Egypt's Shift Towards Non-Alignment at Bandung

Egypt at Bandung:
A Transformation in Cold War Relations

Farah Osman
900071389
POLS 430
Dr. Ezz El-Arab

1

Abstract: This paper examines the effects of the Bandung Conference on Egypt’s role in

the Cold War, with a primary focus on the years between 1955 and 1958. Following an

extensive background on the conference and its context, an examination of its effects on

Egypt’s relationship with the Communist bloc, the Western bloc and the Third bloc is

offered. Through the usage of secondary sources, the bulk of which were written in the

years following the conference, this paper will show how Bandung drew Nasser into the

arms of the Soviet Union, led to the deterioration of relations with the West and

effectively created the Third bloc. In doing so, and with a focus on the political and

economic aspects of the aforementioned relationships, this paper sheds light on Nasser’s

Cold War policy during this timeframe and explains why these relationships unfolded in

the way they did.

2

Outline

I. Introduction

• Thesis: this paper will seek to examine the effects of the Bandung
Conference on Egypt’s role within the Cold War. It will highlights how
Bandung served as a turning point in that it drew Egypt closer the
Communist bloc, further away from the Western bloc, and essentially
created the Third bloc.
Contextualizing Bandung
II. The neutralist debate
I. Nasser and the US
II. Nasser and regional security pacts
The Bandung Conference
III. The Bandung Conference (on April 18 to 24, 1955)
IV. Nasser in Bandung
Egypt and the Communist Bloc
V. Sino-Egyptian Relations
VI. Egypt and the Soviet Union
Egypt and the Western Bloc
VII. Nasser’s new views on the West
VIII. Western reactions to Bandung
IX. The Aswan Dam Debacle
X. Suez Crisis
XI. The Eisenhower Doctrine:
Egypt and the Third Bloc
XII. Third Bloc Rising
XIII. The “Big Three”
XIV. The birth of non-Alignment
XV. Conclusion

3

“What can we do? We can do much! We can inject the voice of reason into world

affairs [and] mobilize all the spiritual, all the moral, all the political strength of Asia and

Africa on the side of peace.1” These inspirational words were uttered by President

Sukarno of Indonesia in his opening address at the Bandung Conference of 1955, and

embody the optimism with which this conference was viewed. While the Bandung

conference indubitably had wide-ranging effects on all those in attendance, it was a

definitive turning point in Egypt’s role within the Cold War matrix. This paper will

therefore seek to examine the effects of this conference on Egypt’s role in the Cold War,

with a primary focus on the Bandung era between 1955 and 1958. Firstly, Egypt’s

relation to the Communist and Western bloc prior to the Bandung Conference will be

examined. This will be followed by a detailed account of the Bandung Conference – its

objectives, influences and outcomes. At this point, the impact of the conference on

Nasser himself as a leader will be highlighted, followed by an explanation of the effect of

the Bandung Conference specifically on the Communist bloc, the Western bloc and

finally the Third bloc. The overarching theme of this examination will be that it was the

Bandung Conference that drew Nasser into the arms of the Soviet Union, led to the

deterioration of relations with the West and effectively created the Third bloc.

Contextualizing Bandung

In order to aptly understand the roots of the Bandung Conference, it is imperative

to examine the regional political concerns in the years preceding it. Arab states gaining

independence following WWII found themselves born into a polarized international

context – defined and controlled by Cold War dynamics. Consequently, there was an

1
Bregie van Eekelen, Shock and Awe: War of Words, (Santa Cruz, California: New Pacific Press), 114.

5

ongoing debate in neighboring Arab states regarding whether as newly independent states

they should remain neutral or align themselves with either of the Cold War blocs2.

The short relationship between Nasser and the US prior to Bandung was marked

by turmoil. The Free Officers coup of 1952 was hailed with optimism from the US due to

their seemingly friendly attitude towards the West. Despite this optimism, Nasser was

initially skeptical about an alliance with the US that required Egypt to make concessions

without firm prospects of US aid. However, Nasser remained willing to cooperate with

the West on his own terms and proposed Western help in building defense forces3. This

clearly signifies the fact that prior to Bandung, contrary to the belief that he was fiercely

anti-Western throughout the entirety of his political career, Nasser was not ideologically

opposed to an alliance with the West but rather wanted to ensure that it was to Egypt’s

advantage. This is evident in a statement given by Nasser following the Anglo-Egyptian

treaty of 1954 assuring a New York Times correspondent that “there is nothing standing

in the way of […] good relations with the West4”. This explicit acceptance of a Western

alliance was affirmed by a Revolutionary Command Council press statement that

identified the Soviet Union as the major threat to the Middle East5. This proves that in the

pre-Bandung years, Egypt had no intention of an alliance with the Communist bloc

whatsoever.

