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DDOS — Nuisance or Threat? 
© Norse 
Harold Teunissen & Roland van Rijswijk-Deij 
TECHEX14, Indianapolis, October 2014
Serving Dutch research & education 
DDOS Nuisance or Threat — TECHEX14— Indianapolis, IN — October 2014 
2
SURF as umbrella 
• All ICT activities for Higher Education and Research in the 
Netherlands are under the SURF umbrella 
DDOS Nuisance or Threat — TECHEX14— Indianapolis, IN — October 2014 
3 
Scientific Computing 
& Big Data 
Commercial ICT 
Products & Services 
National Research & 
Education Network 
eScience Collaboration 
and Tools
Absolute awareness 
DDOS Nuisance or Threat — TECHEX14— Indianapolis, IN — October 2014 
4
We take security serious 
DDOS Nuisance or Threat — TECHEX14— Indianapolis, IN — October 2014 
5
Vision 
DDOS Nuisance or Threat — TECHEX14— Indianapolis, IN — October 2014 
6
Immunity 
DDOS Nuisance or Threat — TECHEX14— Indianapolis, IN — October 2014 
7
Level of protection 
DDOS Nuisance or Threat — TECHEX14— Indianapolis, IN — October 2014 
8
Security & Privacy Program 
SAFE AND SECURE ENVIRONMENT 
DDOS Nuisance or Threat — TECHEX14— Indianapolis, IN — October 2014 
9 
AWARENESS 
STANDARDS 
FREE 
INTERNET 
COMMUNITIES SERVICES
What do we see? 
FAIR SHARE? 
DDOS Nuisance or Threat — TECHEX14— Indianapolis, IN — October 2014 
10 
Universities Attacks 
Attacks 
Vocational 
Education 
High Attacks 
Schools
Regular user 
DDOS Nuisance or Threat — TECHEX14— Indianapolis, IN — October 2014 
11 
DUTCH PUBLIC BROADCASTER
Regular user 
DDOS Nuisance or Threat — TECHEX14— Indianapolis, IN — October 2014 
12 
DUTCH PUBLIC BROADCASTER 
Winter 
Olympics 
World Cup 
Soccer
Regular user 
DDOS Nuisance or Threat — TECHEX14— Indianapolis, IN — October 2014 
13 
DUTCH PUBLIC BROADCASTER 
MH17
Not every spike is an attack 
A Large University 
DDOS Astronomers 
DDOS Nuisance or Threat — TECHEX14— Indianapolis, IN — October 2014 
14
What do we see? 
• DDoS attacks mostly directed against schools 
• Majority are Bandwidth Denial-of-Service attacks 
- Usually some form of amplification, mostly NTP, DNS, 
CharGen, we also now see some UPnP based stuff 
• Not every traffic spike is an attack 
- Monitor for anomalous events (e.g. excess UDP/ICMP 
traffic) 
- Manual analysis by our CSIRT 
• Attacks in Tens-of-Gigabits order of magnitude 
• Many attacks rely on “DDoS-for-Hire” a.k.a. 
Booters and are often inside jobs 
DDOS Nuisance or Threat — TECHEX14— Indianapolis, IN — October 2014 
15
Keep your friends close... 
•We were monitoring for a particular attack 
(because it abused some of our infrastructure) 
•One of our customers appeared in a list of 
spoofed IP addresses for this particular attack 
•And was the victim of a number of DDoS attacks 
•The timing of the attacks was rather suggestive... 
Always during school hours! 
•Let’s have a look at what the school found 
DDOS Nuisance or Threat — TECHEX14— Indianapolis, IN — October 2014 
16
Let’s see what happens if... 
•The external NAT IP address is changed 
–Will the attack follow? 
•We look at the time lines 
–Comparing attack times against class schedule 
•We ask teachers about suspicious behaviour 
–Are there signs that the culprit is among the students? 
