304PROJECT

EMBODIED SIMULATION 1
The Influence of Weight Metaphors on the Perception
of Concrete Weight:
an Embodied Simulation account
Sian Callaghan
2015
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of the requirements of the degree of BSc (Hons) in Psychology

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Abstract
In our everyday language, there is a tendency to represent abstract concepts with metaphors.
We describe serious and important issues as being ‘heavy’, whilst we attribute ‘lightness’ to
less serious issues; for example, a ‘light-hearted’ subject. Previous research has demonstrated
that experiencing weight can have an impact on subsequent judgements of issue importance
and severity. Other research has demonstrated the reversal of this activation; that priming
with an important issue can lead to heavier subsequent judgements of concrete weight. One
way of understanding the former is through Conceptual Metaphor Theory; we learn about
abstract metaphors through interactions with the concrete. The latter can be explained by an
Embodied Simulation account, whereby specific experiences activate mental re-
representations of an event or episode, thus inducing different bodily sensations, implicit
perceptions and emotions. The present research supports the latter account. 37 participants
were asked to either read a passage about a serious medical condition, or a not so serious
medical condition. Subsequently, they were asked to rate the passage in terms of seriousness
and emotionality. They were then required to make perceptual judgements relating to a box
and a number of coloured slides. Participants estimated the absolute weight of the box to be
heavier in the more serious condition. There was no difference in judgements of object
length, object liking, and ratings of colour brightness between conditions, suggesting that this
phenomenon does not have a general perceptual effect, but a specific effect on weight
judgement alone. Ratings of passage emotionality significantly correlated with absolute
weight judgements, suggesting that an induction of negative mood may affect perceptual
judgements of weight; thus the effect might not be due to metaphorical mappings at all.

The Influence of Weight Metaphors on the Perception of Concrete
Weight: an Embodied Simulation account
Metaphors can be defined as the representation of a concept or entity with another
concept or entity that does not apply literally. Typically, one of these concepts is abstract,
whilst the other is more concrete. They are embedded in our everyday lives; through
conversations and interactions, literary works, comedy and advertising, to name a handful of
platforms. We describe suspicious situations as ‘fishy’, people as ‘hot-headed’, and serious,
important issues as ‘heavy’. ‘Weighty’ matters refers to those issues we consider to be more
important and serious, or that carry a greater psychological burden. By contrast, less serious
issues are often described in terms implying lightness, e.g. ‘flimsy’ or ‘lacking substance’.
This particular metaphoric association is not just part of abstract psychological theory, but
surfaces in a wider social context. For example, on the social networking site ‘Facebook’,
Lance Armstrong recently described Oliver Sacks’ account of a terminal cancer diagnosis as
“beautiful yet heavy”. Research has suggested that this link between concrete and abstract
concepts is not purely literary, and these meanings can overlap, interact with and influence
one another. This was exemplified by Jostmann, Lakens and Schubert (2009), who gave
participants a clipboard which varied in concrete weight between conditions. Participants
were asked to think about a particular issue as they held the clipboard. Those with the heavier
clipboard subsequently judged issues as more important than those with the lighter clipboard.
Such research demonstrates how perceptual information and experience in terms of weight
can influence judgements of the conceptual.
One explanation for this effect of the perceptual on the conceptual lies in Conceptual
Metaphor Theory (Landau, Meier & Keefer, 2010). This account suggests that we use pre-
existing knowledge about concrete concepts and objects in the real world in order to make

sense of the more abstract, as these are more difficult to understand and define. In this view,
the concrete concept is always the foundation on which the new knowledge is based. This
suggests a uni-directional relationship; that the concrete can influence our understanding of
the abstract, but not the other way around. Such an account has origins in Cognitive
Linguistics; we are not born with this generalised capacity for conceptual knowledge, but we
acquire this knowledge through experience. Lakoff and Johnson (1980) suggested that
abstract concepts are grounded in knowledge that people have about their bodies in a
metaphorical sense. That is, people are very knowledgeable about their bodies and
environments. They can subsequently use this knowledge to talk about abstract concepts; for
example, ‘love is a journey’, ‘good is up’ (Meier & Robinson, 2006), and ‘the past behind us’
(Miles, Nind & Macrae, 2010). These metaphors represent how people process information,
rather than just reflecting a linguistic tendency or device (Barsalou, 2008).
Unlike Conceptual Metaphor Theory, the Embodied Simulation account suggests that
bodily experiences can influence cognitive states, but can also be the result of them; and such
cognitive states can be induced by metaphor. This occurs due to simulation: a process by
which the brain re-enacts states acquired during a certain experience when this state is
experienced again (Barsalou, 2008). This state is acquired by integrating modalities to create
a multimodal representation of a particular experience. The key notion here is that the
direction of activation between bodily experiences and cognitive states is dynamic- activation
can flow both ways. From this perspective, the source concept does not have to be derived
from the concrete.
Research has supported the Embodied Simulation account. Schneider, Rutjens,
Jostmann and Lakens (2011) have demonstrated that the manipulation of subject importance
can lead to subsequent heavier estimates of weight, questioning Conceptual Metaphor
Theory’s fundamental idea that the concrete must serve as the source concept. Participants

