2. Maritime Security from the
Viewpoint of Maritime Labor
George A. Quick
Vice President
International Organization of
Masters, Mates and Pilots
3. Maritime Security
• Maritime labor fully supports ship and port
security as envisioned by the IMO in the ISPS
Code.
• There is a need to recognize the international
scope of the maritime transportation system.
• Only an international regime can effectively
address the security of a global transportation
system.
4. ISPS Code
• The IMO undertook the drafting and adoption
of the ISPS Code in 2002.
• In drafting the Code it was recognized that
there was a potential conflict between security,
the efficiency of maritime transport and the
human rights and working conditions of
transport workers
5. ISPS Code
Preamble to the ISPS Code
10 Nothing in this Code shall be interpreted or applied
in a manner inconsistent with the proper respect of
fundamental rights and freedoms as set out in
international instruments, particularly those
relating to maritime workers and refugees,
including the International Labor Organization
Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights
at Work, as well as international standards
concerning maritime and port workers.
6. ISPS Code
• A major concern was that a security regime
would unreasonably restrict the freedom of
movement of seafarers by:
• Denial of shore leave
• Denial of access through terminals
7. ISPS Code
Preamble to the ISPS Code
11 Recognizing that the Convention on the Facilitation of
Maritime Traffic, 1965, as amended, provides that foreign
crew members shall be allowed ashore by the public
authorities while the ship on which they arrive is in port,
provided that the formalities on arrival of the ship have been
fulfilled and the public authorities have no reason to refuse
permission to come ashore for reasons of public health,
public safety or public order, Contracting Governments
when approving ship and port facility security plans should
pay due cognizance to the fact that ship’s personnel live and
work on the vessel and need shore leave and access to shore
based seafarer welfare facilities, including medical care.
8. ISPS Code, Part A - Mandatory Provisions
16 PORT FACILITY SECURITY PLAN
16.2 The port facility security plan shall be approved by the
Contracting Government in whose territory the port facility is
located.
16.3 Such a plan shall be developed taking into account the
guidance given in Part B of this Code and shall be in the
working language of the port facility. The plan shall address,
at least, the following:
.15 procedures for facilitating shore leave for ship's
personnel or personnel changes, as well as access of visitors
to the ship including representatives of seafarers' welfare
and labour organizations.
9. ISPS Code
• The provisions of the ISPS Code regarding
shore leave and access through port facilities
are not being adhered to by all governments.
• The denial of shore leave and access through
port facilities are of major concern to seagoing
maritime labor.
• In June of 2004 the IMO issued further
guidance on the proper application of the ISPS
Code in MSC/Circ.1112
10. MSC/Circ.1112- Shore Leave and Access to Ships under the ISPS Code
1 The 2002 SOLAS Conference that adopted …….the ISPS
Code…………..was aware of potential human aspect
problems affecting the fundamental human rights of seafarers
with the imposition of a security regime on international
shipping on a global basis. It was recognized that seafarers
would have the primary duties and responsibilities for
implementing the new security regime for ships. At the same
time, there was concern that the emphasis on port facility
security may result in the ship and seafarers being viewed as a
potential threat to security rather than partners in the new
security regime.
11. MSC/Circ.1112- Shore Leave and Access to Ships under the ISPS Code
2 In this regard, it was recognized that there may be conflicts
between security and human rights, as well as between
security and the efficient movement of ships and cargoes in
international trade that is essential to the global economy.
There must be a proper balance between the needs of security,
the protection of the human rights of seafarers and port
workers, and the requirement to maintain the safety and
working efficiency of the ship by allowing access to ship
support services such as the taking on of stores, repair and
maintenance of essential equipment, and other vital activities
that are appropriately undertaken while moored at port
facilities.
12. MSC/Circ.1112- Shore Leave and Access to Ships under the ISPS Code
4 To address these concerns and principles…..
the ISPS Code provides that a port facility security
plan (PFSP) must contain procedures for facilitating
shore leave, crew changes and access for visitors
including representatives of seafarers’ welfare and
labour organizations. This should be construed as
including shore-based ship support personnel and the
taking onboard of ship’s stores. The guidance
contained in ……. the ISPS Code reinforces this
requirement by providing that the PFSP should
contain such procedures relating to all security levels.
