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Fragmented Distribution Attack
Virus Bulletin Annual Conference 2009, Geneva
September 18, 2009
Author: Anoirel S. Issa
MessageLabs, now part of Symantec
Anoirel_issa@symantec.com
Fragmented Distribution Attack:
     Abstract


Through the years there has been a constant evolution of anti-virus evasion
techniques. One of the latest trend that has been widely witnessed is the
process code injection.

However, a technique which has not been previously disclosed and may
lead to some irreversible consequences is the “Fragmented Distribution Attack”.

The scenario: An email with an attached image arrives in your mailbox from a
recognized sender, you double click and open it. As expected, the image is
displayed and nothing else happens. The system administrator may not
have noticed anything suspicious from his system monitor logs and everything
looks fine as the anti-virus product, along with the firewall, remain silent.

Under this silence, the computer is possibly being compromised by a Fragmented Distribution
Attack.




                                                                                  2
Agenda



• An attempt to define the Fragmented Distribution Attack
  (FDA)
• Exposing the attack: case study
      • The mystery of the bodiless header
• P.O.C embedded code fragments and re-assembler
• Live variant of a fragmented distribution attack
• Consequences and possible implications
• Detecting FDA
• Conclusion
                                                            3
Terminology:
Fragmented Distribution Attack


• A new AV evasion technique
• Aim to bypass Firewalls, IDS and Anti-virus
• Exploiting different file formats for distribution
• Code fragments embedded in innocent files
• Fragment re-assembler used to rebuild original threat
• Fragments locator – within the re-assembler




                                                          4
Exposing the Attack



• File format exploitation and abuse
• Data fragments embedded in normal file
• Embedding code in innocent files a new method?
• Not a new technique: seen on exploits
• So what differentiates FDA to embedding technique?




                                                       5
A Schematic View of an FDA:
Fragment Distribution


                          • 1 malware split
                               in 3 fragments
                          • Segments embedded
                            in innocent files
                          • Fragment carriers
                            sent over the
                            protected network




                                            6
The Fragment Re-assembler



                       •    A separate program
                       •    Not necessarily malware
                       •    Locates fragment carriers
                       •    Pre-assemble fragment in
                            memory
                       •    May write code to disk
                       •    Executes re-assembled
                            code in MEM or on Disk
                       •    System compromised
                                            7
Case 1: Uncovered Live
Fragment


                         •   Embedded PE Header
                         •   No other PE
                             characteristics
                         •   No encryption
                         •   Clearly isolated
                             fragment
                         •   Remaining part is
                             elsewhere
                         •   Possibly an FDA
                                                8
Detection of the previous live
fragment


                           •     Discovered in
                                 2008
                           •     7 AV detects
                                 the header
                                 today
                           •     Confusion:
                           - Dropper?
                           - Downloader?
                           - No description
                           Why ? an FDA?
What if the sample was an
    FDA?


•      Conclusion about previous sample:
•      Isolated fragment – no shellcode - no encryption
•      What if our conclusion was 100% accurate?
•      How would that work?
•      How a single fragment of a PE file would be used
       and executed to compromise systems?
•      FDA is the answer.
•      How would an FDA work then?
•      Research results and FDA POC follows
FDA Proof of concept:
The Goat and the Smiling Image



                                 To validate our
                                 deduction of FDA in the
                                 previous case we
                                 develop an FDA POC
                                 using the image in the
                                 left and a goat file




                                                   11
Fragment 1: PE header



                        •   Goat file fragment
                            embedded in the
                            image
                        •   Image displays
                        •   No visible alteration
                        •   Fragment detected by
                            1 AV




                                              12
Fragment 2 & 3:
Code Section & Sec Table


                           • Fragment
                             marker “DEAD”
                           • Fragment order
                             3-2
                           • Image displays
                           • No detection




                                              13
Extending the POC:
Infectious Fragments: W32.Virut



                              •   Not modified Virut
                                  sample
                              •   “Unanimously”
                                  detected




                                                   14
Extending the POC:
Infectious Fragments: W32.Virut



                              •   4 fragments
                              - embedded in same
                                   image
                              •   Not detected:
                                      - 4 fragments
                              •   PE Header fragment
                                  detected
                                      - 1 AV spotted
                                      the MZ/PE
                                                   15
A Serious Attack: Live sample



•      September 09 – FDA variant seen live
        • Targeting financial institutions


         • Use old shell code technique to run re-
           assembler code
•      Use of fragment marker
•      Hacked PE header values
•      Fragments of entire files
•      Attack involves: Rootkit - information stealer
•      Use Http to send / receive data
FDA:
    The Consequences


•     If successfully achieved, an FDA attack can
      result to some serious consequences
•     Depends on the victim's level of protection
•     Consequence not easily predictable but can lead
      to:
        • Data, intellectual property leakage
        • Government, military, industrial espionage
        • Irreversible financial losses
Detecting Fragmented
    Distribution Attacks


