This article introduces a new methodology called "Cultural Mapping" for intelligence analysis to better account for cultural factors. Cultural Mapping is designed to isolate and assess cultural variables influencing issues of intelligence interest and distinguish their degree of influence on decision-making and outcomes. The methodology aims to provide a more systematic and persuasive treatment of culture compared to how it is typically addressed peripherally in intelligence analysis. The authors developed Cultural Mapping to remedy perceived deficiencies in how the intelligence community incorporates cultural understanding and to improve analysis for policymakers.

1. Improving Analysis
Cultural Topography: A New Research Tool
for Intelligence Analysis
Jeannie L. Johnson and Matthew T. Berrett
In the third edition of his “History of the World,” J.M. Roberts
“
notes that “Historical inertia is easily underrated…the historical
forces molding the outlook of Americans, Russians, and Chinese for
centuries before the words capitalism and communism were
American invented are easy still to overlook.” 1 In this article, Jeannie Johnson
decisionmakers have and I offer a variation on Roberts’s view: Cultural inertia is easily
shown a need for help in underrated, and American decisionmakers have shown a need for
isolating and help in isolating and understanding the complexity, weight, and rel-
understanding the evance of culture as they consider foreign policy initiatives.
complexity, weight, and
relevance of culture as The view I bring to this discussion is not one of an anthropologist
but rather one of a former economic analyst in US intelligence who
they consider foreign has been a senior manager of analysts in various disciplines for a
policy initiatives. decade. My analytic and management positions have repeatedly
brought me into indirect and sometimes direct interaction with top-
” level US decisionmakers including several US presidents. As I wit-
nessed these decisionmakers in action and tried to help deliver
insights they needed, I came to conclude that the "inertia of culture"
was often underrated in their assessments of opportunities and
obstacles, in part because few if any of their information sources
offered a systematic and persuasive methodology for addressing this
inertia and its implications for their policy options. I also came to
conclude from direct observation and some readings out of the aca-
demic field of strategic culture that America's cultural view fea-
tures the notion that Americans can achieve anything anywhere
including going to the moon—if they just invest enough resources.
This notion is understandable but perhaps hazardous. America’s
remarkable history of achievement includes being the first nation
actually to go to the moon, but the we-can-do-anything part of Amer-
ican self-identity also leads some to argue still that US failures in
The endnotes and an appendix are available in the digital version of the article in
cia.gov.
All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the
author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US govern-
ment endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.
Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2011) 1

2. Mapping Culture
Vietnam were not the consequence of a poorly managed investment; they were the consequences of invest-
ing too little. 2 How many resources and over what period would have been sufficient to strike “suc-
cess”—particularly if success would have required changes in Vietnam at the cultural level? I have rarely
seen American policymakers ask “Will our desired foreign policy outcome require change over there at the
cultural level? Over what period and with what resources is such cultural change achievable?”
The more I observed the policy-intelligence dynamic, the more I perceived a need for an analytic con-
struct designed exclusively to illustrate clearly and persuasively the inertia of culture. Cultural influ-
ences are typically touched on within US Intelligence Community (IC) analyses as peripheral factors,
described with passing references, and often in general and superficial terms. Although the IC is full of
world-class expertise on foreign peoples, places, and organizations, this industry rarely isolates and illus-
trates culture as a factor deserving its own sophisticated and thorough treatment.
To remedy this perceived deficiency, I teamed with Jeannie Johnson—formerly an intelligence analyst
at CIA and now with Utah State University—who had brought her academic training in strategic cul-
ture to a pursuit similar to mine. For some time she had been amassing training ideas in the area of cul-
tural analysis for IC experts, and our combined efforts, along with significant input from other members
of my former office, 3 trial runs of intelligence products, research, and continued refinements over the past
four years have resulted in a process we call “Cultural Mapping.” This process, or methodology, is
designed to isolate and assess cultural factors at play on issues of intelligence interest and to distin-
guish the degree to which those factors influence decisionmaking and outcomes. Mapping exercises done
across time, spanning multiple issues, and on diverse groups within a society may aid in understanding
that society’s “Cultural Topography.” We describe the process below.-mtb
Target Audience: norms onto others.” Intuition, a requires a significant number of
Intelligence Analysts compass regularly employed by years viewing the world
career analysts, is culturally through the lens of one specific
Understanding this methodol-
encoded and, by nature, ethno- domain. This concentration
ogy and its specific structure
centric. Johnston warns of its gives the expert the power to
requires a grasp of the users for
use as a barometer for analyz- recognize patterns, perform
whom it was designed: intelli-
ing or predicting the behavior of tasks, and solve problems, but
gence analysts. Anthropologist
foreign agents. 5 According to it also focuses the expert’s
Rob Johnston was hired in the
Edward Stewart and Milton attention on one domain to the
wake of 9/11 to complete an eth-
Bennett, American cultural ten- exclusion of others.” 7
nographic analysis of the IC’s
dencies are particularly unhelp-
analytic cadre and to offer sug- Johnston’s cautionary counsel
ful in this regard. Despite vast
gestions for improving its per- regarding the habits of experts
information resources and expo-
formance. He observed biases echoes that penned by Rich-
sure to exotic cultures, Ameri-
produced by both ethnocen- ards Heuer two decades earlier:
cans continue to overemphasize
trism and expertise, which
similarity and assume that
resulted in rather serious cogni- Once people have started
other social groups have values
tive gaps, and he noted a lack of thinking about a problem
and aspirations in line with
systematic tools for going after one way, the same mental
their own. 6
cultural data. 4 circuits or pathways get
It may seem counterintuitive activated and strength-
Johnston defines ethnocen- ened each time they think
to see expertise as a source of
trism as the tendency to proj- about it. This facilitates
bias but Johnston points out
ect “one’s own cognition and the retrieval of informa-
that “becoming an expert
2 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2011)

