This summary provides an overview of the challenges to demilitarization and democratic consolidation in West Africa based on the document:
1) West Africa poses some of the greatest challenges to demilitarization due to a history of conflicts, increased arms flows, influence of private armies, and the prominent role of force in conflict resolution.
2) Successful demilitarization requires addressing both quantitative reductions in military forces as well as qualitative changes in military culture and influence.
3) Key challenges include overcoming the militarized mindset developed during decades of authoritarian rule, addressing the colonial legacy of West African militaries, and developing knowledgeable civilian oversight to replace military dominance over security policies.
Civil military relations in the current global configuration, a case study of...Jeffrey S. Gibson
The document analyzes factors that allow militaries to dominate governments, using Pakistan as a case study. It finds that high external threats, high internal threats like terrorism and ethnic tensions, and a weak state that cannot ensure security or development have allowed Pakistan's military to rule for 33 of its 66 years, conducting 4 coups. The military is cohesive due to its composition and generous benefits, and it has institutionally entrenched itself in politics. However, these factors were less significant in countries like Brazil where the military is no longer dominant and Turkey where it plays more of a guardian role.
The Baloch people have faced oppression from the Pakistani state since Balochistan was forcibly incorporated into Pakistan in 1948. This has led to several independence movements over the decades fighting against human rights abuses, lack of autonomy, and exploitation of Balochistan's resources by the central government. The latest conflict began in 2004 in response to the killing of Baloch leader Akbar Bugti, and since then over 20,000 Baloch activists and civilians have been abducted or killed by Pakistani security forces, fueling a violent insurgency for an independent Balochistan that continues today.
The Postulates on Russia’s Foreign Policy developed with the participation of the Russian International Affairs Council’s members and experts discuss Russia’s position in the international arena, the role of global challenges in shaping the foreign policy agenda and outline foreign policy priorities for the period from 2012 to 2018. The main purpose of the Postulates is to encourage a public discourse about new contours and orientation of Russia’s foreign policy and to devise the solutions to be protected against traditional and emerging security challenges.
Ayub Khan came to power in 1958 after a military coup. He aimed to rapidly industrialize Pakistan's economy and encourage private sector growth. Agricultural reforms like high-yielding seeds boosted farm output. Industrial policy focused on import substitution. Economic growth averaged 6.25% annually during Ayub's rule. However, foreign aid dependence rose and industrial protection policies made some industries inefficient. The 1965 war with India also slowed economic progress.
This document discusses the challenges of achieving national integration in Pakistan. It outlines several political, economic, and ethno-religious factors that have either strengthened or weakened integration efforts. Politically, delays in establishing a democratic system and granting true autonomy to provinces created misunderstandings. Economically, unequal resource distribution and an unfair revenue sharing system widened disparities between provinces. Ethnically and religiously, emphasizing a single national identity over regional diversity, as well as the rise of sectarianism, aggravated tensions. Overall, the document analyzes how failures of governance, political instability, and the exploitation of ethnic and religious divisions have posed obstacles to national cohesion in Pakistan.
Mazhar Aziz's book provides a new perspective on civil-military relations in Pakistan by introducing the concept of "institutional path dependency", however it fails to precisely define this concept. The reviewer argues that the book misses important factors that have influenced Pakistan's military interventions, such as the colonial legacy of British rule in Punjab and the role of the US in manipulating the Pakistani military to achieve geopolitical aims. While the military has acted out of institutional interests at times, the reviewer asserts that personal motivations and class interests of top generals have been more influential in driving regime changes. Defeat in war may be the only way to reduce the military's oversized role in Pakistan's politics.
This document summarizes a presentation about media and civil-military relations in Turkey. It discusses how the Turkish military's relationship with the media has changed from one of censorship and manipulation prior to 1990 to a more interactive relationship after 1990. The media played a role in increasing civilian control over the military by becoming more critical and questioning of the military leadership. This shift reflects the general trend of civilianization in Turkey since 2000 as well as changes in the commercialization and digitization of the media landscape.
