The document summarizes lessons learned from efforts to support democracy in Afghanistan and Iraq over the past decade. It discusses the challenges of nation-building, state-building, demobilizing militias, and economic development that have accompanied democracy promotion. Key lessons highlighted include the importance of political agreements among groups in the post-conflict period, establishing stable constitutional and governmental institutions, developing an effective electoral system and political parties, and fostering leaders committed to national rather than sectarian interests.
Voter ID Law is a law that needs some sort of authority distinguishing proof all together for a man to enlist to vote, get a poll for an election, or to vote. Voter distinguishing proof laws are important to battle the genuine peril of voter misrepresentation. There is a long history of voter pantomime all through the United States. Voter extortion meddles with individual races, as well as undermines voter trust in delegate government by and large.
Agenda 21 is a broad course of action of move to be made thoroughly, extensively and at local level by relationship of the United Nations System, Govt., and Main Groups in every region in which human consequences for the earth. A June 2013 study of 1,301 United States voters by the American Planning Association found that 9.1% supported this Agenda, 6.2% confined it, and 85.1% thought they didn't have enough data to shape a feeling.
Redistricting, Democracy and New York: A Practical SolutionWagner College
Dr. Abraham Unger, a political scientist at Wagner College's Hugh L. Carey Institute for Government Reform, proposes a relatively simple, eminently practical way to reform New York State's highly partisan, notoriously unfair decennial redistricting process.
Voter ID Law is a law that needs some sort of authority distinguishing proof all together for a man to enlist to vote, get a poll for an election, or to vote. Voter distinguishing proof laws are important to battle the genuine peril of voter misrepresentation. There is a long history of voter pantomime all through the United States. Voter extortion meddles with individual races, as well as undermines voter trust in delegate government by and large.
Agenda 21 is a broad course of action of move to be made thoroughly, extensively and at local level by relationship of the United Nations System, Govt., and Main Groups in every region in which human consequences for the earth. A June 2013 study of 1,301 United States voters by the American Planning Association found that 9.1% supported this Agenda, 6.2% confined it, and 85.1% thought they didn't have enough data to shape a feeling.
Redistricting, Democracy and New York: A Practical SolutionWagner College
Dr. Abraham Unger, a political scientist at Wagner College's Hugh L. Carey Institute for Government Reform, proposes a relatively simple, eminently practical way to reform New York State's highly partisan, notoriously unfair decennial redistricting process.
The consequences of the wrong actions in the right directionSUN&FZ Associates
It is not that those who mattered in corridors of political power were not timely advised to put Pakistan’s derailed political process back on track. It is also not that the so-called establishment did not acknowledge and consider the set of suggestions which were submitted for its consideration and appropriate action. Then what went wrong?
An exclusive political review of excerpts from an article published in the daily Jang Lahore on 18th and 19th April, 1990 and an analysis of what is happening in Pakistan now and how that can be corrected!
Three curable symptoms of an ailing global economy and their treatmentSUN&FZ Associates
It goes without saying that poverty and inequality beyond rationally acceptable limit are caused by wrong economic, monetary and fiscal policies; legislative, legal and regulatory flaws; and imbalance between pro-business and pro-people and pro-employer and pro-employee policies.
The transfer of money through channels other than strictly regulated and monitored companies cannot be ruled out but that money’s unchecked investment in bonds, shares, properties and business companies clearly and convincingly points out that the countries and their governments at both ends are intentional accomplices of white collar crimes for a number of understandable but inexcusable reasons.
Is it possible that those who are responsible to monitor the inter-state flow of money don’t know from which countries money is transferred to their countries? Who in regulatory, banking and financial circles doesn’t know whose money is parked in which tax haven for how long? Who doesn’t know who manages the illegally transferred funds on whose behalf? Why do the tax havens hide the information?
Why these questions have not been answered so far?
Who is responsible?
What can be done about it?
The Answers follow…
Survival of Two Regional Powers at the Expense of the Security of the Middle ...QUESTJOURNAL
ABSTRACT: Many have called the current relationship between Iran and Saudi Arabia a cold war. In an article in "The National Interest", Mohammed Ayoob refers to the competition between the two as "a new cold war" [Ayoob, 2013]. The relationship betweenIran and Saudi Arabia for the last three and a half decades has been tumultuous at best, so talk of conflict between these two countries isn’t anything new. The conflict is occasionally given more visibility to the rest of the world by media attention and political analysis, but it’s typically overshadowed by other newsworthy events elsewhere. However, now it looks like their infighting has expanded to full out aggression. The upsizing in military might have major and long-lasting consequences for many of the people that live in the Middle East. Current events related to the conflict between the two countries risk creating a new border system to emerge. The Islamic Republic of Iran and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia are fully responsible for the birth, development, and shaping of the coming borders. The purpose of this paper is to focus on the background of the conflictbetween Iran and SaudiArabia; a conflict with a Middle Eastern instability and danger of secessions in the region as part of the consequences. It is intended to provide a highlighting of the twocountries’ hugeinternalchallenges and thus the need to externalenemies in the form of intensifying the historicalShia-Sunniconflict.
An analytical review of the political impact of Kurdistan's referendum on September 25th 2017. The article adopts an analytical methodology based on provisions of reality and their repercussions on the political arena in Iraq. The article attempts to have an insight on the various political levels that vary between agents and actors; national, regional and international, and their role in the political deprivation caused by the referendum.
On initial consideration, the idea of reintegration might seem peripheral to achieving the objectives of a counterinsurgency campaign, and that demanding surrender should be the order of the day, not seeking mutual forgiveness. However, nothing could be further from reality. In countering an insurgency the motives of each fighter and supporter dictate their adversarial actions, and the potential size of the insurgency is theoretically limited only by the population of the country itself. On deeper reflection then, the salience of reintegration rapidly emerges as central to any successful strategy to conclude an insurgency.