3. Mapping Culture
Despite vast information resources and exposure to exotic cul-
tures, Americans continue to overemphasize similarity and as-
tion. These same sume that other social groups have values and aspirations in
pathways, however, also
become the mental ruts
line with their own.
that make it difficult to
reorganize the informa- leaders and the elite cadres Specific cultural knowl-
tion mentally so as to see that surround them. We have, edge is a skill and the
it from a different institutionally, very few tools foundation for forecast-
perspective. 8 aimed at understanding ing the behavior and
national populations or specific decisionmaking of foreign
A third form of observed bias subcultures, a point General actors. Acquiring cultural
among analysts, which might Michael Flynn made in his pub- knowledge should be
be added to Johnston’s list, has lic rebuke of intelligence prac- taken as seriously as
roots in academic training and tices in Afghanistan in January learning any other facet of
is an institutional legacy that 2010. 9 The emphasis on elites one’s analytic capabili-
tends to leave culture out in the has produced cognitive gaps in ties. Moreover, it is
“all-source” approach to analy- our analysis—perhaps illus- incumbent on analysts to
sis. The academic backgrounds trated anew by the surprise educate their own leader-
of most intelligence analysts over the political tumult that ship and policymakers
stem from disciplines that erupted across North Africa about the value and util-
emphasize power and wealth as and the Middle East in early ity of cultural knowledge
the primary human motiva- 2011. Johnston observes: for intelligence analysis. 11
tors, leaving underexplored
other motivators such as iden- [An] analyst, while Johnston’s advice may sound
tity, preservation of social insti- accounting successfully rather obvious, but given the
tutions, alternative value for an adversary’s capa- scope and complexity of the
structures, powerful narra- bility, may misjudge that phenomenon we call “culture,”
tives, or perceptions of the secu- adversary’s intention, not attempting its research and
rity environment distinctive to because of what is cogni- determining—with no prior
a person’s or group’s region and tively available, but training in this field—which
history. Due to institutional because of what is cogni- aspects have policy relevance
habits, the educational para- tively absent. The failure can be an intimidating task
digms of many of our experts, to determine an adver- even for the most talented polit-
and the reticence of members of sary’s intention may ical, economic, or military ana-
the anthropological community simply be the result of lyst. Interviews with analysts
to accept positions within US missing information or, have often revealed a sense of
security institutions, culture just as likely, it may be being overwhelmed by the scope
has received limited attention the result of missing of cultural data that are rele-
as a variable. Most analysts hypotheses or mental vant to their accounts—and of
have simply not been intro- models about an adver- dismay at the length and depth
duced to the training or the sary’s potential behavior. 10 of the historical knowledge nec-
research tools for going after essary to capture a grand stra-
cultural data effectively. Noting that the lack of cul- tegic profile of any region or
tural data in mental models is a group. One reaction is to sub-
This bias also affects intelli- problem not only for analysts consciously search for reasons
gence collection, which aims but also for the policymakers why cultural data are not nec-
disproportionately at foreign they support, Johnston exhorts: essary—a position that ana-
Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2011) 3

4. Mapping Culture
Interviews with analysts have often revealed a sense of being
overwhelmed by the scope of cultural data that are relevant to
their accounts, and of dismay at the length and depth of the his- amorphous and often inter-
nally contradictory substance
torical knowledge necessary to capture a grand strategic pro-
we call “national culture” often
file of any region or group. suffer follies of overgeneraliza-
tion and static analysis, and
lysts schooled in the research and analysis forward they reach, as a consequence,
international relations para- within the community. Our questionable conclusions about
digms of realism and neoreal- research tool is designed to the sources of security policy. 12
ism are already trained to take. broaden the IC’s grasp of the Patrick Porter heaps heavy crit-
factors that drive outcomes, spe- icism on many of the West’s
Analysts also face institu- cifically cultural factors, and to nascent efforts at cultural anal-
tional obstacles to in-depth cul- help IC analysts be creative in ysis for making this mistake.
tural study. The organizations their collection of cultural data. He accuses military and intelli-
they work for are required to We make no attempt to deliver gence analysts of drawing static
produce large volumes of often the end point or last word in cul- portraits of Eastern cultures
tactical pieces on a daily basis. tural research. What we offer is rather than recognizing them
For some analytic assignments, an accessible research tool that as moving, flexing, human cre-
this pace can be relentless. IC can produce systematic, sophis- ations—and, in so doing, intro-
institutions simply do not have ticated surveys of cultural vari- ducing dangerous sources of
the manpower to pursue the ables, a grasp of which can error. a 13
type of cultural research greatly help US policymakers
employed by professional achieve desired outcomes and To reference “culture” in the
anthropologists: living in the avoid surprises. singular for any particular pol-
region for extended periods in ity is typically an error; there is
order to conduct ethnography rarely just one internal variety.
(participant observation) and to Research Philosophy Walter Russell Mead identifies
refine fluency in the local lan- Our experience in marrying four distinct narratives within
guage. Many analysts move cultural data and analysis to US strategic culture and posits
from one account to another the daily demands of defense that our various foreign poli-
during their careers and must and intelligence analysis has cies are formed from the “colli-
conduct cultural research via led to a few conclusions about sions and debates” those
short-term stays in theater, best practice. The most overrid- narratives inspire. 14 The idea of
brief stints of language train- ing of these is that sweeping composite cultures is not
ing, and information that can cultural profiles of a region or a restricted to analysis of the US,
be accessed from their desk or national group are of limited of course. Authors writing on
in library holdings. value in the intelligence indus- Germany, China, India, and
try for a number of reasons. As Iran, to name a few, all note the
Given this particular organiza- internal conflict of competing
has been effectively argued by
tional backdrop, our aims have cultural narratives about
Christopher Twomey, security
been modest but effective, we national security within these
studies that attempt to draw
hope, in moving cultural countries. 15 The existence of
predictive power from the
a Porter’s warnings are valid but may be a bit overstated. Today’s Department of Defense is not entirely uninitiated in doctrines of cul-
tural change. Leading-edge training methods emphasize “practice theory”—an approach to culture which treats the change dynamic as
central. Practice theory explains culture as a product of interaction between agent and structure and trains analysts to expect change
rather than stasis.
4 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2011)

5. Mapping Culture
Most academic work examining the impact of culture on securi-
ty policy mirrors the biases of the IC by privileging elite-level
multiple cultures is present not
only at the national level; it is culture (usually at the organizational level) over other types.
true right down to the ordinary
individual. As Kevin Avruch institutional and academic according to logical,
quips, “for any individual, cul- work already done on their understandable princi-
ture always comes in the topic and assess afresh which ples that every person
plural.” 16 The cultural influ- actors and cultural influences living in the culture must
ences at play on a single actor are most relevant for the policy understand, at least intui-
could derive from a background issue they are researching. In tively, in order to get
that features Northern Euro- some cases this may be a vastly along with each other.
pean, Catholic, engineering understudied section of the pop- With some basic study,
school, and family-specific ulation, one which has received [others] can also recog-
influences. little attention within official nize and understand these
channels, and one whose principles and apply that
Most academic work examin- research will require unortho- understanding to their
ing the impact of culture on dox (for the institution) survey operations. 18
security policy mirrors the and collection methods.
biases of the IC by privileging It is with our specific audi-
elite-level culture (usually at Culture at any level—organi- ence and these basic assump-
the organizational level) over zational, tribal, ethnic, tions about culture in mind that
other types. The typical justifi- regional, or national—is a we constructed the Cultural
cation of this approach is that dynamic human creation and Mapping method. It is pre-
while public opinion may play a subject to change, but this sented here in the step-by-step
peripheral role, “it is arguably should not discourage analysts process we have provided
the elite—owing to its role as from its study. Any tool devised recently to groups of analysts.
gatekeeper, its expert knowl- to track cultural influences
edge and its privileged access to must employ questions that
means of communication—that challenge previous assump- Cultural Mapping Exercise
ultimately decides which way tions, unearth fresh data, and
Step 1: Identify an Issue of
security policy goes.” 17 But this highlight possible areas of
Intelligence Interest
logic breaks down when one is change, but as Barak A. Sal-
The first injunction to ana-
assessing the impact of culture moni and Paula Holmes-Eber
lysts is to narrow the scope of
within the context of counterin- remind Marines who may be
cultural inquiry by isolating a
surgency and stability opera- intimidated by the complexity
particular policy question of
tions, for instance. Given the and movement of the cultures
interest. The narrower the
pivotal role of local popular they are studying:
issue, the more targeted the
opinion in this type of military
Although people are, by cultural research, and the more
engagement, understanding
nature, variable and likely it will yield actionable
public culture, the cultures of
unpredictable, they still data. The issue selected may
significant substate groups, and
need to work with others reflect a frequently asked ques-
how these affect security policy
in social and cultural tion that needs examining from
becomes paramount.
groups. These groups a new angle, or a question that
The research method pre- —and their associated policymakers are not ask-
sented here asks analysts to beliefs and struc- ing—perhaps due to ethnocen-
step outside the biases of the tures—are organized tric blinders, habit, or limited
Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2011) 5