Despite these positive aspects of Egyptian-Western relations, long and futile

2
Georgiana G. Stevens, “Arab Neutralism and Bandung,” MEJ, 11:2 (1957), 140.
3
Elie Podeh, “The Drift towards Neutrality: Egyptian Foreign Policy during the Early Nasserist Era, 1952-
55,”MES, 32:1 (1996), 162.
4
Ibid, 164.
5
Ibid, 164.

6

attempts at securing US aid negatively impacted Nasser’s view of the West. In 1954, as

Egyptian hopes of US assistance soared, Nasser envisioned an independent Arab bloc

that would receive Western arms in exchange for not recognizing the communist People’s

Republic of China6. However, the US continued to deprive Nasser of aid, presumably due

to his refusal to sign a written agreement with the US or allow an American supervisory

team on Egyptian soil7. In February 1955, David Ben Gurion launched an Israeli attack

on the Egyptian position in Gaza, causing Nasser to bombard US ambassador Henry

Byroade with aid demands. As Nasser prepared to leave for Bandung a year later, he

asked for a definitive statement from Byroad concerning US aid and was given nothing8.

Therefore, Nasser went to Bandung harboring feelings of resentment and disappointment

towards the US.

The years prior to Bandung were also characterized by debates concerning

regional defense pacts. Seeing as how the Middle East is of strategic importance for a

multitude of reasons, including its proximity to the Soviet Union, the Western bloc was

attempting to sponsor regional defense pacts to protect against communist infiltration.

While some recognized the need for Western arms and protection early on (such as Iran

and Iraq), others such as Egypt were more hesitant about allowing Western-sponsored

pacts that may infringe on their sovereignty9. With Nasser assuming the presidency,

however, the West believed the tides would turn and Egypt would willingly cooperate in

defense arrangements under their auspices. To their dismay, they soon realized that there
6
Bary Rubin, “America and the Egyptian Revolution, 1950-1957,” PSQ, 97:1 (1982), 81.
7
Ibid, 83.
8
Ibid.
9

7

was no change in Egyptian policy. This was rooted in Nasser’s believe that it was too

difficult for Egypt to participate in Western-sponsored pacts, as it would be condemned

by public opinion and viewed as a perpetuation of Western occupation. The Baghdad

Pact – which would ultimately include Turkey, Iraq, Pakistan, Iran and Britain – was

consequently opposed by Egypt. Nasser believed this threatened to marginalize Egypt, as

Iraq replaced the Suez base as the hub of regional defense10. Despite discontent in the

formative months of the Baghdad Pact, Nasser expressed his concern that being too

critical of the pact would ostracize US11. Therefore, while clearly opposed to a Western-

defense pact in terms of its infringement on national sovereignty and concern that it

deprived Egypt of its source leverage over the West, Nasser was still prioritizing the hope

of positive relations with the West above said opposition. While Egypt was clearly

Western-oriented prior to the Bandung conference, these relations would soon drastically

change.

The Bandung Conference

The Bandung Conference took place on April 18 until April 24, 1955 in Bandung,

Indonesia. This monumental conference brought together 29 representatives of African

and Asian states together in order to promote Afro-Asian economic cooperation and

mutual interests12. Sponsored by Indonesia, India, Myanmar (present-day Burma), Ceylon

(present-day Sri Lanka), and Pakistan, Bandung was rooted in a need to share in the

decisions affecting their countries, dissatisfaction with Western domination of world

10
Elie Podeh, “The Drift towards Neutrality: Egyptian Foreign Policy during the Early Nasserist Era,
1952-55,”MES, 32:1 (1996), 162.
11
Ibid, 168.
12

8

affairs, desire to ease tensions between the People’s Republic of China with the West and

other Asian countries, and opposition to colonialism13. These goals were a natural

outgrowth of the context within which the conference took place – in the midst of a wave

of African decolonization and a growing division between Communist nations and

Western democracies. Therefore, the objectives of Bandung were to: promote goodwill

amongst states in attendance, consider socioeconomic and cultural problems that these

states face, consider problems that are unique to Afro-Asia (such as national sovereignty,

racism, colonialism), and view their position within the international community in order

to allow them to contribute to world peace and international cooperation14. While

undertaking these noble vows, the delegates also emphasized pursuing a middle ground

in the Cold War, respect for territorial sovereignty and respect for human rights.

