1. Since the Colonial era, the US has been involved in six different wars or armed conflicts. . False 2. Thomas and Kilman identified five main conflict management strategies: avoiding, accommodating, compromising, competing, and collaborating. True 3. You should determine which conflict management strategy works best for you, and then stick with this strategy. False 4. The American approach to conflict management (embodied in Thomas and Kilman’s five conflict management strategies) does not take into account the importance that conflict avoidance has for other cultures. True 5. The dynamic conflict management style, used by many Saudis and other Arabs, avoids the direct discussion of conflict, but people are expected to express strong emotions. True 6. Which of the following statements is not an accurate statement about how Americans think about conflict? . A typical American textbook definition of conflict will describe conflict in neutral terms. . Many Americans believe that conflicts of opinion should be avoided or indirectly addressed. . American business and industry often encourage healthy conflict. . In America, insisting that a conflict cannot be resolved because it would violate an individual’s autonomy may be viewed as heroic. 7. In America, insisting that a conflict cannot be resolved because it would violate an individual’s autonomy may be viewed as heroic. . None of these . They almost always view conflict as inappropriate, disruptive, harmful, and dangerous. . They are not comfortable with the expression of many different opinions, especially when these opinions clash or conflict. . All of these 8. Which of the following statements is not an accurate statement about the American approach to conflict? . Americans love to negotiate prices and “dicker” over prices and fees for goods and services. 9. Conflict within a group or country is called . ethnic conflict. . international conflict. . class conflict. . internecine conflict. 10. Conflict that becomes more confrontational, destructive, or serious over time is called . escalating conflict. . pseudo conflict. . historical conflict. . serial conflict. 11. Stephen P. Cook has designed an interactive, web-based experience that allows people to explore 81 different worldview themes and 320 worldview subcategories. . True 12. Huston Smith identifies and labels three major ontological worldviews that have existed in human history. . True 13. Mark Staller identifies and labels three major epistemological worldviews that have developed linearly in the history of western culture. . False 14. Religious syncretism is widely practiced in China and other Eastern countries. . True 15. About 2% of the world population is secular/nonreligious/agnostic/atheist. . False 16. According to Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck, what is a primary cultural view of human nature? . All of these 17. Which of the following is not a characteristic of worldviews? . Worldviews can clash or conflict. . Worldviews are tran ...

1. 1. Since the Colonial era, the US has been involved in six
different wars or armed conflicts.
. False
2. Thomas and Kilman identified five main conflict management
strategies: avoiding, accommodating, compromising, competing,
and collaborating.
True
3. You should determine which conflict management strategy
works best for you, and then stick with this strategy.
False
4. The American approach to conflict management (embodied in
Thomas and Kilman’s five conflict management strategies) does
not take into account the importance that conflict avoidance has
for other cultures.
True
5. The dynamic conflict management style, used by many
Saudis and other Arabs, avoids the direct discussion of conflict,
but people are expected to express strong emotions.
True
6. Which of the following statements is not an accurate
statement about how Americans think about conflict?
. A typical American textbook definition of conflict will
describe conflict in neutral terms.
. Many Americans believe that conflicts of opinion should be
avoided or indirectly addressed.
. American business and industry often encourage healthy
conflict.
. In America, insisting that a conflict cannot be resolved
because it would violate an individual’s autonomy may be
viewed as heroic.
7. In America, insisting that a conflict cannot be resolved
because it would violate an individual’s autonomy may be
viewed as heroic.
. None of these

2. . They almost always view conflict as inappropriate, disruptive,
harmful, and dangerous.
. They are not comfortable with the expression of many
different opinions, especially when these opinions clash or
conflict.
. All of these
8. Which of the following statements is not an accurate
statement about the American approach to conflict?
. Americans love to negotiate prices and “dicker” over prices
and fees for goods and services.
9. Conflict within a group or country is called
. ethnic conflict.
. international conflict.
. class conflict.
. internecine conflict.
10. Conflict that becomes more confrontational, destructive, or
serious over time is called
. escalating conflict.
. pseudo conflict.
. historical conflict.
. serial conflict.
11. Stephen P. Cook has designed an interactive, web-based
experience that allows people to explore 81 different worldview
themes and 320 worldview subcategories.
. True
12. Huston Smith identifies and labels three major ontological
worldviews that have existed in human history.
. True
13. Mark Staller identifies and labels three major
epistemological worldviews that have developed linearly in the
history of western culture.
. False
14. Religious syncretism is widely practiced in China and other
Eastern countries.
. True
15. About 2% of the world population is

3. secular/nonreligious/agnostic/atheist.
. False
16. According to Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck, what is a primary
cultural view of human nature?
. All of these
17. Which of the following is not a characteristic of
worldviews?
. Worldviews can clash or conflict.
. Worldviews are transmitted by human cultures.
. Worldviews are solid and static.
. Worldviews can contain internal conflicts or tensions.
18. Which of the following are types of worldviews presented
in the textbook?
. All of these
19. Which of the following is not a basic element of religion
identified in the textbook?
. Creed
. Code
. Conflict
20. The belief that one religion is correct, and that other
religions are in serious error, is called
. exclusivism.
. syncretism.
. plurism.
. monotheism.
21. A labor diaspora occurs when people are banished from
their place of origin usually as the result of conquest,
persecution, enslavement, genocide, or exile.
. False
22. Many Native Americans use the term “genocide” to describe
the Trail of Tears, a 1,000 mile forced migration of an estimated
60,000 Native Americans from the Southeastern US to
Oklahoma prompted by the Indian Removal Act of 1830.
. True
23. Between 1640 and 1661, many of the American colonies

4. legalized the importation and permanent enslavement of people
from Africa. However, most African slaves in America were
still treated with respect as people.
. False
24. The enclosure acts of 1730-1860 forced hundreds of
thousands of people off their ancestral lands in England, Wales,
Scotland, and Ireland in the 100-year period that became known
as the Industrial Revolution.
. True
25. According to the results of the 2000 and 2010 US census,
Hispanics or Latinos comprise the largest racial group in
California, over half of the population of this US state.
。False
26. The traditional, unofficial, non-institutional part of culture
transmitted word of mouth or by customary examples is called
. federal history.
. folklore.
. the public record.
. national history.
27. Which of the following is not a shared value listed by the
American Historical Association?
。Strive for complete objectivity and a preferred account of
events from the past.
28. Historians build their narratives from
。 All of these
29. Histories centered on the expansion of nations beyond their
own borders and the effects those expansions had on the
indigenous people whose lives were impacted are called
. political histories.
. socioeconomic class histories.
. colonial histories.
. federal histories.
30. When migrants go to another land that has been conquered
by their own nation and enjoy higher status as a result of their
status as representatives of a conquering power, this is called a
(n)

5. 。 imperial diaspora.
31. Most of us are born into our privileges and have no idea that
we are getting advantages that other people do not have access
to.
。 True
32. In Chapter Nine of the textbook, “minority identities” is a
term used to refer to identities related to racial or ethnic groups
that are not White.
。False
33. Majority identity development and minority identity
development follow the four exact same stages.
。False
34. If you are a US citizen, male, middle-class, right-handed,
able-bodied, or heterosexual, you have a Majority Identity.
。True
35. The Platinum Rule essentially says, “Do to others what you
would have done to you.”
。False
36. When a person who has noticed a difference points out an
aspect of our identities, they might.
。 All of these
37. Which of the following statements about identity are true?
。Our identities act as lenses through which we see the world
and we do not think much about our own identities unless we
begin to notice how they are similar or different from those
around us.
38. Our identity lenses are constructed out of
。All of these
39. Our identity lenses are not constructed out of
. the personal experiences of others.
. the ways our physical presence is supported/negated by our
cultures.
. the ways people we care about treat us.
. our personal interests, abilities, and desires.

6. 40. Words and actions that exclude or negate the experiential
reality of a person are best called.
. microinvalidations.
41. In order to be ready for responsible travel and tourism, you
should
. All of these
42. Travelers might encounter people or cultures that have an
extreme fear or hatred of strangers or foreigners, otherwise
known as
. arachnophobia.
. xenophobia.
. ethnocentrism.
. racism.
43. Traveling for enjoyment and pleasure based on
environmental attractions is called
. eco-tourism.
. John Murism.
. environmentalism.
. naturism.
44. One of the most famous examples of how travel impacted an
individual and shaped the course of their life (an example
dramatized in the 2004 movie Motorcycle Diaries) is that of
. Winston Churchill.
. Che Guevara.
. Marco Polo.
. Adolph Hitler.
45. Chapter 10 of the textbook explores intercultural
communication in the context of
. health care.
. None of these

7. . tourism and travel.
. All of these
46. Americans should be grateful for the superior education
they have received compared to the education offered in other
countries.
. False
47. Western, traditional, conventional medicine, the
predominant type of treatment provided in the United States, is
focused less on preventive medicine and more on reactive care
to sickness, illness, or ailments that patients encounter.
. True
48. Unlike the United States, most of the nations of the world
have government- funded health-care systems.
. False
49. In many developing nations there are significant obstacles
in providing the amenities of healthcare that Americans and
people from other developed countries often take for granted.
. True
50. When it comes to medical care, patients must not be passive
consumers of their medical treatment but rather active
participants in how care is delivered.
. True
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8. More African countries on the route: the positive
and negative impacts of the Belt and Road
Initiative
Michael Mitchell Omoruyi Ehizuelen
To cite this article: Michael Mitchell Omoruyi Ehizuelen (2017)
More African countries on the
route: the positive and negative impacts of the Belt and Road
Initiative, Transnational Corporations
Review, 9:4, 341-359, DOI: 10.1080/19186444.2017.1401260
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RESEARCH ARTICLE
More African countries on the route: the positive and negative
impacts of
the Belt and Road Initiative
Michael Mitchell Omoruyi Ehizuelen
Institute of African Studies, Zhejiang Normal University,
Jinhua, Zhejiang, China
ABSTRACT
The grand vision was launched in 2013 originally as the ‘One
Belt, One Road’ (OBOR) initiative.
OBOR involves China underwriting billions of dollars of
infrastructure investment linking coun-
tries in Europe, Asia, and Africa. At the centre of the plan are
two physical routes: the Silk Road
Economic Belt, stretching from Asia to Europe; and the twenty-
first century Maritime Silk Road