6. Mapping Culture
knowledge of the region—but group properties. Analysts are the world works; and foreign
should be. invited to loop back to this youth who work part time at
stage after an initial round of America’s franchises may be
Step 2: Select an Actor research in order to disaggre- internalizing a strong dose of
Analysts are urged in the this gate, refine, or switch actor sets capitalist work ethic. We
step to isolate a particular pop- in a way most profitable for encourage analysts to consider
ulation for study. All “players” intelligence analysis. all plausible influences ini-
within this issue arena are tially, pursuing this as an
identified for consideration, Continued refinement occurs exploratory stage. Decisions
stretching to include some not to the central policy question as about which influences are
typically examined. A sampling well. Analysts may find that most relevant will come later.
of possible actors might include they were as captive to ethno-
prosperous urban elites, an eth- centric blinders as the clients Step 4: Explore the Cultural
nic subgroup, a particular gov- they serve when crafting the Data from Four Perspectives
ernment institution, a dissident initial intelligence question. In order to supply structure to
group, a village council, house- Looped-back refinements on the cultural exploration encour-
wives across a region, a youth this front are to be expected. aged in Step 3, we suggest the
bulge, or the cadre around a following four categories for
leadership figure. From among Step 3: Amass a Range of assessing cultural data: Iden-
these subgroups, or actors, one Cultural Influences tity, Norms, Values, and Percep-
is selected for focused study. Assuming Avruch’s logic that tual Lens. This is not an
This actor may be the one all individuals and groups pos- exhaustive list of important cul-
expected to play the most piv- sess culture in the plural, ana- tural factors but is a useful
otal role in a particular out- lysts are asked to map out the starting point in examining cul-
come on the issue selected or various cultural influences ture from four policy relevant
one that is dangerously under- which may guide the behavior perspectives. The categories are
studied and may present a wild of members of this distinctive enough from one
card for the future. group—again, within the con- another to inspire different sets
text of the issue they are assess- of questions and elastic enough
The actor in question need not ing. These influences range to capture a wide range of data:
have a discernible “group cul- from the local, such as clan,
ture.” The important question tribal, or organizational cul- Identity: The character traits
here is not “what is this actor’s tures, to wider cultural influ- the group assigns to itself, the
culture?” but rather “what cul- ences, such as regional, ethnic, reputation it pursues, and indi-
tural influences will weigh in religious, national, gendered, vidual roles and statuses it des-
on decisionmaking on this issue socioeconomic, or generational. ignates to members.
for members of this group?” Analysts need not confine
themselves to fleshing out “typ- Norms: Accepted and
The mapping exercise is ical” cultural influence sets but expected modes of behavior.
designed as a looping process. rather think expansively and
The actor who seems most rele- creatively about the specific Values: Material or ide-
vant initially may fade into the group they are studying. ational goods that are honored
background as research pro- or that confer increased status
gresses and the salience of New forms of social media to members.
other actors becomes apparent. have norms embedded and
Conversely, the initial actor learned by new users; a leader- Perceptual Lens: The filter
may remain of interest but ship cadre hailing from a simi- through which this group deter-
emerge as a far more complex lar educational institution may mines “facts” about others.
entity once research magnifies espouse a common view of how
6 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2011)

7. Mapping Culture
Unearthing and isolating factors that might be captured as
identity, norms, values, and perceptual lens is a messy busi-
Analysts receive an in-depth
ness.
list of questions for each cate-
gory. a The magnitude of cul-
tural data unearthed in • Would our proposed changes answers are readily apparent
answering the questions in in this policy area offer group and attainable. The reality is
these four categories may be members a way out of increas- that unearthing and isolating
managed by keeping a litmus ingly unpopular normative factors that might be captured
test for policy relevance in practices? Which members? as identity, norms, values, and
mind. An initial short list of perceptual lens is a messy busi-
questions might examine the Values. ness. It involves doing heavy
issue selected in Step 1 in the amounts of open-source read-
ways below. • What is considered “honor- ing, using the research skills
able” behavior in this issue honed in graduate school
Identity. area? (rather than the typical day-to-
• Which local values may be in day practices of the intelli-
• Which factors surrounding gence business), and wading
this issue would cause this conflict with our approach to
this issue? through a lot of data of ques-
actor’s identity to be threat- tionable relevance.
ened? Alternatively, which
might provide the US com- • Which values might be co-
opted in moving US interests Most analysts need to take
mon ground for co-option? themselves off-line for a period
forward?
in order to accomplish this task
• Is group cohesion strong along with any effectiveness. This
identity lines in response to • Where might value differ-
ences between target groups sort of research does not mix
this issue? What would cause well with the often frenetic pace
the group to fracture or to present an opportunity to
exploit cleavages? of producing current intelli-
unite behind a common front? gence. Some offices have been
• What individual roles and sta- Perceptual Lens: particularly proactive in this
tuses might group members regard and have offered their
• What are the preconceived analysts short sabbaticals in
seek to protect? notions of this group concern- order to get them away from
Norms. ing the behavior and charac- their desks. These intelligence
ter of the United States? officers remove themselves to a
• Does this issue place social separate location—in most
institutions or common prac- • What are group’s beliefs about instances to an institution with
tices under threat? the future? significant holdings on their
• What hurdles must we over- area of interest—to conduct
• Which practices are deeply research. Other offices have
internalized and likely to come in messaging to this
group on this issue? assigned analysts into research
inspire resistance? or methodology teams where
This tidy and rather simple they can focus on a long-term
• Which practices are compati- research endeavor with the nec-
ble with US interests on this list of questions may provide
the false impression that the essary consistency.
issue?
a The questions are contained in an appendix available in digital versions of this article.
Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2011) 7