were given a book, which they were informed was either important or unimportant. They
were then asked to estimate the weight of the book. The greater the importance of the book,
the heavier the subsequent judgements of its weight. This research demonstrates the reversal
of activation direction; from concrete to conceptual, to conceptual to concrete, questioning
the premise of the Metaphor Enriched perspective. This evidence is contrary to the
aforementioned Jostmann et al. (2009) paper, where the concrete concept served as the source
domain.
The Embodied Simulation account proposes that this link between weight and
importance may go further than Conceptual Metaphor Theory suggests. It is, however, not
without its flaws. Importance may not have generated differential perceptions of weight, but
may have simply explicitly activated semantic knowledge regarding the relation between
importance and weight. That is, the participant may be explicitly aware of this link, and so
estimates are made in accordance with this knowledge, rather than activating a genuine
embodied state. Another issue is that of construct validity- because the book was highlighted
as ‘important’, participants may have assumed it was more demanding to read. This relates to
an association between perceived cognitive load in terms of demandingness, and perceived
concrete weight, rather than metaphorical weight.
Although it utilised a similar design to Schneider et al (2011), the present study
tackled some of these discussed issues. In order to reduce the possibility of participants
making explicit links between the two tasks they were asked to complete in the current
research, they were given a guise in which they were told that reading of a text passage, and
making perceptual judgements, were part of two separate studies to collect preliminary data
for further research. The two tasks were labelled as ‘Factors influencing clarity of prose in
English’, and ‘Perceptual Judgements’, respectively. These task labels were reinforced in the
information sheet, consent form, and in the experiment response sheets themselves. This

made the link between the two tasks inconspicuous, and any effect of manipulation implicit.
In order to improve construct validity, participants estimated the weight of an unfamiliar box.
This was chosen to reduce the effect of expectation of weight, as the object was novel. The
appearance of the object was obscured by a layer of white paper, again, reducing the
influence of apriori expectation of weight.
This implicit association between cognitive load and perceived weight demonstrates
an example of Embodied Cognition; the notion that our mental states are grounded in our
bodily states and experiences. Research has supported this idea of Embodied Cognition;
particularly when looking at the effect of perceived weight and energy expenditure.
Typically, heavy objects demand more physical energy due to their very nature. They also
provide a greater cognitive demand as more planning is required to interact with a heavy
object (Schneider, Rutjens, Jostmann & Lakens, 2011). Research has shown that carrying a
heavy rucksack could influence participants’ perceptions of hill steepness. Those carrying
heavier rucksacks have been shown to perceive a hill to be steeper than those in a condition
carrying lighter bags. A similar effect has also been observed in those fatigued after exercise,
as well as in those less capable of climbing hills, such as the elderly or physically unfit
(Bhalla & Proffitt, 1999). This exemplifies an embodied perspective; that perception of
steepness is reliant on bodily experiences relating to energy expenditure. Such adaptations are
seen to be beneficial as they are a deterrent from ‘bioenergetically costly’ activities, and for
those who would experience detrimental effects from climbing the hill (Proffitt, 2008). This
account suggests that our cognitive processes and perceptions are grounded in our bodies, and
this relates to the concept of metaphor. Metaphors are an integral focus of research into
Embodied Cognition as they can transfer bodily experiences (in this case, the experience of
weight, fatigue and fitness) onto more abstract concepts (i.e. perceived energy expenditure)
(Hellman, Echterhoff & Thoben, 2013).

