The document discusses security issues with the automated election system used in Philippine elections in 2010 and 2013. It notes that several mandatory security features required by law, such as UV lamps, voter verification paper audit trails, and digital signatures, were disabled by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). The document also provides examples from Biliran Province showing discrepancies between transmission times logged by precinct count optical scan (PCOS) machines and the municipal board of canvassers computer system (MBOC), suggesting possible transmission manipulation.
This document provides labeling conventions and an overview of the legacy copper infrastructure for the voice network in several buildings on the UWM campus, including NWQA, NWQB, NWQC, NWQD, NWQE, NWQF and NWQG. It identifies the location and specifications of various riser cables, patch panels, and 110 blocks that comprise the backbone infrastructure and notes some non-standard implementations. Abbreviations and conventions used in the copper riser cable labels are explained.
From Tek-X Cross Platform interoperability with PHP including history lesson, a bit about each category of operating systems, and gotchas related to PHP
Identifying Web Servers: A First-look Into the Future of Web Server Fingerpri...Jeremiah Grossman
The document discusses techniques for fingerprinting web servers by analyzing differences in their responses to common HTTP requests. It then outlines how this information can be used to identify specific web server software and versions. The document also examines how web server fingerprinting could enable cross-site tracing attacks if certain HTTP request methods like TRACE are enabled.
Mugdha and Amish from OSSCube present on Php security at OSSCamp, organized by OSSCube - A Global open Source enterprise for Open Source Solutions
To know how we can help your business grow, leveraging Open Source, contact us:
India: +91 995 809 0987
USA: +1 919 791 5427
WEB: www.osscube.com
Mail: sales@osscube.com
Quick & Easy Dev Environments with VagrantJoe Ferguson
Vagrant is a tool that allows users to easily create and configure virtual development environments and ensures that everyone is working with the same target environment. The document demonstrates how to install Vagrant and VirtualBox, acquire a virtual machine box, set up a basic LAMP stack environment, configure port forwarding and shared folders, and introduce some common Vagrant commands.
This document provides instructions for installing and configuring the Apache web server on UNIX systems. It discusses downloading and unpacking the Apache source code, running the configure script, compiling the code, and installing the Apache files. It also explains how to configure Apache by editing the httpd.conf file to set parameters like the listening port, document root, and virtual directories. The document outlines how to start, stop and restart Apache using the apachectl script for easy management.
This document provides an overview of object-oriented programming concepts in PHP, including defining classes, creating objects, inheritance, and introspection methods. It also covers PHP sessions and using session variables to maintain data across multiple pages. Key topics include defining classes with properties and methods, creating object instances, accessing object properties and methods, constructors and destructors, inheritance between classes, and functions for examining classes and objects.
ClueCon2009: The Security Saga of SysAdmin SteveDan York
This is a story of VoIP security, a disgruntled employee and the trouble that can be caused in an unsecured environment. The presentation is done in a minimalist style popularized by Professor Lawrence Lessig. The 248 slides were presented in about 15 minutes at ClueCon 2009 in Chicago on August 5, 2009. A video recording will be made available and an update will be posted here.
Do note that I did give an older version of this talk at ETel 2007 as "The Black Bag Security Review".
This document provides labeling conventions and an overview of the legacy copper infrastructure for the voice network in several buildings on the UWM campus, including NWQA, NWQB, NWQC, NWQD, NWQE, NWQF and NWQG. It identifies the location and specifications of various riser cables, patch panels, and 110 blocks that comprise the backbone infrastructure and notes some non-standard implementations. Abbreviations and conventions used in the copper riser cable labels are explained.
From Tek-X Cross Platform interoperability with PHP including history lesson, a bit about each category of operating systems, and gotchas related to PHP
Identifying Web Servers: A First-look Into the Future of Web Server Fingerpri...Jeremiah Grossman
The document discusses techniques for fingerprinting web servers by analyzing differences in their responses to common HTTP requests. It then outlines how this information can be used to identify specific web server software and versions. The document also examines how web server fingerprinting could enable cross-site tracing attacks if certain HTTP request methods like TRACE are enabled.
Mugdha and Amish from OSSCube present on Php security at OSSCamp, organized by OSSCube - A Global open Source enterprise for Open Source Solutions
To know how we can help your business grow, leveraging Open Source, contact us:
India: +91 995 809 0987
USA: +1 919 791 5427
WEB: www.osscube.com
Mail: sales@osscube.com
Quick & Easy Dev Environments with VagrantJoe Ferguson
Vagrant is a tool that allows users to easily create and configure virtual development environments and ensures that everyone is working with the same target environment. The document demonstrates how to install Vagrant and VirtualBox, acquire a virtual machine box, set up a basic LAMP stack environment, configure port forwarding and shared folders, and introduce some common Vagrant commands.
This document provides instructions for installing and configuring the Apache web server on UNIX systems. It discusses downloading and unpacking the Apache source code, running the configure script, compiling the code, and installing the Apache files. It also explains how to configure Apache by editing the httpd.conf file to set parameters like the listening port, document root, and virtual directories. The document outlines how to start, stop and restart Apache using the apachectl script for easy management.
This document provides an overview of object-oriented programming concepts in PHP, including defining classes, creating objects, inheritance, and introspection methods. It also covers PHP sessions and using session variables to maintain data across multiple pages. Key topics include defining classes with properties and methods, creating object instances, accessing object properties and methods, constructors and destructors, inheritance between classes, and functions for examining classes and objects.
ClueCon2009: The Security Saga of SysAdmin SteveDan York
This is a story of VoIP security, a disgruntled employee and the trouble that can be caused in an unsecured environment. The presentation is done in a minimalist style popularized by Professor Lawrence Lessig. The 248 slides were presented in about 15 minutes at ClueCon 2009 in Chicago on August 5, 2009. A video recording will be made available and an update will be posted here.
Do note that I did give an older version of this talk at ETel 2007 as "The Black Bag Security Review".
Web Technology – Web Server Setup : Chris Uriartewebhostingguy
This document provides an overview and introduction to a course on setting up a web server. It discusses the course goals of teaching students how to install, configure, and administer a web server to deliver dynamic content. It also covers topics like the history of the world wide web, roles of webmasters, how the internet works, options for hosting a web server, and different web server software.
Presents:
Introduction and Using jQuery
Selectors and Attributes
Events
Height and Width
DOM Manipulation and Modification
Effects and Animation
Store arbitrary data and add your functions.
Ajax
Effective communication is a key skill that improves both personal and professional life. The document outlines various aspects of communication including what it is, why it's important, different channels of communication, and key skills. Some of the main communication skills discussed are reading, writing, speaking, listening, and using gestures properly. The document emphasizes being clear, avoiding assumptions, listening fully without interrupting, acknowledging others, and managing stress to communicate effectively.
Red Hat Enterprise Linux provides strong security features that align with the defense in depth philosophy. These include hardening the operating system, applying security patches, using SELinux for mandatory access control, and implementing strong authentication methods. Proper authorization and profiling of users is also important to only grant necessary privileges.
This document discusses various security issues related to PHP websites such as cross-site scripting (XSS), SQL injection, session hijacking, cross-site request forgery (CSRF), and phishing. It provides examples of how these issues can be exploited to steal user information or modify website content. The document recommends approaches for preventing these vulnerabilities, including sanitizing user input with functions like htmlentities(), mysql_real_escape_string(), and PHP's filter extension.
The document discusses accessible and valid dynamic forms with jQuery. It provides examples of code on GitHub for form accessibility fundamentals like labels, instructions, layout, and dynamism. It also covers common WCAG 2.0 success criteria around perceivable, operable, understandable and robust forms. Specific techniques are presented for labels, instructions, layout, controls, and validation fundamentals.
The document provides an introduction to PHP basics including:
- PHP code is embedded in HTML using tags and the server executes the PHP code and substitutes output into the HTML page.
- PHP supports variables, data types, operators, control structures like if/else statements and loops. Useful built-in functions allow working with forms, cookies, files, time and date.
- Server-side programming alternatives like CGI, ASP, Java Servlets, and PHP are discussed. PHP was created in 1995 and is now widely used as a free, open-source scripting language for server-side web development.
Your Inner Sysadmin - Tutorial (SunshinePHP 2015)Chris Tankersley
One thing that most programmers do not take the time to understand is the servers that their application lives on. Most know a smattering of Apache configs, PHP configs, and basic information about the OS. This talk will deal with looking at tools that can help you quickly set up a server and how it can help you be a better developer. We'll look at tools like puppet for server management, OSSEC for log management, different command line tools, and nagios/monit for system monitoring.
This document is a workshop outline by Chris Shiflett on PHP security. It introduces Chris as an author on PHP security books and articles, and a founder of the PHP Security Consortium. The outline then lists security principles and best practices as topics to be covered, along with common PHP vulnerabilities. It concludes with a section for questions and answers.
UML (Unified Modeling Language) is a standard modeling language used to visualize, specify, construct, and document software systems. It includes standard graphical notations for modeling classes, objects, interactions, use cases, and other aspects of software design. The UML metamodel defines the building blocks of UML through a library of classes that describe all UML elements. UML is commonly used for documentation, specifications, and agile processes like SCRUM. Popular tools for working with UML include Enterprise Architect, BoUML, LucidChart, and online tools like Genmymodel.org. Certification is available at fundamental, intermediate, and advanced levels.
jQuery is one of the most popular and easy to use JavaScript frameworks. jQuery is an open source library that simplifies DOM manipulation, event handling, Ajax, and animation. The jQuery core is lean and light, while having the power and extensibility to support a rich plugin ecosystem. It also sports a concise and elegant API that is a joy to behold and use.
This document summarizes a presentation on PHP security given to the NWO-PUG group. The presentation covers the most common web application attacks like injection, cross-site scripting, insecure authentication, and how to prevent them following secure coding principles. It discusses the OWASP Top 10 security risks and how to avoid each one through input validation, output encoding, authorization checking, secure session handling and encryption. The presentation emphasizes defense in depth and that attackers may combine different vulnerabilities.
1. Unicode is an international standard for representing characters across different languages. It allows websites and software to support multiple languages.