8. Mapping Culture
Most analysts need to take themselves off-line for a period in
order to accomplish this task with any effectiveness.
tory but of a glorious defeat in
1389 at the hands of the Otto-
After immersing themselves One way to gauge those aspects man Turks. Serbs celebrate the
in what cultural data is avail- of history relevant to the issue valor of the war’s hero, Prince
able through official channels, being tracked is to pay atten- Lazar, who received a heavenly
open-source searches, and (ide- tion to historic references made visitation on the eve of battle
ally) visits to the region, ana- when the policy issue is and was told that unless he sur-
lysts begin to identify cognitive addressed, whether in political rendered he faced certain
gaps in previous modes of anal- rhetoric, private conversation, defeat the next day. Given the
ysis. In addition to benefitting lessons in school, or expres- choice, Lazar declared that it
from new data accumulated on sions from the artistic commu- was better to die in battle than
their account, they become far nity. Which narratives do to live in shame. 21 He did pre-
more attuned to what they politicians draw on to legiti- cisely that—and became
don’t know—what information mize their behavior on this cemented in Serbian legend.
the institution is not collecting. issue and to pacify the public?
Identifying key knowledge gaps Which narratives work? Which This tale permeates Serbian
means coming up with creative do not? society. It is taught to young-
solutions for going after the tar- sters in school and is repre-
get data. Time constraints limit Physical manifestations such sented in homes and offices in
the ability of intelligence ana- as architecture, street names, the renowned painting “Kosovo
lysts to employ extended eth- statues, and memorials demon- Girl.” Most analysts working
nography as a tool, and strate which aspects of a this issue were familiar with
institutional restraints can nation’s history it chooses to these aspects of Serbian cul-
limit the ability to employ preserve and celebrate. Find- ture but lacked a method for
methods pursued by academic ing and understanding the tracking and weighing them
or other institutions. The fol- selection of heroes, for exam- systematically and thus acquir-
lowing is a collection of cul- ple, lends itself to understand- ing the footing necessary to
tural research strategies ing national values. 19 Of articulate persuasively to poli-
proffered by a variety of ana- particular interest are those cymakers the potential impact
lysts representing the full symbols that people volun- on Serbian behavior: that is,
range of experience, with some tarily display in their homes. 20 that Serbia would find victory
residing in academic venues by standing up to an overpow-
and others in policymaking Understanding historic narra- ering military force when the
forums. tives can be critical to making world expected it to fold.
sense of the strategic choices of
Historical Narratives foreign populations. The 1999 Understanding the weight of
Nearly all analysts begin with bombing campaign against Ser- this narrative for Serbs in
the assumption that one must bia supplies an example. US defining honorable conduct dur-
conduct a thorough back- analysts vastly underestimated ing war would probably have
ground investigation to become the duration and expense of the disabused planners of the idea
familiar with a regime’s his- 1999 engagement, in part that the bombing campaign
tory, geography, internal social because they undervalued the would be over quickly. Instead
codes, and general interactions role of historic narratives of vic- of projecting a three-day cam-
with other states. If not con- tory and defeat. Serbia’s paign, we might have helped
ducted with strategic efficiency, national holiday is not a cele- policymakers plan for a cam-
this task can be overwhelming. bration of a past battlefield vic-
8 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2011)

9. Mapping Culture
Useful interaction with the population under survey can range
from rudimentary (daily records of anecdotal interaction) to
paign closer to the almost 80
highly institutionalized methods (sophisticated polling conduct-
days it eventually took. 22
ed nationwide).
Tapping into the Population
Useful interaction with the language modes, and percep- story.” 30 The patterns and
population under survey can tual lens of the local themes developed across con-
range from rudimentary (daily community. 27 A key keeper may versations helped uncover gen-
records of anecdotal interac- be institutional. In determin- erally accepted notions about
tion) to highly institutionalized ing core values within Israeli self and others. Additional
methods (sophisticated polling society, Greg Giles looked first probing may reveal notions of
conducted nationwide). 23 One to shared, institutionalized identity—what is taken for
popular method for both insti- socialization processes. He pin- granted as a natural role for
tutions and individual pointed the Israeli Defense the nation, what is expected,
researchers is targeted focus Force (IDF) since universal con- and what is controversial. 31
groups. Much has been written scription requires that all
on this particular survey tech- Israeli citizens experience One inventive young scholar
nique, but the advice of ana- socialization and training from Monterey’s Naval Post-
lysts in the field is that through this institution. Giles graduate School proposed an
effective focus groups must be points out that it is not just alternative to official poll-
preceded by an in-depth study contact with the institution ing—the systematic study of
of the issue at hand so that the that matters, but institutional “RUMINT” (rumor
interviewer can select a sam- legitimacy. The IDF meets intelligence). 32 She surveyed
pling of relevant focus group these criteria based on the high and prioritized the issues on
participants and frame ques- number of young people polled the minds of Iraqis by tracking
tions appropriately. 24 who said they would be willing the frequency of rumors that
to serve in the IDF even if it appeared in local print. One of
One selection device employed were an all-volunteer force. 28 her findings, a surprise for US
by ethnographers is to narrow forces at the time, was that a
interviews to “key informants” An important window into large swath of Iraqis believed
of local culture. 25 Key infor- norms and the color of a group’s the United States was behind
mants can range from subject perceptive lens is the “conven- the insurgency. Their belief
matter experts to those who are tional wisdom”—the things stemmed not so much from an
cynical about their own culture “everybody knows.” 29 Compil- assumption that the United
and are therefore observant, ing and analyzing oral tradi- States was malicious but from
reflective, and articulate. a 26 tions may take a number of the perception that it was
different forms. The author of a impossible that a superpower
A variation on key infor- recent popular survey of Iran with the might of America
mants is “key keepers” of cul- attempted to do this by engag- could not stop the insurgency if
ture. These people are defined ing in dialogue with persons it wanted to. Therefore, the
by frequent contact and from a sampling of all of the United States must be behind
extended conversation with society’s castes and factions and it. Her work produced a num-
other members of the commu- starting each conversation with ber of timely insights for US
nity. As a result, the key keep- the same request: “Tell me your
ers tend to harbor the notions,
a Bernard claims that cynical informants have consistently been his best sources over the years.
Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2011) 9

10. Mapping Culture
Those not in-theater could use alternative approaches to track-
ing gossip networks.
vice, and health conditions) in
contrast to state claims about
officials concerning Iraqi atti- est living abroad are often its situation. 38
tudes and priorities. better at identifying beliefs and
norms in their home lands than Content Analysis of Texts
Those not in-theater could use fellow citizens left behind When evaluating national-
alternative approaches to track- because the students have level cultural threads, texts
ing gossip networks. Dr. Debo- experienced the contrast taught in school deserve spe-
rah Wheeler, a specialist in between their national beliefs cial attention. Classroom text-
Middle East studies, has and those of people in their host books explain perceptions of a
focused her research on online countries. 35 nation’s own history, its view of
discussions across her region others, acceptable methods of
—particularly among women Secondhand inter- warfare, and common justifica-
who otherwise do not speak out. views—interviewing those who tions for past behavior (norms).
Chat rooms and editorials frequently interact with mem- Societal values are taught to
posted in pseudonymous blogs bers of the culture—are also children explicitly, particularly
may be one way to evaluate the very useful, especially in cases in the early stages of educa-
thinking of otherwise reticent where the populace does not tion. Their texts may include
populations. 33 Christine Fair, feel comfortable speaking hero legends, songs, rhymes,
an analyst writing on Iran, sug- openly about its thoughts and fables and oversimplified anec-
gests another alternative to opinions. 36 In some cases it is dotes from the nation’s
firsthand interviews with citi- politically incorrect to speak of history. 39 Valuable cultural or
zens of a repressive regime: one’s historic culture, espe- political insights can be drawn
cially where security policy is from noting which figures are
Utiliz[e] consulates of concerned, so there is an celebrated, which are despised,
countries where Iranians absence of civil or political rhet- and why. 40 Education and other
seek US visas (India and oric on the topic. Rodney Jones socialization processes also
Turkey) to collect and notes the case of Japan, where result in a body of shared liter-
develop information dur- Jesuit priests who lived there ature considered “classic.” What
ing the visa interview for extended periods were more are the messages in this body of
process. Defense attachés likely than Japanese states- work? How widely are the clas-
may also engage their in- men to speak freely of Japan’s sics read? How often are they
country counterparts in history and predilections. 37 referenced? 41
countries where military
cooperation with Iran are Joe Bermudez, a longtime Military texts are essential
ongoing to gain insights Korea analyst, notes that when sources of information on the
into Iran. 34 information is hard to come by, values, identity, and acceptable
as it is with North Korea, even methods of achieving security
Expatriates are a self-selected interviews with travelers and a within a regime. Twomey rec-
group, often coming from within careful look at their photo- ommends a deep survey of all
a limited segment of society not graphs can prove beneficial. In sorts of doctrinal texts—tele-
representative of the broader North Korea’s case, it helps grams, military orders, descrip-
base. Despite this sampling unveil the genuine state of tions of training regimens,
drawback, interviews with this affairs for the state’s popula- diaries, memoirs, and communi-
group offer some value. Stu- tion (regarding, for example, cations between military
dents from the region of inter- roads, electricity, phone ser- leaders. 42 This study would
10 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2011)

