The document summarizes the 2014 downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 over Ukraine by pro-Russian separatists using a surface-to-air missile. It discusses the technical investigation led by the Dutch Safety Board that found the plane was shot down by a missile and notes the ongoing criminal investigation. It also summarizes the Dutch Safety Board's recommendations focusing on conflict zone risk assessment and management by states and operators. The commentary analyzes the recommendations and notes challenges around balancing sovereignty, safety, and political tensions but argues states ultimately bear responsibility for airspace security.
The document provides information on airport emergencies and procedures. It includes a table of contents listing sections on airport emergencies, bomb threat emergencies, and a conclusion. The introduction discusses the importance of preparing for various emergency situations that airports may face. The airport emergencies section then outlines different types of hazards airports need to plan for, such as aircraft incidents, natural disasters, bomb incidents, and hazardous materials. The bomb threat emergency section provides procedures for responding to bomb threats involving aircraft or buildings. This includes evacuating areas and notifying authorities.
1) The crash of MH17 was caused by the detonation of a Buk surface-to-air missile launched from eastern Ukraine.
2) Ukraine had sufficient reason to close the airspace over eastern Ukraine due to the armed conflict but did not.
3) The current system of responsibilities for flying over conflict areas is inadequate as operators and states do not adequately share information or assess risks to civil aviation from conflicts.
This document provides an overview and guidelines for developing an airport emergency plan. It discusses the need for emergency planning to minimize impacts and save lives during an incident. The airport authority is responsible for establishing the plan and coordinating response efforts among various on-airport and off-airport agencies. Key aspects of a plan include defining command structure, roles and responsibilities, and coordination procedures for different emergency types. The plan should cover pre-incident planning, emergency response operations, and post-incident support. Regular exercises are important to test and improve the plan.
The document outlines the requirements for an airport security program according to Annex 17 of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). It states that each country must require airports serving international flights to establish a written security program to meet national requirements. It also requires the establishment of an airport security committee to help coordinate security controls. The document then discusses the objectives and sources of regulations for security programs, the relevant security authorities, and provides an overview of security measures, training, and emergency response procedures that must be included.
Marina Kuznechevskaya, International Aviation Expert and Member of Advisory board of IATA Cargo and Passenger committees is Guest Speaker for CILT international webinar on Wednesday 15th July 2020.
The COVID-19 virus has spread worldwide without acknowledging borders. It has impacted all industries, all sectors and all aspects of our lives with devastating economic and financial losses and significant uncertainties.
Lt Col (Retd) Kevin Byrne, international aviation expert, and Past International President of CILT is Guest Speaker for CILT international webinar on Wednesday 15th July 2020.
The document provides information on airport emergencies and procedures. It includes a table of contents listing sections on airport emergencies, bomb threat emergencies, and a conclusion. The introduction discusses the importance of preparing for various emergency situations that airports may face. The airport emergencies section then outlines different types of hazards airports need to plan for, such as aircraft incidents, natural disasters, bomb incidents, and hazardous materials. The bomb threat emergency section provides procedures for responding to bomb threats involving aircraft or buildings. This includes evacuating areas and notifying authorities.
1) The crash of MH17 was caused by the detonation of a Buk surface-to-air missile launched from eastern Ukraine.
2) Ukraine had sufficient reason to close the airspace over eastern Ukraine due to the armed conflict but did not.
3) The current system of responsibilities for flying over conflict areas is inadequate as operators and states do not adequately share information or assess risks to civil aviation from conflicts.
This document provides an overview and guidelines for developing an airport emergency plan. It discusses the need for emergency planning to minimize impacts and save lives during an incident. The airport authority is responsible for establishing the plan and coordinating response efforts among various on-airport and off-airport agencies. Key aspects of a plan include defining command structure, roles and responsibilities, and coordination procedures for different emergency types. The plan should cover pre-incident planning, emergency response operations, and post-incident support. Regular exercises are important to test and improve the plan.
The document outlines the requirements for an airport security program according to Annex 17 of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). It states that each country must require airports serving international flights to establish a written security program to meet national requirements. It also requires the establishment of an airport security committee to help coordinate security controls. The document then discusses the objectives and sources of regulations for security programs, the relevant security authorities, and provides an overview of security measures, training, and emergency response procedures that must be included.
Marina Kuznechevskaya, International Aviation Expert and Member of Advisory board of IATA Cargo and Passenger committees is Guest Speaker for CILT international webinar on Wednesday 15th July 2020.
The COVID-19 virus has spread worldwide without acknowledging borders. It has impacted all industries, all sectors and all aspects of our lives with devastating economic and financial losses and significant uncertainties.
Lt Col (Retd) Kevin Byrne, international aviation expert, and Past International President of CILT is Guest Speaker for CILT international webinar on Wednesday 15th July 2020.
This chapter discusses security challenges across various transportation sectors and efforts to address them. It covers difficulties hardening airports, rail stations, ports and securing cargo. Mass transit poses unique risks given accessibility needs. The Transportation Security Administration took over after 9/11 but screeners still miss threats and more funding is needed. Pipeline and trucking industries expanded monitoring but more coordinated security strategies are still needed across sectors. Risk assessment and management best practices can help but bureaucracy has slowed comprehensive security progress.
IMPACT OF COVID-19 ON CIVIL AVIATION: CHANGES IN THE REGULATORY LANDSCAPEAbhijeet Singh
This document provides an agenda for an international conference on the impact of COVID-19 on civil aviation and the resulting changes to the regulatory landscape. The conference will feature several sessions with experts in the field of aviation law discussing topics such as health and safety protocols, contractual obligations, financing challenges, and more. It lists the resource persons who will speak, including professors, lawyers, and academics from countries around the world. The detailed schedule outlines the topics and speakers for each session across the day-long virtual event.
The student expresses gratitude to their teacher Mrs. Piyali Mukherjee for guiding them on their aviation project. The document then provides updates on the growth of the Indian aviation industry, including a 22% increase in domestic passenger traffic in 2016-2017. It also outlines requirements for the project, describing the parts of an airplane, procedures for embarking and disembarking special passengers, emergency equipment and its use, and the routines and responsibilities of cabin crew on international flights. Key aircraft - the Boeing 747 and Airbus A380 - are also compared. The student concludes by thanking their teacher again for helping them learn about and complete the project on the aviation industry.
