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I gave a talk 
about robots 
and hardware! 
A story of Research by: ! 
Josh “m0nk” Thomas / @m0nk_dot! 
44CON 2014
this hour, your talking head is… 
✤ Josh “m0nk” Thomas! 
✤ @m0nk_dot ! 
✤ Partner and Chief Breaking Officer @ Atredis Partners! 
✤ Recovering software developer (AI / Crypto / Mobile “stuff”)! 
✤ Atredis Partners! 
✤ Focused and targeted security firm! 
✤ Specializing in advanced hardware and software assessments! 
✤ Mobile and embedded systems! 
✤ Societal infrastructure! 
✤ Black boxes! 
✤ Advanced malware and rootkit analysis! 
✤ Handcrafted artisanal and deep bespoke research
@m0nk_dot likes to put 
trite commentary in 
front of pretty pictures
story arc 
✤ preface[0] = “Tongue Tied by many nights of NDA curiosity”! 
✤ preface[1] = “What is the point / Where is the squishy?”! 
✤ history lesson [0] = “The story of Wang and the Bed”! 
✤ story[0] = “Hardware Design”! 
✤ story[1] = “Iteration”! 
✤ story [2] = “SoC, Bootloaders and trust chains”
I haz NDA? 
✤ I hate this, but it is sadly worth mentioning! 
✤ … and you thought open source licenses were annoying! 
✤ Words I can say:! 
✤ Sony! 
✤ HTC! 
✤ LG! 
✤ I can sometimes say the words:! 
✤ Nokia! 
✤ Qualcomm! 
✤ BlackBerry! 
✤ Words I cannot say:
Why to care?
Why Hit 
Hardware? 
✤ Hard to get Code Exec / 
Control! 
✤ Forensic OS Dumps! 
✤ Crypto Keys & Boot Settings 
What to look 
for? 
✤ JTAG & Debug Access! 
✤ Direct NAND Access! 
✤ Bootloader Access & 
Manipulation
Functionality aside, why is 
hardware interesting 
✤ Pretty! 
✤ It is just as raw as source code, ASM or IDA! 
✤ A concrete example of how much a company cares / what level of 
effort should be expected to break it! 
✤ Not normally “patchable” / LOOOOOOOONG shelf life
history lesson [0]: could be true? 
The story of Wang and the Bed 
…had a kid, scada-curious, , talked about StuxNet, met at the pub… 
proof that I am not a EE and that some people are just damn cool
story[0] 
All hardware has a story to tell 
stick with me here… I promise the following 
has a point and is more that “vacation pics”
What Simple Looks Like: 
MasterLock dialSpeed
What Complex Looks Like: 
Microsoft Xbox 360
Traces I Love: 
Samsung ChromeBook (Daisy)
Ol’ Grand Dad: 
Qualcomm Dragon Board
The Godfather Phone: 
Qualcomm Snapdragon 8974 Dev Platform
One Sided Conversation / Traces I Hate: 
Motorola Moto X
Grumble Grumble RF Shields: 
BlackBerry Z30
Hidden for a Reason: 
HTC One
Advanced Game: 
Apple iPhone 5S
XXX: 
BlackBerry Z10
XXX: 
Nokia Lumia 635
Speaking of… 
Microsoft Surface RT (V1)
Squares and NAND: 
Sony Arc S
Squares and Burner: 
Sony Xperia Z
XXX: 
LG Nexus 5
Old School: 
LG Nexus 4
Not a Monster: 
Samsung Galaxy Note 3
Oddly Normal: 
Samsung Galaxy 4
Lessons Learned 
✤ Motorola tends to make one sided boards that are very simple and 
masked! 
✤ Samsung likes uber dense complexity and non-euclidean shapes! 
✤ Sony is just kinda boring and square! 
✤ BlackBerry and Nokia internals look oddly identical! 
✤ No one is a dense as Apple! 
✤ Microsoft should QA a bit more! 
✤ The new style is to hide Qualcomm below the NAND
story[1] 
Background Complete: 
Exploring Iterative Design with Amazon Prime
Catching Fire - An Evolution 
✤ Amazon has released 7 iterations of the Kindle Fire platform since late 2011:! 
✤ Kindle Fire (1st Generation - 11/15/2011)! 
✤ Kindle Fire (2nd Generation - 09/14/2012)! 
✤ Kindle Fire HD 7" (1st Generation - 09/14/2012)! 
✤ Kindle Fire HD 8.9" (1st Generation - 11/20/2012) (also has a cellular variant)! 
✤ Kindle Fire HD 7" (2nd Generation - 10/02/2013)! 
✤ Kindle Fire HDX 7" (3rd Generation - 10/18/2013) (also has a cellular variant)! 
✤ Kindle Fire HDX 8.9" (3rd Generation - 11/07/2013) (also has a cellular variant)! 
✤ Fire Phone (released 07/25/2014).
Amazon Fire V1
Amazon Fire V2
Amazon Fire V1
Amazon Fire V2
Amazon Fire HD V1
Amazon Fire HD V2
Amazon Fire HDX V1
Amazon Fire HDX V1
story[2]: 
SoC, Bootloaders and trust chains
TEE on the MSM8960 SoC 
✤ Hosts a collection of Trusted Execution Environments! 
