Kimberley Process

1.
KIMBERLEY PROCESS
CERTIFICATION
SCHEME
REPORT OF THE REVIEW VISIT
TO BRAZIL
24-29 APRIL 2006
Review Visit Members:
United States Represented by Mr Stanley Specht (team leader) and
Mr. Alfredo Gurmendi
Angola Represented by Ms Maria dos Santos
Canada Represented by Ms Gabrielle FitzGerald and Ms
Jennifer Loten
European Community Represented by Mr Kim Eling
Global Witness Represented by Ms Charmian Gooch,
World Diamond Council Represented by Mr Andrew Coxon

2.
Table of Contents
Page
1. Introduction and Methodology
3
2. Legal Framework 5
3. Institutional Framework 8
4. Geology, Exploration, and Production
8
5. Import and Export Regime 10
6. Internal Controls 12
7. Industry Self-Regulation 17
8. Statistics 18
9. Regional issues
20
10. Recommendations 21
11. Glossary 26
Annexes
Annex I: Review Visit Programme
Annex II: DNPM Executive Summary Special Audit Report
Annex III: Brazilian replies to Statistical Questions
Annex IV: Regulation Number 295
Annex V: Proposed Garimperio Law
1.Introduction and Methodology

3.
1. At the invitation of the Brazilian Government, the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme
(KPCS) sent a Peer Review visit team to Brazil from April 24 to April 29, 2006. The team
conducted its review under the terms of the KPCS Administrative Decision of October 30, 2003.
A copy of the Review team’s program is attached at (Annex 1).
2. The team consisted of Stanley Specht, U.S. (team leader); Alfredo Gurmendi (U.S.), Kim
Eling (European Commission), Jennifer Loten and Gabrielle FitzGerald (Canada), Maria dos
Santos (Angola), Charmian Gooch (Global Witness) and Andrew Coxon (World Diamond
Council). A full list of Brazilian participants who met with the KP team appears in the program.
The team would like to thank the many officials, companies and associations that assisted in
making the visit a productive, informative and a pleasant experience. We would like to express
our special appreciation to Mr. Samir Nahass, of the Secretariat of Geology, Mines and Mineral
Processing, for his hospitality and flexibility in coordinating all the logistical arrangements for
the team.
3. At the time of the KP visit, Brazil maintained a voluntarily suspension of its rough diamond
exports imposed in February 2006, in conjunction with Operação Carbono, a high-profile,
international and domestic criminal investigation of companies and individuals that had obtained
KP certificates (KPCs) using a variety of fraudulent techniques. The scale of the uncovered
fraudulent practices at that time of the visit was stunning. We were told by authorities that 49 of
150 KPCs issued during 2003-2006 had used a variety of fraudulent techniques to hide the origin
of the rough diamonds. The fraudulent amounts verified by the authorities at that time of the visit
totalled approximately $22 million, but these findings were described by an official involved in
the Operação Carbono as the “tip of the iceberg.” Considering that Brazil registered only $46
million in official rough diamond exports during 2003-2006, the preliminary results of this
investigation indicates a serious and systematic abuse of the Brazilian KP system that undermines
its credibility with other KP stakeholders. Additionally, the KP team heard from a numbe
r of authorities that a significant, but unknowable amount of Brazilian diamond
production is smuggled out to neighbouring countries and thus is not covered by the KP system.
4. Brazilian authorities are to be commended for their openness and cooperation with the KP
team, the seriousness of their efforts to address both KP specific issues and long-standing social
issues in the mining sector and their recognition that major structural changes and increased
resources are needed to address these shortcomings. To address these shortcomings, the
Departamento Nacional de Produção Mineral (DNPM) conducted an audit of its KPCS and
provided the KP team in June 2006 a copy of the DNPM Executive Summary of its Special
Audit Report of the KPCS of May 2006 referred to in this report as (SAR). The KP team was
favourably impressed with the comprehensive nature of the ten recommendations contained in
the SAR, which, if implemented, provide the basis for a fundamental overhaul of the KP system.
We urge all of these ten recommendations be adopted as soon as possible. We will refer
specifically to a number of recommendations in the SAR as they track, and in some case are
identical to the official recommendations made by the KP team contained in Section 10 of this
report. A follow-up visit by a KP peer review team is essential to assess the state of
implementation of the reforms needed of the KPCS in Brazil, as well as, to visit key diamond
producing regions that the KP team was unable to visit in April 2006 given time constraints.

4.
The Brazilian authorities confirmed to the team that they recognize the importance of a follow-
up visit in order to provide assurances to the other Participants in the Kimberly Process that
Brazil has rectified these serious shortcomings and is fully implementing their KP undertakings.
The KP team recommends that this follow-up visit, be arranged at a mutually agreeable time
within the next year.
2. Legal Framework
5. In Brazil, the legal framework for implementation of the KPCS consists of a specific KPCS
law adopted in 2003 (Law No 10.743 of 9 October 2003), a Regulation adopted in 2003 [Joint
Regulation No 397 of 13 October 2003, adopted jointly by the DNPM within the Ministério de
Minas e Energia (MME) and the Secretaria da Receita Federal (SRF) within the Ministério da
Fazenda (MF)] and an implementing Regulation adopted in 2006 (Regulation No 295 of 1
September 2006, adopted by the Director-General of the DNPM1). The internal controls over
diamond mining required by the KPCS to provide assurances as to the origins of diamonds
produced are based on the relevant provisions of Brazil’s general mining legislation.
6. Law No 10.743 (which replaces the provisional legal instrument2 that initially allowed Brazil
to fulfil the minimum requirements for becoming a Participant) sets out the conditions under
which rough diamonds can be exported from or imported into Brazil; determines the institutions
responsible for implementation of the KPCS and their respective tasks; and lays down the
penalties applicable for infringements of the law.
7. Specifically, the penalties set out in the law involve the forfeiture of goods submitted for
customs procedures without a valid Kimberley Process Certificate (KPC) or carried without a
valid KPC within ports, airports or border customs posts; and fines equivalent to 100 percent the
value of the goods in cases of export or import of rough diamonds without a valid KPC, or where
fraud is used to obtain a KPC. Application of such penalties is the responsibility of the MF.
8. The law sets out the responsibilities of the different Ministries involved in implementation of
the KPCS in Brazil. The primary responsibility is attributed to the DNPM, which is given the
task of issuing Brazilian KPCs. At the same time, the law provides that the SRF is responsible
for examining and verifying parcels submitted for customs procedures on export. The law also
provides that in cases where a shipment for export has to be opened as part of customs controls,
the SRF may issue a replacement KPC (as far as the review visit was able to ascertain, this has
never so far been the case).
9. While the law also refers to the Ministério do Desenvolvimento, Indústria e Comércio
Exterior (MDIC) as being jointly responsible for the implementation of the KPCS, it is the
understanding of the review visit team that this department does not play any practical part in the
issuing of KPCs or in the export or import procedures set out in the law.
1
Regulation
No.
295
of
a
September
2006
replaced
Regulation
No
209
of
5
August
2005.
2
No
125
of
30
July
2003.

5.
10. Joint Regulation No 397 and DNPM Regulation No. 295 set out in greater detail the
procedures that apply to export and import and notably lay down the conditions that have to be
met for a parcel of rough diamonds to be granted a KPC for export. Both Regulations foresee
that the issuance of a KPC is to be based on the information provided by the exporter or his legal
representative. Joint Regulation No 397 provides that “at the discretion of the DNPM, and in
exceptional cases, a technical evaluation may be requested in order to confirm the authenticity of
the information given by the exporter.” The legislation adopted specifically to implement the
KPCS has to be read in conjunction with the legislation providing for mining concessions, given
that any application for a KPC to export a parcel of rough diamonds has to refer to the mining
title where the diamonds in the parcel were mined.
11. In Brazil, the Federal Government is the sole entity responsible for legislating on deposits,
mines, mineral resources, production, and processing. The exploration and exploitation of
mineral resources in Brazil are defined and regulated by the 1967 Mining Code (Executive Law
No. 227 of February 28, 1967). The Brazilian Constitution which was enacted on October 5,
1988, the Constitutional Amendments Nos. 6 and 9 dated August 15, 1995, and the Mining
Code, Law No. 9,314 of January 1997 provide greater flexibility for investment in the Brazilian
mining sector. Article 7 of this Law stipulates that the exploitation of mineral deposits will
depend upon an Exploration Authorization Permit granted by the General Director of the
DNPM and a Development and Mining Concession issued by the Ministro do Minas e Energia.
Licensing is a restricted system applicable exclusively to the exploitation of industrial minerals.
The DNPM is responsible for enforcing this mining code and its complementary legal
provisions.
12. The Small-Scale Mining (Garimpos) within the Cooperatives have priority in authorization
(permits for exploring) and concessions (for mining) small-scale deposits, in the areas where
they are operating (mostly alluvial diamonds, gold, and tin), and in those established by the
Federal Government via Permissôes de Lavra Garimpeiras (PLGs) (Law no. 7,805/1989) to
Cooperatives in order to formalize the activities of the garimpeiros. This process of social
inclusion has been intensified during the past three years.
13. According to the Brazilian Constitution, the National Congress is responsible for
authorizing exploration and exploitation of mineral resources in lands of indigenous peoples, the
affected, indigenous peoples being assured a share (royalty) in the results of the mining. In
2004, due to violent clashes between garimpeiros and indigenous peoples, the Brazilian
government, passed legislation suspending mineral exploration and controlling mining activity
on territories hosting indigenous peoples. The Brazilian Congress is considering legislation to
regulate mining on indigenous lands, which account for 12 percent of Brazilian territory.
14.
The Brazilian government is attempting to clarify the status of garimpeiro mining through
several measures. A draft Garimpeiro Law (Projecto de Lei No. 7505 de 2006) is under
consideration by the Brazilian Congress. The draft law establishes a legal framework for
garimpeiro activity in Brazil and identifies garimpeiro rights and obligations. The MME through
the SGM also is preparing two projects to further address the problems associated with
garimpeiro mining. Those projects include a national program for formalization of mineral
production (Programa Nacional de Formalização da Produção Mineral) and a project to