2. When working with Unicode in PHP, it is important to use UTF-8 encoding, and extensions like intl provide helpful internationalization functions.
3. Common issues include character encoding problems between databases, files and PHP strings, so ensuring consistent encoding is crucial.
The document discusses HTML validation, microformats, and jQuery. It provides an overview of HTML validation including the purpose of validation and DOCTYPE declarations. It then discusses microformats, defining them as simple data formats built upon existing standards to allow information intended for users to also be processed by software. The benefits of microformats discussed include enabling aggregation sites to find user information and allowing communities to share targeted information.
This document contains a 3 sentence summary of the PCB schematic:
The schematic shows the circuit design for a power supply unit for an iNUKE NU3000 amplifier and includes component labels and values as well as design revision details. All information in the document is proprietary to Behringer and those who receive it must maintain it in confidence and not disclose it to unauthorized third parties. Unauthorized use or disclosure of the information may result in civil or criminal penalties.
This document summarizes the results of a single site verification conducted on February 15, 2015 at site UFC2233. Key details include:
- Voice, video, and data calls were successfully made on all six sectors.
- Handovers between sectors and neighboring cells were tested and successful.
- Downlink throughput on each sector exceeded 800kbps during HSDPA testing.
- All RF parameters, cell configurations, and neighbor lists were verified to match planning tools.
- The site met all key performance indicators and no issues were found with coverage, interference, or call quality.
This document contains a schematic diagram for the power supply circuit of a Behringer iNUKE NU3000 amplifier. It includes a list of components, their designations and specifications. The schematic shows the circuit layout including integrated circuits, transistors, diodes, resistors, capacitors and other electrical components that make up the power supply. All information in the document is the property of Behringer and unauthorized disclosure or use is prohibited.
Big Data Week - L'impact du Big Data sur l'intelligence urbaine - FuturoCité ...Julie Roger
La ville intelligente: une réalité d’aujourd’hui au service des citoyens, des communautés et des autorités… grâce aux progrès technologiques Un facteur d’attractivité pour nos villes de demain ! Dans le cadre de la Big Data Week, Futurocité, et ses partenaires IBM et Mobistar ont présenté l’importance et l’utilité des données (Big data et analytics) pour offrir de nouveaux services "Smart city". Comment et pourquoi est-il important d’exploiter, de traiter et d’analyser les données afin de fournir une information cohérente et intelligente pour une gouvernance plus efficace au bénéfice du bien-être des citoyens et la prospérité de leurs communauté.
Web Technology – Web Server Setup : Chris Uriartewebhostingguy
This document provides an overview and introduction to a course on setting up a web server. It discusses the course goals of teaching students how to install, configure, and administer a web server to deliver dynamic content. It also covers topics like the history of the world wide web, roles of webmasters, how the internet works, options for hosting a web server, and different web server software.
Presents:
Introduction and Using jQuery
Selectors and Attributes
Events
Height and Width
DOM Manipulation and Modification
Effects and Animation
Store arbitrary data and add your functions.
Ajax
Effective communication is a key skill that improves both personal and professional life. The document outlines various aspects of communication including what it is, why it's important, different channels of communication, and key skills. Some of the main communication skills discussed are reading, writing, speaking, listening, and using gestures properly. The document emphasizes being clear, avoiding assumptions, listening fully without interrupting, acknowledging others, and managing stress to communicate effectively.
Red Hat Enterprise Linux provides strong security features that align with the defense in depth philosophy. These include hardening the operating system, applying security patches, using SELinux for mandatory access control, and implementing strong authentication methods. Proper authorization and profiling of users is also important to only grant necessary privileges.
This document discusses various security issues related to PHP websites such as cross-site scripting (XSS), SQL injection, session hijacking, cross-site request forgery (CSRF), and phishing. It provides examples of how these issues can be exploited to steal user information or modify website content. The document recommends approaches for preventing these vulnerabilities, including sanitizing user input with functions like htmlentities(), mysql_real_escape_string(), and PHP's filter extension.
The document discusses accessible and valid dynamic forms with jQuery. It provides examples of code on GitHub for form accessibility fundamentals like labels, instructions, layout, and dynamism. It also covers common WCAG 2.0 success criteria around perceivable, operable, understandable and robust forms. Specific techniques are presented for labels, instructions, layout, controls, and validation fundamentals.
The document provides an introduction to PHP basics including:
- PHP code is embedded in HTML using tags and the server executes the PHP code and substitutes output into the HTML page.
- PHP supports variables, data types, operators, control structures like if/else statements and loops. Useful built-in functions allow working with forms, cookies, files, time and date.
- Server-side programming alternatives like CGI, ASP, Java Servlets, and PHP are discussed. PHP was created in 1995 and is now widely used as a free, open-source scripting language for server-side web development.
Your Inner Sysadmin - Tutorial (SunshinePHP 2015)Chris Tankersley
One thing that most programmers do not take the time to understand is the servers that their application lives on. Most know a smattering of Apache configs, PHP configs, and basic information about the OS. This talk will deal with looking at tools that can help you quickly set up a server and how it can help you be a better developer. We'll look at tools like puppet for server management, OSSEC for log management, different command line tools, and nagios/monit for system monitoring.
This document is a workshop outline by Chris Shiflett on PHP security. It introduces Chris as an author on PHP security books and articles, and a founder of the PHP Security Consortium. The outline then lists security principles and best practices as topics to be covered, along with common PHP vulnerabilities. It concludes with a section for questions and answers.
UML (Unified Modeling Language) is a standard modeling language used to visualize, specify, construct, and document software systems. It includes standard graphical notations for modeling classes, objects, interactions, use cases, and other aspects of software design. The UML metamodel defines the building blocks of UML through a library of classes that describe all UML elements. UML is commonly used for documentation, specifications, and agile processes like SCRUM. Popular tools for working with UML include Enterprise Architect, BoUML, LucidChart, and online tools like Genmymodel.org. Certification is available at fundamental, intermediate, and advanced levels.
jQuery is one of the most popular and easy to use JavaScript frameworks. jQuery is an open source library that simplifies DOM manipulation, event handling, Ajax, and animation. The jQuery core is lean and light, while having the power and extensibility to support a rich plugin ecosystem. It also sports a concise and elegant API that is a joy to behold and use.
This document summarizes a presentation on PHP security given to the NWO-PUG group. The presentation covers the most common web application attacks like injection, cross-site scripting, insecure authentication, and how to prevent them following secure coding principles. It discusses the OWASP Top 10 security risks and how to avoid each one through input validation, output encoding, authorization checking, secure session handling and encryption. The presentation emphasizes defense in depth and that attackers may combine different vulnerabilities.
1. Unicode is an international standard for representing characters across different languages. It allows websites and software to support multiple languages.
2. When working with Unicode in PHP, it is important to use UTF-8 encoding, and extensions like intl provide helpful internationalization functions.
3. Common issues include character encoding problems between databases, files and PHP strings, so ensuring consistent encoding is crucial.
The document discusses HTML validation, microformats, and jQuery. It provides an overview of HTML validation including the purpose of validation and DOCTYPE declarations. It then discusses microformats, defining them as simple data formats built upon existing standards to allow information intended for users to also be processed by software. The benefits of microformats discussed include enabling aggregation sites to find user information and allowing communities to share targeted information.
This document contains a 3 sentence summary of the PCB schematic:
The schematic shows the circuit design for a power supply unit for an iNUKE NU3000 amplifier and includes component labels and values as well as design revision details. All information in the document is proprietary to Behringer and those who receive it must maintain it in confidence and not disclose it to unauthorized third parties. Unauthorized use or disclosure of the information may result in civil or criminal penalties.
This document summarizes the results of a single site verification conducted on February 15, 2015 at site UFC2233. Key details include:
- Voice, video, and data calls were successfully made on all six sectors.
- Handovers between sectors and neighboring cells were tested and successful.
- Downlink throughput on each sector exceeded 800kbps during HSDPA testing.
- All RF parameters, cell configurations, and neighbor lists were verified to match planning tools.
- The site met all key performance indicators and no issues were found with coverage, interference, or call quality.
This document contains a schematic diagram for the power supply circuit of a Behringer iNUKE NU3000 amplifier. It includes a list of components, their designations and specifications. The schematic shows the circuit layout including integrated circuits, transistors, diodes, resistors, capacitors and other electrical components that make up the power supply. All information in the document is the property of Behringer and unauthorized disclosure or use is prohibited.
Big Data Week - L'impact du Big Data sur l'intelligence urbaine - FuturoCité ...Julie Roger
La ville intelligente: une réalité d’aujourd’hui au service des citoyens, des communautés et des autorités… grâce aux progrès technologiques Un facteur d’attractivité pour nos villes de demain ! Dans le cadre de la Big Data Week, Futurocité, et ses partenaires IBM et Mobistar ont présenté l’importance et l’utilité des données (Big data et analytics) pour offrir de nouveaux services "Smart city". Comment et pourquoi est-il important d’exploiter, de traiter et d’analyser les données afin de fournir une information cohérente et intelligente pour une gouvernance plus efficace au bénéfice du bien-être des citoyens et la prospérité de leurs communauté.
InfoComm Charging Station Usage Study Secure Mag Swipe, Pin Code, QR CodeJoel Martin
INFOCOMM 2015 / 2016
Brightbox Secure Charging Station Usage Study.
InfoComm is the largest, most exciting event in the Western Hemisphere focused on the pro-AV industry, with nearly 1,000 exhibitors, thousands of products, and 40,000 attendees from 110+ countries. Brightbox has been the official charging station at both the 2015 Orlando and 2016 Las Vegas events.
Events Featured:
Secure Mag Swipe as key module
Secure Pin Code as key module
Email Collection
Impression Analytics
QR Code on-screen
Brightbox is an American B2B kiosk technology company and a world leader in the development, operation and sale of kiosks and a platform for securely recharging smartphones and mobile devices, delivering content and collecting data. Our mission is two-fold: to deliver convenient, highly secure mobile power to the public, and to deliver brand enhancement to organizations. We now have 1000 kiosks deployed in 10 countries. We sell and lease the most sophisticated and secure interactive recharging kiosk to experiential agencies and brands. Features include Camera Audience Measurement, Polling, SMS relay, Coupons, and the ability to amplify a social media campaign via our prized charging amenity. We offer many secure locker key options, including brandable Mag Swipe cards, Secure Pin Code, or RFID readers compatible with the leading badge and ticket registration companies in the industry. BRANDS Increase brand awareness Get credit for solving a huge need Engage customers with interactive messaging, surveys, phone & email acquisition.