The Embodied Cognition account suggests that inducing fatigue could lead to
judgements of physical endeavour as requiring more effort. Extending the previous research,
the present paper discusses this effect of induced fatigue, as well as the possible emotionality
component of ‘weighty’ metaphors. That is, that importance and emotionality may go hand in
hand. It is very difficult, if not impossible to think of an important issue that is truly
emotionless, and vice versa. For this reason, emotionality may be a key mediational effect in
influencing perceptual judgements. When taking the emotionality of issues into
consideration, the link between metaphors and perceived weight may in fact not be
metaphorical at all. It is possible that stimuli regarding more serious issues may induce
affectively negative states in participants, thus leading to embodiment of ‘low mood’ e.g.
lethargy, low levels of energy and feeling ‘heavy’ (Khawaja, Santos, Habibi & Smith, 2013),
This supports the aforementioned Embodied Cognition account. We perceive tasks as more
effortful and requiring more energy expenditure when we have less energy (e.g. when
fatigued). This could translate into greater weight estimations when participants’ moods
were manipulated by a negative stimulus. Research has shown how it is possible to induce
depression-like states with stimulus presentation (Brewer, Dougtie & Lubin, 1980).
Affectively negative stimuli may increase the perceived energy expenditure: perceived
energy required ratio, thus making objects seem heavy as they are perceived to require more
effort. Therefore, this effect of issue importance on judgements of weight may not lie in
metaphor, but may occur due to an association between serious issues and the negative
emotionality attached to them. This is analogous to the discussed cognitive load argument.
We are more likely to perceive negative stimuli as requiring more effort, as this perceived
effort acts as an adaptive deterrent for us engaging with material that may be costly in terms
of cognitive and physical investment. It is important to be cautious with such an explanation,
as it is based on intuitive speculation, and is yet to be identified in published literature.

It has been discussed that experience of weight can have an effect on perceived issue
importance (Jostmann et al., 2009). Manipulation of issue importance can also lead to
subsequent differential judgements of object weight (Schneider et al., 2011). The latter
research, which supports the Embodied Simulation account, provided the rationale for this
paper. Although greater issue importance did lead to heavier judgements of weight in
Schneider et al.’s research, the paper failed to identify whether this effect was specific to
weight, or if importance has a general effect on the perceptual system. In order to establish if
‘weighty’ topics have a general perceptual effect, that is, that they have an influence on more
than one perceptual modality, the present research also looked at the influence of conceptual
metaphors on object length, as well as colour brightness. Previous research has demonstrated
that colour brightness terms, e.g. dark and lightness, are associated with bad and good,
respectively (Meier, Robinson & Clore, 2004). An effect of issue importance on perception of
colour would indicate a perceptual ‘knock-on’ effect of these issues. They could alter weight
perceptions, which could, in turn, alter colour perceptions, as research has shown that ‘heavy’
and ‘dark’ have a tendency to be associated (Cruse, 2000). As a result of these findings, the
present research also looked at the effect of manipulated subject importance on judgements of
length, object liking, colour brightness and colour liking. If an effect of was found for all
perceptual measures, it would suggest that metaphors related to seriousness can alter our
general perceptual system, rather than our perception of weight, specifically. Estimates of
object length also helped to establish whether or not weight metaphors lead to a general
differential perception of size, which in turn implies greater weight, and vice versa. No
difference for this measure would, again, suggest that exposure to ‘weighty’ topics has an
influence on perceived weight, independent of any other perceptual differences.
In terms of broad theoretical framework, there are two largely competing explanations
as to how and why metaphorical concepts are grounded in more concrete domains. The first

of these is the Embodied Simulation account, whereby the concrete and metaphorical can
interact in a bi-directional manner due to re-representation of mental episodes. The second is
Conceptual Metaphor theory, in which the concrete is the source from which conceptual
information is derived, as we acquire knowledge of abstract concepts from this concrete
domain. If the Embodied Simulation account is supported, priming with a conceptual
metaphor should influence subsequent perceptual judgements, as the concrete domain does
not have to serve as the source concept. Such a finding would not dismiss Conceptual
Metaphor theory per se, but would certainly question its theoretical basis. The present
research seeks to provide evidence for the Embodied Simulation account, by presenting
participants with a conceptual metaphor, followed by a perceptual judgements task
Method
Pilot Study
Passages for experimentation were based on two illnesses, of largely differing
severity (Athlete’s Foot and Cancer). These passages were chosen intuitively on the basis
of personal experience/common knowledge. Information for these passages was obtained
from the official NHS website (www.nhs.uk). Passages were controlled for number of
words, so that any effect could not be attributed to this factor (Athlete’s Foot passage
length: 151 words; Cancer passage length: 163 words). Each passage followed a similar
structure to control for confounding effects of linguistic form (i.e. each passage began
with a statement about prevalence, followed by the number of deaths from the illness,
followed by the causes of the illness, followed by treatments). In order to establish if the
passage subjects were deemed to be significantly more important/serious than one
another, an initial study was conducted to establish the ‘weight’ of the passages. This

