The document discusses cybersecurity issues in the Baltic states after the 2016 U.S. presidential election. It provides background on cyber attacks against Estonia and NATO's recognition of cyberspace as a domain of operations. It summarizes analyses that found NATO could not effectively repel a rapid Russian invasion of the Baltic states. The document also covers NATO and Baltic states' national cybersecurity strategies and organizations, and key dates in NATO cybersecurity coordination. It examines perspectives on applying international law to cyber conflicts and responses to cyber-only attacks.
Cyber threats to nuclear weapons systems pose grave risks and require international cooperation to address. A successful cyberattack could lead to an accidental nuclear launch due to false warnings or unauthorized use. All countries with nuclear weapons are vulnerable. Without multilateral engagement, unilateral or bilateral efforts to enhance nuclear security could be seen as destabilizing. The document calls for increased dialogue between nuclear powers like the US and Russia to develop understanding of cyber risks and identify practical steps to reduce risks of cyber-induced crises or accidents. It also urges broader international cooperation through bilateral and multilateral forums to establish norms and confidence building measures regarding cyber threats to nuclear systems.
Reducing nuclear risks is an existential interest for all nations. The document calls for dialogue between governments to reduce growing nuclear dangers from accidents, miscalculations, or cyber threats given heightened tensions. Specifically, it recommends that (1) leaders reinforce that nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought, (2) preserve existing nonproliferation agreements, and (3) fully implement the Iran nuclear deal to prevent nuclear proliferation. Over 50 former and current officials from NATO countries signed in support of government dialogue to reduce nuclear risks.
We are describe about EU, NATO and how they are working together to achieved some vital decision, Terrorism, EU Security concern, WMD(weapon of mass destruction), stability of peace etc.
The document summarizes the development of UK counterterrorism strategy and legislation since the Northern Ireland conflict. It describes the evolving threat from Islamist terrorism. The UK adopted the CONTEST strategy in 2003 with four pillars (Prevent, Pursue, Protect, Prepare) and established new agencies like JTAC. Legislation expanded police powers and allowed control orders and detention without trial. Critics argue these measures undermine civil liberties and fair trials. Reviews propose modest changes but retain broad imprecise offenses and executive powers based on suspicion rather than evidence.
The document summarizes a cyber security challenge scenario involving cyber attacks on Philippine and US networks following a confrontation between Chinese and Philippine vessels in the South China Sea. It then analyzes four policy approaches: 1) A joint US-Philippines cyber security initiative, 2) Attributing attacks to China under international law, 3) Creating UN cyber norms and committees, and 4) Defining attacks as "armed attacks". The analysis chooses approach 1 due to attribution issues with approaches 2 and 4, and approach 3's long-term focus. It argues approach 1 restores networks while flexing US cyber capabilities and involving allies.
Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the contex...Yahya CyberCloud
Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security.
Letter dated 9 January 2015 from the Permanent Representatives of China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General.
This document summarizes the evolution of national cyber security strategies in the European Union and elsewhere. It finds that while some of the earliest strategies focused narrowly on specific issues, over the past decade EU member states have increasingly published comprehensive national cyber security strategies. The document reviews strategies published by Estonia, Finland, Slovakia, Czech Republic, France and Germany between 2008-2011. These strategies generally aim to strengthen cyber security through regulation, education, cooperation, prevention of attacks and failures, and protection of critical infrastructure and citizens. The document concludes by observing common themes and providing recommendations.
The document discusses proposals for strengthening cybersecurity of US government and critical infrastructure. It recommends developing a robust cyber policy, securing federal networks, and engaging internationally. The government needs to work with critical infrastructure owners to assess threats, develop protective measures, and integrate intelligence sharing. Research should promote secure infrastructure design and modeling of incident impacts. Communication systems must enable real-time information access across government levels using accurate data.
Cyber threats to nuclear weapons systems pose grave risks and require international cooperation to address. A successful cyberattack could lead to an accidental nuclear launch due to false warnings or unauthorized use. All countries with nuclear weapons are vulnerable. Without multilateral engagement, unilateral or bilateral efforts to enhance nuclear security could be seen as destabilizing. The document calls for increased dialogue between nuclear powers like the US and Russia to develop understanding of cyber risks and identify practical steps to reduce risks of cyber-induced crises or accidents. It also urges broader international cooperation through bilateral and multilateral forums to establish norms and confidence building measures regarding cyber threats to nuclear systems.
Reducing nuclear risks is an existential interest for all nations. The document calls for dialogue between governments to reduce growing nuclear dangers from accidents, miscalculations, or cyber threats given heightened tensions. Specifically, it recommends that (1) leaders reinforce that nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought, (2) preserve existing nonproliferation agreements, and (3) fully implement the Iran nuclear deal to prevent nuclear proliferation. Over 50 former and current officials from NATO countries signed in support of government dialogue to reduce nuclear risks.
We are describe about EU, NATO and how they are working together to achieved some vital decision, Terrorism, EU Security concern, WMD(weapon of mass destruction), stability of peace etc.
The document summarizes the development of UK counterterrorism strategy and legislation since the Northern Ireland conflict. It describes the evolving threat from Islamist terrorism. The UK adopted the CONTEST strategy in 2003 with four pillars (Prevent, Pursue, Protect, Prepare) and established new agencies like JTAC. Legislation expanded police powers and allowed control orders and detention without trial. Critics argue these measures undermine civil liberties and fair trials. Reviews propose modest changes but retain broad imprecise offenses and executive powers based on suspicion rather than evidence.
The document summarizes a cyber security challenge scenario involving cyber attacks on Philippine and US networks following a confrontation between Chinese and Philippine vessels in the South China Sea. It then analyzes four policy approaches: 1) A joint US-Philippines cyber security initiative, 2) Attributing attacks to China under international law, 3) Creating UN cyber norms and committees, and 4) Defining attacks as "armed attacks". The analysis chooses approach 1 due to attribution issues with approaches 2 and 4, and approach 3's long-term focus. It argues approach 1 restores networks while flexing US cyber capabilities and involving allies.
Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the contex...Yahya CyberCloud
Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security.
Letter dated 9 January 2015 from the Permanent Representatives of China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General.
This document summarizes the evolution of national cyber security strategies in the European Union and elsewhere. It finds that while some of the earliest strategies focused narrowly on specific issues, over the past decade EU member states have increasingly published comprehensive national cyber security strategies. The document reviews strategies published by Estonia, Finland, Slovakia, Czech Republic, France and Germany between 2008-2011. These strategies generally aim to strengthen cyber security through regulation, education, cooperation, prevention of attacks and failures, and protection of critical infrastructure and citizens. The document concludes by observing common themes and providing recommendations.
The document discusses proposals for strengthening cybersecurity of US government and critical infrastructure. It recommends developing a robust cyber policy, securing federal networks, and engaging internationally. The government needs to work with critical infrastructure owners to assess threats, develop protective measures, and integrate intelligence sharing. Research should promote secure infrastructure design and modeling of incident impacts. Communication systems must enable real-time information access across government levels using accurate data.
NATO Cyber Security Conference: Creating IT-Security Start-UpsBenjamin Rohé
introduction about the cyber security startup landscape, what are the drivers, why businesses and governments need to act, some predictions for 2015 and beyond, investment market and Palantir mini-case-study, market growth, 3 startup tips from founders, some references and additional material
This document provides a summary of Barry G. Davidson's professional experience, qualifications, and areas of expertise. Over his decades-long career, Davidson has developed extensive experience in government consulting, community development, event logistics and risk operations, law enforcement, nonprofit management, and information technology. He has held senior roles advising government ministries and managing major organizations, and also founded an international crime prevention association.
This document describes the registration process for a free membership to a solutions program run by Syngress publishing. The summary is:
1. Syngress has published several best-selling books on topics like ISA Server 2000 and intrusion detection and one reason for their success is the solutions program.
2. As a registered owner of this Syngress book, the reader can qualify for free access to the member-only solutions program which provides downloadable e-books, an FAQ page, and a forum for interaction with the book authors.
3. To register for the free membership, the reader needs to visit the listed website and go through a simple registration process using the book.
The document provides an overview of cyber conflict and the People's Republic of China. It discusses China's development of cyber capabilities, including establishing its Cyber Command in 2010. It also examines China's cyber espionage activities targeting governments and companies to obtain intellectual property and advance political and economic objectives. The document analyzes different Chinese state and non-state actors involved in cyber operations, including the Communist Party of China, People's Liberation Army, state-owned enterprises, and hacktivists.
Security assessment for financial institutionsZsolt Nemeth
Group-IB is a cybersecurity company founded in 2003 in Russia that provides services such as security analysis, penetration testing, computer forensics, incident response, and malware intelligence. It has expanded internationally and now has over 60 employees. The company operates the first 24/7 cybersecurity response team in Eastern Europe called CERT-GIB. Group-IB works with many financial institutions and has expertise in vulnerabilities specific to the banking/e-commerce sector.
Cyber Terrorism - Analysis and Strategies for defending your business against cyberterror threats and attacks, with focus on the Banking and Financial Services Sector
Cuban missile crisis Daniel Ortiz/Felipe Jimeno/Andres Felipe MejiaSocialStudiesCampestre
In October 1962, the U.S. discovered that the Soviet Union was secretly constructing nuclear missile bases in Cuba, just over 90 miles from Florida. This led to a 13-day standoff known as the Cuban Missile Crisis. President Kennedy instituted a blockade around Cuba and demanded the Soviets remove the missiles. After tense negotiations, the Soviets agreed to dismantle the Cuban missile bases in exchange for the U.S. promising not to invade Cuba and agreeing to remove its own missiles from Turkey. The crisis ended, but it brought the world dangerously close to nuclear war.
This document discusses power relationships in US cybersecurity policy using Clegg's Circuits of Power theory. It analyzes policy developments through the episodic, social integration, and system integration circuits. Key events discussed include the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, various security breaches in 2007-2008 that led to new policies, and resistance to laws like the Cyber Security Enhancement Act of 2002 and Stop Online Piracy Act due to privacy concerns. The document argues power struggles have weakened the US cybersecurity position amid constant attacks.
This document provides an introduction to NATO's command structure at both the strategic and operational levels. At the strategic level, NATO is led by civilian and military committees and staffs based in Brussels. Operationally, NATO utilizes two main commands - Allied Command Operations focuses on operations while Allied Command Transformation focuses on development. Planning for current operations takes place at Joint Force Headquarters and their subordinate Joint Plans Branches.
Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Jonathan Greenert's World Affairs Brief covering the Navy Today and Tomorrow status slides, the AP Rebalance, Platforms; MLP, AFSB, LCS, JHSV, Zumwalt class destroyer, Autonomous vehicles; Fire Scout, X-47B UCAS, and the LaWS Laser Weapon System.
This document discusses analytics for assessing cybersecurity risks in smart grids. It identifies several risk management practices for smart grids including the NIST supply chain risk management practice, Department of Energy risk management practice, and compliance with technical standards. It also maps the relationships between smart grid domains, actors, interfaces, and vulnerabilities based on NIST guidelines to identify high-risk areas and inform priority actions. Finally, it shows how risk identification and assessment can be conducted based on analyzing security objectives, impact levels, and relationships between smart grid components defined in NIST guidelines.
BGF-UNESCO-at-UCLA conference - Madness - The dynamics of International Cyber...Boston Global Forum
This conference was an official event to establish the Global Citizenship Education Network (GCEN) between UNESCO, UCLA and the Boston Global Forum (BGF) . We had several important dialogues concerning Global Citizenship Education in Cyber Civil Defense
The document discusses US naval ship presence and partnerships in the Pacific region. It states that from 2015 to 2020, the average US ship presence in the Pacific will increase from 58 to 67 ships, while forward stationed forces will remain around 43 to 45 ships. It also outlines the US strategy of strengthening alliances with countries like Japan, South Korea, Philippines, and Australia; enhancing partnerships with Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam, Brunei, and New Zealand; developing a strategic partnership with India; and seeking a constructive relationship with China.