Internal security and defence of pakistanNabeel Khalid
Internal security involves keeping peace within a country's borders through law enforcement and defense against internal threats such as terrorism, extremism, and sectarianism. A roadmap for Pakistan's internal security includes regularly discussing challenges, strengthening the National Counter Terrorism Authority, improving intelligence coordination, creating counterterrorism forces, and enhancing the roles of police, investigations, the judiciary, and media. Key agencies involved are the Defense and Interior Ministries, along with the military, paramilitary, and intelligence organizations under them.
Civil military relations in the current global configuration, a case study of...Jeffrey S. Gibson
The document analyzes factors that allow militaries to dominate governments, using Pakistan as a case study. It finds that high external threats, high internal threats like terrorism and ethnic tensions, and a weak state that cannot ensure security or development have allowed Pakistan's military to rule for 33 of its 66 years, conducting 4 coups. The military is cohesive due to its composition and generous benefits, and it has institutionally entrenched itself in politics. However, these factors were less significant in countries like Brazil where the military is no longer dominant and Turkey where it plays more of a guardian role.
The Baloch people have faced oppression from the Pakistani state since Balochistan was forcibly incorporated into Pakistan in 1948. This has led to several independence movements over the decades fighting against human rights abuses, lack of autonomy, and exploitation of Balochistan's resources by the central government. The latest conflict began in 2004 in response to the killing of Baloch leader Akbar Bugti, and since then over 20,000 Baloch activists and civilians have been abducted or killed by Pakistani security forces, fueling a violent insurgency for an independent Balochistan that continues today.
The Postulates on Russia’s Foreign Policy developed with the participation of the Russian International Affairs Council’s members and experts discuss Russia’s position in the international arena, the role of global challenges in shaping the foreign policy agenda and outline foreign policy priorities for the period from 2012 to 2018. The main purpose of the Postulates is to encourage a public discourse about new contours and orientation of Russia’s foreign policy and to devise the solutions to be protected against traditional and emerging security challenges.
Ayub Khan came to power in 1958 after a military coup. He aimed to rapidly industrialize Pakistan's economy and encourage private sector growth. Agricultural reforms like high-yielding seeds boosted farm output. Industrial policy focused on import substitution. Economic growth averaged 6.25% annually during Ayub's rule. However, foreign aid dependence rose and industrial protection policies made some industries inefficient. The 1965 war with India also slowed economic progress.
This document discusses the challenges of achieving national integration in Pakistan. It outlines several political, economic, and ethno-religious factors that have either strengthened or weakened integration efforts. Politically, delays in establishing a democratic system and granting true autonomy to provinces created misunderstandings. Economically, unequal resource distribution and an unfair revenue sharing system widened disparities between provinces. Ethnically and religiously, emphasizing a single national identity over regional diversity, as well as the rise of sectarianism, aggravated tensions. Overall, the document analyzes how failures of governance, political instability, and the exploitation of ethnic and religious divisions have posed obstacles to national cohesion in Pakistan.
Mazhar Aziz's book provides a new perspective on civil-military relations in Pakistan by introducing the concept of "institutional path dependency", however it fails to precisely define this concept. The reviewer argues that the book misses important factors that have influenced Pakistan's military interventions, such as the colonial legacy of British rule in Punjab and the role of the US in manipulating the Pakistani military to achieve geopolitical aims. While the military has acted out of institutional interests at times, the reviewer asserts that personal motivations and class interests of top generals have been more influential in driving regime changes. Defeat in war may be the only way to reduce the military's oversized role in Pakistan's politics.
This document summarizes a presentation about media and civil-military relations in Turkey. It discusses how the Turkish military's relationship with the media has changed from one of censorship and manipulation prior to 1990 to a more interactive relationship after 1990. The media played a role in increasing civilian control over the military by becoming more critical and questioning of the military leadership. This shift reflects the general trend of civilianization in Turkey since 2000 as well as changes in the commercialization and digitization of the media landscape.
Internal security and defence of pakistanNabeel Khalid
Internal security involves keeping peace within a country's borders through law enforcement and defense against internal threats such as terrorism, extremism, and sectarianism. A roadmap for Pakistan's internal security includes regularly discussing challenges, strengthening the National Counter Terrorism Authority, improving intelligence coordination, creating counterterrorism forces, and enhancing the roles of police, investigations, the judiciary, and media. Key agencies involved are the Defense and Interior Ministries, along with the military, paramilitary, and intelligence organizations under them.
