2001-2014: Lessons Learned
Canada
in Afghanistan
Presentation by: Derakhshan Qurban-Ali
“Defence, Diplomacy, and
Development” to “Danger,
Distrust and Disaffection”
• A review of lessons learned from
Canada’s war in Afghanistan and its
effect on Canadian defence policy from
2001-2014.”
Soviet War in Afghanistan
1979-1989
Civil War in Afghanistan
1992-1995
Taliban Rule in Afghanistan
1996-2001
9/11 and the US-led invasion
of Afghanistan in 2001
Canada in Afghanistan 2001-
2014
• 158 Canadian soldiers
killed
• 2000 wounded
• $18 billion spent
• Canada needs to ask:
what lessons can be
learned from this
engagement?
Questions
1. What were the structural constraints
Canada faced going into the mission?
2. What were the mistakes Canada made
through the course of the Afghan
mission?
3. What should Canada learn from this?
OUR MISSION
BEFORE MANLEY:
• "It was crystal clear from the start that there was no
strategy for the mission...no clear articulation of what
they wanted to achieve, no political guidance and few
forces. It was abysmal.”
• Our reasons justifying Canada’s engagement in Kandahar:
1. to take part in “an international response to the threat to
peace and security inherent in al Qaeda’s terrorist attacks;”
2. to support the United Nations;
3. to support NATO;
4. and to promote and protect “human security in fragile states.”
The Manley Report 2008
• Canada's engagement has been guided by clear
Canadian priorities with two main objectives:
(Manley 53)
1. Providing the necessary security to allow
development to take place in southern
Afghanistan; and
2. Supporting the Afghanistan government in
establishing good governance and in building a
better life for its citizens.
Taliban Controlled Areas
The Civilian-Military Divide
• "Civilians can never trust the
military leadership, not
because they are not
trustworthy, but because they
have a fundamentally
different world view.”
Janice Stein and Eugene Lang,
The Unexpected War: 9
Canada Peacekeeping Myth
“STEPPING ON A LANDMINE”: WAS
COUNTER-INSURGENCY IN
KANDAHAR A MISTAKE?
Bamiyan: A Better Option?
Afghanistan Ethnic Demographics
Regional Security
Pashtuns and Pakistan
Pakistan’s support for the Taliban
•“No guerrilla movement that has
had a set of sanctuaries — let
alone the active help of a
powerful military like Pakistan’s
— has ever been eliminated”
• Fareed Zakaria, CNN Analyst (2012)
Who Are the Taliban?
Addressing Grievances
• Why are locals joining the Taliban?
• ANP (Afghan National Police) Abuses
• Corruption
• Poppy Crop Eradication
• Air Strikes
• 80000 internally displaced people as a result of
NATO air strikes
• Poverty
Taliban, Afghan Government,
or Al-Qaeda member?
• Wahabi Islamist
• Was the first one to invite Osama bin Laden to take refuge in
Afghanistan following his 1996 expulsion from Sudan
• During the Afghan civil war, financed by Saudi Arabia to
mobilize Arab volunteers for the Mujahedin forces
• Close relationship with militant groups such as Al-Qaeda
• Accused of knowingly assisting suicide bombers to
assassinate Northern Alliance leader, Ahmad Shah Massoud
• Established a terrorist training camp in Pakistan used by Al
Qaeda and other Islamic militant groups
• His forces slaughtered, burned, and raped their way through
a Shi’ite neighbourhood in Kabul during the Civil War
• Oppressor of women
Government Official!
Abdul Rasul Sayyaf
• As of 2007, Sayyaf is an
influential member of
Parliament
• Calls for amnesty for
former mujahideen
• Candidate for the 2014
Presidential elections
• Came in fourth place
• Received 7% of vote
• Won Kandahar province as
part of the Islamic Dawah
Organization of
Afghanistan
Taliban, Afghan Government,
or Al-Qaeda member?
• Controls a militia of several thousand men
• Controls drug-smuggling routes
• Participated in civilian massacres
• Known for torturing prisoners
• Widespread human rights abuses
• Widely feared
• Etc…
Government Official and Canadian ally!