For more information contact us
Martin@brightboxcharge.com
or visit http://www.brightboxcharge.com
The patent document describes a mobile terminal that allows multiple credit settlement services to be used with a single device. It can switch the validation and invalidation of storage areas in an IC chip assigned to issuer applications, based on instructions received from issuer terminals. When an issuer application is started, the mobile terminal can display whether each issuer application is available based on the validation state of the assigned storage areas. This allows the user to easily see which credit settlement service has been stopped with just the start of the management application.
Talking Telephone Numbers - A History of Telephone Fraud - Modem Dialler Frau...Clive Aldred
In the early days of the internet, access to websites was conducted by "dial-up" modems. Billions of people worldwide found themselves silently disconnected from a local telephone number to an expensive Premium Rate number, and the call was also bounced around the world. The victims were members of the public who were supposed to be protected by Regulation, but instead were forced to pay huge phone bills. Of course, the law was always late to catch on and most of these early "white collar crimes2 were never prosecuted (at least not in the UK). This presentation was originally put forward at the European Telephone Network Operators Fraud Working Group by its President Luis, who was the only guy with the knowledge and contacts to trace all the way back to the source Lee Jones. No one questions how you made your money so long as you have enough to splash around and today Lee is still in business with his own private investment company(http://www.creditas.com) and telco (see http://www.neutrinonetworks.co.uk), having sold his original businesses Wire9 and Cloud9 back in 2008.
presentation about CCTV concepts and installationawad almekawy
The document provides a report on a proposed CCTV installation with recommendations. It recommends the approval of evaluation criteria for determining new CCTV locations, spending Rs. 405,000 for the first phase of 9 cameras in various locations, and spending Rs. 233,000 for the second phase of 7 cameras in additional locations. The total cost of the 16 camera CCTV system across two phases is estimated to be Rs. 638,000. Management approval and funding is sought.
This document contains information about the signalized intersection of Garth Road and Decker Drive in Baytown, including:
- Diagrams of the intersection layout and signal phasing
- Details of the traffic signal equipment such as cabinet models and serial numbers
- Programming details for the signal phases
- Notes on communication information and any issues found and actions taken
Term schedule for 201308.htm the data you see here may mayank272369
This document contains a term schedule listing accounting and architecture courses offered at a university for the 201308 term. It provides information such as course titles, numbers, times, dates, instructors, prerequisites, and room locations. Over 50 courses are listed across both subjects, ranging from introductory to advanced levels, with details on class formats including online, studio, and lecture styles. Contact information is also provided for waitlists.
Mock RE - Gujarat State Deviation Settlement Account (Deviation charges)Das A. K.
The document is a letter from the Chief Engineer of the Gujarat Energy Transmission Corporation regarding the State Deviation Settlement Account for the week of March 4-10, 2019. It provides the day-wise deviation charges in paise/kWh and notes on the deviation settlement mechanism, including charges paid to the state pool account by wind and solar generators for deviations beyond certain thresholds. Generators must pay indicated amounts for deviations within 10 days to avoid interest.
This document is a course catalog from the Washington State Department of Licensing listing approved real estate education courses from various proprietary schools. It contains over 80 pages of course listings organized into different sections including approved proprietary schools, courses by topic area, schools listed by city, national schools, and state-funded institutions of higher education. The catalog provides school identification codes, contact information, course identification codes and titles, delivery methods, and clock hours for each approved course.
The document lists telecommunications equipment from various manufacturers that are supported by certain Brazilian regulatory measures. It includes items like gateways, routers, switches, fiber optic cables, antennas, and other network infrastructure equipment. The equipment is categorized by manufacturer, model, and the regulatory provision it is supported under.
This document provides a chart of radio frequency allocations in the United States. It lists frequency bands from 3 kHz to 30 GHz on the x-axis and various radio services on the y-axis. Color coding indicates allocations as non-government exclusive, government/non-government shared, or government exclusive use. Frequency bands are allocated for services including broadcasting, mobile services, radionavigation, radiolocation, amateur radio, and space research.
This document contains a notice and proxy statement for the 2005 Annual Meeting of Stockholders of WESCO International, Inc. to be held on May 18, 2005. The proxy statement provides information on voting procedures and proposals to be voted on, including the election of three Class III directors and the ratification of the appointment of PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP as the company's independent registered public accounting firm.
This document contains a notice and proxy statement for the 2005 Annual Meeting of Stockholders of WESCO International, Inc. to be held on May 18, 2005. The proxy statement provides information on voting procedures and proposals to be voted on, including the election of three Class III directors and the ratification of the appointment of PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP as the company's independent registered public accounting firm.
This document contains confidential schematic drawings for a Compal Electronics motherboard. The document headings and watermarks indicate it contains proprietary information belonging to Compal Electronics. The document specifies that the schematic drawings and information they contain are not to be transferred, used or disclosed without prior written consent from Compal Electronics due to containing trade secrets. The schematic drawings depict the circuit design and components of the Compal motherboard.
This document provides a summary of a single site verification report for site UGM0089. Key details include: site and team information; RF configuration of 6 sectors with tri-band antennas; cell information; successful voice call and video phone setup tests across sectors; HSDPA setup and throughput testing; successful handovers between sectors; neighbor cell lists; and overall confirmation that the site is operating as planned with no issues found.
Anguruwathota [wb klt-2106]-umts2100 swap site ssv report_v2.0Yasas Anuradha
This document summarizes drive test results from pre- and post-swap testing of the Anguruwathota site. Key performance indicators like call setup success rate, drop call rate, handover success rate, and data throughput are compared between the two tests to analyze the impact of equipment swapping. Charts of radio measurements and call events from drive tests are included. The conclusion evaluates any differences in site performance after the swap.
The National Transformation Council: The Davao DeclarationJerry Ocampo
Citizens from various parts of Mindanao and other regions met in Davao City to unite with the National Transformation Council in seeking to transform the Philippines into a well-run, peaceful, prosperous democratic nation. They believe regime and systemic change, as proposed by the Council, is necessary and commit to lawful actions to transform the moral, political and constitutional order. They deplore President Aquino's failure to address issues like transportation, energy, and governance crises and his control over Congress in violation of separation of powers. They declare it is now time for President Aquino to step down and for the Council to embark on nationwide mobilization to realize their vision of change.
The butuan declaration 10 nov 2014 - edited by secJerry Ocampo
Representatives from various sectors in Eastern and Northern Mindanao convened in Butuan City on November 11, 2014 to support the objectives of the National Transformation Council and its previous declarations in Lipa and Cebu. They expressed disappointment in the Aquino administration's response to disasters like Super Typhoon Haiyan and called for genuine consultations on the proposed Bangsamoro Basic Law. The declaration calls on the National Transformation Council to advance federalism for the entire country and address issues like the energy crisis and activities of the Abu Sayyaf group in order to achieve peace and good governance starting in Mindanao.
The document discusses the need for progressive leaders in the Philippines who can transform weaknesses into strengths of character. It notes that the country currently faces a moral and spiritual crisis characterized by a lack of respect and responsibility. It argues that developing values like respect, responsibility, honesty and compassion in leaders and citizens is key to addressing issues like poverty, inequality and corruption and creating a just, democratic society. The author calls for leaders who can inspire self-transformation in the people and work towards eradicating social issues to achieve the ideals laid out in the 1987 Constitution.
The National Transformation Council: The Lipa DeclarationJerry Ocampo
The document is a declaration from citizens of the Philippines calling for national transformation. It states that the current president, Benigno Aquino III, has corrupted political institutions and damaged society through corruption and unconstitutional acts. It calls for Aquino to relinquish power and for the National Transformation Council to restore political institutions and prevent further destruction before new elections. The Council would implement political and economic reforms aimed at establishing an independent judiciary, merit-based civil service, transparent government systems, and a fraud-free electoral process.
The National Transformation Council: The Cebu DeclarationJerry Ocampo
The Cebu Declaration was a document produced by delegates from the Visayas and Mindanao regions of the Philippines on October 1, 2014. It supported the call of the Lipa Declaration for President Aquino to step down due to his failure to address issues of corruption, economic problems, and tensions in Mindanao. The Cebu Declaration called on the National Transformation Council to pursue lawful means to remove Aquino from office, organize an interim government, and file criminal charges against politicians involved in misusing public funds. It also supported reforms to the electoral system and energy sector to address problems and restore integrity and public trust.
Este documento presenta el proyecto de ley básica para el Bangsamoro, que establecería una entidad política para el pueblo Bangsamoro en Filipinas. La ley define la identidad, territorio y principios del gobierno del Bangsamoro, incluyendo su autonomía y relación con el gobierno central filipino. La ley reconoce el derecho del pueblo Bangsamoro a la autodeterminación y a establecer un gobierno democrático y civil que promueva la unidad, la justicia social y los derechos humanos.
The document discusses the moral foundations of Abrahamic religions like Christianity and Islam, which see the purpose of human life as flourishing through God's blessings. It argues that the economic, political, and cultural systems in the Philippines are currently not promoting the common good of the people and are harming society through issues like poverty, corruption, and conflict. There is a moral obligation for systemic change to transform the nation and better foster the fullness of life and common good of all citizens through an effective economic system, a merit-based political system, and a culture that promotes solidarity and reverence for God.
How To Cultivate Community Affinity Throughout The Generosity JourneyAggregage
This session will dive into how to create rich generosity experiences that foster long-lasting relationships. You’ll walk away with actionable insights to redefine how you engage with your supporters — emphasizing trust, engagement, and community!
AHMR is an interdisciplinary peer-reviewed online journal created to encourage and facilitate the study of all aspects (socio-economic, political, legislative and developmental) of Human Mobility in Africa. Through the publication of original research, policy discussions and evidence research papers AHMR provides a comprehensive forum devoted exclusively to the analysis of contemporaneous trends, migration patterns and some of the most important migration-related issues.