10. that begins in China and passes along the Indian Ocean littoral
to East Africa and then Europe.
The nature of this economic initiative seeks to create a
community of shared prosperity, in which
nations can share mutual benefits and coexist peacefully along
the trade routes. The paper
examines China–Africa relations, centring on the possibility of
expanding the OBOR initiative to
cover more African nations. Also, it examines the investment
environment of Africa and its sig-
nificant for more African slot. Africa should provide enabling
business environment to grasp the
OBOR’s opportunities.
KEYWORDS
Africa; China; infrastructure;
investment; OBOR
1. Introduction
Historically, China has attempted twice to link its economy with
that of the Western countries. The initial attempt
took place two millennia ago during the Han Dynasty, when
China opened the ancient Silk Road to trade with
Central Asia and the Mediterranean region. Then, in the
fifteenth century during the Ming Dynasty a second, mari-
time, Silk Road was formed connecting China to the Red Sea
via the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea. While
both attempts initially succeeded in opening the West’s gates,
China never really made it through those gates in
any meaningful way. Instead, it descended into isolation and
warlordism, and its economic and political engage-
ment with its surroundings was mainly with its neighbours to
the east and south. The third attempt to integrate
with the West – the ‘third knock’ as former Hong Kong Home
Affairs Secretary Patrick Ho put it – is

11. happening today, as China implements a strategic vision of
building a new Silk Road Economic Belt and a
Twenty-First-Century Maritime Silk Road. China’s lofty
ambition to revive its ancient silk road trading routes is
now becoming a reality. When complete, ‘One Belt, One Road,’
or the Maritime Silk Road as it is more commonly
known, will connect China via rail and shipping links with
major markets in the Middle East, Central Asia, and
Africa. The Maritime Silk Road began when the Chinese
ventured into Southeast Asia, traditionally called
Nanyang. By the Song Dynasty (960–1279), Imperial China had
established tributary relations with numerous
states in Nanyang (Wong, 2014, p. 3).
In October 2012, Professor Wang Jisi was the first Chinese
scholar to mention the need for China to revitalise
three Silk Roads, to Southeast Asia, to South Asia and to
Central Asia (Bondaz, 2015, p. 7). One year later (2013),
China’s ‘One Belt, One Road’ initiative came to prominence.
What started in 2013 as big, albeit half-baked, idea, is
rapidly gaining steam and morphing into a blueprint for growth.
OBOR will not only enable the poor to elevate
themselves but it will also provide a shot in the arm to the
slowing Chinese economy by creating new markets
for Chinese goods and services. As Xi Jinping put it ‘when big
rivers have water, the small ones are filled; and
when small rivers have water, the big ones are filled.’ China, it
seems, has finally discovered the organising prin-
ciple of its foreign and economic policy. Chinese President Xi
Jinping on 15 May 2017, at the Belt and Road
Forum (BRF) held in Beijing urged major multilateral
institutions to join the new Belt and Road Initiative which is
the centrepiece of economic, political, and strategic policy
framework of the Fifth-Generation Leadership of China
CONTACT Michael Mitchell Omoruyi Ehizuelen

12. [email protected] Institute of African Studies, Zhejiang Normal
University, Jinhua, Zhejiang,
China
� 2017 Denfar Transnational Development INC.
TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS REVIEW, 2017
VOL. 9, NO. 4, 341–359
https://doi.org/10.1080/19186444.2017.1401260
http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1080/19186444.20
17.1401260&domain=pdf
http://www.tandfonline.com
under him. With Chinese President Xi Jinping declaring that the
initiative underscores ‘the need to improve policy
coordination and reject beggar-thy-neighbor policies … [the]
need to seek win-win results through greater open-
ness and cooperation, avoid fragmentation, refrain from setting
inhibitive thresholds for cooperation or pursuing
exclusive arrangements and reject protectionism’ by expanding
links between Asia, Africa, Europe and beyond, as
the United States President Donald Trump promotes ‘America
First’.
BRF served as China’s highest profile diplomatic event of the
year, culminating in the 30 world leaders in
attendance signing on to a joint communique that championed
globalisation and free trade. At the forum, Xi
Jinping highlighted some of the recent achievements of the
initiative so far in a series of bilateral examples. In
the three-plus years since rolling out the concept, China has
successfully ‘deepened policy connectivity’ with a
number of other states and groupings. That includes aligning the
Belt and Road with the development strategies
of the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union, ASEAN,

13. Kazakhstan, Turkey, Mongolia, Vietnam, the United Kingdom
and Poland. Xi also highlighted a few of the more high-profile
projects under the Belt and Road framework, for
example, the acceleration of the building of Jakarta-Bandung
high-speed railway, China-Laos railway, Addis
Ababa-Djibouti railway, the Mombasa-Nairobi Standard Gauge
Railway (SGR), and Hungary-Serbia railway, and
upgraded Gwadar and Piraeus ports in cooperation with relevant
countries.
Furthermore, the total trade between China and other OBOR
nations in 2014–2016 has surpassed $3 trillion,
and China’s investment in these nations has exceeded $50
billion.1 Those numbers were bolstered by the estab-
lishment of financing mechanisms specifically to carry out the
OBOR vision, including the China’s Silk Road Fund
and the multilateral Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
(AIIB). The Chinese president promised that China will
funnel an extra RMB 100 billion ($14.5 billion) into the Silk
Road Fund, while the China Development Bank and
Export-Import Bank will set up novel lending schemes of 250
billion ($36.2 billion) and RMB 130 billion ($18.8 bil-
lion), respectively, for the OBOR projects. Additionally, China
will offer RMB 60 billion ($8.7 billion) for humanitar-
ian efforts focussed on food, housing, health care and poverty
alleviation.2 The initiative covers two-thirds of the
world’s landmass, 4.4 billion people in 65 countries with a
collective GDP of more than 2 trillion dollars. The
anticipated investment for OBOR will be $4–$8 trillion. About
50,000 miles of high-speed railway are planned to
be built, more than currently existing in the whole world.
Billions of dollars in new rail, shipping, and airport infra-
structure are underway in dozens of countries, including Egypt,
Djibouti and Kenya, which are among a small
group of African countries that are expected to benefit most
from OBOR.

14. Nearly 2.6 billion, mostly located in developing Asia and
Africa, lack access to 24/7 electricity. Almost 800 mil-
lion people worldwide lack access to water, and about 2.5
billion people lack access to basic sanitation. Roughly
1–1.5 billion people have no reliable phone service. Just over
20% of people in developing countries have access
to the internet. Within this context, China’s Belt and Road
Initiative is a breath of fresh air. It aims to boost global
growth, alleviate poverty and connect billions of people by
addressing one of the biggest barriers to economic
development – the infrastructure deficit. Without infrastructure,
there is no connectivity. Without connectivity,
there can be no economic exchange. Without economic
exchange, there can be no growth. Without growth,
there is no prosperity. Without prosperity, infrastructure cannot
be funded. And so, goes the cycle. The need for
infrastructure investment in Africa is staggering: The
continent’s power sector alone requires $450 billion through
2030, with about 600 million people in Sub-Saharan Africa
lacking access to electricity today. The oil and gas
industry is estimated to need over $2 trillion in investment
between 2013 and 2035. Africa needs to spend $38
billion more each year on infrastructure – plus an additional $37
billion on operations and maintenance – just to
sustain its current level of development. If Africa is to fully
seal its infrastructure gap, some $93 billion per year
for the next decade will need to be invested (Mungai, 2015).
The Belt and Road Initiative is China’s way of addressing the
infrastructure gap. Africa, with its abundant nat-
ural resources, wealth of infrastructure opportunities and
convenient location, is a perfect match for China’s global
infrastructure plan, ‘One Belt, One Road,’ which sets out to
create new land and sea trade routes to ensure energy
supplies, increase foreign trade, promote Chinese enterprise and

15. products, a necessary step for economic growth
in Africa and in particular industrialisation. This is widely seen
as one of China’s major overseas and economic pol-
icy goals3 which are likely to have a significant effect on
Africa. The overall goal of this paper is to examine
China–Africa relations while centring on the implementation
and likely inclusion of more African countries in the
OBOR initiative. The rest of the paper is structured as follows:
Section 2 deals with what One Belt One Road initia-
tive means for China–Africa relations; Section 3 look at how
the OBOR initiative can find a Place for more African
Nations; Section 4 discuss what African nations can do to
improve their general environment for investors from
342 M. M. O. EHIZUELEN
China and other countries to start snowballing effect and
stimulate economic growth in the continent. Section 5
concludes the paper.
2. What OBOR initiative means for China–Africa relations
The idea that China would be crucial to African development is
neither new nor accidental. In fact, Chinese poli-
cymakers have been aware of this notion for quite some time.
China Ya-Fei-La Strategy, literally meaning ‘Asia-
Africa-Latin America’ was conceived during the Maoist era in
the 1960s (Casanova & Garcia-Herrero, 2016) in an
attempt to promote the advancement of developing country
goals in a new world order. Since then, China has
played an active role in promoting South-South cooperation,
being Africa – China cooperation a significant part
of the equation. China’s role in supporting African development
obviously pre-dates official OBOR by many years.