While the attendees managed to reach consensus on a multitude of topics, there

were two major debates throughout the conference. The first debate was whether Soviet

policies should be censured along with Western colonialism. Following extensive debate,

delegates decided to condemn colonialism in all its manifestations15. This meant

opposition to colonialism and neocolonialism by European powers, the US and the Soviet

Union. Constituting a hallmark of history, this was the first time Soviet imperialism was

mentioned and Cold War rivalry was equated with European imperialism. This would

have significant effects on the emergence of a Third World bloc in the years following

the conference. The second debate that took place centered on the issue of alignment and

13
"Bandung Conference." Encyclopedia of the Cold War. Ed.. (New York: Taylor & Francis Group).
14
Georgiana G. Stevens, “Arab Neutralism and Bandung,” MEJ, 11:2 (1957), 144-146.
15
See Seng Tan and Amitav Acharya, Bandung Revisited: the Legacy of the 1955 Asian-African Conference for
International Order, (Singapore: National University of Singapore Press), 7.

9

defense pacts. Two camps formed with regards to the question of alignment with rival

blocs. The first, led by India, Indonesia, Ceylon, Burma and Egypt, favored abstention

from great power military alliances. These military alliances were criticized for being

instruments of great power domination that threatened the sovereignty of newly

independent states. Egypt was a fervent supporter of this notion as an extension of its

previous discontent with the Baghdad Pact and fiercely campaigned against bloc-

alignment. On the other hand, countries that were already engaged in Western-sponsored

defense pacts or planning to in the near future (such as Iran, Iraq, Turkey and Pakistan)

justified alliances by invoking the right of individual or collective self defense16. Despite

this polarization, many in attendance began to identify with Nehru’s view of defense

arrangements merely furthered the interests of superpowers at the expense of state

sovereignty. The conference ultimately accepted the right of individual and collective

self-defense, while calling for “abstention from the use of arrangements of collective self-

defense to further the interests of the big powers.17" Even though a compromise was

reached, this debate resulted in further polarization in the Middle East about the issue of

neutralism and nonalignment, with Egypt returning even more staunchly opposed to the

very existence of the Baghdad Pact.

The impact of the Bandung conference was extensive and wide-ranging.

However, two aspects must be mentioned due to their importance in transforming

Egypt’s relationship with the Communist bloc, Western bloc and Third bloc. Firstly, the

Bandung conference led to an unprecedented emergency of “Pan”-ideologies that

16
Ibid, 7
17
Ibid, 8.

10

transcended nationalist and pointed to internationalism18. This not only significantly

affected Nasser, who would later become one of the main proponents of pan-Arabism; it

also facilitated the creation of an international Third bloc. Furthermore, Bandung served

as an affirmation and extension of a double standard inherent in Asian neutralism –

expecting the worst from the West and giving the East the benefit of the doubt19. While

this blatant double standard may seem incongruent with the definition of neutralism, it

has a logical basis, seeing as how previously colonized countries maintained an anti-

Western sentiment and underdeveloped countries of the time tended to be vaguely

socialist20. While the Bandung conference in itself had a significant impact on all those in

attendance in terms of policy orientation, its effects on Nasser himself are of significant

importance.

Nasser in Bandung

Nasser emerged out of Bandung, his first international conference since seizing

power, as a dynamic and secular Third World leader who was deified for his courageous

stance against the West. Professing the meeting was a turning point in his political

understanding; Nasser credits the Bandung conference for the realization that

nonalignment was the only means through which Egypt could navigate the treacherous

waters of the Cold War21. Additionally, Nasser met several leaders there with whom he

forged relations that would greatly affect Cold War policy in the Bandung era. For
18
Nazli Choukri, "The Non-Alignment of Afro-Asian States: Policy, Perception and Behavior," Canadian
Journal of Political Science, 2:1 (1969), 6.
19
20
G.F. Hudson, "The Neutrals and the Afro-Asians," World Today, 20:12 (1964), 543.
21
Elie Podeh, The Quest for Hegemony in the Arab World: the struggle over the Baghdad Pact (Leiden: Brill
Publishing), 147.

11

example, his meeting which Chinese leader Chou En Lai en route to, and during, the

conference laid the foundation for Sino-Egyptian relations and tackled the possibility of

receiving military aid from the Soviet bloc – both of which would define Egypt’s

relationship with the Communist bloc following the conference. What was of greater

significance, however, was its effect on Nasser’s persona. As one of the most popular

leaders at Bandung, both inside and outside the Conference halls, Nasser could be seen

waving to the crowds and signing autographs for children eagerly awaiting his

appearance22. Applauded for his role in arriving at compromises between pro-Western

and neutral camps at Bandung, Nasser was elected chairman of the committee charged

with selecting and formulating resolutions23. This clear position of dominance and the

admiration with which fellow delegates viewed him changed Nasser’s perceptions of his

own role – a grander, more expansive and international role. This validation would assert

his prominence at home, but more importantly influence his relations with the

Communist and Western blocs. Upon his return, Nasser was hailed as the champion of