•Policy-Based Routing (PBR) 
–Giving a suspected class a different external IP address 
DDOS Nuisance or Threat — TECHEX14— Indianapolis, IN — October 2014 
17
Caught after bragging 
DDOS Nuisance or Threat — TECHEX14— Indianapolis, IN — October 2014 
Courtesy: Graafschap College 
18
Is this a problem? 
• If an attack originates from our network that is 
very bad — we have big pipes… 
• The example inside job caused 1000s of students 
and 100s of staff to go home because they could 
no longer work 
• Students need to learn that they are committing 
a criminal offense 
DDOS Nuisance or Threat — TECHEX14— Indianapolis, IN — October 2014 
19
What do we do? 
• Our CSIRT keeps vigil 24x7 
• We constantly monitor our and our 
constituency’s infrastructure for abuse 
- Concerted efforts to combat e.g. open DNS resolvers and 
vulnerable NTP servers 
• We report criminal offenses to the authorities and 
encourage our constituency to do so too 
- We collaborate with law enforcement and the public 
prosecutor’s office 
• We (pre-)wash traffic 
- using rate limiting, filters, … 
DDOS Nuisance or Threat — TECHEX14— Indianapolis, IN — October 2014 
20
Cybersave Yourself 
DDOS Nuisance or Threat — TECHEX14— Indianapolis, IN — October 2014 
21
Research 
• We actively collaborate with academic groups 
and non-profit organisations on DDoS research 
• Study on “DDoS-for-Hire” services 
• Support DDoS Defense research 
• Legal expert opinions on e.g. botnet 
take-downs 
• Share operational network data with researchers 
and develop policy for ethical data sharing 
• Software Defined Security 
DDOS Nuisance or Threat — TECHEX14— Indianapolis, IN — October 2014 
22
Upcoming Services 
• Protection as a Service a.k.a. DIY Cyber Laundry 
• Centralised firewall 
• Pentesting 
• Maturity scans and auditing (ISO2700x) 
• Security games 
DDOS Nuisance or Threat — TECHEX14— Indianapolis, IN — October 2014 
23
harold.teunissen@surfnet.nl haroldteunissen

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DDOS – a Nuisance or Threat?

  • 1. DDOS — Nuisance or Threat? © Norse Harold Teunissen & Roland van Rijswijk-Deij TECHEX14, Indianapolis, October 2014
  • 2. Serving Dutch research & education DDOS Nuisance or Threat — TECHEX14— Indianapolis, IN — October 2014 2
  • 3. SURF as umbrella • All ICT activities for Higher Education and Research in the Netherlands are under the SURF umbrella DDOS Nuisance or Threat — TECHEX14— Indianapolis, IN — October 2014 3 Scientific Computing & Big Data Commercial ICT Products & Services National Research & Education Network eScience Collaboration and Tools
  • 4. Absolute awareness DDOS Nuisance or Threat — TECHEX14— Indianapolis, IN — October 2014 4
  • 5. We take security serious DDOS Nuisance or Threat — TECHEX14— Indianapolis, IN — October 2014 5
  • 6. Vision DDOS Nuisance or Threat — TECHEX14— Indianapolis, IN — October 2014 6
  • 7. Immunity DDOS Nuisance or Threat — TECHEX14— Indianapolis, IN — October 2014 7
  • 8. Level of protection DDOS Nuisance or Threat — TECHEX14— Indianapolis, IN — October 2014 8
  • 9. Security & Privacy Program SAFE AND SECURE ENVIRONMENT DDOS Nuisance or Threat — TECHEX14— Indianapolis, IN — October 2014 9 AWARENESS STANDARDS FREE INTERNET COMMUNITIES SERVICES
  • 10. What do we see? FAIR SHARE? DDOS Nuisance or Threat — TECHEX14— Indianapolis, IN — October 2014 10 Universities Attacks Attacks Vocational Education High Attacks Schools
  • 11. Regular user DDOS Nuisance or Threat — TECHEX14— Indianapolis, IN — October 2014 11 DUTCH PUBLIC BROADCASTER
