable growth via a European Social Union.
This analysis serves as the Final Report for the DG TAXUD Project 2015/CC/131, “Study and Reports on the VAT Gap in the EU-28 Member States”, which is a follow up to the reports published in 2013, 2014, and 2015.
In this report, we present estimates of the VAT Gap and the Policy Gap for the year 2014, as well as revised estimates for the years 2010-2013 due the transmission of Eurostat national accounts from the ESA95 to the ESA10. This update covers Croatia, which was not included in the previous updates. While it was hoped that the update would also cover Cyprus, it has not been possible due to incomplete national accounts data.
The VAT Gap is a measure of VAT compliance and enforcement that provides an estimate of revenue loss due to fraud and evasion, tax avoidance, bankruptcies, financial insolvencies, as well as miscalculations. It is defined as the difference between the amount of VAT collected and the VAT Total Tax Liability (VTTL), which is expressed in the report in both absolute and relative terms. The VTTL is the theoretical tax liability according to tax law, and is estimated using a “top-down” approach.
In the last decade, advanced economies, including the euro area, experienced deflationary pressures caused by the global financial crisis of 2007-2009 and the anti-crisis policies that followed—in particular, the new financial regulations (which led to a deep decline in the money multiplier). However, there are numerous signs in both the real and financial spheres that these pressures are disappearing. The largest advanced economies are growing up to their potential, unemployment is systematically decreasing, the financial sector is more eager to lend, and its clients—to borrow. Rapidly growing asset prices signal the possibility of similar developments in other segments of the economy. In this new macroeconomic environment, central banks should cease unconventional monetary policies and prepare themselves to head off potential inflationary pressures.
This Report has been prepared for the European Commission, DG TAXUD under contract TAXUD/2017/DE/329, “Study and Reports on the VAT Gap in the EU-28 Member States” and serves as a follow-up to the six reports published between 2013 and 2018.
This Study contains new estimates of the Value Added Tax (VAT) Gap for 2017, as well as updated estimates for 2013-2016. As a novelty in this series of reports, so called “fast VAT Gap estimates” are also presented the year immediately preceding the analysis, namely for 2018. In addition, the study reports the results of the econometric analysis of VAT Gap determinants initiated and initially reported in the 2018 Report (Poniatowski et al., 2018). It also scrutinises the Policy Gap in 2017 as well as the contribution that reduced rates and exemptions made to the theoretical VAT revenue losses.
Economic effects of a potential secession of Catalonia from Spain and paths f...Miqui Mel
Scenarios of Macro-economic Development for Catalonia on Horizon 2030: Economic effects of a potential secession of Catalonia from Spain and paths for integration with the EU
Source: CEPS & CIDOB
Date: July 2015.
The 17th edition of Social policy in the European Union: state of play reports on recent EU and national social policymaking, with contributions from leading scholars pointing to a ‘crisis’, the best word to characterize 2015. Tensions in the EU reached an unprecedented level: the migration crisis showed the EU the limits of its decision-making capacity, economic weakness continued to prevail, austerity policies and the badly handled socioeconomic Greek crisis turned populations against the EU – and then came the Brexit vote.
This book argues that the centrifugal pressures within the EU and the EMU can be handled through a process of managed integration and disintegration. It maintains that the EU’s renewed focus on long-term unemployment is biased towards a ‘jobs first’ approach, contributing to the EU’s Janus-faced approach to the social dimension. It demonstrates that the austerity dogma has led to an erosion of social rights and makes a plea in favour of going ‘back to basics’ with regard to worker’s protection. Reflection and down-to-earth debate on the long-term integration of both EU migrants and refugees is required.
The political reality of 2015 demonstrates that the EU project has been too narrowly focused on reciprocity, instead of solidarity. The harsh reality is that the European project can no longer be considered irreversible. The EU’s core values must therefore be reaffirmed with a view to creating a new common sense of purpose, including a more explicit commitment to equitable growth via a European Social Union.
SA’s unemployment rate increases by 7.5% SABC News
South Africa’s unemployment rate increased by 7.5% points to 30.8% in the third quarter of the year compared with the second quarter. This is the highest unemployment rate recorded since in 2008.
The world economy, which continues to suffer from the fallout of the financial crisis that began in late 2007 and the meltdown in September 2008, has not been able to revive the growth conditions of the preceding decade. Those conditions had been particularly supportive of economic and social progress in the developing world, and the resulting momentum, especially in some of the larger developing countries, helped to stoke recovery in the world economy once the worst of the crisis had been contained. However, those countries are now losing that momentum and downside risks for the world economy are growing again. The immediate problem is the inability of the developed countries to return to a normal growth pattern, but there is also an equally serious problem of contagion. Amidst their fragile recovery, an unreformed (and unrepentant) financial sector and macroeconomic policies that are timid at best, and counterproductive at worst, the developing countries will find it difficult to sustain their own growth dynamic, let alone that of the global economy. Therefore, a fundamental policy reorientation is needed, recognizing that healthy and inclusive growth will require a stable expansion of consumption and investment in productive capacity based on favourable income expectations of the working population and positive demand expectations of entrepreneurs. This requires a rethinking of the principles underlying the design of national economic policy and supportive international institutional arrangements.In detail, in its first chapter the report is dealing with current trends and challenges in the world economy. In the second chapter the report covers the main issues of income inequality and its evolution. Further on the third chapter concerns with the impacts of changes in globalization and technology for income inequality and the fourth chapter with the role of fiscal policy in income distribution. The last chapter finishes the report with a reconsideration of current economics and politics of inquality.
The analytical research on the economic developments in BH by international financial institutions, especially the IMF and World Bank, as well as domestic bodies, especially the Economic Policy Research Unit, was extensively exploited in the research. However, the primary focus of the research was on structural and institutional aspects facilitating or impeding functioning of a market economy in the BH and country's capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the EU. Therefore, the report focuses on background analysis of economic factors influencing the functioning of market economy and the capacity to withstand the competition in the EU market.
Authored by: Malgorzata Antczak, Rafal Antczak, Karina Kostrzewa, Ranko Markus, Wojciech Paczynski
Published in 2007
Inflation in advanced economies is low by historical standards but there is no threat of deflation. Slower economic growth is caused by supply-side constraints rather than low inflation. Below-the-target inflation does not damage the reputation of central banks. Thus, central banks should not try to bring inflation back to the targeted level of 2%. Rather, they should revise the inflation target downwards and publicly explain the rationale for such a move. Risks to the independence of central banks come from their additional mandates (beyond price stability) and populist politics.
Pensions of Eurocrats rise another 6 % in 2018Thierry Debels
On 4 September 2017, the Council adopted its position on the draft general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2018, details of which are set out in the present explanatory memorandum. Pensions of Eurocrats rise another 6 % in 2018.
Sample Europe Digital Fitness Market Report 2022 - Cognitive Market Research....Cognitive Market Research
Europe Digital Fitness Market Report 2022
Report Link- https://www.cognitivemarketresearch.com/Europe-Digital-Fitness-Market-Report Cognitive Market Research provides detailed analysis of Europe Digital Fitness in our recently published report titled, "Europe Digital Fitness 2022" The market study focuses on industry dynamics including driving factors to provide the key elements fueling the current market growth. The report also identifies restraints and opportunities to identify high growth segments involved in the Europe Digital Fitness market. Key industrial factors such as macroeconomic and microeconomic factors are studied in detail with help of PESTEL analysis in order to have a holistic view of factors impacting Europe Digital Fitness market growth across the globe. Market growth is forecasted with the help of complex algorithms such as regression analysis, sentiment analysis of end-users, etc. #EuropeDigitalFitnessReport #EuropeDigitalFitnessMarket #EuropeDigitalFitnessMarketForecast #EuropeDigitalFitnessMarketStatus #EuropeDigitalFitnessMarket2022
Sample Europe Digital Fitness Market Report 2022 - Cognitive Market Research....Cognitive Market Research
Europe Digital Fitness Market Report 2022
Report Link- https://www.cognitivemarketresearch.com/Europe-Digital-Fitness-Market-Report Cognitive Market Research provides detailed analysis of Europe Digital Fitness in our recently published report titled, "Europe Digital Fitness 2022" The market study focuses on industry dynamics including driving factors to provide the key elements fueling the current market growth. The report also identifies restraints and opportunities to identify high growth segments involved in the Europe Digital Fitness market. Key industrial factors such as macroeconomic and microeconomic factors are studied in detail with help of PESTEL analysis in order to have a holistic view of factors impacting Europe Digital Fitness market growth across the globe. Market growth is forecasted with the help of complex algorithms such as regression analysis, sentiment analysis of end-users, etc. #EuropeDigitalFitnessReport #EuropeDigitalFitnessMarket #EuropeDigitalFitnessMarketForecast #EuropeDigitalFitnessMarketStatus #EuropeDigitalFitnessMarket2022
The central objective of this report (completed in March 2006) is to identify the best forms of enhanced economic integration that could be pursued over the next 5- 10 years between the EU and Ukraine, Russia, Egypt, Morocco and Algeria, from the EU perspective.
All of these countries except Russia are partners in the European Neighbourhood Policy, which is a new framework for the EU’s relations with its neighbour countries. Russia is not formally part of the ENP, but the four common policy spaces agreed at the summit in May 2005 amount to a more selective Russian derivative of the ENP, with the notable exclusion of democracy and human rights. Russia is also to be included in the operating area of the European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument (ENPI, the ENP’s budget). The five countries covered in this report are of medium to large size in terms of population, but small in economic terms, relative to the EU. They have different histories of co-operation with the EU, but all have been recipients of substantial EU financial assistance.
Authored by: Malgorzata Jakubiak, Anna Kolesnichenko, Wojciech Paczynski, John Roberts, Sinan Ülgen
Published in 2007
This Report is one of six studies in the first phase of the EU project on “Costs and Benefits of Labour Mobility between the EU and the Eastern Partnership Partner Countries.” It aims to provide an informed view on the potential for increased migration flows and their consequences as a result of possible changes in the migration policies of the European Union with regard to Moldova. Since Moldova’s Declaration of Independence in 1990, migration has transformed the country in ways that were impossible to predict. With over a quarter of its labour force now working abroad (a full ten percent of its population), Moldova has become the epitome of a migration-dependent country, with all the costs and benefits associated with this definition. Remittances are as high as one-third of national income, and have helped the country raise its living standards and fuel investment in housing and small businesses. Yet there have also been costs to the large migratory flows, ranging from effects on the macroeconomy to the disruption of social life. All in all, migration has been good for Moldova. This complex socio-economic phenomenon now appears to have stabilized. Further gains for Moldova and its partner countries could be achieved when new agreements are implemented and the institutions dealing with the planning of migration and protection of migrants are strengthened.
Authored by: Georgeta Mincu, Vasile Cantarji
Published in 2013
This report provides estimates of the VAT Gap for 26 EU Member States for 2012, as well as revised estimates for the period 2009-2011. It is a follow-up to the report “Study to quantify and analyse the VAT Gap in the EU-27 Member States” , published in September 2013. This update incorporates the NACE Rev. 2 classification of economic activities into the calculation of the theoretical liability.
http://www.case-research.eu/en/node/58716
SA’s unemployment rate increases by 7.5% SABC News
South Africa’s unemployment rate increased by 7.5% points to 30.8% in the third quarter of the year compared with the second quarter. This is the highest unemployment rate recorded since in 2008.
The world economy, which continues to suffer from the fallout of the financial crisis that began in late 2007 and the meltdown in September 2008, has not been able to revive the growth conditions of the preceding decade. Those conditions had been particularly supportive of economic and social progress in the developing world, and the resulting momentum, especially in some of the larger developing countries, helped to stoke recovery in the world economy once the worst of the crisis had been contained. However, those countries are now losing that momentum and downside risks for the world economy are growing again. The immediate problem is the inability of the developed countries to return to a normal growth pattern, but there is also an equally serious problem of contagion. Amidst their fragile recovery, an unreformed (and unrepentant) financial sector and macroeconomic policies that are timid at best, and counterproductive at worst, the developing countries will find it difficult to sustain their own growth dynamic, let alone that of the global economy. Therefore, a fundamental policy reorientation is needed, recognizing that healthy and inclusive growth will require a stable expansion of consumption and investment in productive capacity based on favourable income expectations of the working population and positive demand expectations of entrepreneurs. This requires a rethinking of the principles underlying the design of national economic policy and supportive international institutional arrangements.In detail, in its first chapter the report is dealing with current trends and challenges in the world economy. In the second chapter the report covers the main issues of income inequality and its evolution. Further on the third chapter concerns with the impacts of changes in globalization and technology for income inequality and the fourth chapter with the role of fiscal policy in income distribution. The last chapter finishes the report with a reconsideration of current economics and politics of inquality.
The analytical research on the economic developments in BH by international financial institutions, especially the IMF and World Bank, as well as domestic bodies, especially the Economic Policy Research Unit, was extensively exploited in the research. However, the primary focus of the research was on structural and institutional aspects facilitating or impeding functioning of a market economy in the BH and country's capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the EU. Therefore, the report focuses on background analysis of economic factors influencing the functioning of market economy and the capacity to withstand the competition in the EU market.
Authored by: Malgorzata Antczak, Rafal Antczak, Karina Kostrzewa, Ranko Markus, Wojciech Paczynski
Published in 2007
Inflation in advanced economies is low by historical standards but there is no threat of deflation. Slower economic growth is caused by supply-side constraints rather than low inflation. Below-the-target inflation does not damage the reputation of central banks. Thus, central banks should not try to bring inflation back to the targeted level of 2%. Rather, they should revise the inflation target downwards and publicly explain the rationale for such a move. Risks to the independence of central banks come from their additional mandates (beyond price stability) and populist politics.
Pensions of Eurocrats rise another 6 % in 2018Thierry Debels
On 4 September 2017, the Council adopted its position on the draft general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2018, details of which are set out in the present explanatory memorandum. Pensions of Eurocrats rise another 6 % in 2018.
Sample Europe Digital Fitness Market Report 2022 - Cognitive Market Research....Cognitive Market Research
Europe Digital Fitness Market Report 2022
Report Link- https://www.cognitivemarketresearch.com/Europe-Digital-Fitness-Market-Report Cognitive Market Research provides detailed analysis of Europe Digital Fitness in our recently published report titled, "Europe Digital Fitness 2022" The market study focuses on industry dynamics including driving factors to provide the key elements fueling the current market growth. The report also identifies restraints and opportunities to identify high growth segments involved in the Europe Digital Fitness market. Key industrial factors such as macroeconomic and microeconomic factors are studied in detail with help of PESTEL analysis in order to have a holistic view of factors impacting Europe Digital Fitness market growth across the globe. Market growth is forecasted with the help of complex algorithms such as regression analysis, sentiment analysis of end-users, etc. #EuropeDigitalFitnessReport #EuropeDigitalFitnessMarket #EuropeDigitalFitnessMarketForecast #EuropeDigitalFitnessMarketStatus #EuropeDigitalFitnessMarket2022
Sample Europe Digital Fitness Market Report 2022 - Cognitive Market Research....Cognitive Market Research
Europe Digital Fitness Market Report 2022
Report Link- https://www.cognitivemarketresearch.com/Europe-Digital-Fitness-Market-Report Cognitive Market Research provides detailed analysis of Europe Digital Fitness in our recently published report titled, "Europe Digital Fitness 2022" The market study focuses on industry dynamics including driving factors to provide the key elements fueling the current market growth. The report also identifies restraints and opportunities to identify high growth segments involved in the Europe Digital Fitness market. Key industrial factors such as macroeconomic and microeconomic factors are studied in detail with help of PESTEL analysis in order to have a holistic view of factors impacting Europe Digital Fitness market growth across the globe. Market growth is forecasted with the help of complex algorithms such as regression analysis, sentiment analysis of end-users, etc. #EuropeDigitalFitnessReport #EuropeDigitalFitnessMarket #EuropeDigitalFitnessMarketForecast #EuropeDigitalFitnessMarketStatus #EuropeDigitalFitnessMarket2022
The central objective of this report (completed in March 2006) is to identify the best forms of enhanced economic integration that could be pursued over the next 5- 10 years between the EU and Ukraine, Russia, Egypt, Morocco and Algeria, from the EU perspective.
All of these countries except Russia are partners in the European Neighbourhood Policy, which is a new framework for the EU’s relations with its neighbour countries. Russia is not formally part of the ENP, but the four common policy spaces agreed at the summit in May 2005 amount to a more selective Russian derivative of the ENP, with the notable exclusion of democracy and human rights. Russia is also to be included in the operating area of the European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument (ENPI, the ENP’s budget). The five countries covered in this report are of medium to large size in terms of population, but small in economic terms, relative to the EU. They have different histories of co-operation with the EU, but all have been recipients of substantial EU financial assistance.
Authored by: Malgorzata Jakubiak, Anna Kolesnichenko, Wojciech Paczynski, John Roberts, Sinan Ülgen
Published in 2007
This Report is one of six studies in the first phase of the EU project on “Costs and Benefits of Labour Mobility between the EU and the Eastern Partnership Partner Countries.” It aims to provide an informed view on the potential for increased migration flows and their consequences as a result of possible changes in the migration policies of the European Union with regard to Moldova. Since Moldova’s Declaration of Independence in 1990, migration has transformed the country in ways that were impossible to predict. With over a quarter of its labour force now working abroad (a full ten percent of its population), Moldova has become the epitome of a migration-dependent country, with all the costs and benefits associated with this definition. Remittances are as high as one-third of national income, and have helped the country raise its living standards and fuel investment in housing and small businesses. Yet there have also been costs to the large migratory flows, ranging from effects on the macroeconomy to the disruption of social life. All in all, migration has been good for Moldova. This complex socio-economic phenomenon now appears to have stabilized. Further gains for Moldova and its partner countries could be achieved when new agreements are implemented and the institutions dealing with the planning of migration and protection of migrants are strengthened.