Asia and Africa. Nasser’s former colleague and rival in the RCC Khalid Muhi al-Din

recalled Nasser’s ascendancy by stating, “I immediately sensed that things had changed

greatly. In the past we used to address him as ‘Gamal’, but now I found everyone

addressing him as ‘chief’”24. Officially making Egypt synonymous with Nasser, the

Bandung conference elevated Nasser’s status domestically and internationally, while also

endowing him with a formidable conviction that he would no longer be subject to the

22
See Seng Tan and Amitav Acharya, Bandung Revisited: the Legacy of the 1955 Asian-African
Conference for International Order, (Singapore: National University of Singapore Press), 12.
23
Ibid.
24
James P. Jankowski, Nasser's Egypt, Arab Nationalism and the United Arab Republic, (Boulder: Lynne
Rienner Publishers, Inc.), 66.

12

whims of Cold War dynamics, but would commit steadfastly to an independent foreign

policy within the Cold War.

Egypt and the Communist Bloc

Sino-Egyptian Relations

Nasser’s meeting with Chinese premier Chou En-Lai in Bandung served as the

first step in promoting Sino-Egyptian relations. Post-Bandung, China opened its gates to

emissaries from all over the world. This led to heightening of Sino-Egyptian interaction

in the Bandung era through official and private missions of exchange. In 1956, Egypt

took a historical step by becoming one of the first countries in the region to formally

recognize the People’s Republic of China. This recognition was followed by a significant

increase in Communist Chinese diplomatic and economic activities in Egypt. Interaction

with China further intensified in 1958 with the establishment of the Permanent

Organization of the Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity25. The benefits of Sino-Egyptian

relations for Egypt, forged due to the Bandung conference, were two-fold: political and

economic. While communist China gained Egypt’s support for its claim to Taiwan and its

seat in the UN, Egypt gained Chinese support on most Arab issues including, but not

limited to, the Palestinian conflict, opposition to Western imperialistic designs in the

area, and French colonial presence in north Africa26. Furthermore, during the Suez Crisis

of 1956, China offered to send 280,000 volunteers to help the Egyptian forces in their

campaign against the West. While political and military support aided Egypt, it was the

economic relationship forged with China as a result of Bandung that was most
25
Joseph E. Khalili, “Communist China and the United Arab Republic,” Asian Survey, 10:4 (1970), 310.
26
Ibid.

13

significant. On August 22, 1955, China signed a three-year trade agreement with Egypt

under which payment should be affected in transferable sterling or in any other currency

acceptable to both parties27. Furthermore, Egypt’s recognition of China was accompanied

by a barter agreement under which 45,000 tons of Egyptian cotton was exchanged for

2,500 tons of Chinese steel28. In the years between 1955 and 1957, Sino-Egyptian trade in

creased from $28 million to $63 million annually29. Seeing as how China’s trade

relationship with Egypt was mainly as a market for cotton exports, by March 1958 China

was third amongst countries to which Egypt exported cotton30. The effects of Bandung on

Sino-Egyptian economic relationships were not only significant, but long lasting as well.

Even with the decline in Egyptian exports to China from 1957 until 1963 – following the

end of the Bandung era - Chinese exports remained almost constant, a testament to the

favorable balance of trade with China. Therefore, Bandung had a positive effect on Sino-

Egyptian relations that were favorable to Egypt. While significant in itself, Sino-Egyptian

relations’ post-Bandung also brought Egypt within the orbit of the Soviet Union

Soviet-Egyptian Relations

While it may seem odd that a conference that denounced Soviet imperialism

would lead to a closer alliance with the Soviet Union, the Bandung conference left Nasser

disillusioned with the West, and adamant in his pursuit of an independent Cold War

policy. During the conference, Nasser asked Chou En Lai to contact the Soviet Union

27
Ibid, 315.
28
Ibid.
29
Joseph E. Khalili, “Communist China and the United Arab Republic,” Asian Survey, 10:4 (1970), 315.
30
Ibid, 314.

14

about an Egyptian request for arms. As Egypt became increasingly aware of Soviet

willingness to provide Egypt with necessary military needs, and due to inheriting the

aforementioned Asian double standard, serious Soviet-Egyptian talks began following

Bandung. In July 1955, Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Dimitri Shepilov arrived in

Egypt to negotiate a possible arms agreement. The subsequent arms deal was guised as a

transaction between Egypt and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic – a Soviet satellite31.

The Czech arms deal of September 1955 granted Nasser between 120 and 200 MiG

fighters, 200 medium and heavy tanks, 35 twin-engine bombers and much more. The

significant of this arms deal is not solely military, but signifies a marked move towards

the Soviet Union32. Furthermore, this was hailed by the Egyptian public as a sign of

liberation from Western patronage and manifestation of Egypt’s independent foreign

policy. This monumental step in Egyptian history, which has repercussions on Cold War

dynamics in the entire region, could not have been possible without the Bandung

Conference.