6.
consolidate garimpeiro training through cooperatives (Projeto de Consolidação e Capacitação de
Pequenos Produtores Minerais no Trabalho Cooperativo.)
15. Prior to September 2006, diamond dealers-traders (buyers/sellers) were not covered by any
laws or regulations. With the adoption of Regulation 295, all producers, dealer-traders and
importers and exporters are required to register online through an electronic application form in
the National Cadastre of Diamond Trade (CNCD.) The form is submitted to the DNPM Director
General, printed and filed in DNPM Regional Offices. All sales dating back to October 1, 2005,
must be reported. All commercial transactions must be recorded on a Report of Commercial
Transaction (RTC) which is monitored by the DNPM.
Assessment
16. The review visit team notes that Brazil adopted legislation to implement the KPCS in 2003
in accordance with its obligations under the KPCS. The legislation sets out very clearly the
procedures to be followed for the export and import of rough diamonds, and establishes the
responsibilities of the different services involved in implementation of the KPCS in Brazil.
17. The review visit team notes that the law adopted in 2003 provides for clear penalties in
cases of infringement of the law. However, the review visit team believes that against the
background of the alleged extensive fraud that has occurred in the issuance of Brazilian KPCs,
consideration might be given to the introduction of more severe penalties (including custodial
penalties) for the most serious cases of infringement.
18. The review visit team notes that in the attribution of mining concessions, on-site controls by
the DNPM are required as part of the production process for industrial-scale mining. The team
believes that legal requirements for on-site checks by the DNPM should be introduced for all
types of mining concessions (including PLGs).
19. The review visit team notes that the efforts of the Brazilian government have been directed
at ensuring that all diamonds presented for export can be sourced to some legal mining title, and
believes this effort is consistent with the requirement for effective internal controls contained in
the KPCS.
20. However, the review visit team also notes that garimpeiro miners do not at present have
any formal status in Brazilian law (following the abrogation of the garimpeiro status in 1988),
and believes this creates a strong incentive for garimpo production to be falsely presented as
derived from a legal mining title.
21. The draft law governing garimpeiro activity is before Congress. The review team
encourages the Brazilian authorities to pursue efforts to establish a framework in which
garimpeiro production can be legally captured by the certification system.
3. Institutional Framework

7.
22. Four Government Ministries cooperate to monitor and control the export and import of rough
diamonds in Brazil. These are MDIC through its Department de Comércio Exterior (DECEX),
the MF through the SRF, the MME through the DNPM, and the Ministerio da Justiça
(MJ) through Departamento de Policia Federal (DPF). Each Ministry has discrete responsibilities
at different stages of the export process and communications among the
Ministries appear to be weak. Overall responsibility for implementing and coordinating the
Kimberley Process is exercised by the Ministry of Mines and Energy through the Secretariat of
Geology, Mining and Minerals Processing (SGM) and the DNPM. The DNPM is responsible for
the system of internal controls, the issuance and safeguarding of KPCs, and providing Customs
assurance that documentation needed to legally import rough diamonds into Brazil has been
completed. The SRF is responsible for the monitoring of export and import of rough diamonds,
and the issuance of the nota fiscal, the basis of calculation of production tax, and the indication of
point of origin. The MJ is responsible for the legal framework governing the production and
movement of rough diamonds. The DPF supports and enforces the activities of the other
Departments. We were told that these Ministries meet on a regular basis to coordinate and share
information.
4. Geology, Exploration and Production
23. The kimberlitic Province of West Minas Gerais is the most important diamondiferous district in Brazil
and contains the majority of kimberlites discovered up to the present time. The geology of this Province
comprises Upper Pre-Cambrian metasediments belonging to the Araxa Group (oldest unit composed of
schists and metabasites of high greenschist and amphibolite facies); Canastra Group (quarzites and
phyllites); and Bambui Group (slates and limestones). Several kimberlites in West Minas Gerais appear to
be Cretaceous, which is supported by field evidence and it began with the outcropping of basaltic lava that
intruded the sediments of the Parana Basin about 125 million years ago. The kimberlite occurrences in
Brazil are located in the States of Bahia (Morro de Chapeu and Lençois); Goías (Baliza and Mineiros);
Mato Grosso (Aripuanã, Chapada Guimarães, Diamantina, Juína, Proxeu, Rondonopolis, Coxim, and Barra
do Garças); Minas Gerais (Tiros, Estrela do Sul, Coromandel, Romaria, Abaete, Grão Mogol, Diamantina);
Pará (Marabá); Parana (Tibagi); Piauí (Guilbues); Rondonia (Machado); Roraima (Tepequen,
Uraricoera); and São Paulo (Franca).
Exploration
24. Exploration of mineral resources will always be authorized (permitted) for a limited or fixed
set period; the mining concession is for an unlimited period. Exploration permit and mining
concession rights may not be assigned or transferred, wholly or partially, without prior consent
by the Federal Government.
25. In Brazil, some advanced projects are the Juína diamond project, the Chapada alluvial
diamonds projects, a bulk sampling alluvial project in the Abaete River; the Canastra kimberlite
project, and some work on properties in the area of Patos de Minas in Minas Gerais State where
many kimberlites and lamproites have been found since 1995. Investments in the Brazilian
mining industry are expected to continue to enhance exploration and mine development activities
in, in order of importance, iron ore, gold, copper, diamond, and emeralds. This trend is
expected to continue because several transnationals have been forming consortiums, joint

8.
ventures, and acquiring exploration properties, mining prospects, and permits particularly for, in
order of importance, oil and gas, iron ore, gold, diamond, and base metals. The Brazilian
Companhia Vale do Rio Doce approved an $80 million exploration budget, and 80 percent of
which was allocated to the search for bauxite-, copper-, diamond-, gold-, iron-, and nickel-
bearing deposits in 2005.
26. The States of Mato Grosso and Minas Gerais, and the States of Pará, Rondonia, Roraima in
the Amazon region continued to offer potential for major undiscovered mineral wealth in
addition to the large reserves of, in order of economic value, iron ore, manganese, bauxite, gold,
and tin. A factor that may constrain mineral development over the longer term, however, is the
concern over biodiversity in the Amazon Rainforest, which comprises 30 percent of the world’s
remaining tropical forests, provides shelter to 10 percent of the globe’s plant and animal species,
and removes excess carbon dioxide from the atmosphere. Much will depend, however, on the
approaches and technologies to be used for economic and social development while protecting
the environment in a sustainable way.
Production
27. Brazil is one of the most important producers and traders of mineral commodities, worldwide. In
South America, Brazil is the leading producer and trader of mostly alluvial diamonds followed by Guyana
and Venezuela. The country continued to be one of the South America’s leading gemstone producers and
exporters. Many different varieties of gemstones are found in the Araxa, Canastra, and Bambui Groups;
these include, in order of value ($/carat), diamond, emerald, aquamarine, topaz, tourmaline, opal,
chrysoberyl, amethyst, citrine, and agate. Brazil is the world’s only source of some quality gemstones, such
as imperial topaz and Paraíba tourmaline.
28. According to the DNPM’s Sumário Mineral Statistics—2000-2005, Brazil’s diamond
production from year to year has been uncertain, and annual production has been declining since
2000. In 2005, Brazil produced 300,000 carats valued at about $26.1 million or $87 per carat,
compared with 300,000 carats in 2004 valued at $26.4 million; 400,000 carats in 2003 valued at
$38.1 million; 500,000 carats in 2002 valued at almost $31 million; 700,000 carats in 2001
valued at $43.8 million; and 1 million carats in 2000 valued at $56 million.
29. Diamond mining is be dominated by the garimpeiros from alluvial deposits located in
Coromandel and Diamantina, Minas Gerais; Juína, Poxoréu, and Guiratinga in Mato Grosso; and
Serra de Tepequém, Bacia dos Quinô, Suapi, and Mau in Roraima.
30. Brazilian garimpeiro output, has apparently continued to decline because depletion of
garimpos’ reserves and increased environmental restrictions. In 2005, the Government
continued closing high-content gem placers in indigenous reserves to exploration, the jewellery
industry’s gemstone consumption was unknown, taxation on domestic sales of jewellery was
high, and the private sector faced severe competition from its black-market competitors in the
triangle of Boa Vista (Brazil), Lethem (Guyana), and Santa Elena de Uairén (Venezuela).
Taking into consideration these factors, Brazil’s gemstone reserves were almost impossible to
quantify. Brazil (according to the DNPM’s Anuário Mineral—2005), however, diamond
production may have great potential because it has 1,000 million cubic meters of sedimentary