Table 1.
Text passages to describe medical conditions, used in both the pilot study and main experiment
required the participant to read the passage of text, either about Cancer or Athlete’s foot
(see table 1 for passages), and then answer a number of questions about the text.
Questions were:
‘1) How serious of an illness do you believe [illness] to be?
Athlete’s
Foot
Approximately 12,600,000 individuals are diagnosed with athlete’s foot in
the UK in their lifetime; more than 1 in 5 people. The illness mainly occurs
in male adults, but can occur in children and women. There are no recorded
deaths as a result of athlete’s foot but the infection is a source of discomfort.
The infection is caused by bacteria which thrive in warm and damp
conditions. Consequently, you are more likely to develop athlete’s foot if
you wear closed shoes such as trainers. The infection causes mild itchiness
and dry skin, but otherwise it is largely harmless. If left untreated, it can
lead to minor complications such as fungal nail infection, or spreading of
the infection to other areas of the body, such as the palms of your hand.
Treatments for athlete’s foot are well established and effective: regular
applications of over-the-counter powders and creams provide extremely
high rates of recovery.
Cancer
Approximately 309,000 people are diagnosed with cancer each year in the
UK. In the UK, more than 1 in 3 people will suffer from cancer in their
lifetime. The illness mainly occurs in older individuals, but can also occur
in children and teenagers. In 2009, more than 156,000 individuals died of
cancer and it is one of the main causes of death in adulthood. More than
three quarters of these deaths occur in those aged 65 and over. The causes of
cancer are complex and only partially understood, although many factors
are known to increase the risk of developing the illness, such as smoking
and obesity. As well as placing physical strains on the body, cancer has
some emotional effects such as shock, depression and anxiety. The illness
can be detrimental for relationships and can be an emotional burden for
families of those with the illness. Developing treatments for cancer is costly
and time consuming and, as yet, complete cures have proved elusive.

2) How important do you feel it is to cure [illness]?
3) How much strain do you feel [illness] puts on an individual socially? i.e. in terms of
friendships, romantic relationships, family relations and social life?
4) How much of a burden do you think [illness] is to the family and friends of the
individual with the illness?
5) To what extent do you think [illness] places physical limits on the individual suffering
with the illness?’
Responses were scored on a 1-7 Likert scale, with 1 indicating a mild effect, and 7
indicating a more extreme effect. 46 Undergraduate students from Lancaster University
took part in this pilot. These participants did not overlap with those that participated in the
main experiment. Pilot Study responses were analysed using t-tests. The passage about
Cancer was rated significantly higher than the passage about Athlete’s Foot in terms of:
Illness severity (Cancer M= 6.74, SD= 0.54, Athlete’s foot M= 1.74, SD=0.54) ,( t(44)=
31.35, p<.001), importance of cure (Cancer M= 6.52, SD= 0.73, Athlete’s foot M= 2.70,
SD= 1.15), ( t(44)= 13.51, p<.001), strain on social life (Cancer M= 6.09, SD= 1.12,
Athlete’s foot M=2.04, SD= 0.88), ( t(44)=13.56, p<.001), burden to family and friends
(Cancer M = 5.96, SD= 1.36, Athlete’s foot M= 1.70, SD= 1.26) , (t(44)=11.01, p<.001),
and physical limits of the illness (Cancer M= 6.17, SD= 0.83, Athlete’s foot M= 2.17,
SD= 0.72), (t(44)=17.44, p<.001).
Pilot questions that included a metaphor themselves (i.e. those about ‘strain’ and

‘burden’) were not included in the main experiment, as this could have acted as a prime
for metaphorical association. Passages were retained for the main experiment.
Main Experiment
Participants
A total of 37 participants (24 female, 13 male. Aged between 18 and 54, M= 23,
SD= 7.97), 35 Lancaster University Undergraduates and 2 Adult School Leavers
participated in this research. No participants reported any difficulty with reading e.g.
dyslexia. Although text passages were scrutinised by an ethics committee, those
participants with a personal emotional affiliation to either passage subject were
encouraged not to participate, as the passages were a potential source of distress. Each
participant gave fully informed consent by reading a comprehensive information sheet,
and signing a consent form (see appendices A & B, respectively). A full verbal and
written debrief (see appendix C) was given to the participants after taking part. No
participants decided to withdraw from the experiment.
Materials
Participants were given one of two text passages to read (one about Cancer or one about
Athlete’s foot, see table 1), followed by questions relating to clarity, seriousness, and
emotionality.
Questions were:
‘1) How easy did you find this passage to understand?
2) How serious of an illness do you think [illness] is?