The document discusses the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators which measures six dimensions of governance in over 200 countries including voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. It also discusses some common critiques of these indicators such as comparability over time and across countries as well as biases in expert assessments. Finally, it lists some of the data sources that are used to construct the governance indicators such as surveys of households and firms, commercial business information providers, NGOs, and public sector organizations.
Future challenges to international securityParas Bhutto
The document outlines several structural challenges to international security, including terrorism, cyberterrorism, nuclear proliferation, China's rise, the crisis in the Middle East, corruption, and climate change. It provides details on each challenge, such as how terrorism is difficult to define but has been an effective tactic, how cyberterrorism allows terrorists to wage war in cyberspace, and how climate change will cause global instability and pressure on resources. The conclusion states that the current rapid rate of change outpaces human and state abilities to cope, putting pressure on nation states and potentially fueling issues like terrorism.
What is separation of powers and how is it ineffective in Pakistan?MashifMahboob
THEORY ON PRINCIPLES OF SEPARATION OF POWERS AND THE CONCEPT OF CHECKS AND BALANCES
Its IMPORTANCE, CRITICISM, Clear Distinctions, Role of Legislature, Role of Executive, NAB
Parliament, FIR, Police, Army, Role of Judiciary
Separation of Powers And our Constitution
Judiciary in Contradiction to concept of separation of powers
Powerful beaurucrac hy and Army Intervention, Legislative process and powerful executive in hurdle of applying concept of separation of powers
Policy Recommendation
Conclusion
System of Check and Balances is the balanced system overall.
Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) 1901, As Amended in 2011 (English, including...fatanews
The definitive legal version of the amended Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR), following the FATA reforms package enacted by the President of Pakistan in August 2011. This version (printed in March 2013) also includes a brief history of the regulations and a new summary of the 2011 amendments.
Pakistan adopted the Government of India Act of 1935 as an interim constitution after independence in 1947. Quaid-e-Azam sought to frame a comprehensive constitution but faced difficulties due to other pressing issues. The first constituent assembly passed the Objectives Resolution in 1949, outlining Pakistan as a democratic Islamic republic. After several amendments and martial laws, the Constitution of 1973 was approved, establishing a parliamentary system. It has since faced multiple amendments that have altered the balance of power between civilian and military institutions.
1) Pakistan has experienced over 33 years of military rule over its history through 3 martial laws declared in 1958, 1977, and 1999.
2) The first President of Pakistan, Iskander Mirza, relied on the military and declared martial law in 1958, appointing General Ayub Khan as chief administrator, who later became President.
3) Weak civilian leadership, political parties, institutions, and rising civil-military bureaucracy have contributed to the military's repeated interventions in domestic politics throughout Pakistan's history.
A presentation delivered by Mr. Mohammad Ishaque Jamali, an officer of Provincial Civil Service Balochistan, Pakistan during his study of Master's in Public Policy Program at National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS), Tokyo for the Course titled "Policy Design and Implementation in Developing Countries".
This document discusses Pakistan's role in combating terrorism. It outlines several factors that contribute to terrorism in Pakistan, including its geographical location bordering countries experiencing conflicts, economic and political instability within Pakistan, and involvement of external powers seeking to destabilize the region. The document examines Pakistan's weaknesses in combating terrorism, such as societal divisions and poverty, as well as its strengths, including national unity around the vision of an independent Pakistan and resilience of the Pakistani people. It provides recommendations for addressing the root causes of terrorism by promoting economic development, justice and hope. Combating terrorism requires a long-term, global approach rather than short-term military solutions alone.
This document discusses various approaches to studying civil-military relations, including social science, political science, and considering factors like law, philosophy, psychology, and economics. It examines the relationship between civilian groups and armed groups, and between the military and social classes. It also outlines the roles and nature of civilians versus the military in areas like state building, development, and security. It provides models for analyzing the output of different combinations of strong and weak civilians and military. Overall, the document takes a multifaceted approach to analyzing civil-military relations in Myanmar by considering individual, state and international levels.
