This document provides a summary of a university lecture on international politics concepts. It discusses three basic concepts for analyzing international relations: actors, goals, and instruments. It also covers the prisoner's dilemma game and the security dilemma concept. Finally, it discusses how cooperation between countries is possible through concepts like the stag hunt game and the development of international society through international organizations and non-governmental organizations.

1. Fundamental Concepts
of International Politics
Spring 2015
Prof. H. Steven Green
Toyo University
Faculty of Law
Lecture 4
May 6th 2015
Security Dilemma (Rev.),
“Games”

2. Today’s Plan
1. Review of 3 Basic Concepts
2. Review of PD and Security Dilemma
3. “The Long Shadow of the Future”
4. Ethics and IP
5. 3 Views of the Role of Morality in IP

3. Match the concepts with the correct examples.
1 Instruments A
2 Actors B
3 Goals C

4. (1) 3 Basic Concepts for Theorizing, Review, 2
CONCEPT EXAMPLES
1. Actors
2. Goals
3. Instruments
Match the words below with the correct concept.
Japan, safe drinking water, navy, negotiation, Al Qaeda, trade,
stopping AIDS, military security, Toyota, United Nations (UN),
suicide bombing (自爆テロ), sanctions (制裁), army

5. 3 Basic Concepts for Theorizing
CONCEPT EXAMPLES
1. Actors
Japan, Al Qaeda, Toyota, UN,
2. Goals safe drinking water, stopping AIDS,
military security
3. Instruments navy, negotiation, trade, suicide
bombing, sanctions, army

6. PD and the Security Dilemma
SECURITY DILEMMA
Why did Athens and Sparta go to war?
COOPERATE
If Sparta stops
Corinth
DEFECT
If Sparta does not
stop Corinth
COOPERATE
If Athens does not
help Corcyra
Peace… but
not security
Sparta &
Peloponnesian
League stronger
DEFECT
If Athens helps
Corcyra
Athens & Delian
League stronger
WAR

7. PD in-class game
You are the leader of a country.
You feel threatened by the rise of another
country’s power.
Your goal is to maximize your country’s power.

8. PD in-class game
• Play ONCE with 5 different people
• Show your choice with scissors and paper
(paper = cooperate, scissors = defect)
• Record your results
• Everyone starts with zero points

9. PD in-class game
If B plays paper
(cooperate)
If B plays scissors
(defect)
If A plays
paper
(cooperate)
If A plays
scissors
(defect)

10. PD in-class game
If B plays paper
(cooperate)
If B plays scissors
(defect)
If A plays
paper
(cooperate)
A&B: 20
B: + 50 points
A: - 50 points
If A plays
scissors
(defect)
A: + 50 points
B: - 50 points
A&B: -25 points

11. PD in-class game
You are the leader of a country.
You feel threatened by the rise of another
country’s power.
Your goal is to maximize your country’s power.

12. The Security Dilemma
SD = Two (or more) countries enter a conflict
(e.g. war) even though none of the countries
wants conflict.
Cause: When one state feels insecure in relation
to another state, it may try to increase its
security by increasing its military power
and/or joining a military alliance.
• The other state interprets these actions as
threats and increases its military power,
which…
• The first state believes are threats.

13. The Security Dilemma Review
Thucydides & realists:
Athens’s and Sparta’s decision was rational (合理的).
The security dilemma makes war inevitable.
Always and in all cultures.

14. DISCUSSION
Do you believe this explanation?
Why or why not?
Can the security dilemma be avoided?
How?

15. PD Game 2
You are the leader of a country.
Your goal is to maximize your country’s power. .

16. PD Game 2
• Play FIVE TIMES with 1 person.
• Show your choice with paper and scissors
• Record your results
• Everyone starts with zero points

17. PD in-class game
If B plays paper
(cooperate)
If B plays scissors
(defect)
If A plays
paper
(cooperate)
If A plays
scissors
(defect)

18. PD in-class game
If B plays paper
(cooperate)
If B plays scissors
(defect)
If A plays
paper
(cooperate)
A&B: 20
B: + 50 points
A: - 50 points
If A plays
scissors
(defect)
A: + 50 points
B: - 50 points
A&B: -25 points

19. PD Game 2
What happened?
What did you do more often-
cooperate or defect?
Why?

20. War is Not Inevitable (Maybe)
戦争は決して避けられないものではない(かも。。。）
• When people or governments disagree we need
to know if they are playing one game or more.
• A “game” is a situation where people or
governments want different things and have to
cooperate or compete to get them.
• In one “game” (i.e. a single issue) where BOTH
sides will probably lose some power, defection is
the best strategy (協力しない方がいい) because
states really cannot trust each other.

21. War is Not Inevitable
戦争は決して避けられないものではない
• In many games (i.e. issues), we can learn to
trust each other.
WHY?

22. States can develop trust for each other by
using the TIT-FOR-TAT strategy
• IF A defects, B will defect
• If A cooperates, B will cooperate
In other words…
• If A threatens B, then B will threaten A
• If A does not threaten B, then B will not
threaten A
AND…
Tit-for-tat strategy

23. …both states learn that the most rational
strategy (一番合理的な戦略) is to
cooperate.
Leaders must think about the future.

24. Why do states cooperate or at least keep talking?
1. They think about the future

25. Didn’t Athens or Sparta think
about the future?

26. • Sparta feared the rise of Athens.
• Athens believed war was inevitable
so…
Athenian leaders decided they could
not trust the Corinthians or the
Spartans

27. • If country X believes it cannot trust
country Y, then country X will act as if the
“game” is over, so…
• The most rational strategy is to defect
Athens did not trust Sparta or Corinth, so it
acted as if the game were over (and
Sparta did not trust Athens so…)
When does defection occur?