11. Mapping Culture
Military texts are essential sources of information on the val-
ues, identity, and acceptable methods of achieving security
reveal national aspirations over within a regime.
time (identity), accepted norms
for achieving them, and per-
haps more particular values tity front, Glenn Chafetz, Hillel and entertainments originat-
such as views on the use of Abramson, and Suzette Grillot ing elsewhere. 49
manpower and loss of life. 43 employ content analysis of lead-
ers’ speeches in order to explain In order to understand iden-
Tracking Political Rhetoric the weapons acquisitions pat- tity distinctions within large
The key to analyzing political terns of diverse states. Their regions, one might systemati-
rhetoric effectively is under- research presents a strong cor- cally observe social ceremonies
standing, in local context, the relation between four identity and rituals. What is the pur-
role it plays in communicating typologies and a “marked ten- pose of the ceremony? Who
with the population of interest. dency toward nuclear attends? 50 Which norms viola-
Russia analyst Fritz Ermarth acquisition.” 47 The method tions are publicly punished?
notes that a first step in weigh- Chafetz et al. suggest for cod- Which achievements publicly
ing the value of political rheto- ing role conception can easily be celebrated? One daily ritual
ric within a nation is to track duplicated for other issues. that often sheds light on iden-
its correlation with actual tity and value structure is the
behavior in the past. Tracking Extended Observation of protocol of salutations, espe-
over time and across politi- Public Behavior cially in conversations between
cians may yield useful general- Public reactions to the moves members of the population
izations about government made by state leadership may meeting for the first time. How
speeches as indicators of sin- highlight areas of congruence or does one introduce oneself? Is it
cere goals and security cleavage between the under- by way of profession, clan ties,
objectives. 44 On China, Twomey standing of values and norms or religious affiliation? 51 Which
points out that the culture fostered by the populace and aspects of personal identity are
tends to weigh private com- the behavior of state officers. most valued?
ments more heavily than pub- Disaffection may come in the
lic statements and that form of protest, local grum- Humor can serve as a useful
inflammatory public state- bling, or biting humor pointed test for one’s grasp of the cul-
ments need to be qualified at political officials, while con- ture under study. What does
accordingly. 45 gruence might manifest itself this group find funny? Why?
through strong turnout for Which alternative group is con-
Once understood, public rhet- state events and parades, vol- sistently used as the object of
oric may represent a rich data untary displays of state insig- ridicule? Which of the alterna-
field for assessing norm nia, or healthy membership in tive group’s characteristics are
strength or identity trends. The state-related organizations. 48 subjected to mockery? How does
work of Andrew Cortell and Congruence or cleavage this illuminate the values of the
James Davis, as well as that of between separate identity group being tracked? What does
Paul Kowert and Jeffrey Legro, groups may be manifest in part it say about their perception of
suggests measuring a norm’s by the degree to which the tar- others?
strength by the frequency with get group is willing to accumu-
which it is referenced by states- Language is an indispensable
late and incorporate traditions
men proposing a course of source of cultural information.
of food, dress, verbal expres-
action or legitimizing one Not every analyst is going to
sion, names given to children,
already taken. 46 On the iden- have the opportunity to become
Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2011) 11

12. Mapping Culture
Entertainment media provides valuable insights for those seek-
ing to understand the current state of a particular set of norms
nizations, media outlets must
within a society.
present a worldview comfort-
able to their audience. The
fluent in the local tongue but In a free society, the bounds worldview captured in news-
will find that pursuing even and content of political debates casts validating (especially con-
novice-level language compe- channeled through the press troversial) state actions may
tence may yield cultural can identify not only cleavages illuminate popular perspec-
insights. Concepts that a popu- in the strategic and political tives and narratives that more
lation values are often assigned culture but also points of popu- formal instruments for measur-
more words than those that are lar congruence. 54 Sometimes ing opinion would miss. 56
not. Recent research suggests what is not addressed is as
that language has a profound interesting as what is. Christo- Entertainment media pro-
impact on our perceptual lens. pher Meyer and Adrian Zdrada vides valuable insights for
It registers the content of our isolated a pronounced identity those seeking to understand the
memories—the aspects of real- aspect to Poland’s willingness current state of a particular set
ity that we record, and how we to ally with the United States of norms within a society. The
record them. 52 in our runup to the invasion of fabric of television sitcoms is
Iraq in 2003 through content the exaggerated presentation of
Evaluating the Output of the analysis of press debates on the social faux pas and situational
Media and the Artistic issue. Their research revealed conundrums. 57 Sitcoms are also
Community an absence of serious security a helpful reference for illustrat-
Depending on the level of discussions relating to Iraq and ing a culture’s typical problem-
independence enjoyed by news, strong emphasis on establish- solving devices and for illumi-
entertainment, and artistic ing Polish identity as a reliable nating changes underway in
producers within a popula- US partner. The identity basis society by poking fun at norms
tion, these may yield signifi- of Poland’s participation helps that are in flux. TV dramas
cant insight into a group’s explain why the failure to serve a different purpose—they
identity and its core norms unearth weapons of mass most often focus on norms vio-
and values. Twomey notes the destruction in the Iraqi theater lations that are serious enough
onerous level of work involved did not diminish the enthusi- to be considered tragedy and
in a comprehensive review of asm for the US alliance in represent a shared core of val-
these sources and commends Poland as it did in Great ues across the society.
two authors who have tackled Britain. 55
it: Peter Hays Gries on China,
Free media may also serve as Step 5: Assemble Critical
and Ted Hopf, on Russia. 53
Even completely controlled a reliable watchdog for norms Cultural Factors
media may still offer material violations within the state. For After analysts have worked to
for cultural analysis. State example, the flurry of reporting fill cognitive gaps and amassed
propaganda illuminates the in the United States on a sizeable accumulation of cul-
identity, norms, and values excesses in Guantanamo and at tural data, they are then pre-
that the state hopes to Abu Ghraib manifest norms sented with the painful task of
achieve, as well as the narra- violations that are considered setting much of it aside—hon-
tive it hopes will dominate serious and newsworthy in the ing their data down to those
popular perception. United States but may not have cultural factors that are likely
been treated that way in other to play a role in the decision-
countries. As commercial orga- making of this group on this
12 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2011)