Authored by: Georgeta Mincu, Vasile Cantarji
Published in 2013
This report provides estimates of the VAT Gap for 26 EU Member States for 2012, as well as revised estimates for the period 2009-2011. It is a follow-up to the report “Study to quantify and analyse the VAT Gap in the EU-27 Member States” , published in September 2013. This update incorporates the NACE Rev. 2 classification of economic activities into the calculation of the theoretical liability.
http://www.case-research.eu/en/node/58716
This report looks at the prospects for economic integration between Ukraine and the European Union. The so-called Orange Revolution of late 2004 saw the question of Ukraine’s future geopolitical orientation re-emerge, and the idea of closer integration with the EU received wide social support. Yet, already by mid-2006 the political support to the idea of Euro-Atlantic integration seem to diminish. It is not clear if, how and when the idea of deeper integration with the EU will be put into action.
Although the main steps have been charted at the official level (Ukraine becoming WTO member and both sides start to gradually lower barriers to trade in manufacturing goods), neither their timing, nor the steps going beyond them can be specified with any degree of certainty. This report aims at showing the possible and optimal policy options.
Authored by:
Authored by: Dmytro Boyarchuk, Inna Golodniuk, Malgorzata Jakubiak, Anna Kolesnichenko, Mykyta Mykhaylychenko, Wojciech Paczynski, Anna Tsarenko, Vitaly Vavryschuk
Published in 2006
The webinar provided background information on various call topics and on support available for both UK and European organisations in how to apply for funding and search for partners. KTN hosted this event on behalf of Innovate UK and was delivered by Samana Brannigan, National Contact Point for Health, and Stephen Alexander, National Contact Point for Legal and Financial Issues.
The webinar gave an overview of H2020 Health Call topics, and support available for UK organisations in how to apply for funding, as well as information on Brexit and the continuation of UK participation in H2020. This enabled attendees to gain an insight into the benefits of participating, guidelines for preparing a project outline and the support and collaboration tools available.
In summary, the webinar covered:
- Open and Forthcoming Health Call Topics
- Support for UK Organisations
- UK participation in Horizon 2020
Find out more about the Health Special Interest Group at https://ktn-uk.co.uk/interests/health
This report presents and discusses the findings of the “Study to quantify and analyse the VAT Gap in the EU-27 Member States”, conducted by CASE and CPB. The main aim of the study was to help better understand the recent trends in the field of VAT fraud and analyse determinants of VAT Gaps using a number of econometric techniques. The authors discuss the structure of the VAT systems in the EU, the broad trends in the EU economy over the period 2000-2011, and review the behaviour of VAT revenues, as well as the changes in VAT rates and exemptions that have occurred as a response to economic events or policy decisions. They pay particular attention to the events following the onset of the economic crisis in 2008. Moreover, they discuss the definition of VAT Gaps that has been used in this study, as well as other alternatives existing in the literature. They review possible shortcomings associated with different concepts. Subsequently, they present the results of the estimations for EU-26 countries for the period 2000-2011. The estimates are first discussed for the EU-26 as a whole, and then for each country individually. Finally, an econometric analysis of the determinants of VAT Gaps for the period under consideration is provided.
Written by Luca Barbone, Misha V. Belkindas, Leon Bettendorf, Richard M. Bird, Michael Smart and Mikhail Bonch-Osmolovsky. Published in December 2013
PDF available on our website at: http://www.case-research.eu/en/node/58372
Similar to Study and Reports on the VAT Gap in the EU-28 Member States: 2020 Final Report (20)
The report examines the social and economic drivers and impact of circular migration between Belarus and Poland, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic. The core question the authors sought to address was how managing circular migration could, in the long term, help to optimise labour resources in both the country of origin and the destination countries. In the pages that follow, the authors of the report present the current and forecasted labour market and demographic situation in their respective countries as well as the dynamics and characteristics of short-term labour migration flows between Belarus and Poland, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic, concentrating on the period since 2010. They also outline and discuss related policy responses and evaluate prospects for cooperation on circular migration.
Podręcznik został opracowany w celu przekazania trenerom i nauczycielom podstawowej wiedzy, która może być przydatna w prowadzeniu szkoleń promujących pracę rejestrowaną. Prezentuje on z jednej strony korzyści z pracy rejestrowanej, z drugiej – potencjalne koszty związane z pracą nierejestrowaną. W pierwszej kolejności informacje te przedstawiono w odniesieniu do pracowników najemnych (rozdział 2), podkreślając w sposób szczególny to, że negatywne konsekwencje pracy nierejestrowanej są ponoszone przez całe życie. Ze względu na specyficzną sytuację cudzoziemców pracujących w Polsce konsekwencje ponoszone przez tę grupę opisano oddzielnie (rozdział 3). Ponadto zaprezentowano skutki dotyczące pracodawców z szarej strefy z wyodrębnieniem tych, którzy zatrudniają cudzoziemców (rozdział 4). Uzupełnieniem przedstawionych informacji jest opis działań podejmowanych przez państwo w celu ograniczenia zjawiska pracy nierejestrowanej w Polsce (rozdział 5) oraz prowadzonych w Wielkiej Brytanii, czyli w kraju będącym liderem w walce z szarą strefą (rozdział 6).
European countries face a challenge related to the economic and social consequences of their societies’ aging. Specifically, pension systems must adjust to the coming changes, maintaining both financial stability, connected with equalizing inflows from premiums and spending on pensions, and simultaneously the sufficiency of benefits, protecting retirees against poverty and smoothing consumption over their lives, i.e. ensuring the ability to pay for consumption needs at each stage of life, regardless of income from labor.
One of the key instruments applied toward these goals is the retirement age. Formally it is a legally established boundary: once people have crossed it – on average – they significantly lose their ability to perform work (the so-called old-age risk). But since the 1970s, in many developed countries the retirement age has become an instrument of social and labor-market policy. Specifically, in the 1970s and ‘80s, an early retirement age was perceived as a solution allowing a reduction in the supply of labor, particularly among people with relatively low competencies who were approaching retirement age, which is called the lump of labor fallacy. It was often believed that people taking early retirement freed up jobs for the young. But a range of economic evidence shows that the number of jobs is not fixed, and those who retire don’t in fact free up jobs. On the contrary, because of higher spending by pension systems, labor costs rise, which limits the supply of jobs. In general, a good situation on the labor market supports employment of both the youngest and the oldest labor force participants. Additionally, a lower retirement age for women was maintained, which resulted to a high degree from cultural conditions and norms that are typical for traditional societies.
Until now, the banking sector has been one of the strong points of Poland’s economy. In contrast to banks in the U.S. and leading Western European economies, lenders in Poland came through the 2008 global financial crisis without a scratch, without needing state financial support. But in recent years the industry’s problems have been growing, creating a threat to economic growth and gains in living standards.
For an economy’s productivity to increase, funds can’t go to all companies evenly, and definitely shouldn’t go to those that are most lacking in funds, but to those that will use them most efficiently. This is true of total external financing, and thus funding both from the banking sector and from parabanks, the capital market and funds from public institutions. In Poland, in light of the relatively modest scale of the capital market, banks play a clearly dominant role in external financing of companies. This is why the author of this text focuses on the bank credit allocation efficiency.
The author points out that in the very near future, conditions will emerge in Poland which – as the experience of other countries shows – create a risk of reduced efficiency of credit allocation to business. Additionally, in Poland today, bank lending to companies is to a high degree being replaced by funds from state aid, which reduces the efficiency of allocation of external funds to companies (both loans and subsidies), as allocation of government subsidies is not usually based on efficiency. This decline in external financing allocation efficiency may slow, halt or even reverse the process, that has been uninterrupted for 28 years, of Poland’s convergence, i.e. the narrowing of the gap in living standards between Poland and the West.
The economic characteristics of the COVID-19 crisis differ from those of previous crises. It is a combination of demand- and supply-side constraints which led to the formation of a monetary overhang that will be unfrozen once the pandemic ends. Monetary policy must take this effect into consideration, along with other pro-inflationary factors, in the post-pandemic era. It must also think in advance about how to avoid a policy trap coming from fiscal dominance.
This paper is organized as follows: Chapter 2 deals with the economic characteristics of the COVID-19 pandemic and its impact on the effectiveness of the monetary policy response measures undertaken. In Chapter 3, we analyse the monetary policy decisions of the ECB (and other major CBs for comparison) and their effectiveness in achieving the declared policy goals in the short term. Chapter 4 is devoted to an analysis of the policy challenges which may be faced by the ECB and other major CBs once the pandemic emergency comes to its end. Chapter 5 contains a summary and the conclusions of our analysis.
Purpose: This paper tries to identify the wage gap between informal and formal workers and tests for the two-tier structure of the informal labour market in Poland.
Design/methodology/approach: I employ the propensity score matching (PSM) technique and use data from the Polish Labour Force Survey (LFS) for the period 2009–2017 to estimate the wage gap between informal and formal workers, both at the means and along the wage distribution. I use two definitions of informal employment: a) employment without a written agreement and b) employment while officially registered as unemployed at a labour office. In order to reduce the bias resulting from the non-random selection of
individuals into informal employment, I use a rich set of control variables representing several individual characteristics.
Findings: After controlling for observed heterogeneity, I find that on average informal workers earn less than formal workers, both in terms of monthly earnings and hourly wage. This result is not sensitive to the definition of informal employment used and is
stable over the analysed time period (2009–2017). However, the wage penalty to informal employment is substantially higher for individuals at the bottom of the wage distribution, which supports the hypothesis of the two-tier structure of the informal labour market in Poland.
Originality/value: The main contribution of this study is that it identifies the two-tier structure of the informal labour market in Poland: informal workers in the first quartile of the wage distribution and those above the first quartile appear to be in two partially different segments of the labour market.
The rule of law, by securing civil and economic rights, directly contributes to social prosperity and is one of our societies’ greatest achievements. In the European Union (EU), the rule of law is enshrined in the Treaties of its founding and is recognised not just as a necessary condition of a liberal democratic society, but also as an important requirement for a stable, effective, and sustainable market economy. In fact, it was the stability and equality of opportunity provided by the rule of law that enabled the post-war Wirtschaftswunder in Germany and the post-Communist resuscitation of the economy in Poland.
But the rule of law is a living concept that is constantly evolving – both in its formal, de jure dimension, embodied in legislation, and its de facto dimension, or its reception by society. In Poland, in particular, according to the EU, the rule of law has been heavily challenged by government since 2015 and has evolved amid continued pressure exerted on the institutions which execute laws. More recently, the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic transformed the perception of the rule of law and its boundaries throughout the EU and beyond (Marzocchi, 2020).
The euro is the second most important global currency after the US dollar. However, its international role has not increased since its inception in 1999. The private sector prefers using the US dollar rather than the euro because the financial market for US dollar-denominated assets is larger and deeper; network externalities and inertia also play a role. Increasing the attractiveness of the euro outside the euro area requires, among others, a proactive role for the European Central Bank and completing the Banking Union and Capital Market Union.
Forecasting during a strong shock is burdened with exceptionally high uncertainty. This gives rise to the temptation to formulate alarmist forecasts. Experiences from earlier pandemics, particularly those from the 20th century, for which we have the most data, don’t provide a basis for this. The mildest of them weakened growth by less than 1 percentage point, and the worst, the Spanish Flu, by 6 percentage points. Still, even the Spanish Flu never caused losses on the order of 20% of GDP – not even where it turned out to be a humanitarian disaster, costing the lives of 3-5% of the population. History suggests that if pandemics lead to such deep losses at all, it’s only in particular quarters and not over a whole year, as economic activity rebounds. The strength of that rebound is largely determined by economic policy. The purpose of this work is to describe possible scenarios for a rebound in Polish economic growth after the epidemic.
A separate issue, no less important, is what world will emerge from the current crisis. In the face of the 2008 financial crisis, White House Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel said: “You never want a serious crisis to go to waste. And what I mean by that is an opportunity to do things that you think you could not do before.” Such changes can make the economy and society function better than before the crisis. Unfortunately, the opportunities created by the global financial crisis were squandered. Today’s task is more difficult; the scale of various problems has expanded even more. Without deep structural and institutional changes, the world will be facing enduring social and economic problems, accompanied by long-term stagnation.
"Many brilliant prophecies have appeared for the future of the EU and our entire planet. I believe that Europe, in its own style, will draw pragmatic conclusions from the crisis, not revolutionary ones; conclusions that will allow us to continue enjoying a Europe without borders. Brussels will demonstrate its usefulness; it will react ably and flexibly. First of all, contrary to the deceitful statements of members of the Polish government, the EU warned of the threats already in 2021. Secondly, already in mid-March EU assistance programs were ready, i.e. earlier than the PiS government’s “shield” program. The conclusion from the crisis will be a strengthening of all the preventive mechanisms that allow us to recognize threats and react in time of need. Research programs will be more strongly directed toward diagnosing and treating infectious diseases. Europe will gain greater self-sufficiency in the area of medical equipment and drugs, and the EU – greater competencies in the area of the health service, thus far entrusted to the member states. The 2021-27 budget must be reconstructed, to supplement the priority of the Green Deal with economic stimulus programs. In this way structural funds, which have the greatest multiplier effect for investment and the labor market, may return to favor. So once again: an addition, as a conclusion from the crisis, and not a reinvention of the EU," writes Dr. Janusz Lewandowski the author of the 162nd mBank-CASE seminar Proceeding.
Dla wielu rodaków europejskość Polski jest oczywista, trudno jest im nawet wyobrazić sobie, jak kształtowałyby się losy naszego kraju bez uczestnictwa w integracji europejskiej. Szczególnie młode pokolenie traktuje osiągnięty przez nas dzięki uczestnictwie w Unii ogromny postęp cywilizacyjny jako coś danego i naturalnego. Jednak świadomość tego, jaki był nasz punkt wyjścia, jaką przeszliśmy drogę i jak przyczyniły się do tego unijne działania oraz jakie wynikały z tego korzyści powinna nam stale towarzyszyć. Bez tej świadomości, starannego weryfikowania faktów i docenienia naszych osiągnięć grozi nam uleganie niesprawdzonym argumentom przeciwników integracji europejskiej i popełnienie nieodwracalnych błędów. Dla tych, którzy chcą poznać te fakty, przygotowany został raport "Nasza Europa. 15 lat Polski w Unii Europejskiej". Podjęto w nim ocenę 15 lat członkostwa Polski z perspektywy doświadczeń procesu integracji, z jego barierami i sukcesami, a także wyzwaniami przyszłości.
Raport jest wynikiem pracy zbiorowej licznych ekspertów z różnych dziedzin, od wielu lat analizujących wielowymiarowe efekty działania instytucji UE oraz współpracy z krajami członkowskimi na podstawie europejskich wartości i mechanizmów. Autorzy podsumowują korzyści członkostwa Polski w Unii Europejskiej na podstawie faktów, nie stroniąc jednakże od własnych ocen i refleksji.
This report is the result of the joint work of a number of experts from various fields who have been - for many years – analysing the multidimensional effects of EU institutions and cooperation with Member States pursuant to European values and mechanisms. The authors summarise the benefits of Poland’s membership in the EU based on facts; however, they do not hide their own views and reflections. They also demonstrate the barriers and challenges to further European integration.
This report was prepared by CASE, one of the oldest independent think tanks in Central and Eastern Europe, utilising its nearly 30 years of experience in providing objective analyses and recommendations with respect to socioeconomic topics. It is both an expression of concern about Poland’s future in the EU, as well as the authors’ contribution to the debate on further European integration.
Poland’s new Employee Capital Plans (PPK) scheme, which is mandatory for employers, started to be implemented in July 2019. The article looks at the systemic solutions applied in the programme from the perspective of the concept of the simultaneous reconstruction of the retirement pension system. The aim is to present arguments for and against the project from the point of view of various actors, and to assess the chances of success for the new system. The article offers a detailed study of legal solutions, an analysis of the literature on the subject, and reports of institutions that supervise pension funds. The results of this analysis point to the lack of cohesion between certain solutions of the 1999 pension reform and expose a lack of consistency in how the reform was carried out, which led to the eventual removal of the capital part of the pension system. The study shows that additional saving for old age is advisable in the country’s current demographic situation and necessary for both economic and social reasons. However, the systemic solutions offered by the government appear to be chiefly designated to serve short-term state interests and do not create sufficient incentives for pension plan participants to join the programme.
Belarus was among the few post-communist countries to resign from comprehensive market reforms and attempt to improve the efficiency of the economy through administrative means, leaving market mechanisms only an auxiliary role. Since its inception, the ‘Belarusian economic model’ has undergone several revisions of a de-statisation and de-regulation kind, but still the Belarusian economy remains dominated by the state. This paper analyses the characteristic features of the Belarusian economic system – especially those related to the public sector – as well as its evolution over time during the period following its independence. The paper concludes that during the post-Soviet period, the Belarusian economy evolved from a quasi-Soviet system based on state property, state planning, support to inefficient enterprises and the massive redistribution of funds to a more flexible hybrid model where the public sector still remains the core of the economy. The case of Belarus shows that presently there is no appropriate theoretical perspective which, in an unmodified form, could be applied to study this type of economic system. Therefore, a new perspective based on an already existing but updated approach or a multidisciplinary approach that incorporates the duality of the Belarusian economy is required.