13. ISPS Code, Part A - Mandatory Provisions
14 Port Facility Security
14.1 A port facility is required to act upon the security levels
set by the Contracting Government within whose territory it is
located. Security measures and procedures shall be applied
at the port facility in such a manner as to cause a
minimum of interference with, or delay to, passengers,
ship, ships’ personnel and visitors, goods and services.
14. The Identity dilemma
• There is a need for a universally accepted
seafarer identity document.
• The International Labor Organization (ILO)
has developed an international Seafarer
Identity document (SID).
• The ILO SID Convention is not yet ratified
and some countries are reluctant to accept an
identity document issued by another country
for visa or travel purposes.
15. The Identity dilemma
• In order to go ashore or travel for crew change
purposes the United States is now requiring
seafarers to make a personal appearance before
a US Consul to obtain an individual visa.
• This is a time consuming and costly
requirement for a foreign seafarer.
16. The Identity dilemma
• The Australian model - a Maritime Crew Visa
(MCV).
• Application with passport number via the
internet.
• Security check against Australian database.
• Visa issued within three to four days,
electronically linked to passport number.
• No charge to the seafarer for the visa.
17. The Problem
• Security professionals lack an understanding
of the maritime industry.
• A singular focus on the port facility in the
security plan without consideration of its
impact on the other partners in the maritime
transportation system.
18. The Problem
The politics of fear driving the security
agenda – more important to look vigorously
committed to security regardless of whether
the action or program is reasonable or
effective.
19. THE END
I hope I have said enough about maritime
labor and maritime security to start an
interesting discussion with some of you over
the next few days.
Editor's Notes
Good morning, Ladies and gentlemen.
My name is George Quick and I am vice president of the international Organization of Masters, Mates and Pilots. Our organization represents the officers aboard American flag ships.
I am very pleased to have been invited to this conference and given the opportunity to express the views of maritime labor on maritime security.
I was on the working group as a representative of labor at the International Maritime Organization meetings that drafted the ISPS Code. I must say, It has been disturbing to observe over the last four years the differences that have arisen between the intent of the Code as envisioned by the drafters and its implementation.
In this presentation I am going to limit myself to a discussion of what seagoing labor had hoped for in the ISPS Code and where we have been disappointed.
Maritime labor fully supports ship and port security as envisioned by the IMO in the ISPS Code.
Transportation workers are on the front line and will suffer the first casualties of any terrorist attack.
There is a need to recognize the international scope of the maritime transportation system. It is the middle link in the global supply chain that supports the global economy. And as such, it may be an inviting target to terrorist to use as a vehicle for terrorist activities, or to attack as a means of crippling the Western economy.
Only an international regime can effectively address the security of a global transportation system.
It was recognized immediately after 9/11 that only an international body, such as the International Maritime Organization which is the United Nations organization that regulates international shipping, had the capacity to develop and implement a global maritime security regime.
The IMO undertook the drafting and adoption of the ISPS Code in 2002. The members nations of IMO with the participation of industry and labor representatives met in three sessions to draft the Code that ultimately was adopted by a Diplomatic Conference in 2002.
In drafting the Code it was recognized that there was a potential conflict between security, the efficiency of maritime transport and the human rights and working conditions of transport workers. The IMO was very aware that there was a potential conflict between the goals of security and maintaining an efficient Maritime Transportation System, and between security and the human rights and working conditions of maritime transport workers.
The IMO and the subsequent Diplomatic Conference placed language in the preamble of the ISPS Code drawing attention to the need to respect the rights of transport workers in applying the security provisions of the Code. And later took further steps, both in the Code and in follow up guidance on how the code was to be implemented, to protect the rights and working conditions of transport workers.
The IMO was concerned that there could be a singular focus on port security without regard to its effect on ship's crews and the Maritime Transportation System. In the name of security there might be unreasonable restrictions placed on seafarers by port states or port facilities to leave the ship for shore leave, crew changes or medical attention.
Denial of the right to go ashore in a port results in seafarers being imprisoned aboard ship for long periods of time - a fundamental denial of human rights.