General Abdul Raziq
• Provincial Police
Chief in Kandahar
• US and NATO ally
• Frequent partner of
Canadian Forces in
Kandahar in fight
against the Taliban
UNSAVORY ALLIES: “THE ENEMY
OF MY ENEMY IS MY FRIEND”
• The Manley Panel made a clear distinction
between the Canadian forces and the
combatants they were fighting:
• “Afghanistan is at war, and Canadians are
combatants. It is a war fought between an
elected, democratic government and a
zealous insurgency of proven brutality.”
• Reality is not as black and white
NATO Strategy and Losing
“Hearts and Minds”
A War on Three Fronts
• War on Poverty
• War on Terror
• War on Drugs
• Canada and NATO can not win these wars
through arms and military force
• A diplomatic and political solution is the only
viable and sustainable solution that takes into
account everyone’s grievances and includes
everyone at the negotiating table
Shortcomings & Lessons to Learn
1. Lost legitimacy and lacked the ability to distinguish ourselves from
the forces we were fighting
• By supporting corrupt warlords
• Detainee crisis
• Support of a corrupt government regime
• Losing popular support (burning poppy crops & air raids)
2. Not understanding the cultural and historical legacy of Afghanistan
before engaging in Kandahar; both domestic and international factors
• Trusting Pakistan
• Not understanding the tribal, ethnic, and historical tensions in Afghanistan
Brief Conclusions
• In order to successfully execute nation-building and
counter-insurgency efforts in a country like Afghanistan,
Canada needs
1. to address the civilian-military divide
2. leverage its unique diplomatic capabilities
3. develop a greater understanding of the geopolitical,
historical, and ethnic factors involved in a given
regional security complex, and
4. consistently uphold the tenets of Canada’s human
rights standards in military conduct abroad.
Something to reflect upon…
“Sitting on straw mats in the mud structure that serves as
a guesthouse, drinking green chai made from goat's milk,
the village elders ask the Western visitor if the West will
stay this time. Swatting flies away, the Western visitor
insists that he and the other Westerners are here for the
"long haul." The elders exchange knowing looks; they
have heard this before and were abandoned. The
international community needs to provide the Afghans
the opportunity to prove the promise.”
5.pptx

5.pptx

  • 1.
    2001-2014: Lessons Learned Canada inAfghanistan Presentation by: Derakhshan Qurban-Ali
  • 2.
    “Defence, Diplomacy, and Development”to “Danger, Distrust and Disaffection” • A review of lessons learned from Canada’s war in Afghanistan and its effect on Canadian defence policy from 2001-2014.”
  • 4.
    Soviet War inAfghanistan 1979-1989
  • 5.
    Civil War inAfghanistan 1992-1995
  • 6.
    Taliban Rule inAfghanistan 1996-2001
  • 7.
    9/11 and theUS-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001
  • 8.
    Canada in Afghanistan2001- 2014 • 158 Canadian soldiers killed • 2000 wounded • $18 billion spent • Canada needs to ask: what lessons can be learned from this engagement?
  • 9.
    Questions 1. What werethe structural constraints Canada faced going into the mission? 2. What were the mistakes Canada made through the course of the Afghan mission? 3. What should Canada learn from this?
  • 10.
    OUR MISSION BEFORE MANLEY: •"It was crystal clear from the start that there was no strategy for the mission...no clear articulation of what they wanted to achieve, no political guidance and few forces. It was abysmal.” • Our reasons justifying Canada’s engagement in Kandahar: 1. to take part in “an international response to the threat to peace and security inherent in al Qaeda’s terrorist attacks;” 2. to support the United Nations; 3. to support NATO; 4. and to promote and protect “human security in fragile states.”
  • 11.
    The Manley Report2008 • Canada's engagement has been guided by clear Canadian priorities with two main objectives: (Manley 53) 1. Providing the necessary security to allow development to take place in southern Afghanistan; and 2. Supporting the Afghanistan government in establishing good governance and in building a better life for its citizens.
  • 12.
  • 13.
    The Civilian-Military Divide •"Civilians can never trust the military leadership, not because they are not trustworthy, but because they have a fundamentally different world view.” Janice Stein and Eugene Lang, The Unexpected War: 9
  • 14.
  • 15.