Belarusian economy has been stagnating in 2011-2015 after 15 years of a high annual average growth rate. In 2015, after four years of stagnation, the Belarusian economy slid into a recession, its first since 1996, and experienced both cyclical and structural recessions. Since 2015, the Belarusian government and the National Bank of Belarus have been giving economic reforms a good chance thanks to gradual but consistent actions aimed at maintaining macroeconomic stability and economic liberalization. It seems that the economic authorities have sustained more transformation efforts during 2015-2018 than in the previous 24 years since 1991.
As the relative welfare level in Belarus is currently 64% compared to the Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) countries average, Belarus needs to build stronger fundaments of sustainable growth by continuing and accelerating the implementation of institutional transformation, primarily by fostering elimination of existing administrative mechanisms of inefficient resource allocation. Based on the experience of the CEE countries’ economic transformation, we highlight five lessons for the purpose of the economic reforms that Belarus still faces today: keeping macroeconomic stability, restructuring and improving the governance of state-owned enterprises, developing the financial market, increasing taxation efficiency, and deepening fiscal decentralization.
Estonia has Europe’s most transparent tax system (while Poland is second-to-last, in 35th place), and is also known for its pioneering approach to taxation of legal persons’ income. Since 2000, payers of Estonian corporate tax don’t pay tax on their profits as long as they don’t realize them. In principle, this approach should make access to capital easier, spark investment by companies and contribute to faster economic growth. Are these and other positive effects really noticeable in Estonia? Have other countries followed in this country’s footsteps? Would deferment of income tax be possible and beneficial for Poland? How would this affect revenue from tax on corporate profits? Would investors come to see Poland as a tax haven? Does the Estonian system limit tax avoidance and evasion, or actually the opposite? Is such a system fair? Are intermediate solutions possible, which would combine the strengths or limit the weaknesses of the classical and Estonian models of profit tax? These questions are discussed in the mBank-CASE seminar Proceeding no. 163, written by Dmitri Jegorov, deputy general secretary of the Estonian Finance Ministry, who directs the country’s tax and customs policy, Dr. Anna Leszczyłowska of the Poznań University of Economics and Business and Aleksander Łożykowski of the Warsaw School of Economics.
The trade war between the U.S. and China began in March 2018. The American side raised import duties on aluminum and steel from China, which were later extended to other countries, including Canada, Mexico and the EU member states. This drew a negative reaction from those countries and bilateral negotiations with the U.S. In June 2018 America, referring to Section 301 of its 1974 Trade Act, raised tariffs to 25% on 818 groups of products imported from China, arguing that the tariff increase was a response to years of theft of American intellectual property and dishonest trade practices, which has caused the U.S. trade deficit.
Will this trade war mean the collapse of the multilateral trading system and a transition to bilateral relationships? What are the possibilities for increasing tariffs in light of World Trade Organization rules? Can the conflict be resolved using the WTO dispute-resolution mechanism? What are the consequences of the trade war for American consumers and producers, and for suppliers from other countries? How high will tariffs climb as a result of a global trade war? How far can trade volumes and GDP fall if the worst-case scenario comes to pass? Professor Jan J. Michałek and Dr. Przemysław Woźniak give answers to these questions in the mBank-CASE Seminar Proceeding No. 161.
The paper discusses the role of the state in shaping an economic system which is, in line with the welfare economics approach, capable of performing socially important functions and achieving socially desirable results. We describe this system through a set of indexes: the IHDI, the World Happiness Index, and the Satisfaction of Life index. The characteris-tics of the state are analyzed using a set of variables which describe both the quantitative (government size, various types of governmental expenditures, and regulatory burden) and qualitative (institutional setup and property rights protection) aspects of its functioning. The study examines the “old” and “new” member states of the European Union, the post-communist countries of Eastern Europe and Asia, and the economies of Latin America. The main conclusion of the research is that the institutional quality of the state seems to be the most important for creation of a socially effective economic system, while the level of state interventionism plays, at most, a secondary and often negligible role. Geographical differentiation is also discovered, as well as the lack of a direct correlation between the characteristics of an economic system and the subjective feeling of well-being. These re-sults may corroborate the neo-institutionalist hypothesis that noneconomic factors, such as historical, institutional, cultural, and even genetic factors, may play an important role in making the economic system capable to perform its tasks; this remains an area for future research.
EuroPACE is an innovative financial mechanism inspired by an American building improvement initiative called Property Assessed Clean Energy (PACE). The innovative character of the EuroPACE mechanism is that financing through EuroPACE is linked to the taxes paid on a property. In other words, the financing lent by a private investor is repaid through property taxes and other charges related to the buildings. EuroPACE is therefore in line with the EC’s objectives of (1) putting EE first, (2) contributing to the EU’s global leadership, and (3) empowering consumers to enable MS to reach their energy and climate targets for 2030. Last but not least, EuroPACE could contribute to the democratisation of the energy supply by offering cash-flow positive, decentralised EE solutions.
The EuroPACE mechanism engages several stakeholders in the process: local government, investors, equipment installers, and homeowners. To establish the EuroPACE programme, several conditions must be satisfied, each of which are relevant for different stakeholder at different stages of the implementation. For the purpose of this report, we divided these criteria into two categories: key criteria, which make the implementation possible, and complementary criteria, which make the implementation easier. For the time being, it is a pure hypothesis to be tested with potential EuroPACE implementation.
Twenty years of euro history confirms the euro’s stability and position as the second global currency. It also enjoys the support of majority of the euro area population and is seen as a good thing for the European Union. The European Central Bank has been successful in keeping inflation at a low level. However, the European debt and financial crisis in the 2010s created a need for deep institutional reform and this task remains unfinished.
More from CASE Center for Social and Economic Research (20)
how can I sell my pi coins for cash in a pi APPDOT TECH
You can't sell your pi coins in the pi network app. because it is not listed yet on any exchange.
The only way you can sell is by trading your pi coins with an investor (a person looking forward to hold massive amounts of pi coins before mainnet launch) .
You don't need to meet the investor directly all the trades are done with a pi vendor/merchant (a person that buys the pi coins from miners and resell it to investors)
I Will leave The telegram contact of my personal pi vendor, if you are finding a legitimate one.
@Pi_vendor_247
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what is the best method to sell pi coins in 2024DOT TECH
The best way to sell your pi coins safely is trading with an exchange..but since pi is not launched in any exchange, and second option is through a VERIFIED pi merchant.
Who is a pi merchant?
A pi merchant is someone who buys pi coins from miners and pioneers and resell them to Investors looking forward to hold massive amounts before mainnet launch in 2026.
I will leave the telegram contact of my personal pi merchant to trade pi coins with.
@Pi_vendor_247
how to swap pi coins to foreign currency withdrawable.DOT TECH
As of my last update, Pi is still in the testing phase and is not tradable on any exchanges.
However, Pi Network has announced plans to launch its Testnet and Mainnet in the future, which may include listing Pi on exchanges.
The current method for selling pi coins involves exchanging them with a pi vendor who purchases pi coins for investment reasons.
If you want to sell your pi coins, reach out to a pi vendor and sell them to anyone looking to sell pi coins from any country around the globe.
Below is the contact information for my personal pi vendor.
Telegram: @Pi_vendor_247
US Economic Outlook - Being Decided - M Capital Group August 2021.pdfpchutichetpong
The U.S. economy is continuing its impressive recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic and not slowing down despite re-occurring bumps. The U.S. savings rate reached its highest ever recorded level at 34% in April 2020 and Americans seem ready to spend. The sectors that had been hurt the most by the pandemic specifically reduced consumer spending, like retail, leisure, hospitality, and travel, are now experiencing massive growth in revenue and job openings.
Could this growth lead to a “Roaring Twenties”? As quickly as the U.S. economy contracted, experiencing a 9.1% drop in economic output relative to the business cycle in Q2 2020, the largest in recorded history, it has rebounded beyond expectations. This surprising growth seems to be fueled by the U.S. government’s aggressive fiscal and monetary policies, and an increase in consumer spending as mobility restrictions are lifted. Unemployment rates between June 2020 and June 2021 decreased by 5.2%, while the demand for labor is increasing, coupled with increasing wages to incentivize Americans to rejoin the labor force. Schools and businesses are expected to fully reopen soon. In parallel, vaccination rates across the country and the world continue to rise, with full vaccination rates of 50% and 14.8% respectively.
However, it is not completely smooth sailing from here. According to M Capital Group, the main risks that threaten the continued growth of the U.S. economy are inflation, unsettled trade relations, and another wave of Covid-19 mutations that could shut down the world again. Have we learned from the past year of COVID-19 and adapted our economy accordingly?
“In order for the U.S. economy to continue growing, whether there is another wave or not, the U.S. needs to focus on diversifying supply chains, supporting business investment, and maintaining consumer spending,” says Grace Feeley, a research analyst at M Capital Group.
While the economic indicators are positive, the risks are coming closer to manifesting and threatening such growth. The new variants spreading throughout the world, Delta, Lambda, and Gamma, are vaccine-resistant and muddy the predictions made about the economy and health of the country. These variants bring back the feeling of uncertainty that has wreaked havoc not only on the stock market but the mindset of people around the world. MCG provides unique insight on how to mitigate these risks to possibly ensure a bright economic future.
when will pi network coin be available on crypto exchange.DOT TECH
There is no set date for when Pi coins will enter the market.
However, the developers are working hard to get them released as soon as possible.
Once they are available, users will be able to exchange other cryptocurrencies for Pi coins on designated exchanges.
But for now the only way to sell your pi coins is through verified pi vendor.
Here is the telegram contact of my personal pi vendor
@Pi_vendor_247
Latino Buying Power - May 2024 Presentation for Latino CaucusDanay Escanaverino
Unlock the potential of Latino Buying Power with this in-depth SlideShare presentation. Explore how the Latino consumer market is transforming the American economy, driven by their significant buying power, entrepreneurial contributions, and growing influence across various sectors.
**Key Sections Covered:**
1. **Economic Impact:** Understand the profound economic impact of Latino consumers on the U.S. economy. Discover how their increasing purchasing power is fueling growth in key industries and contributing to national economic prosperity.
2. **Buying Power:** Dive into detailed analyses of Latino buying power, including its growth trends, key drivers, and projections for the future. Learn how this influential group’s spending habits are shaping market dynamics and creating opportunities for businesses.
3. **Entrepreneurial Contributions:** Explore the entrepreneurial spirit within the Latino community. Examine how Latino-owned businesses are thriving and contributing to job creation, innovation, and economic diversification.
4. **Workforce Statistics:** Gain insights into the role of Latino workers in the American labor market. Review statistics on employment rates, occupational distribution, and the economic contributions of Latino professionals across various industries.
5. **Media Consumption:** Understand the media consumption habits of Latino audiences. Discover their preferences for digital platforms, television, radio, and social media. Learn how these consumption patterns are influencing advertising strategies and media content.
6. **Education:** Examine the educational achievements and challenges within the Latino community. Review statistics on enrollment, graduation rates, and fields of study. Understand the implications of education on economic mobility and workforce readiness.
7. **Home Ownership:** Explore trends in Latino home ownership. Understand the factors driving home buying decisions, the challenges faced by Latino homeowners, and the impact of home ownership on community stability and economic growth.
This SlideShare provides valuable insights for marketers, business owners, policymakers, and anyone interested in the economic influence of the Latino community. By understanding the various facets of Latino buying power, you can effectively engage with this dynamic and growing market segment.
Equip yourself with the knowledge to leverage Latino buying power, tap into their entrepreneurial spirit, and connect with their unique cultural and consumer preferences. Drive your business success by embracing the economic potential of Latino consumers.
**Keywords:** Latino buying power, economic impact, entrepreneurial contributions, workforce statistics, media consumption, education, home ownership, Latino market, Hispanic buying power, Latino purchasing power.
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how to sell pi coins effectively (from 50 - 100k pi)DOT TECH
Anywhere in the world, including Africa, America, and Europe, you can sell Pi Network Coins online and receive cash through online payment options.
Pi has not yet been launched on any exchange because we are currently using the confined Mainnet. The planned launch date for Pi is June 28, 2026.
Reselling to investors who want to hold until the mainnet launch in 2026 is currently the sole way to sell.
Consequently, right now. All you need to do is select the right pi network provider.
Who is a pi merchant?
An individual who buys coins from miners on the pi network and resells them to investors hoping to hang onto them until the mainnet is launched is known as a pi merchant.
debuts.
I'll provide you the Telegram username
@Pi_vendor_247
Resume
• Real GDP growth slowed down due to problems with access to electricity caused by the destruction of manoeuvrable electricity generation by Russian drones and missiles.
• Exports and imports continued growing due to better logistics through the Ukrainian sea corridor and road. Polish farmers and drivers stopped blocking borders at the end of April.
• In April, both the Tax and Customs Services over-executed the revenue plan. Moreover, the NBU transferred twice the planned profit to the budget.
• The European side approved the Ukraine Plan, which the government adopted to determine indicators for the Ukraine Facility. That approval will allow Ukraine to receive a EUR 1.9 bn loan from the EU in May. At the same time, the EU provided Ukraine with a EUR 1.5 bn loan in April, as the government fulfilled five indicators under the Ukraine Plan.
• The USA has finally approved an aid package for Ukraine, which includes USD 7.8 bn of budget support; however, the conditions and timing of the assistance are still unknown.
• As in March, annual consumer inflation amounted to 3.2% yoy in April.
• At the April monetary policy meeting, the NBU again reduced the key policy rate from 14.5% to 13.5% per annum.
• Over the past four weeks, the hryvnia exchange rate has stabilized in the UAH 39-40 per USD range.
The secret way to sell pi coins effortlessly.DOT TECH
Well as we all know pi isn't launched yet. But you can still sell your pi coins effortlessly because some whales in China are interested in holding massive pi coins. And they are willing to pay good money for it. If you are interested in selling I will leave a contact for you. Just telegram this number below. I sold about 3000 pi coins to him and he paid me immediately.
Telegram: @Pi_vendor_247
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Turin Startup Ecosystem 2024
Una ricerca de il Club degli Investitori, in collaborazione con ToTeM Torino Tech Map e con il supporto della ESCP Business School e di Growth Capital
how to sell pi coins on Bitmart crypto exchangeDOT TECH
Yes. Pi network coins can be exchanged but not on bitmart exchange. Because pi network is still in the enclosed mainnet. The only way pioneers are able to trade pi coins is by reselling the pi coins to pi verified merchants.
A verified merchant is someone who buys pi network coins and resell it to exchanges looking forward to hold till mainnet launch.
I will leave the telegram contact of my personal pi merchant to trade with.
@Pi_vendor_247
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What website can I sell pi coins securely.DOT TECH
Currently there are no website or exchange that allow buying or selling of pi coins..
But you can still easily sell pi coins, by reselling it to exchanges/crypto whales interested in holding thousands of pi coins before the mainnet launch.
Who is a pi merchant?
A pi merchant is someone who buys pi coins from miners and resell to these crypto whales and holders of pi..
This is because pi network is not doing any pre-sale. The only way exchanges can get pi is by buying from miners and pi merchants stands in between the miners and the exchanges.
How can I sell my pi coins?
Selling pi coins is really easy, but first you need to migrate to mainnet wallet before you can do that. I will leave the telegram contact of my personal pi merchant to trade with.
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Study and Reports on the VAT Gap in the EU-28 Member States: 2020 Final Report
1. Study and Reports
on the VAT Gap
in the EU-28 Member States:
2020 Final Report
Grzegorz Poniatowski
Mikhail Bonch-Osmolovskiy
Adam Śmietanka
No. 503 (2020)
CASE Reports
9. CASE Working Paper | No 1 (2015)
9
List of Graphs
Figure 1.1. Change in VAT Revenue Components
(2018 over 2017, %). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Figure 2.1. Evolution of the VAT Gap in the EU, 2014–2018
and Fast Estimate for 2019. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Figure 2.2. VAT Gap as a percent of the VTTL
in EU-28 Member States, 2018 and 2017. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Figure 2.3. Percentage Point Change in VAT Gap,
2018 over 2017. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Figure 2.4. VAT Gap in EU Member States, 2014–2018. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Figure 5.1. Comparison of Results (VAT Gap as % of the VTTL in EU-28). . . . 70
Figure 5.2. Backcasting of EU-wide Estimates Presented
in Figure 5.1 (VAT Gap as % of the VTTL). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
Figure 5.3. Backcasting of Individual Estimates
(VAT Gap as % of the VTTL). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
Figure 5.4. Individual Estimates in Consecutive Studies
(VAT Gap as % of the VTTL). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
Figure 5.5. Linear Predictions Broken Out by Member State. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
Figure 5.6. Contributions to VAT Gap Change. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
Figure 6.1. 2020 Spring Forecasts of the European Commission (%). . . . . . . . . 86
Figure 6.2. Change in the VAT Gap and Prediction Intervals
(increments, percentage points). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
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Figure 6.3. VAT Gap and Prediction Intervals (% of the VTTL). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
Figure A1. Components of Ideal Revenue, VTTL, and VAT Collection . . . . . . . 98
Figure C1. VAT Gap Forecasts for 2020 (increments, pp). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
List of Graphs
11. List of Acronyms and Abbreviations
CASE Center for Social and Economic Research (Warsaw)
COICOP Classification of Individual Consumption according to Purpose
CPA Statistical Classification of Products by Activity in accordance with Regulation (EC)
No 451/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2008 establishing
a new statistical classification of products by activity
EC European Commission
ESA European System of Accounts
EU European Union
EU-28 Member States of the European Union, UK inclusive
FE Fixed Effects
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GFCF Gross Fixed Capital Formation
IC Intermediate Consumption
MFI Monetary Financial Institution
MOSS Mini One Stop Shop
MTIC Missing Trader Intra-Community
NAC National Currency
NPISH Non-Profit Institutions Serving Households
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
ORS Own Resource Submissions
o/w of which
pp. percentage points
SUT Supply and Use Tables
TAXUD Taxation and Customs Union Directorate-General of the European Commission
VAT Value Added Tax
VTTL VAT Total Tax Liability
12. CASE Working Paper | No 1 (2015)
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This Report has been written for the European Commission, DG TAXUD, for the project
TAXUD/2019/AO-14, “Study and Reports on the VAT Gap in the EU-28 Member States”,
and is a follow-up to the seven reports published between 2013 and 2019.