Along with the Czech arms deal, which opened up the Soviet arsenal to Egypt and

signified military cooperation, the Bandung era was characterized by political and

economic cooperation. In June 22nd, 1956, a joint communiqué was issued between the

Soviet Union and Egypt expressing desire for all-around cooperation. Furthermore, that

same year, the Soviet Union supported Egypt during the Suez crisis by sending

diplomatic notes to Britain, France and Israel threatening use of force in order to restore

peace. Further agreements of cooperation were reached on a multitude of issues such as:

peaceful use of atomic energy in 1956, cultural cooperation in 1957 and economic and
31
32
Ibid.

15

technical cooperation in 1958. Furthermore, on May 15, 1958, a joint declaration was

issued expressing Soviet-Egyptian desire to strengthen relations on the basis of mutual

respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity. This declaration also outlined a dedication

to noninterference in each other’s affairs and peaceful resolution of international affairs.

These agreements are indicative of a strong Soviet-leaning during the Bandung era. This

was further exacerbated by a Soviet offer in June 1956 to finance the construction of the

High Dam, supplemented by offers of technical assistance throughout the building of the

dam. While this was a significant economic assistance, a survey of Soviet bloc assistance

throughout the Bandung era further affirms the extent of Soviet-Egyptian economic ties.

Along with financing the High Dam, the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, East Germany

and Hungry financed several other heavy industry and basic industry projects33.

Furthermore, trade with the Soviet bloc constituted one-third of Egypt’s foreign trade,

with the balance of trade clearly in Egypt’s favor. The Soviet bloc’s long-term trade

agreements granted Egypt L.E. 230 million in credit facilities as well as loans of L.E. 186

million34. Distant maturity rates, low rates of interest and payment in cotton ensured that

loans were not burdensome on the Egyptian economy and could be utilized immediately

without concern. Along with economic assistance, the Soviet bloc also undertook the task

of training and educating Egyptian engineers and technicians35. The aforementioned

Soviet and Chinese assistance not only solidified the Communist bloc as Egypt’s greatest

ally in the Bandung era, but signifies a strengthening of relations with said bloc in all

33
Anouar Abdel-Malek, Egypt: Military Society, (N.p.: Random House), 241.

34
Anouar Abdel-Malek, Egypt: Military Society, (N.p.: Random House), 241..
35
Ibid, 242.

16

aspects – political, economic, educational – as a result of the Bandung conference.

Nasser and the Western Bloc

While bringing Nasser significantly closer to the Communist bloc, the Bandung

conference inversely resulted in the deterioration of relations between Nasser and the

West. Prior to Bandung, Nasser was viewed by the US as a pro-Western moderate who

would not pose a threat to Western interests in the region. Following Bandung, however,

there was a noticeable shift in Nasser’s stance. Whereas the tone of pre-Bandung rhetoric

was conciliatory, with an emphasis on the peaceful aspects of neutralism, Nasser returned

from Bandung with a rhetorical undertone of Soviet support36. Simultaneously, due to his

emergence as an international figure in Bandung and his newfound persona, Nasser

returned more confident in his dealings with the West, and the disillusionment he felt

prior to Bandung was now manifested in a more independent foreign policy. Bandung

also endowed Nasser with a legitimate basis for adopting an even firmer stance against

the Baghdad Pact, as he believed the conference outlined abstention from defense pacts

of this kind. As opposed to the watered-down resistance he exhibited before the

conference, Nasser staunchly opposed the pact following the conference and set out to

establish defense pacts with neighboring Arab countries that excluded Western powers,

such as the Arab Solidarity Pact of January 1957 with Syria, Saudi Arabia and Jordan37.

The validation Nasser received at Bandung also empowered him enough to give the US

an ultimatum – unless he obtained US arms unconditionally, he would turn to Moscow.

Oblivious to the extent to which Nasser’s persona had been affected by Bandung, US
36
37

17

Secretary of State John Foster Dulles believed this was a bluff. By the time Dulles

realized Nasser was sincere in his ultimatum, the Czech arms deal had gone through.

Aswan Dam Financing and Project Omega

Increasingly aware of Egypt’s Soviet leanings post-Bandung, the US resorted to

involvement in Aswan High Dam financing as a means of ascertaining good relations

with Egypt. The financial commitment by the US, Britain and the World Bank was rooted

in the belief that, as stated by Treasury Secretary George Humphrey, “if the West does

not do, the Soviet bloc will38”. However, the US was outraged by Nasser’s recognition of

communist China. While Nasser believed that this act would convey to Washington his

new independent and neutralist foreign policy, the US considered it an attack on their

Cold War interests and US legislators were no longer willing to aid Egypt. Following a

statement by the chairman of the House Appropriations Committee Joseph Canon to

Dulles in which he explains, “we will not approve one cent for any dam in Egypt”, the

US revoked their financing of the High Dam39.