Kennedy orders a naval blockade of Cuba to prevent further Soviet missile shipments and demands the removal of existing missile sites. With nuclear war threatening, an agreement is reached on October 28th where the Soviets agree to remove missiles from Cuba and the US agrees not to invade Cuba and secretly removes missiles from Turkey and Italy. The crisis highlighted the danger of the Cold War and encouraged direct communication between the US and Soviet leaders to reduce tensions.
Models of Escalation and De-escalation in Cyber ConflictZsolt Nemeth
The cyber insecurity conundrum cuts across all things digital or networked. How can we prioritize defensive efforts across such a vast domain? This talk will describe a framework for engineering systems and policymaking based on the work factors for cyber attack and defense. After developing the work factor concept, it will be illustrated in several examples
The document discusses the tension between state sovereignty and international governance in matters of international security. It provides an overview of different approaches to humanitarian intervention, democracy and good governance promotion, and international criminal tribunals that have challenged the traditional concept of absolute state sovereignty. While globalization has increased calls for intervention, implementation remains inconsistent and challenges include lack of political will, selective application depending on strategic interests, and tension between universal values and local contexts.
This document provides an overview of the Cuban Missile Crisis through an interactive presentation. It introduces the author and outlines the major topics to be covered, including the countries involved (US, Soviet Union, Cuba, Turkey), explanations of the crisis, President Kennedy's response, and the outcome and effects. Resources on pictures and videos related to the crisis are also listed.
Dni nato cyber panel via the interceptBaddddBoyyyy
Russia and China pose the greatest cyber threats to NATO computer networks. Russia is considered the most strategic threat due to its capabilities and intent to target and disrupt NATO infrastructures. China's cyber espionage operations against military networks have expanded dramatically and NATO information is likely a target. While hacktivist groups get media attention, nation-states like Russia pose a greater threat through proxy operations. Classified NATO networks remain at risk from insider threats and vulnerabilities like infected thumb drives. Prioritizing the most critical data and networks could help allocate resources to address gaps and develop response plans.
This document discusses upgrading relations between NATO and Israel, as well as Israel's involvement in US-led ballistic missile defense. It notes that NATO has undergone changes that could create opportunities for closer cooperation with Israel. Areas discussed include intelligence sharing, missile defense, counterterrorism, and Israel providing experience to NATO in areas like counterinsurgency. The document also outlines US ballistic missile defense plans that envision a key partnership role for Israel against threats like Iran. It argues Israel should work to define its long-term strategy regarding NATO and contribute to NATO's review of its strategic concept.
NATO Cyber Security Conference: Creating IT-Security Start-UpsBenjamin Rohé
introduction about the cyber security startup landscape, what are the drivers, why businesses and governments need to act, some predictions for 2015 and beyond, investment market and Palantir mini-case-study, market growth, 3 startup tips from founders, some references and additional material
This document provides a summary of Barry G. Davidson's professional experience, qualifications, and areas of expertise. Over his decades-long career, Davidson has developed extensive experience in government consulting, community development, event logistics and risk operations, law enforcement, nonprofit management, and information technology. He has held senior roles advising government ministries and managing major organizations, and also founded an international crime prevention association.
This document describes the registration process for a free membership to a solutions program run by Syngress publishing. The summary is:
1. Syngress has published several best-selling books on topics like ISA Server 2000 and intrusion detection and one reason for their success is the solutions program.
2. As a registered owner of this Syngress book, the reader can qualify for free access to the member-only solutions program which provides downloadable e-books, an FAQ page, and a forum for interaction with the book authors.
3. To register for the free membership, the reader needs to visit the listed website and go through a simple registration process using the book.
The document provides an overview of cyber conflict and the People's Republic of China. It discusses China's development of cyber capabilities, including establishing its Cyber Command in 2010. It also examines China's cyber espionage activities targeting governments and companies to obtain intellectual property and advance political and economic objectives. The document analyzes different Chinese state and non-state actors involved in cyber operations, including the Communist Party of China, People's Liberation Army, state-owned enterprises, and hacktivists.
Security assessment for financial institutionsZsolt Nemeth
Group-IB is a cybersecurity company founded in 2003 in Russia that provides services such as security analysis, penetration testing, computer forensics, incident response, and malware intelligence. It has expanded internationally and now has over 60 employees. The company operates the first 24/7 cybersecurity response team in Eastern Europe called CERT-GIB. Group-IB works with many financial institutions and has expertise in vulnerabilities specific to the banking/e-commerce sector.
Cyber Terrorism - Analysis and Strategies for defending your business against cyberterror threats and attacks, with focus on the Banking and Financial Services Sector
Cuban missile crisis Daniel Ortiz/Felipe Jimeno/Andres Felipe MejiaSocialStudiesCampestre
In October 1962, the U.S. discovered that the Soviet Union was secretly constructing nuclear missile bases in Cuba, just over 90 miles from Florida. This led to a 13-day standoff known as the Cuban Missile Crisis. President Kennedy instituted a blockade around Cuba and demanded the Soviets remove the missiles. After tense negotiations, the Soviets agreed to dismantle the Cuban missile bases in exchange for the U.S. promising not to invade Cuba and agreeing to remove its own missiles from Turkey. The crisis ended, but it brought the world dangerously close to nuclear war.
This document discusses power relationships in US cybersecurity policy using Clegg's Circuits of Power theory. It analyzes policy developments through the episodic, social integration, and system integration circuits. Key events discussed include the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, various security breaches in 2007-2008 that led to new policies, and resistance to laws like the Cyber Security Enhancement Act of 2002 and Stop Online Piracy Act due to privacy concerns. The document argues power struggles have weakened the US cybersecurity position amid constant attacks.
This document provides an introduction to NATO's command structure at both the strategic and operational levels. At the strategic level, NATO is led by civilian and military committees and staffs based in Brussels. Operationally, NATO utilizes two main commands - Allied Command Operations focuses on operations while Allied Command Transformation focuses on development. Planning for current operations takes place at Joint Force Headquarters and their subordinate Joint Plans Branches.
Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Jonathan Greenert's World Affairs Brief covering the Navy Today and Tomorrow status slides, the AP Rebalance, Platforms; MLP, AFSB, LCS, JHSV, Zumwalt class destroyer, Autonomous vehicles; Fire Scout, X-47B UCAS, and the LaWS Laser Weapon System.
This document discusses analytics for assessing cybersecurity risks in smart grids. It identifies several risk management practices for smart grids including the NIST supply chain risk management practice, Department of Energy risk management practice, and compliance with technical standards. It also maps the relationships between smart grid domains, actors, interfaces, and vulnerabilities based on NIST guidelines to identify high-risk areas and inform priority actions. Finally, it shows how risk identification and assessment can be conducted based on analyzing security objectives, impact levels, and relationships between smart grid components defined in NIST guidelines.
BGF-UNESCO-at-UCLA conference - Madness - The dynamics of International Cyber...Boston Global Forum
This conference was an official event to establish the Global Citizenship Education Network (GCEN) between UNESCO, UCLA and the Boston Global Forum (BGF) . We had several important dialogues concerning Global Citizenship Education in Cyber Civil Defense
The document discusses US naval ship presence and partnerships in the Pacific region. It states that from 2015 to 2020, the average US ship presence in the Pacific will increase from 58 to 67 ships, while forward stationed forces will remain around 43 to 45 ships. It also outlines the US strategy of strengthening alliances with countries like Japan, South Korea, Philippines, and Australia; enhancing partnerships with Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam, Brunei, and New Zealand; developing a strategic partnership with India; and seeking a constructive relationship with China.
Kennedy orders a naval blockade of Cuba to prevent further Soviet missile shipments and demands the removal of existing missile sites. With nuclear war threatening, an agreement is reached on October 28th where the Soviets agree to remove missiles from Cuba and the US agrees not to invade Cuba and secretly removes missiles from Turkey and Italy. The crisis highlighted the danger of the Cold War and encouraged direct communication between the US and Soviet leaders to reduce tensions.
Models of Escalation and De-escalation in Cyber ConflictZsolt Nemeth
The cyber insecurity conundrum cuts across all things digital or networked. How can we prioritize defensive efforts across such a vast domain? This talk will describe a framework for engineering systems and policymaking based on the work factors for cyber attack and defense. After developing the work factor concept, it will be illustrated in several examples
The document discusses the tension between state sovereignty and international governance in matters of international security. It provides an overview of different approaches to humanitarian intervention, democracy and good governance promotion, and international criminal tribunals that have challenged the traditional concept of absolute state sovereignty. While globalization has increased calls for intervention, implementation remains inconsistent and challenges include lack of political will, selective application depending on strategic interests, and tension between universal values and local contexts.
This document provides an overview of the Cuban Missile Crisis through an interactive presentation. It introduces the author and outlines the major topics to be covered, including the countries involved (US, Soviet Union, Cuba, Turkey), explanations of the crisis, President Kennedy's response, and the outcome and effects. Resources on pictures and videos related to the crisis are also listed.
Dni nato cyber panel via the interceptBaddddBoyyyy
Russia and China pose the greatest cyber threats to NATO computer networks. Russia is considered the most strategic threat due to its capabilities and intent to target and disrupt NATO infrastructures. China's cyber espionage operations against military networks have expanded dramatically and NATO information is likely a target. While hacktivist groups get media attention, nation-states like Russia pose a greater threat through proxy operations. Classified NATO networks remain at risk from insider threats and vulnerabilities like infected thumb drives. Prioritizing the most critical data and networks could help allocate resources to address gaps and develop response plans.
This document discusses upgrading relations between NATO and Israel, as well as Israel's involvement in US-led ballistic missile defense. It notes that NATO has undergone changes that could create opportunities for closer cooperation with Israel. Areas discussed include intelligence sharing, missile defense, counterterrorism, and Israel providing experience to NATO in areas like counterinsurgency. The document also outlines US ballistic missile defense plans that envision a key partnership role for Israel against threats like Iran. It argues Israel should work to define its long-term strategy regarding NATO and contribute to NATO's review of its strategic concept.
The document lays out recommendations for addressing Russian hybrid challenges facing NATO and EU countries. It first describes the nature of the hybrid threats, which include low-level use of force, cyberattacks, economic and political coercion/subversion, and information warfare. It then proposes five categories of functional recommendations and one structural recommendation. The functional recommendations provide actions that can be taken to enhance resilience against each specific threat. The structural recommendation proposes establishing a coordinating entity to maximize effectiveness of NATO, EU, national, and private sector responses. The recommendations emphasize intelligence sharing, operational coordination, reducing dependencies, and developing an information strategy to counter election interference.
1. NATO leaders met in Madrid and issued a declaration outlining decisions made at the summit to strengthen the alliance in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine.
2. Key decisions included endorsing a new Strategic Concept to guide NATO's approach, increasing support for Ukraine, enhancing NATO's deterrence and defense posture, and inviting Finland and Sweden to join the alliance.
3. Leaders also committed to addressing other challenges like climate change, emerging technologies, partnerships, and defense spending to ensure NATO remains adapted to the changing security environment.
This document provides an analysis and recommendations from a group of experts on developing a new strategic concept for NATO by 2020. It summarizes the group's key findings: NATO must adapt to new threats like terrorism while maintaining its core function of collective defense. The new concept should reaffirm NATO's enduring principles but also allow for partnerships, operations outside Alliance borders when needed, and a comprehensive approach to complex security issues. It must ensure NATO remains vigilant against both conventional and unconventional dangers.
1. The memorandum discusses the legal status of individuals conducting cyber operations and whether cyber attacks can be considered a "use of force" under international law.
2. There are differing views on how existing international law applies to cyber attacks. Some argue any attack that causes damage should be prohibited, while others argue only attacks using kinetic, physical means were intended in existing treaties.