13. Mapping Culture
The cultural factors that emerge from this rigorous culling pro-
cess are the Critical Cultural Factors (CCFs).
issue. The analyst’s instruc-
tions are to evaluate each cul-
tural factor according to: cymakers? To what degree are play on this issue (i.e., tribal,
we confident that behavior will sectarian, professional/organi-
• Relevance for the issue reflect this cultural influence? zational), or are cultural influ-
selected. How many types of research ences widely dispersed and
sources or methods validate unlikely to provide anything
• Robustness of the factor. a 58 this finding? close to a clear script for action?
•How well established is it?
Step 6: Mapping Step 7: Writing the Paper
•How widely shared is it
among members of this After an analyst has isolated Based on the outcome of the
group? the relevant set of CCFs, she is mapping exercise, a finished
asked to map the primary Cultural Topography paper will
•To what extent is opinion or source of each from among the define for the reader first,
behavior that is inconsis- various cultural influences which aspects of identity,
tent with this aspect of iden- identified in Step 3 (national, norms, values and perceptual
tity, norms, values, or ethnic, tribal, professional, lens are most important to
perceptual lens rewarded or etc.). Are the identity compo- understand when the United
punished internally by other nents on the CCFs list confined States engages this actor on
members of this group? primarily to one domain (i.e., this issue, and second, the prob-
tribal), or shared across other able influence boundaries of the
• Likelihood of this cultural fac- sources of cultural influence CCFs identified. These CCFs
tor to provoke a Response (i.e., ethnic and religious)? provide the primary focus of the
(cooperative or conflictual) What about critical norms and paper. The paper answers, in
when external actors engage values? What about critical specific terms, the following
this group on this issue. aspects of the group’s percep- questions:
tual lens?
The cultural factors that • Which CCFs represent points
emerge from this rigorous cull- The purpose of this portion of of possible leverage and coop-
ing process are the Critical Cul- the mapping exercise is to eration?
tural Factors (CCFs) for this define—for the analyst as well
group on this issue and will be as the eventual audience of her • Which CCF red lines are
the concepts that are addressed intelligence product—the influ- likely to spark resistance or
in the finished intelligence ence boundaries of the CCFs. even armed conflict between
product. In intelligence terms, Are they spread across the cul- foreign elites and their
each factor must be solidly con- tural landscape or confined to broader populations or
nected to a “so-what.” What one or two key cultural influ- between foreign populations
impact is it likely to have on ences? Is there a clear, some- and US actors?
outcomes of interest to US poli- what bounded, cultural force at
a The work of Jeffrey Legro may serve as a useful reference point for this task. He has written extensively on measurement of norm
strength and his work on norms probably has some transferability to identity, values and perceptual lens. He proposes that a norm be
evaluated according to three criteria: how clearly it is recorded in the rules of society (specificity), how long it has existed within this soci-
ety and its strength in standing up to normative competitors (durability), and how widely it is accepted and referenced in discourse (con-
cordance).
Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2011) 13

14. Mapping Culture
A handful of papers based on the Cultural Topography method-
ology have been produced, but they have prompted reaction to
one of only two items—from a
suggest the method offers a way to add analytic value.
large pile of intelligence mate-
rials—he wanted sent back to
• Do most of the CCFs stem Initial Impact of Cultural his office for further study. Sev-
from one cultural tradition or Topography eral senior commanders also
source of influence (i.e., eth- expressed significant interest
nic, religious, tribal)? If so, Only a handful of papers based in this paper.
what else do we need to know on the Cultural Topography
about this cultural domain in methodology have been pro- Additional reactions have been
order to acquire adequate con- duced, but they have prompted consistent with those noted
text for understanding the sufficient reaction to indicate above, but only the continued
CCFs in question? that the insights they offer get application and refinement of
beyond the general body of infor- this tool will fully display
• Are the members of the group mation already grasped by most whether its potential is great or
under study drawing from analysts and policymakers, and limited. The methodology is
multiple cultural tradi- early reactions to such insights being taught in at least one IC
tions/influences when they suggest that the methodology institution, and several new Cul-
respond to this issue? Will it offers a way to add analytic tural Topography papers are in
cause them to fracture when value: motion now. The main challenge
pressure is exerted on the to pursuing and exploiting this
myriad aspects of this issue? • In a meeting that was part of a approach within the IC is the
US policy review on a specific pressure of daily production
• To what extent do adversarial country, an attendee not famil- driven mostly by conventional
groups in the region share the iar with this methodology collection and analysis. Cultural
same cultural mapping on reported that several analysts, Topography holds no promise of
this issue as the group under authors of a Cultural Topogra- advancing the understanding of
study, reflecting common phy paper on this country, cultural influences on foreign
sources of cultural influence? “quickly proved themselves to perceptions and actions unless
Where is this not the case? be as smart or smarter on researchers are given the time to
How does that inform fore- [country of focus] than anyone find additional, often novel data
casting on future cooperation else in the room…on history, and then to incorporate them
or divergence between these ethnic topography.” It is worth into the tool.
groups? adding that the room was filled
with experts who had spent (The appendix and endnotes.
• Within which tradition will significantly more years on the are available in the digital ver-
our messages to this group on subject than had these ana- sion of this article.)
this issue be most persuasive? lysts.
❖ ❖ ❖
• How likely are other groups • While traveling abroad, a spe-
across the region to respond cial envoy with significant
in similar fashion when pre- expertise selected one of the
sented with this issue? Cultural Topography papers as
14 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2011)

15. Mapping Culture
Appendix A
Cultural Analysis
Concepts and Questions
Identity
•Is individual identity seen as comprising one’s distinct, unique self, or is it bound up in a larger
group (family, clan, tribe)? 59
•Does this group see itself as responsible for and capable of solving social problems? Are prob-
lems responded to with energy or left to fate?
•Which myths and national narratives compose the stories everyone knows? How do these speak
about group identity?
•What is this group’s origin story? Does it inform group members of their destiny?
•What would this group list as defining traits of its national, tribal, ethnic character?
•Is one aspect of identity being overplayed, not because it is foundational for most decisions but
because it is being threatened or diminished?
Values
•For the linguist, which concepts/things are described in nuanced ways (meaning that many words
have been assigned to them)? Which concepts are missing from the language? (For example,
the concept of “fair play” is hard to find outside of English.)
•What generates hope in this population?
•Which is viewed more highly as a communicative tool—emotion or logic? Are conversational
styles which emphasize logic viewed as trustworthy?
•Is conspicuous consumption valued as a status marker? If not, what incentives exist to work hard?
•To what extent do security concerns trump liberty concerns in this society? Which parts of liberty
are deemed attractive?
•Is social mobility considered a good thing, or is it deemed disruptive to a highly organized sys-
tem? Would this group fight to keep a hierarchical arrangement even if offered opportunities for
egalitarianism?
•To what extent does loyalty trump economic advantage?
•Which is more value-laden for this group—“progress” or “tradition”?
•Is optimism rewarded as a character trait or is it considered naive, juvenile, and possibly danger-
ous?
•Which character qualities are consistently praised?
•What composes the “good life”?
•What sorts of myths, hero figures, segments of history, or identity markers does the material cul-
ture celebrate? What is revealed by the decorations in homes, modes of dress, food eaten (or not
eaten), monuments respected (as opposed to those covered with graffiti), gifts given, etc.?
Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2011) 15