3) How emotional of an issue do you think [illness] is?’
Responses were scored on a 7 point Likert scale; those nearer to 1 on the scale indicated
‘very difficult’, ‘not at all’, and ‘not at all emotional’, respectively. Responses nearer to 7
on the scale indicated ‘very easy’, ‘very serious’, and ‘extremely emotional’, respectively.
They also received a question sheet relating to perceptual judgements (see appendix D).
The stimulus for the perceptual judgement tasks was a box masked with white paper in
order to obscure its identity as an object, making it novel, thus keeping apriori knowledge
and expectation of object weight to a minimum. The size and weight of the object was
appropriate for all participants to comfortably hold. Participants were also shown a series
of coloured slides (Microsoft PowerPoint 2010).
Procedure
Prior to participation, subjects were informed that the experiment consisted of two
independent and unrelated tasks. The guise for this was that the two tasks were to
establish some baseline judgements for a subsequent piece of research into the clarity of
written English prose. This was to dissociate the two tasks, so that participants did not
assume a link between them, which may have affected their subsequent judgements. In
the first task, participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions, in which they
had to read one of the two aforementioned text passage. Once they had read their given
passage, participants were asked to answer three questions that would assess the clarity of
the passage on a 7 point Likert-style scale, as well as emotionality and seriousness of the
issue presented in the text (see pages 13 & 14 for passage rating questions). Ratings of

clarity were included to fit the guise of the experiment; that the first section was about
factors affecting the clarity of prose in English.
Immediately after completing these ratings, participants moved on to the second task.
This was introduced to the participants by informing them that they had completed the
first experiment, and that they were moving on to another unrelated task. It was reiterated
that this second task was to collect preliminary data for further study into ‘perceptual
judgements’, reinforcing the guise. They were then handed a box, and were told to use
this object when answering the questions in the next task. Participants were encouraged
not to focus on the contents of the box, but to concentrate on the object’s perceptual
nature in terms of size and weight. In the first part of the second task, participants were
asked to make a number of judgements about the object they had been presented with.
The first judgement involved an estimate of weight on a 10-point scale (relative weight
judgement), ranging from the weight of a ‘tennis ball’, to the weight of a ‘full bottle of
wine’, as these scale extremes were deemed to be familiar objects. Participants were also
asked to make estimates of object weight in kg/g (absolute weight judgement), liking of
the object, and width of the object in cm/m. Those participants that were not accustomed
to metric units were able to use imperial; responses were converted at analysis.
After completing these judgements, participants were instructed to turn their attention to a
slideshow presented on a computer monitor. The slideshow consisted of 3 slides, each
presenting a different colour. Participants answered two questions about each colour; the
first question involved a rating of colour brightness on a scale of 1-5, and the second
question invited the participant to rate how much they liked each colour on a scale of 1-5
(see appendix D for perceptual judgements response sheet).

After being fully debriefed, the research (including the guise) was explained to participants
verbally. They were given the opportunity to ask any questions and were reminded that they
were still able to withdraw their data if they so wished. Participants were explicitly asked if
they had any suspicion towards the guise of the study. None of the participants expressed any
suspicion; therefore all data were retained.
Results
Passage ratings
Those in the less serious condition (Athlete’s foot) showed significantly lower ratings of
passage seriousness (t(35)=14.50, p<.001), and passage emotionality (t(35)=8.78, p<.001) than
those in the more serious condition (Cancer), confirming and validating the results of the pilot
study (see table 2 for descriptive statistics). Ratings of passage seriousness, and passage
emotionality, significantly correlated (r(35)= 0.90, p<.001). Passage emotionality correlated
significantly with passage manipulation (r(35)= -0.83, p<.001)
Table 2.
Means and standard deviations of passage ratings
Cancer Athlete’s foot
M SD M SD
Seriousness 6.53 0.90 2.17 0.92
Emotionality 5.95 1.39 2.06 1.30
Perceptual judgements of weight and length
Those in the serious passage condition (Cancer) showed significantly larger estimations

of absolute weight than those in the less serious condition (Athlete’s foot) (t(35)=7.14,
p=.015,). There were significant biserial correlations of absolute weight with condition
manipulation (r(35)= -0.40, p= .015), passage seriousness (r(35)= 0.42. p=.011), and passage
emotionality (r(35)= 0.41, p= .011). Absolute weight did not correlate significantly with
estimations of object length (r(35)= 0.21, p= .224), and object liking (r(35)= 0.19, p= .27).
There was no significant difference in ratings of relative weight between the two conditions
(t(35)=3.184, p=.91). Passage emotionality ratings did not significantly correlate with
estimates of absolute weight within group; in the more serious condition (r(17)= 0.22, p=.36),
or the less serious condition (r(16)= -.004, p=.97). Descriptive statistics for judgements of
weight, length and liking can be found in Table 3. A Kolmogorov-Smirnoff test for normality
indicated a positive skew in predictions of relative weight across both conditions (D= 0.219,
p<.001). This test was employed to identify any anchoring effects of rating scale (see
discussion).
Table 3.
Means and standard deviations of perceptual judgements of relative weight, absolute weight
(in kg), object length (in cm), and object liking
Cancer Athlete’s Foot
M SD M SD
Relative weight 4.74 2.08 4.67 1.53
Absolute weight 1.94* 2.24 0.58* 0.31
Object length 29.00 5.82 32.67 11.46
Object liking 2.84 0.60 3.17 1.10
(* significant at the 0.05 level)

