Automatic CAN Communication
andCybersecurity in EV
Architecture
A System-Level Perspective
Keerthana Sahadevan
15-Minute Technical Review
2.
Why Communication IsCritical in
EVs
• Electric vehicles consist of multiple distributed
ECUs
– Battery, motor, and charging systems are safety-
critical
– Real-time coordination is mandatory
– Communication failure can directly impact vehicle
safety
3.
Typical EV ElectronicArchitecture
Battery
+BMS
VCU
Inverter
& Motor
On-Board
Charger
DC-DC
Converter
4.
In-Vehicle Communication
Networks
• CAN– Powertrain, BMS, charging systems
– LIN – Low-speed sensors and actuators
– FlexRay – Legacy deterministic systems
– Ethernet – ADAS and infotainment
– CAN dominates EV powertrain due to robustness
and determinism
5.
What Is AutomaticCAN
Communication?
• Message-based protocol (not address-based)
– No master node in the network
– Event-driven message transmission
– Priority-based arbitration
– ECUs operate autonomously based on received
messages
6.
CAN Arbitration andSafety
• Lower CAN identifier corresponds to higher
priority
– Dominant and recessive bit mechanism avoids
collisions
– Ensures deterministic bus access
– Safety-critical messages always win arbitration
7.
CAN Communication at
ComponentLevel
• BMS: State-of-Charge, temperature, fault flags
– VCU: Torque commands and operating modes
– Inverter: Speed and current feedback
– On-Board Charger: Voltage, current, charging
status
8.
Device and EquipmentPerspective
• Commercial BMS ICs integrate CAN/CAN-FD
– Examples: TI BQ769x, NXP MC33771, ADI LTC6811
– Continuous monitoring and fault detection
– Faults and limits are broadcast via CAN messages
9.
CAN Communication DuringEV
Charging
• BMS defines voltage, current, and
temperature limits
– VCU authorizes and supervises charging
– On-Board Charger regulates power flow
– Continuous CAN feedback ensures charging safety
10.
Cybersecurity Awareness inEV
CAN
• CAN lacks built-in authentication
– No encryption of messages
– Trust-based network architecture
– Vulnerable to spoofing and replay attacks
11.
Industry Response andStandards
• ISO 21434 – Road vehicle cybersecurity
– UNECE R155 – Cybersecurity regulation
– Secure gateways and network segmentation
– CAN intrusion detection systems
12.
Summary and OpenQuestions
• CAN is the safety communication backbone of
EVs
– Automatic arbitration enables reliable real-time
control
– Device-level behavior is critical for safety
– Cybersecurity must be addressed at system level
– Guidance sought on real-world validation practices
Editor's Notes
#1 This presentation summarizes my system-level understanding of CAN communication in electric vehicles, focusing on architecture, device-level interaction, and cybersecurity awareness.
#2 EVs behave as cyber-physical systems. Safe operation depends on reliable and deterministic communication between electronic control units.
#3 This slide shows the distributed electronic architecture of a typical EV. All these subsystems are coordinated through in-vehicle communication networks, primarily CAN.
#4 Despite newer protocols, CAN remains the backbone of EV powertrain and battery management communication.
#5 Automatic CAN communication allows decentralized control, which is essential for safety-critical EV operations.
#6 For example, a battery fault message will override non-critical data, ensuring immediate system response.
#7 Each ECU publishes data onto the CAN bus, and other ECUs subscribe to information relevant to their function.
#8 Studying real BMS devices helps understand how CAN communication is implemented in commercial EV systems.
#9 Internal CAN communication ensures safe charging, while external protocols handle grid or fast-charger interaction.
#10 This is an awareness-level study. The focus is on identifying vulnerabilities rather than designing mitigation strategies.
#11 Industry addresses security through layered approaches rather than modifying the CAN protocol itself.
#12 I welcome guidance on CAN priority design, BMS validation methods, and secure charging communication in real EV systems.