An analytical review of the political impact of Kurdistan's referendum on September 25th 2017. The article adopts an analytical methodology based on provisions of reality and their repercussions on the political arena in Iraq. The article attempts to have an insight on the various political levels that vary between agents and actors; national, regional and international, and their role in the political deprivation caused by the referendum.

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Kurdistan's Political Doomsday: Analytical Review
and Futuristic Improvisation.
By: Firas Dabbagh Nov. 2017
25th
of September, 2017 has been a turning point in Iraq's modern history.
After 14 years of devastating turmoil, Iraq internal political structures commenced to
work on shaping the country's future, as an effective actor in the region. What has
been the trigger to this political redirection and retention of political confidence is
the latest referendum of Iraq's Kurdistan region. A day before the referendum, the
vision towards Iraq's political future was fundamentally different from the aftermath
vision. The vision of Iraq's future political role before the referendum reflected a
picture of a weak country torn between sectarian political parties, extrusive
corruption and high prospective to be divided into three sectarian city-states. But,
thanks go to Kurdistan referendum that availed a golden opportunity for the Iraqi
PM, Al-Abadi, who ceased the political momentum generated against the
referendum, nationally, regionally and internationally. Al-Abadi smartly moved in a
revisionist approach towards the status quo that the Kurdish political agenda had
been working on, since 2003, to normalize. Accordingly, the concurrent situation in
Iraq raises several questions: First, why did the Kurdish political elite choose to
implement the referendum decision and why at this time? Second, what are the
consequences of the implementation of the referendum decision? And third, what is
the impact of the post-referendum political atmosphere on the Iraqi polities,
nationally, regionally and internationally? This article, therefore, shall attempt to
validate adequate answers to these questions, to shed light on Iraq's foreseeable
future in the international world of politics.

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First, why did the Kurdish political elite choose to implement the referendum
decision and why at this time?
Despite all the warnings and hints made by national, regional and international
actors, the Kurdish political elite insisted to go ahead with the implementation of the
referendum. Such insistence has been grounded on certain perceptions that belong
first and foremost, in my view, to personal agenda; second, misunderstanding of the
international stance; and finally, miscalculation of the regional geopolitical interests
map
Personal Agenda
Barzani's long history as a spearhead of the Kurdish national struggle has inflated his
position to be a national icon. Beside his position as the revolutionary political
leader, he's been elected in 2005 to be the president of Kurdistan region that
enabled him to master wide executive authorities. Altogether, political power and
executive authorities have allowed Barzani to widely spread his wings on the
accounts of the weak central government in Baghdad. This atmosphere created an
inflated false confidence and eminent egoism. Thus, Barzani, the 71 years old, has
been so longing for culminating his personal victories with what would be a popular
wagon to engrave his name in the Kurdish history as 'The father of Kurdistan
independence'. In this line, another persistent factor played an important role in
pushing Barzani to take the referendum decision. This factor is engulfed in his power
dilemma, as his presidency period has, constitutionally, been 4 years over-due and
the opposition voices are getting louder, plus the impact of the extrusive corruption
started to be tangible in the Kurdish people daily life. Therefore, there should have
been a very recognizable political status that justifies the continuity of Barzani's
presidential and political privileges. On the other hand, implementing the
referendum would have to be the first solid step towards the realization of the
Kurdish independence dream. For Barzani, the referendum was a stone to hit down
two birds.

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Misunderstanding
On the international political arena, Barzani's projections have been maximizing the
fears against the formation of dangerous dictatorship based on racial grounds. This
notion fundamentally, nevertheless, contradicts the universal political persuasions,
especially in the Middle East area. An area which is not in a position that allows it for
neither further political complications nor volatile conflicts. The USA's opposition to
the referendum is totally reasonable, because any disaggregation of Iraq's territories
in a way that leads into the creation of a new dictatorship would put the USA, as the
key international actor in Iraq, in an embarrassing situation in front of the
international community, lessens its political authenticity and shakes its image as a
liberal superpower that advocates for democracy. On the other side, the
international community has been striving to mitigate the anarchic nature of the
international political system, through the institutionalization of system's norms,
principles and procedures. Thus, any disruption to the system's fundamental
grounds would definitely lead into undesirable reactions from the system's actors.
Therefore, the UNSC's 15 members sent a clear no-support message to the Kurdish
political elites through their statement "continuing respect for the sovereignty,
territorial integrity, and unity of Iraq". The EU's stance was not different, in this
concern, as well. The EU's reaction towards Kurdistan referendum has been
expressed as: “Unilateral actions, such as the proposed referendum, is
counterproductive and must be avoided". The EU's stance is in fact a reflection
against Europe's potential similar separatist moves. Regionally, Iran and Turkey have
been forming the strongest opposition, as they both considered the Kurdish
referendum a direct threat to their national security. Therefore, the Iraqi-Turkish
shaken ties have immediately been strengthened, in response to the Kurdish
referendum, in a step of containment towards the impact of the Kurdish aggressive
political maneuver. Another area that has not been politically comprehended by the
Kurdish political elite is the International political agenda, where security is, usually,
tabula rasa, and the fight against terrorism is on the top of its priorities. Thus, any
disturbance or shift in focus, away from these international priorities would