9.
rocks that contain diamond that grade between 0.01 and 0.1 carat per cubic meter, or about 26
million carats equal to about 2.1 percent of the world’s diamond reserve base.
31. Brazilian diamond production could increase significantly in the foreseeable future because
of increased interest by domestic and foreign investors in largely unexplored areas. Thus far
(2005), the DNPM has granted investors of the private sector with 1,200 exploration permits,
which could increase primary diamond discoveries. Known diamond occurrences are mostly
Precambrian deposits (kimberlites) and alluvial placers. For example, a joint venture of
Brazilian Diamonds Limited of Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada, the Brazilian state-owned
mining development organization CODEMING, and the Mineração
Rio
Novo
Ltda.
of Brazil are
conducting a feasibility study of the Santo Antônio do Bonito River drainage in Minas Gerais.
5. Import and Export Regime
32. The Brazilian system to control the import and export of rough diamond in accordance with
KPCS standards is characterised by some important strengths, including features which could
constitute best practices. Brazilian officials are convinced that their adherence to the KPCS and
the accompanying implementation of new procedures including the issuance of licensing and
exportimport controls have already yielded benefits. In particular, these include improvements
in the ability to monitor levels of production and exports over time. Further improvements,
notably in record keeping with regard to imports, and enhanced communication between levels
and branches of government would strengthen the system.
The Application Process
Subsequent
to
the
review
visit,
Regulation
Nr.
295,
was
adopted
on
September
1,
2006
creating
the
following
application
process:
• The
National
Cadastre
of
Diamond
Trade
(CNCD)
is
a
national
trade
monitoring
instrument,
which
is
available
on-line.
All
producers,
dealer-­‐-­‐-­‐traders
(buyer/sellers)
and
importers
and
exporters
are
required
to
register
in
the
CNCD
through
an
electronic
application
form.
The
form
is
submitted
to
the
Director
General
of
DNPM,
printed
and
filed
in
DNPM
Regional
Offices.
A
CNCD
must
report
his
sales
dating
back
to
October
1,
2005.
• The
Report
of
Commercial
Transactions
(RTC)
is
a
monitoring
and
control
instrument
of
production
and
trade
of
rough
diamonds.
The
reports’
content
is
described
in
Article
9
of
the
regulation.
All
data
presented
in
this
report
is
subject
to
monitoring
by
DNPM
• According
to
Article
13
of
the
regulation,
a
KP
Certificate
may
only
be
issued
for
diamonds
originated
from
a
production
area
that
has
been
monitored
by
DNPM.
• Article
14
defines
the
specifications
of
the
rough
diamonds
for
export
.

10.
• Article
15
defines
the
monitoring
that
should
be
made
by
DNPM
before
sealing
a
package
of
rough
diamonds
for
export.
.
Exports:
33. The central feature of the control of exports is SISCOMEX, Brazil’s on-line system to
control and monitor exports of all kinds. The system provides a direct link between the Central
Bank of Brazil, the SRF of the MF and the DNPM of the MME and is accessed directly by both
exporters and authorities to register, monitor and verify products destined for export as they
move from the exporter through approval processes until they leave the country. As part of the
commitment to the KPCS, Brazil created a separate category within SISCOMEX for rough
diamonds. The category imposes an additional requirement to physically examine and verify
shipments of rough diamonds as they leave the country.
The Export Process:
34. The export process begins with the issuance of a KPC. Modified in 2005 as part of the
follow up to Operação Carbono, Law 209 gives the exporter 60 days from the issuance of the
KPC to deliver the stones to the importer, after which the certificate expires. With the KPC in
hand, the exporter logs onto the SISCOMEX (which can be done from any internet connection)
and registers the intention to export. The exporter provides detailed information including
contact information, a description of the goods including weight, value of the parcel, point of
origin, and destination. The exporter is responsible for the accuracy of the information entered
into SISCOMEX. The DNPM is notified of the intention to export through SISCOMEX, and
can verify the information against data available through the KPC application.
35. Almost all official exports of rough diamonds leave Brazil by air, most through Minas
Gerais. The customs office at the airport is managed jointly by the Receita Federal and the
Federal Police. Customs monitors all exports through the SISCOMEX. When a shipment of
rough diamonds appears on the system, the customs officer is prompted by the system to
physically inspect the parcel. Agents check for a valid KPC, ensure that the information on the
certificate is consistent with the information recorded in SISCOMEX, and have training to assess
whether the description matches the parcel. Agents do not have sorting or valuation training, and
have no capacity to verify the origins of the stones. They accept at face value the information on
the KCPS and in SISCOMEX and in this are dependent upon the accuracy of the information
provided by the exporters themselves, and by the DNPM’s KPC approval process.
36. If upon inspection inconsistencies are noted, the inspecting officer will contact the DNPM’s
KPC issuing office to verify the validity of the certificate. Should the parcel appear inconsistent
with the information on the certificate, the agent may contact a local evaluator to verify the value
of the parcel. Although Minas Gerais processes the majority of exports of rough diamonds, there
is only one Receita Federal technician in the state. Receita Federal is authorised to open the
parcel for a thorough inspection, and can issue a replacement KPC should the parcel pass
inspection. One thousand of the five thousand KPCs printed by the mint have been set aside for
this purpose. Should an agent wish to open a sealed parcel, both the DNPM and the exporter

11.
would be notified and are required to be present. The customs office in Belo Horizonte, MG,
through which the majority of rough diamond exports pass, has never opened a shipment.
37. If the agent is satisfied that the certificate is valid, and the contents of the parcel appear to
match the description on the certificate, the shipment is cleared for export.
Imports:
38. On average 90 percent of imports of rough diamonds into Brazil are industrial and are
processed through the major centres of São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. The Review team did not
have the opportunity to visit these sites, but were provided with extensive information through
the DNPM team, the Federal Police, and through the customs office at the Belo Horizonte
airport. The general procedure is outlined as follows:
39. Customs officials in São Paulo or Rio send a copy of the KPC to the DNPM in Brasilia, who
verify authenticity of signatures through an electronic record of issuing countries authorities.
Separately, the importer provides a declaration to the DNPM his identification number in the
Registry of Contributors of the SRF, his full address, the description of the imported
merchandise, and its weight in carats, the value of the parcel in U.S. dollars, the origin of the
diamonds, and a copy of the KP certificate issued by the exporting country. When the shipment
is received at customs, the agent notifies the DNPM which authorises the import. The original
certificate remains at the point of entry, in the possession of the importer. Neither the importer
nor the government is currently required to retain the original certificate for any period of time.
Brazil does not currently confirm receipt of the shipment with exporting countries.
40. There are no records of imports arriving by other than air. Illegal or suspicious imports are
seized at the point of arrival by the Federal Police and are the property of the DNPM.
6. Internal Controls
Overview:
41. The KP
Review team sought to clarify the system and practice, even though exports had
been suspended by the Brazilian Government since February 2006 as a result of Operação
Carbono. In addition the KP team sought to clarify what changes to the system have been
adopted by the Brazilian Government through the DNPM. An Executive Summary (Relatório da
Auditoria Especial Certificação do Processo Kimberley no Brasil, Sumário Executivo, SAR) was
prepared by the SGM, the MME, and the DNPM. The work was in response to a joint
investigation by the police and other authorities, as well as reports by the Non Government
Organization (NGO) Partnership Africa Canada (PAC). With up to 45 percent production either
fraudulent or suspect, serious reforms are needed. The SAR report verified the serious problems
involving fraudulent mining claims and exports and money laundering which had affected a
significant percentage of the diamond sector in Brazil. It recognised that there had been no
proper check of KP Certificates before issuance and that there were no adequate management
systems in place. The report indicates that the pertinent authorities and the Public Ministry

12.
(Ministério Público Federal) and the Federal Police (Polícia Federal) will implement the reforms.
The recommendations of the SAR address many of the failings that led to the fraudulent activities
and exports. The review team endorses the measures recommended by the report. The team
further urges that DNPM present a formal report to the Botswana Kimberley Process Plenary
in November 2006 detailing the recommendations that have been implemented.
The suspended system:
42. The KPCS is implemented by the MME through the SGM and operationally through the
SGM.
SGM is responsible for overall coordination of the KPCS in Brazil and acts as a focal
point. The DNPM is responsible for issuing and control of the KPCs, and has other areas of
responsibilities – see below for more detail. The other Ministries involved:
• The Ministério do Desenvolvimento, Indústria e Comércio Exterior (MDIC) through its
Departmento de Comércio Exterior which is responsible for Export and Import Statistical
Data;
• The MF through its SRF which is responsible for Customs Control (see section on Export
and Import Processes);
• The Ministério das Relações Exteriores (MRE) through its Divisão de Acesso a Mercados
(DACESS) which acts as an information interchange between Ministries and Embassies
receives and distributes documents and acts as a general facilitator;
• The MJ which is responsible for combating smuggling.
43. The main work of the DNPM is to oversee the issuing of exploration permits and mining
concession rights for all minerals in Brazil. Its duties have also expanded to include the
collection of fees and duties. Many of the elements of the work carried out as part of the KPCS
(alluvial diamonds) are paralleled by the licensing and data collection on other minerals (mostly
gold and tin). The DNPM oversees 80 mineral production chains, and 160,000 mining titles with
a staff of 840 employees, including 240 professionals. Only a small percentage of these are
devoted diamond mining. At the time of the visit, the team was informed that the DNPM was in
the process of hiring 200 new employees, the first new hires in 30 years.
44. The core system of internal controls is the point in the process where the application for a
KPC is cross referenced with the Cadastro Mineiro (which is a publicly accessible database) and
contains all the exploration permit and mining concession rights. The ease of access and
transparency of the system is very impressive. Whilst good in principle, in practice, as Operação
Carbono has found, there was a total failure to catch large-scale fraudulent production from
mining licenses that were not physically capable of such production. The system did not include
field visits, which meant that no on-site checks of the data on KPC Export applications were
made between the start of the KPCS in Brazil in late 2003 and early 2006. Nor was the review
team able to find evidence of any office-based checks or reviews.
45. The first step in obtaining a KPC is to obtain an Application Form which can be downloaded
from the DNPM’s website or obtained from any of the 25 regional DNPM offices. The exporter
is responsible for the accuracy of the data. It was noted that the DNPM processes approximately
30,000 requests per year for the entire mineral sector. However the staff working on diamonds
dealt with very small numbers of requests for KPC for export. In 2005, the two most active