16. Over the past decades, China has built up a strong brand in
Africa. Africans generally view China as a positive
influence. For instance, a survey of 54,000 individuals spanning
the continent of Africa by Afrobarometer found
that 63% of respondents believed China was either a somewhat
or very positive influence on their country
(Afrobarometer, 2016). The OBOR initiative is regarded as a
welcome shift of the economic policy debate from
macroeconomic to structural policies (OECD, 2015).
As a cause and consequence, China has proven to be incredibly
successful both diplomatically and commer-
cially. As a result, Africa’s economic trajectory has
increasingly aligned to China’s. China is the source for 21% of
Africa’s total imports, and 17 percent of Africa’s total exports;
China’s policy banks have extended nearly $100 bil-
lion in loans to African sovereigns and corporates; and Chinese
FDI stock in Africa is close to $30 billion (Stevens,
2017). Given China’s rising importance across Africa, many
African nations are still metabolising the medium- to
long-term implications of the ‘New Normal’. Envisioned here is
an economy that is expanding more slowly; one
that is less factor- and investment-driven. Of course, lower
output growth in China has spilled over onto sub-
Saharan Africa through direct and indirect channels. Now it
seems another question must be posed: what further
influences will the Belt and Road have on China–Africa
relations? Promisingly, it seems that the downward
momentum of China–Africa investment and trade has bottomed.
China’s non-financial direct investment in Africa
jumped 64% year-on-year in the quarter. Interestingly, Djibouti
– one of three African countries embedded in
OBOR – saw an increase of over 100% year-on-year in the
quarter. Furthermore, China and Africa trade volume
has been soaring showing tremendous development potential
and vitality in the relations. China surpassed the

17. US to become Africa's largest trade partner in 2009. In 2014,
mutual trade volume totalled $220 billion, 22 times
more than the trade volume in 2000, and the investment from
China into Africa exceeded $30 billion. However,
trade and investment both dropped greatly in 2015 due to the
Chinese economic slowdown. But in 2016, the
trade volume increases to $149.2 billion from $147.6 billion in
2015, while in January–November 2016, the non-
financial direct investment flow from Chinese enterprises to
Africa increased 25% with more than US$3 billion
(MOFA, 2017). China’s investment in Africa continues to
increase greatly, embodying Chinese enterprises’ confi-
dence in tapping African market and China’s increasingly anti-
risk tenacity in its investment and cooperation with
Africa.
For Chinese firms investing in Africa, improved economic
conditions of most African nations, rich natural
resources, and large potential markets all contribute towards
location advantage for them (Chun, 2013). Also
Africa’s motive for increased trade, infrastructure development,
institutional environment and increased invest-
ment relationships with the Chinese have also added to the
internationalisation advantage for China’s firms run-
ning a business in Africa which is part of the OBOR aims.
Critics of the plan tend to view OBOR as merely a trade
route for oil and minerals. African natural resources help power
factories across China and provide the minerals
and metals for the manufacturing sector. Indeed, the top 10
Chinese imports from Africa are raw materials. Oil-
rich Angola is the top African exporter to China, and 99% of its
exports to China are petroleum products (EOM,
Hwang, Atkins, Chen, & Zhou, 2017). However, from Figure 1,
we can see China is investing across all the coun-
tries both in resourced endowed and non-resource endowed
economies. Most significantly, in the service sector

18. with fewer in the manufacturing sector (Chen, Dollar, & Tang,
2015). In 2015, manufacturing was 13% of Chinese
foreign direct investment in Africa. In comparison, just 7% of
U.S. investment in the region went to manufacturing
ventures.4 Speaking of Africa, in late December 2015 at the
FOCAC Summit in Johannesburg, China promised to
lend Africa $60 billion, of this enormous amount, more than
half of the money will be channelled towards infra-
structure construction in Africa. China is committed to dozens
of large-scale infrastructure investments in Africa,
in the power generation sector and transportation as well (see
Table 1). The table classifies a selection of larger
TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS REVIEW 343
projects and conveys some of the geographic and sectoral
depths of China’s infrastructure-associated investment
in the African continent.5
The leading project among those is almost certainly the
Standard Gauge Railway project in Kenya that was
inaugurated on 31 May 2017. China’s plan to pursue
infrastructure development in the African continent will con-
tinue. The significance is clarified by both political and
economic benefits and most especially by China’s OBOR
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400

19. 450
0
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d
…
Figure 1. Distribution of Chinese ODI Projects by Nation.
Source: Chen et al. (2015).
Table 1. Selected African Infrastructure built by China.
Nations Projects Explanation Investment
Ethiopia Addis Ababa Port of Doraleh in
Djibouti
The railway crosses 752 km and cuts the travel time
between Addis and the Port of Doraleh from three
days to just 12 h
$2.49 billion
Chad China-Sudan Railway A 1344-km railway being
constructed in three phases
and will also connect the two countries with
Cameroon
$5.6 billion

27. Congo DRC Infrastructure for Mines Barter Deal The deal was
to develop the mine fields in Mashamba
and Dima basins and Kolwezi
$7.16 billion
Kenya Standard Gauge Railway A 609-km railway linking
Mombasa’s port to the capital
Nairobi (completed on 31 May 2017)
$3.8 billion
Mozambique Mphanda Nkuwa Dam and
Hydroelectric station project
Offer 1500 megawatts of power to national electricity
grid, and includes construction of Moamba major
Dam to supply drinking water to residents of Maputo
$3.1 billion
Nigeria Coastal Railway 1,402-km railway to connect Lagos
with Calabar (to
east), passing through 10 states and connecting cities
with oil-rich Niger-Delta states
$12 billion
Nigeria Dangote Cement PLC. Expansion Dangote Cement Plc.
Expansion in Nigeria, and into
Ethiopia, Kenya, Zambia, Senegal, Mali Cameroon and
Ivory Coast. A boost to cement production of 25 mn
tonnes and taking production to over 70 mn tonnes
per year
$4.3 billion

28. South Africa Modderfontein New City Project A housing and
entertainment precinct being built in
outer Johannesburg, South Africa’s largest city
$7 billion
Sudan Port Sudan Khartoum Railway The project was completed
in 2012 and it connects Port
Sudan to the nation’s capital, Khartoum in a 762 km
of railway
$1.38 billion
Tanzania Bagamoyo Port 20 million (annual) container ports,
which would be the
largest East African port. This would be connected to
a railway corridor and sit next to a new industrial
zone. Shrouded in uncertainty
$7 billion
Ethiopia Grand Ethiopia Renaissance Dam Hydroelectric power
of an average output of 39,000
megawatts per year. The project is expected to be
completed by 2025
$100 billion
Source: Mail and Guardian (2015).
344 M. M. O. EHIZUELEN
and Maritime Silk Road initiative. The infrastructural upgrade

29. ushered by the OBOR initiative is also expected to
highly benefit numerous nations that lie along and beyond the
Silk Road routes, as it will also serve the import
and export activities of these nations, especially African
nations. The Belt and Road focus on infrastructure
because Chinese construction companies need the business.
China has provided almost 900 aid projects to
African nations since 1956. The aid includes assistance
supporting textiles factories, hydropower stations, stadi-
ums, hospitals, and schools. Although China assist African
nations with infrastructure which Africa needs in terms
of closing the infrastructure deficit, but these projects do not
come cheap or free. They are funded with Chinese
loan from the China’s largest financier of African loans –
China’s Export-Import (EXIM) Bank. The billions of dollars
China commits to Africa are repayable, long-term loans. From
2000 to 2015, China Eximbank contributed US$63
billion in loans to Africa, largely aimed at road, railroad,
airport and harbour construction. The top Africa nation
recipients of China Eximbank financing from 2000 to 2015 are
Ethiopia at US$7.2 billion, Angola at US$6.9 billion
and Kenya at US$6.3 billion (EOM et al., 2017) (see Figure 2).
Chinese loans are not necessarily meant to access
natural resources: although Angola is a resource-rich country,
Ethiopia is a resource-poor country. Moreover, there
are few patterns of favoured lending to client states: Sudan is a
top country for Chinese loans, but Zimbabwe is
not. The largest China Eximbank commitment was a US$3.8
billion loan (in two tranches) in 2014 to build the
Standard Gauge Railway from Mombasa to Nairobi in Kenya.
The second largest loan was a commitment of US$3
billion (split between Ethiopia and Djibouti) in 2013 for the
construction of the Addis Ababa-Djibouti Railway
(EOM et al., 2017).
In 2000, the gross annual revenue of Chinese construction

30. contractors in Africa was $1 billion; by 2015, this fig-
ure was $55 billion (see Figure 3) (EOM et al., 2017). The top
five countries are Algeria, Ethiopia, Angola, Kenya
and Nigeria. These top five countries account for 48 percent of
all Chinese companies’ 2015 construction project
gross annual revenues in Africa; Algeria alone accounts for
roughly 15.1%. Except for a slowdown in 2011, the
gross annual revenues of Chinese companies' construction
projects have been steadily increasing since 2000. In
January–November 2016, the contractual value of contracted
projects newly signed by Chinese enterprises in
Africa reached US$65.2 billion, with an increase of 7.2% year
on year (MOFCOM, 2016). The number of Chinese
workers in Africa by the end of 2015 is just over 263,000. This
is an extra 4289 workers than in 2014, which shows
that 2015 has a much slower growth rate than 2014 and 2013,
each of which added 45,000 and 33,000 workers
compared with preceding years (John Hopkins University SAIS
China–Africa Research Initiative, 2017). In 2015, the
top five nations with Chinese workers are Algeria, Angola,
Ethiopia, Equatorial Guinea and the Republic of Congo.
These five nations are responsible for over 60% of the entire
Chinese workers in the continent of Africa at the
end of 2015; Algeria alone accounts for over 35%. These
figures comprise of Chinese workers sent to work on
Chinese firms’ construction contracts in Africa (‘workers on
contracted projects’) and Chinese workers sent to
work for non-Chinese firms in Africa (‘workers doing labour
services’) (John Hopkins University SAIS China–Africa
Research Initiative, 2017).
Looking ahead, on a more positive note, OBOR projects may
place a floor under raw material demand inside
China (even as the economy rebalances) given the projects
envisioned in China’s Western and Central regions.
Furthermore, the infrastructure projects across OBOR are