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definitely be ignored, if not heavily opposed. Accordingly, the right of peoples' self-
determination comes later, relative to the fight against terrorism.
Miscalculation
Kurdistan political mesh has been woven basically by two dominant political parties:
Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), headed by Barzani; and Democratic National
Union of Kurdistan (DNUK), headed by late Talbani. Their national agendas intersect
in the realization of the national Kurdish dream home. Nevertheless, they have deep
ideological differences. They have been across several disputes and conflicts along
their national struggle in many occasions. Yet, in 2003, they could set their
ideological differences and united towards a solid Kurdish political representation in
the new Iraqi political era. In 2005, the Kurdish polities were successful to dominate
Iraq's presidential seat. While, Talbani was nominated as Iraq's president, Barzani
ascended to be the president of Kurdistan region. The political representation in the
Iraqi political arena was not only depicted the president's seat, but this
representation was further strengthened by two more sovereign positions, whose
most eminent was the position of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, attained by Zibari.
Thus, Barzani was working on strengthening of the Kurdish internal front; Talbani
was working on the normalization of the political Kurdish iconic presence in the Iraqi
political scene; and, Zibari was working on the strengthening of the Kurdish visibility
on the international level. Thus, this three-dimensional political scheme has been an
important factor in availing wide opportunities for the Kurdish elites to involve in
various political international events, with high voice of diplomatic representation
and actions on the international level. Furthermore, the safe and secured internal
environment has been successful in attracting foreign investments. The lion's share
of the foreign investments was attained by Turkey, in two main sectors: Real estate
and Oil. The latter became more prosperous in 2014, when KRG extended its control
to conquer oil-rich areas in Kirkuk and Mosul. This situation provided KRG with
remarkable income benefits. In the meantime, IFG was suffering from the heavy
shadows of the repercussions of ISIS occupation of a wide area of Iraqi territories.

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This atmosphere gave the impression that KRG in Erbil was stronger than IFG in
Baghdad. Furthermore, this atmosphere provided inflated image of Kurdistan's
geopolitical capabilities.
On the other hand, the ideological differences between the Sunni Turkey and Shiite
Iran denoted an illusion for the Kurdish political elite to cease this opportunity and
employ it to the referendum's projected outcomes. The Turkish-Iranian competition
in Kurdistan was another false indicator to the Kurdish polities. Turkey's investment
in Kurdistan was colossus and Iran's intelligence presence was vital for Iran's
operations in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. Hence, Kurdistan's political elite thought that
the Turkish and Iranian interests in Kurdistan would prevent any opposition against
the Kurdish referendum. Moreover, the US support for the Syrian Kurdish factions on
the one side and its military base in Kurdistan and long history of US support to the
Kurdish case, on the other side, seemed indispensible US interests in the eyes of the
Kurdish political elite. Besides, there has been Germany's military support to the
Pishmerga, which seemed another pro for the referendum case, as Germany is
almost the strongest actor in the EU. Thus, it seemed for the Kurdish politics that
Germany would be an advocate for the Kurdish support in the EU political
community. Accordingly, the Kurdish political elites imagined that they would be
powered by an immense regional and political momentum, if they go ahead with the
referendum.
In terms of the referendum's timing, the Kurdish political elite built, I assume, the
referendum timing decision on certain subjective reasoning grounds. First of all, the
Kurdish political elite were clutching for an opportunity to advance the Kurdish cause
a step further. Thus, they presumed that the concurrent political atmosphere in the
region would be an added value for their referendum implementation decision on 25
Sep. 2017. On the internal level, IFG has been, since Oct. 2016, to an ongoing fight
against ISIS and the 2018 parliament elections behind the door. Thus, I assume that
the Kurdish political decision-makers presumed, on the one hand, that IFG would not
be ready to open an internal front while it was mobilizing efforts and resources to
eliminate ISIS existence on Iraqi territories. On the other hand, the Kurdish political
elite presumed that the referendum would be a strong pressure element for the