This Study contains Value Added Tax (VAT) Gap estimates for 2018, fast estimates using
a simplified methodology for 2019, the year immediately preceding the analysis, and
includes revised estimates for 2014–2017. It also includes the updated and extended
results of the econometric analysis of VAT Gap determinants initiated and initially reported
in the 2018 Report (Poniatowski et al., 2018). As a novelty, the econometric analysis to
forecast potential impacts of the coronavirus crisis and resulting recession on the evolution
of the VAT Gap in 2020 is reported.
In 2018, most European Union (EU) Member States (MS) saw a slight decrease in the
pace of gross domestic product (GDP) growth, but the economic conditions for increasing
tax compliance remained favourable. We estimate that the VAT total tax liability (VTTL)
in 2018 increased by 3.6 percent whereas VAT revenue increased by 4.2 percent, leading
to a decline in the VAT Gap in both relative and nominal terms. In relative terms, the EU-wide
Gap dropped to 11 percent and EUR 140 billion. Fast estimates show that the VAT Gap will
likely continue to decline in 2019.
Of the EU-28, the smallest Gaps were observed in Sweden (0.7 percent), Croatia (3.5
percent), and Finland (3.6 percent), the largest – in Romania (33.8 percent), Greece (30.1
percent), and Lithuania (25.9 percent). Overall, half of the EU-28 MS recorded a Gap
above 9.2 percent. In nominal terms, the largest Gaps were recorded in Italy (EUR 35.4
billion), the United Kingdom (EUR 23.5 billion), and Germany (EUR 22 billion).
The Policy Gap and its components remained stable. For the EU overall, the average
Policy Gap level was 44.24 percent. Of this, in 2018, 10.07 percentage points were due
to the application of various reduced and super-reduced rates (the Rate Gap) and 34.17
were due to the application of exemptions without the right to deduct.
The results of the econometric analysis show that the VAT Gap is influenced by
a group of factors relating to the current economic conditions, institutional environment,
and economic structure as well as to the measures and actions of tax administrations.
Executive Summary
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Out of a broad set of tested variables, GDP growth and general government balance ap-
peared to explain a substantial set of VAT Gap variation across time and countries. Within the
control of tax administrations, share of IT expenditure proved to have the highest statistical
significance in explaining the size of the VAT Gap. In addition, the VAT Gap appeared to be
inter-related with the values of risky imports of goods, indicating the role of fraud in driving
the overall share of the VAT Gap.
Since the COVID-19 recession will likely have a dire impact on the EU economies, the VAT
Gap in 2020 is forecasted to increase. If the EU economy contracts by 7.4 percent in 2020
and the general government deficit jumps as forecasted in the Spring Forecast of the Euro-
pean Commission, the Gap could increase by 4.1 percentage points year-over year up to 13.7
percent and EUR 164 billion in 2020. The hike in 2020 could be more pronounced than the
gradual decrease of the Gap observed over the three preceding years. Moreover, a return to
the VAT Gap levels observed in 2018 and 2019 will take time and require significant action
from tax administrations.
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This Report presents the findings of the 2020 “Study to quantify the VAT Gap in the EU
Member States”, which is the seventh publication following the original Study conducted
by Barbone et al. in 20131
.
We present Value Added Tax (VAT) Gap estimates for 2018, fast estimates using
a simplified methodology for 2019, the year immediately preceding the analysis, and include
revised estimates for 2014–20172
. We also include updated and extended results of the
econometric analysis of VAT Gap determinants initiated and initially reported in the 2018
Report (Poniatowski et al., 2018). As a novelty, we operationalise the econometric analysis
to forecast potential impacts of the coronavirus crisis and resulting recession on the
evolution of the VAT Gap in 2020 and 2021.
The VAT Gap, which is addressed in detail by this Report shall be understood as the
Compliance Gap. It is the difference between the expected and actual VAT revenues and
represents more than just fraud and evasion and their associated policy measures. The VAT
Gap also covers VAT lost due to, for example, insolvencies, bankruptcies, administrative
errors, and legal tax optimisation. It is defined as the difference between the amount
of VAT collected and the VAT Total Tax Liability (VTTL) – namely, the tax liability accord-
ing to tax law. The VAT Gap can be expressed in absolute or relative terms, commonly as
a ratio of the VTTL or gross domestic product (GDP). In this Report, we refer to the VAT
Gap as the ratio of the VTTL.
In addition to the analysis of the Compliance Gap, this Report also updates the Policy
Gap estimates from 2018 as well as the contribution that reduced rates and exemptions
made to these theoretical VAT revenue losses.
The structure of this Report builds on the previous publications. Chapter 1 presents
the main economic and policy factors that affected European Union (EU) Member States
(MS) during the course of 2018. It also includes a decomposition of the change in VAT
1 The first study of the VAT Gap in the EU was conducted by Reckon (2009); however, due to differences in methodology,
it cannot be directly compared to these latter studies.
2 The estimates for 2019 are referred to as “fast” since they use different method described in Section d in Annex A and could be
associated with larger estimation error.
Introduction
15. CASE Reports | No. 503 (2020)
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revenues. The overall results are presented and briefly described in Chapter 2. Chapter 3
provides detailed results and outlines trends for individual countries coupled with
analytical insights. In Chapter 4, we examine the Policy Gap and the contribution that
VAT reduced rates and exemptions have made to this Gap. Chapter 5 is devoted to the
econometric analysis. It provides an overview of the literature, highlights the most
important novelties introduced with this update, and discusses and visualises the results
which are complemented by a robustness check. The final chapter presents the impact
of the coronavirus recession on the evolution of the VAT Gap. Annex A contains the
methodological considerations underlying all components of the analysis. Annex B
provides statistical data and a set of comparative tables, whereas Annex C provides
additional graphs.
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a. Economic Conditions in the EU during 2018
In 2018, most EU MS saw a moderate decrease in the pace of GDP growth. Overall,
growth of the EU economy fell from 2.5 percent in 2017 down to 2.0 percent in 2018 in real
terms. Positive economic tailwinds provided particularly good conditions for an increase
in VAT collections in Ireland (GDP growth of 8.2 percent), Poland (5.3 percent), and
Hungary (5.1 percent). The lowest GDP growth rates were observed in Italy (0.8 percent)
and the United Kingdom (1.5 percent).
In nominal terms, GDP increased by 3.3 percent and consumer prices by 1.9 percent.
Final consumption, which is the core of the VAT base (68 percent of the VTTL in 2018),
ncreased by 3.1 percent in total. Investment in gross fixed capital formation (GFCF, which
made up 14 percent of the VTTL in 2018) increased by 4.2 percentage points for the entire
EU.
The change in GFCF was volatile across countries and varied from −18.7 percent in
Ireland to 24.4 percent in Hungary. Due to the volatility and frequent revisions of GFCF
figures by Statistical Offices, GFCF is the main source of VAT Gap revisions. Whenever
new information on the actual investment figures of exempt sectors becomes available,
the estimates of VAT Gap are revised backwards.
General government budgets and the labour markets remained relatively sound. The
average general government balance amounted to −0.7 percent with half of EU MS
observing a nominal surplus. The unemployment rate fell in nearly all EU MS and by −0.9
percent on average.
1. Background: Economic
and Policy Context in 2018
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Table 1.1. Real and Nominal Growth in the EU-28 in 2018 (in national currencies [NAC])
Source: Eurostat.
Member State
Real GDP
Growth (%)
General
Government
Balance (%)
Change in
Unemployment
Rate (pp)
Nominal Growth (%)
GDP
Final
Consumption
GFCF
Belgium 1.5 −0.8 −1.1 3.0 3.3 6.2
Bulgaria 3.1 2.0 −1.0 7.2 7.7 9.7
Czechia 2.8 0.9 −0.7 5.5 6.6 9.1
Denmark 2.4 0.7 −0.7 3.3 3.0 7.3
Germany 1.5 1.9 −0.4 3.1 2.9 6.3
Estonia 4.8 −0.6 −0.4 9.5 8.1 5.3
Ireland 8.2 0.1 −0.9 9.1 6.0 −18.7
Greece 1.9 1.0 −2.2 2.5 0.9 −12.0
Spain 2.4 −2.5 −1.9 3.5 3.4 7.7
France 1.8 −2.3 −0.4 2.8 2.2 4.6
Croatia 2.7 0.2 −2.7 4.5 4.5 4.7
Italy 0.8 −2.2 −0.6 1.7 2.0 3.8
Cyprus 4.1 −3.7 −2.7 5.5 5.0 −4.5
Latvia 4.3 −0.8 −1.3 8.4 7.3 18.0
Lithuania 3.6 0.6 −0.9 7.1 6.8 10.1
Luxembourg 3.1 3.1 0.1 5.7 6.1 −5.3
Hungary 5.1 −2.1 −0.5 9.9 7.6 24.4
Malta 7.3 1.9 −0.3 9.5 10.2 0.8
Netherlands 2.4 1.4 −1.1 4.9 4.6 6.3
Austria 2.4 0.2 −0.6 4.2 3.3 6.0
Poland 5.3 −0.2 −1.0 6.6 6.4 10.8
Portugal 2.6 −0.4 −1.9 4.3 3.9 9.0
Romania 4.4 −2.9 −0.7 11.0 13.2 3.9
Slovenia 4.1 0.7 −1.5 6.4 5.4 11.4
Slovakia 3.9 −1.0 −1.6 6.0 6.0 4.9
Finland 1.5 −0.9 −1.2 3.4 3.1 6.6
Sweden 2.0 0.8 −0.3 4.4 4.4 4.6
United Kingdom 1.3 −2.2 −0.3 3.5 3.8 1.6
EU-28 (EUR) 2.0 −0.7 −0.9 3.3 3.1 4.2
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b. VAT Regime Changes
2018 was another stable year in terms of both EU-wide and country-specific changes
affecting the VTTL.
The temporary measure of the Mini One Stop Shop (MOSS) retention fee, which is the
revenue retained in the country of origin of service providers obliged to pay VAT in the
country of residence of their customers, was maintained in 2018 at the level of 15 percent.
For this reason, the rule for estimating the VTTL of electronic services remained unchanged.
As for country-specific changes, only one MS implemented significant changes to the
structure of its VAT rates in 2018. As of January 2018, Latvia introduced a super-reduced
rate of 5 percent applicable to a range of common vegetables and fruits. There were also
a few examples of the reclassification of rates applicable to certain products. Among
those, Lithuania applied a reduced rate of 9 percent on accommodation services (down
from 21 percent). Similarly, starting from November, Romania applied a reduced rate
of 5 percent to accommodation, restaurants, and catering services. In Hungary, the rate
applicable to Internet access services was reduced from 18 percent to 5 percent.
Overall, the average effective rate remained unchanged compared to 2017 and accounted
for 12 percent3
.
3 Changes in the effective rat compared to the 2017 Report also result from the revision of the VTTL estimates and the
statistical data underlying the estimates.
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Table 1.2. VAT Rate Structure as of 31 December 2017 and Changes during 2018 (%)
Source: TAXUD, VAT Rates Applied in the Member States of the European Union: Situation
of 1st
January 2018.
Member State
Standard
Rate (SR)
Reduced
Rate(s)
(RR)
Super−
Reduced
Rate
Parking
Rate
Changes
during 2018
Effective
Rate 4
Belgium 21 6 / 12 − 12 10.1
Bulgaria 20 9 − − 14.0
Czechia 21 10 / 15 − 12.6
Denmark 25 − − − 14.9
Germany 19 7 − − 10.6
Estonia 20 9 − − 12.9
Ireland 23 9 / 13.5 4.8 13.5 12.3
Greece 24 6 / 13 − − 13.1
Spain 21 10 4 − 8.8
France 19.6 5.5 / 10 2.1 − 9.6
Croatia 25 5 / 13 − − 16.4
Italy 22 10 4 / 5 − 10.2
Cyprus 19 5 / 9 − − 10.5
Latvia 21 12 5 − Super−Reduced Rate
introduced (5%)
11.8
Lithuania 21 5 / 9 − − 13.6
Luxembourg 17 8 3 14 12.2
Hungary 27 5 / 18 − − 14.8
Malta 18 5 / 7 − − 12.1
Netherlands 21 6 − − 10.0
Austria 20 10 / 13 − 12 11.3
Poland 23 5 / 8 − − 12.1
Portugal 23 6 / 13 − 13 11.5
Romania 20 5 / 9 − − 12.1
Slovenia 22 9.5 − − 11.8
Slovakia 20 10 − − 11.6
Finland 24 10 / 14 − − 12.2
Sweden 25 6 / 12 − − 13.4
United Kingdom 20 5 − − 9.6
4 The effective rate is the ratio of the VTTL and the tax base. See methodological considerations in Section c in Annex A.
Source: TAXUD, VAT Rates Applied in the Member States of the European Union: Situation
of 1st
January 2018.
4 The effective rate is the ratio of the VTTL and the tax base. See methodological considerations in Section c in Annex A.
20. CASE Reports | No. 503 (2020)
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c. Sources of Change in VAT Revenue Components
The value of the actual VAT revenue can be decomposed into components, which is helpful
in understanding the underlying sources of its evolution. Since revenue is a product of the
VTTL and the compliance ratio4
, VAT collection could be expressed as:
Actual Revenue = VTTL × Compliance Ratio,
where Compliance Ratio is: 1 – VAT Gap (%).
As the VTTL is a product of the base and the effective rate, the actual revenue could be
further decomposed and expressed as:
Actual Revenue = Net Base × Effective Rate × Compliance Ratio,
where Effective Rate is the ratio of the theoretical VTTL to the Net Base. The Net
Base (which is the sum of the final consumption and investment by households, non-profit
institutions serving households [NPISH], and government), in turn, is calculated as the
difference between the Gross Base, which includes VAT, and the VAT revenues actually
collected.
Table 1.3 and Figure 1.1 present the decomposition of the total changes in nominal
VAT revenues into these three components: change in net taxable base, change in the
effective rate applied to the base, and change in the compliance ratio.5
4 In other words, VAT collection efficiency.
5 In other words, VAT collection efficiency.
5
21. CASE Reports | No. 503 (2020)
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Table 1.3. Change in VAT Revenue Components (2018 over 2017)
Source: own calculations.
Member
State
Change
in Revenue
Change
in the VTTL
Change
in ComplianceChange
in Base
Change
in Effective Rate
Belgium 4.3% 3.1% 3.6% −0.5% 1.2%
Bulgaria 9.3% 7.5% 8.0% −0.4% 1.7%
Czechia 6.5% 6.6% 7.8% −1.1% −0.1%
Denmark 4.3% 3.1% 3.2% 0.0% 1.2%
Germany 3.8% 3.6% 3.3% 0.2% 0.2%
Estonia 8.5% 7.5% 8.8% −1.2% 0.9%
Ireland 8.5% 8.2% 7.4% 0.8% 0.3%
Greece 4.4% −0.2% −0.6% 0.5% 4.6%
Spain 4.9% 4.4% 3.8% 0.5% 0.4%
France 3.5% 3.8% 2.2% 1.6% −0.3%
Croatia 6.8% 4.5% 4.3% 0.2% 2.1%
Italy 1.6% 1.3% 2.0% −0.7% 0.3%
Cyprus 10.5% 9.1% 8.0% 1.0% 1.3%
Latvia 13.2% 7.7% 8.4% −0.7% 5.1%
Lithuania 6.4% 7.5% 7.5% 0.0% −1.0%
Luxembourg 8.6% 11.4% 5.9% 5.2% −2.5%
Hungary 13.9% 7.5% 9.4% −1.8% 5.9%
Malta 13.5% 10.1% 9.8% 0.3% 3.1%
Netherlands 5.6% 4.9% 5.2% −0.3% 0.7%
Austria 3.6% 4.1% 3.2% 0.9% −0.5%
Poland 11.4% 6.0% 6.4% −0.4% 5.1%
Portugal 6.3% 4.7% 4.0% 0.6% 1.5%
Romania 12.7% 12.0% 14.3% −2.0% 0.7%
Slovenia 8.1% 7.5% 6.1% 1.3% 0.6%
Slovakia 6.8% 7.3% 7.0% 0.3% −0.5%
Finland 4.7% 3.1% 3.8% −0.7% 1.6%
Sweden 4.8% 3.5% 4.2% −0.6% 1.3%
United Kingdom 4.6% 5.0% 4.0% 1.0% −0.3%
EU-28 (total) 4.2% 3.6% 3.3% 0.4% 0.5%
22. CASE Reports | No. 503 (2020)
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Figure 1.1. Change in VAT Revenue Components (2018 over 2017, %)
Source: own calculations.