An enduring peace among antagonists in an insurgency and a lasting recourse to the sovereignty of the in-power government can only be properly expressed in terms that encompass the reintegration of the host society. In its most holistic form, reintegration encompasses not only fighters who have taken up violent resort to obtain their own ends, but also fragments and factions in society that are disenfranchised, ostracised or otherwise excluded from participating in a country’s social-political construct between its government and the people.
Lasting reintegration is much harder to foster and generate than simply announcing a policy. Personal allegiances, misgivings, fear, and human and institutional frailty all seem arrayed against even attempting reintegration, yet is a valid and indeed fundamental aim in counterinsurgency that must be grasped, like a nettle, with confidence and vigour. Reintegration not only has a role for all actors – police, civil and military – but indeed demands of them a common purpose, and a truly concerted effort to attain it. This paper draws on six months of field work in southern Afghanistan grappling with these challenges.
The consequences of the wrong actions in the right directionSUN&FZ Associates
It is not that those who mattered in corridors of political power were not timely advised to put Pakistan’s derailed political process back on track. It is also not that the so-called establishment did not acknowledge and consider the set of suggestions which were submitted for its consideration and appropriate action. Then what went wrong?
An exclusive political review of excerpts from an article published in the daily Jang Lahore on 18th and 19th April, 1990 and an analysis of what is happening in Pakistan now and how that can be corrected!
Three curable symptoms of an ailing global economy and their treatmentSUN&FZ Associates
It goes without saying that poverty and inequality beyond rationally acceptable limit are caused by wrong economic, monetary and fiscal policies; legislative, legal and regulatory flaws; and imbalance between pro-business and pro-people and pro-employer and pro-employee policies.
The transfer of money through channels other than strictly regulated and monitored companies cannot be ruled out but that money’s unchecked investment in bonds, shares, properties and business companies clearly and convincingly points out that the countries and their governments at both ends are intentional accomplices of white collar crimes for a number of understandable but inexcusable reasons.
Is it possible that those who are responsible to monitor the inter-state flow of money don’t know from which countries money is transferred to their countries? Who in regulatory, banking and financial circles doesn’t know whose money is parked in which tax haven for how long? Who doesn’t know who manages the illegally transferred funds on whose behalf? Why do the tax havens hide the information?
Why these questions have not been answered so far?
Who is responsible?
What can be done about it?
The Answers follow…
Survival of Two Regional Powers at the Expense of the Security of the Middle ...QUESTJOURNAL
ABSTRACT: Many have called the current relationship between Iran and Saudi Arabia a cold war. In an article in "The National Interest", Mohammed Ayoob refers to the competition between the two as "a new cold war" [Ayoob, 2013]. The relationship betweenIran and Saudi Arabia for the last three and a half decades has been tumultuous at best, so talk of conflict between these two countries isn’t anything new. The conflict is occasionally given more visibility to the rest of the world by media attention and political analysis, but it’s typically overshadowed by other newsworthy events elsewhere. However, now it looks like their infighting has expanded to full out aggression. The upsizing in military might have major and long-lasting consequences for many of the people that live in the Middle East. Current events related to the conflict between the two countries risk creating a new border system to emerge. The Islamic Republic of Iran and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia are fully responsible for the birth, development, and shaping of the coming borders. The purpose of this paper is to focus on the background of the conflictbetween Iran and SaudiArabia; a conflict with a Middle Eastern instability and danger of secessions in the region as part of the consequences. It is intended to provide a highlighting of the twocountries’ hugeinternalchallenges and thus the need to externalenemies in the form of intensifying the historicalShia-Sunniconflict.
An analytical review of the political impact of Kurdistan's referendum on September 25th 2017. The article adopts an analytical methodology based on provisions of reality and their repercussions on the political arena in Iraq. The article attempts to have an insight on the various political levels that vary between agents and actors; national, regional and international, and their role in the political deprivation caused by the referendum.
On initial consideration, the idea of reintegration might seem peripheral to achieving the objectives of a counterinsurgency campaign, and that demanding surrender should be the order of the day, not seeking mutual forgiveness. However, nothing could be further from reality. In countering an insurgency the motives of each fighter and supporter dictate their adversarial actions, and the potential size of the insurgency is theoretically limited only by the population of the country itself. On deeper reflection then, the salience of reintegration rapidly emerges as central to any successful strategy to conclude an insurgency.
An enduring peace among antagonists in an insurgency and a lasting recourse to the sovereignty of the in-power government can only be properly expressed in terms that encompass the reintegration of the host society. In its most holistic form, reintegration encompasses not only fighters who have taken up violent resort to obtain their own ends, but also fragments and factions in society that are disenfranchised, ostracised or otherwise excluded from participating in a country’s social-political construct between its government and the people.
Lasting reintegration is much harder to foster and generate than simply announcing a policy. Personal allegiances, misgivings, fear, and human and institutional frailty all seem arrayed against even attempting reintegration, yet is a valid and indeed fundamental aim in counterinsurgency that must be grasped, like a nettle, with confidence and vigour. Reintegration not only has a role for all actors – police, civil and military – but indeed demands of them a common purpose, and a truly concerted effort to attain it. This paper draws on six months of field work in southern Afghanistan grappling with these challenges.
Syllabus for the Barcelona yearly Follow Up Class, by Chip Chace.
Details on the topics we'll be covering, such as: Extraordinary Vessels engagement, review of Yang Rhythm, Fluid dynamics, Midline Dynamics, Shape of Qi, and more.
Also you can check the content of the first of the ENGAGING VITALITY LECTURE SERIES, were core concepts of the Engaging Vitality style and Chinese Medicine, are explored in depth.
The objective of this paper involved an analysis to democracy in Islam. The paper tried to answer the
question of how democratic and/or Islamic some countries in the Islamic world are. The paper analysed 59
countries using data from the World Values Survey 2005-2008. It measured several variables such as,
Religiosity, Islamic Practices, Political Importance, Family Importance and the GDP. The paper concluded
that there was absolutely no evidence to suggest that either Islam is anti-democratic or democratic, it is clearly
subjective.