Civil services of Pakistan include 12 departments that provide administrative functions excluding military and judicial branches. The departments include Pakistan Customs Services, Pakistan Administrative Service, Police Service of Pakistan, and others. Reforms to the civil services have been limited with the system still operating similar to under British rule. Some reforms include changes in 1973, during certain Prime Ministers' terms, and under Musharraf who commissioned the National Commission on Government Reforms to propose changes such as adding a personality test to the selection process.
The Legal Framework Order of 1970 established the legal framework for elections in Pakistan following the abrogation of the 1962 constitution. It dissolved the One Unit system in West Pakistan and replaced the principle of parity with direct elections. The Order laid out the distribution of seats in the National and Provincial Assemblies, and established that elections would be held in October and December of 1970. It also outlined broad principles for the new constitution, including establishing Pakistan as an Islamic republic, preserving Islamic principles, and ensuring fundamental rights and independence for provinces.
Comprehensive presentation that looks at the question of civil-military relations, specifically the relationship between multi-national military forces and international humanitarian organizations.
This document provides an overview of key influences that have shaped the Muslim world, including political, economic, religious, social, intellectual/arts, and geographic influences. It discusses stereotypes that Westerners and Muslims hold about each other. Politically, it outlines the impacts of European imperialism, ethnic minorities, and various modern political structures. Economically, it notes the importance and disputes over water and oil resources. Religiously, it describes the five pillars of Islam and differences between Sunni and Shi'a traditions. Socially, it outlines cultural practices and the complex Israel/Palestine and India/Pakistan conflicts. Intellectually, it examines religious and secular art/architecture. Geographically, it discusses adapting to diverse
Pakistan faces many challenges in formulating its foreign policy including maintaining good relations with neighboring countries like India, Afghanistan, and Iran while countering threats from global powers. Key issues include the Kashmir dispute with India, countering terrorism, navigating relations with the US regarding drone strikes and the war in Afghanistan, and maximizing benefits from partnerships like the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor while addressing Indian opposition. Pakistan aims to pursue cooperative relations globally while protecting its sovereignty and national interests in a challenging geopolitical environment.
Ayub Khan ruled Pakistan from 1958 to 1969 after declaring martial law. Some key policies and events during his rule included implementing five-year plans that boosted the economy and agriculture, introducing industrialization, and fighting the 1965 war with India. However, his regime also faced criticisms like curtailing political rights, economic issues after the war, and failing to address the growing nationalist movement in East Pakistan, which contributed to Pakistan's division in 1971.
Pak-National Security: Internal and External dimensionsDr Shahzad Aslam
The document outlines the composition and agenda of working groups formed as part of a national security workshop in Pakistan. It discusses increasing militarization of internal security and its implications. The working groups will evaluate issues such as the impact of militarization, devising border security strategies, and handling proscribed organizations. They will propose recommendations to strengthen civilian law enforcement and reduce excessive reliance on armed forces for domestic security matters.
Local Government Reforms in Pakistan: Context, Content and Causes fatanews
This paper examines the recent decentralization reforms in Pakistan under
General Musharraf. We highlight major aspects of this reform and analyze its
evolution in a historical context to better understand potential causes behind this
current decentralization. Analyzing the evolution of local government reforms in
Pakistan is interesting because each of the three major reform experiments has
been instituted at the behest of a non-representative centre using a ‘top down’
approach. Each of these reform experiments is a complementary change to a
wider constitutional reengineering strategy devised to further centralization of
political power in the hands of the non-representative centre. We argue that the
design of the local government reforms in these contexts becomes endogenous to
the centralization objectives of the non-representative centre. It is hoped that
analyzing the Pakistani experience will help shed light on the positive political
economy question of why non-representative regimes have been willing
proponents of decentralization to the local level.
The document discusses various perspectives on the meaning and scope of international relations (IR). It addresses traditional narrow and broader views, as well as perspectives put forth by scholars like Holsti, Wright, Hoffmann, and Mathiesen. Evolutionary phases of IR are examined, including the historical, legalistic, organizational, Cold War, post-behavioral, and current phases. Differences between IR and international politics are explored. The scope and approaches to studying IR are summarized, including traditional, scientific, behavioral, post-behavioral, and system approaches. Realist and idealist theories under the traditional approach are also summarized briefly.
Financial Federalism in Pakistan & National Finance CommissionShahbaz Cheema
Pakistan's federal constitutional system provides how its finances powers and resources would be distributed among various federating units. This slide show introduces the readers about that.