16. Mapping Culture
•In describing a proposed project, what will “impress” this audience? The project’s size? Its histori-
cal relevance? The technology used to produce it? How might new projects best be framed in
order to win popular support?
NORMS
Political
•What is considered a legitimate pathway to power? How do “heroes” in film and other popular
media obtain their power? Do they act as isolated individualists or in concert with others?
•“What gives a public the comfortable feeling that the way that decisions are reached and leaders
are chosen is ‘right’?” 60
•How does the group view compromise?
•Where does “genuine” law come from? (Nature? God? A constitution? Current political institu-
tions? Imagined, future institutions? Moral conscience? A personality from the past?)
•Is adherence to state-manufactured law admired or disdained? To what extent is state law equated
with “right” and “wrong”?
Social
•Is social status in this society primarily ascribed (i.e., one is born into it) or achieved? If achieved,
how so? 61
•What are the primary markers of a person of high rank in this society? How would you recognize
him/her? Does political power or intellectual prestige rank higher than economic surplus?
•What is the process for establishing trust? How does one know when it has been achieved?
•Do people perceive their own place and the dominant hierarchy as natural?
•To what extent are subordinates responsible for their own actions? 62
•What do proverbs say about social expectations and the perceived pathway to success?
Economic
•What are the group’s views on work? Which types are admired? Which are disdained? What are
the economic implications?
•Which economic activities are considered immoral?
•Is it considered appropriate to “master” the natural environment and bend it to one’s will?
•To what extent is the economy intertwined with kin obligations?
•What are obstacles to private property ownership?
•How does this culture group stack up when evaluated against the traits some claim are necessary
for successful market economies? 63 These can include:
•Is there trust in the individual?
•Are wealth and resources perceived as finite or infinite? Is the focus on “what exists” or “what
does not yet exist”?
•Is competition seen as healthy or unacceptably aggressive?
•Is this society comfortable with a questioning mind?
•Does the education system encourage investigative learning?
16 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2011)

17. Mapping Culture
•Are the “lesser virtues”—punctuality, job performance, tidiness, courtesy, efficiency – admired?
•Which are emphasized—small achievements accomplished by the end of the day (prefera-
ble for market economies) or grandiose projects (the unfinished megaworks of progress-
resistant economies)?
•What is the “radius of trust” in this community? Is trust extended to family only? How far does it
extend to strangers? 64
•What are prestige commodities within this community? Why? Might these serve as stronger incen-
tives for cooperation than direct funding?
•Is risk taking admired or negatively sanctioned? How widely spread is the “harm” of individual fail-
ure (damages family honor, potentially ignites retribution cycle, etc.)?
Security
•What defines “victory” for this group in a kinetic conflict?
•What types of battlefield behavior would result in shame?
•What level of internal destruction is acceptable?
•How do accepted myths describe this group’s military history? What is its projected destiny?
•Are allies viewed as reliable, or historically treacherous? What is the resultant ethic regarding alli-
ance loyalties?
Time/Change Orientation
•Does this group behave according to linear time? Is there a marked contrast between rural and
urban regions? Do deadlines matter? 65
•What is the future orientation of this group? Does it see itself as capable of changing the near
future? Is it deemed appropriate or laudable to make aggressive efforts to do so?
•Which time frames are referenced with strong positive emotion—past or future scenarios?
•Is there a significant gap between socioeconomic expectations and reality? (This often is a precur-
sor of social shifts.) 66
Problem-Solving Devices
•What is the order of activities for solving a social problem (often called an action chain)? Does
face-to-face confrontation happen first or last? Is violence used as a signal or is it an endgame? 67
•How do those outside of official channels of activity (i.e. women in seclusion, youth in elder-ori-
ented cultures) play a part in problem-solving processes?
•Which is preferred—action or deep deliberation? Is this group comfortable with trial and error as a
discovery method?
•Are individuals comfortable with making a wide range of personal choices? Are individual choice
and accountability practiced social norms? Would the choices present in democratic and market
systems be overwhelming?
•To what extent must community consensus be reached in order for a decision to go forward?
PERCEPTIVE LENS
Cognitive processes
•What sources of information yield ‘truth’? Scientific/factual processes? Dreams? 68 Inspired author-
ity figures?
Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2011) 17

18. Mapping Culture
•Are most situations set into dichotomous frames? Are they made to be black and white? How com-
fortable are group members with situational complexity? How patient are they in working to
understand it?
Of Self
•What are the basic expectations about the future? (“Poverty becomes a greater problem the
moment wealth is perceived as a definite possibility.”) 69 How might typical aspirations within this
society be charted?
•How does this group characterize/perceive its own history? Which events are highlighted? Which
are omitted?
•What does this group’s history tell it about “dangerous” behaviors/circumstances for a society?
(For example, Chinese—chaos, Americans—tyranny).
Of Others Generally
•How do members of this group assign intentions? What motives make the most sense to them? (If
the best US intentions do not “make sense” to the host population, they will assign intentions that
do. It is to our advantage to understand and then emphasize areas of cognitive congruence when
embarking on joint ventures.) 70
•What is this group’s view on human nature? Are people generally trustworthy? Are they prone to
excess and beset by vices, or are they able to regulate themselves? How are these views used
for legitimating less or more government?
•How does this group obtain its information about the outside world? Which sources are consid-
ered most reliable? How are those sources biased or deficient?
•Are outsiders perceived as fundamentally different or fairly similar to group members?
Of the US Specifically
•What are regarded by this group as US vulnerabilities?
•What does this group believe drives Americans? 71 What do they value?
•Does this group see common ground with its American counterparts? In which areas?
•To what extent does this group believe American rhetoric matches intentions?
Cosmology (The way the world works...origin and structure of the universe)
•When explanations for events are not easily accessible, how does this group fill in the blanks?
❖ ❖ ❖
18 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2011)

19. Mapping Culture
Endnotes
1. J.M. Roberts, The Penguin History of the World (London: Penguin Books,
1995), xi–xii.
2. See reviews in this issue of three works on Vietnam, two of which suggest
this approach.
3. Special thanks go to David Newcomb.
4. Rob Johnston, Analytic Culture in the US Intelligence Community: An Eth-
nographic Study, (Washington DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2005).
5. Ibid., 75–76.
6. Edward Stewart and Milton Bennett, American Cultural Patterns: A Cross-
Cultural Perspective (Yarmouth, ME: Intercultural Press, 1991), 11.
7. Johnston, Analytic Culture, 66.
8. Richards Heuer, Psychology of Intelligence Analysis (Washington DC: Cen-
ter for the Study of Intelligence, 1999), 21.
9. MG Michael T. Flynn (USA) et al., Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making
Intelligence Relevant to Afghanistan (Washington, DC: Center for a New
American Security, 2010)
10. Johnston, Analytic Culture, 8.
11. Ibid., 84.
12. Christopher Twomey, “Lacunae in the Study of Culture in International
Security,” Contemporary Security Policy 29 no. 2 (August 2008): 338–57.
13. Patrick Porter, Military Orientalism: Eastern War through Western Eyes,
(London: Hurst & Co, 2009)
14. Walter Russell Mead, Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and
How it Changed the World (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2001), xvii.
15. Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen, “The Test of Strategic Culture: Germany, Pacifism
and Pre-emptive Strikes,” Security Dialogue 36, no. 3 (September 2005):
339–59; Huiyun Feng, “A Dragon on Defense: Explaining China’s Strategic
Culture,” in Strategic Culture and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Culturally
Based Insights into Comparative National Security Policymaking, eds. J. L.
Johnson, K. M. Kartchner, and J. A. Larsen (New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
2009), 171–88; Rodney Jones, “India’s Strategic Culture and the Origins of
Omniscient Paternalism,” ibid., 117–36; Afshin Molavi, The Soul of Iran: A
Nation’s Journey to Freedom, (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2002).
16. Kevin Avruch, Culture and Conflict Resolution, (Washington DC: United
States Institute of Peace Press, 1998), 15.
17. Dalgaard-Nielsen, “The Test of Strategic Culture,” 342.
18. Barak A. Salmoni and Paula Holmes-Eber, Operational Culture for the
Warfighter: Principles and Applications, (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Univer-
sity Press, 2008), 13.
19. J. Avalos, discussion with author Jeannie Johnson, 2006.
20. C. Boyd, discussion with author Jeannie Johnson, 2006
Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2011) 19