✤ Krait Core 0 (Trust Zone)! 
✤ The ARM7 based RPM (Resource and Power Management System)! 
✤ The Modem System (assume this is the Hexagon Baseband 
platform)! 
✤ The SPS (Smart Peripheral System)
Hardware of Note 
✤ eFuses / QFPROM hold a lot of data (covered later)! 
✤ The SoC reuses the ARM7 and ARM9 cores for different functions 
depending on the current processing needs! 
✤ Hardware hosts 2 discrete “Crypto Engine” processors in hardware! 
✤ CE1 is hardware latched to fuses for the the Primary Hardware Key ! 
✤ CE2 is hardware latched to fuses for the User Hardware Key! 
✤ Assumed to be the ARM9 cores
A Glance at the Boot Chain before 
the “Bootloader”
The Secure Boot 3.0 Process 
Interesting tidbits 
✤ RPM PBL starts executing at physical address 0x00! 
✤ Multitude of Bootloader options here specifying where to look for 
more code to execute! 
✤ All Authentication pre TZ load uses the Crypto Engine 1 (CE1) & the 
Primary Hardware Key (PHK) from the eFuse block! 
✤ (Supposedly) Debuggable via “proprietary” tools! 
✤ Highly eFuse controlled! 
✤ Supports an “Emergency Download Mode” upon crash
Things are getting fused
How Fuses Work 
✤ Total of 16kb block of eFuses / QFPROM on MSM8960! 
✤ 4kb mapped and easily accessible:! 
✤ QFPROM BASE PHYSICAL: 0x00700000! 
✤ QFPROM SHADOW BASE: 0x00706000! 
✤ Can be read whenever / Written Once! 
✤ To write, need to hold voltage for $TIME_PERIOD
Interesting QFPROM 
✤ A 256-bit Primary Hardware Key (PHK used by CE1)! 
✤ A 256-bit Secondary Hardware Key (SHK used by CE2)! 
✤ A 128-bit OEM Customer key! 
✤ A 2048-bit Customer private key! 
✤ Fuses to disable debug / JTAG! 
✤ Fuses to reenable debug / JTAG! 
✤ Possible large swaths of unmapped free space
<insert POC||GTFO source here>
There is no conclusion, only Zuul 
thanks for letting me talk… 
any questions?

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44CON 2014 - I gave a talk about robots and hardware!, Josh Thomas

  • 1. I gave a talk about robots and hardware! A story of Research by: ! Josh “m0nk” Thomas / @m0nk_dot! 44CON 2014
  • 2. this hour, your talking head is… ✤ Josh “m0nk” Thomas! ✤ @m0nk_dot ! ✤ Partner and Chief Breaking Officer @ Atredis Partners! ✤ Recovering software developer (AI / Crypto / Mobile “stuff”)! ✤ Atredis Partners! ✤ Focused and targeted security firm! ✤ Specializing in advanced hardware and software assessments! ✤ Mobile and embedded systems! ✤ Societal infrastructure! ✤ Black boxes! ✤ Advanced malware and rootkit analysis! ✤ Handcrafted artisanal and deep bespoke research
  • 3. @m0nk_dot likes to put trite commentary in front of pretty pictures
  • 4. story arc ✤ preface[0] = “Tongue Tied by many nights of NDA curiosity”! ✤ preface[1] = “What is the point / Where is the squishy?”! ✤ history lesson [0] = “The story of Wang and the Bed”! ✤ story[0] = “Hardware Design”! ✤ story[1] = “Iteration”! ✤ story [2] = “SoC, Bootloaders and trust chains”
  • 5. I haz NDA? ✤ I hate this, but it is sadly worth mentioning! ✤ … and you thought open source licenses were annoying! ✤ Words I can say:! ✤ Sony! ✤ HTC! ✤ LG! ✤ I can sometimes say the words:! ✤ Nokia! ✤ Qualcomm! ✤ BlackBerry! ✤ Words I cannot say:
  • 7. Why Hit Hardware? ✤ Hard to get Code Exec / Control! ✤ Forensic OS Dumps! ✤ Crypto Keys & Boot Settings What to look for? ✤ JTAG & Debug Access! ✤ Direct NAND Access! ✤ Bootloader Access & Manipulation
  • 8. Functionality aside, why is hardware interesting ✤ Pretty! ✤ It is just as raw as source code, ASM or IDA! ✤ A concrete example of how much a company cares / what level of effort should be expected to break it! ✤ Not normally “patchable” / LOOOOOOOONG shelf life
  • 9. history lesson [0]: could be true? The story of Wang and the Bed …had a kid, scada-curious, , talked about StuxNet, met at the pub… proof that I am not a EE and that some people are just damn cool
  • 10.
  • 11.
  • 12. story[0] All hardware has a story to tell stick with me here… I promise the following has a point and is more that “vacation pics”
  • 13. What Simple Looks Like: MasterLock dialSpeed
  • 14.
  • 15. What Complex Looks Like: Microsoft Xbox 360
  • 16.