3. A third approach advocates analyzing cyber attacks on a case-by-case basis considering factors like severity of damage, immediacy of impact, and whether responsibility is claimed to determine if it constitutes a prohibited "use of force." Applying this framework to examples could help clarify the legal status of cyber operations going forward.
Application of principles of international law to computer networks operation...Adriana Dvorsak
The document discusses the application of international law principles to computer network operations and management. It covers topics such as individual privacy rights, national security concerns, cyber security concepts, principles of just war theory applied to cyber conflicts, and NATO and EU rules and directives regarding cyber operations and national network security strategies. It also examines issues of sovereignty, self-defense, data protection, mandatory security breach reporting, and the development of cyber capabilities in the EU and among smaller states.
The document outlines the Reflection Group's vision for strengthening NATO's political role by 2030. It identifies key trends that will shape NATO's security environment, including the return of strategic competition and rise of new threats. Main recommendations are to reinforce Allied unity, increase political consultation within NATO, and strengthen NATO's political role to address emerging challenges from all strategic directions, such as Russia, China, disruptive technologies, and more. The recommendations aim to ensure NATO remains adapted to changing times.
Cyber security , an Analysis of State Security in Sri LankaEvan Pathiratne
Cyber security in Sri Lanka faces several challenges. Sri Lanka's cyber security body, SLCERT, is understaffed and has limited technical knowledge compared to the private sector. Sri Lankan cyber security resources and attention are also less than neighboring countries. To improve, Sri Lanka should coordinate cyber activities across institutions, regulate with business involvement, and extend national security policies to include cyber security. Public-private partnerships and international cooperation are also needed to bolster Sri Lanka's cyber defenses.
Chatham House Cyber+Space Conference June 2013 - International Norms for Cybe...Oleg Demidov
The presentation was prepared for the workshop of the Chatham House on 'Making the Connection:
Building Stability in Cyber and Space" (London, 7 May 2013)
The Russian and Iranian Missile Threats and their implications for NATO Missi...Azriel Bermant
This memorandum analyzes the implications of the Russian and Iranian missile threats for NATO's missile defense system. It discusses the evolution of US missile defense policy and NATO's plans to deploy systems in Romania and Poland by 2015 and 2018, respectively. While NATO claims the system addresses threats from the Middle East, Russia views it as directed at its own strategic forces. The paper also examines Russia's opposition to NATO missile defense and debates over potential cooperation. It concludes the system will likely continue due to tensions between NATO and Russia and concerns over Iran, even if a nuclear deal is reached with Iran.
Rising Nuclear Dangers: Steps to Reduce Risks in the Euro-Atlantic RegionRussian Council
International statesmen Des Browne, Wolfgang Ischinger, Igor Ivanov, and
Sam Nunn call on Western and Russian leaders to take immediate steps to
reduce the risk of a dangerous military confrontation. This report offers
recommendations to avoid accidents, enhance predictability, and build
confidence.
Russia and the West are at a dangerous crossroads. During the past several years, we have been in a state of escalating tension, trapped in a downward spiral of antagonism and distrust. With our militaries moving closer—in the skies over the Baltic Sea, in the depths of the North Atlantic, and across the Middle East—the risks of miscalculation or accident and escalation are unacceptably high. Unless Western and Russian leaders take immediate steps to improve transparency and enhance predictability, they may inadvertently risk a deadly confrontation.
This paper, which is based on a survey of leading defense and security experts from the United States, Russia, and Europe, puts forward nine urgent and practical recommendations to ensure that we avoid the worst kind of catastrophe: a nuclear incident involving NATO and Russian forces. The measures are focused on preventing accidents, enhancing predictability, and building confidence. These include recommendations to fly military aircraft with transponders turned on, to establish “safe distance” protocols for ships and aircraft, to demonstrate restraint in military exercises, and to improve transparency for deployments of both missile and missile defense systems.
Perhaps most importantly, this paper recommends that Western and Russian leaders initiate a dialogue focused on strategic stability and nuclear risk reduction. Dialogue should never be seen as a sign of weakness—it is essential for nuclear risk reduction to protect our citizens. Military-tomilitary discussions should be at the top of the list of near-term steps to reduce risk.
Even during the darkest days of the Cold War, we maintained robust channels of communication to prevent nuclear accidents, miscalculations, or nuclear escalation. Today, nearly all of these channels have eroded, and our political and military leaders seldom talk to one another. Simply put, it is national security malpractice that today we have virtually no dialogue among our capitals on reducing nuclear risks. This must change.
Absent engagement, nuclear risks will only continue to increase, endangering all of us. The time to act on
our common security interests is now.
The Department of Defense is one of the largest consumers of energy in the United States. Currently, the DOD is investing heavily in renewable energy and aims to spend $10 billion annually on renewable energy by 2030. This focus on renewable energy will help reduce the military's fossil fuel consumption and dependence on foreign oil.
Witnessing the series of attacks, debates and laws on cyber terrorisms or attacks viz- a-viz application of self-defense doctrine has become a hot button issue in global arena. Self defense per se an magnetic subjects which fascinates lawmaker and international bodies to play their active role. But as the emanation of a new threat of Cyber attacks and bit of new technologies, the issue of security has reached to its zenith. International laws, domestic laws, regulations, treaties etc. turn out to be vague and handicap to tackle this concept of cyber terrorism.
This letter from Senator Mike Lee to President Obama makes three main points:
1) While NATO remains strategically important, European allies need to take on more responsibility for their own defense given changes since WWII.
2) The letter agrees with Obama that not all European NATO members contribute 2% of GDP to defense as committed. It urges Obama to seek commitments on defense spending at the upcoming NATO summit.
3) The letter argues that instead of continued US defense aid, European allies who have not met decade-old commitments should invest more in their own budgets now to sustain NATO in the 21st century.
Surveillance of communication by the National Defence Radio Establishment (FRA)Klamberg
The document summarizes Sweden's legislation authorizing surveillance of communications by the National Defence Radio Establishment (FRA). It discusses how the law requires telecom operators to transfer all international communications to FRA nodes for intercept. FRA can then intercept communications and collect data for signal intelligence purposes. The document also reviews similar intelligence laws and programs in other countries like the US, UK, France and Germany.