31. certainly potentially sizable. That said, over the near
term, given that China’s domestic fixed asset investment tallied
$8.5 trillion in 2016, it would be difficult for OBOR
to fully offset the ongoing slowdown in investment growth in
China. Of course, given 5 years of below-trend
Figure 2. Chine Exim Bank loan to Africa, by country, 2000–
2015. Source: EOM et al. (2017).
TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS REVIEW 345
economic growth in advanced economies, China has been
recalibrating the destination of its sales abroad. And
Africa has proven to be an obvious market because it still needs
China’s well-made but low-cost products.
Indeed, for a two and half year period after the global financial
crisis, Africa was actually China’s fastest-growing
market. Worryingly although, for the first time, African imports
from China declined in 2016. The slump has been
particularly precipitous in some key economies such as Angola
(�60%), Nigeria and South Africa (�25%), and
Mozambique (�37%) and Tanzania (�13%). Of course, Africa’s
softer economic growth has had a sizeable
explanatory role in declining sales to Africa – especially in key
markets such as Nigeria and South Africa. Thus, it
is reassuring that Chinese sales to Africa were flat in Q1:2017
at $20 billion (Stevens, 2017).
Chinese investment in the belt and road nations has been a
cumulative $50 billion. An estimated 47 central
government-owned SOEs were involved in 1676 projects in
OBOR countries. China has developed 56 overseas
economic and trade zones with 20 OBOR countries (Stevens,
2017). Unfortunately, Africa is a bit part player at the

32. periphery of OBOR, touching only a few countries in East
Africa. Worryingly, OBOR may divert attention away
from Africa. Already by region, Africa has been usurped by
OBOR countries as the favourite destination for
Chinese infrastructure investment. Policy banks have already
extended more loans to OBOR in just three years
than they have cumulatively to Africa, and are expected to lend
out nearly 10 times more over the next three
years. Looking ahead, OBOR also casts some doubt over what
was seen as a logical progression of outbound
investment following Chinese sales in Africa. As yet, rising
consumer demand in Africa is reflected in the growth
of total imports. African countries need to begin to selectively
manufacture these products in partnership with
Chinese firms. More than ever before, the onus is on African
projects to remain relevant. It seems reasonable to
argue that any African infrastructure projects that can fit into
the still fluid OBOR narrative will be fast-tracked.
OBOR may build an additional framework – complementing
FOCAC – for which Chinese government and corpor-
ate leaders and their counterparts can align their engagements.
This means that Africa needs to provide a more
systematic coordinated and industry-specific plan to remain at
the centre of China’s foreign policy. At the same
time, African governments must also focus on sustainable
development and determine the best policy mix and
governance structures to keep China true to its commitment to
job creation and industrial upgrading inside
Africa. In recent years China’s manufacturing investment has
increased significantly.
At present, China is restructuring and upgrading its industrial
structure and exporting excess manufacturing
capacity due to the rising cost of labour. China’s labour-
intensive industries are losing their comparative advan-
tages. Firms have started relocating to nations with lower wages

33. rates, Africa is an ideal partner to host China
labour-intensive industries as they transfer overseas. With the
fall in demand for China’s exports and earlier dis-
proportionate capital investment growth mean that China is now
home to excess capacities across a swathe of its
industrial sub-sectors, especially for instance in steel. Africa’s
under-realized industrial capacity and a substantial
chance for Chinese companies in construction sectors in Africa
have instigated a stable stream of investments in
African steel and Iron ore (Johnston, 2016). Speaking of
investment, since Africa is not a major region along the
Figure 3. Gross annual revenue of Chinese Construction
Projects in Africa. Source: John Hopkins University SAIS
China–Africa
Research Initiative (2017).
346 M. M. O. EHIZUELEN
OBOR route and so is it hard for the continent to fully benefit
from the initiative. This can be seen in the area of
investment. According to Huiping Chen (2016), the author
asserts that China’s outward FDI to the continent of
Africa accounts for a very small percentage when compared to
its total outward FDI with other regions (see
Figure 4). For that reason, there is a need for more concerted
effort to improve this, and OBOR initiative provides
an ample opportunity for redress. The inclusion of African
countries into the OBOR initiative could help keep man-
ufacturing jobs and investment in China and Africa as well as
address the thorny problem of industrial overcap-
acity in China even as the Chinese own economic growth slows.
It is also our view that African nations should
take action at various levels to profit from the OBOR initiative.

34. 3. The inclusion of more African nations into the Belt and Road
Initiative
Africa has a natural and historical connection with the Belt and
Road Initiative. In the fifteenth century, Chinese
Admiral Zheng He led a fleet of 300 ships to Africa, which has
planted friendship seeds in the hearts of both
Chinese and African people since then. With an area of over 30
million square kilometers, 1.1 billion population
(youth accounts for more than 50 percent), 800 million hectares
arable land, countless natural resources, Africa is
unarguably an important pillar of the world economy. China and
Africa are anticipated to move to a higher level
of economic cooperation which could transform Africa’s
economies, bolstered by the formal inclusion of Africa in
China’s trillion-dollar Belt Road strategy. China’s commitment
to construct a gigantic network of roads, rail lines,
and ports and other infrastructure in 67 nations across Asia,
Europe and Africa, at a cost of $1 trillion, is widely
seen as one of its major overseas and economic policy goals.6
For that reason, the OBOR initiative has been
viewed as an ambitious and promising plan by the international
community. In spite of the enthusiasm demon-
strated by the Chinese for this grand initiative, nonetheless, the
strategic aims of OBOR are interpreted differently
by individuals. Recently, international relations scholars have
compared OBOR with the US-led Marshall Plan in
the post-World War II period, but scholars from China argue
that the OBOR and Marshall Plan are not compar-
able.7 The reason why they are not comparable lies in policy
purposes and goals. For the Marshall Plan, it was
officially the European Recovery Program, was the American
initiative to offer economic support to rebuild war-
devastated European nations, while preventing them from
pursuing communist regime and following the then

35. Soviet Union.
In contrast, the OBOR initiatives’ emphasis was placed on
stronger and closer economic cooperation, on joint
infrastructure projects, the enhancement of security
cooperation, and environment technical and scientific collab-
oration. The other difference is the goals of these two
initiatives. While the Marshall Plan covered only Western
countries and excluded all nations and regions the West thought
were ideologically close to the Soviet Union,
Chinese initiatives are open to all the economies along the land
and sea Silk Roads, regardless of their ideological
and societal leanings. In fact, many countries have shown great
interest in the initiative; China has been promot-
ing the initiative chiefly with a focus on Asian and European
nations. Only since early 2015, Africa is beginning to
become a focus of the Initiative.
On 20 January 2015, shortly before the initiative’s vision
document was published in March, former chief
economist of the World Bank, Justin Yifu Lin, raised the idea
that China should also include Africa in the initiative,
expanding it to ‘One Belt and One Road, One Continent’ and
that the initiative’s ‘core task in Africa should be
industrial relocation and infrastructure construction’ (China
Daily, 2015). A focus on infrastructure, proposed by
0
20000
40000
60000
80000

36. 100000
120000
140000
2006 2007
La�n America
2008 2009
Europe North America Africa
20122010 2011
Oceania
2013
Total
2014
Asia
Figure 4. China’s outward FDI flows by regions (2006–2014).
Source: Huiping Chen (2016).
TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS REVIEW 347
Justin Yifu Lin is completely in line with an agreement signed
between China and the African Union (AU), which

37. aims to link all 54 African nations through transportation
infrastructure projects, including modern highways, air-
ports, and high-speed railways. In 2015, the African Union
(AU) launched Agenda 2063, intending to accelerate
the modernisation and industrialisation progress of African
countries. Since the continent launched the AU’s
Vision 2063, Africa has been identified as the future driver of
global growth. The reality is that Africa we knew
30 years ago is fast transforming and all indicators are pointing
to the continent of peace and security under-
pinned by good governance and enhanced economic growth and
development.
However, it will be crucial to determining how OBOR can
complement Agenda 2063 to create the ‘Africa we
want’. Agenda 2063, a 50-year development plan which is used
to build an integrated, prosperous and peaceful
Africa is considered as one of the efforts to pursue economic
development in Africa. The agenda is comprised of
seven primary aspirations, 18 goals and 44 priority areas,
further expressed into 161 different national-level targets
(DeGhetto, Gray, & Kiggundu, 2016). The synergies and
complementarities between OBOR and Africa’s Agenda
2063, while focussing on the implementation of both agendas
are based on the fact that both agendas highlight
the need for inclusive and people-centred development with an
emphasis on sustainable industrialisation, indus-
trial diversification, creating high value added and decent
employments for all. Additionally, strategic coordination
between OBOR initiative and Agenda 2063 offers several
cooperation possibilities for the Chinese and African
investors. The ‘461’ China–Africa cooperation framework and
the ‘Three Networks and Industrialization programme
could be considered a rehearsal to help align and coordinate
these two development strategies (Shu, 2015). To
attain the economic transformation envisioned by both agendas,