13.
states, Minas Gerais averaged 2.8 per month and Mato Grosso 3.4; with 9 being the highest
number processed in one month by both of them. The DNPM official checks the number of the
mining license against the SIGMINE database and Mineiro checks that there is a receipt or chain
of sales receipts as appropriate, verifies the carat weight but is not trained to verify value which
is left to the exporter to declare. The lack of official valuation has been identified by the DNPM
as an area for reform and they have hired staff to be trained. An export can be made directly by a
mining company or by a buyer who may have purchased from a miner, or from other buyers. In
the latter case a series of receipts is required to show each sale, with the receipt from the first
point of sale including the number of the mining title. The review team was unable to make a
physical inspection of the files as they were still being held by the police as part of Operação
Carbono. This makes it difficult to comment on the efficacy of the chain of receipts. There does
not seem to have been any proper cross referencing activity at the regional office. For example,
while the number of the mining title is checked to verify that it is correct no check is made to
ascertain whether the production data is feasible, nor is there any cumulative data gathering.
This is one of the many areas that Brazilian authorities have identified for immediate
improvement. A clear example of the scale of the problem is the case of KPC 64 detailed in
PACs reports of 2005 and 2006. The PLGs were approved on June 30, 2004. Eight days later,
on July 7,
2004, some 6,876.92 carats were sold to Morgan Mineração Industria e Commercio.
The company later noted that the receipts were falsified. It is of concern that the operating
system at the DNPM failed to verify: 1) that the production came from an area that was unlikely
to produce such quantities; 2) that the first sale was impossibly soon after the PLG had been
granted; 3) the difference between declared value for KPC purposes, of $981,895, and the
official receipt from the exporter to the importer of $2,969,228. The total number of certificates
processed by the DNPM for export is relatively low: 59 in 2004 and 79 in 2005. There were 13
KPCS exports during the last two months of 2003, and in 2006 just six in January with the
suspension halting exports until September. In 2004, the Minas Gerais office handled 49 of the
export applications and the Mato Grosso office just 10. This changed in 2005 with the Mato
Grosso office handling 41 applications, the Minas Gerais office handling 34, and the offices of
Rio de Janeiro and Paraná Janeiro Paraná three in total. The pattern continues in the first month
of 2006 with four export applications in Mato Grosso and two in Minas Gerais.
46. Once the mining title and receipts have been checked an individually numbered physical file
is created and stored at the regional office. The official then faxes a copy of the request form to
the head office in Brasilia where the relevant official checks that the regional office did generate
the KPC request and then proceeds to enter the data and issue the KPC. This was the only form
of check made; and no adequate oversight measures were in place at the head office. The
centralised database recording the data from the export certificates is sited in the Brasilia office.
The physical files for each export remain in the regional office where the request for export was
originally lodged. Brazil tallied a very high proportion of cancelled certificates due to technical
printing issues: 2003 - 13 issued and four cancelled; 2004 - 59 issued and nine cancelled; 2005 -
79 issued and 14 cancelled; 2006 - 6 issued and 4 cancelled. The team was not able to verify the
original or the cancelled certificates as all files had been removed by the police as part of
Operação Carbono. An initial review indicated that certain KPCS minimum requirements were
not included on the certificates. These include the identification of the rough diamond importer
and exporter, including the complete mailing address, as well as indicating the number of parcels
in the shipment. Brazilian officials have indicated they will begin advance notification of

14.
shipments to foreign importing authorities to include importer and exporter address and number
of parcels. Given the team's inability to verify the files a full review of the paper files would be
necessary during the follow-up review visit. Sufficient time must be allocated to the review team
in order to properly view the complete reports. The security for the storage and filing of
certificates and KP data was minimal and although it does not appear that there have been any
breaches.
Assessment
47. The review team was positively impressed by the commitment shown by the DNPM staff to
correctly implement the essential elements of the KPCS. One element of the system, the Cadastro
Mineiro (https://sistemas.dnpm.br/sicom/sicom.asp) represents a level of transparency
and public access which merits particular mention as a best practice that could be emulated by
other Participants. If connected into a reporting and verification structure with full cross
referencing of information and with risk analysis profiling, then the database could become a
powerful tool in building a system to eliminate the potential presence of conflict diamonds and to
combat fraud and money laundering by organised crime.
48. It was clear to the review team that a serious attempt has been made to understand how such
a high percentage of fraudulent certificates were possible. According to the recent (May 2006)
Summary Audit Report, there appear to be good proposals for addressing the gaps in the system
however these are all future proposals.
49. The scale of the problems highlighted by PAC and investigated as part of Operação Carbono
has clearly had a major impact on the Brazilian government and the DNPM in particular. The
DNPM and indeed the Brazilian government understood that the former system could not
provide the necessary controls as required by KPSC Section IV(a) “Each Participant should
establish a system of internal controls designed to eliminate the presence of conflict diamonds
from shipments of rough diamonds imported into and exported from its territory.”
50. The DNPM has traditionally been responsible for granting permission for exploration and
concession for mining. With the introduction of the KPCS the focus has been upon managing the
mining authorisation process and then upon the physical issuance of the KPCs. What to date has
been lacking is a focus on regular and rigorous analysis of the data, and a complete lack of
oversight and analysis of the dealers-traders (buyers and sellers): these elements are necessary to
develop a robust system. Operação Carbono has shown that it is essential for the government to
increase the focus of the DNPM to include buying activity which had been regarded as a matter
solely for the Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Commerce
through its Secretaria
de Comércio Exterior (SECEX-MDIC). In other countries facing similar challenges, in building
systems to cope with widespread alluvial mining and with buying activity, authorities have
chosen to include licensing of the buyers as an important element of their KPCS. The team
believes that such licensing, with subsequent oversight of activity would be an enormous help in
addressing the weak elements of the KPCS in Brazil.
51. Another complex problem also faced by other countries with alluvial production, is of the
large numbers of unlicensed diggers (garimpeiros). The Government is encouraging the

15.
formation of cooperatives (Comunidades-garimpeiras em CoopMinas) and we were told the
number of CoopMinas formed over the past two years had increased from 11 to 147, including 9
diamond CoopMinas. There is a lack of clarity over the approximate numbers of those working
in the illegal sector in Brazil. Whilst the DNPM give an estimate of 20 percent of Brazil’s
exports as coming from this sector, the wide range of figures from various sources, from
unfeasibly small to very sizeable, make the 20 percent figure hard to analyse.
52. Brazil does not have reliable statistics on the number of garimpeiros. SGM is carrying out a
project to register the number of people who work as diamond garimpo and miners of other
gems. The DNPM told the review team that there were an estimated 9,000 diamond garimpeiros
working in Brazil, but the number of people who depend on alluvial mining may have reached as
high as 500,000. These estimates should be clarified. This points to the need for the DNPM to
improve data collection. There are projects and initiatives to develop cooperatives, but they are
limited in comparison to the number of unlicensed miners. To add to the challenges faced by the
Brazilian Government much of the illegal unlicensed mining activity takes place on reservations
where mining activity is completely banned. A number of these reservations border other
countries which increases the risk of goods being smuggled into and out of Brazil.
52. The system had been too reliant on individual officials carrying out their duties rather than
there being an integrated reporting system to ensure oversight and consideration of issues at a
team level on a regular basis. The recommendations arising from the Special Audit Report
address the lack of structured oversight. It is clear that the DNPM staff is committed to
addressing the problems.
Reforms Underway
53. Subsequent to the review visit, Brazil launched an overhaul of its regulations governing
rough diamonds through Regulation 295 (Portaria No. 295 of September 1, 2006.) Regulation
295 establishes new requirements and a new electronic system for the issuance of KP
certificates. Applications are available at http://www.dnpm.gov.br/cpk. A Report of
Commercial Transactions also has been established to monitor diamond production and trade.
The DNPM has assembled a team of experts to monitor KP activities, including control of rough
diamonds production. The team will maintain a photographic cadastre of diamond production
and records of mineralogical and gemological descriptions of diamonds collected from regional
DNPM offices. The team will maintain a database on rough diamond production and trade and
the mining cadastre.
7. Industry Self-Regulation
54. Brazil produces many of the most valuable and important beautiful diamonds in the whole
world but as most of them are recovered by the informal mining sector and sold to itinerant
diamond buyers, the full value and production origin is rarely declared.
55. Exceptional stones include the largest red diamonds worth up to $1m per carat after
polishing and Gemological Institute of America certification. Others of note are pink or blue
with a rough export value of $150,000 per carat and large gem diamonds weighing between two

16.
hundred to four hundred carats each valued at a minimum of $25,000 per carat. These figures
will always distort Brazilian diamond statistics from quarter to quarter, year to year.
56. Unfortunately, to the country’s detriment, Brazil has been one of the most hospitable places
to buy and sell diamonds for over forty years. Possibly because in the past legislation has
focused more on diamond extraction than it has on trading and exporting with the result that the
term self regulation has been taken literally by many diamond dealers for too many years.
57. The recent Operação Carbon by Brazilian authorities has had a dramatic effect on all
diamond traders and they have started to take a fresh look at Brazilian rules and regulations
Brazil. Respect for these regulations has been heightened by the need to have a valid Kimberley
Process Certificate before their rough diamonds leave, but there is still more that could be done
to bring the same sense of order that exists today in the formal mining sector to the equally
important diamond dealing sector.
58. A key commitment made by the diamond industry to other stakeholders in KPCS Section IV
was the establishment of a voluntary system of warranties on rough diamond sales, underpinned
through verification by independent auditors and supported by internal penalties. During the
Brazil visit, the review team found no evidence that Brazil’s diamond industry has established a
voluntary system of warranties. It found strong support among both large firms and the
CoopMinas for the KPCS and willingness to help facilitate the traceability of diamond
transactions by government authorities. The scale of dealing activity is thought to be much
larger than previously believed, especially as the large numbers of illegally declared exports were
apparently local market purchases and not from any registered diggings. If dealers were obliged
to register and pay for an annual licence as they do elsewhere, they would be much less
tolerant of those who work unofficially.
59. We heard differing views on the size of Brazil’s diamond polishing industry. There were
three diamond polishing companies in Brazil who employed almost 2,000 workers at the peak of
their success: Cindam, Kessuram, and Selig. Although all of those factories have now closed
down, it is likely that some of their skilled workers have become self employed and are selling
their polished diamonds locally.
60. No evidence was found during this peer review that diamonds from African conflict zones
had reached Brazil. However, given the widespread smuggling and weakness of internal
controls, the possibility exists that they may have done or could do so.
8. Statistics
61. Brazil became a KP Participant on October 31, 2003; however, statistical data submissions
were received for the full year. Despite this, analysis and data reconciliation focuses primarily
on data submission from January 1, 2004 onwards.
62. Brazil has met the minimum statistical requirements of the KPCS with respect to semi-
annual production data, quarterly trade, and KPC count data. These data are entered onto the
statistics web site, in a timely manner, directly by the Participant.