A TASK BASED information break down of COUNTERING UAVEdwin Hofte
THE RAPID SPREAD AND GROWING USE OF UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES (UAV) BY INDIVIDUALS, THE PRIVATE SECTOR AND TERRORISTS HAS GIVEN WAY TO NUMEROUS DEVELOPING SECURITY CONCERNS. THIS ARTICLE ANALYSES HOW GOVERNMENT, REGULATORS, SECURITY SERVICES, LAW ENFORCEMENT CAN ADDRESS SOME OF THESE CONCERNS. COUNTERING THESE SECURITY THREATS IS COMPLEX AS THE THREATS HAVE TO BE COUNTERED AT DIFFERENT TECHNOLOGICAL LEVELS AND INTENDED USE SUCH AS TERRORIST, CRIMINAL, MILITARY, INTELLIGENCE, SAFETY ETC. TO ENABLE ANALYSIS A FRAMEWORK IS INTRODUCED TO CLASSIFY THE TASKS COMMONLY ASSOCIATED WITH ADDRESSING SECURITY THREATS: INTELLIGENCE, GUARD AND SECURE, OPERATIONS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT. USING THIS FRAMEWORK A BREAKDOWN OF THE INFORMATION NECESSARY TO PERFORM THE DIFFERENT TASKS IS INTRODUCED. WE ANALYSED WHAT INFORMATION NEEDS TO BE GATHERED TO ENABLE THE DEVELOPMENT AND EXECUTION OF COUNTER MEASURES ASSOCIATED WITH THE DIFFERENT TASKS. SPECIAL ATTENTION IS PAID TO HOW DIGITAL FORENSICS ON UAV’S COULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE TASKS OF INTELLIGENCE, GUARD AND SECURE, OPERATIONS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT.
The document discusses various transportation security laws and regulations passed after 9/11. It provides an overview of key laws such as the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, which created the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), and the Maritime Transportation Security Act, which enhanced port security. It also discusses international treaties and standards regarding aviation, cargo, rail, maritime, and hazardous materials transportation security. While significant progress has been made in strengthening domestic transportation security laws, the document concludes that more still needs to be done to standardize security practices across all modes of transportation.
The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) is a UN agency that develops standards and policies for civil aviation safety and security worldwide. Key points:
- ICAO works to ensure safe and orderly growth of civil aviation globally through developing standards for aviation security, air navigation facilities, and flight safety.
- In response to incidents like the 1985 hijacking of TWA Flight 847, ICAO established policies like requiring member states to screen passengers, baggage, and employ security agencies at airports to prevent terrorist attacks on civil aviation.
- ICAO also created the Universal Security Audit Program to conduct regular, mandatory security audits of member states' compliance with ICAO standards and help address identified deficiencies
India stepped up airport security after the 1999 hijacking of Indian Airlines Flight 814. [1] The Central Industrial Security Force (CISF) is responsible for security at Indian airports under the Bureau of Civil Aviation Security. [2] The CISF formed an Airport Security Group and assigns Airport Security Units (APSUs) to each airport to protect against unlawful interference. [3]
Conflict Zones - ERA operations group 28.04.2015Philippe Carous
This document discusses conflict zones in civil aviation. It begins by assessing the risks posed by anti-aircraft systems like missiles and the conflicts zones in April 2015. It then examines existing rules regarding conflict zones at the international, regional and national levels. Several observations are made, including that rules are not specific to conflict zones and responsibility is unclear. The document outlines obstacles in dealing with conflict zones, such as different community approaches and information sharing challenges. Finally, it discusses potential solutions at legal, institutional and operational levels from various stakeholders like ICAO, states, airlines and passengers. The ICAO approach of a centralized information sharing system is highlighted.
This document discusses aviation security and the importance of protecting the aviation industry from criminal and terrorist threats. It notes that aviation is a target due to its role in worldwide economic stability and transportation. The document outlines some of the challenges in securing the complex aviation system and infrastructure. It also examines the economic impact of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on aviation and stresses the need for proactive security strategies to prevent further deterioration of the economy or stability from terrorist activities.
The State Affected, Egypt, has indicated an objection to the information posted by the United Kingdom regarding potential risks from anti-aviation weaponry in the Sinai Peninsula region of Egypt.
The document discusses responsibilities for airport security between airport operators and the TSA, as well as various roles and areas within commercial airport security. It explains that before 9/11, airport operators were responsible for all security except passenger screening, but now TSA plays a larger role and boundaries have blurred. It describes the Federal Security Director (FSD) as clarifying security regulations and approving Airport Security Programs. It also outlines various secured areas within airports like the Security Identification Display Area (SIDA) and roles like the Airport Security Coordinator (ASC) and Designated Ramp Observer (DRO).
1. The document discusses the importance of the global transportation system, including air, rail, and maritime components. It explores their historical development and contributions to economic prosperity.
2. After 9/11, security became a greater priority for these industries. The industries established security plans and increased coordination with government agencies.
3. The transportation systems play a crucial role in trade and movement of goods worldwide. Disruptions could significantly impact the global economy. Maintaining secure infrastructure across all components is important.
This is from a webinar presented by Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University-Worldwide called “General Aviation Security.” The presenter is Dr. Daniel Benny.
The document discusses the importance of basic security procedures and personnel protection for transportation facilities. It emphasizes that the security patrol officer is critical for any security scheme and they must be adequately trained. It also covers procedures for vehicle searches, the importance of thorough hiring practices such as background checks, and the need for employee training, indoctrination, and quality assurance programs. Executive protection is also discussed as protecting executives from threats like kidnapping or assassination.
This document discusses security threats and solutions across different modes of transportation including trucking, mass transit, and oil pipelines. It covers the importance and history of each component, their facilities and infrastructure, regulations, and emergency funding needs. While steps have been taken to improve aviation security, more efforts are still needed to enhance security for mass transit, railroads, and pipelines through close cooperation between industry and government.
This white paper discusses legal remedies for victims and states in the downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 over Eastern Ukraine in 2014. It analyzes potential cases before (1) the International Court of Justice to establish state responsibility, (2) the European Court of Human Rights to address human rights violations, and (3) the International Criminal Court or domestic courts to criminally prosecute individuals. Civil litigation options are also examined seeking compensation from Ukraine, the airlines, or Malaysia. The paper aims to help victims' families and governments pursue legal accountability and justice, though it will be a challenging and lengthy process.
This document is a flight reservation confirmation for Mr. Froilan Aloro traveling from Manila to Kalibo, Philippines on April 25, 2013 and returning on April 28, 2013. It provides details of the passenger, flights, payment, baggage, and terms and conditions of the reservation. The total cost of the reservation is 1948.32 PHP which was paid in full by credit card on February 5, 2013.
Here are some potential advantages and disadvantages of installing anti-terrorist technology on transportation assets:
Advantages:
- It can help deter terrorist attacks by making transportation targets harder to attack successfully. Hardening assets with technology makes them less vulnerable and vulnerable targets may be less appealing to terrorists.
- It can help protect lives. If an attack does occur, protective technology has the potential to minimize loss of life by containing or limiting the damage from an attack.
Disadvantages:
- It involves significant costs for research, development, purchase, and installation of new security systems. Taxpayer or customer dollars must fund these expenses. The costs may outweigh the risks for some systems or assets.
- New systems may have
Surinam Airways: Overcoming Potential Threats and ChallengesShalini Levens
This document provides an overview of Surinam Airways, the national carrier of Suriname. It discusses the airline's history and current operations. It also summarizes the security challenges facing global aviation and the steps Surinam Airways is taking to address these threats, including implementing security standards from IATA and IOSA, conducting screening of passengers and employees, and training crews to detect suspicious behavior. The CEO of Surinam Airways discusses the airline's security programs and challenges in ensuring safety as it works to expand operations and route networks.