In this paper I examine the development effects of coups. I first show that coups overthrowing democratically-elected leaders imply a different kind of event than those overthrowing autocratic leaders, and that these differences relate to the implementation of authoritarian institutions following a coup in a democracy. Secondly, I address the endogeneity of coups by comparing the growth consequences of failed and successful coups as well as implementing matching and panel data methods, which yield similar results. Although coups taking place in already autocratic countries show imprecise and sometimes positive effects on economic growth, in democracies their effects are distinctly detrimental. I find no evidence that these results are symptomatic of alternative hypothesis involving the effects of failed coups or political transitions. Thirdly, when overthrowing democratic leaders, coups not only fail to promote economic reforms or stop the occurrence of economic crises and political instability, but they also have substantial negative effects across a number of standard growth-related outcomes including health, education, and investment.
Find more research publications at https://www.hhs.se/site
Much of the study of politics centers on the tension between human agency and constraints on choice. Political leaders typically emphasize their ability to act in a sovereign fashion, describing politics as the art of the possible. What they less often refer to are the institutional and structural constraints that they face when trying to chart a new path. The old pathway is hard to escape, making them all captives of a certain path dependency.
Authoritarianism, Populism, and the GlobalRetreat of Democra.docxjesuslightbody
Authoritarianism, Populism, and the Global
Retreat of Democracy: A Curated Discussion
Paul S. Adler1, Amr Adly2, Daniel Erian Armanios3 ,
Julie Battilana4, Zlatko Bodrožić5, Stewart Clegg6,7, Gerald F. Davis8,
Claudine Gartenberg9, Mary Ann Glynn10, Ali Aslan Gümüsay11,12,
Heather A. Haveman13, Paul Leonardi14, Michael Lounsbury15,
Anita M. McGahan16, Renate Meyer17, Nelson Phillips14
and Kara Sheppard-Jones10
Abstract
To the surprise of many in the West, the fall of the USSR in 1991 did not lead to the adoption of liberal democratic govern-
ment around the world and the much anticipated “end of history.” In fact, authoritarianism has made a comeback, and liberal
democracy has been on the retreat for at least the last 15 years culminating in the unthinkable: the invasion of a democratic
European country by an authoritarian regime. But why does authoritarianism continue to spread, not only as an alternative to
liberal democracy, but also within many liberal democracies where authoritarian leaders continue to gain strength and pop-
ularity? In this curated piece, contributors discuss some of the potential contributions of management scholarship to under-
standing authoritarianism, as well as highlight a number of directions for management research in this area.
Keywords
institutional theory, business & society, ethics
Introduction
Michael Lounsbury and Nelson Phillips
Over the past decade, there have been increased calls for man-
agement scholars to do more research that is societally relevant
and important—to, for example, address grand challenges (e.g.,
George et al., 2016) and to examine the role of organizations
and institutions in the production and maintenance of economic
inequality and systemic power imbalances (e.g., Amis et al.,
2020). While historically “such topics have been difficult to
publish in our leading journals,” more recently “business
schools are becoming more oriented to making research and
education more relevant to their broader societies, which will
in turn encourage scholars to pursue under researched topics
of critical importance” (Tihanyi et al., 2022, p. 712). We
believe that recent events in Ukraine demand that management
scholars once again look beyond more traditional management
themes and focus their attention on a topic that is highly socie-
tally relevant and globally important: the rise of authoritarianism
and the threat this poses to democratic governments and the
international rule of law.
When Russia invaded Ukraine in February of this year,
the Western world reacted with shock and disbelief, and as
days, weeks, and now months have passed, this shock has
evolved into a mixture of anger and fear as it has become
apparent that there is seemingly little the West can (or at
least will) do to stop Russian aggression and the growing
humanitarian crisis that has followed the invasion. While
1University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA, USA
2American University of Cairo, New Cairo, Egypt
3Un.
Types of the political system
There are different states and governments around the world. In this context, the state is a political entity in which power and authority reside. This unit can be an entire country or a subdivision within a country. As such, countries of the world are sometimes called states (or nations), as are subdivisions within nations such as California, New York, and Texas in the United States.
Government means the people who direct a nation's political affairs, but it can also mean the rules by which a country is run. Another term for this second meaning of government is a political system, which we use here with the government. The type of government people lives in intensely impacts their freedom, happiness, and even lives. So let us take a quick look at the major political systems in the world today.
1 Democracy
The type of government we are most familiar with is a democracy, a political system in which citizens directly or indirectly govern themselves. The term democracy comes from Greek and means "rule by the people." In Lincoln's moving words in the Gettysburg Address, democracy is "government of the people, by the people, for the people." In a direct (or pure) democracy, people make decisions about policies and resource allocations that directly affect them.
An example of such democracy is the New England Town Meeting, where townspeople meet yearly to vote on budgets and other issues. However, direct democracy is unrealistic when the population exceeds a few hundred. So representative democracy is much more common. In this type of democracy, people elect civil servants to represent them in parliamentary votes on issues that affect the public.
Wajid khan explains that In large societies, representative democracy is more practical than direct democracy, but political scientists cite another advantage of representative democracy. It ensures, at least in theory, that the individuals who govern society and contribute to its functioning possess the right talents, skills, and knowledge.
In this way of thinking, the masses are too ignorant, uneducated, and apathetic to run society independently. In this way, representative democracy is "Cream at the top." Those who enable and govern societies are best suited to carry out this vital task (Seward, 2010). While this argument has many merits, it is also true that many of those elected to office are either impotent or corrupt.
Regardless of our political leanings, Americans can think of many politicians who fit these labels, from presidents to local civil servants. As Chapter 14, Politics and Government, Section 14.4, "U.S. Politics," discusses political lobbying, elected officials are unduly influenced by campaign funds from corporations and other interest groups. You may receive it. As far as this influence goes, representative democracy falls short of the ideals proclaimed by political theorists.