17.
63. The DNPM is in charge of implementation of the KPCS in Brazil and carries out this
function through 25 regional DNPM offices. Each office is responsible for collecting and
processing the KPCS applications in its jurisdiction, including the verification of application
information prior to the issuance of a KPC. Each regional DNPM office is responsible for
submitting the verified application, by fax, to the head DNPM office in Brasilia, where KPCs are
issued.
64. As part of the review visit to Brazil, a statistical report on Brazil’s production, trade, and
KPC count was prepared. In response, an explanatory document was prepared by Brazil and
is included as Appendix III.
Production Statistics:
65. To date, all diamond production statistics for Brazil have been submitted. Production
volume for Brazil is calculated using a combination of export certificate data and imputation.
The KPC export statistics are thought by DNPM to represent approximately 80 percent of
production within Brazil. The remaining 20 percent is a rough estimate of production levels.
The basis for this 20 percent estimation comes from discussions that the regional DNPM officers
have with operations. Production is calculated as, approximately:
• 80 percent of production coming from mining companies and legal garimpeiro
activities (e.g. CoopMinas)
• 20 percent of production coming from all other diamond production not performed by
establishments or legal garimpeiros activities.
66. To further describe production volume calculations, an example using 2005 Brazilian data is
as follows:
• Brazil total production volume in 2005 was 300,000 carats.
• Brazil issued 75 KPCs (export certificates) with a total export volume of 278,863.19
carats. This volume is taken to represent approximately 80 percent of Brazil’s annual
production (in 2005, this actually represents 9 percent).
• The remaining production volume of 21,136.81 carats is an estimate collected from
non-formal Brazilian operations.
67. Brazil is currently unable to establish accurate estimates of production levels within the
country, given that data are based primarily on export information and no formal records of
production levels exist. The DNPM should, as a priority, seek to identify the production
capacities of each region. As for estimates for the value of production, Brazil uses an average
value based on the semi-annual value of exports and multiplies this average by the semi-annual
production volume for that same period. Since the review visit, production data for the first half
of 2005 were reviewed by Brazil and changes made to the value of production based on the
above calculations. Given the fact that Brazil does not sieve or sort any production or exports, a
non-weighted average based on total value of exports are not an accurate assessment of
production values.

18.
68. An initiative mentioned to the review visit team indicated that a Cadastro Mineiro–census
with diamond CoopMinas – would be carried out and provide information related to socio-
economic data such as employment wages and levels, environment, etc. It is unclear as to
whether this Cadastro survey will include information to determine production capacity levels.
The Cadastro survey was due to be completed in July 2006.
69. Regarding production analyses, Brazil was able to clarify the large fluctuations in production
value per carat through the example of a company which exported a single stone of 25.12 carats
at a value of US $2 million.
Import/Export Statistics:
70. At the time of the review visit, all trade statistics for Brazil have been submitted. Export
statistics for Brazil are based on KPC export certificate data and import statistics are based on
advance notification data received from the exporting authorities shipping to Brazil. Brazil has
put in place the Administrative Decision requiring the date of expiry of the KPC be no more than
60 days after issuance.
71. The data for imports into Brazil are based on advanced notification by the exporting
authority and not on KP certificate data, as per the Administrative Decision on KPC-based
statistical submissions. Brazil is now aware that advance notification by exporting countries is
not mandatory and therefore the import data submitted by Brazil does not reflect the true nature
of imports. The lack of rigorous KPC-based import data can easily be dealt with once Brazil
receives all original import KPCs. This data can be received either through customs or directly
from the Brazilian importer.
72. Brazil is a producer of both industrial and gem quality diamonds. They export under
7102.10, 7102.21 and 7102.31. Brazil does not have the infrastructure for diamond sorting and
valuation in order to classify these rough diamonds correctly. They do not sieve, sort or value
the rough diamonds and therefore diamond exports should not be classified, in the first instance,
under HS codes 7102.31 as the diamonds are not sorted for market.
73. Many statistical anomalies between Brazil and its trading partners need to be followed up on
an individual country basis. These discrepancies have been highlighted within the statistical
review visit report and can be achieved through the data and tables available on the rough
diamond statistics web site. Outcomes from these discussions can be shared with the Working
Group on Statistics.
KPC Counts:
74. The DNPM in Brasilia is in charge of issuing KP Certificates. The certificate data are
recorded and certificates printed in Brasilia then sent, by registered mail, to the regional DNPM
offices. The total number of export KPC issued should be accurate given that issuance is from a
single source (DNPM, Brasilia). As for import KPC counts, DNPM offices do not know the
number of actual import certificates as these are not collected by any governing body.

19.
75. During 2003-2005, Brazil used 184 certificates, of which 34 were voided due, primarily, to
printing errors. One of the 34 certificates voided was due to an exporter who had not shipped the
parcel of rough diamonds before the 60-day expiration date. This expired KPC has remained
with the exporter and was not returned to the DNPM in Brasilia. No follow-up mechanism has
been put in place to ensure that expired or unused certificates are returned to the DNPM. As
indicated, Brazil does not collect import KP certificates. The lack of receipt of original import
KPCs means these certificate counts may not reflect the true numbers of KPC entering the
country. Bilateral reconciliation with KP exporters to Brazil can assist in determining the key
information necessary for follow-up with Brazilian importers. In addition to being able to
rectifying their import data, Brazil will also be able to send the confirmation of import from these
certificates (through KPC tear-off or by email).
76. Despite the fact that Brazil statistics are focused mainly on 2004 and 2005 data, it is
important to follow-up on outstanding KPCs for 2003. In 2003, no import KPC counts were
recorded; however, import trade statistics were recorded. The lack of recorded KPCs should be
explained for Canada, the EC, and the US, who indicate exports to Brazil. The DNPM needs to
reform its KPC production process to eliminate the high level of print errors leading to a high
percentage of cancelled certificates.
9. Regional issues
77. Since 2003, there have been reports that illicit trade in rough diamonds is occurring on a
significant scale between the three KPCS Participants in South America (Brazil, Guyana, and
Venezuela). These reports point to an illicit flow of rough diamonds originating in Brazil through
Guyana on to world markets; there have also been allegations that significant quantities of
Venezuelan rough diamonds are being smuggled out of Venezuela through Roraima State in
Brazil.
78. Moreover, the Brazilian authorities have themselves repeatedly indicated to the KP their
concern at the scope for illicit trade with Brazil’s neighbours, and have indicated (even well
before the problems in Brazil’s diamond sector emerged) their willingness to coordinate with
their Guyanese and Venezuelan counterparts on ways of addressing the illicit trade.
79. The review team did not investigate these allegations in detail. It is intended that a second
review visit to Brazil later in 2006 (or in the beginning of 2007) will focus specifically on the
situation in and around mining areas in the North and North-West of the country.
80. However, given the weaknesses in Brazil’s present system of internal controls, the lack of
any internal regulation of diamond traders in Brazil, the lack f a cataloguing system to identify
diamonds typical of different regions of Brazil and the long and remote borders traversing
diamond areas between Brazil, Guyana, and Venezuela, the team believes there is indeed a
significant risk of substantial illicit trading activity between the three countries in question.
81. The team believes that in order for the KP to obtain a more reliable overview of the scale of
illicit rough diamond flows between Brazil, Guyana, and Venezuela, it would be desirable for a

20.
review visit to be carried out at the earliest opportunity in Venezuela, in addition to a second
review visit to Brazil.
82. The review visit team would also underline that in order properly to address the underlying
causes of illicit cross-border diamond flows between Brazil, Guyana, and Venezuela; it is an
urgent priority to initiate a dialogue at the technical level between the KP authorities and other
relevant agencies in the three Participants. Such a dialogue could be initiated by a technical
meeting to be hosted by one of the three Participants, under the auspices of (and if necessary
with the assistance of) the KP. The team believes that such a meeting would moreover be
consistent with the objectives, and practice, of the KP’s sub-group on alluvial production, and
would allow the proper dissemination among Participants in the region of best practices
identified within the sub-group. Conversely, it would allow Participants in the region to feed
best practices identified in their respective systems more effectively into the wider sub-group.
83. The Brazilian authorities indicated to the team their willingness to participate in a technical
meeting with Guyana and Venezuela in the near future, and indeed to host such a meeting in Boa
Vista. The team understands that the authorities in Guyana similarly expressed their willingness
to participate in a regional meeting to the KP review visit team that visited Guyana from 2 to 4
May 2006. The team recommends that the Chair of the KP and the Chair of the Working Group
on Monitoring facilitate the arrangement of such a meeting at the earliest opportunity.
10. Recommendations
Recommendations for Brazil:
1. The recommendations of Brazil’s Summary Audit Report address many of the failings that
made possible the fraudulent activities and exports. The review team endorses those
recommendations and urges the DNPM present a formal report to the KP plenary in
November 2006 on the progress towards implementation.
2. A legal requirement for regular on-site inspections of diamond production sites by the
DNPM should be introduced for all categories of mining concessions, including those that
cover artisanal output. SAR recommendation (9g) states that these regular site visits be
carried out by the DNPM staff at least once every six months. DNPM personnel should file
written reports of their on-site inspections that detail observable production, potential
production, check sales records, and confirm any inventories at the site. Sites should have
been visited by the DNPM prior to acceptance of applications for KPC in line with SAR
Recommendations (9i) and (9o).
3. In line with SAR recommendation (9e), a regulation should be adopted to require monthly
production statistics from all mining sites be sent to DNPM’s KP team in Brasilia to be
entered into a computer-based system for analysis and background for future DNPM site
visits and to have a more solid basis for semi-annual production figures reported to the KP
statistical web-site. As further recommended in SAR recommendation (9e), the monthly
data sent to the DNPM should include quantity and value of production, where the
production had been sold, and a legal declaration by the responsible mining official that the