This report explores the significance of border towns and spaces for strengthening responses to young people on the move. In particular it explores the linkages of young people to local service centres with the aim of further developing service, protection, and support strategies for migrant children in border areas across the region. The report is based on a small-scale fieldwork study in the border towns of Chipata and Katete in Zambia conducted in July 2023. Border towns and spaces provide a rich source of information about issues related to the informal or irregular movement of young people across borders, including smuggling and trafficking. They can help build a picture of the nature and scope of the type of movement young migrants undertake and also the forms of protection available to them. Border towns and spaces also provide a lens through which we can better understand the vulnerabilities of young people on the move and, critically, the strategies they use to navigate challenges and access support.
The findings in this report highlight some of the key factors shaping the experiences and vulnerabilities of young people on the move – particularly their proximity to border spaces and how this affects the risks that they face. The report describes strategies that young people on the move employ to remain below the radar of visibility to state and non-state actors due to fear of arrest, detention, and deportation while also trying to keep themselves safe and access support in border towns. These strategies of (in)visibility provide a way to protect themselves yet at the same time also heighten some of the risks young people face as their vulnerabilities are not always recognised by those who could offer support.
In this report we show that the realities and challenges of life and migration in this region and in Zambia need to be better understood for support to be strengthened and tuned to meet the specific needs of young people on the move. This includes understanding the role of state and non-state stakeholders, the impact of laws and policies and, critically, the experiences of the young people themselves. We provide recommendations for immediate action, recommendations for programming to support young people on the move in the two towns that would reduce risk for young people in this area, and recommendations for longer term policy advocacy.
The Antyodaya Saral Haryana Portal is a pioneering initiative by the Government of Haryana aimed at providing citizens with seamless access to a wide range of government services
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2. MINIMUM SECURITY FEATURES
ULTRA VIOLET LAMP
Security feature to identify whether a ballot is authentic or fake
Required under R.A. 9369 Sec 13
COMELEC DID NOT IMPLEMENT this security feature
VOTER VERIFICATION – PAPER AUDIT TRAIL
Mechanism to secure that the vote is counted for the chosen candidate(s)
Required under R.A. 9369 Sec 7
DISABLED BY COMELEC under Resolution 8786 Sec 36 (b)
DIGITAL SIGNATURE
Authenticates election results and their respective electronic transmissions
Required under R.A. 9369 Sec 19
DISABLED BY COMELEC under Resolution 8786 Sec 40 (f)(g)(h) (March 10,
2010 and Resolution 9640 Sec 51 (e) (f) (g) (h) (February 15, 2013)
MANDATORY SOURCE CODE REVIEW
Required under R.A. 9369
COMELEC CONTINUES TO FAIL to submit the source code for meaningful
independent review
3. MINIMUM SECURITY FEATURES
Republic Act 9369 – January 23, 2007
SEC. 19. Section 18 of Republic Act No. 8436 is
hereby amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 22. Electronic Returns. - Each copy of the
of the printed election returns shall bear
appropriate control marks to determine the time
and place of printing. Each copy shall be signed
and thumbmarked by all the members of the
board of election inspectors and the watchers
present. …
4. MINIMUM SECURITY FEATURES
SEC 19, B, 13. “… The election returns
transmitted electronically and digitally signed shall
be considered as official election results and shall
be used as the basis for the canvassing of votes and
the proclamation of a candidate.“ …
6. MINIMUM SECURITY FEATURES
COMELEC Resolution No. 9640
(15 February 2013)
Section 51
e. The screen will display a message “POLL IS BEING CLOSED
PLEASE WAIT”, followed by another message “VOTING HAS
BEEN CLOSED NO MORE BALLOTS WILL BE ACCEPTED
BY THIS PCOS”;
f. Thereafter, the PCOS shall automatically count the votes and
immediately display a message “WOULD YOU LIKE TO
DIGITALLY SIGN THE TRANSMISSION FILES WITH A
BEI SIGNATURE KEY?”, with “YES or NO” options;
7. MINIMUM SECURITY FEATURES
COMELEC Resolution No. 9640
(15 February 2013)
Section 51 (c0ntinued)
e. Press the “NO” option. The PCOS will display “ARE YOU
SURE YOU DO NOT WANT TO APPLY ANY DIGITAL
SIGNATURE?”, with “YES or NO” options;
f. Press the “YES” option. A message shall be displayed
“PREPARING ELECTION REPORTS. PLEASE WAIT” ...
followed by a message “GENERATING TRANSMISSION
FILES. . . PLS WAIT” then by a message “PRINTING 8
COPIES OF NATIONAL RETURNS PLEASE WAIT” and the
PCOS automatically prints the 8 copies;
8. BILIRAN PROVINCE
May 10, 2010
Very improbably high voter turnout
PCOS Audit Log Report (ALR)
147 out of 166 ALRs = 88.6 % voter turnout
MBOC / CCS Print Log (PL)
8 out of 8 PLs = 100 % voter turnout
11. CASE I
MBOC/CCS
CULABA
CP 7805002
BRGY. BACOLOD
LAST ENRTRY IN AUDIT LOG
8:39:01PM MAY 10, 2012
CP 7805002
BRGY. BACOLOD
RECORDED SUCCESSFUL
ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION
11:23:23 PM MAY 10, 2010
FROM IP ADDRESS 10.12.3.143
TIME DIFFERENCE OF THE
TWO TRANSMISSIONS
2 H 44M 22 S
SAME PRECINCT:
FAILURE TO TRANSMIT FROM PCOS/
SUCCESSFUL TRANSMISSION IN MBOC
FAILED TO TRANSMIT
12. MBOC/CCS
CULABA
CASE II
SAME PRECINCT:
TWO TRANSMISSIONS HOURS APART
FROM DIFFERENT IP ADDRESSES
CP 7805006
BRGY. BOOL WEST
CP 7805006
BRGY. BOOL WEST
TRANSMITTED AT
1:55:36AM MAY 11, 2010
IP ADDRESS
10.15.2.121
TRANSMITTED AT
3:41:51AM MAY 11, 2010
IP ADDRESS
10.15.3.43
TIME DIFFERENCE OF THE
TWO TRANSMISSIONS
1 H 46 M 15 S
LAST ENTRY RECORDED IN THE
AUDIT LOG OF CP 7805006
WAS AT 3:08:38AM MAY 11, 2010
THE 2ND TRANSMISSION WAS
RECORDED 33 MINS 13 SECS AFTER
CP 7805006 WAS TURNED OFF
SAME CHARACTERISTICS OF DOUBLE TRANSMISSION IN 7 CLUSTERED PRECINCTS IN
2 MUNICIPALITIES: 7805006 / 7805008 / 7805011 / 7805012 / 7805017 / 7805018 / 7804011
13. MBOC/CCS
ALMERIA
CASE III
DIFFERENT PRECINCTS:
TRANSMITTING FROM THE SAME
IP ADDRESS
CP 7801002
BRGY. POBLACION 2
CP 7801001
BRGY. POBLACION 1
TRANSMITTED AT
1:06:50AM MAY 11, 2010
IP ADDRESS
10.15.0.157
TRANSMITTED AT
1:23:53AM MAY 11, 2010
IP ADDRESS
10.15.0.157
REG. VOTERS 915
ACTUALLY VOTED 749
TURNOUT 81.85%
REG. VOTERS 965
ACTUALLY VOTED 790
TURNOUT 81.86%
ALL OTHER ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSIONS IN BILIRAN REGISTERED
SEPARATE AND DISTINCT IP ADDRESSES EXCEPT THESE 2 CLUSTERED PRECINCTS
14. MBOC/CCS SERVER
CASE IV
WIDESPREAD DISCREPANCIES
BETWEEN THE TIME OF TRANSMISSION
BY PCOS AND THE TIME OF RECEIPT
OF TRANSMISSION BY MBOC/CCS
SERVERS
CP7801009
Transmitted
23:26:52
CP7802005
Transmitted
21:28:44
CP7805011
Transmitted
22:42:42
Recorded Receiving Time:
CP7801009 23:16:21 (10m)
CP7802005 21:19:14 (9m)
CP7805011 22:33:57 (9m)
CP7807004 20:07:54 (8m)
CP7808022 22:54:00 (11m)
CP7807004
Transmitted
20:15:38
CP7808022
Transmitted
23:05:28
OUT OF 166 PCOS FUNCTIONING IN BILIRAN ON ELECTION DAY, ONLY 53 HAD COMPLETE DATA ON THE
TIME AND DATE OF ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSIONS IN BOTH PCOS AND MBOC/CCS SERVER.
OF THESE 53, 52 OR MORE THAN 98%, SHOWED THE PCOS TRANSMITTING LATER IN RELATION TO
THEIR RESPECTIVE MBOC/CCS SERVER RECEVING THE SAME EARLIER. THE MBOC/CCS SERVERS
RECORDED THE SAME TRANSMISSION AHEAD THAN THE PCOS TRANSMISSION TIME FROM 2 MINUTES
UP TO 131 MINUTES.