Colour ratings
There was no effect of passage on ratings of colour brightness, or colour liking (See
table 4).
Table 4.
Means and standard deviations of ratings of colour brightness and colour liking, and t-test
comparisons
Cancer Athlete’s Foot
M SD M SD t Sig.
Colour liking 3.49 1.07 3.50 1.15 -0.042 0.97
Colour brightness 3.19 0.91 3.37 0.92 -1.18 0.25

Discussion
The present research sought to provide evidence for an Embodied Simulation account;
that exposure to a conceptual metaphor could lead to subsequent differential perceptual
judgements due to the interwoven nature of conceptual knowledge and bodily states. This is
contrary to Conceptual Metaphor theory, which suggests that concrete experience (in this
case, experiencing weight physically) must serve as the source domain. Manipulated subject
‘weight’ in this experiment lead to differential estimations of concrete object weight. Those
in the more serious condition estimated the weight of the object to be greater than those in the
less serious condition. This is consistent with our hypothesis; that priming with a conceptual
metaphor can have an effect on subsequent judgements of weight. This is inconsistent with
the pattern of activation suggested by Conceptual Metaphor theory; as conceptual
information served as the source domain. This questions the idea that abstract knowledge
must be derived from concrete concepts, as Conceptual Metaphor theory suggests.
This effect of passage seriousness on estimations of absolute weight was independent
of differing estimates of relative weight, object length, object liking, colour brightness ratings
and colour liking between conditions. This suggests that conceptual metaphors of importance
have an effect on weight perception alone; rather than there being a global perceptual effect.
That is, that metaphorical weight could have a ‘knock-on’ effect; exposure to a
serious/important stimulus triggers this concept of metaphorical weight, which may lead to
perceiving colour as darker, as darkness is metaphorically associated with negativity and
serious issues (Crawford, 2009). However, greater estimates of weight in the serious
condition were independent of any difference in colour brightness ratings. Although in this
case they have no effect on colour perception, it is possible that conceptual metaphors of
weight may make us perceive things as generally larger, thus, heavier. However, as heavier
estimations of weight occurred in the serious condition, but greater estimates of object length

did not, we can conclude that this is not a general effect on size perception, but we are
specifically activating a mechanism related to the perception of weight.
If this effect is specific to weight, we would expect that ratings of relative weight as
well as absolute weight would differ between conditions of manipulated seriousness.
However, this was not found to be the case; there was no significant difference in ratings of
relative weight between conditions. A positive skew in ratings of relative weight across
conditions suggests the possible influence of anchoring; where a scale defines referents which
influence subsequent ratings on this scale (Epley & Gilovich, 2006). In other words, our
responses on a scale are biased by the use of the scale itself. Participants have a tendency and
bias towards the first item presented, and we use this as an ‘anchor’. In this case, the first
referent was a tennis ball. This may explain why responses were skewed towards this end of
the scale. Rather than presenting this measure of relative weight in scale form, future research
should ask participants to identify an object that they deem to be the closest weight to that of
the target object. This would provide a measure of relative weight prediction, without
anchoring, the effects of which were seemingly detrimental to the conclusions of the present
research.
Another possible limitation of the present research lies in the guise used to separate
the tasks of passage rating and perceptual judgements. Participants were told that the two
tasks they completed were independent of one another, and that they were part of preliminary
data collection for further study. This may, ironically, have led participants to focus on the
fact that the two tasks were separate, thus creating suspicion towards the separateness of the
two tasks. Although no participants reported any suspicion towards the guise, they were
asked this directly, rather than through a pencil and paper response. It is possible that
participants in order to give seemingly ‘desirable’ responses to the researcher. Future
research should record these responses using pencil and paper techniques, as that reduces the