- Safety reporting programs in the aviation industry collect more data than ever before to develop predictive safety information and mitigation strategies, but this data is increasingly being turned over for use in criminal prosecutions and civil liability cases.
- Individuals and organizations may be reluctant to participate in voluntary safety reporting programs or conduct internal investigations for fear that any information provided could be used against them in court. This "chilling effect" hampers investigators' ability to determine the root causes of accidents.
- Stronger legal protections are needed to prevent voluntarily submitted safety information from being discoverable or admissible as evidence in criminal and civil proceedings, in order to maintain a "blame free" culture and continue improving aviation safety.
This document discusses the endless debate around defining the term "accident" under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention, which governs airline carrier liability for passenger injuries. The Convention creates a presumption of carrier liability for accidents but does not define the term. Courts have struggled to determine what constitutes an accident. The document examines two recent cases where courts had to decide if incidents like a passenger receiving the wrong meal or a medical emergency response were accidents. It traces the term back to a 1903 UK case and discusses the goals and liability scheme of the Warsaw Convention, which have been updated over time but still rely on the undefined term "accident."
This chapter discusses security challenges across various transportation sectors and efforts to address them. It covers difficulties hardening airports, rail stations, ports and securing cargo. Mass transit poses unique risks given accessibility needs. The Transportation Security Administration took over after 9/11 but screeners still miss threats and more funding is needed. Pipeline and trucking industries expanded monitoring but more coordinated security strategies are still needed across sectors. Risk assessment and management best practices can help but bureaucracy has slowed comprehensive security progress.
IMPACT OF COVID-19 ON CIVIL AVIATION: CHANGES IN THE REGULATORY LANDSCAPEAbhijeet Singh
This document provides an agenda for an international conference on the impact of COVID-19 on civil aviation and the resulting changes to the regulatory landscape. The conference will feature several sessions with experts in the field of aviation law discussing topics such as health and safety protocols, contractual obligations, financing challenges, and more. It lists the resource persons who will speak, including professors, lawyers, and academics from countries around the world. The detailed schedule outlines the topics and speakers for each session across the day-long virtual event.
The student expresses gratitude to their teacher Mrs. Piyali Mukherjee for guiding them on their aviation project. The document then provides updates on the growth of the Indian aviation industry, including a 22% increase in domestic passenger traffic in 2016-2017. It also outlines requirements for the project, describing the parts of an airplane, procedures for embarking and disembarking special passengers, emergency equipment and its use, and the routines and responsibilities of cabin crew on international flights. Key aircraft - the Boeing 747 and Airbus A380 - are also compared. The student concludes by thanking their teacher again for helping them learn about and complete the project on the aviation industry.
A TASK BASED information break down of COUNTERING UAVEdwin Hofte
THE RAPID SPREAD AND GROWING USE OF UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES (UAV) BY INDIVIDUALS, THE PRIVATE SECTOR AND TERRORISTS HAS GIVEN WAY TO NUMEROUS DEVELOPING SECURITY CONCERNS. THIS ARTICLE ANALYSES HOW GOVERNMENT, REGULATORS, SECURITY SERVICES, LAW ENFORCEMENT CAN ADDRESS SOME OF THESE CONCERNS. COUNTERING THESE SECURITY THREATS IS COMPLEX AS THE THREATS HAVE TO BE COUNTERED AT DIFFERENT TECHNOLOGICAL LEVELS AND INTENDED USE SUCH AS TERRORIST, CRIMINAL, MILITARY, INTELLIGENCE, SAFETY ETC. TO ENABLE ANALYSIS A FRAMEWORK IS INTRODUCED TO CLASSIFY THE TASKS COMMONLY ASSOCIATED WITH ADDRESSING SECURITY THREATS: INTELLIGENCE, GUARD AND SECURE, OPERATIONS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT. USING THIS FRAMEWORK A BREAKDOWN OF THE INFORMATION NECESSARY TO PERFORM THE DIFFERENT TASKS IS INTRODUCED. WE ANALYSED WHAT INFORMATION NEEDS TO BE GATHERED TO ENABLE THE DEVELOPMENT AND EXECUTION OF COUNTER MEASURES ASSOCIATED WITH THE DIFFERENT TASKS. SPECIAL ATTENTION IS PAID TO HOW DIGITAL FORENSICS ON UAV’S COULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE TASKS OF INTELLIGENCE, GUARD AND SECURE, OPERATIONS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT.
The document discusses various transportation security laws and regulations passed after 9/11. It provides an overview of key laws such as the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, which created the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), and the Maritime Transportation Security Act, which enhanced port security. It also discusses international treaties and standards regarding aviation, cargo, rail, maritime, and hazardous materials transportation security. While significant progress has been made in strengthening domestic transportation security laws, the document concludes that more still needs to be done to standardize security practices across all modes of transportation.
The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) is a UN agency that develops standards and policies for civil aviation safety and security worldwide. Key points:
- ICAO works to ensure safe and orderly growth of civil aviation globally through developing standards for aviation security, air navigation facilities, and flight safety.
- In response to incidents like the 1985 hijacking of TWA Flight 847, ICAO established policies like requiring member states to screen passengers, baggage, and employ security agencies at airports to prevent terrorist attacks on civil aviation.
- ICAO also created the Universal Security Audit Program to conduct regular, mandatory security audits of member states' compliance with ICAO standards and help address identified deficiencies
India stepped up airport security after the 1999 hijacking of Indian Airlines Flight 814. [1] The Central Industrial Security Force (CISF) is responsible for security at Indian airports under the Bureau of Civil Aviation Security. [2] The CISF formed an Airport Security Group and assigns Airport Security Units (APSUs) to each airport to protect against unlawful interference. [3]
Conflict Zones - ERA operations group 28.04.2015Philippe Carous
This document discusses conflict zones in civil aviation. It begins by assessing the risks posed by anti-aircraft systems like missiles and the conflicts zones in April 2015. It then examines existing rules regarding conflict zones at the international, regional and national levels. Several observations are made, including that rules are not specific to conflict zones and responsibility is unclear. The document outlines obstacles in dealing with conflict zones, such as different community approaches and information sharing challenges. Finally, it discusses potential solutions at legal, institutional and operational levels from various stakeholders like ICAO, states, airlines and passengers. The ICAO approach of a centralized information sharing system is highlighted.
This document discusses aviation security and the importance of protecting the aviation industry from criminal and terrorist threats. It notes that aviation is a target due to its role in worldwide economic stability and transportation. The document outlines some of the challenges in securing the complex aviation system and infrastructure. It also examines the economic impact of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on aviation and stresses the need for proactive security strategies to prevent further deterioration of the economy or stability from terrorist activities.
The State Affected, Egypt, has indicated an objection to the information posted by the United Kingdom regarding potential risks from anti-aviation weaponry in the Sinai Peninsula region of Egypt.