15. ELECTRONICALLY-TRANSMITTED RESULTS
MUNICIPALITY OF ALMERIA
PCOS
TRANSMISSION
MBOC MINUTES
RECEIPT OF TRANSMISSION
MBOC PRINT LOGS
RECEIPT OF TRANSMISSION Minutes by Which
MBOC Received
Results AHEAD of
CLUSTERED TIME DATE TIME DATE TIME DATE IP ADDRESS
PCOS Transmission
PRECINCT
7801001 1:33:41 5/11/10 1:24 AM 5/11/10 1:24:29 5/11/10 10.15.0.157 9
7801002 1:07 AM 5/11/10 1:07:34 5/11/10 10.15.0.157 incomplete data
7801003 2:18:11 5/11/10 2:07 AM 5/11/10 2:07:24 5/11/10 10.11.0.20 11
7801004 8:21:10 5/11/10 8:12 AM 5/11/10 8:12:19 5/11/10 10.12.0.3 9
7801005 3:21:43 5/11/10 3:13 AM 5/11/10 3:13:18 5/11/10 10.11.4.9 8
7801006 23:10:42 5/10/10 8:59 PM 5/10/10 20:59:46 5/10/10 10.24.24.83 131
7801007 23:10:42 5/10/10 11:00 PM 5/10/10 23:00:22 5/10/10 10.12.0.53 10
7801008 0:06:00 5/11/10 11:57 PM 5/10/10 23:57:07 5/10/10 10.12.19.131 9
7801009 23:26:52 5/10/10 11:16 PM 5/10/10 23:16:21 5/10/10 10.11.9.120 10
7801010 not transmitted CF card inserted to Laptop no transmission
7801011 8:16:36 5/09/10 8:15 PM 5/10/10 20:06:13 5/10/10 10.11.48.22 10
7801012 19:58:08 5/10/10 7:49 PM 5/10/10 19:49:30 5/10/10 10.11.18.64 9
7801013 not transmitted CF card inserted to Laptop no transmission
7801014 21:49:00 5/10/10 9:43 PM 5/10/10 21:43:39 5/10/10 10.11.7.81 5
16. ELECTRONICALLY TRANSMITTED RESULTS
MUNICIPALITY OF BILIRAN
PCOS
TRANSMISSION
MBOC MINUTES
RECEIPT OF TRANSMISSION
MBOC PRINT LOGS
RECEIPT OF TRANSMISSION Minutes by Which
MBOC Received
Results AHEAD of
CLUSTERED TIME DATE TIME DATE TIME DATE IP ADDRESS
PCOS Transmission
PRECINCT
7802001 22:36:14 5/10/2010 22:26:07 5/10/2010 10.11.40.212 10
7802002 20:05:53 5/10/2010 19:54:42 5/10/2010 10.11.9.116 11
7802003 19:48:23 5/10/2010 19:38:36 5/10/2010 10.11.37.105 10
7902004 20:20:44 5/10/2010 20:10:37 5/10/2010 10.11.2.164 10
7802005 21:28:44 5/10/2010 21:19:14 5/10/2010 10.12.12.103 9
7802006 0:46:54 5/11/2010 0:36:43 5/10/2010 10.12.10.29 10
7802007 2:16:26 5/10/2010 10.11.0.103 incomplete data
7802008 20:06:11 5/10/2010 19:57:16 5/10/2010 10.12.20.124 9
7802009 20:04:33 5/10/2010 19:58:12 5/10/2010 10.11.16.178 6
7802010 0:49:38 5/10/2010 0:39:03 5/10/2010 10.11.7.96 10
7802011 13:39:51 5/10/2010 20:04:01 5/10/2010 10.11.29.241 time stamp error
7802012 CF CARD INSERTED TO LAPTOP incomplete data
7802013 23:08:19 5/10/2010 23:01:46 5/10/2010 10.12.14.140 7
7802014 21:34:36 5/10/2010 21:25:10 5/10/2010 10.12.30.210 9
7802015 23:13:49 5/10/2010 10.12.2.194 incomplete data
7802016 19:49:42 5/10/2010 19:36:54 5/10/2010 10.12.24.97 12
17. ELECTRONICALLY-TRANSMITTED RESULTS
MUNICIPALITY OF CULABA
PCOS
TRANSMISSION
MBOC MINUTES
RECEIPT OF TRANSMISSION
MBOC PRINT LOGS
RECEIPT OF TRANSMISSION
Minutes by Which
MBOC Received
Results AHEAD of
PCOS Transmission
CLUSTERED
PRECINCT
TIME DATE TIME DATE TIME DATE IP ADDRESS
7805001 not transmitted CF card inserted to Laptop no transmission
7805002 11:25 PM 5/11/10 23:25:03 5/10/10 10.12.3.143 incomplete data
7805003 00:28:18 5/11/10 12:18 AM 5/11/10 0:18:23 5/11/10 10.11.11.12 10
7805004 01:21:47 5/11/10 1:10 AM 5/11/10 1:10:31 5/11/10 10.15.29.126 11
7805005 23:14:39 5/10/10 11:03 PM 5/10/10 23:03:00 5/10/10 10.15.27.222 11
7805006 02:04:08 5/11/10 1:56 AM 5/11/10 1:56:50 5/11/10 10.15.2.121 7
7085007 not transmitted CF card inserted to Laptop no transmission
7805008 2:05:54 5/11/10 1:57AM 5/11/10 1:57:06 5/11/10 10.11.6.177 9
7805009 not transmitted CF card inserted to Laptop no transmission
7805010 not transmitted CF card inserted to Laptop no transmission
7805011 22:42:42 05/10/10 10:34 PM 5/10/10 22:33:57 5/10/10 10.11.11.139 9
7805012 02:26:41 5/11/10 2:17 AM 5/11/10 02:17:25 5/11/10 10.11.2.192 9
7805013 not transmitted CF card inserted to Laptop no transmission
7805014 not transmitted CF card inserted to Laptop no transmission
7805015 19:50:20 05/10/10 7:41 PM 5/10/10 19:41:05 5/10/10 10.12.9.202 9
7805016 not transmitted CF card inserted to Laptop no transmission
7805017 11:02 PM 5/10/10 23:01:51 5/10/10 10.11.19.47 incomplete data
7805018 21:17:33 5/10/10 9:06 PM 5/10/10 21:06:13 5/10/10 10.12.41.14 11
18. ELECTRONICALLY TRANSMITTED RESULTS
MUNICIPALITY OF MARIPIPI
PCOS
TRANSMISSION
MBOC MINUTES
RECEIPT OF TRANSMISSION
MBOC PRINT LOGS
RECEIPT OF TRANSMISSION Minutes by Which
MBOC Received
Results AHEAD of
CLUSTERED TIME DATE TIME DATE TIME DATE IP ADDRESS
PCOS Transmission
PRECINCT
7807001 20:47:44 05-10-10 8:42 PM 05-10-10 20:36:41 05-10-10 10.12.39.124 11
7807002 19:42:24 05-10-10 7:35 PM 05-10-10 19:33:00 05-10-10 10.12.14.180 9
7807003 1:00 PM 05-10-10 19:53:17 05-10-10 10.12.23.108 incomplete data
7807004 20:15:38 05-10-10 8:00 PM 05-10-10 20:07:54 05-10-10 10.12.26.165 8
7807005 20:12:30 05-10-10 8:06 PM 05-10-10 20:03:00 05-10-10 10.12.16.121 9
7807006 19:58:52 05-10-10 8:05 PM 05-10-10 19:52:53 05-10-10 10.12.16.212 6
7807007 21:12:49 05-10-10 9:08 PM 05-1040 21:03:20 05-10-10 10.12.40.208 9
7807008 not transmitted 10:45 PM 05-10-3.0 CF card inserted to Laptop no transmission
7807009 not transmitted 11:55 PM 05-10-10 CF card inserted to Laptop no transmission
7807010 not transmitted 1:05 AM 05-11-10 CF card inserted to Laptop no transmission
7807011 20:23:32 05-10-10 8:16 PM 05-10-10 20:14:57 05-10-10 10.12.5.178 9
7807012 20:42:07 05-10-10 8:40 PM 05-10-10 20:34:56 05-10-10 10.12.42.112 7
7807013 19:29:05 05-10-10 7:20 PM 05-10-10 18:19:58 05-10-10 10.11.12.94 69
7807014 19:41:43 05-10-10 7:40 PM 05-10-10 19:34:13 05-10-10 10.12.4.227 7
7807015 20:59:32 05-10-10 9:05PM 05-10-10 21:00:40 05-10-10 10.12.7.191 (1)
19. PCOS
CASE V
PROTECTIVE COUNTERS OF PCOS SHOW
VARIOUS INITIAL NUMBERS INDICATING
4,114 BALLOTS HAD BEEN SCANNED
EVEN BEFORE ELECTION DAY
Ballot Cast #1
(Valid)
PC = 1
IF NO BALLOT HAD BEEN CAST AND
SCANNED (PRELOADED) THEN THE
PROTECTIVE COUNTER SHOULD
HAVE STARTED WITH ZERO
Ballot Cast #2
(Valid)
PC = 2
Ballot Cast #3
(Rejected)
PC = 2
Ballot Cast #4
(Valid)
PC = 3
Ballot Cast #5
(Valid)
PC = 4
THE PROTECTIVE COUNTER COUNTS THE NUMBER OF VALID SCANS MADE BY THE PCOS. IT ADVANCES
BY ONE (1) EVERYTIME A VALID BALLOT IS SCANNED. REJECTED BALLOTS ARE NOT COUNTED.
THE PROTECTIVE COUNTER APPEARS ON THE 8TH ENTRY OF THE PCOS AUDIT LOG REPORT EVERY
TIME THE PCOS IS TURNED ON.
20. EXTENT OF PROTECTIVE COUNTER PROBLEM
IN BILIRAN
ONLY 2 PCOS HAD PROTECTIVE COUNTERS STARTING AT ZERO.
145 PCOS HAD PROTECTIVE COUNTERS STARTING FROM 1 TO 128.
THE MAJORITY OF THE PCOS REFLECTED 29 SCANS BEFORE
TESTING AND SEALING.
TOTAL SCANS RECORDED IN THE PROTECTIVE COUNTERS OF 145
PCOS BEFORE TESTING AND SEALING IS 4,114 BALLOTS.
THE 4,114 BALLOTS ARE SUSPICIOUSLY HIDDEN AND CANNOT BE
TRACED INDIVIDUALLY IN EACH OF THE AUDIT LOG REPORTS OF
ALL THE 145 PCOS WITH INITIAL DATA ON THEIR PROTECTIVE
COUNTERS.
21. CASE VI
PAPER AUDIT TRAIL OF THE SMARTMATIC
AUTOMATED ELECTION SYSTEM (AES)
DOES NOT MATCH IN SIGNIFICANT
ASPECTS
PCOS
Audit Log Report
(Trace to Hash Codes)
Hash Codes of
Ballot Images
(Trace to Ballot Images)
Ballot Image
(Determination of
Match or Mismatch))
PAPER AUDIT TRAIL IS COMPOSED PRINCIPALLY OF 3 DOCUMENTS PRODUCED BY THE PCOS TO
INCLUDE: PCOS AUDIT LOG REPORT, HASH CODES OF THE BALLOT IMAGES, AND THE BALLOT IMAGES.