•     Detection would be tricky but possible
•     Depend on your scan engine capabilities
Conclusion



•     Hope you enjoyed this presentation which aimed
      to:
        - bring this type of threat to light


        - not demonstrating malware distribution
          technique for hackers
E.O.F.
Questions?
Thank you.
anoirel_issa@symantec.com
      Also on LinkedIn  20

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Anoirel Issa Vb2009

  • 1. Fragmented Distribution Attack Virus Bulletin Annual Conference 2009, Geneva September 18, 2009 Author: Anoirel S. Issa MessageLabs, now part of Symantec Anoirel_issa@symantec.com
  • 2. Fragmented Distribution Attack: Abstract Through the years there has been a constant evolution of anti-virus evasion techniques. One of the latest trend that has been widely witnessed is the process code injection. However, a technique which has not been previously disclosed and may lead to some irreversible consequences is the “Fragmented Distribution Attack”. The scenario: An email with an attached image arrives in your mailbox from a recognized sender, you double click and open it. As expected, the image is displayed and nothing else happens. The system administrator may not have noticed anything suspicious from his system monitor logs and everything looks fine as the anti-virus product, along with the firewall, remain silent. Under this silence, the computer is possibly being compromised by a Fragmented Distribution Attack. 2
  • 3. Agenda • An attempt to define the Fragmented Distribution Attack (FDA) • Exposing the attack: case study • The mystery of the bodiless header • P.O.C embedded code fragments and re-assembler • Live variant of a fragmented distribution attack • Consequences and possible implications • Detecting FDA • Conclusion 3
  • 4. Terminology: Fragmented Distribution Attack • A new AV evasion technique • Aim to bypass Firewalls, IDS and Anti-virus • Exploiting different file formats for distribution • Code fragments embedded in innocent files • Fragment re-assembler used to rebuild original threat • Fragments locator – within the re-assembler 4
  • 5. Exposing the Attack • File format exploitation and abuse • Data fragments embedded in normal file • Embedding code in innocent files a new method? • Not a new technique: seen on exploits • So what differentiates FDA to embedding technique? 5
  • 6. A Schematic View of an FDA: Fragment Distribution • 1 malware split in 3 fragments • Segments embedded in innocent files • Fragment carriers sent over the protected network 6
  • 7. The Fragment Re-assembler • A separate program • Not necessarily malware • Locates fragment carriers • Pre-assemble fragment in memory • May write code to disk • Executes re-assembled code in MEM or on Disk • System compromised 7
  • 8. Case 1: Uncovered Live Fragment • Embedded PE Header • No other PE characteristics • No encryption • Clearly isolated fragment • Remaining part is elsewhere • Possibly an FDA 8
  • 9. Detection of the previous live fragment • Discovered in 2008 • 7 AV detects the header today • Confusion: - Dropper? - Downloader? - No description Why ? an FDA?
  • 10. What if the sample was an FDA? • Conclusion about previous sample: • Isolated fragment – no shellcode - no encryption • What if our conclusion was 100% accurate? • How would that work? • How a single fragment of a PE file would be used and executed to compromise systems? • FDA is the answer. • How would an FDA work then? • Research results and FDA POC follows
  • 11. FDA Proof of concept: The Goat and the Smiling Image To validate our deduction of FDA in the previous case we develop an FDA POC using the image in the left and a goat file 11
  • 12. Fragment 1: PE header • Goat file fragment embedded in the image • Image displays • No visible alteration • Fragment detected by 1 AV 12
  • 13. Fragment 2 & 3: Code Section & Sec Table • Fragment marker “DEAD” • Fragment order 3-2 • Image displays • No detection 13
  • 14. Extending the POC: Infectious Fragments: W32.Virut • Not modified Virut sample • “Unanimously” detected 14
  • 15. Extending the POC: Infectious Fragments: W32.Virut • 4 fragments - embedded in same image • Not detected: - 4 fragments • PE Header fragment detected - 1 AV spotted the MZ/PE 15
  • 16. A Serious Attack: Live sample • September 09 – FDA variant seen live • Targeting financial institutions • Use old shell code technique to run re- assembler code • Use of fragment marker • Hacked PE header values • Fragments of entire files • Attack involves: Rootkit - information stealer • Use Http to send / receive data
  • 17. FDA: The Consequences • If successfully achieved, an FDA attack can result to some serious consequences • Depends on the victim's level of protection • Consequence not easily predictable but can lead to: • Data, intellectual property leakage • Government, military, industrial espionage • Irreversible financial losses
  • 18. Detecting Fragmented Distribution Attacks • Detection would be tricky but possible • Depend on your scan engine capabilities
  • 19. Conclusion • Hope you enjoyed this presentation which aimed to: - bring this type of threat to light - not demonstrating malware distribution technique for hackers