As depicted by Table 1.3 and Figure 1.1 and highlighted in the preceding section,
the growth of the base was the main driver of VAT revenue growth in 2018. An increase in
the base contributed to approximately 78 percent of the total VAT revenue growth in the
EU. The effect of increased compliance contributed to approximately 10 percent of the
growth, which translated to 0.4 percent of the overall VAT revenue.
For the vast majority of EU MS, both the tax base and compliance effect were positive.
In five countries, namely Hungary, Romania, Latvia, Malta, and Poland, the overall effect
of the increase in the tax base and compliance exceeded 10 percent of VAT revenue.
VAT Gap in the EU-28 Member States
page 15 of 99
Figure 1.1. Change in VAT Revenue Components (2018 over 2017, %)
Source: own calculations.
As depicted by Table 1.3 and Figure 1.1 and highlighted in the preceding section, the growth
of the base was the main driver of VAT revenue growth in 2018. An increase in the base
contributed to approximately 78 percent of the total VAT revenue growth in the EU. The effect
of increased compliance contributed to approximately 10 percent of the growth, which
translated to 0.4 percent of the overall VAT revenue.
For the vast majority of EU MS, both the tax base and compliance effect were positive. In five
countries, namely Hungary, Romania, Latvia, Malta, and Poland, the overall effect of the
increase in the tax base and compliance exceeded 10 percent of VAT revenue.
2. The VAT Gap in 2018
The estimates of the VAT Gap presented in this section were derived using the same
methodology as in the previously cited VAT Gap Studies. The VAT Gap is defined as the
difference between the VTTL and the amount of VAT actually collected over the same period.
We compute the VTTL using a top-down “consumption-side” approach by deriving the
expected VAT liability from the observed national accounts data, such as supply and use tables
(SUT). For this reason, the methodology used in this Study relies on the availability and quality
of SUT data, which vary country to country.
The VAT liability is estimated for final household, government, and NPISH expenditures; non-
deductible VAT from the intermediate consumption of exempt industries; and VAT from the
GFCF of exempt sectors. We also account for country-specific tax regulations, such as
exemptions for small businesses under the VAT thresholds (if applicable); non-deductible
business expenditures on food, drinks, and accommodation; and restrictions to deduct VAT on
leased cars, among others. The precise formula is given in Section c in Annex A.
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
BE BG CZ DK DE EE IE EL ES FR HR IT CY LV LT LU HU MT NL AT PL PT RO SI SK FI SE UK
Effective rate Compliance Base Revenue
23. CASE Working Paper | No 1 (2015)
23
The estimates of the VAT Gap presented in this section were derived using the same
methodology as in the previously cited VAT Gap Studies. The VAT Gap is defined as the
difference between the VTTL and the amount of VAT actually collected over the same
period. We compute the VTTL using a top-down “consumption-side” approach by deriving
the expected VAT liability from the observed national accounts data, such as supply and
use tables (SUT). For this reason, the methodology used in this Study relies on the availability
and quality of SUT data, which vary country to country.
The VAT liability is estimated for final household, government, and NPISH expenditures;
non-deductible VAT from the intermediate consumption of exempt industries; and VAT from
the GFCF of exempt sectors. We also account for country-specific tax regulations, such as
exemptions for small businesses under the VAT thresholds (if applicable); non-deductible
business expenditures on food, drinks, and accommodation; and restrictions to deduct VAT
on leased cars, among others. The precise formula is given in Section c in Annex A.
The results presented in this report are not fully comparable with the results presented
in the earlier Reports, as each year some figures are revised backwards. The main source
of the revisions are the updates of national accounts and revenue figures compiled by
Member States. Moreover, in the course of our computations, some expenditure and
investment figures that are not available for the most recent years are estimated. Thus,
whenever actual national accounts data is published or new information on taxable
investment becomes available, VAT Gap estimates need to be revised. A detailed discussion
on the sources of the revisions is presented in Section a in Annex A.
In nominal terms, in 2018, the VTTL and VAT revenue amounted to EUR 1,272 billion
and EUR 1,132 billion, respectively. Compared to 2017, VAT revenue increased by 4.2 percent
whereas the VTTL increased by 3.6 percent, leading to decline in the VAT Gap in both relative
and nominal terms. In relative terms, the EU-wide Gap dropped to 11 percent. Fast estimates
show that the VAT Gap will likely continue to decline in 2019 and could fall below EUR 130
billion and 10 percent of the VTTL6
.
6 As discussed in Section d in Annex A fast estimates use a simplified methodology and their accuracy is lower.
2. The VAT Gap in 2018
24. CASE Reports | No. 503 (2020)
24
Figure 2.1. Evolution of the VAT Gap in the EU, 2014–2018 and Fast Estimate for 2019
Source: own calculations.
The smallest Gaps were observed in Sweden (0.7 percent), Croatia (3.5 percent), and
Finland (3.6 percent), the largest – in Romania (33.8 percent), Greece (30.1 percent),
and Lithuania (25.9 percent). Overall, half of the EU-28 MS recorded a Gap above 9.2
percent (see Figure 2.2 and Table 2.1). In nominal terms, the largest Gaps were recorded
in Italy (EUR 35.4 billion), the United Kingdom (EUR 23.5 billion), and Germany (EUR 22.1
billion).
page 16 of 99
revisions are the updates of national accounts and revenue figures compiled by Member
States. Moreover, in the course of our computations, some expenditure and investment figures
that are not available for the most recent years are estimated. Thus, whenever actual national
accounts data is published or new information on taxable investment becomes available, VAT
Gap estimates need to be revised. A detailed discussion on the sources of the revisions is
presented in Section a in Annex A.
In nominal terms, in 2018, the VTTL and VAT revenue amounted to EUR 1,272 billion and
EUR 1,132 billion, respectively. Compared to 2017, VAT revenue increased by 4.2 percent
whereas the VTTL increased by 3.6 percent, leading to decline in the VAT Gap in both relative
and nominal terms. In relative terms, the EU-wide Gap dropped to 11 percent. Fast estimates
show that the VAT Gap will likely continue to decline in 2019 and could fall below EUR 130
billion and 10 percent of the VTTL6
.
Figure 2.1. Evolution of the VAT Gap in the EU, 2014-2018 and Fast Estimate for 2019
Source: own calculations.
The smallest Gaps were observed in Sweden (0.7 percent), Croatia (3.5 percent), and Finland
(3.6 percent), the largest – in Romania (33.8 percent), Greece (30.1 percent), and Lithuania
(25.9 percent). Overall, half of the EU-28 MS recorded a Gap above 9.2 percent (see Figure
2.2 and Table 2.1). In nominal terms, the largest Gaps were recorded in Italy (EUR 35.4 billion),
the United Kingdom (EUR 23.5 billion), and Germany (EUR 22.1 billion).
6
As discussed in Section d in Annex A fast estimates use a simplified methodology and their accuracy
is lower.
14.3%
13.0% 12.1%
11.5%
11.0%
9.6%
162
154
143 141 140
125
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
16%
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019*
% of VTTL (left axis) EUR billion (right axis)
25. CASE Reports | No. 503 (2020)
25
Figure 2.2. VAT Gap as a percent of the VTTL in EU-28 Member States, 2018 and 2017
Source: own calculations.
The rank of MS with respect to the relative size of the Gap remained relatively stable,
with the largest changes in position observed for Hungary and Latvia (improvement by eight
and six positions, respectively). The VAT Gap share decreased in 21 countries. The most
significant decreases in the VAT Gap occurred in Hungary (–5.1 percentage points), Latvia
(–4.4 percentage points), and Poland (–4.3 percentage points), whereas the biggest increases
were observed for Luxembourg (+2.5 percentage points), Lithuania (+0.8 percentage points),
and Austria (+0.5 percentage points) (see Figure 2.3).
VAT Gap in the EU-28 Member States
page 17 of 99
Figure 2.2. VAT Gap as a percent of the VTTL in EU-28 Member States, 2018 and 2017
Source: own calculations.
The rank of MS with respect to the relative size of the Gap remained relatively stable, with the
largest changes in position observed for Hungary and Latvia (improvement by eight and six
positions, respectively). The VAT Gap share decreased in 21 countries. The most significant
decreases in the VAT Gap occurred in Hungary (-5.1 percentage points), Latvia (-4.4
percentage points), and Poland (-4.3 percentage points), whereas the biggest increases were
observed for Luxembourg (+2.5 percentage points), Lithuania (+0.8 percentage points), and
Austria (+0.5 percentage points) (see Figure 2.3).
Figure 2.3. Percentage Point Change in VAT Gap, 2018 over 2017
Source: own calculations.
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
SE HR FI SI CY NL LU EE ES FR DK HU DE AT LV PT PL BE IE BG CZ UK MT SK IT LT EL RO
2017 2018 median
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
HU LV PL EL MT HR FI BG PT SE CY DK BE EE NL SI RO ES IE IT DE CZ FR UK SK AT LT LU
26. CASE Reports | No. 503 (2020)
26
Figure 2.3. Percentage Point Change in VAT Gap, 2018 over 2017
Source: own calculations.
page 17 of 99
Source: own calculations.
The rank of MS with respect to the relative size of the Gap remained relatively stable, with the
largest changes in position observed for Hungary and Latvia (improvement by eight and six
positions, respectively). The VAT Gap share decreased in 21 countries. The most significant
decreases in the VAT Gap occurred in Hungary (-5.1 percentage points), Latvia (-4.4
percentage points), and Poland (-4.3 percentage points), whereas the biggest increases were
observed for Luxembourg (+2.5 percentage points), Lithuania (+0.8 percentage points), and
Austria (+0.5 percentage points) (see Figure 2.3).
Figure 2.3. Percentage Point Change in VAT Gap, 2018 over 2017
Source: own calculations.
SE HR FI SI CY NL LU EE ES FR DK HU DE AT LV PT PL BE IE BG CZ UK MT SK IT LT EL RO
2017 2018 median
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
HU LV PL EL MT HR FI BG PT SE CY DK BE EE NL SI RO ES IE IT DE CZ FR UK SK AT LT LU
27. CASE Reports | No. 503 (2020)
27
Figure 2.4. VAT Gap in EU Member States, 2014–2018
Source: own calculations.
Figure 2.4. VAT Gap in EU Member States, 2014-2018
Source: own calculations.
29. CASE Working Paper | No 1 (2015)
29
3. Individual Country Results
Country Page
Belgium 30
Bulgaria 31
Czechia 32
Denmark 33
Germany 34
Estonia 35
Ireland 36
Greece 37
Spain 38
France 40
Croatia 41
Italy 42
Cyprus 44
Latvia 45
Lithuania 46
Luxembourg 47
Hungary 48
Malta 49
Netherlands 50
Austria 51
Poland 52
Portugal 53
Romania 54
Slovenia 55
Slovakia 56
Finland 57
Sweden 58
United Kingdom 59
30. CASE Reports | No. 503 (2020)
30
Table 3.1. Belgium: VAT Revenue, VTTL, Composition of VTTL, and VAT Gap, 2014–2018 (EUR million)
Belgium 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019*
VTTL 30,272 31,416 32,263 33,619 34,670 35,534
o/w liability
on household
final consumption
17,326 17,714 18,522 19,230 19,688
o/w liability on
government and NPISH
final consumption
1,424 1,435 1,272 1,317 1,358
o/w liability on
intermediate
consumption
6,103 6,675 7,017 7,289 7,520
o/w liability on GFCF 4,739 4,957 4,808 5,106 5,440
o/w net adjustments 680 634 644 676 663 Highlights
· In 2018, the VAT Gap accounted for 10.4 percent of the VTTL
(a decline of 1.1 percentage points compared to 2017).
· The VAT revenue reported by Eurostat contains VAT assessed but
unlikely to be collected. This component was removed
from the reference figures to ensure comparability with other EU MS.
VAT Revenue 27,518 27,594 28,750 29,763 31,053 31,679
VAT GAP 2,755 3,822 3,513 3,856 3,617
VAT GAP as
a percent of VTTL
9.1% 12.2% 10.9% 11.5% 10.4% 9.4%
VAT GAP change
since 2014
+1.3 pp
VAT Gap in the EU-28 Member States
page 21 of 99
Table 3.1. Belgium: VAT Revenue, VTTL, Composition of VTTL, and VAT Gap, 2014-2018 (EUR million)
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019*
VTTL 30,272 31,416 32,263 33,619 34,670 35,534
o/w liability on
household final
consumption
17,326 17,714 18,522 19,230 19,688
o/w liability on
government and
NPISH final
consumption
1,424 1,435 1,272 1,317 1,358
o/w liability on
intermediate
consumption
6,103 6,675 7,017 7,289 7,520
Highlights
In 2018, the VAT Gap accounted for 10.4 percent of the VTTL (a
decline of 1.1 percentage points compared to 2017).
The VAT revenue reported by Eurostat contains VAT assessed
but unlikely to be collected. This component was removed from
the reference figures to ensure comparability with other EU MS.
o/w liability on GFCF 4,739 4,957 4,808 5,106 5,440
o/w net adjustments 680 634 644 676 663
VAT Revenue 27,518 27,594 28,750 29,763 31,053 31,679
VAT GAP 2,755 3,822 3,513 3,856 3,617
VAT GAP as a
percent of VTTL
9.1% 12.2% 10.9% 11.5% 10.4% 9.4%
VAT GAP change
since 2014
+1.3 pp
9.1%
12.2%
10.9% 11.5%
10.4%
9.4%
0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019*
VAT GAP as a percent of VTTL VAT Revenue VTTL
31. CASE Reports | No. 503 (2020)
31
Table 3.2. Bulgaria: VAT Revenue, VTTL, Composition of VTTL, and VAT Gap, 2014–2018 (BGN million)
Bulgaria 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019*
VTTL 9,576 9,867 9,852 10,391 11,169 12,363
o/w liability
on household
final consumption
6,910 7,071 7,257 7,779 8,279
o/w liability on
government and NPISH
final consumption
302 275 284 298 341
o/w liability on
intermediate
consumption
1,111 1,110 1,151 1,256 1,413
o/w liability on GFCF 1,174 1,328 1,143 1,044 1,110
Highlights
· The VAT Gap in Bulgaria in 2018 amounted to 10.8 percent,
which is about the EU total.
· After a considerable improvement in 2016,
the VAT Gap in Bulgaria has remained stable and is expected
to remain so in 2019 based on fast estimates.
o/w net adjustments 79 82 16 14 25
VAT Revenue 7,451 7,940 8,639 9,121 9,968 10,988
VAT GAP 2,124 1,927 1,213 1,270 1,201
VAT GAP as
a percent of VTTL
22.2% 19.5% 12.3% 12.2% 10.8% 11.1%
VAT GAP change
since 2014
−11.4 pp
VAT Gap in the EU-28 Member States
page 22 of 99
Table 3.2. Bulgaria: VAT Revenue, VTTL, Composition of VTTL, and VAT Gap, 2014-2018 (BGN million)
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019*
VTTL 9,576 9,867 9,852 10,391 11,169 12,363
o/w liability on
household final
consumption
6,910 7,071 7,257 7,779 8,279
o/w liability on
government and
NPISH final
consumption
302 275 284 298 341
o/w liability on
intermediate
consumption
1,111 1,110 1,151 1,256 1,413
Highlights
The VAT Gap in Bulgaria in 2018 amounted to 10.8 percent,
which is about the EU total.
After a considerable improvement in 2016, the VAT Gap in
Bulgaria has remained stable and is expected to remain so in
2019 based on fast estimates.
o/w liability on GFCF 1,174 1,328 1,143 1,044 1,110
o/w net adjustments 79 82 16 14 25
VAT Revenue 7,451 7,940 8,639 9,121 9,968 10,988
VAT GAP 2,124 1,927 1,213 1,270 1,201
VAT GAP as a
percent of VTTL
22.2% 19.5% 12.3% 12.2% 10.8% 11.1%
VAT GAP change
since 2014
-11.4 pp
22.2%
19.5%
12.3% 12.2%
10.8% 11.1%
-1.0%
4.0%
9.0%
14.0%
19.0%
24.0%
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019*
VAT GAP as a percent of VTTL VAT Revenue VTTL
32. CASE Reports | No. 503 (2020)
32
Table 3.3. Czechia: VAT Revenue, VTTL, Composition of VTTL, and VAT Gap, 2014–2018 (CZK million)
Cech Republic 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019*
VTTL 384,062 409,703 417,820 439,493 468,350 488,365
o/w liability
on household
final consumption
245,538 253,991 264,293 277,353 291,006
o/w liability on
government and NPISH
final consumption
19,387 21,179 21,705 21,091 23,755
o/w liability on
intermediate
consumption
71,811 75,118 78,614 83,448 88,367
o/w liability on GFCF 48,021 59,799 53,287 57,802 64,161
Highlights
· The VAT Gap in Czechia as a percent of the VTTL remained
nearly unchanged in 2018 as compared to 2017.