A MORE EXTENSIVE AUDIT COULD INCLUDE INDEPENDENTLY PRODUCED DOCUMENTS BY THE
MBOC/CCS SERVER SUCH AS THE PRINT LOG.
22. CASE VII ILLEGAL EXTENSION OF VOTING TIME
Clustered
Precinct
Barangay/Municipality
No. of Voters
Listed in MOV
After 7PM
List of Names
of Voters Who
Voted After
7PM
Actual Vote
Cast
After 7PM
(ALR)
No. of Hours
Voting Was
Extended
(ALR/MOV)
Loss of
Fmr. Rep.
Glenn Chong
7801003 Caucab, Almeria 234 none 251 5H 59M 57S 43
7801004 Iyusan, Almeria 0 none 354 11H 31M 08S 66
7801005 Jamorawon, Almeria 156 none 254 5H 32M 41S 89
7801013 Talahid, Almeria 222 none 227 5H 26M 58S 192
7802010 Julita, Biliran No Entry none 139 3H 01M 15S 149
7802013 Sangalang, Biliran No Entry none 133 3H 25M 16S 46
7803015 Looc, Cabucgayan 276 none 270 10H 22M 38S 29
7804001 Palanay, Caibiran 249 none 276 5H 18M 07S 60
7804009 Bariis, Caibiran 263 none 255 7H 34M 24S 88
7804010 Binohangan, Caibiran 160 none 219 7H 01M 40S 172
7804011 Cabibihan, Caibiran 178 none 304 9H 30M 45S 78
7804022 Villa Vicenta, Caibiran 107 none 98 4H 16M 29S 83
7806001 Poblacion, Kawayan 0 none 335 8H 40M 55S 37
7806003 Balacson, Kawayan 216 attached (211) 510 5H 30M 00S 125
7806009 Inasuyan, Kawayan 134 none 212 4H 6M 30S 84
7806016 San Lorenzo, Kawayan 220 none 242 5H 49M 14S 132
7808025 Libtong, Naval No Entry none 202 6H 20M 22S 86
TOTALS 2,415 4,281 1,559
23. GENERAL OUTLINE OF ELECTORAL FRAUD
2010 NATIONAL AND LOCAL ELECTIONS
GENERAL MODES
(TWO)
AUTOMATED FRAUD
(2 MODES)
MANUAL FRAUD
(1 MODE)
MULTIPLE TRANSMISSIONS
NATIONAL COVERAGE
(CASE I, CASE II, CASE III)
CONCEALMENT MECHANISM
(CASE IV)
PRELOADED CF CARDS
CONCEALMENT MECHANISM
(CASE VI)
LOCAL COVERAGE
(CASE V)
EXTENDED VOTING TIME
LOCAL COVERAGE
(CASE VI)
MODE 1
MODE 2
24. EVIDENCE OF FRAUD
STATISTICAL
60-30-10 Pattern
Consistent Vote Share (each and all senatorial candidates for
every bulk votes reported by the transparency server)
Suspiciously High Voter Turnout
More Votes Than Voters
Changing Vote Totals
PHYSICAL
Manual/Actual Ballot Count
Post-Election Tampering/Cover-up
29. Consistent Vote Share of Senatorial Candidates
(Source: Rappler Transparency Server)
Notice that on every bulk vote that enters it is consistent that every candidate
gets uniform vote share
31. SUSPICIOUSLY HIGH VOTER TURNOUT
2013 Significant Election Statistics
100% turnout = 70 clustered precincts
90%-99.9% turnout = 2,687 clustered precincts
80%-89.9% turnout = 44,453 clustered precincts
Total CPs with questionable voter turnout = 47,210 clustered
precincts
(Sources: COMELEC Data at comelec.gov.ph and radarsweep.com)
32. MORE VOTES THAN VOTERS
Local Elections
Pasay City, Metro Manila
Clustered Precincts
1/2/3/4/5/6/7/8/9/10/20/21/22/23/24/25/27/28/46/47/48/49
TOTAL VOTER TURNOUT IN 22 CPs 7,547 VOTES
REPORTED VOTES OF PASAY CITY MAYOR 9,045 VOTES
EXCESS CREDITED VOTES 1,498 VOTES
NOTE: These 22 Clustered Precincts were the first to be counted.
(Source: Jairus Bondoc, Philippine Star)
33. MORE VOTES THAN VOTERS
National Elections
(Source: Jairus Bondoc, Philippine Star)
129/304
42%
175/304
58%
34. CHANGING VOTE TOTALS
Rappler.com Mirror Server of COMELEC
-----------------------------------------------------------
Total Number of Voters Who Voted: 39,898,992
As Of: May 18, 2013 05:37pm
Comelec.gov.ph
-----------------------------------------------------------
Total Number of Voters Who Voted: 31,568,679
As Of: May 29, 2013 08:26am
DISCREPANCY
-----------------------------------------------------------
Votes: 8,330,313
Time: 10 days 14 hours 49 minutes
35. MANUAL/ACTUAL BALLOT COUNT
Aranas, et al vs The Municipal Election Registrar, et al
Civil Case No. 4378-13 for Opening of Ballots and Manual Counting of
Votes Cast for Eduardo Villanueva
Regional Trial Court Branch 34 (Gapan City, Nueva Ecija) ruled in a
decision dated 21 Mar 2014:
The petitioners have standing to sue on matters of transcendental
importance or paramount public interest as ascertaining by manual
count their votes cast in the 2013 elections
In CPs 19, 29 and 30 of General Tinio, Nueva Ecija, senatorial
candidate Villanueva actually garnered 900 votes as against the
official COMELEC PCOS count of only 781 votes
Villanueva could have garnered 119 more votes if the PCOS counted
correctly
COMELEC did not appeal the decision which is now final
Source: Certified True Copy of Decision Signed by Judge Celso O. Baguio
49. ALL THESE CIRCUMSTANCES ARE NOT ONE GIGANTIC OR
FANTASTIC HAPPENSTANCE OR MERE COINCIDENCE. THEY
ARE NOT THE FABRIC OF ONE’S IMAGINATION WOVEN INTO
ONE FANTASTIC TALE BUT RATHER THE PRODUCT OF
COLLUSION AND INTERVENTION. LIKE AN ORCHESTRA, THE
CADENCE OF THESE CIRCUMSTANCES OR EVENTS
CLEARLY IMPLIES THE ABLE HANDS OF A MASTER OR
CONDUCTOR, AND DEFINITELY THAT MASTER IS NOT THE
VICTIM.
END
Editor's Notes
As with any crime committed, the pursuit of justice entails a lot of hard work, perseverance and patience. The success or failure of any quest for justice depends much on how much evidence is obtained, processed and interpreted. Nowhere are these postulates true than in crimes involving technology and automation. By its very nature, technology and automation are beyond the ordinary reach and comprehension of most of our people. A charge of fraud in an automated election is definitely not easy to comprehend and prove. Since it was our first experience in automated elections, everybody, except the ones who run the system, had any idea what to look for, how to interpret them, how to connect one proof to another, and how to present them for better understanding of ordinary citizens.
In the case of Biliran, immediately after the unexpected defeat of Fmr. Rep. Glenn Chong, the people from all municipalities demanded, and were able to get certified true copies of 88% of all audit log reports generated by the PCOS, and 100% of all MBOC print logs generated by the Consolidation and Canvassing System. Over the last 30 months, our group of young volunteers from different fields poured over close to 25 boxes of documents (including approximately 35,000 pages of ballot images) in detail and came up with a comprehensive analysis of the automated elections in 2010.
We endeavor as much as possible to present to you a clear and easy-to-comprehend presentation, including our final conclusion that two modes of election fraud was committed in 2010, one for national coverage and another for local coverage. This conclusion is backed by certified true copies of documents obtained from the COMELEC itself and from the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal.
We will also endeavor to expose to the greater public ways and means to prevent the commission of this kind of fraud in this coming elections in 2013 and all future automated elections. One good thing is that our knowledge and understanding of the capabilities and severe shortcomings of the PCOS system has enabled us to devise ways and means to prevent it. Only by making known our observations and conclusions will the public come to know of the full extent of the vulnerabilities of the system. And by making it known, the public can help devise ways and means to prevent a hijacking of the elections based on the information we share.
We have no other agenda than to obtain justice for our people in Biliran and expose proof of fraud to prevent our country and people from perpetual enslavement by the vested interests that controls the PCOS.
Be aware though that as we continue to move on from one election to another using the same PCOS system, these vested interests will become more adept at hiding any traces of fraud which will make our task of discovering and proving them all the more difficult if not impossible.
We hope that by presenting these documents, empirical evidences and conclusions, we are able to enlighten our people and warn them of the greater evil that looms just around the corner while almost all of us, millions of Filipinos, have no idea about either because we are plainly ignorant, or because the collusion of certain entities, especially but not limited to the COMELEC, have successfully suppressed most objections and evidences.
We will never stop exposing and devising ways to prevent this great evil until our country final acts to get rid of this menace.
FIRST CASE OF PCOS ELECTION IRREGULARITY:
The Audit Log Report of Clustered Precinct 7805002 (Brgy. Bacolod, Culaba, Biliran) clearly showed that no successful transmission was ever made to all three (3) servers after several attempts, including the MBOC/CCS of Culaba. The last entry of the ALR was recorded at 8.39PM of May 10, 2010 before it was shutdown. However, in the MBOC/CCS of Culaba, a successful electronic transmission of results was received and recorded at 11.23PM of May 10, 2010 from IP address 10.12.3.143. Plainly, the MBOC/CCS of Culaba received an electronic transmission of results 2 hours 44 minutes and 22 seconds after the PCOS was already shutdown.
The modem of each PCOS is dependent on the power supply of the PCOS itself. So much so that if the PCOS had already been shutdown, no power supply is available to the modem to be able to transmit. Where then did this transmission come from?