38. a high premium has also been placed on deep-
ening regional economic integration through infrastructure
development and regional trade. China is supportive
of Africa’s home-grown development plan as set in the African
Union’s Agenda 2063. There are clear synergies
with the Belt and Road Initiative that support greater
connectivity.
Justin Yifu Lin further argued that OBOR will provide major
opportunities for Chinese firms to expand their for-
eign market, and the strategy will bolster various African
economies and benefit China in the meantime. The
socio-economic development level of African nations is not a
bottleneck preventing them from joining the initia-
tive. On the contrary, the engagement of Africa with the
initiative will further strengthen China–Africa economic
cooperation. So, as an initiative of economic cooperation with
overseas nations to promote common develop-
ment, He Wenping echoed that the initiative and Africa’s
development strategy ‘share similar spirit’ and that com-
bining the two ‘will not only create new momentum for Sino-
African cooperation, but present new approach for
South-South cooperation as well’ (Global Times, 2015).
In another call for Africa’s inclusion in the initiative, Lin
Songtian, Director of the Department of African Affairs
at China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, echoed in October 2015
that ‘Africa–China cooperation is a relationship that
is blessed with shared needs, benefits and opportunities, which
will make the African continent a significant foot-
hold for the OBOR initiative’ (FOCAC, 2015a). The initiative
targets to ‘link Asian, European and African nations
more closely and promote mutually beneficial partnership to a
new level and in new forms (NDRC, 2015).
Although China attached great importance to China–Africa
relations, the OBOR document only provides detail

39. concerning Europe and Asia. Europe was mentioned 12 times,
Asia and its sub-regions mentioned over 30 times,
while Africa was mentioned only six times (WWF, 2016).
Nonetheless, from the Chinese viewpoint, they assert that
the African continent is the last stop for the OBOR initiative,
which means that more African nations will be
included in the OBOR initiative.8 Sun asserts that China’s
interests have been well-articulated by the Chinese lead-
ership in their emphasis on employment creation in Africa
through their ambitious proposal to build African
regional infrastructure networks in 2014. Sun further argued
that the establishment of the OBOR initiative does
not change the overall direction of China’s Africa policy.9
However, looking at the geographical areas of this initiative,
out of the 67 nations (see Table 2) that are part of
the initiative, only three nations (which represent just 4%) are
from the continent of Africa (see Figure 5). In terms
of population share, Africa represents 18% (see Figure 6).
Africa has one of the fastest growing young population
globally, with a labour force expected to be larger than that of
China or India by 2035 (AfDB, 2014). Nevertheless,
in spite of the anticipated huge demographic dividend, poor
infrastructure is one of the key obstacles to African
development. As a result, scaling up infrastructure investment
in the region could help achieve much expected
higher growth and OBOR’s aim is meant to facilitate
infrastructure among countries along the route which com-
pliment African infrastructure need. In 2015, the summit of
China–Africa Cooperation Forum (FOCAC), which
serves as the supreme platform for China–Africa cooperation
since 2000, upgraded China–Africa relations to a
‘comprehensive strategic and cooperative partnership. True, the
OBOR initiative was not included in spite of the
348 M. M. O. EHIZUELEN

40. initiative’s aim of promoting connectivity with the African
continent. But in consideration of the openness and
flexibility of the initiative, including Africa is a reasonable and
desired option. It will offer a valuable opportunity
for China and Africa to share development opportunities and
further reinforce their relations.
The dearth of clear references in the vision documents on the
extent and the possibility of Africa’s participation
in the initiative is an indication that the inclusion of Africa was
initially not foreseen and that details remain to be
defined. In this context, it is not surprising that China’s latest
Policy Paper (Xinhuanet, 2015) published in
December 2015 does not include any references to the Belt and
Road Initiative. The only reference incorporated
in the FOCAC Johannesburg Action Plan (2016–2018) is that
the ‘African sides welcome the Chinese side’s cham-
pioning “the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road”, which include
the African continent, and that China and Africa will
foster mutually beneficial partnership in the blue economy’
(FOCAC, 2015c). This is now the only Pan-African
statement that allowed Africa to consider itself a part of the
Maritime Silk Road. Since 2013, China’s state media
Figure 6. OBOR Nations Population Share by Region, 2017.
Source: Author’s personal illustration.
Figure 5. One Belt and One Road Initiative by Region. Source:
Author’s personal illustration.
Table 2. List of the 67 nations along the OBOR’s route.
Region Countries

41. Africa Djibouti, Egypt, Kenya
East Asia China, Mongolia
Southeast Asia Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia,
Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste,
Vietnam
Central Asia Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan,
Uzbekistan
Middle East Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait,
Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Palestine, Syria, United
Arab
Emirates, Yemen
South Asia Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives,
Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka
Europe Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia,
Georgia,
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro,
Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia,
Turkey, Ukraine
Source: Helen Chin & He (2016) and Mwatela & Zhao (2016).
TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS REVIEW 349
has published numerous diverse Belt and Road Maps with
varying indications of Africa’s participation in the
Maritime Silk Road. Most of the maps include a route through
the Indian Ocean towards Kenya, passing Somalia,
Djibouti, Eritrea, Sudan and Egypt before continuing in the
Mediterranean Sea.
Other maps display the Maritime Silk Road leading from the

42. Indian Ocean directly to the Red Sea through the
Suez Canal into the Mediterranean Sea. In most cases, these
maps do not provide any indication on ports along
the African part of the Maritime Silk Road. However, the latest
version published by the Chinese news agency
Xinhua (see Figure 7) displays that the route has reached
Africa’s east coast, specifically an area that is part of
modern Kenya – Nairobi, as a part of the Maritime Silk Road.10
This is consistent with the most historical link to
Africa that relates to China’s fourteenth-century maritime
fleets, which initially saw the bilateral trade between
China and Kenya during the early fifteenth century (Wekesa,
2015). Also, with the violence between North and
South Sudan being far over, the need for an alternative route to
export oil to China is needed.11 These facts help
clarify why Kenya is China’s nominated African hub for the
One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative. Notably, the
other cities on the map are port cities, while Kenya is nearly
500 km further than the closest port situated in
Mombasa. This is not only an indication that China sees Kenya
as part of the Belt and Road Initiative, but also
that the new $3.8 billion railway and economic corridor that
China built in partnership with Kenya from Mombasa
to Nairobi is part of the Maritime Silk Road.
As a relatively large regional and coastal economy with a port
of East African significance (in Mombasa), Kenya
is also important for reasons of economic geography (Johnston,
Morgan, & Wang, 2014). Chinese-invested rail
plans intend to better link Kenya and its ports to a number of
proximate landlocked economies, including
Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda and South Sudan, unlocking intra-
Africa as well as broader international trade opportu-
nities in the process. In July 2016, neighbouring and Coastal
Tanzania also signed a US$7.6 billion loan agreement
with the Export-Import Bank of China (Johnston, 2016). The

43. loan is for the construction of a standard gauge rail
corridor that will similarly connect Tanzania with regional
neighbours Congo, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi. Such
in fact is the scale of Africa’s need for infrastructure and
innovative funding for it – and China’s capacity and will-
ingness to deliver it – just the kind of investment projects being
intended by OBOR.
Figure 7. Map of the Silk Road Economic Belt (Silk Road) and
Twenty-first Century Maritime Silk Road (Maritime Silk Road).
Sources: Xinhua.21
350 M. M. O. EHIZUELEN
3.1. Some proposed potential members of OBOR initiative
3.1.1. Mozambique
With a population of about 30 million and a GDP of 3.3, down
from 6.6 in 2015 extending membership to the
country will make economic sense. Mozambique’s two-way
trade figures with China have shown a recovery. In
the first 5 months of the year, imports and exports totalled 748
million US dollars, which represents a growth of
6.4% compared with the same period in 2016. Whilst imports
from China fell 1.35% to 517 million dollars, exports
grew by 29.11% to 231 million dollars. This makes Mozambique
the fourth largest Lusophone trading partner
with China – behind Brazil, Angola and Portugal. China’s
investment in Mozambique has also been growing at a
very fast pace and in cumulative terms is approaching US$6
billion. The pace of growth of Chinese investment in
Mozambique has been very fast, with 100 Chinese companies
operating in the country in diverse areas such as

44. energy, agriculture, fishing, real estate, building materials,
tourism, buses, telecommunications, infrastructure and
trade. Chinese investment in Mozambique aims to help
Mozambicans to be self-sufficient, both in the industry
and in agriculture. In Mozambique, a consortium of Chinese
companies has announced to invest USD 1 billion to
construct a new port in Maputo (Macau Hub, 2016). With all
these positive signs and development, China intends
to view Mozambique as a natural extension of the twenty-first
century Maritime Silk Road and bolster cooperation
with Mozambique in maritime economy and port-neighbouring
industrial parks, as well as transfer its advanta-
geous production capacity and mature technologies to
Mozambique (MOFA, 2016).
3.1.2. South Africa
The Trade Law Centre data display that none of China’s top ten
trading partners in Africa is a member of the
OBOR initiative. Even China’s main trading and fellow BRICS
partner South Africa (NBSC, 2015). Most recent
reports, however, indicate that South Africa may also be part of
the Maritime Silk Road since South Africa and
China have signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)
with regard to the One Belt One Road initiative
(People’s Daily Online, 2016). With a population of over 55
million, it will make economic sense to include the
second biggest economy in Africa–South Africa. Since 1998,
China–South African relations have passed through
three different stages: the relationship began as a limited
partnership defined by a recognition of common inter-
ests; then evolved to a maturation of strategic economic and
political ties; and finally settled on its current
‘comprehensive strategic partnership’ that has developed into a
strong trade relationship and heightened the
nations’ common interests. China’s relationship with South