21.
production had been produced at that site. Also, as noted in SAR recommendation (9e), the
mining site operators should keep complete records of monthly production at the mine site,
and the name, address, and tax identification number of the first buyer.
4. Brazil should require rough diamond parcels to be sieved out into easy to monitor industry
sizes rather than exported as a mixed bag of run of mine. All special stones above 5 carats
listed separately and all fancy colours of any size recorded as items of importance.
5. In line with SAR recommendation (5), a photographic profile/data base of the diamond-
producing regions of Brazil should be established that would be readily accessible to DNPM
and Customs officials to make mixing diamonds from outside the region more difficult.
Additionally, in line with recommendation (9b), the mixing of rough diamonds from distinct
mining regions should be prohibited.
6. In line with SAR recommendation (9c), adequate numbers of customs agents and DNPM
officials should be trained to assess declared value of both imported and exported rough
diamonds shipments in line with SAR recommendation 10. As an interim measure, while
local valuation capacity is being developed, request that Belgium Customs, to check the
value of the parcel against the Kimberley Process Certificate issued by Brazil. Such a
procedure would discourage dealers and/or exporters from under or over declaring their
shipments.
7. In line with the SAR recommendations (9m) and (9p), a National Registry of Diamond
Dealers and Exporters, should be established. We recommend that all diamond
buyers/sellers, importers and exporters be licensed and registered in a computerized data base
and required to keep detailed records of their daily transactions, and bills of sales, which
would be subject to government audits. We recommend that in designing this system, the
authorities should consider the recommendations in KPCS Annex II paragraphs 13-16.
8. Proposed government regulation of the diamond industry through the National Registry of
Diamond Dealers should be completed. Government authorities should meet with the
diamond industry to establish a voluntary industry system of warranties to attest that rough
diamonds sold are not conflict diamonds. This written warranty would be required to be
provided by the seller each time a rough diamond was sold, just as the Nota Fiscal is
required. This industry self regulation is an important element of the KPCS which has been
shown to help facilitate full traceability of rough diamond transactions by government
authorities in other KP participants countries. Industry self-regulation should be guided by
principles contained in KPCS Section IV.
9. Either the importer or a government agency should be required to retain the original
incoming KP certificate for a period of at least three years, consistent with KPCS
requirements.
10. A system to provide timely import confirmations by the DNPM to exporting countries
should be implemented.

22.
11. Given the relatively small number of KP certificates issued per year, Brazil should consider
centralizing the processing of KP certificates by the highly specialized and trained KP team
that will operate in Brasilia. Ensure that copies, including voided KPCs, be kept in the safe
at the DNPM in Brasilia. Enhance security controls over the physical issuance and the KP
database.
12. The Brazilian KP certificate should identify the rough diamond importer and exporter,
including complete address information, a minimum KP requirement, before DNPM issues
the certificate. Our review of scanned KP certificates indicated this important information
was not included on the KP certificate. The Brazilian KP certificate should identify the
number of parcels in the shipment, a minimum KP requirement, before DNPM issues the
certificate.
13. Given the fact that the Receita Federal has not issued a replacement KP certificate, but has
been given 1,000 KP certificates, Brazilian authorities should consider centralizing all KP
certificates in DNPM headquarters in Brasilia. In the rare event, that a replacement
certificate is needed, Receita Federal would request the DNPM send a replacement
certificate.
14. Brazil should ensure that any KP certificate not exported within the maximum 60-day period
be returned to the DNPM in Brasilia. The DNPM should develop a system of oversight to
ensure the returns take place. It is recommended that the DNPM review and amend its KP
certificate production process to eliminate the simple print errors which have led to a high
percentage of cancelled certificates.
15. Brazil should institute a system in which future rough diamond import data based on the KP
certificate is reported in a timely fashion to the statistical authorities either by Customs or by
the importer.
16. At a minimum, Brazil should follow-up on all 2005 imports, using KP trading partners’
export authority information, in order to obtain copies of all these KPC. Brazil should put in
place a mechanism to collect these certificates immediately upon entry into the country. Once
the import KPCs have been recovered, Brazil should update all import KPC counts and
import trade data for 2005 and onwards.
17. Significant trade statistical anomalies should be cleared up by requesting bilateral
reconciliations with the largest trading partners, including the U.S., EC and Israel.
18. Brazil should consider the introduction of more severe penalties, including custodial
penalties, for the most serious infringements of legislation implementing the KPCS.
19. Brazil should review best practices in other alluvial-producing countries to evaluate the
benefits to Brazil of collecting a 2 percent export duty from dealer exporters at the time of
issuance of a Kimberley Certificate. Formal mining companies in other Participants are often
exempted as they pay taxes in other ways, but dealers in other Participant diamond-producing
countries pay between 2 and 3 percent as it is known that smuggling costs them one percent

23.
and they now need to have the Kimberley Certificate to be legal in their country of final
selling.
20. Operacao Carbono has shown that it is essential for the government to increase the focus of
the DNPM to include buying activity which had been regarded as a matter solely for the
Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Commerce through its Secretaria de
Comércio Exterior (SECEX)].
21. Brazil should seek to clarify the number of diamond garimperos.
Recommendations for other Participants in the region
22. Brazil, Guyana and Venezeula should work together to address the underlying causes of
illicit cross-border diamond flows between Brazil, Guyana and Venezuela. Given the
problems identified by the Brazilian authorities and by the Guyanese authorities (see Guyana
KP Review Visit Report) the three countries should initiate a dialogue at the technical level
between the KP authorities and other relevant agencies in the three Participants.
23. Brazil should initiate a process to strengthen its ability to control entry of diamonds by land,
including instituting regular coordination and information sharing meetings with Guyana and
Venezuela. Priority attention should be given to establishing better border control in the
triangle area of Boa Vista (Brazil), Lethem (Guyana), and Santa Elena de Uairén
(Venezuela).
24. Venezuela should be encouraged to invite a review visit, and such a review visit should
examine the scope for illicit trade between Venezuela and Guyana. Similarly, a second
review visit to Brazil should examine the scope for illicit trade between Brazil, Guyana, and
Venezuela.
25. KP Participants in South America (Brazil, Guyana, and Venezuela) should be encouraged to
initiate a regional dialogue on cross-border issues in the diamond sector. Such a dialogue
could be initiated by a technical meeting to be hosted by one of the three participants, under
the auspices of (and if necessary with the assistance of) the KP.
26. In the long term, Guyana, Brazil, and Venezuela might consider ways of moving towards a
common diamond export regime and collect an identical level of export duty (and one that is
more comparable to pan-African rates) for their diamonds.
Recommendations for the Chair of the Kimberley Process
27. Brazil, as leader of the sub-group of South American alluvial producers has been trying,
without success, to arrange a meeting with Venezuela and Guyana authorities to discuss
regional Kimberley Process issues. We urge the Chair to send a letter to KP authorities in
Venezuela and Guyana urging them to meet with Brazil as soon as possible. The Chair
should also request a joint report of the meeting results be provided to the Chair of the
Monitoring Committee.

24.
12. GLOSSARY
Cadastro Mineiro – System which links information about the mining process.
Cooperatives (Garimpos) – Mining cooperatives - CoopMinas for Garimpeiros.
DACESS - Divisão de Acesso a Mercados (DACESS - MRE) Division of Market Access
(DACESS - MRE)
DNPM - Brazil’s National Department of Mineral Production.
DPF - Departamento de Policia Federal (DPF) of the MF.
Garimpeiros - unlicensed diggers
MF - Ministério da Fazenda - Ministry of Finance
MDJ – Ministério da Justicia - Ministry of Justice
MDIC - Ministério do Desenvolvimento, Indústria e Comércio Exterior - Ministry of
Development, Industry and Foreign Trade.
MPF - Ministério Público Federal - Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office.
MME - Ministério do Minas e Energia - Ministry of Mines and Energy.
MRE - Ministerio das Relações Exteriore (MRE) - Ministry of Foreign Relations
Operação Carbono - The law enforcement operation to investigate the diamond sector, code
named Operação Carbon, involved nearly 260 Federal Police and 50 agents of the Receita
Federal.
Small-Scale Mining (Garimpo) cooperatives - CoopMinas are organized to perform exploration
and exploitation/mining on small-scale mining reserves and deposits (mostly alluvial diamonds,
gold, and tin).
PLGs - Permissões de Lavra Garimpeiras provided by the Federal Government via Law no.
7,805/1989 to Cooperatives in order to formalize the activities of the garimpeiros.
SAR – Executive Summary of the Special Audit Report of the Kimberly Process Certification
Scheme in Brazil.
SECEX - Secretaria de Comércio Exterior (MDIC). Ministry of Development, Industry and
Foreign Commerce

25.
SGM – Secretaria de Geologia, Mineração e Transformação Mineral. – Ministry of Geology,
Mines and Mineral Processing.
SRF – Secretaria da Receita Federal - Internal Revenue Secretariat of the MF.