SECOND CASE OF PCOS ELECTION IRREGULARITY:
The MBOC/CCS Print Log indisputably shows a receipt of an electronic transmission of results purportedly from Clustered Precinct 7805006 (Brgy. Bool West, Culaba, Biliran) at 1:55:36AM of May 11, 2010 from IP 10.15.2.121. However, the same MBOC/CCS Print Log subsequently received and recorded another electronic transmission of results purportedly for the same Clustered Precinct 7805006 at 3:41:51AM of May 11, 2010 but from a different IP 10.15.3.43. The last recorded entry or event in the Audit Log Report of CP7805006 was 3:08:38AM of May 11, 2010. Therefore, the second transmission of results received and recorded by the MBOC/CCS server came 1 hour 46 minutes 15 seconds after the sending PCOS (CP7805006) had already been shutdown.
In going over the next slides showing all 7 precincts exhibiting the same characteristics of double transmission of results, the following guides might be helpful for a full understanding of this phenomena:
Does the evidence or documentation clearly establish the fact of double transmission for a single precinct?
Was the IP address used to originally transmit the results the same or different from the subsequent transmission?
Was the PCOS supposedly sending a second transmission still open and functioning at the time of the recorded receipt of the second transmission?
How many hours did it elapse between the first and second transmissions?
Did the MBOC/CCS Print Log show how it handled the second transmission? Did it disregard the second transmission or did it override the first transmission?
THIRD CASE OF PCOS ELECTION IRREGULARITY:
The MBOC/CCS Print Log of the Municipality of Almeria shows that 2 clustered precincts, CP7801002 and CP7801001 both of Brgy. Poblacion transmitted one after the other at 1:06:50AM and 1:23:53AM of May 11, 2010, respectively. However, even a cursory examination of the Print Log will show that both separate clustered precincts transmitted from one and the same IP 10.15.0.157.
An examination of all 8 MBOC Print Logs in Biliran will show that all PCOS which electronically transmitted results transmitted from separate and distinct IP addresses (including even the double transmissions), except for these 2 precincts where they share one and same IP address.
Earlier, we have established that the system used in assigning IP addresses to the different PCOS was static and not dynamic. A static IP assignment system would have assigned different or individual IP addresses to these 2 separate precincts. The fact that they share the same IP address puts much doubt on the election results from these subject precincts.
The official explanation of COMELEC and SMARTMATIC in this case is the same as in Case I (Brgy. Bacolod). According to them, the protocol to follow in case of failure to transmit is to remove the CF card and transmit from another available PCOS. Under this protocol, one condition precedent must be established before the protocol becomes operable, ie. failure to transmit. In other words, there must first be a failure to transmit before transmission can be attempted in another PCOS. In the succeeding slides, we will rebut this explanation of COMELEC and SMARTMATIC.
Before moving on, we draw your attention to the eerie similarity of the turnout percentages of both precincts. Mathematically, the turnout percentages of both precincts are exactly the same, although numerically there is a difference of 0.01%. One more actual voter in Precinct 2 would have added 0.11% to the total percentage of 81.85%. One more actual voter in Precinct 1 would have added 0.10% to the total percentage of 81.86%. So that for both precincts’ turnout percentages to be not mathematically the same, the difference should have been at the least 0.10%. In other words, in Precinct 2, one voter is equivalent to 0.11% while in Precinct 1, one voter is equivalent to 0.10%. The fact that the difference between the two precincts is only 0.01% then that is only a fraction of one voter in either precinct. Therefore, both numbers, while numerically different, are actually and mathematically the same.
FOURTH CASE OF PCOS ELECTION IRREGULARITY:
The illustration above shows five (5) randomly selected precincts across Biliran which electronically transmitted results on election day to their respective MBOC/CCS servers. By examining their respective PCOS Audit Log Report, we were able to pinpoint the time at which the first transmission was made by the PCOS to their respective MBOC/CCS servers. The time of first transmission is shown below each clustered precinct number.
By examining the respective MBOC Print Log, each transmission can be traced and identified. The recorded time at which the transmission was received by the respective MBOC/CCS server for each of the 5 precincts is shown right next to the MBOC/CCS Server picture clip. Opposite the recorded times are the variances in minutes.
By a simple comparison of the two (2) recorded times (PCOS and MBOC/CCS), the difference is quite glaring. It would appear then that the respective MBOC/CCS servers recorded their receipt of the transmissions ahead by a few minutes before the PCOS recorded its own transmission time. Stated differently, the MBOC/CCS server already recorded a receipt of transmission of results even before the PCOS did actually send one.
These discrepancies, aside from being widespread, entail at least a couple of dangerous effects on the election system, as follows:
The MBOC/CCS server which recorded an earlier transmission could reject any and all subsequent transmissions from purportedly the same precinct. The authentic results which came later in time may be rejected or disregarded if a spurious result is transmitted and recorded ahead of it.
With these transmission time discrepancies littering the audit or paper trail produced by both the PCOS and MBOC/CCS, any subsequent audit becomes muddled and very difficult to definitively trace any fraud committed.
The very simplistic explanation of COMELEC and SMARTMATIC in this case was that the date and time of the PCOS and MBOC/CCS servers were not synchronized. Ostensibly, it may explain the discrepancies observed in Biliran. However, the simplicity of the explanation requires us to believe that more than 98% of the PCOS would have their respective time set later and that 100% of the MBOC/CCS servers would have their respective time set earlier. In other words, if this were an innocent case of unsynchronized times and dates, then the tables next following this slide would have shown any number (some) of PCOS ahead in time and any number (some) of MBOC/CCS servers late in time. The tables clearly show that this is not the case. What the tables of compiled information show is the uniformity of the PCOS being set late and uniformity of the MBOC/CCS servers being set in advance.
In its entirety, the tables indisputably show the following:
There is synchronization of the respective time in more than 98% of the PCOS to be LATE.
There is synchronization of the respective time in 100% of the MBOC/CCS servers to be ADVANCE.
There is NO synchronization between the two groups (PCOS and MBOC/CCS server).
When more than 98% and 100% of 2 groups of available data show uniformity within that same group, it is definitely a pattern. This leads us to conclude that this widespread discrepancies pertaining to vital transmission information is far from being innocent but that the same was designed to confuse any subsequent audit of the system. This is just one more circumstance of the system being primed for cheating.
We believe that this widespread discrepancies in the times of transmission and receipt, between the PCOS and MBOC/CCS servers, respectively, is intended to hide any fraudulent machination arising from double or multiple transmissions (one of two modes of fraud). We see no other logical explanation.
FIFTH CASE OF PCOS ELECTION IRREGULARITY:
In our study of 147 audit log reports, we found out that the PCOS actually had two (2) separate counting mechanisms. One counter counts and segregates the votes for candidates while the other counter counts the valid ballots as they are scanned by the PCOS. This second counter is denominated in the audit log reports of each PCOS as protective counter.
The illustration above shows five (5) ballots which when scanned by the PCOS will update the protective counter by increments of one (1) for each valid ballot scanned. However, when a ballot is rejected the protective counter does not count it.
The protective counter information can be found on the 8th entry of the PCOS audit log report every time the PCOS is turned on or rebooted.
SIXTH CASE OF PCOS ELECTION IRREGULARITY:
Under the Terms of Reference between COMELEC and SMARTMATIC, a proviso requires for an immutable paper audit trail. Theoretically, when any automated system is backed by an irrefutable or indisputable paper audit trail or audit mechanisms, it lends confidence to the users and credibility to outside observers of the automated process. With much more relevance will this theory apply in cases of sovereign elections. Elections, by its nature, are offensive types of confrontation, at least in this country. It presupposes that after elections, a lot of election controversies will necessarily arise and refuse to die down. The arena simply changes from the polling centers to the election tribunals. Especially in this case where the elections in this country was automated for the first time. Therefore, providing for an immutable or incontrovertible means to conduct an audit ultimately to settle election controversies once and for all in a quick and credible manner, it is indeed laudable for COMELEC to have provided such a requirement. At least in theory, it appears to be one of best intentions.
However, in reality, as the ‘immutable’ paper audit trail is put to actual test in the field on election day, it increasingly appears that what at first ostensibly appear to be one of best intentions, actually meant the best intentions to hide what must necessarily be hidden from the victims and the public at large.
In this particular case, we will endeavor to show that the 3 principal documents produced by each and every PCOS operating on election day did not actually fully match with each other as to provide an immutable paper audit trail. At best, what it provides is a means to muddle any investigation into any fraud that may be committed on election day. No reasonable, credible and incontrovertible audit findings can ever be made with what the SMARTMATIC system provided.
We believe that this problem of mismatched paper audit trail is intended to hide any fraudulent machination arising from the preloading of CF cards (one of two modes of fraud). We see no other logical explanation.
The table above shows significant information culled from both the Minutes of Voting (MOV) and the Audit Log Reports (ALR) to put the 17 subject precincts in the right perspective.
Column 3 lists the number of voters per precinct who allegedly voted after 7PM of election day. These figures are individually numerically indicated in the precincts’ respective minutes of voting. Column 5, on the other hand, lists the number of votes actually cast after 7PM of election day as shown in their individual audit log reports. Column 6 shows the extent of the illegal extensions as shown in their respective audit log reports and corroborated by the time entries in the corresponding minutes of voting. In short, with respect to Column 6, both audit log reports and minutes of voting substantially matched.
The total of those who allegedly voted after 7PM of election day and at least numerically accounted for in the various minutes of voting is 2,415. While the total actual ballot or vote cast after 7PM of election day is 4,281. The unaccounted difference is 1,866 more voters or votes or ballots however denominated . It is most coincidental, to say the least, that Fmr. Rep. Glenn Chong lost 1,559 votes in all these 17 illegally extended precincts. It is likewise most coincidental that all 17 illegally extended precincts benefitted Espina immensely.
Equally significant is Column 4 concerning the list of names of those who allegedly voted past 7PM of election day. For any extension of voting to be legal or valid under the express provision of COMELEC Resolutions 8896 and 8786 (Sec 21), the following substantive requirements must be met:
The poll clerk must list down the names of voters still within 30 meters of the precinct at 7:00PM;
Call the voter twice in order to vote, so that if the voter is does not answer the call, he/she forfeits the right to vote; and,
The list so prepared must be turned over to the Election Officer, thus forming part of the records of the proceedings.
