2 Do Close Elections Benefit the Poor, Johanna Koehler
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This document summarizes a presentation on factors that influence water service policy choices in Kenya's devolved system of governance. The presentation finds that counties with closer elections have a higher sense of responsibility for water services to fulfill their constitutional obligations. However, counties with greater socio-climatic risks and lower baseline access also respond with high responsibility to address needs. Fair tariffs and provision levels vary across counties and between urban and rural areas, with poorer counties generally having higher tariffs. Decentralization risks reinforcing regional disparities, so adapting strategies to local political and socioeconomic contexts is important for achieving water access goals.
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2 Do Close Elections Benefit the Poor, Johanna Koehler
- 1. Do close elections benefit the poor? Water policy choices in a decentralised system Johanna Koehler, University of Oxford 10th Anniversary Conference of the ESRC-DFID Joint Fund for Poverty Alleviation Research Pretoria – 16 March 2016
- 2. Human Right to Water & Constitutional Obligation 273m rural Africans lack improved water access Kenya’s constitution of 2010 states in Article 43(1) (d) that every person has the right to clean and safe water in adequate quantities. Constitution defining the contract between the duty-bearers and the rights- holders. Criteria for evaluating water service policy choices 1. Sufficient quantity 2. Potable quality 3. Affordability 4. Physical access 5. Non-discrimination
- 3. Research Questions Which factors influence decision-makers’ interpretations of their constitutional mandate? Do close elections drive water service responsibility levels? How is the ‘affordability’ criterion translated into ‘fair tariffs’? Does decentralisation lead to improved water services?
- 4. Constitutional mandate: • Water Service Responsibility Index Political and socio-climatic risks: • Election Margin • Aridity • Baseline Water Coverage • County Water Budget • Poverty Level • Urbanisation Level • Citizen satisfaction
- 5. Water Policy Choice Framework High Low Socio-Climatic Risks Risk unattended Risk recognised Risk deferred Risk addressed Political Risk Low High Public choice & mutuality of gain Buchanan & Tullock 1962 Buchanan & Tollison 1972 Brennan & Lomasky 1993
- 6. Methodology Survey of 47 County Water Ministries (100%) in October to December 2015. 27 semi-structured interviews with national and county stakeholders in April to May 2015. Other sources: General election results from 4 March 2013 (IEBC 2013), 2015 Afrobarometer survey, Global Aridity Index (CGIAR-CSI 2009), 2011/12 WASREB data on water coverage, 2005/06 Kenya Integrated Household Budget Survey (KNBS 2012), 2009 Kenya Population and Housing Census (KNBS 2010).
- 7. Do County Water Ministries’ policy choices align with their constitutional obligation? §
- 8. Which factors influence county water policy choices?
- 9. Do closer elections lead to a higher degree of responsibility? -0.45 -0.4 -0.35 -0.3 -0.25 -0.2 -0.15 -0.1 -0.05 0 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 ResponsibilityIndex Election Margin Predicted association between widening of the election margin and the level of water service responsibility
- 10. High <10% margin Low >10% margin Electoral Pressure Low High Poverty n=9 Urban Rural Sufficient Quantity 78% 50% Potable Quality 89% 50% Affordability 56% 33% Physical access 89% 78% Non-Discrimination 89% 78% n=5 Urban Rural Sufficient Quantity 80% 80% Potable Quality 100% 80% Affordability 60% 100% Physical access 100% 100% Non-Discrimination 100% 100% n=13 Urban Rural Sufficient Quantity 64% 46% Potable Quality 64% 30% Affordability 62% 46% Physical access 77% 46% Non-Discrimination 75% 64% n=19 Urban Rural Sufficient Quantity 63% 63% Potable Quality 74% 74% Affordability 53% 58% Physical access 68% 79% Non-Discrimination 68% 79% Responsibilities across the risk zones