The Future of Demilitarisation and Stable Civil-Military Relations in West Af...Kayode Fayemi
This document summarizes the challenges of demilitarization and establishing stable civil-military relations in West Africa. It argues that West Africa poses some of the greatest obstacles to demilitarization in Africa due to high levels of conflicts, arms flows, private armies, and military influence over political decision-making. While countries in West Africa have democratized through elections, many have not established true democracies and still struggle with issues like rigged elections, authoritarian leaders, and exclusion of opposition groups. This paradox means that completely demilitarizing is difficult for authoritarian leaders but also that solely focusing on elections does not promote demilitarization or resolve the root causes of conflicts. The challenges of demilitarization in
Reforming Civil Military Relations for Sustainable Democracy in Nigeria - Iss...Kayode Fayemi
This document discusses reforming civil-military relations in Nigeria for sustainable democracy. It identifies several obstacles to achieving stable civil-military relations, including the military's legacy from colonial rule, the civilian elite's lack of knowledge about the military, and the military's lack of a clear mission. The document compares experiences in other countries and discusses several options and issues to consider in reforming Nigeria's civil-military relations, including refocusing the military's mission, subordinating the military to civilian control, and addressing human rights abuses.
The document discusses the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators which measures six dimensions of governance in over 200 countries including voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. It also discusses some common critiques of these indicators such as comparability over time and across countries as well as biases in expert assessments. Finally, it lists some of the data sources that are used to construct the governance indicators such as surveys of households and firms, commercial business information providers, NGOs, and public sector organizations.
Future challenges to international securityParas Bhutto
The document outlines several structural challenges to international security, including terrorism, cyberterrorism, nuclear proliferation, China's rise, the crisis in the Middle East, corruption, and climate change. It provides details on each challenge, such as how terrorism is difficult to define but has been an effective tactic, how cyberterrorism allows terrorists to wage war in cyberspace, and how climate change will cause global instability and pressure on resources. The conclusion states that the current rapid rate of change outpaces human and state abilities to cope, putting pressure on nation states and potentially fueling issues like terrorism.
What is separation of powers and how is it ineffective in Pakistan?MashifMahboob
THEORY ON PRINCIPLES OF SEPARATION OF POWERS AND THE CONCEPT OF CHECKS AND BALANCES
Its IMPORTANCE, CRITICISM, Clear Distinctions, Role of Legislature, Role of Executive, NAB
Parliament, FIR, Police, Army, Role of Judiciary
Separation of Powers And our Constitution
Judiciary in Contradiction to concept of separation of powers
Powerful beaurucrac hy and Army Intervention, Legislative process and powerful executive in hurdle of applying concept of separation of powers
Policy Recommendation
Conclusion
System of Check and Balances is the balanced system overall.
Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) 1901, As Amended in 2011 (English, including...fatanews
The definitive legal version of the amended Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR), following the FATA reforms package enacted by the President of Pakistan in August 2011. This version (printed in March 2013) also includes a brief history of the regulations and a new summary of the 2011 amendments.
Pakistan adopted the Government of India Act of 1935 as an interim constitution after independence in 1947. Quaid-e-Azam sought to frame a comprehensive constitution but faced difficulties due to other pressing issues. The first constituent assembly passed the Objectives Resolution in 1949, outlining Pakistan as a democratic Islamic republic. After several amendments and martial laws, the Constitution of 1973 was approved, establishing a parliamentary system. It has since faced multiple amendments that have altered the balance of power between civilian and military institutions.
1) Pakistan has experienced over 33 years of military rule over its history through 3 martial laws declared in 1958, 1977, and 1999.
2) The first President of Pakistan, Iskander Mirza, relied on the military and declared martial law in 1958, appointing General Ayub Khan as chief administrator, who later became President.
3) Weak civilian leadership, political parties, institutions, and rising civil-military bureaucracy have contributed to the military's repeated interventions in domestic politics throughout Pakistan's history.
A presentation delivered by Mr. Mohammad Ishaque Jamali, an officer of Provincial Civil Service Balochistan, Pakistan during his study of Master's in Public Policy Program at National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS), Tokyo for the Course titled "Policy Design and Implementation in Developing Countries".