A defining feature of representative democracy is voting in elections
Three Stages of Political Development
Lucian Pye was the first to explore the idea of political evolution thoroughly. He outlined the following directions for political development in his book "Aspects of Political Development": (A) Political progress is necessary for economic gain. (B) Political modernization as a result of political development. (C) Political evolution as a nation-activity. State's (D) Political action is advancing administrative and legal systems. Political mobilization and participation as development (E).
Wajid khan shares that In the words of Rostow and Pye, political development is to "broaden the base of national political unity and political participation." The idea simply refers to the development and transformation of the political system.
Political Development's Foundations
Stanford Francis Fukuyama, a political scientist, puts forth an integral theory explaining why some nations fail. Despite America's efforts and billions of dollars, Somalia, Afghanistan, and Iraq are more like anarchist states than democracies. In reality, they were constructing second stories without first stories or foundations. Without foundation, a home cannot stand.
Fukuyama believes there are three stages that must be completed. The first, which took place in the distant past, was the founding of the "state," usually by a king who subjugated tribes and areas with a sword or a pistol. Fukuyama, like Hobbes, does not demand that this king be "good," only strong enough to subdue or subdue obstreperous aspects. Many developing nations have yet to create powerful states.
Soon, the monarch will need administrative staff to manage the realm. The stronger the state, the more loyal, literate, and clean the bureaucracy is. Without a strong bureaucracy, the state would always be weak and faulty. Administrative positions are initially sold before becoming impersonal and merit-based.
The more current state that everyone must adhere to is the "rule of law."
Three Stages of Political Development.pdfWajidKhanMP
Lucian Pye was the first to explore the idea of political evolution thoroughly. He outlined the following directions for political development in his book "Aspects of Political Development": (A) Political progress is necessary for economic gain. (B) Political modernization as a result of political development. (C) Political evolution as a nation-activity. State's (D) Political action is advancing administrative and legal systems. Political mobilization and participation as development (E).
Wajid khan shares that In the words of Rostow and Pye, political development is to "broaden the base of national political unity and political participation." The idea simply refers to the development and transformation of the political system.
InstructionsRewrite into your own wordsDo not rewrite a.docxnormanibarber20063
Instructions:
Rewrite into your own words
Do not rewrite anything in BOLD.
Question 3:
1. As a member of a delegation of the United Nations visiting El Salvador, you have to write
a report evaluating the peace process. Your report must address the following points: a)
what are the main historical stages and who are the main actors (national and
international) of the peace process, b) what are the most important agreements (mention
as many as you can), c) how would you evaluate the results of the peace process.
The peace process at El Salvador has political, social and economic significance as it is going to
play a great role in ending the prolonged civil war, in fact, this agreement is beyond just achieving the
cease-fire between two parties. This peace accord is considered as the most important part of the
negotiation process that has just entered the final phase of signing the Geneva Accord in April 1990.
The objectives of that accord are to end the armed conflict using the political means, promote the
democratization, raise the importance of human rights and let the Salvadoran society become reunited.
The peace accord states that sustained economic and social development is the prerequisite for the
democratic reunification of the Salvadoran society. A set of agreements is needed with minimum
commitments to end the conflict and promote the development of the population. The government of
El-Salvador and Frente Farabundo Marti de Liberacion National (FMLN) signed the peace accord
referred by United Nation (UN) in January 1992. In 1994 the guerrilla forces of FMLN for the first
time took part in elections. (CRUZ, 2003)
what are the main historical stages
National and International Actors in Peace Process
The international actors of this peace process included. international organizational such as UN
Security Council, the UN general assembly. Domestic includes representatives of the Salvadoran
government, the rebel movement FMLN, and political parties, with observers from the Roman Catholic
Church and United Nations. endorsed the document. The presidents of some other countries like
Uruguay, Peru, Argentina, and Brazil create Support group or Lima group to participate in the peace
process. The national actors of this peace process include civil society organizations such as Catholic
Church, universities and trade unions etc. These national actors lobbied the government, armed forces
and the international community to support the peace accord. Moreover, the labor organizations, trade
unions, indigenous groups, human rights organizations, cooperatives, women’s groups and other small
and medium enterprises support the peace process. (Stahler-Sholk, 1994)
some of the most important agreements are
(1) human rights, with an international Truth Commission to investigate and redress the abuses of the
past 12 years; (2) demilitarization, relinquishing of arms by the FMLN as well as reform and
reduction of t.
Holding power has been central in many fragile states, where political leaders has employed the political settlements approach, including the politics behind the distribution of resources in Ghana's education sector, the politics behind the transformation of Kigali in Rwanda, the distribution of national wealth (state resources) in Cameroon….
Holding power refers to ‘the capability of an individual or group to engage and survive in conflicts.’ Thus, holding power refers to the capacity of groups to impose costs on others and also, the capacity to absorb costs inflicted on them.
What is Political settlement, and it matters and what are its dimensions?
KAFKAS ÜNİVERSİTESİ/KAFKAS UNIVERSITY
SOCIOLOGY
Course
LECTURE NOTES AND POWER POINT PRESENTATIONS
Prof.Dr. Halit Hami ÖZ
Kars, TURKEY
hamioz@yahoo.com
03062024_First India Newspaper Jaipur.pdfFIRST INDIA
Find Latest India News and Breaking News these days from India on Politics, Business, Entertainment, Technology, Sports, Lifestyle and Coronavirus News in India and the world over that you can't miss. For real time update Visit our social media handle. Read First India NewsPaper in your morning replace. Visit First India.