tendency of social desirability bias (Fisher, 1993). Because of this suspected link, participants
may have used their prior knowledge of an association between importance and weight to
guide their subsequent judgements, rather than the conceptual metaphor evoking an embodied
state.
Extending previous research, the present paper looked at the influence of a possible
emotionality component that is associated with seriousness. That is, serious issues are almost
always emotional. The reverse is also true; less serious issues tend to induce little emotional
response (Smith & Lazarus, 1990). Based on this logic, heavier weight estimations after
being exposed to a more serious stimulus may be related to induction of low mood, rather
than an embodied state, as the Embodied Simulation account suggests. Emotionality
significantly correlated with passage, as well as absolute weight judgements. It is possible
that an induction of low mood may have led to lethargy in the participants. Patients who
suffer from depression; an illness defined by low mood, often report feelings of tiredness,
lethargy, and feeling heavy. Inducing low-mood states, therefore, could increase the
perceived energy necessary to hold the object of which participants had to estimate the
weight of. This could subsequently lead to heavier estimations of weight (Bhalla & Proffitt,
1999). However, participants’ self-reported mood was not assessed, so it is difficult to draw
any conclusions from the correlationary data obtained in the present research without further
study. Further research should isolate the effect of emotionality to establish whether the
metaphorical weight of the passage, or the emotion attached to presented issues is key. It is
possible that perceptual differences between conditions could be mediated by mood changes
triggering an embodiment of negativity. Although the seriousness of an issue can induce
feelings of lethargy in participants, it can also motivate and energise some individuals (Dijk
& Kluger, 2011). Therefore, we might expect more serious issues to reduce estimations of

weight. This stresses the need for future research to take pre- and post- experiment self-
reported mood, as well as ratings of tiredness, physical capability and lethargy.
In summary, the present research has posed a challenge to Conceptual Metaphor
Theory, as it is possible for conceptual information, in this case, a ‘weighty’ subject to serve
as the source domain of influence on judgements of weight. In this case, conceptual
metaphors relating to weight have been shown to influence subsequent judgements of weight,
in that those exposed to a more serious stimulus estimated the weight of an object to be
heavier than those in the less serious condition. This supports an Embodied Simulation
account, which suggests that conceptual metaphors trigger genuine embodied states as a
result of multimodal representations of experiences, allowing the activation between bodily
experiences and cognitive states to be dynamic and bi-directional. However, flaws have been
noted in the methodology and design of the current experiment; problems with the use of
scales for weight judgements, an unconvincing guise, and the possibility of induction of low
mood leading to differences in weight perception due to feelings of lethargy. The latter needs
further experimentation in order to establish if greater judgements of object weight are related
to embodied states relating to seriousness, or an embodiment of the emotionality of the issue.
Reflecting on the previous literature and the present study, both accounts could indeed be a
plausible.

References
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Bhalla, M., & Proffitt, D. (1999). Visual–motor recalibration in geographical slant
perception. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and
Performance, 25, 1076-1096.
Brewer, D., Doughtie, E., Lubin, B. (1980). Induction of mood and mood shift. Journal of
Clinical Psychology,36, 215-226.
Cruse, D. (2000). Aspects of the micro-structure of word meanings. In Ravin, C., &
Leacock, C (eds.), Polysemy: Theoretical and computational approaches, 30-51.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Crawford, E. (2009). Conceptual Metaphors of Affect. Emotion Review, 1, 129-139.
Dijk, D., & Kluger, A. (2011). Task type as a moderator of positive/negative feedback effects
on motivation and performance: A regulatory focus perspective. Journal of
Organizational Behaviour, 21, 1084-1105.
Epley, N., & Gilovich, T. (2006). The Anchoring-and-Adjustment Heuristic: Why the
Adjustments Are Insufficient. Psyhological Science, 17, 311-318.
Fisher, R. (1993). Social Desirability Bias and the Validity of Indirect Questioning. Journal
of Consumer Research, 20, 303-315.
Hellman, J., Echterhoff, G, & Thoben, D. (2013). Metaphor in embodied cognition is more
than just combining two related concepts: a comment on Wilson and Golonka (2013).
Frontiers in Psychology, 4, doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00201
Jostmann, N., Lakens, D., & Schubert, T. (2009). Weight as an embodiment of importance.
Psychological Science, 20, 1169-1174.

Khawaja, N., Santos, M., Habibi, A., & Smith, R. (2013). University students’ depression: a
cross-cultural investigation. Higher Education Research & Development, 32, 392-
406.
Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (1980). Metaphors We Live By. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.
Landau, M., Meier, B., & Keefer, L. (2010). A metaphor-enriched social cognition.
Psychological Bulletin, 136, 1045-1067.
Meier, B., & Robinson, M. ( 2006). Does “feeling down” mean seeing down?
Depressive symptoms and vertical selective attention. Journal of Research in
Personality, 40, 451– 461.
Meier, B., Robinson, M., & Clore, G. (2004). Why good guys wear white: Automatic
inferences about stimulus valence based on brightness.
Psychological Science, 15, 82– 87.
Miles, L., Nind, L., & Macrae, C. ( 2010). Moving through time. Psychological
Science, 21, 222– 223.
Proffitt, D. (2009). Affordances matter in geographical slant perception. Psychonomic
Bulletin & Review, 16,970-972.
Schneider, I., Rutjens, B., Jostmann, N., & Lakens, D. (2011). Weighty matters: Importance
literally feels heavy. Social Psychological & Personality Science, 2, 474-478.
Smith, C., & Lazarus, R. (1990). Handbook of Personality: Theory and Research. New York:
Guilford Press.