26.
MINISTRY OF MINES AND ENERGY
SECRETARIAT OF GEOLOGY, MINING, AND MINERAL PROCESSING
Kimberley Process Review Visit to Brazil
Brasília – Ministry of Mines and Energy
Monday, 24 April 2006
PROGRAM
09:00 – 09:10h Welcome Address:
Secretary of Geology, Mining, and Mineral Processing – SGM
09:10 – 09:40h The Ministry of Mines and Energy and the Kimberley Process
Claudio Scliar – Secretary of the SGM
09:40 – 09:55 Queries
09:55 – 10:10h The DNPM and the Kimberley Process
Miguel Antônio Cedraz Nery – Director-General of the DNPM
10:10 – 10:25h The Geological Survey of Brazil(CPRM),and the Kimberley Process
Reinaldo Brito – Head of Department of the CPRM
10:25 – 10:40 Queries
10:40 – 10:55h The Ministry of Justice and the Kimberley Process
Marcilândia Araujo – Coordinator-General of the Ministry of Justice
10:55 – 11:10 Queries
11:10 – 11:25h The Secretariat of the Federal Revenue (SRF) and the KP
Marco Aurélio Mucci Mattos – Head of Division of the SRF
11:25 – 11:40 Queries
11:40 – 11:55h The Ministry of the External Relations (MRE) and the KP
José Antônio Cury G. Braga – Secretary of the MRE/DACESS
11:55 – 12:10 Queries
12:10 – 12:25h The Ministry of the Development, Industry and Foreign Trade (MDIC), and the
PK.
12:25 – 12:40 Ieda Ferreira Fernandes – Adviser of the DECEX – MDIC
Queries
12:40h – 14:40h Lunch

27.
MINISTRY OF MINES AND ENERGY
SECRETARIAT OF GEOLOGY, MINING, AND MINERAL PROCESSING
Kimberley Process Review Visit to Brazil
Brasília – Ministry of Mines and Energy
Monday, 24 April 2006
DNPM
15:00 – 15:15h Operation Carbon
Jorge Maria Fonseca – Federal Police Officer – MJ/PF
15:15 – 15:30h Queries
15:30 – 15:45h The Work Group of the Special Audit PK/DNPM
João César de Freitas Pinheiro – Deputy Secretary-General of DNPM
15:45 – 16:00h The rough diamond in Juína – Mato Grosso
Jocy Gonçalo de Miranda – Head of DNPM District – MT
16:00 – 16:15h The rough diamond in Rondônia-RO
Deolindo Neto - Head of DNPM District - RO
16:15 – 17:15h Discussion and queries on DNPM certification activities, the process of the
certificate’s emission, as well as problems that Brazil has been facing related to
those emissions, and which improvements DNPM has been carrying out.
17:15 – 18:00h Discussions and queries on statistics problems.
Tuesday, 25 April 2006
PROGRAM
07:00h Trip to Coromandel
Departure from Melia Brasilia Hotel (bus of the company TRESMIK)
12:00h Lunch (probably on the road)
14:00 – 14:30h Visit to a Center of Support to Small-Scale Miner
14:30 – 15:30h Meeting with miners, owners of mineral rights, representatives of artisanal miners
and syndical leaderships
15:30 – 18:00h Visit two productive rough diamond areas
20:00h Dinner offered by the Town hall of Coromandel
Overnight in Coromandel – Hotel D. Adélia
Wednesday, 26 April 2006
PROGRAM
07:15 – 09:05h Trip to Patos de Minas, by bus
10:10 – 11:00H Trip to Belo Horizonte, TO-5557

28.
12:00 – 14:00h Lunch
14:00 – 15:00h Visit to DNPM Ofice
15:00 – 17:00h Visit to Belo Horizonte Customs
19:00h Work dinner offered by the entrepreneurs.
Federation of the Industries of the State of Minas Gerais (FIEMG)
Overnight in Belo Horizonte – Liberty Palace Hotel
Thursday, 27 April 2006
PROGRAM
07:00h Trip to Diamantina Departure from Liberty Palace Hotel (Rua Paraíba, 1465)
12:00h Lunch (probably on the road)
13:00 – 18:00h Meeting with the Co-operative of the Garimpeiros of Diamantina
Visit to a productive diamond area
20:00h Dinner offered by the local entrepreneurs
Overnight – Hotel Pousada do Garimpo
Friday, 28 April 2006
PROGRAM
07:00 Trip to Belo Horizonte Departure from Hotel Pousada do Garimpo
12:00h Lunch (probably on the road)
14:25h Trip Belo Horizonte – Brasília (JJ-3149)
Overnight Brasília – Hotel Melia
Saturday, 29 April 2006
PROGRAM
09:00 – 12:00h Meeting in SGM to evaluate the visit’s results and to propose guidelines for the
improvement of the implementation of KP in Brazil.
Overnight in Brasília or departure to origin country

29.
RELATÓRIO
DA
AUDITORIA
ESPECIAL
CERTIFICAÇÃO
DO
PROCESSO
KIMBERLEY
NO
BRASIL
SUMÁRIO
EXECUTIVO
PORTARIA
CONJUNTA
SGM-­‐-­‐-­‐MME/DNPM
Nº
25,
DE
14/02/2006
DOU
DE
15/02/2006
PORTARIA
CONJUNTA
SGM-­‐-­‐-­‐MME/DNPM
Nº
65,
DE
16/03/2006
DOU
de
17/03/2006
PORTARIA
CONJUNTA
SGM-­‐-­‐-­‐MME/DNPM
Nº
81,
DE
03/04/2006
DOU
de
05/04/2006

30.
Brasília,
maio
de
2006.
I) INTRODUÇÃO
O
presente
documento
apresenta
um
sumário
sobre
o
Relatório
da
Auditoria
Especial
designada
pelas
Portarias
em
epígrafe,
pelas
autoridades
que
instituíram
o
versado
Grupo
de
Trabalho,tendo
como
objetivo
a
implementação
de
diretrizes
e
procedimentos,
no
sentido
de
superar
eventuais
vulnerabilidades
e
promover
o
aperfeiçoamento
do
sistema,
bem
como
adotar
providências
junto
ao
Ministério
Público
e
Polícia
Federal
e
demais
entidades
mencionadas.
Inicialmente,
cumpre
ressaltar
que
a
Lei
nº
10.743,
de
9
de
outubro
de
2.003
afirma
que
o
Sistema
de
Certificação
do
Processo
de
Kimberley
-­‐-­‐-­‐
SCPK
refere-­‐-­‐-­‐se
a
todas
as
atividades
internacionais
relacionadas
à
certificação
de
origem
de
diamantes
brutos,
visando
impedir
o
financiamento
de
conflitos
pelo
seu
comércio,
e
que,
na
exportação,
o
SCPK
visa
impedir
a
remessa
de
diamantes
brutos
extraídos
de
áreas
de
conflito
ou
de
qualquer
área
não
legalizada
perante
o
Departamento
Nacional
de
Produção
Mineral
–
DNPM.
Do
ponto
de
vista
do
governo,
a
implantação
do
SCPK
no
Brasil
teve
como
principais
objetivos:
1) Garantir
o
acesso
legal
da
produção
brasileira
de
diamantes
brutos
ao
Mercado
internacional;
2) Controlar
e
impedir
a
entrada,
no
território
nacional,
de
diamantes
brutos
originários
de
países
não
participantes
do
Processo
Kimberley,
ou
de
países
participantes
mas
sem
o
Certificado
Kimberley;
3) Proibir
e
impedir
a
exportação
de
diamantes
brutos
produzidos
no
Brasil
sem
Certificado
do
Processo
Kimberley
-­‐-­‐-­‐
CPK;
4) Servir
de
Instrumento
para
regularizar
a
atividade
mineradora
e
garimpeira
informal
de
extração
de
diamantes
brutos;
No
contexto
em
que
se
deu
a
aprovação
da
Lei,
em
2003,
o
DNPM
recebeu
esta
nova
atribuição,
sem
que
a
Autarquia
estivesse
suficientemente
aparelhada
para
atender
ao
conjunto
das
demandas
do
setor
mineral.
O
sucateamento
da
estrutura
administrativa
do
DNPM
ocorrido
desde
a
sua
transformação
em
Autarquia
no
ano
de
1994
pelo
Governo
anterior,
dificultou
a
que
a
instituição
respondesse
na
sua
plenitude
ao
conjunto
de
atribuições
que
lhe
foram
estabelecidas.
O
atual
Governo
na
tentativa
de
sanar
as
debilidades
institucionais
vem
implementando
no
DNPM
políticas
de
aparelhamento
e
modernização
da
sua
estrutura
de
gestão,
a
exemplo
a
implantação
de
plano
de
carreira
e
realização
de
concurso
público,
fato
este
que
não
ocorria
a
cerca
de
vinte
e
sete
anos.
Desta
forma,
os
procedimentos
de
emissão
do
CPK
foram
mais
voltados
para
fomentar
a
exportação
regular
de
diamantes
e
para
a
formalização
das
outorgas
minerais.
Apesar
das
dificuldades,
o
sistema
de
certificação
do
Processo
de
Kimberley
-­‐-­‐-­‐
SCPK
implantado
no
Brasil
atingiu
parcialmente
seu
objetivo,
Portanto,
o
SCPK
brasileiro
permitiu
que
o
Brasil
possuísse
um
controle
da
produção
e
exportação
de
diamantes
brutos,
sem
o
que
a
própria
auditoria
teria
dificuldades
de
obter
as
informações
levantadas.