The document discusses responsibilities for airport security between airport operators and the TSA, as well as various roles and areas within commercial airport security. It explains that before 9/11, airport operators were responsible for all security except passenger screening, but now TSA plays a larger role and boundaries have blurred. It describes the Federal Security Director (FSD) as clarifying security regulations and approving Airport Security Programs. It also outlines various secured areas within airports like the Security Identification Display Area (SIDA) and roles like the Airport Security Coordinator (ASC) and Designated Ramp Observer (DRO).
1. The document discusses the importance of the global transportation system, including air, rail, and maritime components. It explores their historical development and contributions to economic prosperity.
2. After 9/11, security became a greater priority for these industries. The industries established security plans and increased coordination with government agencies.
3. The transportation systems play a crucial role in trade and movement of goods worldwide. Disruptions could significantly impact the global economy. Maintaining secure infrastructure across all components is important.
This is from a webinar presented by Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University-Worldwide called “General Aviation Security.” The presenter is Dr. Daniel Benny.
The document discusses the importance of basic security procedures and personnel protection for transportation facilities. It emphasizes that the security patrol officer is critical for any security scheme and they must be adequately trained. It also covers procedures for vehicle searches, the importance of thorough hiring practices such as background checks, and the need for employee training, indoctrination, and quality assurance programs. Executive protection is also discussed as protecting executives from threats like kidnapping or assassination.
This document discusses security threats and solutions across different modes of transportation including trucking, mass transit, and oil pipelines. It covers the importance and history of each component, their facilities and infrastructure, regulations, and emergency funding needs. While steps have been taken to improve aviation security, more efforts are still needed to enhance security for mass transit, railroads, and pipelines through close cooperation between industry and government.
This white paper discusses legal remedies for victims and states in the downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 over Eastern Ukraine in 2014. It analyzes potential cases before (1) the International Court of Justice to establish state responsibility, (2) the European Court of Human Rights to address human rights violations, and (3) the International Criminal Court or domestic courts to criminally prosecute individuals. Civil litigation options are also examined seeking compensation from Ukraine, the airlines, or Malaysia. The paper aims to help victims' families and governments pursue legal accountability and justice, though it will be a challenging and lengthy process.
This document is a flight reservation confirmation for Mr. Froilan Aloro traveling from Manila to Kalibo, Philippines on April 25, 2013 and returning on April 28, 2013. It provides details of the passenger, flights, payment, baggage, and terms and conditions of the reservation. The total cost of the reservation is 1948.32 PHP which was paid in full by credit card on February 5, 2013.
Here are some potential advantages and disadvantages of installing anti-terrorist technology on transportation assets:
Advantages:
- It can help deter terrorist attacks by making transportation targets harder to attack successfully. Hardening assets with technology makes them less vulnerable and vulnerable targets may be less appealing to terrorists.
- It can help protect lives. If an attack does occur, protective technology has the potential to minimize loss of life by containing or limiting the damage from an attack.
Disadvantages:
- It involves significant costs for research, development, purchase, and installation of new security systems. Taxpayer or customer dollars must fund these expenses. The costs may outweigh the risks for some systems or assets.
- New systems may have
Surinam Airways: Overcoming Potential Threats and ChallengesShalini Levens
This document provides an overview of Surinam Airways, the national carrier of Suriname. It discusses the airline's history and current operations. It also summarizes the security challenges facing global aviation and the steps Surinam Airways is taking to address these threats, including implementing security standards from IATA and IOSA, conducting screening of passengers and employees, and training crews to detect suspicious behavior. The CEO of Surinam Airways discusses the airline's security programs and challenges in ensuring safety as it works to expand operations and route networks.
- Safety reporting programs in the aviation industry collect more data than ever before to develop predictive safety information and mitigation strategies, but this data is increasingly being turned over for use in criminal prosecutions and civil liability cases.
- Individuals and organizations may be reluctant to participate in voluntary safety reporting programs or conduct internal investigations for fear that any information provided could be used against them in court. This "chilling effect" hampers investigators' ability to determine the root causes of accidents.
- Stronger legal protections are needed to prevent voluntarily submitted safety information from being discoverable or admissible as evidence in criminal and civil proceedings, in order to maintain a "blame free" culture and continue improving aviation safety.
This document discusses the endless debate around defining the term "accident" under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention, which governs airline carrier liability for passenger injuries. The Convention creates a presumption of carrier liability for accidents but does not define the term. Courts have struggled to determine what constitutes an accident. The document examines two recent cases where courts had to decide if incidents like a passenger receiving the wrong meal or a medical emergency response were accidents. It traces the term back to a 1903 UK case and discusses the goals and liability scheme of the Warsaw Convention, which have been updated over time but still rely on the undefined term "accident."
Journal of Aviation Management 2013 by Singapore Aviation AcademyAmnat Sk
Journal of Aviation Management 2013 by Singapore Aviation Academy
With very low accident rates in recent decades, air transportation is widely recognised as the
safest mode of transport. The aviation community, including airlines, aircraft manufacturers,
maintenance organisations, air navigation service providers, airport operators, and the safety
regulators have been working closely to make our skies safer. Amongst all the stakeholders
involved in the aviation industry, there is a particular group of aviation professional who
are seldom mentioned, yet they contribute significantly to improving aviation safety.
They are the air accident investigators – the people whose job is to determine the causes
and circumstances of air accidents and incidents so that similar accidents can be prevented.
One accident is one too many; and whenever it happens, it is bound to hit the news headlines
across the globe almost instantaneously. The idealistic aspiration of zero accident, albeit
statistically unachievable, keeps everyone in the aviation profession focused on building an
increasingly safe aviation system.
In the international civil aviation regime, Article 26 of the Convention on International
Civil Aviation (Ninth Edition 2006) stipulates that it is incumbent upon the State in which
an aircraft accident occurs to institute an inquiry into the circumstances of the accident.
Annex 13 further specifies that the objective of the investigation of an accident or incident
is for the prevention of recurrence and not for the purpose of apportioning blame or liability.
The identification of causal factors to prevent recurrence is best accomplished through
a properly conducted investigation.
To meet all these international obligations and to enable a proper investigation of accidents
or incidents to be conducted, an appropriate establishment needs to be put in place by
the Contracting States. With continuous air traffic growth globally, such an air accident
investigation establishment is essential and instrumental to support the growth and
development of a safe and sustainable air transport system. It should comprise, inter alia, the
following six key elements:
The lecture shows, by means of an example the importance, cooperation in regard to the determination of facts has. It makes clear that all parties involved, judicial authorities and investigation authorities, need to work together form the very beginning. At the same time it clarifies at which point cooperation ends and the authorities investigate further depending on their respective assignment of tasks.
Conclusion: only, if both authorities have the same level of information regarding the determined facts, a more in-depth investigation by the accident investigation authority and determination of causes without blaming someone is possible without interference by the judicial authority or legal representatives.
