This document discusses the importance of identifying intelligence requirements and priorities to guide data collection efforts. It notes that the US intelligence community takes guidance from the National Intelligence Priorities Framework. The document also discusses challenges like not being able to collect all information, differing priorities requiring different resources, and the need to share information across agencies. It summarizes the case of Sam Adams, where policymakers rejected his intelligence estimates on guerilla numbers in Vietnam and pressured the army to provide lower numbers. This shows how policymakers can influence intelligence and reject findings they disagree with. Intelligence agencies need clear priorities and specialization to avoid duplicated efforts, conflicting results, and tensions over jurisdictions.

1. 1
According to Lowenthal, collecting data provides information that is used in
making decisions. When collecting data, requirements have to be
identified. Requirements are those interests which involve some risk or likelihood of a
national security event and are usually a threat or some issue of vital importance or
priority to an administration. Identifying requirements means defining those policy issues
or areas to which intelligence is expected to make a contribution, as well as decisions
about which of these issues has priority over the others (Lwenthal, p. Chapter 4).
American intelligence agencies currently take their cue from a dynamic (semiannually
updated) document called the National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF), and it
serves as the DNI’s guidance to the IC on priorities approved by the President (such as
which foreign nations to focus upon). The NIPF guides prioritization over the operation,
planning, and programming of U.S. intelligence analysis and collection. All intelligence
requirements for collection are and must be based on and traceable to the NIPF.
One can surmise that perfect collection is not possible. It is impossible to cover
everything; and not every issue requires the same collection resources - and not
everything collected is of equal value (Lowenthal 2006). Collection for homeland
security purposes requires all-agency and all-source reporting, even law enforcement
reporting of suspicious incidents. These reports should be forwarded and put into some
kind of central or master database. An agency can, of course, sanitize any report it
forwards to avoid compromising sensitive sources, and there are various other things that
can be done with classified documents. Sam Adams says that his memorandums to the
pentagon were put in a filing cabinet in a manila file name “indefinitely hold”.1
1 Lowenthal Chapter 4 pg. 57
Lowenthal Chapter 4 pg. 61

2. 2
In practice, there will be several lists and databases, posing a database integration
problem, but the key is getting information into a database quickly. Policymakers should
be monitored when making policies. They have the power to accept, reject intelligence,
collect/manufacture their own intelligence; therefore, there should be restrains to what
they can do because the policies affect every American. In the case of Sam Adams, he
tried to make the number of guerilla militia in Vietnam known to the pentagon. The
policy makers rejected and ignored his observations. Not only did they not comment on
his findings, but also never looked at the memorandums Sam Adams presented to them.
The policy makers overlooked the intelligence agency findings and exercised their
powers to reject the observations. I addition the army that also undertook a similar
investigation with that of Sam Adams was told to keep its numbers below 300,000. This
shows that the policy makers made a policy without consulting the intelligence agencies
(CIA).
The army and CIA carried out investigations on Vietnam to determine how many
guerilla militia and militants the USA was fighting in Vietnam. Intelligence should
always be an adjunct to policy, and not a policy maker in its own right. Their
unwillingness to share intelligence and unwillingness to accept intelligence from other
agencies should be regulated because they are not always acting in every citizen’s best
interest. Moreover, intelligence should always strive to remain objective and not be
involved in politics. 2
2 Sam Adams-2 pg. 43 & 44
Sam Adams-2 pg. 64 &65

3. 3
Intelligence agencies need direction, and one can summarize that sometimes
policy makers assume the intelligence community knows their priorities and sometimes
policy makers watch over the intelligence analysis process like a hawk (Immerman
2008). As Sam Adams observes, the army officials did not accept his numbers. They
rejected Sam Adams altogether because he did not have enough or many documentation
samples. The army representative only had one document that did not even support his
argument but still dismissed Adam’s views about the numbers of militia in Vietnam. The
army became territorial and did not want the CIA interfering and were not willing to
share their intelligence.
The intelligence agencies overlapped jurisdictions, duplicated efforts and
competed with each other. This led to the agencies, in Sam Adams case, the army and the
CIA to provide very different results and numbers about the war in Vietnam and
Cambodia. The army provided very low estimates to reflect “a light at the end of the
tunnel” (Adams). The CIA on the other hand through Sam Adams presented true
estimates of the militia in Vietnam and the Khmer Rogue Rebels in Cambodia. The army
felt that Sam Adams was going into matters that were in its jurisdictions. Because of this,
he was banned from attending briefings and lectures to CIA agents going to Vietnam.
This resulted in radical different estimates/ analyses of the same situation by both
agencies. Over lapping of jurisdictions and duplicating efforts in both agencies affected
Sam Adams’ efforts to correct the figures and provide genuine numbers.3
3 Sam Adams-2 pg. 65…73
Lowenthal Chapter 5a pg. 76

4. 4
Sam Adams was many times told or advised to resign from his CIA job by his
seniors. Why this happened is because the same people meant to collect information/data
were the very same ones analyzing the data and making decisions about it. Many
memorandums that Sam Adams provided to his seniors were never meant to be released
to the relevant people like John Court. “I received a letter of reprimand for releasing the
memo to an outsider” (Adams). Basing on Sam Adams article, Lowenthal was right to
state that dual responsibilities would cause problems in the agencies. The intelligence
agencies ought to have divided the responsibilities so that every agency specialized in a
specific area and jurisdiction.
According to my opinion and the accounts of Sam Adams, the most fundamental
lesson learnt from the conflicts of numbers and order of battle is specialization. The
intelligence agencies should have specialized in specific areas of the Vietnam War. The
CIA should have provided the militia numbers estimates, the white house should have
come up with policies and the army should have implemented the policies, either by
adding troops or applying more devastating measures.
On the other hand, the CIA itself should have divided its staff to partake different
roles in the investigations and making sure the findings were forwarded to the appropriate
people e.g. the White House Staff and the President. We should learn that the conflicts
were caused by agencies having dual responsibilities and the policy makers making
policies that crippled findings from the intelligence agencies.4
4 Sam Adams-2 pg. 72