It is important to note that, while Congressional debate regarding financing the

dam was occurring, Dulles was drafting an informal policy towards Nasser’s Egypt in

March 1956. Project Omega, as it came to be called, realigned Middle East policy

towards the marginalization of Nasser. This was a direct response to Egyptian Soviet

leanings, and was meant to show Nasser that he would seize to receive any favorable

treatment from the US if he continued to cooperate with the Soviet Union. Dulles

proposed doing this through restricting Eisenhower’s 1954 Food for Peace Program and
38
39
Ibid.

18

other forms of economic aid, as well as actively delaying and eventually cancelling

Aswan Dam financing40. Dulles hoped Project Omega would strike a balance between

reprimanding Nasser and undermining his regional dominance, while still avoiding an

open break with Egypt that would drive it into the arms of the Soviet Union. Parallel to

US policy responding to Nasser’s Soviet support, Britain was responding by adopting a

hardened policy due to tits belief that Egypt was the root of anti-British activity in the

Arab world. Further enraged by Nasser’s opposition to the Baghdad Pact and his attempt

to foil British plans to incorporate Syria, Jordan and Lebanon, Britain hoped to overthrow

Nasser41. As Project Omega and the British policy were being formulated, and the US

was on its way to revoking dam financing, Nasser threatened to resort to Soviet

financing. Not only did the latter happen, Nasser did the unimaginable in response to the

acts of the Western bloc and nationalized the Suez Canal in the “spirit of Bandung”42.

The Suez War

The nationalization of the Suez Canal, regarded by Egyptians and Arabs at large

as a courageous blow to Western imperialism, resulted in the Suez War of 1956 – a

defining moment in Egypt’s relationship with the West. Following the nationalization,

Britain, France and Israel conspired to launch a tripartite aggression. The US disagreed

with this invasion and wanted to avoid war at all costs. It also resented Anglo-French

attempts at implicating the US and specified its primary concern as the continuation of

40
Ibid, 88.
41
42

19

peaceful operation of the canal43. US unwillingness to intervene was based on the belief

that Western-Arab confrontation in Suez would surely benefit Soviet interests in the

Middle East. Therefore, along with the Soviet Union, the US forced the withdrawal of

tripartite forces and played a major role in securing Nasser’s political success. While

support and intervention in the Suez Canal by communist China and the Soviet Union

resulted in the strengthening of ties, this was not the case with the US. The result of the

Suez War was devastating on Western bloc relations with Egypt. Along with destroying

British credibility and crippling the Baghdad Pact, it resulted in US resentment towards

Nasser. Following the war, the CIA, White House and State Department were fiercely

anti-Nasserist and became convinced that he was a Soviet tool44. This belief, coupled with

heightened fears that Egypt’s Soviet leaning would have a ripple effect across the region,

played a role in the birth of the Eisenhower Doctrine.

The Eisenhower Doctrine

Following the Suez Crisis, which posited Nasser as the ultimate Arab and Third

World hero, president Eisenhower felt the need to replace the power vacuum left by

Britain and France in the region and off-put Nasser’s dominance. This resulted in the

creation of the Eisenhower doctrine – a US attempt to mobilize the Middle East against

the perceived Soviet-Egyptian threat. Under this doctrine, the US promised to help

nations protect their independence and integrity against armed aggression from

Communist – or communist-dominated – countries45. While no specific reference was

43
44
Ibid.
45

20

made, the Eisenhower Doctrine was aimed at Egypt and Syria. Eisenhower hoped that by

extending a helping hand, he would provide Arab regimes with an alternative to pro-

Soviet Nasserism. Egypt viewed this as an attack by the US, and issued an official

response on February 1957 declaring a policy of positive neutralism, and reaffirming the

belief that the defense of the Arab should come from within the Arab national rather than

under the sponsorship of either power bloc46. This signified the final deterioration of

Egypt’s relations with the Western bloc in the Bandung era.

