Automatic CAN Communication
and Cybersecurity in EV
Architecture
A System-Level Perspective
Keerthana Sahadevan
15-Minute Technical Review
Why Communication Is Critical in
EVs
• Electric vehicles consist of multiple distributed
ECUs
– Battery, motor, and charging systems are safety-
critical
– Real-time coordination is mandatory
– Communication failure can directly impact vehicle
safety
Typical EV Electronic Architecture
Battery
+BMS
VCU
Inverter
& Motor
On-Board
Charger
DC-DC
Converter
In-Vehicle Communication
Networks
• CAN – Powertrain, BMS, charging systems
– LIN – Low-speed sensors and actuators
– FlexRay – Legacy deterministic systems
– Ethernet – ADAS and infotainment
– CAN dominates EV powertrain due to robustness
and determinism
What Is Automatic CAN
Communication?
• Message-based protocol (not address-based)
– No master node in the network
– Event-driven message transmission
– Priority-based arbitration
– ECUs operate autonomously based on received
messages
CAN Arbitration and Safety
• Lower CAN identifier corresponds to higher
priority
– Dominant and recessive bit mechanism avoids
collisions
– Ensures deterministic bus access
– Safety-critical messages always win arbitration
CAN Communication at
Component Level
• BMS: State-of-Charge, temperature, fault flags
– VCU: Torque commands and operating modes
– Inverter: Speed and current feedback
– On-Board Charger: Voltage, current, charging
status
Device and Equipment Perspective
• Commercial BMS ICs integrate CAN/CAN-FD
– Examples: TI BQ769x, NXP MC33771, ADI LTC6811
– Continuous monitoring and fault detection
– Faults and limits are broadcast via CAN messages
CAN Communication During EV
Charging
• BMS defines voltage, current, and
temperature limits
– VCU authorizes and supervises charging
– On-Board Charger regulates power flow
– Continuous CAN feedback ensures charging safety
Cybersecurity Awareness in EV
CAN
• CAN lacks built-in authentication
– No encryption of messages
– Trust-based network architecture
– Vulnerable to spoofing and replay attacks
Industry Response and Standards
• ISO 21434 – Road vehicle cybersecurity
– UNECE R155 – Cybersecurity regulation
– Secure gateways and network segmentation
– CAN intrusion detection systems
Summary and Open Questions
• CAN is the safety communication backbone of
EVs
– Automatic arbitration enables reliable real-time
control
– Device-level behavior is critical for safety
– Cybersecurity must be addressed at system level
– Guidance sought on real-world validation practices

Automatic_CAN_Communication_in_EVs_15min.pptx

  • 1.
    Automatic CAN Communication andCybersecurity in EV Architecture A System-Level Perspective Keerthana Sahadevan 15-Minute Technical Review
  • 2.
    Why Communication IsCritical in EVs • Electric vehicles consist of multiple distributed ECUs – Battery, motor, and charging systems are safety- critical – Real-time coordination is mandatory – Communication failure can directly impact vehicle safety
  • 3.
    Typical EV ElectronicArchitecture Battery +BMS VCU Inverter & Motor On-Board Charger DC-DC Converter
  • 4.
    In-Vehicle Communication Networks • CAN– Powertrain, BMS, charging systems – LIN – Low-speed sensors and actuators – FlexRay – Legacy deterministic systems – Ethernet – ADAS and infotainment – CAN dominates EV powertrain due to robustness and determinism
  • 5.
    What Is AutomaticCAN Communication? • Message-based protocol (not address-based) – No master node in the network – Event-driven message transmission – Priority-based arbitration – ECUs operate autonomously based on received messages
  • 6.
    CAN Arbitration andSafety • Lower CAN identifier corresponds to higher priority – Dominant and recessive bit mechanism avoids collisions – Ensures deterministic bus access – Safety-critical messages always win arbitration
  • 7.
    CAN Communication at ComponentLevel • BMS: State-of-Charge, temperature, fault flags – VCU: Torque commands and operating modes – Inverter: Speed and current feedback – On-Board Charger: Voltage, current, charging status
  • 8.
    Device and EquipmentPerspective • Commercial BMS ICs integrate CAN/CAN-FD – Examples: TI BQ769x, NXP MC33771, ADI LTC6811 – Continuous monitoring and fault detection – Faults and limits are broadcast via CAN messages
  • 9.
    CAN Communication DuringEV Charging • BMS defines voltage, current, and temperature limits – VCU authorizes and supervises charging – On-Board Charger regulates power flow – Continuous CAN feedback ensures charging safety
  • 10.
    Cybersecurity Awareness inEV CAN • CAN lacks built-in authentication – No encryption of messages – Trust-based network architecture – Vulnerable to spoofing and replay attacks
  • 11.
    Industry Response andStandards • ISO 21434 – Road vehicle cybersecurity – UNECE R155 – Cybersecurity regulation – Secure gateways and network segmentation – CAN intrusion detection systems
  • 12.
    Summary and OpenQuestions • CAN is the safety communication backbone of EVs – Automatic arbitration enables reliable real-time control – Device-level behavior is critical for safety – Cybersecurity must be addressed at system level – Guidance sought on real-world validation practices

Editor's Notes

  • #1 This presentation summarizes my system-level understanding of CAN communication in electric vehicles, focusing on architecture, device-level interaction, and cybersecurity awareness.
  • #2 EVs behave as cyber-physical systems. Safe operation depends on reliable and deterministic communication between electronic control units.
  • #3 This slide shows the distributed electronic architecture of a typical EV. All these subsystems are coordinated through in-vehicle communication networks, primarily CAN.
  • #4 Despite newer protocols, CAN remains the backbone of EV powertrain and battery management communication.
  • #5 Automatic CAN communication allows decentralized control, which is essential for safety-critical EV operations.
  • #6 For example, a battery fault message will override non-critical data, ensuring immediate system response.
  • #7 Each ECU publishes data onto the CAN bus, and other ECUs subscribe to information relevant to their function.
  • #8 Studying real BMS devices helps understand how CAN communication is implemented in commercial EV systems.
  • #9 Internal CAN communication ensures safe charging, while external protocols handle grid or fast-charger interaction.
  • #10 This is an awareness-level study. The focus is on identifying vulnerabilities rather than designing mitigation strategies.
  • #11 Industry addresses security through layered approaches rather than modifying the CAN protocol itself.
  • #12 I welcome guidance on CAN priority design, BMS validation methods, and secure charging communication in real EV systems.