31.
I) SUMÁRIO
EXECUTIVO
A
Auditoria
reconheceu
que
por
meio
do
cruzamento
das
notas
fiscais
representativas
da
compra
dos
diamantes
e
sua
venda
ao
exportador,
é
possível
mostrar
a
cadeia
de
relações
neste
negócio,
o
que
contribui
para
que
órgãos
públicos
como
o
Ministério
Público
Federal
e
o
Departamento
de
Polícia
Federal
possam
melhor
elucidar
os
fatos,
assim
como
o
próprio
DNPM.
As
fraudes
externas
constatadas
pela
auditoria
só
puderam
ser
identificadas
por
meio
dos
dados
extraídos
dos
autos
dos
processos.
A
auditoria
afirmou
que
o
procedimento
de
certificação
apresenta
inversão
procedimental
anômala,
uma
vez
que
a
autoridade
hierarquicamente
superior
–
Diretor-­‐-­‐-­‐Geral
do
DNPM
–
assina
o
CPK
(Certificado
do
Processo
de
Kimberley)
antes
de
qualquer
confirmação
dos
dados
declarados
pelo
exportador,
ficando
a
decisão
de
emissão
do
certificado
concentrada
na
mão
de
autoridade
hierarquicamente
inferior,
qual
seja:
Chefe
do
Distrito.
Foi
afirmado
haver
ausência
de
controle
no
âmbito
do
procedimento
implantado
para
a
certificação
e
de
que
inexistia
gestão
administrativa
no
sentido
de
controlar
e
avaliar
as
certificações
brasileiras
não
considera
o
significativo
esforço
do
atual
Governo
em
recuperar
a
capacidade
de
gestão
do
Estado
por
meio
do
DNPM,
bem
como
todos
os
investimentos
realizados
no
processo
de
modernização
institucional.
A
Autarquia
tem
buscado
desenvolver
ações
de
inteligência
de
fiscalização,
incluindo,
para
tanto,
inúmeros
seminários
e
oficinas
de
trabalhos
realizados,
inclusive
com
a
Polícia
Federal.
A
proposta
de
modernização
da
gestão
apresentada
pela
FIA
(Fundação
Instituto
de
Administração
da
Universidade
de
São
Paulo)
contempla
no
seu
relatório
final
aspectos
da
própria
estrutura
organizacional.
Foi
constatada
a
ausência
de
vistoria
prévia
à
emissão
dos
certificados
–
uma
vez
que
o
procedimento
visa
identificar
a
origem
dos
diamantes
objeto
de
exportação,
além
da
capacitação
deficiente
dos
servidores
para
fins
de
avaliação
das
pedras.
Após
o
Seminário
realizado
com
a
Polícia
Federal
em
dezembro
de
2004
foi
feita
essa
recomendação,
mas
no
3º
Distrito
de
Minas
Gerais
essa
recomendação
não
foi
implementada.
Tendo
em
vista
que
o
SCPK
visa
identificação
da
origem
dos
diamantes
brutos,
objetivo
nem
sempre
atingido
com
os
mecanismos
de
controle
adotados
até
aqui
e,
considerando
a
natureza
das
lacunas
existentes
no
sistema
de
certificação
implantado
no
Brasil,
há
necessidade
de
uma
nova
configuração
na
gestão
administrativa
do
sistema,
com
uma
nova
estrutura
regimental
para
o
Departamento
Nacional
de
Produção
Mineral,
assim
como
a
adoção
de
outros
mecanismos
de
controle
para
o
SCPK
brasileiro.
Ainda
que
o
DNPM
tenha
sido
informado
sobre
eventuais
vulnerabilidades
no
SCPK
no
Brasil,
é
fato
que
não
foram
envidados
esforços
no
sentido
de
identificação,
análise
e
eventual
solução
dessas
falhas.
A
análise
desenvolvida
acerca
do
certificado
nº
64,
ocorrida
cerca
de
6
meses
após
denúncia
do
fato
por
autoridade,
demonstram
a
fragilidade
e
a
ineficiência,
especialmente
no
Distrito
de
Minas
Gerais
em
cumprir
ao
conjunto
das
atribuições
relativas
ao
CPK.
Com
a
identificação
da
prática
de
atos
administrativos
e
indícios
de
condutas
irregulares
e
ilegais
e,
até
mesmo,
tipificadas
criminalmente,
ponderando-­‐-­‐-­‐se
o
fato
de
que
um
mesmo
comportamento
pode
produzir
efeito
no
âmbito
de
esferas
jurídicas
distintas,
quais
sejam:
administrativa,
civil
e
penal,
sobre
as
considerações
pertinentes
a
cada
uma
dessas
esferas
tem-­‐-­‐-­‐se
os
seguintes
comentários:
a) No
âmbito
administrativo,
apresenta-­‐-­‐-­‐se
necessária
a
adoção
de
uma
série
de
medidas
pela
Diretoria-­‐-­‐-­‐
Geral
do
Departamento
Nacional
de
Produção
Mineral
–
DNPM
com
fins
de
saneamento
dos
processos
administrativos
e
eventual
responsabilização
dos
servidores
envolvidos,
as
quais
devem
ser
imediatamente
implementadas.
Com
fins
de
saneamento
dos
processos,
deverão
ser
anulados
os
títulos
minerários
outorgados
no
âmbito
dos
autos
de
mineração
nº
833.476/2003
e
833.479/2003,
tendo
em
vista
que
as
permissões

32.
de
lavra
garimpeira
foram
outorgadas
em
favor
de
pessoa
física
à
época
falecida:
Fábio
Tadeu
Dias
de
Oliveira,
conforme
faz
prova
certidão
de
óbito
em
anexo
ao
relatório.
Também
devem
ser
invalidados
os
títulos
minerários
outorgados
no
âmbito
dos
autos
de
mineração
nº
831.973/2002,
831.710/1999,
867.577/2005,
866.156/2001,
866.614/2004
e
866.961/1994
ou,
se
possível,
adotadas
medidas
para
saneamento
dos
feitos;
tendo
em
vista
que
em
todas
as
áreas
desses
processos,
a
vistoria
realizada
pela
equipe
operacional
da
auditoria
constatou
extração
ilegal
de
diamantes,
ora
em
local
não
autorizado
pelo
título
minerário,
ora
em
montante
superior
ao
autorizado
por
guia
de
utilização,
devendo
ser
adotadas
as
medidas
administrativas
cabíveis.
Constatada
a
utilização
dos
processos
de
mineração
de
autos
nº
860.122/2003,
860.123/2003,
833.477/2003,
833.478/2003
e
831.972/2002
supostamente
para
práticas
irregulares
e
ilegais,
DNPM
deverá
adotar
as
medidas
administrativas
necessárias
à
invalidação
dos
títulos
minerários.
Para
adotar
as
medidas
de
nulidade
de
títulos
indicadas,
deverá
o
DNPM
observar
o
poder-­‐-­‐-­‐dever
de
autotutela
da
Administração
Pública
garantindo-­‐-­‐-­‐se
aos
envolvidos
os
princípios
constitucionais
do
contraditório
e
da
ampla
defesa.
Embora
haja
a
constatação
de
extração
ilegal
de
diamantes
nas
áreas
dos
processos
de
autos
nº
833.476/2003,
833.479/2003,
831.973/2002,
831.710/1999,
867.577/2005,
805.982/1972
e
866.961/1994,
a
despeito
dos
certificados
de
kimberley
emitidos
com
fundamento
nestes
processos
terem
certificado
diamantes
frutos
de
extração
ilegal,
não
é
possível
sua
invalidação
em
decorrência
dos
efeitos
produzidos
por
estes
atos
administrativos
terem
ultrapassado
o
âmbito
da
ordem
jurídica
interna,
em
razão
da
exportação
dos
diamantes
certificados.
Assim,
não
há
que
se
falar
em
anulação
dos
certificados
enumerados
com
fundamento
no
princípio
da
segurança
jurídica
que
há
de
ser
preservado
nas
relações
firmadas
pelo
Brasil
e
demais
Estados
soberanos
no
âmbito
da
ordem
jurídica
internacional.
Na
esfera
administrativa
ainda,
a
Auditoria
afirma
que
deve
ser
apurada
a
eventual
responsabilização
de
servidores
do
Departamento
Nacional
de
Produção
Mineral
envolvidos
no
procedimento
do
Sistema
de
Certificação
do
Processo
de
Kimberley
–
SCPK.
No
âmbito
do
Distrito
de
Minas
Gerais,
a
comissão
de
auditoria
sugere
a
instauração
de
processo
administrativo
disciplinar,
com
fins
de
apuração
de
responsabilidades
identificadas
no
âmbito
dos
processos
administrativos
de
certificação
do
Processo
Kimberley,
inclusive
os
que
culminaram
na
emissão
dos
certificados
nºs
25,
26,
29,
39,
com
fundamento
nos
artigos
143
e
148
da
Lei
8.112/1990.
Em
razão
da
relevância
do
Sistema
de
Certificação
do
Processo
de
Kimberley,
assim
como
a
gravidade
das
condutas
apontadas
na
análise
da
auditoria
a
Auditoria
sugere
que
seja
procedida
nomeação
imediata
de
novo
Chefe
para
aquela
unidade
regional
do
DNPM
Na
composição
da
comissão
do
processo
administrativo
disciplinar
sugerido,
como
forma
de
assegurar
a
imparcialidade
na
apuração
das
condutas,
os
servidores
efetivos
do
3º
Distrito/MG
não
deverão
ser
utilizados.
É
imprescindível
que
a
documentação
extraída
dos
autos
administrativos
de
certificação
de
kimberley
por
servidor
do
3o
Distrito
deverá
ser
encaminhada
imediatamente
ao
Presidente
do
inquérito
policial
relativo
à
Operação
Carbono
do
Departamento
de
Polícia
Federal/MG,
tendo
em
vista
a
existência
de
mandado
judicial
que
determinou
sua
apreensão.
Considerando
as
informações
prestadas
pelo
Sr.
José
Carreteiro,
acerca
da
produção
mineral
nas
áreas
dos
autos
nº
826.339/2002
e
826.052/2003,
indicados
como
de
origem
dos
diamantes
objetos
dos
certificados
de
kimberley
nºs
107,
002,
088,
134,
a
comissão
de
auditoria
entende
que
deva
haver
a
instauração
de
sindicância
para
fins
de
apuração
da
origem
dos
diamantes
vinculados
aos
citados
processos.