    “STEPPING ON ALANDMINE”: WAS COUNTER-INSURGENCY IN KANDAHAR A MISTAKE?
  • 16.
  • 17.
  • 18.
  • 19.
  • 20.
    Pakistan’s support forthe Taliban •“No guerrilla movement that has had a set of sanctuaries — let alone the active help of a powerful military like Pakistan’s — has ever been eliminated” • Fareed Zakaria, CNN Analyst (2012)
  • 21.
    Who Are theTaliban?
  • 22.
    Addressing Grievances • Whyare locals joining the Taliban? • ANP (Afghan National Police) Abuses • Corruption • Poppy Crop Eradication • Air Strikes • 80000 internally displaced people as a result of NATO air strikes • Poverty
  • 23.
    Taliban, Afghan Government, orAl-Qaeda member? • Wahabi Islamist • Was the first one to invite Osama bin Laden to take refuge in Afghanistan following his 1996 expulsion from Sudan • During the Afghan civil war, financed by Saudi Arabia to mobilize Arab volunteers for the Mujahedin forces • Close relationship with militant groups such as Al-Qaeda • Accused of knowingly assisting suicide bombers to assassinate Northern Alliance leader, Ahmad Shah Massoud • Established a terrorist training camp in Pakistan used by Al Qaeda and other Islamic militant groups • His forces slaughtered, burned, and raped their way through a Shi’ite neighbourhood in Kabul during the Civil War • Oppressor of women
  • 24.
    Government Official! Abdul RasulSayyaf • As of 2007, Sayyaf is an influential member of Parliament • Calls for amnesty for former mujahideen • Candidate for the 2014 Presidential elections • Came in fourth place • Received 7% of vote • Won Kandahar province as part of the Islamic Dawah Organization of Afghanistan
  • 25.
    Taliban, Afghan Government, orAl-Qaeda member? • Controls a militia of several thousand men • Controls drug-smuggling routes • Participated in civilian massacres • Known for torturing prisoners • Widespread human rights abuses • Widely feared • Etc…
  • 26.
    Government Official andCanadian ally! General Abdul Raziq • Provincial Police Chief in Kandahar • US and NATO ally • Frequent partner of Canadian Forces in Kandahar in fight against the Taliban
  • 27.
    UNSAVORY ALLIES: “THEENEMY OF MY ENEMY IS MY FRIEND” • The Manley Panel made a clear distinction between the Canadian forces and the combatants they were fighting: • “Afghanistan is at war, and Canadians are combatants. It is a war fought between an elected, democratic government and a zealous insurgency of proven brutality.” • Reality is not as black and white
  • 28.
    NATO Strategy andLosing “Hearts and Minds”
  • 29.
    A War onThree Fronts • War on Poverty • War on Terror • War on Drugs • Canada and NATO can not win these wars through arms and military force • A diplomatic and political solution is the only viable and sustainable solution that takes into account everyone’s grievances and includes everyone at the negotiating table
  • 30.
    Shortcomings & Lessonsto Learn 1. Lost legitimacy and lacked the ability to distinguish ourselves from the forces we were fighting • By supporting corrupt warlords • Detainee crisis • Support of a corrupt government regime • Losing popular support (burning poppy crops & air raids) 2. Not understanding the cultural and historical legacy of Afghanistan before engaging in Kandahar; both domestic and international factors • Trusting Pakistan • Not understanding the tribal, ethnic, and historical tensions in Afghanistan
  • 31.
    Brief Conclusions • Inorder to successfully execute nation-building and counter-insurgency efforts in a country like Afghanistan, Canada needs 1. to address the civilian-military divide 2. leverage its unique diplomatic capabilities 3. develop a greater understanding of the geopolitical, historical, and ethnic factors involved in a given regional security complex, and 4. consistently uphold the tenets of Canada’s human rights standards in military conduct abroad.
  • 32.
    Something to reflectupon… “Sitting on straw mats in the mud structure that serves as a guesthouse, drinking green chai made from goat's milk, the village elders ask the Western visitor if the West will stay this time. Swatting flies away, the Western visitor insists that he and the other Westerners are here for the "long haul." The elders exchange knowing looks; they have heard this before and were abandoned. The international community needs to provide the Afghans the opportunity to prove the promise.”