45. Africa has deepened significantly in recent years, as
shown by a raft of economic and political proclamations.
The year 2014 was dubbed ‘the year of South Africa in China’.
It was followed in 2015 by the ‘Year of China in
South Africa’. Now South Africa has been upgraded to China’s
lofty ‘Strategic Comprehensive Partner’. In 2009,
South Africa become China’s largest trading partner in Africa,
accounting for one-quarter of China’s trade with
African countries, with bilateral trade reaching US$16.06
billion, a 56% increase in 2008.12 By 2014, bilateral trade
had reached US$24.16 billion, with South African exports to
China totalling R94bn; and imports from China total-
ling R167bn.13 From 1996 to 2011, bilateral trade grew from
1.3% of total South African trade to over 13%.14
Chinese scholars stress that Chinese–South African trade is
based on the ‘comparative advantage’ of each country
and that China’s domestic labour supply and manufacturing
capacity complements South Africa’s rich mineral
resources and well-developed mining economy.15 China has
become a major investor in South Africa’s key indus-
tries, like mining and financial services. The participation of
South Africa will, thus, make economic sense as it
expands the Maritime Silk Road beyond its ancient route to the
South. South Africa has a broad portfolio of proj-
ects with China in the area of infrastructure and power projects
as well as the monetary sector and industrial
partnership.
3.1.3. Nigeria
Another potential member of the OBOR initiative is Nigeria.
Nigeria is a regional economic giant that plays a cen-
tral role in increasing China’s engagement in Africa. Nigeria is
a resource-endowed nation with a population of

46. over 180 million people; Nigeria has a young and growing
diverse population. The favourable demographics
advantage makes Nigeria a consumer country. China has been
embraced with large arms by Nigeria and has con-
tinued to expand its trade relations in the country. Nigeria
became China’s third largest trading partner in Africa
in 2014. According to the statistics of the General
Administration of Customs of China, total bilateral trade
volume
TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS REVIEW 351
between China and Nigeria, from the year 2004 to 2015,
recorded at 101 billion dollars. Furthermore, China and
Nigeria bilateral trade from January to July 2016, stood at $6.46
billion. This represented 7.6% of the total trade
volume between China and Africa and 36.4% of total trade
volume between China and ECOWAS (Akingbade,
2016). On the part of investment, China invests $2.5 billion in
the Nigerian’s economy especially in areas such as
petroleum, solid minerals, telecommunications, broadcasting,
construction materials and agriculture. Also, the
China Railway Construction Corporation signed a USD 12
billion contract to build a 1400-km railway along
Nigeria’s coastline, linking Lagos with Benin and Cameroon.
Furthermore, the China Railway Construction
Corporation has recently completed the Abuja-Kaduna railway,
which is the first phase of a larger railway modern-
isation project connecting Lagos with Kano in Nigeria’s north.
Other large Chinese-invested infrastructure projects
include the port of Lekki and the adjacent Lekki Free Trade
Zone. Nigeria possesses some economic significance
relating to the Lekki port that is expected to be completed in
2018. When completed, the massive port facilities

47. may function as a trading centre expanding the Maritime Silk
Road further to the West on the continent of Africa
(United Nation Development Programme China, 2015b). China
is, therefore, one of the few countries that can
assist Nigeria to bridge her huge financing gap, especially for
infrastructural development. However, Nigeria was
not given priority from China in terms of membership. The
reason might be the snowballing administrative and
business cost coupled with the rising security concerns may be
among the reasons Nigeria has not been given
top priority by the Chinese.
3.1.4. Angola
Over the past year, the Angolan economy has shown signs of
slowing down. Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
grew by 2.8% in 2015, down from 4.8% in 2014, mostly as a
result of the drop in oil prices (World Bank,
2016). With a population of over 26 million, Angola can be a
potential member of the OBOR initiative if
membership is extended to the country. Beyond the usual
political rhetoric, Angola has become a core stra-
tegic partner of China in Africa. It has also been amongst one of
the largest recipients of Chinese investment
in Africa. Angola is strategically important to China for a
number of reasons. First, its vast oil deposits tie in
with China’s national oil corporations’ designs for pursuing oil
assets to support its search for securing global
energy security. Second, as an African west coast economy,
Angola has great potential as a gateway to the
region and most importantly to central Africa – in particular,
the DRC – where Chinese mining investment is
currently being negotiated. Third, Angola is one of the most
fertile agricultural regions in Africa offering great
potential for commercial agricultural development. China
Development Bank has already announced a US$1

48. billion fund for investment in this sector. Angola received the
largest share of China’s loans between 2000
and 2014,16 is China’s second largest trading partner (NBSC,
2015) and number one oil exporter on the con-
tinent.17 Angola has further been selected by China as a China–
Africa industrial cooperation priority country,
which makes it likely that industrial cooperation will
significantly increase under the FOCAC Johannesburg
Action Plan (2016–2018). Being a Lusophone economy, it is
also less politically exigent for China to build a
presence in Angola compared with Francophone and
Anglophone African countries where the strategic inter-
ests of the former colonial powers are far more entrenched than
in the Portugal-Angola case. The keyword
here is potential. Angola’s economic progress will be
underpinned by political stability and effective govern-
ment management. China has recognised this potential and is
investing accordingly. Due to its investment,
Angola has become one of China’s largest trading partner in
Africa and its investment will continue to scale
rapidly as a result. Based on this, with Angola inclusion, the
OBOR initiative will further enlarge from its
ancient route, venturing into the Atlantic (WWF, 2016).
3.1.5. Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)
The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is the largest
country in Francophone Africa, with a population of
over 82 million. The country has vast natural resources and
spans a surface area of 2.3 million square kilometres.
After sharply increasing to almost 9% in the period 2013–2014,
the real gross domestic product (GDP) rate decel-
erated in 2015 and the growth rate is not expected to exceed
2.5% in 2016. On 27 May 2011, in Brussels, China
and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC or Congo)
signed an $9 billion-dollar economic cooperation

49. agreement to increase the trade in natural minerals between both
countries. Today, China is the DRC’s largest for-
eign investor. With China’s increasing need to intensify
development and growth, China sees the DRC as both a
352 M. M. O. EHIZUELEN
development partner and a beneficiary of its economic
investments abroad. In fact, the DRC government repre-
sentatives assert that the China’s policies for economic
investments generate ‘tangible development’. The China
Road and Bridge Corporation is building a new port at Pointe-
Noire, Congo’s economic capital. The port construc-
tion plans include an industrial park as well as an oil refinery
and a power plant. China’s plan of building a new
railway line would most likely encompass the modernisation of
the existing PointeNoire-Brazzaville line and per-
haps also the line branching off to Mbinda, which connects
Congo to Gabon (CRBC, 2016). So, with all these
development between both parties, the inclusion of the Republic
of Congo into the OBOR initiative will make
economic sense, because the Maritime Silk Road would,
therefore, enlarge further up North from Angola into the
geostrategically vital Gulf of Guinea.
3.1.6. Togo
Togo, a small nation in West Africa, is seeking to strengthen
bilateral relations with China with the hope of
becoming China’s staging point in West Africa. Similar to the
other countries, China has been active in
Togo’s transport infrastructure which is in line with the aim of
OBOR – connectivity. Togo can be a potential
member as well. Togo has an estimated population of 7.3

50. million inhabitants, with a demographic growth
rate of about 3%. Togo’s recent economic performance has been
relatively robust: over the past three years,
GDP growth has averaged approximately 5%, higher than most
Sub-Saharan economies. The main drivers of
the economic growth have been agricultural production and the
extractive industries, as well as trading activ-
ities. Agricultural production, which accounts for approximately
half of the country’s GDP and over 60% of its
employment, benefitted from good climatic conditions. Inflation
has remained under control, averaging 2.1%
in 2016 thanks to a prudent monetary policy followed by the
low food prices. China and Togo are highly
complementary economically and enjoy broad prospects of
cooperation. Togo is the gateway to West Africa,
having a geographic advantage and great potential in the
development of industries of transit trade, cotton,
and phosphate. Togo is implementing the strategy of
‘Development Channel’, aimed at developing the econ-
omy and accelerating agricultural modernisation, which has
attracted the attention of Chinese investors. A
number of renowned Chinese businesses such as CACC,
Huawei, ZTE and WIETC have already started invest-
ment there. Chinese businesses have strong wish to participate
in infrastructure construction and industrialisa-
tion process in Togo. Chinese businesses investing in Togo
carry out a more localised operation and make
their due contribution to Togo’s economic and social
development. So, if membership is extended to the
country, it can be the anchor point in West Africa.
3.1.7. Tanzania
The East African nation of Tanzania has an estimated
population of 50 million as of 2016. The country has main-
tained relatively stable, high growth over the last decade

51. (averaging 6–7% per annum). Tanzania and China have
enjoyed relatively solid economic and political relations for
many years now. China hosted the Belt and Road
Forum for International Cooperation in May 2017. Tanzania was
invited, not only because it is a historic and nat-
ural part of the Maritime Silk Road, and it is a landing point of
the Belt and Road in Africa. More significantly,
Tanzania was invited because of its special traditional
friendship with China built since history. In 2015, the
Chinese government selected Tanzania as a pilot country for
China–Africa capacity cooperation. Currently it is the
largest trade partner and project contractor of Tanzania, and a
major source of FDI. A large number of Chinese
state-owned and private firms with robust capital, technical and
management capacity are taking part in
Tanzania’s industrialisation.
The results of China–Tanzania cooperation can be seen in
various sectors of the economic development
and all the aspects of people’s livelihood in Tanzania. The
highly complementary national development strat-
egies are an internal impetus to push forward the Belt and Road
Initiative. President Magufuli is leading
Tanzania people to forge ahead on the road of building a
middle-income nation by improving infrastructure,
expanding economic and trade cooperation with oversea nations,
fostering industrialisation, invigorating agri-
cultural industry and other strategic measures. All these stated
development strategies are well in line with
the concept and content of OBOR Initiative. So, it will make
economic sense if membership is extended to
Tanzania because it will bring significant influence to the
OBOR initiative. This is as a result of the
Tanzania–Zambia railway constructed by the Chinese in the
1970s, which stands as a great historical

52. TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS REVIEW 353
significance for China–Africa cooperation and could offer a
chance for connecting landlocked nations like
Zambia to the Maritime Silk Road.
The successful execution of the initiative all through the
continent of Africa will have an added impact of
developing intra-Africa trade. Currently, trade among nations in
Africa stands at around 12%, which is the lowest
compared to 60% in Europe, 30% for ASEAN and North Africa
40%.18 The multiplier effect that the OBOR initiative
has would most definitely drive the continent of Africa into the
growth path. Sun19 asserts that the inclusion of
Africa in the OBOR strategy will generate more attention,
emphasis and, most significantly, more government
money to bolster the policy’s execution. In this way, the move
could offer extra momentum to bolster the scope
and depth of China’s economic initiative in the Africa
continent. The membership of Africa countries into the
OBOR initiative will potentially bring significant opportunities
for China and Africa to work together for the better
development of China–Africa cooperation.
4. Is reviving Africa’s investment environment the key for more
slot?
Many African countries have a great deal to gain from OBOR,
but there are a number of risks in investing in such
markets, including: foreign exchange volatility; risk of
recession; price instability; ‘crowding-out’ of private sector
investment; legal and regulatory issues; dearth of pre-existing
basic infrastructure; corruption; bureaucratic issues;
and poor transparency. Also, several African nations have

53. relatively weak governance systems. So, operating risks
are higher in such environments, project management could be
fraught, and the financial returns hampered.
In order to slot in more African nations into the Belt and Road
Initiative, the continent needs to revive its
investment environment. As more African nations have
expressed interest, China has responded, at least rhetoric-
ally, in favour of their inclusion. Yet this will not be enough.
Support from African nations is key. This will success-
fully hinge on these African nations providing sufficient
security to protect the investment environment.
Establishing a business-friendly climate is a key step towards
the development of a vibrant private sector that is
crucial for Africa’s transformation and the success of OBOR in
Africa. The private sector does not come to Africa
to give aid – they come to Africa to do business, but through the
business they achieve development goals. A
vibrant private sector is the engine of productivity, economic
growth and higher incomes. The private sector gen-
erates 90% of Africa’s employment, two-thirds of its investment
and 70% of its output, almost 70% of African
nations have improved their general quality of governance in
recent years (AfDB, 2014). Also, a large and differen-
tiated formal private sector which contributes taxes and expects
services can be a strong advocate for policy
reform and a driver of good governance. Establishing a virtuous
circle by improving the business environment
and permitting private sector growth can, in turn, strengthen
governance reforms.
While seen for a long time as a risky place to do business, the
last decade has put the continent solidly on the
map of international investment. Since 2000, close to US$46
trillion of foreign direct investment has flown into
Africa, with the annual rate rising five-fold. The success has

54. been matched with a policy stance more favourable
to businesses. Africa has made considerable headway in
promoting a more business-friendly environment. The
cost of business start-up has fallen by more than two-thirds over
the past eight years, while the time required for
business start-up nearly halved. More broadly, African
governments will need to do more to foster an enabling
environment for projects to succeed, especially if, as envisaged,
the private sector plays a significant role in the
Belt and Road projects. Although Africa’s investment
environment has improved over the past decades and is
among the fastest growing economies in the world (AfDB,
2014). However, improving the investment climate
from what it is nowadays in the continent can help begin the
snowballing effect and stimulate economic growth
in Africa.
The policies and means of attracting both foreign and domestic
investment are (a) setting relevant macroeco-
nomic policy frameworks and providing the public sector with a
proper role. African countries can reduce risk
through macroeconomic stability. This means that inflation has
to be controlled, exchange rates stabilised and
interest rates set at realistic levels; (b) defining and
implementing proper incentive packages. Investment incentive
systems are the main policy instruments that can directly
influence the volume and allocation of investment. In
view of the competitive global investment environment, African
governments should undertake a complete over-
haul of their investment incentive packages, taking into account
the experiences of other developing regions; (c)
African countries are widely diverse, ranging from energy-
resource rich to some of the world’s most energy poor
countries. In terms of Infrastructure development, power is one
of the main challenges facing Africa across all
aspects of the Economic Value Chain. According to the

55. International Energy Agency (IEA), however, only 45% of
354 M. M. O. EHIZUELEN
Africa’s population had access to electricity in 2014, compared
with 80–100% in other parts of the developing
world (see Table 3),20 increasing public investment towards
human development and infrastructural development.
The budget allocation process should take into account the
priority accords of these two key pre-requisites to
enhanced investment flows.
Due regard should be accorded to the social rate of return in
these domains which should be seen as partici-
pating in productive activities (and not as unproductive
investments); (d) Building reliability through political sta-
bility, predictable sets of rules and regulations and continuity in
the supply of foreign currency for input imports
and transfers; (e) enhancing financial intermediation. The
banking and non-banking financial systems should be
shaped to play their role in promoting productive investments
and providing efficient services to investors and
corporate activities. The speculative bias of current credit and
monetary policies should be looked into and rem-
edied. Banks should be urged to consider funding productive
investments. Investment banks should also be
encouraged; (f) improving the world's perception of Africa:
abolishing the continent's negative image. Where the
lack of information is the cause of such stereotyping and the
consequent shying away from Africa by potential
investors, a general information campaign could make a great
difference. The benefits of such campaign could be
immense. First, it could convince potential investors to pay
more attention to Africa. Second, it could influence

56. the behaviour of African governments in creating conditions
attractive to investors. The record of the modern
mass media and the experience of South-East Asia show that
these objectives can be achieved. If the investment
environment can be revived for the Chinese and other investors
from other part of the world, then the OBOR ini-
tiatives will be able to offer a strategic opportunity to dock
development strategy with Africa’s Agenda 2063.
4.1. Positive and negative impacts of OBOR initiative
On his first visit to Africa as president in early 2013, speaking
in Tanzania, China’s President Xi Jinping called for
China and Africa together to realise a fast track of
‘comprehensive development.’ Since then, growth in China has
slowed, increasing the importance of outbound growth to
China’s own economic transformation. This piece has
provided an overview of the logic of broad economic
complementarity that underpins OBOR in Africa: that of a
large per-capita-resources-scarce developing economy with an
old population and that of a large resource-rich
developing continent with a mostly young population; and
between a country with excessive savings and infra-
structure capacity, and a continent which in aggregate relatively
lacks both. The OBOR initiative represents an
agenda that broadly seeks to take ‘win–win’ advantage of that
complementarity. Despite the hazards and uncer-
tainties, the projects not only has substantial financial support
but also offers its partners numerous opportunities
for mutual gain.
Several African nations need to improve their infrastructure
stock. Pressures on the existing stock continue to
mount as population rise, urbanisation continues, and ongoing
industrialisation and economic development
requires backing from infrastructure. These factors, combined

57. with the need to catalyse future economic growth
with high quality infrastructure, necessitate ongoing investment.
For years, Gabon, a West African country, had
wanted to improve the transport network of its crumbling
French colonial buildings and dilapidated roads. Things
change recently when China Road and Bridge Corporations
(CRBC) won the contract to build the first overland
route from the capital city Libreville to Port-Gentil with the
nation’s deepest harbour. The once impossible road
Table 3. Electricity access in 2014 – regional aggregates.
Region
Population without
electricity (millions) Electrification rate (%)
Urban electrification
rate (%)
Rural electrification
rate (%)
Developing aations 1185 79 92 67
Africa 634 45 71 28
North Africa 1 99 100 99
Sub-Saharan Africa 633 35 63 19
Developing Asia 512 86 96 79
China 0 100 100 100
India 244 81 96 74
Latin America 22 95 98 85
Middle East 18 92 98 78
Transition Economies & OECD 1 100 100 100
World 1186 84 95 71
Source: IEA, World Energy Outlook, Electricity Access Data
Base (IEA: 2016). Retrieved from

58. http://www.worldenergyoutloo-
korg/resources/energydevelopment/energyaccessdatabase/
(Accessed 2 June 2017).
TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS REVIEW 355
http://www.worldenergyoutlookorg/resources/energydevelopme
nt/energyaccessdatabase/
http://www.worldenergyoutlookorg/resources/energydevelopme
nt/energyaccessdatabase/
through seemingly impassable jungle and marshland is now a
reality, and the economic and commercial value-
added from this route stacks up. Irrespective of this
infrastructure development in Gabon, several African nations
still lack the financial capacity to develop their infrastructure
through public funds, and the private sectors is
unable to meet the shortfall.
Better integrating the private sector into the construction
industry, rather than relying predominantly on the
public sector, can bring a number of benefits, including
mitigating the financing burden placed on the govern-
ment; snowballing productivity and improving the quality of
public services; and facilitating knowledge transfer
and sharing of the best-practice experiences and expertise from
the private to public sector. A greater number of
such funding arrangements can be anticipated for construction
projects across the Silk Road. Certainly, funding
model used will be particularly well suited to building capacity
and undertaking the required infrastructure
development.
There are several necessary conditions for private sector
financing to work alongside public money. These