The above conditions are not flimsy, but substantive requirements, to prevent fraud. Compliance with these conditions lends legitimacy to any extension of voting time. While failure to enforce these conditions gives the BEI unbridled authority to extend the elections for as long as they wish thereby opening the floodgates to electoral fraud.
Notably, of the 17 questioned precincts, 16 did not have any such list at all as mandatorily required by COMELEC regulations. Only one (CP7806003, Balacson, Kawayan) had such list attached to the minutes of voting but all the voters did not actually physically cast their ballots into the PCOS. The BEIs did all the casting or scanning of the 510 ballots beginning at 4:13AM and ending at 8:14AM of May 11, 2010. For this grave reason, the credibility of the elections in this precinct becomes highly suspect, which necessarily infects the attached list.
The conspicuous absence of even a single credible list or name out of 4,281 alleged voters throws much weight on the argument of fraud. Precisely, because of the absence of the lists, 1,866 more voters were actually able to vote during such extended voting as accurately reflected in the audit log reports. Stated another way, originally, the BEIs indicated numerically in their respective minutes of voting that a total of 2,415 voters were outside their precincts waiting to vote as of 7PM on election day. During the course of the extensions, it eventually grew by 1,866 more voters (about 77% increase) bringing the final tally to 4,281 who allegedly voted until the next day as shown in the audit log reports. This is loud proof of the absence of any such required list.
If the lists really existed at the time of the elections, it could very well be available for production at any time and during the presentation and formal offer of evidence by Espina at the HRET. Not one credible list or name was ever produced or offered in evidence. If it did not exist at the time of the elections, neither could it subsequently be produced at anytime thereafter.
Alternatively, assuming for the sake of argument but without admitting that the lists did exist, the BEIs and Election Officers cannot present them in evidence without providing damning evidence against themselves in their conspiracy to commit election fraud through these extensions. If the lists were presented in evidence and showed all 4,281 names of alleged voters, how come they numerically indicated and declared in various minutes of voting only a total of 2,451 alleged voters? If the lists were presented in evidence and showed only 2,451 names of alleged voters, how come the audit log reports showed a total of 4, 281 votes cast during the extensions in all precincts? In either case, the unaccounted 1,866 more alleged voters during the extensions could not be reasonably justified. Since it would be a choice between the devil and the deep blue sea, they’d better be off not choosing any. That probably explains why no such list was ever offered in evidence.
Based on all the certified documents we have shown in this presentation, we came up with a general outline of how electoral fraud in 2010 was structured.
We believe that with respect to fraud involving national coverage, intervention through unauthorized network intrusion or multiple transmissions is the most logical and systematic way of implementing an automated version of dagdag-bawas. The positions involved in this fraudulent scheme is uniform all throughout the various political subdivisions in the country. Centralizing the operation of dagdag-bawas is much easier and significantly manageable to handle in this way because of the definite number of candidates and national political positions involved. At this point, however, we make clear again, we are not accusing any national official of committing, aiding or abetting the commission of this kind of electoral fraud.
On the other hand, with respect to fraud involving local coverage, intervention through the preloading of CF cards before the conduct of the elections is the most logical and systematic way of implementing an automated version of dagdag-bawas. The positions involved in this fraudulent scheme varies widely between and throughout the various political subdivisions in the country. It is not logical to centralize this operation in one location because of the thousands of candidates vying for thousands of local political positions across the country. The risk of errors occurring at any stage of the manipulation process and consequent discovery is much greater. The best alternative would be to preload the CF cards before the elections because the same are precinct-specific. In other words, this fraudulent scheme can be tailored-fit so suit the needs involving local positions. At this point also, we make clear as well, that we are not accusing any local official of committing, aiding or abetting the commission of this kind of electoral fraud, except in the case of Biliran where all the documents underlying these conclusions emanated from.
Ostensibly, one may argue that if automated fraud in local positions is committed by preloading the CF cards, there would be absolutely no necessity to engage in the more difficult operation of extending the voting time of a considerable number of precincts in order to otherwise duplicate the fraud. It would be a case of useless redundancy.
Analyzing deeper, it actually makes real sense that the pre-election recorded ballots or scans in the protective counter served as buffer for the cheater, but he is not guaranteed to win because such a buffer is determined and fixed before the actual voting. No one knows with deadly accuracy by how much votes the cheater would win or still lose given the buffer, unless he is more than fortunate enough to have been given an oracle. As insurance, a selected number of precincts (31), randomly chosen to prevent detection, will have to be purposely delayed through the actions of the BEIs controlled by the cheater. In this way, while the results of the elections from regular precincts are reported and tallied, the cheater would by then know if intervention, and by how much additional votes, are needed to insure his fraudulent victory. This is hybrid fraud in local elections.
The cheater could very well have jacked-up his buffer to comfortable levels without worrying about his insurance but then he must also anticipate the public’s reaction if the margin is too high. If the margin is too high to suit his comfort, the public’s rejection of the result might prove scandalously unbelievable and too discomforting for him. If the buffer levels are set too high, there is no way a seamless corrective measure can be made after the voting had started or the results are about to be printed, to bring the margin down to believable levels. The wide popularity of his opponent is definitely a serious consideration in setting the buffer levels.
Therefore, the preloading of CF cards as one of the modes of automated fraud does not necessarily and absolutely exclude the commission of manual intervention to commit fraud. They are not mutually exclusive of each other but are in fact, complementary to one another. Where the buffer levels through preloaded CF cards are set at a low level, manual intervention through voting time extensions provide the means to insure an ostensible victory. This manual scheme of electoral fraud, in the final analysis, merely confirms and strengthens the charge of fraud through preloaded CF cards.
About a month before the elections, the Espina patriarch publicly stated on radio he would be happy if his son (opponent of Chong) wins even by less than 500 votes. Knowing him as a relic of broadcast history, he was conditioning the mind of the public about the outcome of the elections. With Espina eventually gaining a presumptive margin of just 361 votes, one can definitely assume only two things: the Espina patriarch was much-favored with an oracle about the results of the elections; or, he made sure an imaginary oracle becomes a miracle, not by the intervention of saints, but of sinners with him on the lead.
Graphical presentation of the 60-30-10 phenomenon which is grossly abnormal since every precinct, town, city, province and region have their respective and distinct biases for or against particular candidates or group of candidates. To result in a uniform pattern or distribution of votes completely disregards these biases.
On the other hand, manipulating the results of the elections taking into account these biases will be arduous and complicated which the perpetrators may be better off doing away considering that evidence is definitely hard to uncover for those seeking the truth.
The 60-30-10 phenomenon was discovered by mathematics professor Lex Muga of the Ateneo de Manila University.
Numerical presentation (expressed in percentages of votes garnered per group of candidates) of the 60-30-10 phenomenon.
Numerical presentation (expressed in percentages of votes garnered per individual candidate) of the 60-30-10 phenomenon.
Without fail, each senatorial candidate obtains a specific vote share (percentage) from the first reported canvass down to the last reported canvass. Significantly, the individual vote share (percentage) does not vary in significant extent and is maintained almost uniformly from start to finish regardless of the number of votes reported for each canvass.
There are only 2 possible logical explanation for this phenomenon: 1. the votes where cast by robots voting uniformly 2. the voting results were manipulated.
At the very least, it is impossible to have 100% turnout in any election. The cut-off date of the EDCVL (Election Day Computerized Voters’ List – the list posted at the polling precinct on election day) was February 2013. But even beyond this cut-off date, a number of voters already dead or absent are still active in the list. And between February to May (3 months) any number of people in any precinct would have additionally either died or transferred yet their names are still on the EDCVL.
To achieve a 100% turnout on election day would have meant that all the hundreds of voters in each of the 70 precincts indicated above would have returned (both the absent and the dead) and voted.
There were 304 Certificates of Canvass (COCs) in the 2013 elections (1 COC or consolidated report per province, city and overseas absentee voting post). When 129 COCs representing just 42% of the total were canvassed as of May 18, the partial votes reported for the leading senatorial candidates were by the millions (Poe had 20,147,423), yet when the remaining 175 COCs representing the majority at 58% of the total were canvassed subsequent to May 18, the additional votes reported for the same leading senatorial candidates were not more than 200,000 votes each (Poe got an additional of 189,904 votes only).
Stated plainly, how can less than half (42%) of the total COCs produce millions of votes for each candidate while the more than half (58%) of the total COCs produce less than 200,000 votes for each candidate?
Only 3 clustered precincts where identified by the petitioners and each of the subject precincts showed the PCOS shaving off the votes for Villanueva.
The average number of votes shaved off from Villanueva is 39.67 votes per precinct. If 80% of the almost 78,000 clustered precincts functioning on election day were manipulated, the correlated total votes manipulated against Villanueva could reach 2,475,408 votes. This figure is more than enough to affect the overall election results.
In the end, how much faith can you put in this automated election system heralded as clean and credible by its promoters while adamantly refusing to answer squarely, with proof, the issues hounding the system? Would you be willing to make a leap of faith into the unknown with this system and all its vulnerabilities?
With that, we conclude the message we wish to share with you along with the people of this republic. If you believe that the message and the messenger is credible enough, then we, as a people, need to start thinking and doing something about how to insure that our right to give consent to the ruler remains our real right, undiluted by tampering or fraud. For to do otherwise and letting apathy reign in our midst, we all face unimaginable consequences now and far into the future.
We have seen that up close in Biliran when the school bus system and the regular medical/dental missions grounded to a halt immediately after the 2010 elections. One need not venture out farther than our case in Biliran. It is a portent of things to come.
Plato and his political philosophies, after all, is not just one relic in the archives of history. He and his political philosophies continue to reverberate all this time. And considering thousands of years of political greed, it must be at its peak this time anywhere in the world.
Fighting a colossal monster as political greed (wealth and power) is enough to discourage anyone right from the start. But we have a choice of whether we let that monster live and enslave us all, or we go down fighting to free ourselves from it.
It is enough for good men to do nothing for evil to triumph.
It is enough for common men to postpone acting on this message for some other time to place himself and his future at the gravest peril.