- 11. High <10% margin Low >10% margin Electoral Pressure Low High Poverty n=9 Urban Rural Fair Tariff (SD) (USD/m3) 0.71 (0.50) 0.99 (0.42) Fair provision of Drinking Water (l/capita/day) 49 (3) 31 (14) n=5 Urban Rural Fair Tariff (SD) (USD/m3) 1.09 (0.54) 1.28 (0.66) Fair provision of Drinking Water (l/capita/day) 44 (13) 30 (14) n=14 Urban Rural Fair Tariff (SD) (USD/m3) 1.03 (0.65) 1.41 (1.22) Fair provision of Drinking Water (l/capita/day) 42 (13) 32 (16) n=19 Urban Rural Fair Tariff (SD) (USD/m3) 1.48 (1.47) 1.69 (1.25) Fair provision of Drinking Water (l/capita/day) 39 (13) 29 (13) Fair Tariffs & Provision Levels
- 12. Fair tariffs (urban & rural) and poverty levels
- 13. One of the dangers of decentralisation is reinforcing regional disparities. On the one hand, those counties that have a closer election margin tend to have a higher sense of responsibility for serving their electorate. Relevance • For Kenya’s upcoming election: Does a higher level of democratic competition in the gubernatorial elections drive the water service agenda and the fulfilment of constitutional obligations? • For the SDG agenda: Countries do not respond uniformly, especially with a devolved system of governance. If we want to achieve fast progress, then adapting strategies to the socio-political realities of countries and their sub- national institutions is important. On the other hand, those counties that face higher socio-climatic risks, and have a lower baseline, tend to also respond with a higher sense of responsibility as they acknowledge the need for catching up.
- 14. Thank you! Questions and further information Related publications: Koehler et al. (2015) Pump-Priming Payments for Sustainable Water Services in Rural Africa. World Development, Vol. 74, pp. 397–411. Oxford/RFL (2015) Financial Sustainability for Rural Water Services – evidence from Kyuso, Kenya. SSEE Water Programme, Working Paper 2, Oxford University, UK. Hope, R.A (2014) Is Community Water Management the Community’s Choice? Implications for Water and Development Policy in Africa. Water Policy, 1-15. Oxford/RFL (2014) From Rights to Results for Rural Water Services – evidence from Kyuso, Kenya. SSEE Water Programme, Working Paper 1, Oxford University, UK. Thomson et al., (2012) GSM-enabled remote monitoring of rural handpumps – a proof-of-concept study. Journal of Hydroinformatics, 14(4): 29-39. Dr Rob Hope – Friday, 9am Session Translating Research Ideas into Water Security Impacts for the Poor in Rural Kenya Web: http://www.smithschool.ox.ac.uk/research- programmes/water-programme/ Email: johanna.koehler@smithschool.ox.ac.uk
Editor's Notes
- Today I would like to talk about the contract between duty-bearers and rights-holders, between voters and policy-makers. Specifically, I will talk about the contract on the right to water in Kenya and its implications for the poor.
- Rationale for this work: We are approaching the second round of general elections in Kenya’s newly decentralised system… International and national frameworks prescribe water policy choices. …SDGs – Goal 6.1 The political challenge of meeting this sub-goal alone is manifold. Without going into the important debate of measuring attainment of these goals, this paper addresses some of the varying policy choices decision-makers opt for in interpreting and implementing their mandate. Kenya on path to middle-income country, subscribed to HRWS.. 5 criteria These criteria became a constitutional right in Kenya with the 2010 constitution. The right to water is enshrined in article 43 1 (d) … Promises of decentralisation include… The central expectation of rights-holders is therefore an efficient and reliable service delivery – which places high political pressure on duty-bearers. Legal frameworks are currently being developed… The constitutional obligation of the right to water is one thing – but are the human rights criteria across these 5 categories universally acknowledged across the 47 counties?
- GAP: Literature examines the need for a unified approach to measuring the implementation of the SDG target but this misses the divergence that already occurs at the interpretation stage of the obligation. So:
- Water Service Responsibility Index: derived from responses to all 5 categories for both urban and rural.