The document discusses the United States' current cyber strategy and whether it supports offensive cyber operations. It analyzes several scholarly articles on cyber warfare doctrine and strategy. While the articles provide examples of states conducting offensive cyber attacks, the document's hypothesis is that the US cyber strategy focuses on defense and does not explicitly support offensive computer network attacks to achieve national security objectives. The purpose is to examine US cyber strategy and determine if it should incorporate offensive operations to help achieve national goals.
Surveillance of communication by the National Defence Radio Establishment (FRA)Klamberg
The document summarizes legislation passed in Sweden in 2008 that allows the National Defence Radio Establishment (FRA) to conduct surveillance of communications. Key points include:
- Telecom operators must transfer all international communications to nodes controlled by FRA for signal intelligence collection.
- FRA is authorized to intercept communications and collect data to monitor external threats like terrorism and weapons proliferation.
- FRA shares information with government agencies and may partner with intelligence organizations in other countries like the NSA and GCHQ.
- A defense intelligence court and committee provide oversight of FRA's activities and access to databases of communications metadata.
International cooperation is needed to combat cybercrime effectively at a global level. Several international organizations like INTERPOL and NATO have taken steps to facilitate cooperation between countries. INTERPOL established the IGCI in Singapore in 2014 to address cybercrime across borders. The Budapest Convention established a legal framework for information sharing between signatories like the US and EU. However, more integrated efforts are still needed that involve developing countries. The roles of international bodies like the UN will be important in pursuing global cooperation on cybersecurity issues.
Similar to 2016 December -- US, NATO, & The Baltics -- International Security and Cyber[Conflict] (20)
Can We Avert A Cyber-Insurance Market Crisis?Ethan S. Burger
This presentation examines to what extent that cyber-insurance can be a useful tool to manage the risks and harms caused by massive cyber-attacks from the national as opposed to enterprise standpoint --
This presentation examines to what extent that cyber-insurance can be a useful tool to manage the risks and harms caused by massive cyber-attacks from the national as opposed to enterprise standpoint,
2018 april - aba legal construct for understanding adversarial cyber activit...Ethan S. Burger
A Legal Construct for Understanding Adversarial Cyber Activities. This Presentation examines the international law applicable to cyber-operations in the public policy context. It draws attention to when existing legal principles cannot readily be applied to cyber-attacks. It identifies problems presented by politicians and international lawyers not having a common vocabulary
Russian [State] Organized Crime: Principal or Agent. Many people assert that Russia "is a criminal state." This presentation examines the relationship between the ruling Russian elite and organized crime, a distinction that is often gray. This presentation also sets out the legal framework for understanding Russian Organized Crime
2016 December -- Lithuanian Hybrid War PresentationEthan S. Burger
The document discusses the benefits of exercise for mental health. Regular physical activity can help reduce anxiety and depression and improve mood and cognitive functioning. Exercise causes chemical changes in the brain that may help boost feelings of calmness, happiness and focus.
1) The document discusses Russian criminal groups (RCGs) and their activities and influence in Australia and globally. It notes concerns about financial crimes, cyber crimes, illegal weapons exports, and other transnational crimes perpetrated by RCGs.
2) It provides background on the rise of organized crime in Russia after the fall of the Soviet Union and examines the structure and activities of major Russian companies and banks. It questions how closely international criminal networks centered around these companies are monitored.
3) The document analyzes Russia's arms export industry and questions whether all weapons sales are properly reported, as some may be shipped through third parties or private military companies.
This document provides an overview of the complex issues surrounding Ukrainian history, identity, and social cohesion. It touches on several key points:
1) Ukrainian history and identity are complicated questions without clear answers, as they involve differing perspectives on when the nation's history began, competing schools of historiography, shifting borders and ethnic groups over time.
2) Linguistic and ethnic identities in Ukraine are intertwined with political divisions, as Western and Central Ukraine identify more as Ukrainian while Eastern Ukraine has stronger Russian ties.
3) Since the conflicts in Crimea and the Donbas, national pride and identity have increased in Western and Central Ukraine, though opinions in Eastern Ukraine are more varied.
Complacency in the Face of Evolving Cybersecurity Norms is HazardousEthan S. Burger
Complacency in the face of evolving cybersecurity norms is hazardous. Executives and boards are often reluctant to adopt comprehensive cybersecurity policies due to costs and contradictory advice. However, failing to take action increases regulatory and legal risks. Cyberattacks are difficult to defend against and are becoming more sophisticated. Small and medium enterprises are particularly vulnerable targets but may underestimate threats due to limited resources. Government efforts to work with businesses on cybersecurity have been inconsistent, creating uncertainty around compliance. Cyberbreaches can result in significant litigation and liability for companies, especially as legal standards continue developing. Comprehensive and strategic planning is needed to address diverse cyberattack risks.
Complacency in the Face of Evolving Cybersecurity Norms is Hazardous
2016 December -- US, NATO, & The Baltics -- International Security and Cyber[Conflict]
1. 1
Ethan S. Burger
Visiting Professor, Vilnius University
Fulbright Senior Legal Specialist
December 7, 2016
Cybersecurity in Baltics After the USA
Presidential Election: A Bridge Too Far?
Institute of International Relations and Political Science
Vilnius University
3. The Trigger for the Cyber-AttackThe Trigger for the Cyber-Attack
on Estoniaon Estonia
3
4. Key NATO Cybersecurity DatesKey NATO Cybersecurity Dates
2004 – Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) join NATO.
Estonia proposes the concept for a cyber defense centre to NATO.
2006 – Supreme Allied Commander approves concept.
2007 – Cyber attack against Estonia.
2008 – Russian ‘hybrid’ attack against Georgia.
2014-16 – Russian cyber-aggression (Crimea, Donbass, grid) against
Ukraine (and Ukraine’s cyber-responses)
2016 – NATO recognises ‘Cyberspace’ as a ‘Domain of Operations’
at Warsaw Summit.