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‘वोटर्स विल मस्ट प्रीवेल’ (मतदाताओं को जीतना होगा) अभियान द्वारा जारी हेल्पलाइन नंबर, 4 जून को सुबह 7 बजे से दोपहर 12 बजे तक मतगणना प्रक्रिया में कहीं भी किसी भी तरह के उल्लंघन की रिपोर्ट करने के लिए खुला रहेगा।
In a May 9, 2024 paper, Juri Opitz from the University of Zurich, along with Shira Wein and Nathan Schneider form Georgetown University, discussed the importance of linguistic expertise in natural language processing (NLP) in an era dominated by large language models (LLMs).
The authors explained that while machine translation (MT) previously relied heavily on linguists, the landscape has shifted. “Linguistics is no longer front and center in the way we build NLP systems,” they said. With the emergence of LLMs, which can generate fluent text without the need for specialized modules to handle grammar or semantic coherence, the need for linguistic expertise in NLP is being questioned.
Welcome to the new Mizzima Weekly !
Mizzima Media Group is pleased to announce the relaunch of Mizzima Weekly. Mizzima is dedicated to helping our readers and viewers keep up to date on the latest developments in Myanmar and related to Myanmar by offering analysis and insight into the subjects that matter. Our websites and our social media channels provide readers and viewers with up-to-the-minute and up-to-date news, which we don’t necessarily need to replicate in our Mizzima Weekly magazine. But where we see a gap is in providing more analysis, insight and in-depth coverage of Myanmar, that is of particular interest to a range of readers.
31052024_First India Newspaper Jaipur.pdfFIRST INDIA
Find Latest India News and Breaking News these days from India on Politics, Business, Entertainment, Technology, Sports, Lifestyle and Coronavirus News in India and the world over that you can't miss. For real time update Visit our social media handle. Read First India NewsPaper in your morning replace. Visit First India.
CLICK:- https://firstindia.co.in/
#First_India_NewsPaper
role of women and girls in various terror groupssadiakorobi2
Women have three distinct types of involvement: direct involvement in terrorist acts; enabling of others to commit such acts; and facilitating the disengagement of others from violent or extremist groups.
हम आग्रह करते हैं कि जो भी सत्ता में आए, वह संविधान का पालन करे, उसकी रक्षा करे और उसे बनाए रखे।" प्रस्ताव में कुल तीन प्रमुख हस्तक्षेप और उनके तंत्र भी प्रस्तुत किए गए। पहला हस्तक्षेप स्वतंत्र मीडिया को प्रोत्साहित करके, वास्तविकता पर आधारित काउंटर नैरेटिव का निर्माण करके और सत्तारूढ़ सरकार द्वारा नियोजित मनोवैज्ञानिक हेरफेर की रणनीति का मुकाबला करके लोगों द्वारा निर्धारित कथा को बनाए रखना और उस पर कार्यकरना था।
ys jagan mohan reddy political career, Biography.pdfVoterMood
Yeduguri Sandinti Jagan Mohan Reddy, often referred to as Y.S. Jagan Mohan Reddy, is an Indian politician who currently serves as the Chief Minister of the state of Andhra Pradesh. He was born on December 21, 1972, in Pulivendula, Andhra Pradesh, to Yeduguri Sandinti Rajasekhara Reddy (popularly known as YSR), a former Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh, and Y.S. Vijayamma.
27052024_First India Newspaper Jaipur.pdfFIRST INDIA
Find Latest India News and Breaking News these days from India on Politics, Business, Entertainment, Technology, Sports, Lifestyle and Coronavirus News in India and the world over that you can't miss. For real time update Visit our social media handle. Read First India NewsPaper in your morning replace. Visit First India.
CLICK:- https://firstindia.co.in/
#First_India_NewsPaper
Future Of Fintech In India | Evolution Of Fintech In IndiaTheUnitedIndian
Navigating the Future of Fintech in India: Insights into how AI, blockchain, and digital payments are driving unprecedented growth in India's fintech industry, redefining financial services and accessibility.
01062024_First India Newspaper Jaipur.pdfFIRST INDIA
Find Latest India News and Breaking News these days from India on Politics, Business, Entertainment, Technology, Sports, Lifestyle and Coronavirus News in India and the world over that you can't miss. For real time update Visit our social media handle. Read First India NewsPaper in your morning replace. Visit First India.
CLICK:- https://firstindia.co.in/
#First_India_NewsPaper
1. July 2010, Volume 21, Number 3 $12.00
Afghanistan & Iraq: Taking Stock
Zalmay Khalilzad Scott Worden Adeed Dawisha
Liberation Technology
Larry Diamond
Ukraine: Democracy in Danger?
Henry Hale Gwendolyn Sasse
S.B. Yudhoyono on the Indonesian Experience
Mvemba Phezo Dizolele on the DRC
Juan Pablo Luna & Rodrigo Mardones on Chile
Ephraim Ya’ar & Yasmin Alkalay on Muslim Attitudes
Jacques Rupnik on Václav Havel
Judith Kelley on Election Observation
The Rise of the “State-Nation”
Alfred Stepan, Juan Linz & Yogendra Yadav
3. 42 Journal of Democracy
have fought against the emergence of a democratic order. Remnants
of the old regimes, new insurgents, and regional terrorists have con-
tinued to pose security challenges. Further complications are added by
struggles between religious and more secular forces, by powerful elites’
resistance to sharing power with others or to playing by the rules of the
new order, and by an unwelcoming regional environment.
The principal features of the democratization efforts have been an
initial interim political arrangement; an electoral road map; the adoption
of new constitutions; the development of civil society; the introduction
of basic human rights; the establishment of the rule of law; the forma-
tion of political parties; and the building of effective state institutions.
Both countries have made progress on many of these fronts. Yet the
level of progress has been uneven, and there have been some setbacks.
There are both similarities and differences between the trajectories of
Afghanistan and Iraq.
As we think about the challenge of supporting democratization in
postconflict settings, the key areas of focus should be the process of
achieving postconflict stability through political agreements among im-
portant groups; the stability of constitutional and governmental institu-
tions; the effectiveness of the electoral system and political parties; and
the evolution of political leadership dedicated to national rather than
parochial political outlooks.