28. Is cooperation impossible?

29. • Thucydides believed Athenians and Spartans
could not avoid the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD)
(But he did not call it the “prisoner’s
dilemma.” He called it natural!)
• For realists, anarchy creates a permanent PD
But… is the PD really permanent?
Is cooperation impossible?

30. PYE: Thucydides ignores human errors.
• Corinth thought Athens would not fight
• Athens reacted too harshly in Potidaea
(AthensはPotidaeaに厳しい反応を示した。）
These bad decisions made war:
NOT the logic of anarchy
PD is not inevitable

31. • The security dilemma increases the risk
of war but…
• Human behavior is voluntary (自発的)
• States can choose to cooperate: They can
choose to “play many games” with each
other or…
• They can play different games.
“The long shadow of the future”

32. But…
Not all “games”in IR are PD.

33. New Game
You are the leader of a country.
Your goal is to maximize your country’s security.

34. New Game: Play once with 5 people
If B plays paper
(cooperate)
If B plays scissors
(defect)
If A plays
paper
(cooperate)
If A plays
scissors
(defect)

35. New Game: Play once with one person
If B plays paper
(cooperate)
If B plays scissors
(defect)
If A plays
paper
(cooperate)
A&B: +100 points
B: + 50 points
A: 0 points
If A plays
scissors
(defect)
A: + 50 points
B: 0 points
A&B: + 50 points

36. Stag
Rabbit

37. Stag Hunt
• Two hunters can either hunt one stag together or
hunt rabbits separately.
• Stags provide more food, but...
• Hunting a stag is difficult and requires patience and
cooperation.
• It is easy to catch a rabbit, but the rabbit provides
less food.
• The hunters must cooperate to get the most food.

38. Stag hunt

39. Stag Hunt
• Cooperation requires patience and trust.
• Patience: The hunters must wait quietly for a very
long time until a stag comes.
• Trust: It is easy to catch a rabbit, so it is tempting to
quit waiting, hunt a rabbit and enjoy the rest of the
day.

40. Stag hunt
B
A

41. Stag hunt
B
A

42. Stag hunt
B
A

43. Stag hunt
B
A

44. Stag hunt
B
A

45. Stag hunt =
Coordination Game
B
Cooperates
B
Defects
A
Cooperates 5, 5 0, 1
A
Defects 1, 0 1, 1

46. Stag hunt: Discussion
What are some examples of “stag hunt” in
international politics?
What are examples of issues in which coordination
produces the BEST result for both sides?

47. Examples of stag hunt
• Environmental issues
• Nuclear disarmament
• Trade agreements
• Fighting pirates

48. Pirate activity in Arabian Sea, 2011

49. States: Pirates are hostis humani
generis (enemies of humanity)

50. Pirates threaten international trade

51. Pirates attack oil and transport ships

52. Pirates also attack civilians.

53. Who fights the pirates?
• US Navy is most advanced and powerful in the
world
• US can project (i.e. send) its sea (and air) power
anywhere in the world at anytime.
• The US Navy could fight pirates successfully alone.
But it does not.

54. Countries cooperate
to capture and kill
pirates.

56. States often rescue their own citizens
and then punish the pirates in their
own courts.

57. Fighting pirates
Different types of governments coordinate to
fight pirates
Other countries
Cooperate
Other countries
Defect
USA
Cooperates
Coordinated fight by
everyone: Decrease in
number of pirate attacks,
lower costs for everyone,
benefits of cooperation.
USA fights without help
(expensive, risky).
Other countries get free benefit
of safer seas (but difficult to get
all pirates.)
USA
Defects
Other countries fight without
help (expensive, dangerous).
USA get free benefit of safer
seas (but difficult to get all
pirates.)
Everyone fights but only when
their own ships are threatened.
Increase in number of pirate
attacks.

58. International cooperation and ethics
• All states agree that pirates are a threat to the
international system.
• No disagreement about interests or ethics.
• Easy to cooperate. So…
Easy to imagine INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY

59. Hard to cooperate on other issues
Whaling

62. IOs

63. NGOs

64. Why do states cooperate or at least keep talking?
Not all IR “games” are PD
• In PD the only way to “win” is if the other side
loses completely.
• But not all “games” in IR are PD because…
Power is not always zero-sum.

65. 1. Collect information, think carefully,
talk with other states as much as
possible
• Diplomats and leaders talk often
• Foreign policy professionals collect
information (including spying)
How can states avoid the logic of
the PD?

66. 2. Create and participate in international
society (i.e. practice liberalism)
• Create & join IOs, NGOs
• Participate in free trade deals
• Allow people to visit other countries and
allow people to visit your own
How can states avoid the logic of the PD?

67. YES
• Cooperation created domestic society, so it
can also create international society
• IOs, NGOs, trade, exchanges of people can
create conditions for cooperation
• Successful cooperation creates more
cooperation
• Create other games (i.e. other issues, such
as trade, that are stag hunts.)
Can International society solve the PD?

68. International Society
For liberalism:
IOs + NGOs = INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY
International society REDUCES risk of war
from the security dilemma.
What do realists say about this idea?

69. NO
• Cooperation and FORCE created domestic society,
(history of state-building is violent) so international
force will happen.
• Trade does not always prevent war: The world was
more globalized BEFORE World War I than after it
(until 1990): Nations that traded still went to war
(The ancient Greek world was a world of trade)
• Cooperation and understanding do not always
prevent war: Europeans cooperated and understood
each other for hundreds of years and still had many
wars with each other. See also: Israel and Palestine
Can International society solve the PD?

70. FOR NEXT WEEK
• 3 Views MORALITY in IP
• READ about JUST WAR DOCTRINE,
pp.36 (In the box)
• Do HW 4
• Review key words and ideas in
Unit 1
HAVE A GREAT WEEK!