2016 – reaffirms the applicability of international law and NATO’s
defensive mandate for cyberspace and members pledge to further
develop NATO/EU cyber defensive capabilities/cooperation.
4
5. NATO SummaryNATO Summary
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), a military alliance of countries
from Europe and North America promising collective defence. Currently
numbering 26 nations, NATO was formed initially to counter the Soviet Union
and its allies and has searched for a new identity in the post-Cold War world.
The principle of collective defence is at the very heart of NATO’s founding treaty.
The centre piece of the NATO treaty is Article 5, promising collective security:
"an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America
shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently they agree
that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of
individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of
the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking
forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it
deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain
the security of the North Atlantic area.“
5
6. NATO’s Disquieting TruthNATO’s Disquieting Truth
Article 5 does not require states to do anything other than consult.
NATO plans are just that plans.
U.S. forces are in Europe as a “tripwire,” that is, to place troops in
‘harms way’.
Nonetheless, France had limited confidence in the U.S. (nuclear)
umbrella, and therefore developed its ‘force de frappe.’
Query:
How will the U.S. and other states respond to a ‘cyber’ only
attack? A hybrid attack?
While a cyber-only attack is likely to be a ‘use of force’ under
U.N. Charter Article 2.4, can it be regarded as initiating an ’armed
conflict’ under UN Charter Article 51?
6
8. NATO Members’ CybersecurityNATO Members’ Cybersecurity
Cyber is a matter for national-governments. NATO has undertaken a comprehensive
review of existing national organisational models for ensuring cyber security as a part
of national security in NATO Nations. This study outlines the division of cyber security
tasks and responsibilities between different agencies, describes their mandate, tasks and
competence, as well as coordination among them.
In particular, the study describes the mandates of political and strategic management;
operational cyber security capabilities and cyber incident management; military cyber
defence; and cyber aspects of crisis prevention and crisis management. It also offers a
summary of the national information society setting and e-government initiatives as
well as the national cyber security atrategy objectives in order to clarify the context for
the organisational approach in a particular nation.
See https://ccdcoe.org/national-cyber-security-organisation.html
8
9. Baltic Countries’ NationalBaltic Countries’ National
Cybersecurity StrategiesCybersecurity Strategies
Estonia (National security and defence strategies, National Security Concept of
Estonia (2010) Original | English, National Defence Strategy (2010) Original |
English, National cyber security strategy, Cyber Security Strategy (2014) Original
| English).
Latvia (National security and defence strategies, The State Defence Concept
(2012) Original | English, The National Security Concept (2011) Original |
English National cyber security strategy, Latvian cyber security strategy for the
period 2014 to 2018 (2014) Original | English, National legislation, Law on the
Security of Information Technologies (2010) Original | English).
Lithuania (National Security and defence strategies, National Security Strategy
(2012) Original | English, The Military Strategy of the Republic of Lithuania
(2012) Original | English, National cyber security strategy, Programme for the
Development of Electronic Information Security for 2011–2019 (2011) Original |
English, National legislation, Cybersecurity Act (2014) Original | English).
9
10. NATO Cyber-Defense HighlightsNATO Cyber-Defense Highlights
State and non-state actors can use cyber attacks in the context of military operations. In recent events,
cyber attacks have been part of hybrid warfare. NATO and its Allies rely on strong and resilient cyber
defences to fulfil the Alliance’s core tasks of collective defence, crisis management and cooperative
security. NATO needs to be prepared to defend its networks and operations against the growing
sophistication of the cyber threats and attacks it faces.
Cyber defence is part of NATO’s core task of collective defence.
NATO has affirmed that international law applies in cyberspace.
NATO is responsible for the protection of its own networks.
In July 2016, Allies reaffirmed NATO’s defensive mandate and recognised cyberspace as a
domain of operations in which NATO must defend itself as effectively as it does in the air, on
land and at sea.
Allies are and remain responsible for the protection of their national networks, which need to
be compatible with NATO’s and with each other’s.
NATO enhances its capabilities for cyber education, training and exercises.
Allies are committed to enhancing information-sharing and mutual assistance in preventing,
mitigating and recovering from cyber attacks.
NATO signed a Technical Arrangement on cyber defence cooperation with the European
Union in February 2016.
NATO is intensifying its cooperation with industry, via the NATO Industry Cyber Partnership.10
11. NATO Policy on Cyber DefenceNATO Policy on Cyber Defence
“To keep pace with the rapidly changing threat
landscape and maintain a robust cyber defence, NATO
adopted an enhanced policy and action plan, which was
endorsed by Allies at the Wales Summit in September
2014. The policy establishes that cyber defence is part of
the Alliance’s core task of collective defence, confirms
that international law applies in cyberspace and
intensifies NATO’s cooperation with industry. The top
priority is the protection of the communications systems
owned and operated by the Alliance.”
11
12. Developing the NATO cyberDeveloping the NATO cyber
defence capabilitydefence capability
“The NATO Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC) protects
NATO’s own networks by providing centralised and round-the-clock
cyber defence support to the various NATO sites. This capability is
expected to evolve on a continual basis, to maintain pace with the rapidly
changing threat and technology environment.”
“To facilitate an Alliance-wide and common approach to cyber defence
capability development, NATO also defines targets for Allied countries’
implementation of national cyber defence capabilities via the NATO
Defence Planning Process. In 2017, further cyber defence capability
targets will be agreed.?
12
13. Rand’s “Reinforcing Deterrence onRand’s “Reinforcing Deterrence on
NATO’s Eastern Flank” (1 of 2)NATO’s Eastern Flank” (1 of 2)
A rapid assault on the Baltic region would leave NATO with few attractive
options, including a massive risky counterattack, threatening a nuclear weapons
option or simply allowing the Russian to annex the countries.
1. After a lengthy mobilization. deploy a massive counterattack force which
would likely result in a drawn-out, deadly battle.
