1. The document discusses how globalization has changed the nature of international security threats. Whereas states were previously the main security threats, new threats have emerged from global criminal networks and failed states. 2. It argues that the future of international security will be a "consociational" system with a bipolar structure dominated by the US and China as emerging hegemonic powers. States will align with Western or Eastern societies but there will be no single global identity. 3. Accepting conflicting ideologies through open trade, addressing the root causes that enable threats like terrorism, and developing a shared understanding of threats will be key to providing security within this new global structure.

1. 1
Nathan
Anderson
INTS3702
Dr. Lewis Griffith
5-30-2012
Bipolar Anarchy: The Consociational Future of International Security
Civilization is entering a new age in international security. After WWII, the world
went into an era where the main security threat to the west was a state actor – the Soviet
Union. Nuclear weaponry was both the new threat and the new deterrent, and a sort of
malignant bipolarity was the norm. This sort of bipolarity was demonstrated by two
combating ideologies: Western and Marxist. The truth is, since the conference at Breton
Woods, the creation of the League of Nations, the IMF, and the World Bank, American
hegemony at the end of the Cold War was seemingly inevitable. In this time, the United
States has essentially colonized space and has created an unprecedented sea presence that
might never be matched.1
Despite the fact that the US has become the de facto leader in
policy standardization, globalization has created a new world with new security threats.
Credit expansion (most would argue over-expansion) and differing economic ideologies
(i.e. the American tendency to spend and the Asian tendency to save) have created
economic imbalances that have expounded over time. Meanwhile, nuclear weaponry has
become functionally useless. While economic interconnectedness is the norm around the
globe, China and the US are the two emerging hegemons that will be the focus of the
security debate for the foreseeable future. Gone are the days of state security threats, and
a new era has emerged where global criminal networks and failed states have become the
chief threats to functioning society.
1
Dr.
Kevin
Archer
at
the
Korbel
School
has
essentially
argued
that
it
would
take
China
at
least
50
years
to
catch
up
to
the
United
States’
offensive
capabilities
if
they
should
make
a
commitment
to
do
so.

2. 2
At the 2006 World Economic forum, Condoleezza Rice encouraged world leaders
to embrace China as a co-hegemon,2
and she declared that China should be welcomed as
a “responsible shareholder” regarding international security. China, with it’s own
problems – aging population and a fertility rate far below the replacement 2.01, will still
act as a counter to western power because of its massive economy and military
manpower. Indeed, the future of security for the western world is predicated on a new
type of state-regulated global civil society that will not create a global identity, but an
understanding of threats and a bipolar structure aligning states with western or eastern
society. Suddenly the Peace of Westphalia is relevant again, only this time global anarchy
has taken a consociational face through bipolar governance. The sooner developing states
associate with global hegemonic presences, the better off they will be. There will be a
new standardization of security, and that standardization will be an international reality
that is seemingly dominated by western military presence like NATO, and economic
symbiosis between global hegemons. Indeed, NATO controls 17 of the world’s 22
aircraft carriers,3
and while no nation truly matches Asian military manpower, the US and
allied nations are clearly built for an offensive global presence.
It should be clear that the consociational future of globalism is not a rejection of
pluralism, but merely a proliferation of east and west, and states will self-determine based
on this organic global structure. There will be no global identity, and the key elements to
providing global security in the future will be accepting conflicting ideologies in a true
free trade system, accepting the state’s role in international affairs, a realization that
2
Condoleezza
Rice
addresses
the
World
Economic
Forum:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VTwP4n7_8XM
3
http://www.hazegray.org/navhist/carriers/

3. 3
poverty and failed states are the responsibility of the developed world, and an organic
and relative standardization of values proliferating an understanding of new threats.
Accepting conflicting ideologies in a true free trade system
Globalization has empowered both states and non-state actors. States now have
the ability to coordinate security policy for a hegemonic good through military might.
However, military might may not be the end-all be-all of international security. The Cold
War has left the world with lose weapons, and globalization has empowered networks
seeking unconventional methods of terrorism – without state representation and without
borders.4
Open
borders
will
be
essential
to
the
consociation
argument,
as
the
lack
of
a
global
governing
body
means
social
and
economic
values
can
and
will
transcend
borders.
However,
this
creates
a
new
threat:
the
ability
for
rouge
groups
to
organize.
The
answer
to
combating
such
groups
is
not
an
easy
one.
History
has
shown
that
simple
conflicts
in
ideology
can
be
tough
to
overcome,
but
the
good
news
is
that
the
threat
is
transnational,
and
fighting
this
threat
will
be
an
international
effort.
If
the
Cold
War
united
the
free
world
to
combat
the
Soviet
Union,
then
new
threats
have
almost
created
a
new
global
solidarity
in
fighting
common
enemies
that
collectively
threaten
transnational
state
security.
Realist
theory
has
triumphed
because
combating
terrorism
and
rouge
states
is
indeed
in
the
interest
of
bipolar
international
anarchy,
which
should
start
to
level
economic
disparity
in
the
long
run.
Neoclassical
economic
theory
embraces
equilibration
theory.
That
is,
markets
will
eventually
equilibrate
based
on
trade
imbalances:
exports
follow
wealth
while
manufacturing
follows
cheap
labor.
This
4
Joyner/Parkhouse,
Nuclear
Terrorism
in
a
Globalized
World,
p.68