This document discusses Pakistan's role in combating terrorism. It outlines several factors that contribute to terrorism in Pakistan, including its geographical location bordering countries experiencing conflicts, economic and political instability within Pakistan, and involvement of external powers seeking to destabilize the region. The document examines Pakistan's weaknesses in combating terrorism, such as societal divisions and poverty, as well as its strengths, including national unity around the vision of an independent Pakistan and resilience of the Pakistani people. It provides recommendations for addressing the root causes of terrorism by promoting economic development, justice and hope. Combating terrorism requires a long-term, global approach rather than short-term military solutions alone.
This document discusses various approaches to studying civil-military relations, including social science, political science, and considering factors like law, philosophy, psychology, and economics. It examines the relationship between civilian groups and armed groups, and between the military and social classes. It also outlines the roles and nature of civilians versus the military in areas like state building, development, and security. It provides models for analyzing the output of different combinations of strong and weak civilians and military. Overall, the document takes a multifaceted approach to analyzing civil-military relations in Myanmar by considering individual, state and international levels.
Civil services of Pakistan include 12 departments that provide administrative functions excluding military and judicial branches. The departments include Pakistan Customs Services, Pakistan Administrative Service, Police Service of Pakistan, and others. Reforms to the civil services have been limited with the system still operating similar to under British rule. Some reforms include changes in 1973, during certain Prime Ministers' terms, and under Musharraf who commissioned the National Commission on Government Reforms to propose changes such as adding a personality test to the selection process.
The Legal Framework Order of 1970 established the legal framework for elections in Pakistan following the abrogation of the 1962 constitution. It dissolved the One Unit system in West Pakistan and replaced the principle of parity with direct elections. The Order laid out the distribution of seats in the National and Provincial Assemblies, and established that elections would be held in October and December of 1970. It also outlined broad principles for the new constitution, including establishing Pakistan as an Islamic republic, preserving Islamic principles, and ensuring fundamental rights and independence for provinces.
Comprehensive presentation that looks at the question of civil-military relations, specifically the relationship between multi-national military forces and international humanitarian organizations.
This document provides an overview of key influences that have shaped the Muslim world, including political, economic, religious, social, intellectual/arts, and geographic influences. It discusses stereotypes that Westerners and Muslims hold about each other. Politically, it outlines the impacts of European imperialism, ethnic minorities, and various modern political structures. Economically, it notes the importance and disputes over water and oil resources. Religiously, it describes the five pillars of Islam and differences between Sunni and Shi'a traditions. Socially, it outlines cultural practices and the complex Israel/Palestine and India/Pakistan conflicts. Intellectually, it examines religious and secular art/architecture. Geographically, it discusses adapting to diverse
Pakistan faces many challenges in formulating its foreign policy including maintaining good relations with neighboring countries like India, Afghanistan, and Iran while countering threats from global powers. Key issues include the Kashmir dispute with India, countering terrorism, navigating relations with the US regarding drone strikes and the war in Afghanistan, and maximizing benefits from partnerships like the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor while addressing Indian opposition. Pakistan aims to pursue cooperative relations globally while protecting its sovereignty and national interests in a challenging geopolitical environment.
Ayub Khan ruled Pakistan from 1958 to 1969 after declaring martial law. Some key policies and events during his rule included implementing five-year plans that boosted the economy and agriculture, introducing industrialization, and fighting the 1965 war with India. However, his regime also faced criticisms like curtailing political rights, economic issues after the war, and failing to address the growing nationalist movement in East Pakistan, which contributed to Pakistan's division in 1971.
Pak-National Security: Internal and External dimensionsDr Shahzad Aslam
The document outlines the composition and agenda of working groups formed as part of a national security workshop in Pakistan. It discusses increasing militarization of internal security and its implications. The working groups will evaluate issues such as the impact of militarization, devising border security strategies, and handling proscribed organizations. They will propose recommendations to strengthen civilian law enforcement and reduce excessive reliance on armed forces for domestic security matters.