2. Threaten a nuclear option, a scenario which seems unlikely if not completely
unrealistic in light of the U.S. strategy to decrease nuclear arsenals and
discourage the prospect of using nuclear weapons.
3. NATO could simply be to concede the Baltic states and immerse the alliance
into a much more intense Cold War posture. Such an option would naturally
not be welcomed by many of the residents of these states and would, without
question, leave the NATO alliance weakened if not partially fractured.
13
14. Rand’s “Reinforcing Deterrence onRand’s “Reinforcing Deterrence on
NATO’s Eastern Flank” (2 of 2)NATO’s Eastern Flank” (2 of 2)
The absence of short-range air defenses in the U.S. units, and the minimal defenses in the other
NATO units, means that many of these attacks encountered resistance only from NATO
combat air patrols, which are like to be overwhelmed by sheer numbers. The result would be
heavy losses to several NATO battalions and the disruption of the counterattack.”
Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia could be likely Russian targets because all three countries are in
close proximity to Russia and spent many years as part of the former Soviet Union.
Also like Ukraine, Estonia and Latvia are home to sizable ethnic Russian populations that have
been at best unevenly integrated into the two countries’ post-independence political and social
mainstreams and that give Russia a self-justification for meddling in Estonian and Latvian
affairs.
While the Pentagon’s European Reassurance Initiative (ERI) calls for additional funds, forces
and force rotations through Europe whether the funding is approved is uncertain.
The Pentagon is seeking $3.4 Billion ERI request does call for an increased force presence in
Europe as well as “fires,” “pre-positioned stocks” and “headquarters” support for NATO
forces.
14
15. NATO Couldn't Repel RussianNATO Couldn't Repel Russian
Invasion of the Baltic StatesInvasion of the Baltic States
Military analysts believe that Russian forces could conquer the capitals of
Baltic states Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia within 36 to 60 hours.
NATO forces had found numerous deficiencies during the recent
"Anaconda" military exercise in Poland. Heavy military equipment could
not be moved fast enough from western to eastern Europe in time in the
event of an attack.
NATO’s command, control, communications, and intelligence not secure
against cyber attacks. The Anaconda maneuver included troops from
more than 20 NATO member states but was officially a Polish national
exercise.
Some countries, like France and Germany, thought it would be too
provocative toward Russia to call it a NATO exercise".
15
17. Recent News AnalysesRecent News Analyses
What If Russia Invaded the Baltics—and Donald Trump Was President ...
www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/...nato-trump.../492938/
A former NATO general imagines a frightening scenario.
Baltic States Nervous Over Trump's Attitude Toward Russia : NPR
www.npr.org/.../baltic-states-nervous-over-trumps-attitude-toward-russia
NATO members Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia are anxious over President-elect Donald Trump's criticism of NATO
and comments about forging ...
In Trump, NATO Faces a Challenge – WSJ www.wsj.com/articles/in-trump-nato-faces-a-challenge-1478690705
If Mr. Trump tries to reorient the alliance's stance on Russia, NATO ... including American soldiers, to the Baltic
States and Poland next year.
Will Russia Declare War On Europe? Northern Europe, Baltics ...
www.ibtimes.com/will-russia-declare-war-europe-northern-europe-baltic...
Northern Europe, Baltics Concerned Over 'Unknowns' Of Trump ... role in the High North and the Baltic Sea, and
the U.S. funding of NATO.
NATO Seeks Clarity on Trump's Campaign Statements - VOA News
www.voanews.com/a/trump-nato-russia-baltic/3591287.html
17
19. Trump on CyberTrump on Cyber
Trump's Incoherent Ideas About 'the Cyber' - The Atlantic
www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/.../trumps...cyber/501839/
How A Trump Presidency Will Erode Cyber Privacy And National ...
www.forbes.com/.../how-a-trump-presidency-will-erode-cyber-privacy-...
Trump Cyber Security Team and Policy Slow to Take Shape - Fortune
fortune.com/.../trump-cyber-security-team-and-policy-slow-to-take-shap...
Trump's transition has not announced cyber security policy or staffing, which could make the U.S. vulnerable and
worsen a talent shortfall.
www.theverge.com/.../transcript-here-are-words-trump-just-used-to-talk-...
Cybersecurity in President Trump's America: The first 100 days ...
www.techrepublic.com/.../cybersecurity-in-president-trumps-america-the...
It would take months to know what the Trump administration's cybersecurity policy will be. Cyber-defense experts
weigh in with advice and best ...
Trump: “The security aspect of cyber is very, very tough” | Ars Technica
arstechnica.com/.../clinton-cyber-warfare-will-be-one-of-the-greatest-ch...
19
20. The Obama Administration and the Baltic StatesThe Obama Administration and the Baltic States
August 23, 2016August 23, 2016
(https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/08/23/fact-sheet-united-states-(https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/08/23/fact-sheet-united-states-
and-estonia-latvia-and-lithuania-%E2%80%93-nato-allies)and-estonia-latvia-and-lithuania-%E2%80%93-nato-allies)
FACT SHEET:
The United States and Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania – NATO Allies and Global Partners
Defense and Security Cooperation
NATO Allies.
Collective Security.
Security Assistance:.
The State Partnership Program.
Afghanistan.
Counter-ISIL Coalition.
Global Development Cooperation.
Eastern Partnership.
Economic Cooperation.
Trade.
Educational and Professional Cooperation.
Exchange Programs: Since 1991, the United States has awarded Fulbright fellowships to nearly 600 outstanding
scholars, students, and professionals from Baltic States and (500 U.S. Fulbright students and scholars)
Cultural Heritage Celebrations.
Cultural Festivals. 20
21. NATO is a Political AllianceNATO is a Political Alliance
NATO in a sense is more of a political than a military
alliance. National security is far broader than purely military
affairs. There are many policy documents that will serve as
critical planning guidance in the future, the most recent
being:
[The U.S.] Commission on Enhancing National
Cybersecurity, December 1, 2016, Report on Securing and
Growing the Digital Economy.
Another document worth examining will be NATO’s “Tallinn
Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber
Warfare,” (2017). 21