- Political pressure exists from above – constitution – and from below since CGs are elected and seek re-election. This paper hypothesises that the right to water and its water service responsibilities are not universally acknowledged across the 47 counties. If this is the case, the question arises: why do different interpretations of this right exist? To answer this difficult question, the lens of public choice theory is applied. Politicians and bureaucrats are expected to work as agents of the general public and act in its interest. According to public choice theory, this is but a special case of what is called the principal-agent problem. At its centre is the mutuality of gain: To avoid the ‘public bad’, certain socio-climatic risks need addressing – if those are high, there may be a high utility for the duty-bearer in addressing the risks If duty-bearers face an incentive (for example through competition over re-election) they consider a higher utility in ensuring that their constitutional mandate is fully met. Quadrant…
- 72% of the surveys were conducted with the CEC Members for Water themselves. Some directed their Chief Officers (15%) or Directors of Water Services (11%) to respond. CAVEAT: County water policy choices are measured here in terms of the subjective statement by County Water Ministries
- Article 174 (f) states that the objectives of the devolution of government include “the provision of proximate, easily accessible services throughout Kenya”. BUT when county water ministries were asked whether they acknowledge responsibility of 5 categories… mixed response.
- We conducted a multivariate linear regression analysis with responsibility index as the dependent variable. “Election margin” was transformed into its square root …. Due to missing data 41 out of 47 cases are observed. 59 per cent of the variance in water service responsibilities is explained through the model. All variables but aridity are statistically significant at the five per cent level. If all other variables are held constant, the model suggests that a wider election margin is associated with a lower degree of responsibility…
- Here we see the predicted association… So, a widening of the election margin from 1 to 10% as well as from 10 to 30% is associated with a decrease in the level of responsibility by 10% if all other variables are held constant. Literature supports this finding. For example, in an article examining primary education spending among 29 Mexican states (1999-2004), Hecock (2006) shows that greater electoral competition leads to increased spending.
- Here we cross-tabulate by election margin and poverty levels… The quadrant of counties facing high electoral pressure and high poverty has the highest level of attention across the 5 responsibility categories (“risk addressed” quadrant). Then following down the quadrants (risk recognised, risk deferred), we finally get to the 13 counties facing low risks for both electoral pressure and poverty which also appears to have the lowest levels of responsibility on average. Affordability…outlier: jump… Let’s investigate the affordability & poverty relationship more closely – also in relation to fair tariffs.
- We also asked the County Water Ministers what constitutes a fair tariff for urban and rural areas. It is quite striking that the average fair tariff for rural water provision was defined 29% higher for rural.. This difference may partially be accounted for: Here we cross-tabulate means for fair tariffs and fair drinking water provision levels… On average those counties that face high electoral pressure have lower tariffs, but so do those counties with LOWER poverty rates. A number of reasons: a) affordability is relative… b)counties with mainly rural areas tend to have higher poverty rates…and are drier… cost of provision
- Poverty levels are higher in the arid and more rural northern and north-eastern counties. The question of subsidisation arises: According to the Water Ministers, 40% of the counties state that users should pay the full cost of water provision.
- Relevance: Poor and marginalised (lower baseline coverage) appear to benefit from water policy choices in terms of responsibilities. Relevance for Kenya’s upcoming election: it appears that a healthy level of democratic competition in the gubernatorial elections drives the water service agenda and the fulfilment of the constitutional obligations. It is certainly true that county water ministers (as appointed by governor) drive their agenda with the view to fulfil their election promises to achieve re-election. Relevance for SDG/HRW debate – responsibilities across the five categories are driven by a number of political and socio-climatic factors. Countries do not respond uniformly, especially if they have a devolved system of governance. The question of achieving SDG target starts with the acknowledgement and uptake of their mandate by decision-makers before we even start to measure progress.