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The Thing That Should Not Be

           A glimpse into the dark future of
               web application security



Bruno Morisson <bm@integrity.pt>               IBWAS’10
About me
•  Consultant & Partner - INTEGRITY, Consulting &
   Advisory
•  ~12 years in Information Security
•  CISSP-ISSMP/CISA/ISO27001 Lead Auditor
•  Background as a Linux/Unix sysadmin
•  Background as a C developer




                                                2
Warning!

This is all rather unscientific!



            Really.



 Consider yourself warned.



                                   3
If wishes were ponies…
…security would be inherent to the applications.

…there would be no (security) bugs.

…we would all get along just fine.




                                                    4
This is how they see us




                           5
This is how we see them




                           6
We’re all skewed!
Security practitioners have a skewed vision of reality.

We’re usually what regular people would call paranoid.

Developers have a skewed vision of reality.

They usually don’t care about (or understand) security
  issues.




                                                           7
We’re all skewed!
We believe everyone should care about security at least as
 much as we do.




   WE’RE WRONG!

                                                             8
We’re all skewed!




                     9
Security Mindset
“Good engineering involves thinking about how things
 can be made to work; the security mindset involves
 thinking about how things can be made to fail.”
                                          Bruce Schneier




                                                       10
“We have a firewall on our internets”




                                        11
“We use usernames and passwords to access our web
application”




                                               12
SSL
       13
Proof




Source: Cenzic Web Application Security Trends Report – Q1-Q2,
  2010, Cenzic Inc.
                                             14
More Proof




Source: Cenzic Web Application Security Trends Report – Q1-Q2,
  2010, Cenzic Inc.
                                             15
Even more proof




Source: Verizon Data Breach Report 2010
                                           16
OWASP Top Ten
•    Injection
•    XSS
•    Broken Authentication and Session Management
•    Insecure Direct Object Reference
•    CSRF
•    Security Misconfiguration
•    Insecure Cryptographic Storage
•    Failure to Restrict URL Access
•    Insufficient Transport Layer Protection
•    Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards

                                                     17
How are we solving this ?
The typical approach is forcing developers to
  solve all of these problems.

But the question is: Who are the developers ? Do
  they understand the problem ?

Most of them know nothing about security.

Some of them know little about web development.
                                                   18
19
Render Unto Caesar…
Security practitioners are not web developers

Why should web developers be security practitioners ?




                                                         20
Flashback




             21
Let’s party like it’s 1999
Most security vulnerabilities had to do with services:
•  HTTP (IIS, apache)
•  FTP (wu-ftpd, IIS)
•  POP3 (Qpopper)
•  SMTP (Sendmail)
•  DNS (Bind)
•  Telnet
•  SSH
•  …

Buffer Overflows, Format Strings, Integer Overflows were the flavor
  of the decade…

                                                            22
What happened ?
Security vulnerabilities had global impact.

Few companies/groups produced that software: Microsoft, Apache,
  SUN, Sendmail, Linux community/vendors.

Some built security into the process (Secure SDL), mainly Microsoft.

Tools started having security features (from bounds checking, to
  static and dynamic code analysis)

Operating Systems security was improved (no ASLR or DEP back
  then)


                                                               23
Back to the future




                      24
And now ?
Impact of vulnerabilities is limited to that company (or set of
  companies that use that particular software)

Anyone develops a Web Application.

Myriad of development languages.

Point & Click frameworks that automagically create code…




                                                             25
Looking into the future…
Let’s break this down into 4 areas:

•  Compliance

•  Processes

•  People

•  Tools

                                       26
Compliance
Unless there’s a business requirement, don’t
 expect anyone to implement security.

Ex: PCI-DSS, Data Privacy Laws, …




                                           27
Processes
If security is done ad-hoc, it will most surely
   fail.

•  Embed security in the SDL
•  Create internal processes for dealing
   specifically with security (e.g. risk
   assessment, engineering, testing, etc)


                                              28
29
People
Developers won’t build security into the apps,
 unless it’s a requirement…

They need to:
understand the security impact.
know how to solve the problem.
know how to use the tools…

Developers won’t become security gurus.
                                                 30
Tools
People fail. 

Tools/frameworks should become more idiot-
  proof.

Have security built in by default. Force
 insecurity to be explicit.


                                           31
32
Thank You!"

                                 Q&A?