In an effort to emphasis that locking down seafarers aboard their ships was an unacceptable approach to port security, the IMO included language in the preamble to the ISPS Code drawing attention for the need for shore leave and access to shore. The language of the preamble addresses two issues - the government granting permission, or visa, for a seafarer to go ashore, and the government ensuring that in approving port facility security plans they provided for physical access of seafarers through terminals needed to take advantage of the visa to go ashore. In order to leave a ship for any reason, a seafarer needs both a visa from the port state and the ability to pass through the terminal.
To make it clear that seafarers, and others that provide services to the ship or its crew, have a need and a right of access through port facilities at which the ship is berthed, the IMO included a provision in the mandatory Part A of the Code that governments must ensure that, as a condition of approval of security plans, port facilities must have procedures in place to facilitate shore leave, crew changes, and access for visitors including representatives of seafarer welfare and labor organizations. This provision has been construed by IMO as including shore-based ship support personnel and the taking onboard of ship’s stores.
During the implementation phase of the ISPS Code it was clear that not all governments where adhering to their treaty obligations as contracting parties to the SOLAS Convention in implementing the provisions in the ISPS code regarding shore leave and access through port facilities. The United States was and still is one of the main offender.
In our view the denial of shore leave and access are violations of fundamental human rights.
In June of 2004 the IMO Maritime Security Working Group considered the impact that the improper application of security measures, in violation of the ISPS Code provisions, were having on ship's crews and the Maritime Transportation System. The result was further guidance by IMO on the appropriate application of security measures under the ISPS Code.
MSC/Circular 1112 is an important document as it defines what the relationship should be under the ISPS Code between the ship and its crew, and the port facility under the ISPS Code. The first paragraph of the Circular is posted on the screen. It makes it clear that there is a potential conflict between human rights and security. And it points out that ships crews are an integral part of an effective security regime, and should be viewed as partners rather than as a potential threat. Unfortunately in many cases ship's crews are still being treated as potential terrorists. In spite of the fact that ships operate under a security plan that is supposed to complement port security in a cooperative working relationship. In our view there seems to be something about port security that fosters a sense of suspicion and distrust in their interaction with ships and crews.
The second paragraph of the Circular posted on the screen addresses the need for a balance between security and the human rights of seafarers and port workers. It recognizes the conflict between security and the efficient movement of cargoes in international trade that is essential to the global economy. And it ties the working efficiency ships, which world trade depends upon, to their ability to have access to support services, such as taking on of stores, repair and maintenance of equipment, and other activities that are necessarily undertaken while berthed at port facilities. Without ships there isn't a maritime transportation system. And ships have needs that must be met to continue to function efficiently, or function at all. Those needs must be taken into account in imposing port security controls. I suspect that a large part of the problem is that the security professionals responsible for port security don't have a background or understanding of ship operations.
Paragraph 4 of the Circular posted on the screen reiterates the mandatory requirement that port facilities facilitate access for ship's crew, support personnel and the taking on of stores. Unfortunately, some port facilities still lock down access to the ship as a security measure, while others see security as a potential profit center and charge seafarers or visitors to the ship exorbitant "security fees" to escort the seafarer from the gangway to the gate. The "escort" fees in some instances can be several hundred dollars to walk less than a 100 meters through the terminal to the gate. With ships being denied access for crew change or taking stores, some ships are changing crews or taking stores via a boat service while underway in the channel. This is a practice that is expensive, hazardous to personnel and to shipping traffic in congested ports.
This not the fault of the ISPS Code or the IMO which have developed appropriate provisions in the ISPS Code in anticipation of these situations arising and have issued appropriate guidance in their Circular after the conditions where brought to their attention.
The fault lies with national governments that do not enforce the provisions of the ISPS Code and the guidance provided by the IMO. Port facilities that don't provide access as required by the ISPS Code should not have their Port Security Facility Plans approved by the government, and if they operate in violation of the ISPS Code requirements they should be shut down until they are in compliance with international requirements.