After the Initial Transitions
In postconflict situations, a transition from wartime to peacetime
political leadership is typically required. After the internal conflicts wind
down, political conditions often enter a “warlord phase.” Power lies in
the hands of those who gain control over people and resources through
the command of armed groups. Militias are the coin of the realm. In the
immediate postconflict period, it is critical to create space for leaders
and groups who seek power based on popular support, and to engineer a
transition that diminishes the influence of armed groups.
This poses a dilemma for those who seek to help advance the transi-
tion. On the one hand, outside powers can occupy a country and use
their own power to bring armed groups and militias to heel. This is a
high-cost option that also can generate internal resistance. On the other
hand, external powers can choose to accommodate armed internal ac-
tors, while overseeing a gradual transition toward democratic politics.
This option requires fewer outside forces and is less likely to provoke
armed opposition, but it can slow the transition away from militia-based
politics.
During the immediate post-Taliban period, Afghanistan lacked basic
national institutions. Effective local control was in the hands of power-
ful individuals. Some of these leaders were unpopular with the Afghan
4. Zalmay Khalilzad 43
population, and the atrocities that they had committed during the early
1990s contributed to the rise of the Taliban. Those charged with making
U.S. policy feared a return of these past patterns, recognizing that quasi-
feudal power centers were not conducive to the goal of democratization.
At the same time, the coalition did not seek a long-term occupation and
was unwilling to expend the effort necessary to challenge and remove
these figures.
The United States favored a phased transition that accommodated
powerful political figures while helping Afghans to build a political
system that would require these forces to play by a new set of rules.
The challenge lay in finding ways to integrate these forces into the
new order and to deter them from mistreating their people. The United
States hoped that new institutions, as they matured, would control and
eventually displace such forces. The other key goal was to prevent the
Taliban from regrouping by reaching out to those who were prepared
to reconcile while attacking the more extreme, irreconcilable elements.
The Coalition and its Afghan allies made significant progress in both
respects during the years immediately after the toppling of the Taliban,
only to see these efforts falter over the last few years.
In Iraq, the initial situation after the transition was quite different.
The country had powerful institutions, including a strong national army.
In this case, however, the Bush administration opted for the coalition to
become an occupying power in order to accelerate the transition away
from Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship. The Coalition Provisional Au-
thority governing Iraq dissolved the Baath Party, dismissed many of its
members from the government, and disbanded the military and other
security forces. As a result, a large number of people saw no place for
themselves in the new order. Sunni Arabs took a hostile position, as their
rivals, the Shia and the Kurds, gained stature and became the base for
the newly emerging order. The political process during the initial phase
was characterized by the dominance of Shia religious parties, minimal
Kurdish integration, and some obstruction from Sunni Arabs. Sectarian
violence grew, as did insurgency, terrorism, and militia violence. It be-
came increasingly important to bring the Sunni Arabs into the political
process, undermine sectarian elements, defeat al-Qaeda, and discourage
the Shia and Kurds from overreaching by persuading them that fair Sun-
ni Arab participation and shared political power was a better formula for
progress and stability.
Two lessons emerge from the Afghanistan and Iraq cases. The first is
that external powers should not become occupiers. It is better to create
an inclusive political process, like the one adopted in Afghanistan. This
model empowers local actors to start normalizing their politics. The sec-
ond lesson is that external actors should not take a “hands-off” approach
once the host country establishes an interim political regime. Instead,
they should position themselves as mediators ready to help local lead-
5. 44 Journal of Democracy
ers to overcome differences, and as facilitators who will shoulder some
of the burden of demilitarizing armed groups and moving the country
toward normal politics.
Crafting Constitutions and National Compacts
New written constitutions have been critical features of postconflict
democratization in Afghanistan and Iraq. In both countries, the new na-
tional compacts reflected the major political challenges that local lead-
ers faced. The resulting constitutions, developed with U.S. and other
external support, laid the foundation for new orders. Both constitutions
strike a delicate but necessarily ambiguous balance between Islam and
secularism.
The design of Afghanistan’s constitution reflected the challenge
posed by the weakness of the existing state. The document embraced a
centralized system in the hope that this would expedite state-building.
It established a strong presidency with a parliament and an indepen-
dent judiciary. At the Constitutional Loya Jirga, delegates were more
concerned with creating an effective national government than they
were with curtailing its power. There was broad support among the key
groups for a unitary state, though some favored a parliamentary rather
than a presidential system and a few argued for a federal system.
The upside of this approach was that it drew on Afghan traditions,
particularly from the period in the 1950s and 1960s that many Afghans
view as a golden era of political stability and progress. This approach
also avoided the risk of political paralysis, which has bedeviled many
democratizing states. Because local-government capacity hardly existed
or was in the hands of warlords, Afghans understood that the best route
to improved governance was to build up the national government. As a
result, they opted for a unitary system that had the capacity to act. Such
a centralized system poses two main risks, however. First, the concen-
tration of power in the presidency means that those who lose a presiden-
tial election may feel shut out of power. Second and more important,
it puts a premium on effective and rapid state-building. If the national
government is to fill such an ambitiously conceived role, strong tools
need to be put at its disposal.
Iraq’s post-Saddam constitution, by contrast, reflects that country’s
ethnic differences and the Kurds’ unwillingness to accept a strong Arab-
controlled center. Having endured decades of Saddam’s oppressive rule,
Iraqis wished to weaken their country’s central government. Their new
constitution embraces a federal and parliamentary system that delegates
substantial powers to the regions and provinces. It requires a super-
majority for many key decisions in order to ensure that no one ethnic
group can dominate the process. There were varying degrees of sup-
port for federalism among the religious Shia parties, but Sunni forces
6. Zalmay Khalilzad 45
opposed it altogether. The deal that ultimately brought the Sunni Arabs
into the political process contained an agreement to amend the consti-
tution soon after its ratification and to review articles dealing with the
formation of future federal units.