The document is a European Action Plan for the Prevention of Runway Incursions. It contains 8 sections that provide recommendations to reduce runway incursions. The recommendations are directed at aerodrome operators, air navigation service providers, aircraft operators, and national aviation authorities. They address issues like communications procedures, signage and markings, training, and safety management systems. The goal is to implement the recommendations by certain completion dates to improve runway safety through consistent application of ICAO standards and increased situational awareness.
Assignment On: Tokyo Convention: Offences, Jurisdiction (Include cases), Air ...Asian Paint Bangladesh Ltd
This document provides an overview and analysis of the Tokyo Convention of 1963, an international treaty regarding offenses committed on aircraft. It discusses key provisions such as the convention applying to criminal offenses and acts affecting flight safety. It also examines jurisdictional issues, such as a state other than the state of registration only being able to exercise jurisdiction under limited conditions. The document also analyzes related conventions and problems regarding jurisdiction over crimes committed on aircraft.
This document discusses the legal framework around protecting information gathered during aviation accident and incident investigations. It notes that while Annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation and the EU Regulation 996/2010 provide some protections, there are still open issues that national laws need to address. Specifically, the Spanish law on air safety has some inconsistencies and hermeneutic problems that need clarification regarding how safety information can be used or disclosed, and which regulations take precedence in cases of conflict. Addressing these issues is important to ensure sensitive safety information is properly protected and continues to be shared freely to aid future investigations.
1) Civil air traffic controllers play a crucial role in supporting national security by detecting anomalies in flight behavior and alerting military authorities. However, with increasing air traffic, focusing primarily on safety means anomalies not affecting safety can be missed.
2) The article proposes introducing automated "security nets" to detect anomalies like deviations from flight plans, loss of communication or transponders, to expedite military response. This requires information sharing between civil and military air traffic control.
3) Examples from Germany and NATO initiatives show civil-military coordination systems providing real-time flight information to military controllers. The next step is incident coordination across borders and domains to rapidly share information and coordinate responses to security incidents.
Detailed program of EUROPEAN DRONE SUMMIT 2019
The EUROPEAN DRONE SUMMIT is an international conference for the European drone industry to explore strategies for the efficient use of UAS. Key figures from the fields of politics, law-making, research, industry and business come together to discuss the way forward for achieving acceptance and devising solutions for the safe and effective commercial use of unmanned aircraft in Europe.
The EUROPEAN DRONE SUMMIT is the European platform for discussing the current needs of the UAS industry, both for newcomers with an interest in the industry as well as long-time experts. Meetings on special topics cover business models and strategies as well as use cases, whereby the highlights will be
- Safety and security using UAS as well as counter drone systems
- Integrating UAS into airspace
- Vertical mobility using UAS in urban environments
- Services backed up by UAS – rescue and emergency response services
Our top speakers will present different opportunities to connect existing business concepts with boosting new technologies.
The EUROPEAN DRONE SUMMIT is the place to learn how to implement best the advantages of UAS in your business and avoid common mistakes. Start a dialogue with an eminent network of distinguished drone experts.
Drones are becoming more popular for both personal and commercial use, but their increasing presence also poses risks to commercial aviation safety. The director of IATA called drones a "real and growing threat" to airplanes and cited several near-misses between drones and airliners. While companies like Amazon see opportunities in drone delivery services, regulators are concerned about drones interfering with air traffic, especially around airports. Many countries are establishing rules for drone use, such as registration requirements, but there are disagreements over how much regulation is needed versus restricting innovation. The article concludes that rules are needed to allow drone usage while preventing interference with aviation to achieve a balance of innovation and safety.
Safeguarding International civil aviation against acts of unlawful interferenceMomina Riaz
A concise presentation on ICAO Annex 17, which focuses on the safety and security of civil aviation authority. Detail about the safety and recommended practices of the regulatory bodies of the aviation sector. The civil aviation conventions that make certain rules and guidelines to implement aviation security
LIABILITY AND ALLOCATION OF BURDEN INVOLVING AUTOMATED SYSTEMS IN AVIATION: R...ALIAS Network
1) The document discusses several cases from Italian case law involving failures of automated systems and human errors in aviation that led to criminal and civil liabilities.
2) One case involved the Linate airport disaster in 2001 where a collision occurred due to low visibility, high traffic volume, and lack of visual aids and ground radar, resulting in 118 deaths. Former officials from the air traffic control authority and airport operator were convicted of manslaughter for negligent behavior and management failures.
3) Another case involved a 2005 Tuninter air crash where factors like an incorrectly replaced fuel indicator, overreliance on automated readings, and failure to follow emergency procedures led to not having enough fuel, stalling engines, and crashing into the sea, killing 18
The document discusses regulations for the civil applications of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). It provides an overview of UAV types and applications, both military and civil. It discusses key international regulations like the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and challenges around integrating UAVs into non-segregated airspace. The document proposes three modes of decentralized airspace management to enable autonomous UAV operations: centralized, cooperative decentralized, and non-cooperative decentralized.
2013-09-13_LCGGS_CUSST_Leuven_EASA_Paper_Marciacq et al_finalJean-Bruno Marciacq
This document discusses establishing a regulatory framework in the EU for sub-orbital and orbital aircraft (SOA) development and operations, with a focus on the role of the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA). It provides background on SOA projects in Europe and the US. EASA's remit includes regulating aviation safety, and SOA could in principle fall under this. The document reviews relevant international law and outlines options for developing regulations to allow safe and environmentally controlled SOA operations in Europe.
EUROCONTROL has championed the development of a just culture in aviation safety. A just culture aims to encourage safety reporting by not punishing minor errors, while still holding people accountable for gross negligence. EUROCONTROL created a Just Culture Task Force and developed a Model Policy to guide interactions between safety experts and the judiciary. They have also held courses for aviation experts and prosecutors on just culture. EUROCONTROL's efforts aim to foster understanding and trust between the safety and legal fields.
Rev_SACAA. Response to DA Shadow Minister [5].docx
ASJ_XV No 2 (2016)_Julianne Oh
1. 1
The Aviation & Space JournalISSN 2281-9134
The Aviation & Space Journal
[online]
Website: www.aviationspacejournal.com
APR / JUN 2016 YEAR XV N° 2
CONTENTS
p.2
p.10
p.18
Aviation
Air Medical Assistance: An Unclear Scenario.
Alfredo Roma
Vincenzo Nasillo
Commentary in Memoriam of the 2014 MH17 Accident
– In light of Conflict Zone Risk Mitigation.
Julianne S. Oh
A cost-benefit analysis of the ECJ Open Skies Judgment: EU-India
aviation relations.
Rishiraj Baruah
The problem of licensing the Air Traffic Services Electronic
Personnel (ATSEP).
Petrović Goran p.29
p.46
p.50
p.52
Miscellaneous material of interest
European Commission: guidelines for the interpretation of
regulation on passengers’ rights and regulation on air carriers liability
in the event of accidents.
Alfredo Roma
The new EU airports legal framework.
Anna Masutti
Najah Zeilah
EU Directive to use passenger name record (PNR) to prevent
terrorist threats.