Not only does the ISPS Code contain specific provisions addressing access for shore leave and visitors to the ship, but it contains a mandatory section 14, posted on the screen, providing that security measures shall be applied at the port facility in such a manner as to cause a minimum of interference with, or delay to, passengers, ship, ship's personnel and visitors, goods or services. Nothing could be clearer that the port facility's security procedures are to take into account the needs of the ship and its crew. How locking down the ship at the berth, confining the crew onboard, denying access for essential service and support personnel, denying access for taking on stores, fuel or water, and charging exorbitant fees for "escort services" - can be justified under the ISPS Code provisions intended to protect the ship from these types of abuses is unbelievable. The real disgrace is that these are port facilities operating under security plans approved by port state governments who bear the ultimate responsibility for how security procedures are applied at port facilities under their jurisdiction.
At least part of the problem with shore leave and port facility access control is the lack of a internationally recognized identity document attesting to the fact that the holder has been screened for terrorist activities and cleared for shore leave and access control purposes.
At the international level the Seafarer Identity Document Convention is under the jurisdiction of the International Labor Organization (ILO), a sister UN organization to the IMO that controls international labor standards. At the request of the IMO, the ILO convened a conference to adopt a new international standard for a Seafarers’ Identity Document (SID) to be used in conjunction with the security regime envisioned in the ISPS Code. That standard is now contained in ILO Convention C 185 and is based on biometric identifiers using standards developed by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) which regulate international air transport. The international SID is intended to be complementary to the ISPS Code for controlling access to secure areas and to permit mariners free movement to and from ships for shore leave or crew changes.
Unfortunately the ILO SID Convention is not yet ratified and some countries are reluctant to accept an identity document issued by another country in lieu of a visa for shore leave or travel for crew change purposes.
On the basis of maritime security, the US has eliminated the crew list visa and are requiring seafarers who go ashore or travel to the US to make a personal appearance before a US consul to obtain an individual visa.
Most seafarers are under contracts lasting between four and eight months in duration. The ships may be trading worldwide and no one knows before hand, months in advance, the ships schedule or itinerary. To expect seafarers to travel to a port and apply in person before a consul and pay a fee to obtain a visa for each country that a ship may call at during an eight month voyage is unreasonable.
Australia had the same reluctance as the US to accept an identity document issued by another country in lieu of a visa for shore leave or crew change purposes. Their solution was to develop a Maritime Crew Visa that can be applied for on line by completing a form containing all the required personal information and the seafarers national passport number. The information is checked against an Australian data base and if cleared the seafarer is issued an electronic visa linked to his national passport number. The visa is usually issued within 3-4 days and there is no charge to the seafarer for the visa.
While in principle maritime labor would prefer the ILO SID be recognized as an identity document and accepted for shore leave and travel purposes. We can understand at this point that the Australian Maritime Crew Visa represents a reasonable compromise until the issues with the ILO SID can be resolved.
The need to implement the ISPS Code has created a whole new industry of security professionals. Retired military or police officers that had any tenuous claim to security experience became security consultants or began new careers with security contracting companies. This newly expanded industry has a vested interest in extending security controls into all facets of the maritime industry, but has very little knowledge or concern as to how the maritime transportation system operates, or the work environment of maritime transport workers. It is not surprising that the security plans they develop and implement are out of touch with the realities of the maritime work place.
When a security consulting firm is contracted to develop the required security plan for a port facility it is apparent few take a holistic approach as to how that plan fits into the overall goal of the ISPS Code to find an appropriate balance between security, the efficiency of international trade, the operating requirements of the ship that makes international trade possible and the human rights of seafarers. We sometimes wonder if the security professionals responsible for the plan have ever read, let alone understand the provisions of the ISPS Code. There often appears to be a singular focus on the security of the port facility to the exclusion of all other considerations. The security procedures enforced by port facilities under such plans are deeply resented by ship’s crews and do little to establish a cooperative working relationship between the ship and port facility.
It is politically incorrect to say it, but there is a political agenda driving some of the decisions made in the name of security. No one wants to be perceived as soft on terrorism. And there are contracts and funding available if a company or government agency can make a visible public show of being on the front lines in the war on terror. Unfortunately, most of the programs under taken to demonstrate the commitment to protect the public from terrorists have ships and seafarers, or port workers as the designated potential terrorists. Labor pays the price by being burdened with regulations that many of us see as unnecessary and ineffective.