Local Government Reforms in Pakistan: Context, Content and Causes fatanews
This paper examines the recent decentralization reforms in Pakistan under
General Musharraf. We highlight major aspects of this reform and analyze its
evolution in a historical context to better understand potential causes behind this
current decentralization. Analyzing the evolution of local government reforms in
Pakistan is interesting because each of the three major reform experiments has
been instituted at the behest of a non-representative centre using a ‘top down’
approach. Each of these reform experiments is a complementary change to a
wider constitutional reengineering strategy devised to further centralization of
political power in the hands of the non-representative centre. We argue that the
design of the local government reforms in these contexts becomes endogenous to
the centralization objectives of the non-representative centre. It is hoped that
analyzing the Pakistani experience will help shed light on the positive political
economy question of why non-representative regimes have been willing
proponents of decentralization to the local level.
The document discusses various perspectives on the meaning and scope of international relations (IR). It addresses traditional narrow and broader views, as well as perspectives put forth by scholars like Holsti, Wright, Hoffmann, and Mathiesen. Evolutionary phases of IR are examined, including the historical, legalistic, organizational, Cold War, post-behavioral, and current phases. Differences between IR and international politics are explored. The scope and approaches to studying IR are summarized, including traditional, scientific, behavioral, post-behavioral, and system approaches. Realist and idealist theories under the traditional approach are also summarized briefly.
Financial Federalism in Pakistan & National Finance CommissionShahbaz Cheema
Pakistan's federal constitutional system provides how its finances powers and resources would be distributed among various federating units. This slide show introduces the readers about that.
The Future of Demilitarisation and Stable Civil-Military Relations in West Af...Kayode Fayemi
This document summarizes the challenges of demilitarization and establishing stable civil-military relations in West Africa. It argues that West Africa poses some of the greatest obstacles to demilitarization in Africa due to high levels of conflicts, arms flows, private armies, and military influence over political decision-making. While countries in West Africa have democratized through elections, many have not established true democracies and still struggle with issues like rigged elections, authoritarian leaders, and exclusion of opposition groups. This paradox means that completely demilitarizing is difficult for authoritarian leaders but also that solely focusing on elections does not promote demilitarization or resolve the root causes of conflicts. The challenges of demilitarization in
Reforming Civil Military Relations for Sustainable Democracy in Nigeria - Iss...Kayode Fayemi
This document discusses reforming civil-military relations in Nigeria for sustainable democracy. It identifies several obstacles to achieving stable civil-military relations, including the military's legacy from colonial rule, the civilian elite's lack of knowledge about the military, and the military's lack of a clear mission. The document compares experiences in other countries and discusses several options and issues to consider in reforming Nigeria's civil-military relations, including refocusing the military's mission, subordinating the military to civilian control, and addressing human rights abuses.
Entrenched Militarism and the Politics of Democratic Consolidation in NigeriaKayode Fayemi
This document discusses the entrenched role of the military in Nigerian politics stemming from its colonial origins. It traces how the Nigerian military was formed under British colonial rule and recruited primarily from northern ethnic groups. After independence, the nationalist leaders were ambivalent towards the military but still dependent on colonial powers for defense. This colonial legacy, combined with regional political tensions and the Cold War context, enabled the military to increasingly intervene in politics. The military came to see itself as an alternative power center and became politicized due to recruitment policies. As a result, the military has remained deeply entrenched in Nigerian politics for decades, posing challenges for democratic consolidation.
Comments on the human security aspect of the poverty reduction guidelinesKayode Fayemi
The document discusses the human security dimension of poverty reduction guidelines. It analyzes four typical policy levers proposed in the guidelines: 1) Support for peace building and reconstruction, 2) Support for state monopoly of means of coercion, 3) Promoting social coherence through civil society and tolerance, and 4) Building assets against disasters and economic shocks. However, the document argues that the assumptions and focus on the state in the guidelines provide an incomplete picture in Africa given increasing state illegitimacy. A human security approach requires considering non-state actors and the complex local and international dimensions driving conflicts on the continent.
This document provides a historical analysis of the military in Nigeria and its role in politics and development. Some key points:
1. The military ruled Nigeria for 29 of its 43 years of independence and contributed significantly to damaging the state through corruption and centralization of power.
2. After four years of civilian rule, the military is said to be in retreat but its authoritarian tendencies and impact on discourse still linger.
3. To understand the military's complex role, the analysis examines the sociological and institutional underpinnings of its involvement in nation-building projects and democratic transitions over time.