Anna Masutti
Najah Zeilah
National Space Legislation in Europe.
Book review by Alfredo Roma p.54
Forthcoming Events
INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS IN AEROSPACE INDUSTRY
Executive Course 27 June–02 July 2016 p.57
E-mail: newsletter@lslex.com
Registrazione presso il tribunale di Bologna n. 7221 dell’8 maggio 2002
Editor
Anna Masutti
Board of Editors
Donatella Catapano
Vincent Correia
Massimo Deiana
Nikolai P. Ehlers
Liu Hao
Stephan Hobe
Pietro Manzini
Sergio Marchisio
Sofia M. Mateou
Pablo Mendes de Leon
Wolf Müller-Rostin
Alessio Quaranta
Alfredo Roma
Raffaella Romagnoli
Giovanni Sartor
Kai-Uwe Schrogl
Francis Schubert
Neil Smith
Greta Tellarini
Filippo Tomasello
Leopoldo Tullio
Stefano Zunarelli
Alexander von Ziegler
The Issue’s
Contributors:
Alfredo Roma
Vincenzo Nasillo
Julianne S. Oh
Rishiraj Baruah
Petrović Goran
Anna Masutti
Najah Zeilah
ALMA MATER STUDIORUM
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ABSTRACT
While threats against civil aviation have been witnessed throughout its history in
many sizes and forms for a variety of reasons, including the latest bombing at
Brussels airport, the incidents of direct missile attacks against civilian aircraft,
such as the KAL Flight 007 shot down by the former Soviets in 1983, are relatively
countable. The issue of using weapons against civil aviation has resurfaced with
the downing of Malaysia Airlines (MH17) on 17 July 2014 by the pro-Russian insur-
gents in Ukraine, the responsibility of which are denied by both the Ukrainian and
Russian governments. With the troubling concerns about civilian carriers operating
to, from and over conflict zones, this incident reinforces the critical role of infor-
mation and intelligence vis-à-vis potential risks to civil aviation in such airspace.
Indeed, renewed awareness and commitment are called for among the members of
the international civil aviation community. The leading investigator, Dutch Safety
Board (DSB), in October 2015, completed their task by delivering their Recommen-
dations to various stakeholders; i.e., States and international organizations like
ICAO and IATA with respect to the measures in guarding the safe operation of civil
aircraft in the disputed airspace. On the other hand, the criminal investigation of
the incident is still ongoing by the Dutch prosecution services. This commentary
thus intends to address certain aspects of the DSB Recommendations as well as to
contemplate upon the implications of the incident in general.
SYNOPSIS OF ACCIDENT
• Event: Shooting down of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 by a Buk surface-to-air missile
(SA-11) during the battle in Shakhtarsk Raion as part of 2014 pro-Russian unrest in
Ukraine
• Main Hazard: Use of weapons against civil aviation
• Key Issue: Conflict zone risk mitigation
• Lead Investigation Authorities: Technical – Dutch Safety Board / Criminal – Public
Prosecution Service of the Dutch Ministry of Justice
• Final Investigation Report: Technical – 13 October 2015 / Criminal – In progress
• Cause of Crash: Missile attack by the Russian-built BUK systems (surface-to-air
9M38-series missile with 9N314M warhead) in the airspace interfered by the insur-
gents (pro-Russian separatists)
• Nature of Risk: Political
Commentary in Memoriam of the 2014 MH17 Accident
In light of Conflict Zone Risk Mitigation
Julianne S. Oh*
*M.I.S. in International Law, and LL.M. in Air and Space Law from
the Institute of Air and Space Law, McGill University. Previously
trained in the Air Transport Directorate of the European Commis-
sion, and has worked in Canada, Europe and Asia. Currently pursuing
a graduate degree in the Integrated Aviation Management Program at
McGill University.
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• The root of the incident: Inadequate risk assessment by several stakeholders
- The Ukrainian Air Traffic Control should have closed the airspace;
- Malaysia Airlines should have chosen an alternative route; and
- International Civil Aviation Organization / public authorities did not sufficiently
account for risks of flying over conflict areas.
INVESTIGATION
As mentioned above, the Dutch Safety Board had led the technical investigation of
MH17 accident, which may raise a doubt why and how. Pursuant to Article 26 of
the Chicago Convention, its Annex 131
lists the eligible States that are entitled to
initiate and/or participate in the process of investigation, such as the States of
Occurrence, Registry, Operator, Design and Manufacture, and accredited represen-
tatives. According to these relevant provisions, Ukraine must have been the prima-
ry party to conduct this investigation, and yet under Annex 13 5.12
, it had delega-
ted its full task to the Netherlands being the State of flight origin.
For such accident/incidents/occurrence investigations, normally both investiga-
tions for technical errors and criminal liabilities take place in parallel. As a result
of the MH 17 technical investigation, the DSB concluded that there was no indica-
tion of technical/operational issues amounted to the crash, and therefore, an ex-
ternal impact appeared to be the major cause of it3
.
While the Public Prosecution Service of the Dutch Ministry of Justice in charge of
its criminal investigation has remained a neutral position withholding from jumping
to conclusion or presenting any indications of such, it had attempted to form an
international tribunal through the UN to judge which of the two States, either Rus-
sia or Ukraine, would prove to be ultimately held liable for the crash. And yet, it
has been put up with challenges due to Russia’s veto power. Thus, this criminal
investigation is still in progress to date.
Depending on the outcome which of the two States may eventually be indicted, its
legal liability for the crash would probably trigger certain political and economic
consequences.
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RECOMMENDATIONS
According to its final report, the DSB recommends that States involved in armed
conflicts should exercise more caution when evaluating their airspace, and opera-
tors should be more transparent into their methods of selecting flight routes, in
particular regard to (i) airspace management in conflict zones; (ii) risk assessment
of flying in such areas; and (iii) operators’ public accountability for the choice of
their flight routes.
COMMENTS ON DSB’S RECOMMENDATIONS
For the matter of achieving the maximum possible degree of safety in civil avia-
tion, States’ as well as ICAO’s roles and responsibilities have long been discussed
and studied, which includes the delicate borderline between States’ sovereignty
and ICAO’s function with thereby limited binding force4
.
In DSB’s recommendations for the accident concerned, the emphasis was given to
the same context; i.e., States’ sovereignty over their airspace granted and affir-
med by the Chicago Convention, in turn, defines their responsibility for ensuring
the safety and security in it. Also, air carriers shall take their full responsibility for
operating via the safest routes by comprehensively assessing risks in flying open
airspace over conflict zones.
A. Practicality, Feasibility and Suitability
The Recommendations by the DSB may generally be summarized in the following
three points:
• Stricter responsibility of States for safeguarding their airspace;
• More proactive role of ICAO in supporting States in this regard; and
• States’ more active role towards ICAO
Speaking of the underlying philosophy of the above suggestions, it may be wor-
thwhile to reiterate that apparently, only to a certain degree, ICAO can actively
get involved in situations where the essence of a conflict amounts to political ten-
sions, because it is a technical agency by nature and therefore, in principle, it is
supposed to minimize its political intervention, which the DSB had presumably ta-
ken into account as well when drafting this Recommendations.