59. include transparency around the way the money is allocated, a
suitable balance between the public financing
and the private financing, obvious returns, a robust regulatory
system that is able to work across borders, and
conduct that everybody can recognise as being close to market
principles. Without these conditions, the private
sector may be reticent to invest, dampening the spill-over
effects.
Besides infrastructural investments in ports, high-speed rail,
power generations and other utilities, there are
ancillary private-sector investment opportunities in real estate,
telecoms, e-commerce, financial tourism, education,
creative industries and green technologies. All these
opportunities come at a time of rapid internationalisation of
the renminbi, including currency swaps, trade-financing deals
and offshore bond issuance. The currency has been
included in the IMF’s basket of reserve currencies. Numerous
banks and financial institutions across African
nations are salivating for a greater slice of the action.
Chinese firms, both state-owned and private, are able to go
global and export their spare capacity in building
infrastructure projects in Africa. Chinese companies are able to
provide competitive pricing and their prices are
usually lower than Western firms. Chinese companies are also
winning lucrative service contracts, once the
domain of Western and Japanese companies, to run those
completed infrastructure. On the contrary, there are
risks and worries about shoddy products and services but the
quality question is dispelled after witnessing the
19,000 km high-speed rail network and other mega
infrastructure projects undertaken by Chinese firms over the
last decade. The perceived risk of low-quality Chinese
construction is a thing of the past. Nowadays, Chinese firms
are aware that their reputation is in line globally. For example,

60. in March 2012, a military ammunition depot
exploded in Brazzaville, Congo, killing over 261 people and
levelling entire buildings in a blast radius of 3 km.
When the dust settled, one building complex just 50 m away
from the epicentre of the blast stood intact shelter-
ing a local community living behind it from the worst of the
explosion, and the apartment compound was built
by Beijing Construction Engineering Group.
Another worry is that of the long-term employment advantages
to the host countries by awarding Chinese
companies to manage infrastructure projects. The way the
Chinese operate is that they can mobilise capital and
labour rapidly to get things done, but Chinese companies are
aware of the job issue and will earmark a fair share
of the job opportunities to local inhabitant. For instance, the
overland road built by China Road and Bridge
Corporation in Gabon employs around 1000 local inhabitants
and 300 Chinese inhabitants.
5. Conclusion
OBOR is a major programme launched by the Chinese
government in 2013 with many goals: to overcome domes-
tic overcapacity in many industrial sectors through expansion
on foreign markets, to support China’s economic
development and growth in its transition from an investment-led
model to a consumption-based economy, and
to improve the security of trade routes, especially for energy
products. It is particularly focussed on infrastructure
development. The One Belt, One Road initiative builds upon
two decades of intensifying China–Africa economic
ties. However, as it is, the Belt and Road strategy in Africa,
when examined in terms of the significance that China
puts in Africa, it does not reflect the optimism that China–
Africa cooperation has attracted recently. It displays a

61. discord between the rhetoric about the importance and growth
of the relationship. There are only three African
nations out of the 67 nations involved in the project; this does
not give an optimistic picture.
This ambitious plan, alongside Africa’s independent growth
performance, is drawing worldwide attention to
the continent’s vast development promise. And since most
OECD members and even those of the G20 are home
356 M. M. O. EHIZUELEN
to aging populations, increasingly not only China is awake to
the benefits of investing in the untapped potential
of lesser-developed and youth-filled economies, including in
Africa. For African policymakers and entrepreneurs,
whether China or another investor supports the development of
local infrastructure or opens a textile factory
ultimately may prove less important than the fact of negotiating
the best and most transformative deal for local
development – as China itself has so powerfully demonstrated
over recent decades. In exploring ways to best util-
ise OBOR’s immense offerings and those of other investors,
African governments should be hard-nosed and ori-
ented towards implementation and sustainable development in
first identifying and then agreeing the best policy
mix and governance structures for realising African wins. In
summary, there are more benefits to be shared
among countries involved in the One Belt One Road initiative,
and the inherent risks, if properly managed, will
not hinder the progress of world infrastructure upgrading.
Disclosure statement

62. No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
1. What Did China Accomplish at the Belt and Road Forum?
The Diplomat. May 16, 2017. Retrieved from: http://
thediplomat. com/2017/05/what-did-china-accomplish-at-the-
belt-and-road-forum/
2. Ibid.
3. See Charles Clover and Lucky Homby, “China’s Great Game:
Road to a New Empire.” Financial times, October 12, 2015.
Retrieved from https://next.ft.com/content/6e098274-587a-
11e5-a28b-50226830d644#axzz3pCLXHStT.
4. “China’s ‘Belt and Road’ opens up new business in Africa —
for both the U.S. and China’. The Washington Post. 24 July,
2017. Retrieved from:
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-
cage/wp/2017/07/24/chinas-belt-and-road-opens-
up-new-business-in-africa-for-both-the-u-s-and-
china/?utm_term¼.8e8fa99394dd.
5. “What crisis? 16 of China’s biggest projects in Africa – It’s
all billion-dollar territory in here.” Mail and Guardian, 19
September, 2015. Retrieved from
www.mgafrica.com/article/2015-09-18-multi-billion-dollars-
deals-chinas-27-biggest-active-
projects-in-africa
6. See Charles Clover and Lucky Homby, “China’s Great Game:
Road to a New Empire.” Financial times, October 12, 2015.
Retrieved from https://next.ft.com/content/6e098274-587a-
11e5-a28b-50226830d644#axzz3pCLXHStT.

63. 7. The ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ Is Not ‘China’s Marshall
Plan’. Why Not? The Diplomat, January 26, 2016. Retrieved
from:
www.thediplomat.com/2016/01/the-belt-and-road-initiaive-is-
not-chinas-marshall-plan-why-not/
8. “Why African Nations Welcome China”. The Diplomat, 16
February 2017. Retrieved from www.thediplomat.com/2017/02/
why -african-nations-welcome-china/
9. Yun Sun, Inserting Africa into China’s One Belt, One Road
Strategy: A new opportunity for jobs and infrastructure.
Brookings Institute, 2March 2015. Retrieved from
www.brooking.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/posts/2015/03/02-
africa-china-
jobs-infrastructure-sun
10. Kenya is also the only African country included in a recent
Xinhua New promotional video explaining the Belt and Road
Initiative (see
https://twitter.com/XHNews/status/709752281692921856
11. Zhou (2014) argues that the 15 months long standoff caused
by disagreement on transit fee remittance between South
and North Sudan affected oil production and export to China
12. He, ‘When BRIC becomes BRICS’; Wang, ‘South Africa’s
role in the BRICS and the G-20’.
13. ‘Media remarks by the Minister of International Relations
and Cooperation, Ms Maite Nkoana-Mashabane’
14. Franz Crul, China and SA on their Way to Sustainable Trade
Relations (Stellenbosch: Tralac, May 2013), available at: http://
www.tralac.org/files/2013/05/S13IP022013-Crul-China-and-SA-
on-their-way-to-sustainable-trade-relations-20130529-fin.pdf
(accessed 15 October 2015).

64. 15. Wang, ‘South Africa’s role in the BRICS and the G-20’
16. 13% of China’s global oil imports came from Angola in
2014 (see http://www.statista.com/statistics/221765/chinese-oil-
imports-by-country).
17. Five 13% of China’s global oil imports came from Angola in
2014 (see http://www.statista.com/statistics/221765/chinese-
oil-imports-by-country).
18. African Union and SADC discuss intra-regional trade plans.
Bridges Africa, International Centre for Trade and Sustainable
Development.15 June 2014. Retrieved from
www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/bridges-africa/news/african-union-
and-sadc-
discuss-intra-regional-trade-plans
19. Yun Sun, Inserting Africa into China’s One Belt, One Road
Strategy: A new opportunity for jobs and infrastructure.
Brookings Institute, March 2, 2015. Retrieved from
www.brooking.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/posts/2015/03/02-
africa-china-
jobs- infrastructure-sun
20. World Energy Outlook, Electricity Access Data Base (IEA:
2016). Retrieved from http://www.worldenergyoutlookorg/
resources/energydevelopment/energyaccessdatabase/accessed
June 2, 2017, http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org
TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS REVIEW 357
http://thediplomat
http://thediplomat
https://next.ft.com/content/6e098274-587a-11e5-a28b-
50226830d644#axzz3pCLXHStT

65. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-
cage/wp/2017/07/24/chinas-belt-and-road-opens-up-new-
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-
cage/wp/2017/07/24/chinas-belt-and-road-opens-up-new-
http://www.mgafrica.com/article/2015-09-18-multi-billion-
dollars-deals-chinas-27-biggest-active-projects-in-africa
http://www.mgafrica.com/article/2015-09-18-multi-billion-
dollars-deals-chinas-27-biggest-active-projects-in-africa
https://next.ft.com/content/6e098274-587a-11e5-a28b-
50226830d644#axzz3pCLXHStT
http://www.thediplomat.com/2017/02/why
http://www.thediplomat.com/2017/02/why
http://www.brooking.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/posts/2015/03/02-
africa-china-jobs-
http://www.brooking.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/posts/2015/03/02-
africa-china-jobs-
https://twitter.com/XHNews/status/709752281692921856
http://www.tralac.org/files/2013/05/S13IP022013-Crul-China-
and-SA-on-their-way-to-sustainable-trade-relations-20130529-
fin.pdf
http://www.tralac.org/files/2013/05/S13IP022013-Crul-China-
and-SA-on-their-way-to-sustainable-trade-relations-20130529-
fin.pdf
http://www.statista.com/statistics/221765/chinese-oil-imports-
by-country
http://www.statista.com/statistics/221765/chinese-oil-imports-
by-country
http://www.statista.com/statistics/221765/chinese-oil-imports-
by-country
http://www.statista.com/statistics/221765/chinese-oil-imports-
by-country
http://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/bridges-africa/news/african-
union-and-sadc-discuss-
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