The document discusses several organizations involved in nuclear safety - the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the International Nuclear Safety Group (INSAG), and the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board of India (AERB). It then provides details on the construction and operation of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in Ukraine before discussing the causes and impacts of the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear disaster, including technical failures in the reactor's design and incompetence of the plant operators.

1. Industrial Accidents: Nuclear and
Radiation accidents

2. Chernobyl Nuclear
Disaster
A Case Study

3. IAEA
• The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is
an international organization that seeks to promote the
peaceful use of nuclear energy, and to inhibit its use for any
military purpose, including nuclear weapons.
• The IAEA was established as an autonomous organisation on
29 July 1957. The IAEA has its headquarters in Vienna,
Austria.
• The IAEA exists to pursue the "safe, secure and peaceful uses
of nuclear sciences and technology"

4. INSAG (International Nuclear Safety
Group)
• The International Nuclear Safety Group (INSAG) is a group of
experts with a high level of professional competence in the field of
safety. Group members work in regulatory organizations, technical
support organisations, research and academic institutions and the
nuclear industry.
• INSAG is convened under the auspices of the IAEA with the
objective to provide authoritative advice and guidance on nuclear
safety approaches, policies and principles. In particular, INSAG
provides recommendations and opinions on current and emerging
nuclear safety issues to the IAEA, the nuclear community and the
public in INSAG Series Reports and annual letters of assessment to
the IAEA Director General.
• The group was created by the IAEA Director General in 1985.
• In the safety series INSAG has produced a report

5. AERB
• The Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) was constituted on 15
November 1983 by the President of India by exercising the powers
conferred by Section 27 of the Atomic Energy Act, 1962 (33 of
1962) to carry out certain regulatory and safety functions under the
Act.
• The mission of the Board is to ensure that the use of ionising
radiation and nuclear energy in India does not cause undue risk to
health and the environment.
• AERB is supported by the Safety Review Committee for Operating
Plants (SARCOP), Safety Review Committee for Applications of
Radiation (SARCAR) and Advisory Committees for Project Safety
Review (ACPSRs)
• AERB also receives advice from the Advisory Committee on Nuclear
Safety (ACNS). ACNS is composed of experts from AERB,
DAE(Department of atomic energy) and institutions outside the
DAE.

6. Divisions and Directorate of AERB
• OPSD : Operating Plant Safety Division
• NPSD : Nuclear Projects Safety Division
• RSD : Radiological Safety Division
• NSAD : Nuclear Safety Analysis Division
• R&DD : Resources & Documentation Division
• DRI : Directorate of Regulatory Inspection
• DRA&C : Directorate of Regulatory Affairs &
Communications
• DRP&E : Directorate of Radiation Protection &
Environment
• SRI : Safety Research Institute, Kalpakkam

8. Construction
• The nuclear power plant consisted of four RBMK-1000 reactors, each
capable of producing 1,000 megawatts (MW) of electric power (3,200
MW of thermal power).
• The four reactors together produced about 10% of Ukraine's
electricity at the time of the disaster.
• Construction of the plant and the nearby city of Pripyat to house
workers and their families began in 1970.
• The completion of the first reactor in 1977 was followed by reactor
No. 2 in 1978, No. 3 in 1981, and No. 4 in 1983.
• Reactor No. 5 was around 70% complete at the time of block 4's
explosion and was scheduled to come online approximately six
months later, on November 7, 1986.
• A plan of setting of 12 reactors were scheduled to be running in
2010.

9. Aerial View Of All 4 Units

10. ACCIDENT
• The reactor went into operation on December 20th, 1983 with plant
director signing the document and certifying that the construction of
the reactor has been completed to gain fame and being awarded to
have completed the task before the end of the year.
• But the work was not finished. In order to sign that document, all
safety tests had to have been successfully completed. And yet, one
remained.
• The first time they tried, they failed. The second time they tried, they
failed. The third time they tried, they failed. The fourth time they
tried-- was on April 26th, 1986.

11. Causes of the Disaster: Technical
Failures
The cause of the Chernobyl disaster is considered to be the
combination of the incompetence :
• of the plant operators,
• flaws in the nuclear reactor and
• more generally the Soviet approach to nuclear safety and security.
• There is undeniable evidence that the root cause of the Chernobyl nuclear
power station was structural, contributed further by negligence of the operators.
• These problems were discussed in the article by Lyubov Kovalevska, a journalist
in Literaturna Ukraina famous for her deep insight in the catastrophe, which was
released just a month before the accident. The author gave clear “descriptions of
equipment and material shortages, low labour morale, equipment defects,
unrealistic building deadlines, and a slackening of construction standards.”
• In addition to this article, there had been many others since the 1970s that were
concerned about the poor quality of the Soviet nuclear power industry and its
effects on the environment. This proves that these problems were known by the
government, though no real attempts were made to fix them.

12. Domestic Failure
• Firefighters, being one of the first to deal with the explosion, were not aware of
the radiation and lacked relevant clothing and equipment for a catastrophe of such
magnitude.
• Similarly, the in-house medical team in the nuclear power station that aided the
victims were not properly informed, thus, not having appropriate medicine and
clothing.
• The very fact that the town had only four sprinkler trucks further evidences the
trivial way in which nuclear safety was viewed upon in the USSR government.
• it is striking that effects on the people’s health could have been minimized had the
nonradioactive iodine pills been distributed, or at least if the people had been
warned to avoid the worst affected areas of the country.
• The city closest to the disaster, Prypyat, lying three kilometers away, had not been
evacuated until the 27th of April, meaning that its population had already been
exposed to high levels of radiation, with many feeling its symptoms, such as
vomiting, metallic taste and headaches. Instead, the government decided to
maintain the normal state of events in order to avoid panic.

13. Conclusion
• Radkau argues Chernobyl revealed that the top-down approach in addition to
corruption in most spheres of Soviet life was disastrous to the state.
• This was later admitted by Gorbachev, who himself came to the realization that
central planning has a lot of limitations: it deprives the lower level of its own
initiative and decision making, causing incompetence and negligence, as in the case
of Chernobyl.
• It revealed that by surpressing independent critical thinking, the society has a low
capacity for development: it discouraged progress by preventing the flow of ideas
other than those allowed and already circulating.
Chernobyl almost ridiculed the Soviet system of central governing, as
it became evident that the multiple attempts to cover up the
extent of the disaster prevented even the higher echelons of the
USSR from having a full knowledge of the situation, leaving even
Gorbachev “a victim of the bureaucracy.”