Nasser and the Third Bloc

When examining the effects of Bandung on the relationship between Egypt and

the Third bloc, one is faces a peculiar situation. Whereas Bandung resulted in gravitation

towards the Western bloc and away from the Soviet bloc, it effectively created the Third

bloc. The Bandung conference served as a landmark in the emergence of Third World

bloc – aimed to promote political and diplomatic autonomy of less developed countries in

the face of Cold War politics47. The gathering of Third World countries indicated that

Afro-Asian nations were capable of articulating their desire for more autonomy

collectively in a manner consistent with international diplomatic norms48. Furthermore,

these nations directly addressed the pressures placed upon them to participate in US-

Soviet rivalry. Viewing Cold War dynamics as a continuation of a long tradition of

Western-dominated diplomacy, delegates at the Bandung conference proposed the

46
47
"Bandung Conference." Encyclopedia of the Cold War. Ed.. (New York: Taylor & Francis Group).
48
Ibid.

21

creation of an alternative international order49. Therefore, it served as the first serious

challenge by the Third World to the existing Cold War dynamic. Due to the

aforementioned facts, the Bandung conference signified the debut of the Third World on

the international stage. Third World countries, arising from a long history of domination

and political suppression, would no longer be passive recipients but active participants in

global politics. The series of meetings that took place between Afro-Asian nations in the

Bandung era, all of which Egypt played a prominent role in, serve as a testament to the

formation of a cohesive Third Bloc. An example of this is the Afro-Asian People’s

Solidarity Conference that took place from December 1957 until January 1958. This

conference, which brought together 45 African and Asian countries and included the

Soviet Union and China, met in Cairo in order to emphasize their unity on overcoming

underdevelopment and neo-imperialism50. Through the formation of the Third bloc,

Nasser had finally found a place within which he could emerge as an international leader.

From early on in his political career, Nasser was committed to the belief that Egypt’s

place in the world was positioned between three congruent circles of influence – Arab,

African and Muslim. The Third bloc, therefore, endowed him with an arena where all

three circles coexist and where Egypt could become an international leader. Due to his

prominence and popularity during the Bandung conference, the resulting Third bloc

would naturally place Nasser in a position of leadership.

“The Big Three”

The Bandung conference also affected Nasser’s relationship with the Third bloc

49
Ibid.
50

22

as it created the relationship between the “Big Three” of the Nonaligned Movement -

Nehru, Nasser and Tito. Although Nehru and Nasser’s relationship predates Bandung, it

was during that conference that their political relationship was solidified. Furthermore,

Nasser’s commitment to the neutral doctrine during Bandung caught the attention of

Yugoslavian president Josip Broz Tito. This resulted in successive Yugoslav missions to

Egypt throughout 1955, culminating in an official visit between Nasser and Tito in

September of that year. During this meeting, both leaders established a friendship on the

basis of the Bandung principles51. The following year, Nehru, Nasser and Tito met at the

Brioni meeting in order to outline common convictions and the major theses of what

came to be known as positive neutralism. This included commitment to peace through

worldwide collective security, the disappearance of imperialism, belief that nonalignment

would ease global tensions and increase international cooperation52.. Consequently, the

Brioni meeting would serve as the foundation of nonalignment53.

The Birth of Nonalignment

The principles of Bandung inspired the creation of the Non-Aligned Movement

that was established in 1961 to challenge the Cold War spheres of influence. While

nonalignment is traditionally viewed as a replacement to Bandung’s neutralism, the

double standard and Soviet-leanings that originated in the Bandung era continued well

into the era of nonalignment. A study of the votes cast by the 50 nonaligned states on the

56 Cold War issues discussed in the UN General Assembly between 1960 until 1963 are
51
Ibid, 151.
52
Anouar Abdel-Malek, Egypt: Military Society, (N.p.: Random House), 226.

53
Ibid.

23

indicative of the perpetuation of the aforementioned trends during nonalignment54. By

examining the way in which officially nonaligned states voted, the study differentiates

between which countries were Western-oriented, Soviet-oriented, or truly nonaligned.

This study depicts Egypt as one of twenty-five Soviet-oriented nonaligned states – a

qualification based on the fact that Egypt cast a majority of their positive votes (97%) in a

manner identical to the Soviet Union55. This clearly shows that Egypt’s Soviet-leanings

during the Bandung era remained a defining element of its nonaligned policy.

The Belgrade Conference of 1961, the equivalent of Bandung to the Non-Aligned

Movement, hosted by Tito in coordination with Nasser brought together 25

“uncommitted chiefs of staff”56. Similar to the Bandung conference, in which 13 of the

delegations present were Soviet-oriented states, the Belgrade conference was attended by

15 Soviet-oriented states57. Consequently, this resulted in the continuation of the double

standard institutionalized in Bandung and endowing the conference with an anti-Western

hue. The resolutions of this conference, which Nasser played a significant role in

bringing to life, coincided greatly with the resolutions passed at Bandung. These

resolutions both criticized Western imperialism while attributing no condemnation to the

Soviet Union58. The Bandung conference, therefore, resulted in the creation of a Third

bloc that Nasser played a significant role in formulating. Furthermore, it set the

underlying premise of Third bloc views –a premise that would continue to lay the

54
Theodore L. Shay, "Nonalignment Si, Neutralism No," The Review of Politics, 30:2 (1968), 231-232.
55
Ibid, 235.
56
G.F. Hudson, "The Neutrals and the Afro-Asians," World Today, 20:12 (1964), 542.
57
Theodore L. Shay, "Nonalignment Si, Neutralism No," The Review of Politics, 30:2 (1968), 242.
58
Ibid, 241.