· The revenue was amended to more accurately reflect tax accrued to taxation
period on the basis of information received from the Tax Authorities.
For 2018, VAT revenue reported by Eurostat was revised upwards by CZK 3.8 billion.
o/w net adjustments −695 −384 −78 −201 1,061
VAT Revenue 319,485 337,774 354,181 387,074 412,271 439,441
VAT GAP 64,577 71,929 63,639 52,419 56,079
VAT GAP as
a percent of VTTL
16.8% 17.6% 15.2% 11.9% 12.0% 10.8%
VAT GAP change
since 2014
−4.8 pp
VAT Gap in the EU-28 Member States
page 23 of 99
Table 3.3. Czechia: VAT Revenue, VTTL, Composition of VTTL, and VAT Gap, 2014-2018 (CZK million)
Cech Republic 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019*
VTTL 384,062 409,703 417,820 439,493 468,350 488,365
o/w liability on
household final
consumption
245,538 253,991 264,293 277,353 291,006
o/w liability on
government and
NPISH final
consumption
19,387 21,179 21,705 21,091 23,755
o/w liability on
intermediate
consumption
71,811 75,118 78,614 83,448 88,367
Highlights
The VAT Gap in Czechia as a percent of the VTTL remained
nearly unchanged in 2018 as compared to 2017.
The revenue was amended to more accurately reflect tax accrued
to taxation period on the basis of information received from the
Tax Authorities. For 2018, VAT revenue reported by Eurostat was
revised upwards by CZK 3.8 billion.
o/w liability on GFCF 48,021 59,799 53,287 57,802 64,161
o/w net adjustments -695 -384 -78 -201 1,061
VAT Revenue 319,485 337,774 354,181 387,074 412,271 439,441
VAT GAP 64,577 71,929 63,639 52,419 56,079
VAT GAP as a
percent of VTTL
16.8% 17.6% 15.2% 11.9% 12.0% 10.8%
VAT GAP change
since 2014
-4.8 pp
16.8% 17.6%
15.2%
11.9% 12.0%
10.8%
0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
0
100000
200000
300000
400000
500000
600000
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019*
VAT GAP as a percent of VTTL VAT Revenue VTTL
33. CASE Reports | No. 503 (2020)
33
Table 3.4. Denmark: VAT Revenue, VTTL, Composition of VTTL, and VAT Gap, 2014–2018 (DKK million)
Denmark 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019*
VTTL 208,401 213,396 218,207 226,691 233,799 240,382
o/w liability
on household
final consumption
120,503 123,843 128,717 132,514 137,422
o/w liability on
government and NPISH
final consumption
5,283 5,395 5,114 5,198 5,308
o/w liability on
intermediate
consumption
52,826 53,321 51,615 54,632 561,47
o/w liability on GFCF 24,421 25,372 27,095 28,457 28,991
Highlights
· The VAT Gap in Denmark fell down to 7.2 percent of the VTTL in 2018.
· Since 2014, the VAT Gap has followed a slight
downward trend of about 1 percentage point per year.
o/w net adjustments 5,368 5,465 5,668 5,890 5,931
VAT Revenue 185,994 191,479 199,306 208,025 217,046 221,523
VAT GAP 22,407 21,917 18,901 18,666 16,753
VAT GAP as
a percent of VTTL
10.8% 10.3% 8.7% 8.2% 7.2% 7.8%
VAT GAP change
since 2014
-3.6 pp
VAT Gap in the EU-28 Member States
page 24 of 99
Table 3.4. Denmark: VAT Revenue, VTTL, Composition of VTTL, and VAT Gap, 2014-2018 (DKK million)
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019*
VTTL 208,401 213,396 218,207 226,691 233,799 240,382
o/w liability on
household final
consumption
120,503 123,843 128,717 132,514 137,422
o/w liability on
government and
NPISH final
consumption
5,283 5,395 5,114 5,198 5,308
o/w liability on
intermediate
consumption
52,826 53,321 51,615 54,632 561,47
Highlights
The VAT Gap in Denmark fell down to 7.2 percent of the VTTL in
2018.
Since 2014, the VAT Gap has followed a slight downward trend of
about 1 percentage point per year.
o/w liability on GFCF 24,421 25,372 27,095 28,457 28,991
o/w net adjustments 5,368 5,465 5,668 5,890 5,931
VAT Revenue 185,994 191,479 199,306 208,025 217,046 221,523
VAT GAP 22,407 21,917 18,901 18,666 16,753
VAT GAP as a
percent of VTTL
10.8% 10.3% 8.7% 8.2% 7.2% 7.8%
VAT GAP change
since 2014
-3.6 pp
10.8% 10.3%
8.7% 8.2%
7.2% 7.8%
0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
0
50000
100000
150000
200000
250000
300000
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019*
VAT GAP as a percent of VTTL VAT Revenue VTTL
34. CASE Reports | No. 503 (2020)
34
Table 3.5. Germany: VAT Revenue, VTTL, Composition of VTTL, and VAT Gap, 2014–2018 (EUR million)
Germany 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019*
VTTL 229,881 232,507 239,911 248,382 257,207 264,502
o/w liability
on household
final consumption
142,430 141,011 144,979 149,029 152,971
o/w liability on
government and NPISH
final consumption
6,207 6,553 6,823 7,039 7,382
o/w liability on
intermediate
consumption
42,450 44,876 46,857 48,567 50,544
o/w liability on GFCF 37,176 37,843 39,483 41,458 44,070
Highlights
· Over the period 2015–2018, the VAT Gap in Germany has remained
nearly constant, amounting to ca. 9 percent of the VTTL.
· The estimates for Germany were revised backwards due to an improved
methodology for imputing missing and confidential values in Eurostat’s SUT.
o/w net adjustments 1,618 2,223 1,769 2,290 2,239
VAT Revenue 203,081 211,616 218,779 226,582 235,130 244,111
VAT GAP 26,800 20,891 21,132 21,800 22,077
VAT GAP as
a percent of VTTL
11.7% 9.0% 8.8% 8.8% 8.6% 7.7%
VAT GAP change
since 2014
−3.1 pp
VAT Gap in the EU-28 Member States
page 25 of 99
Table 3.5. Germany: VAT Revenue, VTTL, Composition of VTTL, and VAT Gap, 2014-2018 (EUR million)
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019*
VTTL 229,881 232,507 239,911 248,382 257,207 264,502
o/w liability on
household final
consumption
142,430 141,011 144,979 149,029 152,971
o/w liability on
government and
NPISH final
consumption
6,207 6,553 6,823 7,039 7,382
o/w liability on
intermediate
consumption
42,450 44,876 46,857 48,567 50,544
Highlights
Over the period 2015-2018, the VAT Gap in Germany has
remained nearly constant, amounting to ca. 9 percent of the VTTL.
The estimates for Germany were revised backwards due to an
improved methodology for imputing missing and confidential
values in Eurostat’s SUT.
o/w liability on GFCF 37,176 37,843 39,483 41,458 44,070
o/w net adjustments 1,618 2,223 1,769 2,290 2,239
VAT Revenue 203,081 211,616 218,779 226,582 235,130 244,111
VAT GAP 26,800 20,891 21,132 21,800 22,077
VAT GAP as a
percent of VTTL
11.7% 9.0% 8.8% 8.8% 8.6% 7.7%
VAT GAP change
since 2014
-3.1 pp
11.7%
9.0% 8.8% 8.8% 8.6% 7.7%
0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
0
50000
100000
150000
200000
250000
300000
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019*
VAT GAP as a percent of VTTL VAT Revenue VTTL
35. CASE Reports | No. 503 (2020)
35
Table 3.6 Estonia: VAT Revenue, VTTL, Composition of VTTL, and VAT Gap, 2014–2018 (EUR million)
Estonia 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019*
VTTL 1,911 1,986 2,090 2,286 2,458 2,609
o/w liability
on household
final consumption
1,338 1,374 1,436 1,530 1,652
o/w liability on
government and NPISH
final consumption
34 35 64 69 77
o/w liability on
intermediate
consumption
232 244 262 282 305
o/w liability on GFCF 298 323 318 392 418
Highlights
· Over the period 2015–2018, the VAT Gap in Estonia has remained
stable in the range between 5 and 6 percent of the VTTL.
· No substantial change in the size of the VAT Gap
is expected based on fast estimates.
o/w net adjustments 9 9 10 12 5
VAT Revenue 1,711 1,873 1,975 2,149 2,331 2,483
VAT GAP 200 113 115 137 127
VAT GAP as
a percent of VTTL
10.4% 5.7% 5.5% 6.0% 5.2% 4.8%
VAT GAP change
since 2014
−5.3 pp
VAT Gap in the EU-28 Member States
page 26 of 99
Table 3.6. Estonia: VAT Revenue, VTTL, Composition of VTTL, and VAT Gap, 2014-2018 (EUR million)
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019*
VTTL 1,911 1,986 2,090 2,286 2,458 2,609
o/w liability on
household final
consumption
1,338 1,374 1,436 1,530 1,652
o/w liability on
government and
NPISH final
consumption
34 35 64 69 77
o/w liability on
intermediate
consumption
232 244 262 282 305
Highlights
Over the period 2015-2018, the VAT Gap in Estonia has
remained stable in the range between 5 and 6 percent of the
VTTL.
No substantial change in the size of the VAT Gap is expected
based on fast estimates.
o/w liability on GFCF 298 323 318 392 418
o/w net adjustments 9 9 10 12 5
VAT Revenue 1,711 1,873 1,975 2,149 2,331 2,483
VAT GAP 200 113 115 137 127
VAT GAP as a
percent of VTTL
10.4% 5.7% 5.5% 6.0% 5.2% 4.8%
VAT GAP change
since 2014
-5.3 pp
10.4%
5.7% 5.5% 6.0% 5.2% 4.8%
0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019*
VAT GAP as a percent of VTTL VAT Revenue VTTL
36. CASE Reports | No. 503 (2020)
36
Table 3.7. Ireland: VAT Revenue, VTTL, Composition of VTTL, and VAT Gap, 2014–2018 (EUR million)
Ireland 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019*
VTTL 12,406 13,543 14,027 14,652 15,857 15,978
o/w liability
on household
final consumption
7,418 7,732 7,815 8,101 8,522
o/w liability on
government and NPISH
final consumption
173 183 202 207 187
o/w liability on
intermediate
consumption
3,200 3,808 3,820 3,957 4,446
o/w liability on GFCF 1,443 1,649 1,995 2,173 2,498
Highlights
· The estimates for Ireland were revised backwards due to an improved
methodology for imputing missing and confidential values in Eurostat’s SUT.
· The VAT Gap in Ireland is expected to fall substantially in 2019 due to increased
revenues. This might be an overestimation as previous years’ fast estimates were
eventually revised upwards by 2 percentage points because of more precise revenue numbers.
o/w net adjustments 173 172 195 214 205
VAT Revenue 11,528 11,831 12,603 13,060 14,175 15,037
VAT GAP 878 1,712 1,425 1,592 1,682
VAT GAP as
a percent of VTTL
7.1% 12.6% 10.2% 10.9% 10.6% 5.9%
VAT GAP change
since 2014
+3.5 pp
VAT Gap in the EU-28 Member States
page 27 of 99
Table 3.7. Ireland: VAT Revenue, VTTL, Composition of VTTL, and VAT Gap, 2014-2018 (EUR million)
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019*
VTTL 12,406 13,543 14,027 14,652 15,857 15,978
o/w liability on
household final
consumption
7,418 7,732 7,815 8,101 8,522
o/w liability on
government and
NPISH final
consumption
173 183 202 207 187
o/w liability on
intermediate
consumption
3,200 3,808 3,820 3,957 4,446
Highlights
The estimates for Ireland were revised backwards due to an
improved methodology for imputing missing and confidential
values in Eurostat’s SUT.
The VAT Gap in Ireland is expected to fall substantially in 2019
due to increased revenues. This might be an overestimation as
previous years’ fast estimates were eventually revised upwards
by 2 percentage points because of more precise revenue
numbers.
o/w liability on GFCF 1,443 1,649 1,995 2,173 2,498
o/w net adjustments 173 172 195 214 205
VAT Revenue 11,528 11,831 12,603 13,060 14,175 15,037
VAT GAP 878 1,712 1,425 1,592 1,682
VAT GAP as a
percent of VTTL
7.1% 12.6% 10.2% 10.9% 10.6% 5.9%
VAT GAP change
since 2014
+3.5 pp
7.1%
12.6%
10.2% 10.9% 10.6%
5.9%
0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019*
VAT GAP as a percent of VTTL VAT Revenue VTTL
37. CASE Reports | No. 503 (2020)
37
Table 3.8. Greece: VAT Revenue, VTTL, Composition of VTTL, and VAT Gap, 2014–2018 (EUR million)
Grece 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019*
VTTL 17,287 18,545 20,591 21,898 21,858 22,441
o/w liability
on household
final consumption
12,750 13,695 15,673 16,386 16,653
o/w liability on
government and NPISH
final consumption
424 603 673 691 689
o/w liability on
intermediate
consumption
1,759 1,858 2,008 2,115 2,196
o/w liability on GFCF 2,114 2,143 1,948 2,404 2,012
Highlights
· VAT compliance in Greece showed a significant improvement in 2018
(a decrease of the VAT Gap by 3.1 percentage points down to 30.1 percent).
· Fast estimate suggests that next year the VAT Gap will increase above 31%.
o/w net adjustments 239 246 290 302 308
VAT Revenue 12,676 12,885 14,333 14,642 15,288 15,390
VAT GAP 4,611 5,660 6,258 7,256 6,570
VAT GAP as
a percent of VTTL
26.7% 30.5% 30.4% 33.1% 30.1% 31.4%
VAT GAP change
since 2014
+3.4 pp
VAT Gap in the EU-28 Member States
page 28 of 99
Table 3.8. Greece: VAT Revenue, VTTL, Composition of VTTL, and VAT Gap, 2014-2018 (EUR million)
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019*
VTTL 17,287 18,545 20,591 21,898 21,858 22,441
o/w liability on
household final
consumption
12,750 13,695 15,673 16,386 16,653
o/w liability on
government and
NPISH final
consumption
424 603 673 691 689
o/w liability on
intermediate
consumption
1,759 1,858 2,008 2,115 2,196
Highlights
VAT compliance in Greece showed a significant improvement in
2018 (a decrease of the VAT Gap by 3.1 percentage points down
to 30.1 percent).
Fast estimate suggests that next year the VAT Gap will increase
above 31%.
o/w liability on GFCF 2,114 2,143 1,948 2,404 2,012
o/w net adjustments 239 246 290 302 308
VAT Revenue 12,676 12,885 14,333 14,642 15,288 15,390
VAT GAP 4,611 5,660 6,258 7,256 6,570
VAT GAP as a
percent of VTTL
26.7% 30.5% 30.4% 33.1% 30.1% 31.4%
VAT GAP change
since 2014
+3.4 pp
26.7%
30.5% 30.4%
33.1%
30.1% 31.4%
0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
35.0%
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019*
VAT GAP as a percent of VTTL VAT Revenue VTTL
38. CASE Reports | No. 503 (2020)
38
Table 3.9a. Spain: VAT Revenue, VTTL, Composition of VTTL, and VAT Gap, 2014–2018 (EUR million)
Spain a 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019*
VTTL 69,824 72,283 74,791 79,003 82,470 83,515
o/w liability
on household
final consumption
50,920 52,864 55,178 57,795 59,613
o/w liability on
government and NPISH
final consumption
2,413 2,433 2,494 2,567 2,667
o/w liability on
intermediate
consumption
8,525 8,451 8,552 9,229 9,881
o/w liability on GFCF 7,311 7,777 7,891 8,708 9,576
Highlights
· Between 2015 and 2018, the VAT Gap has remained
relatively stable at a level of 6 percent of the VTTL.
· The results were revised due to the update of Eurostat’s revenue figures.
o/w net adjustments 655 759 675 704 733
VAT Revenue 62,825 67,913 70,214 73,970 77,561 79,224
VAT GAP 6,999 4,370 4,577 5,033 4,909
VAT GAP as
a percent of VTTL
10.0% 6.0% 6.1% 6.4% 6.0% 3.1%
VAT GAP change
since 2014
−4.1 pp
VAT Gap in the EU-28 Member States
page 29 of 99
Table 3.9a. Spain: VAT Revenue, VTTL, Composition of VTTL, and VAT Gap, 2014-2018 (EUR million)
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019*
VTTL 69,824 72,283 74,791 79,003 82,470 83,515
o/w liability on
household final
consumption
50,920 52,864 55,178 57,795 59,613
o/w liability on
government and
NPISH final
consumption
2,413 2,433 2,494 2,567 2,667
o/w liability on
intermediate
consumption
8,525 8,451 8,552 9,229 9,881
Highlights
Between 2015 and 2018, the VAT Gap has remained relatively
stable at a level of 6 percent of the VTTL.