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upcoming political rally of the parliament elections in 2018 and consequent political
ally-formation. On the regional level, The Kurdish political elites presumed that
Turkey's military involvement in Syria would distract the Turkish political priorities
and leave the political area wide open for the Kurdish political maneuver of the
referendum. On the international level, the Yemen crisis and GCC crisis in addition to
the Syrian crisis would also be a distraction element for the political impact of the
Kurdish referendum.
Besides, the Kurdish polities misread the International institution of 'peoples' self-
determination', which was originally affirmed by the UN charter for the peoples
colonized by foreign powers. Moreover, the Kurdish political elite forgot, or perhaps
ignored, to look into the core solid presence of the international institution of 'State
Sovereignty', which has been also affirmed by the UN charter. Furthermore, it seems
that the Kurdish political elite did not try to provide an answer for the question:
What is the Kurdish referendum's added-value for the international political system?
And even what is the added value of a Kurdish state to the international political
system?
Therefore, due to all the aforementioned miscalculations, Kurdistan's referendum
turned into a political disaster, whose consequences will be long-termed and mostly
suffered by Kurdish people.
Second, what are the immediate consequences of the implementation of the
referendum decision?
Since 1991, the Kurdish political factions have been manipulating their revisionist
approach to inhibit certain features in the Kurdish society. Barzani, since he
mastered both the top political and executive authorities, resumed the revisionist
approach through deepening ethnic empathy in the Kurdish society and widening
social egoism, from one side. From another side, Barzani worked on the expansion of
the area inhabited by Kurdish ethnicity, through demographic change. The ethnic
empathy was promoted by limiting education to Kurdish language and improvising
extraneous social norms. Social egoism was enriched through the demarcation of
social ethnic differences between the Kurds and the rest of Iraqi society.

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Additionally, the salient gap in security atmosphere and social welfare between
Kurdistan and the rest of Iraq has also been a significant element in widening the
social egoism of the Kurdish society.
Saddam Hussain, during 1980s and 1990s, applied Arabization policy (demographic
change) to several areas in Northern Iraq, especially in Mosul, Kirkuk, Dyala, and
Salahuddin. Barzani, in his turn, readopted this policy and conducted a reversed
demographic change as far as possible in these areas, from 2014 onwards. In order
to maintain security in Kurdistan, Barzani increased the number of constraints in
front of the rest of Iraqi nationals against their freedom of movement, mercantile
activities and ownership of property. Accordingly, the atmosphere resulted from
Barzani's administration procedures and political projections have concluded into
increased societal divide between the Kurdish society and the rest of Iraqi social
spectrum. The September 25th
Kurdish referendum produced political, economic and
security challenges. These challenges are going to be discussed next.
The political challenges resulted from the Kurdish referendum have had immediate
impact on the internal Kurdish political context and contested the iconic image of
Barzani's. Together, these political challenges have resulted severe damages to the
Kurdish cause. Thus, the reflection of which have deteriorated to the political gains
that had already been realized along the last two decades. The turbulence within the
Kurdish scene has, profoundly, turned the shape of the political relationship with IRG
up-side-down. IRG was well-prepared for the referendum's aftermath. Thus, IRG's
well-calculated steps immediately after the referendum have been very effective.
The swift spread of Iraqi federal forces in the disputed areas; the ban on
international flights into Kurdistan airports; and, the high level diplomatic
coordination with Turkey and Iran, concerning the joint borders' entry points have
shaken the Kurdish administration and entangled them in a narrow political path.
Thus, the Kurdish political machinery was left with only two elements to maneuver
with: Cancellation of the referendum's results and Pishmerga. Thus, the Kurdish
politics shall utilize the former as a diplomatic pressure element to drag IRG into
talks and negotiations, while in the meantime it shall utilize the latter to drag IRG
into military confrontation. By this atmosphere, the Kurdish polities shall work on