Besides, has it frequently been pointed out that the Ukrainian authority failed ti-
mely closure of the concerned segment of its airspace which could otherwise have
saved nearly 300 lives onboard MH17 flight. Among several situational elements
that might have delayed closing the airspace in question, the debate over losing its
commercial interest from the overflight fees imposed on civilian flights appears to
be a major one5
. While it might have been somewhat premature or considered
even an overrated measure declaring a no-fly zone at the time, such hesitation in
timely and adequate decision-making must have cost Ukraine much more than the
revenues gained in exchange of forsaking the greater good called public safety.
Inevitably, the government of Ukraine is indebted not only to the victims of the
accident but to all by failing to fulfill their erga omnes6
obligation of ensuring sa-
fety in their airspace.
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That being said, there are certain delicate technicalities in making a weighted de-
cision between conflicts of interest in an attempt to define the boundaries of
‘disputed airspace’ over unrest areas, because the exposure to risks may vary de-
pending on the altitudes/FL (Flight Level) and the classes of airspace that the
aircraft overflies. So was the case of MH17; namely,
… the airspace above Donetsk Oblast was closed by Ukraine below 26,000
feet (7,900m) on 5 June 2014 and, on 14 July, below 32,000 feet (9,800 m).
The route in Russian airspace that MH17 would have taken was closed
below 32,000 feet (9,800 m) by the Russian air control a few hours before
the airliner took off.7
MH17 was then operating between FL330-350 in the airspace controlled by the
Ukrainian ATC. It was reported that there had been other civilian carriers like Sin-
gapore Airlines Flight 351 (B777) and Air India Flight 113 (B787) adjacent to MH17
passing this disputed airspace at the time of the accident8
, either of which could
have become the target instead. In any event, according to the investigation re-
port, other than the timely closure of the airspace by a higher level of authority,
both the Ukrainian (Donetsk) and the Russian air traffic controllers on duty cannot
be held immediately liable for their professional performance conducted in the
course of MH17’s operation above the conflict zone in concern.
Further to these general comments, the following is some considerations with re-
gard to a few particular aspects of the Recommendations.
(1) Coordination between civil and military ANS during an armed conflict: From the
European perspective familiar with the SES9
framework enabling close cooperation
among multiple air navigation service providers, e.g., FAB10
, this may seem like
quite an attainable goal and feasible proposal, but not in all States, ANS is provi-
ded under such a concept like FUA11
, which was designed to achieve the maximized
joint use of airspace by appropriate civil/military co-ordination. Depending on a
State’s history, tradition and development of civil aviation infrastructure, it may
not be an easy task to find a channel and mechanism to establish smooth ANS coo-
peration between civil and military authorities even in times of peace. For exam-
ple, given its particular situation of a prolonged ceasefire state, it is not practical-
ly and entirely feasible for the Republic of Korea to adopt the FUA concept and
redesign a more interoperable system between its civil and military ANS albeit
their relatively established aviation framework, and Korea must not be the only
example. It is ideal, and should certainly be an ultimate goal, but due to a
number of circumstantial and immediate obstacles, it may not happen overnight
regardless of States’ willingness.
(2) Amendment of the Chicago Convention and SARPs: While certain relevant An-
nexes may possibly be amended with more stringent and structured requirements
in a reasonable timeframe, it seems very unlikely that the main provisions of the
Chicago Convention itself would in any foreseeable future, considering the establi-
shed pattern of practice through the years. The Convention is supposed to provide
only the fundamental principles, like the skeleton, and the details of practices are
meant to be guided by its Annexes, and such a structure of this legal instrument
also indicates an intention to minimize the possibility of amending the Convention
contemplated by the forefathers. However, in light of the ‘imbalanced’ relation-
ship between ICAO’s function and its member States due to their ‘sacred’ sove-
reignty, which creates vulnerability in enforcing a higher level of security for civil
6. 14
ALMA MATER STUDIORUM
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aviation12
, like in the case of MH17, it is true that a more ultimate solution should
constantly be sought for. While it has, since the incident of MH17, been suggested
by some authors that “the due respect to the international law applicable to the
armed conflict zones by the parties involved is the fundamental way to achieve
the security”13
of the civil aircraft overflying, the recent events have highlighted
the urgent need for a more innovative perception beyond the existing legal
framework.
(3) Operators’ responsibility of risk assessment for a safe flight operation: If inci-
dents of this kind occur frequently, it would be the operators to be more heavily
burdened with higher insurance premium, especially war-risk insurances. For in-
stance, due to fatal accidents in a row within the same year, the underwriters of
Malaysia Airlines might, quite predictably, have reevaluated its policy.
(4) Disclosure of operating routes to public on a regular basis: Absolutely, it is pas-
sengers' right to make an informed decision regarding their safety. From airliners'
perspective, a question, however, arises whether it would not conflict with their
commercial interest and business strategies in the long run and on a greater spec-
trum, even though it may be agreeable as a temporary measure.
B. Other Security Measures
Following the MH17 tragic event, many industry experts have, either in an indivi-
dual capacity or through the means of international forums, emphasized the need
for more effective and efficient channels of sharing threat-information, data col-
lection and intelligence among civil aviation authorities and the industry, which is
also included in the Recommendations. On a related note, developing a directory
of up-to-date anti-aircraft weaponry and further, establishing corresponding
regulatory as well as technical systems seem to add a helpful precautionary
measure to the existing security protocol as suggested by ICAO, IATA, ACI and
CANSO in their Joint Statement on 29 July 201414
. Considering the increased level
of technology development and intelligence, this may be a reasonably achievable
goal through global collaboration, even though certain States would very likely to
veto the implementation of the plan for the ever-so-famous ‘national security’
reasons.
There have been numerous discussions, comments and suggestions since, and ap-
parently, their conclusions all sum up in the united regulatory enhancements on a
intergovernamental, industry and national level all together. Just to briefly
mention, even though it is certainly beyond the subject of aviation security
measures, often economic sanctions are used not only to retaliate the responsible
party but to alarm others with such intentions and/or prevent similar acts of
threat in the future.
Like most documents of the similar nature, the DSB’s Recommendations overall
come across rather a normative statement. Perhaps, due to the fundamental cause
of the accident with political sensitivity, the extent that the investigation authori-
ty in charge could stretch might have been relatively limited in comparison to the
ones with more technical concerns, like the Air France Flight 447 accident in 2009
led by the BEA (the French Civil Aviation Safety Investigation Authority)15
, which
appears more extensive and thorough. Even taking this limitation into account, the
DSB Recommendations still leave a lot of the ‘how’ in the hands of the concerned
parties.