The results were revised due to the update of Eurostat’s revenue
figures.
o/w liability on GFCF 7,311 7,777 7,891 8,708 9,576
o/w net adjustments 655 759 675 704 733
VAT Revenue 62,825 67,913 70,214 73,970 77,561 79,224
VAT GAP 6,999 4,370 4,577 5,033 4,909
VAT GAP as a
percent of VTTL
10.0% 6.0% 6.1% 6.4% 6.0% 3.1%
VAT GAP change
since 2014
-4.1 pp
10.0%
6.0% 6.1% 6.4% 6.0%
3.1%
0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
0
20000
40000
60000
80000
100000
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019*
VAT GAP as a percent of VTTL VAT Revenue VTTL
39. CASE Reports | No. 503 (2020)
39
Table 3.9b. Spain: Alternative Estimates
Note: Adjusting revenues for the continuing reduction in the stock of claims and adjusting the VTTL for the difference between national accounting and tax conventions
in the construction sector based on the data received from Spanish Tax Authorities led to a downward revision of the VAT Gap for the entire period 2014–2018.
Spain 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
VAT Gap based on alternative data 2,946 2,177 2,680 2,925 1,737
VAT Gap based on alternative data, as a percent of VTTL 4.3% 3.1% 3.7% 3.8% 2.2%
40. CASE Reports | No. 503 (2020)
40
Table 3.10. France: VAT Revenue, VTTL, Composition of VTTL, and VAT Gap, 2014–2018 (EUR million)
France 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019*
VTTL 165,520 167,521 168,611 173,840 180,406 181,524
o/w liability
on household
final consumption
98,441 98,826 100,505 102,189 105,477
o/w liability on
government and NPISH
final consumption
1,606 1,631 1,695 1,734 1,750
o/w liability on
intermediate
consumption
27,176 30,159 30,503 31,365 32,205
o/w liability on GFCF 32,852 31,667 30,719 33,308 35,550
Highlights
· The VAT Gap in 2018 remained stable compared to 2017
and amounted to 7.1 percent of the VTTL and EUR 12.8 billion.
· In 2019, the VAT Gap is likely to decline.
o/w net adjustments 5,445 5,238 5,189 5,244 5,424
VAT Revenue 148,454 151,680 154,490 162,011 167,618 174,356
VAT GAP 17,066 15,841 14,121 11,829 12,788
VAT GAP as
a percent of VTTL
10.3% 9.5% 8.4% 6.8% 7.1% 3.9%
VAT GAP change
since 2014
−3.2 pp
VAT Gap in the EU-28 Member States
page 31 of 99
Table 3.10. France: VAT Revenue, VTTL, Composition of VTTL, and VAT Gap, 2014-2018 (EUR million)
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019*
VTTL 165,520 167,521 168,611 173,840 180,406 181,524
o/w liability on
household final
consumption
98,441 98,826 100,505 102,189 105,477
o/w liability on
government and
NPISH final
consumption
1,606 1,631 1,695 1,734 1,750
o/w liability on
intermediate
consumption
27,176 30,159 30,503 31,365 32,205
Highlights
The VAT Gap in 2018 remained stable compared to 2017 and
amounted to 7.1 percent of the VTTL and EUR 12.8 billion.
In 2019, the VAT Gap is likely to decline.
o/w liability on GFCF 32,852 31,667 30,719 33,308 35,550
o/w net adjustments 5,445 5,238 5,189 5,244 5,424
VAT Revenue 148,454 151,680 154,490 162,011 167,618 174,356
VAT GAP 17,066 15,841 14,121 11,829 12,788
VAT GAP as a
percent of VTTL
10.3% 9.5% 8.4% 6.8% 7.1% 3.9%
VAT GAP change
since 2014
-3.2 pp
10.3% 9.5%
8.4%
6.8% 7.1%
3.9%
0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
0
50000
100000
150000
200000
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019*
VAT GAP as a percent of VTTL VAT Revenue VTTL
41. CASE Reports | No. 503 (2020)
41
Table 3.11. Croatia: VAT Revenue, VTTL, Composition of VTTL, and VAT Gap, 2014–2018 (HRK million)
Croatia 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019*
VTTL 45,718 48,187 48,511 51,073 53,394 55,366
o/w liability
on household
final consumption
33,715 34,679 35,333 37,098 38,876
o/w liability on
government and NPISH
final consumption
1,596 1,615 1,644 1,874 1,953
o/w liability on
intermediate
consumption
5,667 6,722 7,025 7,158 7,356
o/w liability on GFCF 4,485 4,508 4,274 4,737 4,958
Highlights
· The VAT Gap in Croatia fell in 2018 by 2 percentage points
down to 3.5 percent of the VTTL.
· Since 2015, the Gap has followed a downward trend
and is expected to do so in 2019 as well.
o/w net adjustments 255 663 234 205 251
VAT Revenue 41,647 43,387 45,143 48,251 51,526 55,040
VAT GAP 4,071 4,800 3,368 2,822 1,868
VAT GAP as
a percent of VTTL
8.9% 10.0% 6.9% 5.5% 3.5% 0.6%
VAT GAP change
since 2014
−5.4 pp
VAT Gap in the EU-28 Member States
page 32 of 99
Table 3.11. Croatia: VAT Revenue, VTTL, Composition of VTTL, and VAT Gap, 2014-2018 (HRK million)
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019*
VTTL 45,718 48,187 48,511 51,073 53,394 55,366
o/w liability on
household final
consumption
33,715 34,679 35,333 37,098 38,876
o/w liability on
government and
NPISH final
consumption
1,596 1,615 1,644 1,874 1,953
o/w liability on
intermediate
consumption
5,667 6,722 7,025 7,158 7,356
Highlights
The VAT Gap in Croatia fell in 2018 by 2 percentage points down
to 3.5 percent of the VTTL.
Since 2015, the Gap has followed a downward trend and is
expected to do so in 2019 as well.
o/w liability on GFCF 4,485 4,508 4,274 4,737 4,958
o/w net adjustments 255 663 234 205 251
VAT Revenue 41,647 43,387 45,143 48,251 51,526 55,040
VAT GAP 4,071 4,800 3,368 2,822 1,868
VAT GAP as a
percent of VTTL
8.9% 10.0% 6.9% 5.5% 3.5% 0.6%
VAT GAP change
since 2014
-5.4 pp
8.9%
10.0%
6.9%
5.5%
3.5%
0.6%
0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
50000
60000
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019*
VAT GAP as a percent of VTTL VAT Revenue VTTL
42. CASE Reports | No. 503 (2020)
42
Table 3.12a. Italy: VAT Revenue, VTTL, Composition of VTTL, and VAT Gap, 2014–2018 (EUR million)
Italy 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019*
VTTL 137,817 139,703 140,400 142,939 144,772 146,855
o/w liability
on household
final consumption
97,232 99,621 99,890 100,918 102,246
o/w liability on
government and NPISH
final consumption
2,054 2,207 2,269 2,281 2,308
o/w liability on
intermediate
consumption
21,543 21,350 21,086 22,350 22,440
o/w liability on GFCF 13,305 13,318 13,883 14,005 14,366
Highlights
· Over the analysed period, the VAT Gap in Italy has followed
a downward sloping trend, reaching 24.5 percent of the VTTL in 2018.
· Thanks to information provided by the Tax Authorities,
the time break in the intermediate consumption
of public administration in Eurostat’s SUT was corrected.
o/w net adjustments 3,682 3,208 3,272 3,385 3,412
VAT Revenue 96,567 100,345 102,086 107,576 109,333 111,793
VAT GAP 41,250 39,358 38,314 35,363 35,439
VAT GAP as
a percent of VTTL
29.9% 28.2% 27.3% 24.7% 24.5% 23.9%
VAT GAP change
since 2014
−5.5 pp
VAT Gap in the EU-28 Member States
page 33 of 99
Table 3.12a. Italy: VAT Revenue, VTTL, Composition of VTTL, and VAT Gap, 2014-2018 (EUR million)
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019*
VTTL 137,817 139,703 140,400 142,939 144,772 146,855
o/w liability on
household final
consumption
97,232 99,621 99,890 100,918 102,246
o/w liability on
government and
NPISH final
consumption
2,054 2,207 2,269 2,281 2,308
o/w liability on
intermediate
consumption
21,543 21,350 21,086 22,350 22,440
Highlights
Over the analysed period, the VAT Gap in Italy has followed a
downward sloping trend, reaching 24.5 percent of the VTTL in
2018.
Thanks to information provided by the Tax Authorities, the time
break in the intermediate consumption of public administration in
Eurostat’s SUT was corrected.
o/w liability on GFCF 13,305 13,318 13,883 14,005 14,366
o/w net adjustments 3,682 3,208 3,272 3,385 3,412
VAT Revenue 96,567 100,345 102,086 107,576 109,333 111,793
VAT GAP 41,250 39,358 38,314 35,363 35,439
VAT GAP as a
percent of VTTL
29.9% 28.2% 27.3% 24.7% 24.5% 23.9%
VAT GAP change
since 2014
-5.5 pp
29.9%
28.2% 27.3%
24.7% 24.5% 23.9%
0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
35.0%
0
50000
100000
150000
200000
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019*
VAT GAP as a percent of VTTL VAT Revenue VTTL
43. CASE Reports | No. 503 (2020)
43
Table 3.12b Italy: Alternative Estimates
Note: The estimates above are based on adjusted revenues for the changes in outstanding stocks of net reimbursement claims (to better approximate accrued
revenues) and Italy’s own estimates of illegal activities, namely illegal drugs and prostitution activities.
38,194 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
VAT Gap based on alternative data 38,256 38,880 38,294 38,194 34,743
VAT Gap based on alternative data, as a percent of VTTL 28.1% 28.1% 27.0% 27.0% 24.0%
44. CASE Reports | No. 503 (2020)
44
Table 3.13. Cyprus: VAT Revenue, VTTL, Composition of VTTL, and VAT Gap, 2015–2018 (EUR million)
Cyprus 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019*
VTTL N/A 1,681 1,761 1,859 2,028
o/w liability
on household
final consumption
N/A 1,079 1,130 1,188 1,245
o/w liability on
government and NPISH
final consumption
N/A 28 27 30 29
o/w liability on
intermediate
consumption
N/A 437 452 447 485
o/w liability on GFCF N/A 108 134 172 243
Highlights
· Thanks to information from the Tax Authorities, revenue figures were
corrected to account for the expected backward revisions of Eurostat’s figures.
· Due to expected revision of national accounts and an important
component of the country-specific adjustments and a potentially
large estimation error, fast estimates for Cyprus are not published.
o/w net adjustments N/A 29 17 22 25
VAT Revenue N/A 1,517 1,664 1,765 1,951
VAT GAP N/A 165 97 93 77
VAT GAP as
a percent of VTTL
N/A 9.8% 5.5% 5.0% 3.8%
VAT GAP change
since 2014
−6.0 pp
VAT Gap in the EU-28 Member States
page 35 of 99
Table 3.13. Cyprus: VAT Revenue, VTTL, Composition of VTTL, and VAT Gap, 2015-2018 (EUR million)
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019*
VTTL N/A 1,681 1,761 1,859 2,028
o/w liability on
household final
consumption
N/A 1,079 1,130 1,188 1,245
o/w liability on
government and
NPISH final
consumption
N/A 28 27 30 29
o/w liability on
intermediate
consumption
N/A 437 452 447 485
Highlights
Thanks to information from the Tax Authorities, revenue figures
were corrected to account for the expected backward revisions of
Eurostat’s figures.
Due to expected revision of national accounts and an important
component of the country-specific adjustments and a potentially
large estimation error, fast estimates for Cyprus are not
published.
o/w liability on GFCF N/A 108 134 172 243
o/w net adjustments N/A 29 17 22 25
VAT Revenue N/A 1,517 1,664 1,765 1,951
VAT GAP N/A 165 97 93 77
VAT GAP as a
percent of VTTL
N/A 9.8% 5.5% 5.0% 3.8%
VAT GAP change
since 2015
-6.0 pp
9.8%
5.5% 5.0%
3.8%
0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
2015 2016 2017 2018
VAT GAP as a percent of VTTL VAT Revenue VTTL
45. CASE Reports | No. 503 (2020)
45
Table 3.14. Latvia: VAT Revenue VTTL, Composition of VTTL, and VAT Gap, 2014–2018 (EUR million)
Latvia 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019*
VTTL 2,248 2,348 2,329 2,512 2,705 2,819
o/w liability
on household
final consumption
1,748 1,801 1,847 1,965 2,074
o/w liability on
government and NPISH
final consumption
43 49 53 58 63
o/w liability on
intermediate
consumption
293 317 316 325 342
o/w liability on GFCF 211 238 175 227 290
Highlights
· In 2018, Latvia recorded the second fastest decline
of the VAT Gap in the EU by 4.4 percentage points down to 9.5 percent.
· It is expected to fall further in 2019 by around 2 percentage points.
o/w net adjustments −47 −57 −61 −63 −64
VAT Revenue 1,787 1,876 2,032 2,164 2,449 2,632
VAT GAP 460 472 297 348 256
VAT GAP as
a percent of VTTL
20.5% 20.1% 12.8% 13.9% 9.5% 6.6%
VAT GAP change
since 2014
−11.0 pp
VAT Gap in the EU-28 Member States
page 36 of 99
Table 3.14. Latvia: VAT Revenue VTTL, Composition of VTTL, and VAT Gap, 2014-2018 (EUR million)
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019*
VTTL 2,248 2,348 2,329 2,512 2,705 2,819
o/w liability on
household final
consumption
1,748 1,801 1,847 1,965 2,074
o/w liability on
government and
NPISH final
consumption
43 49 53 58 63
o/w liability on
intermediate
consumption
293 317 316 325 342
Highlights
In 2018, Latvia recorded the second fastest decline of the VAT
Gap in the EU by 4.4 percentage points down to 9.5 percent.
It is expected to fall further in 2019 by around 2 percentage
points.
o/w liability on GFCF 211 238 175 227 290
o/w net adjustments -47 -57 -61 -63 -64
VAT Revenue 1,787 1,876 2,032 2,164 2,449 2,632
VAT GAP 460 472 297 348 256
VAT GAP as a
percent of VTTL
20.5% 20.1% 12.8% 13.9% 9.5% 6.6%
VAT GAP change
since 2014
-11.0 pp
20.5% 20.1%
12.8% 13.9%
9.5%
6.6%
0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019*
VAT GAP as a percent of VTTL VAT Revenue VTTL
46. CASE Reports | No. 503 (2020)
46
Table 3.15. Lithuania: VAT Revenue, VTTL, Composition of VTTL, and VAT Gap, 2014–2018 (EUR million)
Lithuania 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019*
VTTL 3,879 3,876 4,015 4,422 4,754 4,910
o/w liability
on household
final consumption
3,168 3,164 3,315 3,590 3,839
o/w liability on
government and NPISH
final consumption
41 43 44 48 50
o/w liability on
intermediate
consumption
373 403 404 434 463
o/w liability on GFCF 442 461 470 505 552
Highlights
· Over the period 2015–2018, the VAT Gap in Lithuania remained
stable, amounting to 25 percent of the VTTL, on average.
· Based on fast estimates, it is expected that the VAT Gap will fall
significantly in 2019 – by about 4 percentage points.
o/w net adjustments −145 −195 −218 −155 −150
VAT Revenue 2,764 2,889 3,028 3,310 3,522 3,850
VAT GAP 1,115 987 988 1,111 1,232
VAT GAP as
a percent of VTTL
28.7% 25.5% 24.6% 25.1% 25.9% 21.6%
VAT GAP change
since 2014
−2.8 pp
VAT Gap in the EU-28 Member States
page 37 of 99
Table 3.15. Lithuania: VAT Revenue, VTTL, Composition of VTTL, and VAT Gap, 2014-2018 (EUR million)
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019*
VTTL 3,879 3,876 4,015 4,422 4,754 4,910
o/w liability on
household final
consumption
3,168 3,164 3,315 3,590 3,839
o/w liability on
government and
NPISH final
consumption
41 43 44 48 50
o/w liability on
intermediate
consumption
373 403 404 434 463
Highlights
Over the period 2015-2018, the VAT Gap in Lithuania remained
stable, amounting to 25 percent of the VTTL, on average.
Based on fast estimates, it is expected that the VAT Gap will fall
significantly in 2019 – by about 4 percentage points.
o/w liability on GFCF 442 461 470 505 552
o/w net adjustments -145 -195 -218 -155 -150
VAT Revenue 2,764 2,889 3,028 3,310 3,522 3,850
VAT GAP 1,115 987 988 1,111 1,232
VAT GAP as a
percent of VTTL
28.7% 25.5% 24.6% 25.1% 25.9% 21.6%
VAT GAP change
since 2014
-2.8 pp
28.7%
25.5% 24.6% 25.1% 25.9%
21.6%
0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
35.0%
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019*
VAT GAP as a percent of VTTL VAT Revenue VTTL
47. CASE Reports | No. 503 (2020)
47
Table 3.16. Luxembourg: VAT Revenue, VTTL, Composition of VTTL, and VAT Gap, 2014–2018 (EUR million)
Luxemburg 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019*
VTTL 3,888 3,510 3,736 3,525 3,928
o/w liability
on household
final consumption
1,237 1,289 1,331 1,361 1,469
o/w liability on
government and NPISH
final consumption
30 32 33 44 89
o/w liability on
intermediate
consumption
875 1,070 1,138 1,160 1,215
o/w liability on GFCF 348 411 626 541 726
Highlights
· In 2018, the VAT Gap was 5.1 percent of the VTTL,
which was a 2.5 percentage point incline year-over-year.
