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Analyzing
Malicious JavaScript
2016.10.22
AV TOKYO 2016
Kazuki Takada
Who am I ?
Kazuki Takada
SecureBrain Corporation
Software engineer and Researcher.
Originally, programmer of the Embedded Software.
I like Python and drinking modestly.
I dislike JavaScript and CUDA programming.
Contents
• About Banking malware
• About malicious JavaScript
3
Banking malware
4
Banking malware
• It is called Banking Trojan.
• It falsifies banking credential information and
does fraudulent money transfer.
5
ROVNIX
• It started to appear in Japan at end of 2015.
• Alias name : Cidox
• Rewrites MITB communication content
6
MITB by ROVNIX
7
Malware
Bank
Web server
Request of JavaScript from
inserted <script>
Malicious JavaScript
<html>
<head>
<title>Internet Banking</title>
<script src=“….”>
Manipulation server
RequestOriginal content
Insert <script> to origin content in target URL.
Injection
C&C Server
Victim PC
Command and configuration
Ex) target URL
Major Banking malware in 2016
• ROVNIX
• URLZONE
• VAWTRAK (New)
• URSNIF
8
Other name Shiotob, Beblohbd
Other name Snifula
Other name Gozi
The two malware have something in
common.
9
Malicious JavaScript is same
10
CENSORED
Function of malicious
JavaScript
11
Malicious JavaScript
• It has about 40,000 lines of code.
• It includes jQuery. But it is enormous even without
jQuery.
• It has a common base and is customized for
each bank site.
• It injects fraudulent web content screens for
various security software introduction and
information fraud.
• Its usage has been traced back to many
countries. For example, Japanese, English,
Hangul and Arabic.
12
13
CENSORED
Behind fraudulent web content...
14
Victim PC
Login
Bank Manipulation server
Login credential info.
Login process
Login Screen
Remittance process
Request of Settlement info.
Dummyscreenof
securitysoftware
Settlement info
Display
some input
screen an
necessary
Record of the fight
15
Pre-condition
SecureBrain Corporation
• To find out what JavaScript manipulates, I
traverse the DOM information after the content
has been read
Criminal
• Malware will inject <SCRIPT> just after
<HEAD>. Malicious JavaScript is read than
anyone else earlier.
• Of course, there are no holds barred.
16
Before hiding
• Manipulation by added <DIV>
17
I can find it only when I traverse
DOM information.
Round 1
• Override of alert
18
It can find by alert.toString. Because it
shows content of the function.
Round 2
• Override of toString
ex)
19
window.alert.toString = function()
{
return “[native code]”;
}
It can find alert.toString.toString
20
CENSORED
Round 3
• Nest of toString...
21
It can find difference in
Object.prototype.toString
Round 4
• Override of Object.prototype.toString
Result of Object.prototype.toString is changed
freely by following function.
22
It can find the true in
Function.prototype.toString.
Round 5
• Of course, Function.prototype.toString is
overrided.
23
略
It can find difference of Property by
getOwnPropertyDescriptor.
Round 6
• Override of getOwnPropertyDescriptor
24
略
We have been chasing in
getOwnPropertyDescriptor now.
The fight continues...
25
26
CENSORED
Conclusion
• After understanding the specification of
JavaScript, the criminal would keep attacking
persistently.
• The specification of JavaScript which can
override every object is a double-edged sword.
• The sharing of threat information is too
important.
27
28
CENSORED
Thank you!!
29

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Analyzing of Malicious JavaScript[en]

  • 2. Who am I ? Kazuki Takada SecureBrain Corporation Software engineer and Researcher. Originally, programmer of the Embedded Software. I like Python and drinking modestly. I dislike JavaScript and CUDA programming.
  • 3. Contents • About Banking malware • About malicious JavaScript 3
  • 5. Banking malware • It is called Banking Trojan. • It falsifies banking credential information and does fraudulent money transfer. 5
  • 6. ROVNIX • It started to appear in Japan at end of 2015. • Alias name : Cidox • Rewrites MITB communication content 6
  • 7. MITB by ROVNIX 7 Malware Bank Web server Request of JavaScript from inserted <script> Malicious JavaScript <html> <head> <title>Internet Banking</title> <script src=“….”> Manipulation server RequestOriginal content Insert <script> to origin content in target URL. Injection C&C Server Victim PC Command and configuration Ex) target URL
  • 8. Major Banking malware in 2016 • ROVNIX • URLZONE • VAWTRAK (New) • URSNIF 8 Other name Shiotob, Beblohbd Other name Snifula Other name Gozi The two malware have something in common.
  • 12. Malicious JavaScript • It has about 40,000 lines of code. • It includes jQuery. But it is enormous even without jQuery. • It has a common base and is customized for each bank site. • It injects fraudulent web content screens for various security software introduction and information fraud. • Its usage has been traced back to many countries. For example, Japanese, English, Hangul and Arabic. 12
  • 14. Behind fraudulent web content... 14 Victim PC Login Bank Manipulation server Login credential info. Login process Login Screen Remittance process Request of Settlement info. Dummyscreenof securitysoftware Settlement info Display some input screen an necessary
  • 15. Record of the fight 15
  • 16. Pre-condition SecureBrain Corporation • To find out what JavaScript manipulates, I traverse the DOM information after the content has been read Criminal • Malware will inject <SCRIPT> just after <HEAD>. Malicious JavaScript is read than anyone else earlier. • Of course, there are no holds barred. 16
  • 17. Before hiding • Manipulation by added <DIV> 17 I can find it only when I traverse DOM information.
  • 18. Round 1 • Override of alert 18 It can find by alert.toString. Because it shows content of the function.
  • 19. Round 2 • Override of toString ex) 19 window.alert.toString = function() { return “[native code]”; } It can find alert.toString.toString
  • 21. Round 3 • Nest of toString... 21 It can find difference in Object.prototype.toString
  • 22. Round 4 • Override of Object.prototype.toString Result of Object.prototype.toString is changed freely by following function. 22 It can find the true in Function.prototype.toString.
  • 23. Round 5 • Of course, Function.prototype.toString is overrided. 23 略 It can find difference of Property by getOwnPropertyDescriptor.
  • 24. Round 6 • Override of getOwnPropertyDescriptor 24 略 We have been chasing in getOwnPropertyDescriptor now.
  • 27. Conclusion • After understanding the specification of JavaScript, the criminal would keep attacking persistently. • The specification of JavaScript which can override every object is a double-edged sword. • The sharing of threat information is too important. 27