  • 12. Regular user DDOS Nuisance or Threat — TECHEX14— Indianapolis, IN — October 2014 12 DUTCH PUBLIC BROADCASTER Winter Olympics World Cup Soccer
  • 13. Regular user DDOS Nuisance or Threat — TECHEX14— Indianapolis, IN — October 2014 13 DUTCH PUBLIC BROADCASTER MH17
  • 14. Not every spike is an attack A Large University DDOS Astronomers DDOS Nuisance or Threat — TECHEX14— Indianapolis, IN — October 2014 14
  • 15. What do we see? • DDoS attacks mostly directed against schools • Majority are Bandwidth Denial-of-Service attacks - Usually some form of amplification, mostly NTP, DNS, CharGen, we also now see some UPnP based stuff • Not every traffic spike is an attack - Monitor for anomalous events (e.g. excess UDP/ICMP traffic) - Manual analysis by our CSIRT • Attacks in Tens-of-Gigabits order of magnitude • Many attacks rely on “DDoS-for-Hire” a.k.a. Booters and are often inside jobs DDOS Nuisance or Threat — TECHEX14— Indianapolis, IN — October 2014 15
  • 16. Keep your friends close... •We were monitoring for a particular attack (because it abused some of our infrastructure) •One of our customers appeared in a list of spoofed IP addresses for this particular attack •And was the victim of a number of DDoS attacks •The timing of the attacks was rather suggestive... Always during school hours! •Let’s have a look at what the school found DDOS Nuisance or Threat — TECHEX14— Indianapolis, IN — October 2014 16
  • 17. Let’s see what happens if... •The external NAT IP address is changed –Will the attack follow? •We look at the time lines –Comparing attack times against class schedule •We ask teachers about suspicious behaviour –Are there signs that the culprit is among the students? •Policy-Based Routing (PBR) –Giving a suspected class a different external IP address DDOS Nuisance or Threat — TECHEX14— Indianapolis, IN — October 2014 17
  • 18. Caught after bragging DDOS Nuisance or Threat — TECHEX14— Indianapolis, IN — October 2014 Courtesy: Graafschap College 18
  • 19. Is this a problem? • If an attack originates from our network that is very bad — we have big pipes… • The example inside job caused 1000s of students and 100s of staff to go home because they could no longer work • Students need to learn that they are committing a criminal offense DDOS Nuisance or Threat — TECHEX14— Indianapolis, IN — October 2014 19
  • 20. What do we do? • Our CSIRT keeps vigil 24x7 • We constantly monitor our and our constituency’s infrastructure for abuse - Concerted efforts to combat e.g. open DNS resolvers and vulnerable NTP servers • We report criminal offenses to the authorities and encourage our constituency to do so too - We collaborate with law enforcement and the public prosecutor’s office • We (pre-)wash traffic - using rate limiting, filters, … DDOS Nuisance or Threat — TECHEX14— Indianapolis, IN — October 2014 20
  • 21. Cybersave Yourself DDOS Nuisance or Threat — TECHEX14— Indianapolis, IN — October 2014 21
  • 22. Research • We actively collaborate with academic groups and non-profit organisations on DDoS research • Study on “DDoS-for-Hire” services • Support DDoS Defense research • Legal expert opinions on e.g. botnet take-downs • Share operational network data with researchers and develop policy for ethical data sharing • Software Defined Security DDOS Nuisance or Threat — TECHEX14— Indianapolis, IN — October 2014 22
  • 23. Upcoming Services • Protection as a Service a.k.a. DIY Cyber Laundry • Centralised firewall • Pentesting • Maturity scans and auditing (ISO2700x) • Security games DDOS Nuisance or Threat — TECHEX14— Indianapolis, IN — October 2014 23