· Due to an important component of the country-specific adjustments
related to e-commerce and financial intermediation services
and a potentially large estimation error,
fast estimates for Luxemburg are not published.
o/w net adjustments 1,398 709 608 419 429
VAT Revenue 3,749 3,420 3,422 3,433 3,729
VAT GAP 139 90 314 92 199
VAT GAP as
a percent of VTTL
3.6% 2.6% 8.4% 2.6% 5.1%
VAT GAP change
since 2014
+1.5 pp
VAT Gap in the EU-28 Member States
page 38 of 99
Table 3.16. Luxembourg: VAT Revenue, VTTL, Composition of VTTL, and VAT Gap, 2014-2018 (EUR million)
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019*
VTTL 3,888 3,510 3,736 3,525 3,928
o/w liability on
household final
consumption
1,237 1,289 1,331 1,361 1,469
o/w liability on
government and
NPISH final
consumption
30 32 33 44 89
o/w liability on
intermediate
consumption
875 1,070 1,138 1,160 1,215
Highlights
In 2018, the VAT Gap was 5.1 percent of the VTTL, which was a
2.5 percentage point incline year-over-year.
Due to an important component of the country-specific
adjustments related to e-commerce and financial intermediation
services and a potentially large estimation error, fast estimates for
Luxemburg are not published.
o/w liability on GFCF 348 411 626 541 726
o/w net adjustments 1,398 709 608 419 429
VAT Revenue 3,749 3,420 3,422 3,433 3,729
VAT GAP 139 90 314 92 199
VAT GAP as a
percent of VTTL
3.6% 2.6% 8.4% 2.6% 5.1%
VAT GAP change
since 2014
+1.5 pp
3.6%
2.6%
8.4%
2.6%
5.1%
0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
VAT GAP as a percent of VTTL VAT Revenue VTTL
48. CASE Reports | No. 503 (2020)
48
Hungary 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019*
VTTL 3,695,038 3,934,985 3,842,561 4,193,962 4,509,050 4,847,886
o/w liability
on household
final consumption
2,561,233 2,667,644 2,813,513 2,928,236 3,037,227
o/w liability on
government and NPISH
final consumption
114,447 121,681 112,677 123,619 131,027
o/w liability on
intermediate
consumption
495,980 529,845 527,033 562,286 608,761
o/w liability on GFCF 464,953 560,845 340,200 520,047 690,748
Highlights
· In 2018, Hungary recorded the fastest decline of the VAT Gap
in the EU – 5.1 percentage points down to 8.4 percent.
· It is expected to decline further in 2019,
but only by 1 percentage point.
o/w net adjustments 58,426 54,969 49,138 59,774 41,287
VAT Revenue 3,011,162 3,309,540 3,299,838 3,626,566 4,129,537 4,526,757
VAT GAP 683,876 625,445 542,723 567,396 379,513
VAT GAP as
a percent of VTTL
18.5% 15.9% 14.1% 13.5% 8.4% 6.6%
VAT GAP change
since 2014
−10.1 pp
Table 3.17. Hungary: VAT Revenue, VTTL, Composition of VTTL, and VAT Gap, 2014–2018 (HUF million)
VAT Gap in the EU-28 Member States
page 39 of 99
Table 3.17. Hungary: VAT Revenue, VTTL, Composition of VTTL, and VAT Gap, 2014-2018 (HUF million)
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019*
VTTL 3,695,038 3,934,985 3,842,561 4,193,962 4,509,050 4,847,886
o/w liability on
household final
consumption
2,561,233 2,667,644 2,813,513 2,928,236 3,037,227
o/w liability on
government and
NPISH final
consumption
114,447 121,681 112,677 123,619 131,027
o/w liability on
intermediate
consumption
495,980 529,845 527,033 562,286 608,761
Highlights
In 2018, Hungary recorded the fastest decline of the VAT Gap in
the EU – 5.1 percentage points down to 8.4 percent.
It is expected to decline further in 2019, but only by 1 percentage
point.
o/w liability on GFCF 464,953 560,845 340,200 520,047 690,748
o/w net adjustments 58,426 54,969 49,138 59,774 41,287
VAT Revenue 3,011,162 3,309,540 3,299,838 3,626,566 4,129,537 4,526,757
VAT GAP 683,876 625,445 542,723 567,396 379,513
VAT GAP as a
percent of VTTL
18.5% 15.9% 14.1% 13.5% 8.4% 6.6%
VAT GAP change
since 2014
-10.1 pp
18.5%
15.9%
14.1% 13.5%
8.4%
6.6%
0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
0
1000000
2000000
3000000
4000000
5000000
6000000
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019*
VAT GAP as a percent of VTTL VAT Revenue VTTL
49. CASE Reports | No. 503 (2020)
49
Malta 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019*
VTTL 935 861 925 984 1,084 1,110
o/w liability
on household
final consumption
460 488 517 538 582
o/w liability on
government and NPISH
final consumption
16 18 49 55 60
o/w liability on
intermediate
consumption
393 253 277 301 337
o/w liability on GFCF 63 82 58 72 88 Highlights
· The VAT Gap in Malta fell by approximately 2.5 percent-
age points in 2018 down to 15.1 percent of the VTTL.
· As a net exporter of electronic services, VTTL and revenue in Malta was af-
fected by the withdrawal of the MOSS retention fee as of 2019.
· The VTTL in Malta was revised significantly upwards thanks
to the availability of data from fiscal registers allowing for more accurate
estimations of the effective rates and propexes for financial and gambling services.
o/w net adjustments 2 20 24 18 18
VAT Revenue 642 673 712 810 920 934
VAT GAP 293 188 213 174 164
VAT GAP as
a percent of VTTL
31.3% 21.8% 23.0% 17.7% 15.1% 16.8%
VAT GAP change
since 2014
−16.2 pp
Table 3.18 Malta: VAT Revenue, VTTL, Composition of VTTL, and VAT Gap, 2014–2018 (EUR million)
VAT Gap in the EU-28 Member States
page 40 of 99
Table 3.18. Malta: VAT Revenue, VTTL, Composition of VTTL, and VAT Gap, 2014-2018 (EUR million)
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019*
VTTL 935 861 925 984 1,084 1,110
o/w liability on
household final
consumption
460 488 517 538 582
o/w liability on
government and
NPISH final
consumption
16 18 49 55 60
o/w liability on
intermediate
consumption
393 253 277 301 337
Highlights
The VAT Gap in Malta fell by approximately 2.5 percentage points
in 2018 down to 15.1 percent of the VTTL.
As a net exporter of electronic services, VTTL and revenue in
Malta was affected by the withdrawal of the MOSS retention fee
as of 2019.
The VTTL in Malta was revised significantly upwards thanks to the
availability of data from fiscal registers allowing for more accurate
estimations of the effective rates and propexes for financial and
gambling services.
o/w liability on GFCF 63 82 58 72 88
o/w net adjustments 2 20 24 18 18
VAT Revenue 642 673 712 810 920 934
VAT GAP 293 188 213 174 164
VAT GAP as a
percent of VTTL
31.3% 21.8% 23.0% 17.7% 15.1% 16.8%
VAT GAP change
since 2014
-16.2 pp
31.3%
21.8% 23.0%
17.7%
15.1%
16.8%
0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019*
VAT GAP as a percent of VTTL VAT Revenue VTTL
50. CASE Reports | No. 503 (2020)
50
Netherlands 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019*
VTTL 47,199 49,756 50,500 52,329 54,897
o/w liability
on household
final consumption
25,363 25,953 26,218 27,101 28,290
o/w liability on
government and NPISH
final consumption
556 595 571 590 621
o/w liability on
intermediate
consumption
12,853 13,718 13,687 14,052 14,696
o/w liability on GFCF 7867 8962 9481 10,038 10,744
Highlights
· In 2018, the VAT Gap fell by 0.6 percentage points down
to nearly 4 percent of the VTTL.
· Due to a substantial change in the VAT rates in 2019 and a potentially
large estimation error, fast estimates for the Netherlands are not published.
o/w net adjustments 560 528 543 547 546
VAT Revenue 42,951 44,746 47,849 49,833 52,619
VAT GAP 4,248 5,010 2,651 2,496 2,278
VAT GAP as
a percent of VTTL
9.0% 10.1% 5.3% 4.8% 4.2%
VAT GAP change
since 2014
−4.8 pp
Table 3.19. Netherlands: VAT Revenue, VTTL, Composition of VTTL, and VAT Gap, 2014–2018 (EUR million)
VAT Gap in the EU-28 Member States
page 40 of 99
Table 3.18. Malta: VAT Revenue, VTTL, Composition of VTTL, and VAT Gap, 2014-2018 (EUR million)
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019*
VTTL 935 861 925 984 1,084 1,110
o/w liability on
household final
consumption
460 488 517 538 582
o/w liability on
government and
NPISH final
consumption
16 18 49 55 60
o/w liability on
intermediate
consumption
393 253 277 301 337
Highlights
The VAT Gap in Malta fell by approximately 2.5 percentage points
in 2018 down to 15.1 percent of the VTTL.
As a net exporter of electronic services, VTTL and revenue in
Malta was affected by the withdrawal of the MOSS retention fee
as of 2019.
The VTTL in Malta was revised significantly upwards thanks to the
availability of data from fiscal registers allowing for more accurate
estimations of the effective rates and propexes for financial and
gambling services.
o/w liability on GFCF 63 82 58 72 88
o/w net adjustments 2 20 24 18 18
VAT Revenue 642 673 712 810 920 934
VAT GAP 293 188 213 174 164
VAT GAP as a
percent of VTTL
31.3% 21.8% 23.0% 17.7% 15.1% 16.8%
VAT GAP change
since 2014
-16.2 pp
31.3%
21.8% 23.0%
17.7%
15.1%
16.8%
0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019*
VAT GAP as a percent of VTTL VAT Revenue VTTL
51. CASE Reports | No. 503 (2020)
51
Austria 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019*
VTTL 27,955 28,736 29,768 30,949 32,231 32,910
o/w liability
on household
final consumption
18,992 19,259 19,885 20,623 21,321
o/w liability on
government and NPISH
final consumption
957 943 947 954 1,493
o/w liability on
intermediate
consumption
4,093 4,188 4,183 4,322 4,176
o/w liability on GFCF 2,585 2,890 3,284 3,467 3,676
Highlights
· Over the period 2014–2018, the VAT Gap in Austria remained
nearly constant, amounting to ca. 8-9 percent of the VTTL, on average.
· In 2019, the VAT Gap is expected to decrease
by about 1.5 percentage points.
o/w net adjustments 1,328 1,456 1,469 1,583 1,566
VAT Revenue 25,386 26,247 27,301 28,304 29,323 30,446
VAT GAP 2,569 2,489 2,466 2,645 2,908
VAT GAP as
a percent of VTTL
9.2% 8.7% 8.3% 8.5% 9.0% 7.5%
VAT GAP change
since 2014
+0.2 pp
Table 3.20. Austria: VAT Revenue, VTTL, Composition of VTTL, and VAT Gap, 2014–2018 (EUR million)
VAT Gap in the EU-28 Member States
page 42 of 99
Table 3.20. Austria: VAT Revenue, VTTL, Composition of VTTL, and VAT Gap, 2014-2018 (EUR million)
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019*
VTTL 27,955 28,736 29,768 30,949 32,231 32,910
o/w liability on
household final
consumption
18,992 19,259 19,885 20,623 21,321
o/w liability on
government and
NPISH final
consumption
957 943 947 954 1,493
o/w liability on
intermediate
consumption
4,093 4,188 4,183 4,322 4,176
Highlights
Over the period 2014-2018, the VAT Gap in Austria remained
nearly constant, amounting to ca. 8-9 percent of the VTTL, on
average.
In 2019, the VAT Gap is expected to decrease by about 1.5
percentage points.
o/w liability on GFCF 2,585 2,890 3,284 3,467 3,676
o/w net adjustments 1,328 1,456 1,469 1,583 1,566
VAT Revenue 25,386 26,247 27,301 28,304 29,323 30,446
VAT GAP 2,569 2,489 2,466 2,645 2,908
VAT GAP as a
percent of VTTL
9.2% 8.7% 8.3% 8.5% 9.0% 7.5%
VAT GAP change
since 2014
+0.2 pp
9.2% 8.7% 8.3% 8.5% 9.0%
7.5%
0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
35000
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019*
VAT GAP as a percent of VTTL VAT Revenue VTTL
52. CASE Reports | No. 503 (2020)
52
Poland 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019*
VTTL 162,348 167,037 168,993 180,386 191,180 201,610
o/w liability
on household
final consumption
112,465 115,495 119,692 127,010 132,706
o/w liability on
government and NPISH
final consumption
7,103 7,356 7,605 8,007 8,626
o/w liability on
intermediate
consumption
22,939 24,786 25,508 27,079 27,866
o/w liability on GFCF 16,875 17,038 13,695 15,757 19,397
Highlights
· In 2018, Poland recorded the third most significant decline of the VAT
Gap in the EU of 4.3 percentage points down to 9.9 percent.
· The trend of significant decreases in the VAT Gap started in 2015
is expected to end in 2018 as the rate in 2019 will remain nearly identical.
o/w net adjustments 2,967 2,361 2,493 2,534 2,585
VAT Revenue 122,671 125,836 134,554 154,656 172,210 182,147
VAT GAP 39,678 41,201 34,439 25,730 18,970
VAT GAP as
a percent of VTTL
24.4% 24.7% 20.4% 14.3% 9.9% 9.7%
VAT GAP change
since 2014
−14.5 pp
Table 3.21. Poland: VAT Revenue VTTL, Composition of VTTL, and VAT Gap, 2014–2018 (PLN million)
VAT Gap in the EU-28 Member States
page 43 of 99
Table 3.21. Poland: VAT Revenue VTTL, Composition of VTTL, and VAT Gap, 2014-2018 (PLN million)
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019*
VTTL 162,348 167,037 168,993 180,386 191,180 201,610
o/w liability on
household final
consumption
112,465 115,495 119,692 127,010 132,706
o/w liability on
government and
NPISH final
consumption
7,103 7,356 7,605 8,007 8,626
o/w liability on
intermediate
consumption
22,939 24,786 25,508 27,079 27,866
Highlights
In 2018, Poland recorded the third most significant decline of the
VAT Gap in the EU of 4.3 percentage points down to 9.9 percent.
The trend of significant decreases in the VAT Gap started in 2015
is expected to end in 2018 as the rate in 2019 will remain nearly
identical.
o/w liability on GFCF 16,875 17,038 13,695 15,757 19,397
o/w net adjustments 2,967 2,361 2,493 2,534 2,585
VAT Revenue 122,671 125,836 134,554 154,656 172,210 182,147
VAT GAP 39,678 41,201 34,439 25,730 18,970
VAT GAP as a
percent of VTTL
24.4% 24.7% 20.4% 14.3% 9.9% 9.7%
VAT GAP change
since 2014
-14.5 pp
24.4% 24.7%
20.4%
14.3%
9.9% 9.7%
0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
0
50000
100000
150000
200000
250000
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019*
VAT GAP as a percent of VTTL VAT Revenue VTTL
53. CASE Reports | No. 503 (2020)
53
Portugal 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019*
VTTL 17,020 17,598 17,890 18,872 19,754 20,253
o/w liability
on household
final consumption
12,823 13,190 13,345 13,843 14,397
o/w liability on
government and NPISH
final consumption
229 444 487 535 554
o/w liability on
intermediate
consumption
2,625 2,433 2,732 2,928 3,088
o/w liability on GFCF 1,017 1,170 941 1,194 1,295
Highlights
· The VAT Gap in Portugal was just below the EU total (9.6 percent of the VTTL).
It followed a downward trend over the analysed period. Between 2014 and 2018,
the Gap fell by approximately one percentage point yearly, on average.
o/w net adjustments 326 361 385 372 420
VAT Revenue 14,682 15,368 15,767 16,810 17,865 18,828
VAT GAP 2,338 2,230 2,123 2,062 1,889
VAT GAP as
a percent of VTTL
13.7% 12.7% 11.9% 10.9% 9.6% 7.0%
VAT GAP change
since 2014
−4.2 pp
Table 3.22. Portugal: VAT Revenue, VTTL, Composition of VTTL, and VAT Gap, 2014–2018 (EUR million)
VAT Gap in the EU-28 Member States
page 44 of 99
Table 3.22. Portugal: VAT Revenue, VTTL, Composition of VTTL, and VAT Gap, 2014-2018 (EUR million)
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019*
VTTL 17,020 17,598 17,890 18,872 19,754 20,253
o/w liability on
household final
consumption
12,823 13,190 13,345 13,843 14,397
o/w liability on
government and
NPISH final
consumption
229 444 487 535 554
o/w liability on
intermediate
consumption
2,625 2,433 2,732 2,928 3,088
Highlights
The VAT Gap in Portugal was just below the EU total (9.6
percent of the VTTL).
It followed a downward trend over the analysed period. Between
2014 and 2018, the Gap fell by approximately one percentage
point yearly, on average.
o/w liability on GFCF 1,017 1,170 941 1,194 1,295
o/w net adjustments 326 361 385 372 420
VAT Revenue 14,682 15,368 15,767 16,810 17,865 18,828
VAT GAP 2,338 2,230 2,123 2,062 1,889
VAT GAP as a
percent of VTTL
13.7% 12.7% 11.9% 10.9% 9.6% 7.0%
VAT GAP change
since 2014
-4.2 pp
13.7%
12.7% 11.9%
10.9%
9.6%
7.0%
0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019*
VAT GAP as a percent of VTTL VAT Revenue VTTL