  • 17. Traces I Love: Samsung ChromeBook (Daisy)
  • 18.
  • 19. Ol’ Grand Dad: Qualcomm Dragon Board
  • 20.
  • 21. The Godfather Phone: Qualcomm Snapdragon 8974 Dev Platform
  • 22.
  • 23.
  • 24.
  • 25.
  • 26.
  • 27. One Sided Conversation / Traces I Hate: Motorola Moto X
  • 28.
  • 29.
  • 30. Grumble Grumble RF Shields: BlackBerry Z30
  • 31.
  • 32.
  • 33.
  • 34. Hidden for a Reason: HTC One
  • 35.
  • 36.
  • 37. Advanced Game: Apple iPhone 5S
  • 38.
  • 39.
  • 41.
  • 42.
  • 44.
  • 45.
  • 46.
  • 47.
  • 48.
  • 49. Speaking of… Microsoft Surface RT (V1)
  • 50.
  • 51.
  • 52.
  • 53. Squares and NAND: Sony Arc S
  • 54.
  • 55.
  • 56. Squares and Burner: Sony Xperia Z
  • 57.
  • 58.
  • 60.
  • 61.
  • 62.
  • 63.
  • 64.
  • 65. Old School: LG Nexus 4
  • 66.
  • 67.
  • 68. Not a Monster: Samsung Galaxy Note 3
  • 69.
  • 70.
  • 71.
  • 73.
  • 74.
  • 75. Lessons Learned ✤ Motorola tends to make one sided boards that are very simple and masked! ✤ Samsung likes uber dense complexity and non-euclidean shapes! ✤ Sony is just kinda boring and square! ✤ BlackBerry and Nokia internals look oddly identical! ✤ No one is a dense as Apple! ✤ Microsoft should QA a bit more! ✤ The new style is to hide Qualcomm below the NAND
  • 76. story[1] Background Complete: Exploring Iterative Design with Amazon Prime
  • 77. Catching Fire - An Evolution ✤ Amazon has released 7 iterations of the Kindle Fire platform since late 2011:! ✤ Kindle Fire (1st Generation - 11/15/2011)! ✤ Kindle Fire (2nd Generation - 09/14/2012)! ✤ Kindle Fire HD 7" (1st Generation - 09/14/2012)! ✤ Kindle Fire HD 8.9" (1st Generation - 11/20/2012) (also has a cellular variant)! ✤ Kindle Fire HD 7" (2nd Generation - 10/02/2013)! ✤ Kindle Fire HDX 7" (3rd Generation - 10/18/2013) (also has a cellular variant)! ✤ Kindle Fire HDX 8.9" (3rd Generation - 11/07/2013) (also has a cellular variant)! ✤ Fire Phone (released 07/25/2014).
  • 78.
  • 79.
  • 80.
  • 89. story[2]: SoC, Bootloaders and trust chains
  • 90.
  • 91. TEE on the MSM8960 SoC ✤ Hosts a collection of Trusted Execution Environments! ✤ Krait Core 0 (Trust Zone)! ✤ The ARM7 based RPM (Resource and Power Management System)! ✤ The Modem System (assume this is the Hexagon Baseband platform)! ✤ The SPS (Smart Peripheral System)
  • 92. Hardware of Note ✤ eFuses / QFPROM hold a lot of data (covered later)! ✤ The SoC reuses the ARM7 and ARM9 cores for different functions depending on the current processing needs! ✤ Hardware hosts 2 discrete “Crypto Engine” processors in hardware! ✤ CE1 is hardware latched to fuses for the the Primary Hardware Key ! ✤ CE2 is hardware latched to fuses for the User Hardware Key! ✤ Assumed to be the ARM9 cores
  • 93. A Glance at the Boot Chain before the “Bootloader”
  • 94.
  • 95. The Secure Boot 3.0 Process Interesting tidbits ✤ RPM PBL starts executing at physical address 0x00! ✤ Multitude of Bootloader options here specifying where to look for more code to execute! ✤ All Authentication pre TZ load uses the Crypto Engine 1 (CE1) & the Primary Hardware Key (PHK) from the eFuse block! ✤ (Supposedly) Debuggable via “proprietary” tools! ✤ Highly eFuse controlled! ✤ Supports an “Emergency Download Mode” upon crash
  • 97. How Fuses Work ✤ Total of 16kb block of eFuses / QFPROM on MSM8960! ✤ 4kb mapped and easily accessible:! ✤ QFPROM BASE PHYSICAL: 0x00700000! ✤ QFPROM SHADOW BASE: 0x00706000! ✤ Can be read whenever / Written Once! ✤ To write, need to hold voltage for $TIME_PERIOD
  • 98.
  • 99. Interesting QFPROM ✤ A 256-bit Primary Hardware Key (PHK used by CE1)! ✤ A 256-bit Secondary Hardware Key (SHK used by CE2)! ✤ A 128-bit OEM Customer key! ✤ A 2048-bit Customer private key! ✤ Fuses to disable debug / JTAG! ✤ Fuses to reenable debug / JTAG! ✤ Possible large swaths of unmapped free space
  • 101. There is no conclusion, only Zuul thanks for letting me talk… any questions?