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the internationalization of the Kurdish cause and demand the International
community for an immediate intervention. These political projections are well-
understood by IRG. Therefore, an observer's eye can see that IRG is grounding all its
maneuvers on the provisions of the Iraqi constitution. But, time plays an important
role for these political skirmishes. Whereas IRG looks for as long enough time as
possible, KRG looks for a very soon relaxation of the crisis. Thus, the economic
factor, here, is dominant, as Kurdistan's economic resources have been,
dramatically, cut short, at a time Kurdistan already had been suffering an economic
retreat. The commercial traffic between Kurdistan on the one side, and Iran, Turkey
and the rest of Iraq, on the other side has almost stopped in the aftermath of the
referendum. The major source of wealth, Kirkuk, is no more under KRG's control.
International air traffic has also been halted. Accordingly, if KRG does not lean to a
realist way of thinking and try to cool down its political rhetoric and reorganize
priorities on its agenda, they may find themselves in a zero-sum position with the
surrounding political rivals. This situation, unfortunately, is bringing Kurdistan into a
position prone to high security risks. In this concern, the concurrent geopolitical map
of the region denotes that there is almost zero chance for the rise of a new state,
especially if such a state is rising on ethnic bases. The security challenges, in fact are
completely surrounding Kurdistan, where Iran is on the East and North-east; Turkey
is on the North and North-West; and, Iraq's Army is on the South and South-West. In
addition, Kurdistan does not have air-force nor missile power. On the other sides,
you have three relatively giant opponents that are ready to defend their national
security and territorial sovereignty and unity to the last breathe.
It is worthy to mention, here also, that the referendum has echoed a sequence of
political mistakes started with the postponement of Kurdistan parliamentarian
elections for eight months through the distribution of Kurdistan presidency's
authorities on the judicial, legislative and executive authorities. Furthermore,
Barzani's abandoning of Kurdistan's presidency held an implicit recognition of the
mistake of the referendum, which heavily contributed to further complicating the
political scene in Kurdistan. Additionally, in order to cover up the climate of

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embarrassment, Barzani kept a high tone of revolutionary speeches of threatening
and intimidating.
Third, what is the impact of the post-referendum political atmosphere on the Iraqi
polities nationally, regionally and internationally?
As I mentioned earlier, Kurdistan's referendum has formulated a turning point in the
modern Iraqi political history. As far as the referendum's timing impacted negatively
on the Kurdish political atmosphere; it had a positive impact upon Iraq's national and
foreign politics. Beside the victories achieved against ISIS, Such an impact will be,
nationally, sensed with the 2018 parliament elections. On the one hand, it increased
Al-Abadi's chances for another 4-year term and provided him with a solid popular
foundation to proceed with his efforts against corruption. On the other hand,
Baghdad has regained its position as the country's political weight center.
Additionally, the referendum allowed an opportunity of reviewing the country's
constitution and an overall review of fair distribution of fortune. However, the
concomitant political challenges may hinder these prospective political
improvisations, especially in the light of the Iranian and American political
interventions and their political interplay, which may turn into military
confrontation.
On the regional level, the decentralized administration of fortune and political
representation, which used to be exacerbated in a quasi-autonomous Kurdistan
before the referendum, will be dramatically decreased and re-centralized. Turkey
and Iran will definitely think twice before practicing foreign policies or commercial
investments in Kurdistan, in isolation of Baghdad, as they understood that the cost
of a powerful Kurdish entity in North Iraq is far greater than the revenues they would
gain from their commercial investments in Kurdistan. This situation will be a solid
element for Iraq's stability, yet this element is also challenged by the American
vague policy in the Kurdish case; besides, the French and German attitude towards
the Kurdish cause. The Americans want to keep Kurdistan strong enough to curb the
Iranian expansion in the region, albeit they also want strong Kurdistan within one
Iraqi political shape. On the other hand, the Americans need to maintain strong

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Kurdistan to use it as a pressure card against Turkey. France and Germany are
supporting the Kurdish cause based on their European humanitarian commitments
and the EU's human-based moral principles. But they understand that any military
strengthening of Kurdistan will lead into a civil war in Iraq, as the Kurds will seek to
enhance their economic power through their control of the oil-rich region in Kirkuk
and Mosul. This situation will bring back the political process in Iraq to ground zero.
Thus, both France and Germany well understand that they need to handle the stick
at the middle, because unstable Iraq will pose the persistence of refugees flow into
Europe. Again, the cost will be much higher and multi-dimensional. The declaration
of an ISIS-free Iraq, will soon mobilize the regional and international support for a
unified strong Iraq, as it will be the only safety valve for the region's stability. The
sectarian religious sameness between Iraq and Iran has allowed for political marriage
between them, yet the ethnic origin of Iraq as an Arab state encompasses it with
moral responsibility towards KSA, Jordan and Kuwait. Thus, any conflict governs
these two features of Iraq will lead into severe instability in the region. Therefore, all
political actors in the region will do their best to maintain proportionate balance
between these features of modern Iraq.
Accordingly, I may conclude here that as the entire region's instability started in Iraq,
the region's stability, therefore, also starts in Iraq.