Despite these important differences, the approaches to democratiza-
tion taken in Iraq and Afghanistan were very similar in some respects.
The articles in both countries’ constitutions on women’s representation,
freedom of faith, and basic rights are almost identical. Both guarantee
freedom of faith, equality among citizens, and freedom of speech, and
each uses a slightly different set of fixed quotas in order to ensure that
women will have the opportunity to participate in political life.
Working on their respective constitutions with Afghans and Iraqis, I
took the view that they needed to use the process to solve fundamental
political challenges facing their societies and to find power-sharing ar-
rangements that would give all groups a stake in stability and progress.
Because of the differences in their histories and societies, the nature of
those challenges differed in Afghanistan and Iraq. The process involved
tough negotiations, as well as a catalytic international role, but the result
in both countries has been a political order that facilitates normal poli-
tics and problem solving.
In postconflict countries, it is essential to ensure that all groups and
factions are represented in governmental institutions from the outset.
In addition, effective political parties are necessary to channel partici-
pation constructively. In Afghanistan, the political process achieved
broad-based electoral participation quickly, but an effective party struc-
ture still has not taken shape. In Iraq, the first election in January 2005
failed to achieve broad-based participation, resulting in polarized sec-
tarian politics. Success in expanding participation came over time, but
it was hard-won. At the same time, political parties have matured more
quickly in Iraq.
In Afghanistan, the first election held after adoption of the constitu-
tion went well, with more than 70 percent of eligible voters participat-
ing. The election ensured that all groups had a stake in the new order.
Afghan political parties, however, did not experience the same level of
growth and maturity. This is in part due to the country’s use of the single
nontransferable vote (SNTV) system, but it also reflects the suspicion
with which many Afghans view political parties. Indeed, both Iraqis and
Afghans have traditionally exhibited skepticism about political parties.
People in both countries associate “parties” with militias and violence.
The word invokes bitter memories—of the Soviet-era communist parties
and warring mujahideen parties in Afghanistan, and of the destructive
role of the Communists and Baathists in Iraq.
While party affiliation can be a candidate’s ticket to office in Iraq,
Afghan candidates were prohibited from even stating their party affili-
ations. Even though Afghanistan has more than a hundred political par-
7. 46 Journal of Democracy
ties, most of which competed in the parliamentary and provincial elec-
tions of 2005 and 2009 and managed to mobilize at least a degree of
popular support for candidates, these parties are far less influential than
their Iraqi counterparts.
The SNTV system for general elections has been controversial in Af-
ghanistan. Although supporters argue that it is “more democratic” in
absolute terms, opponents contend that it has impeded the formation of
effective political parties—a key element in the development of democ-
racy. This is because the system emphasizes individual electability at
the expense of political-party influence. Moreover, the SNTV system
reduces the effectiveness of parliamentary politics by encouraging can-
didates to push local, ethnic, or tribal issues rather than working toward
a national agenda. The SNTV system worked to the advantage of ethnic
and military strongmen, warlords, drug traffickers, and human-rights
violators in the 2005 elections for parliament and provincial councils.
Accordingly, SNTV limited the ability of the legislative bodies to work
efficiently, independently, and in support of state-building. As stronger
political parties develop, it is more likely that well-qualified candidates
will emerge in national elections, that the general focus will be on na-
tional issues and state-building, and that the government will have fewer
chances to permit fraud and to weaken the democratic process.
In Iraq, the failure to achieve broad-based participation in the January
2005 election had catastrophic consequences. The Sunni Arabs boycot-
ted the election, resulting in a parliament and government in which they
were not represented. Subsequent actions by both the government and
the Sunni Arabs led to polarization and escalating sectarian violence. In
late 2005, I worked with Iraqi leaders of all factions to ensure that the
December 2005 election, under the new constitution, would involve all
groups and produce a fully representative government. Still, in these
first elections after the constitution was adopted, Iraqis voted according
to their ethnic and sectarian identities. This was not surprising, since the
elections were held at a time of high sectarian tension. Yet the inclusive
nature of the election laid the political foundation for a government of
national unity that could begin the work of bridging sectarian divisions
and starting the reconciliation process.
Iraq’s shift from party-list proportional representation (PLPR) to-
ward an “open-list” variant during the run-up to the most recent election
has contributed to the development of more effective political parties.
This change came at the right time. The role of ethnic or sectarian iden-
tity in politics was diminishing because of improved security and in-
creased Sunni Arab cooperation with the Baghdad government and the
coalition. The Iraqi government began to take stronger action against
Shia militias—a step which, in turn, created incentives for politicians to
adjust their platforms and respond to the changing moods among their
constituencies. The combination of electoral reforms and improvements
8. Zalmay Khalilzad 47
in the political-military situation is facilitating more moderate and less
intensely ethnic or sectarian forms of politics.
In the 2010 election, the al-Iraqiya bloc, led by Ayad Allawi, success-
fully presented itself as a secular, nationalist, and trans-sectarian option,
appealing to Shia and Sunni Arab voters alike. Sunni Arabs, who had
become disillusioned with their former choices—first, a boycott, and
later, a group of highly sectarian Sunni Arab Islamists—looked beyond
Allawi’s “Shia” background and saw in his coalition a set of ideals that
resonated with their aspirations. Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki’s State
of Law Coalition adopted a similar strategy. It too distanced itself from
its more sectarian former allies—the Sadrists and the Islamic Supreme
Council of Iraq (ISCI)—in an effort to broaden its appeal across sectar-
ian lines.
The two Iraqi coalitions were also keen to present meticulously writ-
ten and detailed electoral programs in which they sought to address the
issues that most interested voters. This was a huge development when
compared with the electoral programs that the parties had presented just
a few years earlier, which amounted to little more than a page or two of
generic remarks. Slogans and personalities had become insufficient to
win over a more demanding and more politically aware electorate.