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ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
A. Political Aspects
Would it have really been an overreaction, had Ukraine declared a no-fly zone for
its disputed airspace over Donetsk Oblast a bit sooner? While it has been noted
that States are burdened with unnecessarily high security cost due to inadequately
assessed risks and unreasonable amount of fear. This statement probably holds
truth under ‘normal' circumstances where security measures are taken to be alert
and preventive. Given the fact that not only MH17 but several Ukrainian military
aircraft had also been shot down in the concerned conflict zone by the insurgents
prior to the date of MH17 accident, it now seems that the Ukrainian government
should have paid more attention to those warning signals.
Post the MH17 accident, ICAO however reacted promptly by forming a special Task
Force on Risks to Civil Aviation arising from Conflict Zones (TF RCZ)16
, and discus-
sed the topic of conflict zone risk mitigation with care through various channels,
including but not limited to its High-level Safety Conference in February 201517
.
As briefly discussed earlier, economic sanctions are one of the available means
that States may resort to, however controversial they maybe, and it appears that
certain States have already put their thoughts into action; “the anger generated by
this mass murder in the skies especially in Europe has enabled certain parties to
expand and reinforce their economic sanctions against Russia.”18
B. Operational Aspects
Early-adopters like Korean Air, Asiana Airlines and British Airways proactively
avoided the Eastern Ukrainian airspace during the period of the Ukrainian unrest.
Provided that it is a standing practice among airlines that they do not compete
insofar as security matters are concerned, and share related information and in-
telligence to the best extent possible, how come certain other carriers like Malay-
sia Airlines had not considered alternative routes? Some suggest that even though
ICAO as well as the US FAA had previously warned to avoid the airspace over Cri-
mea, their intelligence did not include the region that MH17 was crashed19
. In line
with the principle of Annex 13, there is no point of blaming the operator when
and where it must be the most severely affected party. Nevertheless, regrets re-
main.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Given the unpredictability of an armed conflict, risk factors increase for civil
aviation. Depending on the final resolution adopted by the global civil aviation
community in the forms of policies and regulations, additional preventive or de-
tective security measures vis-à-vis attacks against civil aviation by weapons may
add up the cost of security, which is already high in proportion to actually exi-
sting or potentially measurable risks. Like Laura Logan, Director of Air Canada’s
Security Systems & Regulatory Department says, "every day is a new challenge” in
the world of aviation security. Thus, collaborative actions in one voice among the
industry stakeholders to generate more effective standards for carriers and sim-
pler procedures for passengers are ever more desired.
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In light of safeguarding civil aviation from armed threats, while it may sound even
more ideal than the DSB’s Recommendations, the essential first step above any
gestures should be the recognition that human lives and people’s safety supersede
any political consideration, and only based on such foundation, solutions that ac-
tually respond to the practical needs of our everyday life may be found20
.
__________________________________
1
ICAO, Annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, Aircraft Accident and Incident
Investigation, 9th ed. (July 2001).
2
“State of Occurrence initiate investigation, but can be delegated by mutual arrangement and con-
sent.” See also, Dutch Safety Board, Preliminary Report Crash involving Malaysia Airlines Boeing 777-
200 flight 17(September 2014), at 3 [DSB Preliminary Report].
3
See ibid.
4
See Ntorina Antoni, “Safety oversight over disputed airspace,” (2015) 14:3 the Aviation & Space
Jour-nal, University of Bogota Alma Mater Studiorum, at 11-24.
5
6
Wikipedia, <en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Malaysia_Airlines_Flight_17>.
Towards all/everyone. See also, Antoni, “Safety oversight over disputed airspace.”
7
8
Wikipedia, supra note 5.
Ibid.
9
Single European Sky.
10
Functional Airspace Blocks.
11
Flexible Use of Airspace.
12
Antoni, “Safety oversight over disputed airspace,” at 22.
13
Huaping (Maggie) Qin, “Reparation for Victims of the International Civil Aviation Arising from
Armed Conflict Zones,” (2015) 30:1 Korea Journal of Air & Space Law, the Korea Society of Air &
Space Law and Policy, at 269.
14
“Joint Statement on Risks to Civil Aviation Arising from Conflict Zones,” online: ICAO,
<www.icao.int/Newsroom/Pages/Joint-Statement-on-Risks-to-Civil-Aviation-Arising-from-Conflict-
Zones.aspx> (29July 2014).
15
BEA (The French Civil Aviation Safety Investigation Authority), Final Report on the accident on
1st June 2009 of Air France flight AF 447 Rio de Janeiro – Paris (July 2012).
16
“ICAO Welcomes MH17 Accident Investigation Final Report,” online: ICAO Press Release,
<www.icao.int/Newsroom/Pages/ICAO-Welcomes-MH17-Accident-Investigation-Final-
Report.aspx> (13 October 2015).
17
“Information sharing Key to Conflict Zone Risk Mitigation,” (2015) 70:1 ICAO J., at 11.TF RCZ
recommendations included advice on risk assessment terminology, a comprehensive review of
existing requirements and message formats, and industry led-initiatives to share operational
information and be more transparent with passengers. ICAO has also begun work on agreed
contingency flight routings for conflict zones under its regional air navigation planning groups.
9. 17
ALMA MATER STUDIORUM
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18
Chandra Muzaffar, “The Downing of Flight MH17: Why is Malaysia Not Part of the Joint Investigation
Team (JIT)?” Global Research (November 24, 2014), online: Global Research <www.globalresearch.ca/
the-downing-of-flight-mh-17-why-is-malaysia-not-part-of-the-joint-investigation-team-jit/5415863>.
19
Wikipedia, <en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Malaysia_Airlines_Flight_17>.
20
Recent Development: As of April 2016, competing allegations regarding this MH 17’s detonation
was reported through some of the UK’s media, raising a question who was ultimately behind this
tragic event. Such controversial claims had been initiated by a documentary film, which was
publicized to be aired by BBC TV on 03 May 2016. The so-called new theories – puzzling the DSB’s
official findings – include the possibilities of the Ukrainian jet fighter’s willful shooting against this
civilian aircraft supported by eye-witnesses as well as the CIA-backed terrorist operation using the
explosives installed on the MH 17’s aircraft at the time of its departure from Amsterdam. Much can
be said about these conspiracy theories, and yet nothing has officially been announced to give them
a voice. With time, certain undebatable evidences may be revealed to invalidate our current
understanding of the accident, if fortunate. It will however be interesting to see if these emerging
doubts would affect the MH 17’s pending criminal investigation, at least to a certain degree, or
eventually result in opening another round of technical investigations. As the history suggests
though, somewhat frustrating reality of such ‘conspiracy theories’ may be that they often remain
‘unproved’ even if they may be speaking disturbing truth. (For more information, see Poppy Danby,
“Did a Ukrainian fighter jet shoot down MH17? Eye witness accounts claim Boeing 777 may have been
targeted by another plane,” Mail Online (24 April 2016), online: MailOnline <www.dailymail.co.uk/
news/article-3556177/Was-MH17-shot-Ukrainian-fighter-jet-BBC-documentary-claims-Boeing-777-
targeted-plane.html>).