24

foundation of the Non-Aligned Movement.

Conclusion

A close examination of the Bandung Conference clearly shows the extensive

impact it had on Egypt’s relations with the Communist bloc, Western bloc and the newly

emerging Third bloc. This conference radically changed the lens through which the Third

World, including Egypt, viewed itself and its relationships with the global forces of the

Cold War. While this paper covers a wide range of repercussions on Egypt’s Cold War

relations caused by Bandung, one must realize its limitations and the further questions it

raises. In terms of its time-scope, this examination focuses primarily on the Bandung era

with a brief reference to the establishment of the Non-Aligned Movement in 1961.

Therefore, due to this limited time frame, one must question whether the effects of the

Bandung conference went beyond the early years of the Non-Aligned Movement.

Moreover, it remains unanswered whether Egypt’s Soviet-orientation during the Bandung

era was characteristic of Nasser’s presidency at large or whether it was limited to this era.

Yet another limitation of this analysis is its reliance solely on secondary sources. While

this provide valuable information and analysis into the effects of the Bandung era,

primary sources offer an unparalleled insight into the events at hand and bestow the

reader with a sense of the contemporary atmosphere surrounding the events. An

additional limitation lies in the focus of the analysis regarding the Western bloc primarily

on the US. Perhaps the examination would be strengthened by a greater analysis of how

the Bandung conference effected Egypt’s relation with other Western countries – such as

Britain. Furthermore, this analysis raises a question regarding US complicity in Egypt’s

Soviet-leaning during the Bandung era. While the Bandung conference instilled in Egypt

25

an affinity for the Communist bloc, the reaction of the US to the Bandung conference –

possibly an underestimation of its importance – could have exacerbated this affinity.

Therefore, this begs the question of whether this could have been avoided had the US

recognized the importance of the conference itself, and the importance of its effects on

Nasser and his policy. This academic work, therefore, must viewed as a stepping-stone

towards a more comprehensive analysis of this wide-spanning topic. In later stages, it

may aid the work if greater emphasis was placed on the Soviet reaction to Bandung, as

well as an increased time frame that allows determination of the longevity of Bandung’s

effects.

26

Works Cited

Abdel-Malek, Anouar. Egypt: Military Society. N.p.: Random House; First Edition,
1968. Print.
"Bandung Conference." Encyclopedia of the Cold War. Ed.. Ruud van Dijk. New York:
Taylor & Francis Group, 2008. Print.
Choukri, Nazli. "The Non-Alignment of Afro-Asian States: Policy, Perception and
Behavior." Canadian Journal of Political Science 2.1 (1969): 1-17. Web.
12 Dec 2010. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3231472>.
Jankowski, James P. Nasser's Egypt, Arab Nationalism and the United Arab Republic.
Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2002.
Hudson, G.F. "The Neutrals and the Afro-Asians." World Today 20.12 (1964): 542-548.
Web. 12 Dec 2010. <http://jstor.org/stable/40394445>.
Khalili, Joseph E. "Communist China and the United Arab Republic." Asian Survey 10.4
(1970): 308-319. Web. 10 Dec 2010. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2642442>.
Podeh, Elie. "The Drift Towards Neutrality: Egyptian Foreign Policy during the Early
Nasserist Era, 1952-1955"." Middle East Studies 32.1 (1996): 159-178. Web. 10
Dec 2010. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4283780>.
Podeh, Elie. The Quest for Hegemony in the Arab World: the struggle over the Baghdad
Pact. Leiden, the Netherlands: Brill Publishing, 1995.
Rubin, Barry. "America and the Egyptian Revolution, 1950-1057." Political Science
Quarterly 97.1 (1982): 73-90. Web. 10 Dec 2010.
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/2149315>.
Shay, Theodore L. "Nonalignment Si, Neutralism No." The Review of Politics 30.2
Stevens, Georgiana G. "Arab Neutralism and Bandung." Middle East Journal 11.2
Tan, See Seng, and Amitav Acharya. Bandung Revisited: the Legacy of the 1955 Asian-
African Conference for International Order. Singapore: National University of
Singapore Press, 2008. Print.
van Eekelen, Bregje. Shock and Awe: War of Words. Santa Cruz, California: New Pacific
Press, 2004. Print.

27

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