Appendix A: Participant Information Sheet
Participant Information Sheet
You are invited to take part in the following two experiments: ‘Factors influencing Clarity of Prose in
English’, and ‘PerceptualJudgements’. Both experiments are concerned with testing stimuli to see if
they are adequate and appropriate for a longer, fuller subsequent pair of experiments. Your
participation in this research is voluntary and you may withdraw from participation at any time, with
no consequence and without reason. Both experiments should collectively take no longer than 15
minutes to complete. Your data will not be individually identifiable as all responses will be
anonymised. All data and participant information will be held on a private computer, only accessible
by the individuals listed below.
Experiment #1- Factors influencing Clarity of Prose in English
In this experiment, you will be given a passage to read about a particular illness. Your task is to rate
the passage in terms of its clarity, seriousness and emotionality. You should note that the passage is
about cancer/athlete’s foot. If you find this topic difficult in any way, you may choose to withdraw
now or at any point.
Experiment #2- PerceptualJudgements
The second experiment involves you making basic perceptual judgements about objects and colours.
You will also be asked how much you like each of the perceptual stimuli.
Contact
Sian Callaghan (Researcher):s.callaghan@lancaster.ac.uk
Alan Collins (Project Supervisor): a.collins@lancaster.ac.uk
Charlie Lewis (Head of Department): c.lewis@lancaster.ac.uk

Appendix B: Participant Consent Form
Participant Consent Form
‘Factors influencing Clarity of Prose in English’, and ‘PerceptualJudgements’
 I agree to take part in this research and am doing so out of my own free will
 I have had the opportunity to ask questions
 I am aware that I have the right to withdraw from this research at any time, and can withdraw
my data directly after my participation is complete
 My consent is fully informed as I have received sufficient information about the research
prior to my participation
 I understand that my data will be anonymised and confidential
 I have sufficient contact information should I need to raise any questions/queries after my
participation
Gender:__________
Age:_____________
Date:_____________
Signed: __________________________

Appendix C: Participant Debrief
Participant Debrief
Thank you for your participation in this research.
Metaphors are embedded in our everyday lives; we describe weather as ‘miserable’, we judge people
as ‘warm’ or ‘cold’, and more important, serious issues are frequently described as ‘heavy’ or
‘weighty’ (by contrast, less serious issues are often described in terms implying lightness e.g. flimsy
or lacking substance). Research has shown that manipulation of weight of an object leads to
differences in judgements of importance of neutral material (see referencesbelow). The reversalof
this metaphor has also been found:- manipulation of importance of an issue leads to differential
judgement of literal weight.
This ‘metaphor reversal’ was the topic of investigation in this experiment. Both tasks you were asked
to complete were part of the same experiment. There were two different passages describing an
illness; one severe and life-threatening, and the other, only mild– you received only one of these
passages.. We were looking to observe an effect between the manipulation of importance and the
perceived weight of an object. If the findings fall in line with previous research,there will be heavier
ratings of weight of the object in the severe/important condition. It is also predicted that colours will
be rated as less bright in this condition.
This research received full ethical approval from the University.
Thank you once again for your participation; please do not hesitate to contact me with any further
queries.
Sian Callaghan: s.callaghan@lancaster.ac.uk
Further reading:
Jostmann, N. B.,Lakens, D., & Schubert, T. W. (2009). Weight as an embodiment of importance.
Psychological Science, 20(9), 1169-1174.
Schneider, I. K., Rutjens, B. T., Jostmann, N. B., & Lakens,D. (2011). Weighty Matters Importance
Literally Feels Heavy. Social Psychological and Personality Science, 2(5), 474-478

Appendix D: Perceptual Judgements Response Sheet
Experiment #2- Perceptual Judgements
Please answer the following questions about the item you are holding by circling the most appropriate
response:
1) How heavy do you think the item is? (1 being as light as a tennis ball, and 10 being as heavy as a bottle
of wine).
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
2) Estimate the mass of the object in kg/g
…………………….………………
3) How much do you like the object? (1 being ‘severely dislike’ and 5 being ‘like very much’)
1 2 3 4 5
4) Estimate the width of the object in cm/m
……………………………………
Please let the researcher know when you are finished with the previous questions. You will now be shown
a short slide show of three colours. Please answer the following questions about the corresponding colours
on the slideshow:
Colour #1
1) How dark/light do you think colour #1 is? (1 being ‘very dark’ and 7 being ‘very light’)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2) How much do you like colour #1? (1 being ‘severely dislike’ and 5 being ‘like very much’)
1 2 3 4 5
Colour #2
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
Colour #3
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5

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