The ISCI recognized these trends as well. Its new young leader, Am-
mar al-Hakim, came to realize that the idea of turning Iraq into three
largely autonomous substates divided along sectarian and ethic lines—a
project that his late father had strongly supported—did not resonate well
with the majority of voters. Over time, the idea faded from the ISCI’s
agenda, and the party eventually dropped it altogether.
Three Lessons
In this regard, three main lessons may be drawn from the postcon-
flict democratic transitions in Afghanistan and Iraq. First, the rules of
the game need to be designed in such a way that they produce political
dynamics responsive to the host-country’s challenges. Second, external
actors should continually engage local leaders and steer them toward
political strategies that move their countries forward. This is a subtle but
vital contribution to fostering successful democratic transitions. Third,
organization and mobilization of constructive political forces are cru-
cial. At a minimum, the United States should do more to encourage
democratic forces to coalesce in order to exert greater influence. This is
vital for the consolidation of a democratic order.
In other areas of democratization, progress has been robust in both
Iraq and Afghanistan. Hundreds of newspapers and scores of television
and radio stations are operating with unprecedented levels of freedom.
Although poor security and threats of violence from militias and insur-
gents still challenge the media, state censorship is virtually absent. Non-
9. 48 Journal of Democracy
governmental organizations have also mushroomed. Thousands of such
groups now act as advocates for human rights, fairer labor standards,
education, election monitoring, and even environmental protection.
Iraq has made faster and more visible progress than Afghanistan in
strengthening the rule of law. Underlying conditions in the two countries
account for this difference. Iraq has substantially greater material and
human resources that can be used to build or repair state institutions and
security forces. By contrast, external actors devoted limited resources to
the task of building Afghanistan’s security and legal institutions, even
though these had to be created from scratch. At the outset, international
actors designed plans for Afghan security forces based on the resources
that donors were willing to commit and on the potential revenue base of
the Afghan government. Their goals for Afghanistan’s forces were more
modest as well, based on the overly optimistic assumption that these
forces would face a benign security environment. Although both Af-
ghanistan and Iraq have roughly the same populations, Iraq has fielded
security forces three times the size of Afghanistan’s. The latter’s tough
terrain, larger area, widely diffused population, and poor communica-
tions infrastructure make the mission of the smaller force in Afghanistan
even harder.
The Importance of Leadership
Political leadership has had a profound effect on the course of events
in both countries. Differences in leadership styles and effectiveness
have complex correlations with the levels of progress reached in build-
ing the state, democracy, and the rule of law. It is also clear that in-
ternational actors can help local leaders to improve their performance
significantly.
Afghanistan’s President Hamid Karzai is a case in point. In the early
years after the Taliban regime fell, he was heralded as an effective leader
who forged political unity and progress to a degree that few had thought
possible. More recently, however, Karzai has faced accusations that he
is appeasing warlords and is unable or unwilling to confront them. The
reality is complex. From 2003 through 2005, Karzai led a political pro-
cess, supported by the United States, that demobilized militias nation-
wide while ensuring the political inclusion of all significant figures who
supported the constitution and opposed extremists such as the Taliban.
This was a major achievement, and the Afghan people supported it.
In subsequent years, however, neither Karzai nor the United States
and other external powers maintained this momentum toward normaliz-
ing Afghan politics and improving governance. This is why support for
Karzai has eroded. Yet many are too pessimistic about what Karzai can
achieve. The United States can help to revive Karzai’s reform agenda
through a close partnership with his government.
10. Zalmay Khalilzad 49
Iraq’s Prime Minister Maliki was the target of similar criticism in
2006 and 2007. Up through the latter year, he had largely accommo-
dated Shia militias such as the Mahdi Army of radical cleric Muqtada
al-Sadr. By the spring and summer of 2008, however, Maliki had taken
a sharp turn and changed his approach from appeasement to aggressive
confrontation. He dealt hard blows to armed militias in several locales.
Maliki would not have been able to accomplish this change, of course,
without significant growth in the capabilities of Iraq’s security forces.
Although Afghan security forces have also grown substantially,
Karzai has not felt strong enough to take on warlords and insurgents. In
recent elections, he allied himself with warlords, deeming this necessary
for him to win. He has also been hesitant about confronting erstwhile
allies at a time when the Taliban pose a more important threat. This is
doubly true given his poor relations with the United States over the past
two years. The United States must improve its relations with Karzai in
order to reverse these trends. If Karzai is confident about his U.S. al-
liance, he can be persuaded to take risks to improve governance. A re-
newed partnership can lead to improved leadership on Karzai’s part that
will put Afghanistan on a much more promising trajectory.
The democratization efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan have met with
some success but also with setbacks and obstructions. Historical experi-
ence suggests, however, that democracies take time to establish them-
selves and to mature. By any standard, the democratic enterprises in
Afghanistan and Iraq are still very young.
In addition to all the internal challenges that they face, both Afghani-
stan and Iraq have neighbors who are wary of the emergence of stable
and strong democracies on their doorsteps. Several regional powers have
sought—both covertly and overtly—to undermine progress. The emerg-
ing democracies in Afghanistan and Iraq cannot offset such regional
interference without continued support from the world’s advanced de-
mocracies.
The degree to which state-building has been successful has had clear
effects on the trajectory of political development in Iraq and Afghani-
stan. Improved security played a major role in facilitating recent posi-
tive trends in Iraq. Poor security and weak institutions contributed to the
problems in the 2009 presidential election in Afghanistan.
Successful elections, institution-building, the rule of law, and eco-
nomic and social development are mutually reinforcing goals. Progress
toward achieving any one of them is bound to promote progress toward
achieving the others. At the same time, setbacks in any of them will have
negative effects on the others. Overall there has been more progress than
setbacks.
Democratization in Iraq and Afghanistan is a complex work in prog-
ress. Yet popular support for democracy remains strong in both countries.
The chances for success remain greater than the chances for failure.