20. Mapping Culture
Endnotes (cont.)
21. Tim Judah, The Serbs: History, Myth and the Destruction of Yugoslavia,
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 39–47.
22. Author Jeannie Johnson was part of the team conducting intelligence
analysis of Serbia and surrounding countries.
23. K. Moss, discussion with author Jeannie Johnson, 2006.
24. W. Stanley, discussion with author Jeannie Johnson, 2006.
25. H. Russell Bernard, Research Methods in Anthropology: Qualitative and
Quantitative Approaches (Walnut Creek, CA: Alta Mira Press, 2002), 188–93.
26. Ibid., 190.
27. S. Kjar, discussion with author Jeannie Johnson, 2006.
28. Gregory Giles, discussion with author Jeannie Johnson, 2006. See Gregory
Giles, “Continuity and Change in Israel’s Strategic Culture,” in Johnson et al.,
Strategic Culture and Weapons of Mass Destruction, 97–116.
29. W. Stanley, discussion with author Jeannie Johnson, 2006.
30. Molavi, The Soul of Iran.
31. C. Boyd, discussion with author Jeannie Johnson, 2006.
32. Stephanie Kelley, “Rumors in Iraq: A Guide to Winning Hearts and
Minds,” Strategic Insights, 4 (2005). This journal, published by the Naval Post-
graduate School’s Center on Contemporary Conflict, is available on that orga-
nization’s website
www.nps.edu/Academics/centers/ccc/publications/OnlineJour-
nal/2005/Feb/kelleyfeb05.html
33. Deborah Wheeler, discussion with author Jeannie Johnson, 2006.
34. Christine Fair, “Iran: What Future for the Islamic state?,” in Angel M.
Rabasa et al., The Muslim World After 9 / 11 (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND
Corporation, 2004), 244.
35. V. Daniels, discussion with author Jeannie Johnson, 2006.
36. W. Stanley, discussion with author Jeannie Johnson, 2006.
37. Rodney Jones, discussion with author Jeannie Johnson, 2006.
38. Joe Bermudez, discussion with author Jeannie Johnson, 2006.
39. J. Moyes, discussion with author Jeannie Johnson, 2006.
40. S. Taylor, discussion with author Jeannie Johnson, 2006.
41. W. Stanley, discussion with author Jeannie Johnson, 2006.
42. Christopher Twomey, discussion with author Jeannie Johnson, 2006.
43. A. Haycock, discussion with author Jeannie Johnson, 2006.
44. Fritz Ermarth, discussion with author Jeannie Johnson, 2006.
45. Christopher Twomey, discussion with author Jeannie Johnson, 2006.
46. Andrew Cortell and James Davis, “Understanding the Domestic Impact of
International Norms: A Research Agenda,” International Studies Review 2, no.
1 (2000), 65–87; Paul Kowert and Jeffrey Legro, “Norms, Identity, and their
20 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2011)

21. Mapping Culture
Endnotes (cont.)
Limits: A Theoretical Reprise”, in The Culture of National Security, ed. Peter
Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 451–97.
47. Glenn Chafetz, Hillel Abramson, and Suzette Grillot, “Culture and
National Role Conceptions: Belarussian and Ukrainian Compliance with the
Nuclear Proliferation Regime,” in Culture and Foreign Policy, ed. Valerie Hud-
son (London: Lynne Rienner, 1997), 175. The authors also offer a list of seven
typologies unlikely to engage in illegal proliferation. The National Role typolo-
gies are slightly modified versions of those proposed by Kal Holsti. See Kal
Holsti, “National Role Conception in the Study of Foreign Policy,” Interna-
tional Studies Quarterly 14 (1970): 233–309.
48. G. Lawrence, discussion with author Jeannie Johnson, 2006.
49. D. Anderson, discussion with author Jeannie Johnson, 2006.
50. L. Wilde, discussion with author Jeannie Johnson, 2006.
51. A. Richey, discussion with author Jeannie Johnson, 2006.
52. Lera Boroditsky, “Lost in Translation,” Wall Street Journal, 24 July 2010.
53. Peter Hays Gries, China’s New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplo-
macy, (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2005); Ted Hopf, Social
Construction of International Politics: Identities and Foreign Policies, (Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press, 2002).
54. G. Giles, discussion with author Jeannie Johnson, 2006.
55. Christopher Meyer and Adrian Zdrada, “Unpacking the ‘Coalition of the
Willing’: A Comparative Analysis of Norms in British and Polish Press
Debates on the Iraq Invasion,” European Security 15 (2006): 23–45
56. D. Anderson, discussion with author Jeannie Johnson, 2006.
57. C. Curtis, discussion with author Jeannie Johnson, 2006.
58. Jeffrey W. Legro, Cooperation Under Fire: Anglo-German Restraint during
World War II (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press, 1995); Legro, “Which Norms
Matter? Revisiting the ‘Failure’ of Internationalism,” International Organiza-
tion 51 (1997): 31–63. Kowert and Legro, “Norms, Identity, and their Limits,”
451–97.
59. Thomas Hylland Ericksen, Small Places, Large Issues: An Introduction to
Social and Cultural Anthropology, 2nd ed. (Sterling, VA: Pluto Press, 2001),
54–55; Stewart and Bennett, American Cultural Patterns, 129–38.
60. Glen Fisher, Mindset: The Role of Culture and Perception in International
Relations, 2nd ed. (Yarmouth, ME: Intercultural Press, 1997), 95.
61. For examples, see ibid., 52, 64.
62. For discussion, see Ericksen, Small Places, Large Issues, 155.
63. Mariano Grondona, “A Cultural Typology of Economic Development” in
Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress, eds. Lawrence E. Harri-
son and Samuel P. Huntington (New York: Basic Books, 2000).
64. The basic theory: the wider the radius of trust, the easier to engage in
economies of scale market economics. See Francis Fukuyama, “Social Capital”
in Culture Matters.
Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2011) 21

22. Mapping Culture
Endnotes (cont.)
65. A nice discussion of time orientations and why they matter can be found in
Stewart and Bennett, American Cultural Patterns, 73–76.
66. For diverse examples see Fisher, Mindset, 52.
67. A nice discussion of this, with diverse examples, can be found in Edward T.
Hall, Beyond Culture (New York: Anchor Books, 1989), 157–59.
68. Stewart and Bennett provide an interesting insight on this point in Ameri-
can Cultural Patterns, 62–65.
69. Ericksen, Small Places, Large Issues, 251.
70. For good examples, see Fisher, Mindset, 52.
71. Americans tend to overemphasize similarity. See Stewart and Bennett,
American Cultural Patterns, 11.
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22 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2011)