4. 4
works
in
the
long
run,
as
China’s
continued
development
has
created
an
increased
quality
of
life5
and
even
started
to
send
manufacturing
back
to
the
developed
world.6
The
world
economic
system
is
simply
too
integrated
for
state
actors
to
act
against
their
own
self-­‐interest.
Accepting the state’s role in international affairs
The next step in addressing the future of international security will be accepting
that this is an international reality. The three steps that the bipolar hegemons will have to
take – even in the interest of self-preservation – will be addressing the root causes of
criminal networking, unification against state threats, and accepting the fact that failed
states are the developed world’s problem.
“People’s lives become a lot more expendable in the interest of security and
comfort.”7
Perhaps economic equilibration needs a push, and this is where support for
free trade and open borders come into play. Perhaps the biggest threat to global security
is China’s currency manipulation that threatens equilibration. Nevertheless, China has
amassed massive amounts of wealth – albeit concentrated at the top –while laborers
continue to make low incomes while living in a low cost of living situation. This is why
the ability to cross political, social, and geographical boundaries is the best way to
catalyze an internationalist peace. Essentially, if states are to adopt a new understanding
of threats, they need to understand where the threats come from, and anti-west sentiment
can be addressed through goodwill. The argument is not essentially an argument for
forced proliferation of democracy, but rather meeting international needs symbiotically.
While poverty and destitution might be enablers of terrorism, international criminal
5
Fallows, James. The $1.4 Trillion Question. Atlantic Monthly, 2008.
6
Koerner,
Brendan
Made
in
America:
Small
Businesses
Bucking
the
Offshore
Trend,
Wired
Feb
2011
7
Dr.
K.
Archer,
Korbel
School

5. 5
networks, different as they may be, are not responses to poverty, but rather a product of
fundamental opposition to statism. Islamic fundamentalists, for example, do not regard
the state, but rather the Caliphate, as directed by the Ummah. However, the appeal of
joining an Islamic terrorist group or international drug cartel is compounded by poor
economic conditions.
Further, using the example of human trafficking, criminal activity is emboldened
by a lack of national cooperation. Not having an understanding of threats makes it easier
for people for lose their state identity and essentially become invisible blips in global
civil society. This is perhaps the best hyperglobalist argument. Since it has been
established that a global reality is unfavorable, it behooves responsible state actors to
standardize understanding of threats in the interest of functional necessity, as well
pressuring rogue states to behave responsibly lest they be cut off from the international
economic network. There has also been recent talk in congress of eliminating financial
aid to rouge states like Pakistan. Eliminating aid to Pakistan the state is probably a good
idea when the Taliban has gained levels of legitimacy in providing for the Pakistani
people, and all evidence supports the notion that Pakistan might be supporting terrorism,
or at the very least not doing enough to combat it. Most Americans can attest that citizens
don’t care if their nation is considered an international pariah when their needs are met,
and that is where goodwill becomes part of the security strategy as it is interconnected
with realist state interest.8
It behooves states to become fully vested in making people
aware of where their aid is coming from, whether or not local governments carry the
notion.
8
See:
Charlie
Wilson’s
war.
The
end
game
is
vital
in
dealing
with
potential
new
threats.