Bruno Morisson
CISSP-ISSMP, CISA, ISO27001LA
[email]: bm@integrity.pt
[work]: http://www.integrity.pt/
[fun]: http://genhex.org/~mori/
                                         33

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The Thing That Should Not Be

  • 1. The Thing That Should Not Be A glimpse into the dark future of web application security Bruno Morisson <bm@integrity.pt> IBWAS’10
  • 2. About me •  Consultant & Partner - INTEGRITY, Consulting & Advisory •  ~12 years in Information Security •  CISSP-ISSMP/CISA/ISO27001 Lead Auditor •  Background as a Linux/Unix sysadmin •  Background as a C developer 2
  • 3. Warning! This is all rather unscientific! Really. Consider yourself warned. 3
  • 4. If wishes were ponies… …security would be inherent to the applications. …there would be no (security) bugs. …we would all get along just fine. 4
  • 5. This is how they see us 5
  • 6. This is how we see them 6
  • 7. We’re all skewed! Security practitioners have a skewed vision of reality. We’re usually what regular people would call paranoid. Developers have a skewed vision of reality. They usually don’t care about (or understand) security issues. 7
  • 8. We’re all skewed! We believe everyone should care about security at least as much as we do. WE’RE WRONG! 8
  • 10. Security Mindset “Good engineering involves thinking about how things can be made to work; the security mindset involves thinking about how things can be made to fail.” Bruce Schneier 10
  • 11. “We have a firewall on our internets” 11
  • 12. “We use usernames and passwords to access our web application” 12
  • 13. SSL 13
  • 14. Proof Source: Cenzic Web Application Security Trends Report – Q1-Q2, 2010, Cenzic Inc. 14
  • 15. More Proof Source: Cenzic Web Application Security Trends Report – Q1-Q2, 2010, Cenzic Inc. 15
  • 16. Even more proof Source: Verizon Data Breach Report 2010 16
  • 17. OWASP Top Ten •  Injection •  XSS •  Broken Authentication and Session Management •  Insecure Direct Object Reference •  CSRF •  Security Misconfiguration •  Insecure Cryptographic Storage •  Failure to Restrict URL Access •  Insufficient Transport Layer Protection •  Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards 17
  • 18. How are we solving this ? The typical approach is forcing developers to solve all of these problems. But the question is: Who are the developers ? Do they understand the problem ? Most of them know nothing about security. Some of them know little about web development. 18
  • 19. 19
  • 20. Render Unto Caesar… Security practitioners are not web developers Why should web developers be security practitioners ? 20
  • 21. Flashback 21
  • 22. Let’s party like it’s 1999 Most security vulnerabilities had to do with services: •  HTTP (IIS, apache) •  FTP (wu-ftpd, IIS) •  POP3 (Qpopper) •  SMTP (Sendmail) •  DNS (Bind) •  Telnet •  SSH •  … Buffer Overflows, Format Strings, Integer Overflows were the flavor of the decade… 22
  • 23. What happened ? Security vulnerabilities had global impact. Few companies/groups produced that software: Microsoft, Apache, SUN, Sendmail, Linux community/vendors. Some built security into the process (Secure SDL), mainly Microsoft. Tools started having security features (from bounds checking, to static and dynamic code analysis) Operating Systems security was improved (no ASLR or DEP back then) 23
  • 24. Back to the future 24
  • 25. And now ? Impact of vulnerabilities is limited to that company (or set of companies that use that particular software) Anyone develops a Web Application. Myriad of development languages. Point & Click frameworks that automagically create code… 25
  • 26. Looking into the future… Let’s break this down into 4 areas: •  Compliance •  Processes •  People •  Tools 26
  • 27. Compliance Unless there’s a business requirement, don’t expect anyone to implement security. Ex: PCI-DSS, Data Privacy Laws, … 27
  • 28. Processes If security is done ad-hoc, it will most surely fail. •  Embed security in the SDL •  Create internal processes for dealing specifically with security (e.g. risk assessment, engineering, testing, etc) 28
  • 29. 29
  • 30. People Developers won’t build security into the apps, unless it’s a requirement… They need to: understand the security impact. know how to solve the problem. know how to use the tools… Developers won’t become security gurus. 30
  • 31. Tools People fail. Tools/frameworks should become more idiot- proof. Have security built in by default. Force insecurity to be explicit. 31
  • 32. 32
  • 33. Thank You!" Q&A? Bruno Morisson CISSP-ISSMP, CISA, ISO27001LA [email]: bm@integrity.pt [work]: http://www.integrity.pt/ [fun]: http://genhex.org/~mori/ 33