6. 6
State threats can come from legitimate governments. Two legitimate state threats
are Iran and North Korea, two nations that are generally panned by their geographic
neighbors.9
North Korea is the ideal example. This nation has seemingly been able to
completely isolate itself from the global civil society.10
The west has enough footage on
the most secretive nation in the world to give a general idea of the lives that North
Koreans live: starving, famished and destitute. With this information, we have enough
reason to initiate policy beyond the simple politics of communist-era trade embargos
and/or sanctions, and truly unify the west (and east, for that matter) for the sole purpose
of freeing the North Korean people. Internal and external pressures will eventually
introduce the North Korean people to the global market.11
Revolution
doesn’t
happen
at
the
peasant
level.
This
is
especially
true
in
North
Korea,
where
those
who
aren’t
in
the
North
Korean
elite
are
marginalized,
and
are
neither
organized
nor
strong
enough
to
revolt.
The
world
is
entering
an
end
of
history,12
but
the
end
of
history
won’t
come
from
an
appeal
to
western
values,
but
an
increasingly
top-­‐down,
consociational,
bipolar
international
global
structure.
A realization that poverty and failed states are the responsibility of the developed world
Realism and this international reality is precisely why it is in the collective
interest of states to address non-legitimized governments in states that are breeding
grounds for international criminal activity. Society and governments should be addressed
9
Iran,
for
example,
might
be
unified
against
Israel
but
the
Shia
majority
and
the
Persian
ethnicity
create
their
own
problems
in
dealing
with
other
Middle
Eastern
States.
10
Part of this has to do with the moment that the state gained its legitimacy – at a time when global
isolation is possible.
11
Boynton,
North
Korea’s
Digital
Underground,
The
Atlantic,
April
2011,
p.
58
12
Fukuyama,
Franicis
The
End
of
History,
Harper
1993

7. 7
separately. If revolution doesn’t happen at the peasant level, than foreign aid/sanctions
might not serve their purpose of uniting and encouraging/discouraging governments in
the interest of joining a bipolar world. States should understand that if they wish to
participate in this bipolar world, they will only do so on the terms of the states providing
services (such as goodwill, aid, trade, protection). One would be hard-pressed to think
that Pakistan wants the Taliban in their backyard, but its just part of a complex web of
national interests without regard for international participation in a hegemonic structure.
The
United
States
is
the
hegemon
for
western
society
An organic and relative standardization of values proliferating an understanding
of new threats is inevitable because the world is more anarchic than most would believe,
it’s just that sovereign states will yield to greater powers for their own self-interest. The
United States has paid for its role as a global hegemon though military expenses,
soldiers’ lives, and less emphasis on domestic affairs. But from the age of nuclear
deterrence, we’ve seen that peace has essentially come from states protecting their own
interest. Evidently, states have been made aware of game theory in that destruction has
become a zero-sum game. Sure, some global commons issues such as global warming
exist - and the security threats that arise from this will be addressed as they arrive13
- but
despite this, states will align themselves with a global hegemon in the interest of state
preservation.
13
There
is
certainly
a
threat
that
comes
from
an
influx
of
displaced
refugees.
This
further
compounds
the
argument
that
addressing
global
warming
is
best
done
by
preparing
states
for
the
future
effects
of
climate
change,
rather
that
making
the
drastic
economic
commitment
to
try
and
stop
climate
change.

8. 8
For example, if the US has effectively colonized space and have essentially
become the de facto manager of the “space” commons, most states have elected to fall
into order with US policy. It’s simply far more convenient than any alternative. Again,
the issues with the commons will be rouge states and non-state actors, which is precisely
where international pressure should lie. While global governance in its purest form is
impractical, hegemonic influence will essentially become said global governance. Few
international agreements have been reached, and the US typically sits out on the ones that
have (like Kyoto and the ICC), but nations continue to look to the US for guidance in
security and global economic issues. The US has more power than these global
institutions, because it maintains its global sovereignty. When the US fails, other states
fail and that is bad for all interested parties.
It is much easier to govern a bipolar world than a purely anarchic world, because
states better understand their own society and economic needs. And the future will be
dictated by communication between the two global hegemons, with the US directing the
west and China dictating the east. Other countries, such a BRIC countries, may enter the
fold further into the future, but their best interests are served by participation in this
hegemonic structure in the immediate future.
Since new threats are either non-state actors, or states that have been ostracized
from the international community, the future of international security will rally around
common threats regardless of social norms. The world is far too integrated economically
for any state to sustainably isolate itself the way North Korea (perhaps the biggest state
threat) has. Citizens in emerging states today have had the luxury of seeing the benefits of
an international system, and this transcends local and global governance. States who buck

9. 9
universal human rights or support terrorism will be ostracized as international pariahs,
and as such, will be cut off from the global trough. The next fifty years will see rational
state actors following through with self-interest, succeeding to the two global hegemons.
The US should support a “responsible” China in order to bear some of the international
security burden. Both states should address terrorism at its root cause and make criminal
networks the responsibility of the states that facilitate them. The US and China’s
economic integrations and collective self-interest will allow for a standardization of
security policy and, rather then developing a new global identity, will rally around
common enemies to accept the commonality of threats.