4. The military had colonial origins as a small constabulary force that became politicized over
The document provides a historical analysis of the military in Nigeria, outlining several key points:
1. The Nigerian military originated as a small colonial constabulary force and was influenced by its colonial origins, weakening its professionalism.
2. The military ruled Nigeria for 29 of its first 43 years of independence and contributed significantly to damage of the state through corruption and centralization of power.
3. The military's intervention in politics in 1966 was initially welcomed but it exacerbated ethnic divisions and undermined its legitimacy.
4. The civil war strengthened the military's legitimacy and influence but the post-war government failed to maximize this opportunity, politicizing the armed forces and weakening accountability
Processes and mechanisms of security sector transformationKayode Fayemi
This document discusses processes and mechanisms of security sector transformation in Africa. It makes several key points:
1) Security sector changes in post-Cold War Africa have occurred within varied political contexts, from consolidating democracies to conflict-torn societies. This impacts the prospects for democratic norms and controls over security institutions.
2) For democratic consolidation, countries must establish effective and accountable security agencies to protect citizens, as well as effective civilian oversight of armed forces. This requires democratic governance of the security sector.
3) The security sector was largely untouched by early governance reforms. Development agencies focused narrowly on military spending rather than the multi-dimensional process of militarization across society.
4) Understanding
Reflections on a Peace Building Approach to Conflict Prevention– Some Comment...Kayode Fayemi
This document discusses a peacebuilding approach to conflict prevention in West Africa. It argues that peacebuilding must be linked to wider democratization and sustained development efforts. It analyzes the causes of conflicts in Africa, including shifts in global power relations after the Cold War, the rise of identity-based conflicts, increased availability of weapons, and the economic and political impacts of structural adjustment programs in the 1980s. The document calls for a human security approach focusing on four pillars: human security, democracy, transforming conflicts through political processes, and collective regional security.
Democratic consolidation in Nigeria: Looking between the mirage and the mirrorKayode Fayemi
This document discusses democratic consolidation in Nigeria after the return to civilian rule in 1999. It makes three key points:
1) Civilian rule has not necessarily led to democratic consolidation due to deep divisions in Nigeria's politics that predate military rule. Communal conflicts have killed over 10,000 and societal violence is increasing.
2) Civil-military relations remain problematic as the military remains entrenched in civic and economic life. True civilian control requires a democratic struggle beyond just elections or subordinating the military to the president.
3) Electoral politics threaten democratic gains if elections are not free and fair. Rising poverty and pressure to spend on local projects near the 2003 elections could further destabilize the
Helping prevent terrorism and violent conflict the development dimensionKayode Fayemi
The document discusses the development dimension of preventing terrorism and violent conflict in Africa. It argues that narrowly defining security as a military issue fails to address the root causes of conflicts, which are often related to lack of economic opportunity and political legitimacy. A human security approach is needed that considers individual livelihoods and promotes democracy, justice and inclusive development. International organizations must support long-term peacebuilding in a holistic manner rather than just focusing on short-term goals like elections.
Peacebuilding and reconstruction ine aftermath of conflict the case of libe...Kayode Fayemi
Peacebuilding and reconstruction efforts require a holistic approach that addresses both short and long-term needs. Immediate relief efforts are important but not sufficient for sustainable peace and security. International actors should foster policy coherence, consult local communities, and consider how their actions may undermine stability, such as through arms sales or policies prioritizing macroeconomic targets over human welfare. A human security approach requires democratic governance, rule of law, development, and respect for human rights.
Peacebuilding and reconstruction ine aftermath of conflict the case of libe...Kayode Fayemi
Peacebuilding and reconstruction efforts require a holistic approach that addresses both short and long-term needs. Immediate relief efforts are important but not sufficient for sustainable peace and security. International actors should foster policy coherence, consult local communities, and consider how their actions may undermine security and development goals. A human security approach requires addressing poverty, lack of opportunities, and the protection of citizens' rights and dignity.
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Beyond presentability civil-military relations and the future of democratic consolidation in west africa
1. Abstract
This paper examines the state of civil-military relations and the prospects for demilitarisation
and democratisation in contemporary West Africa. The underlying thesis that informs the
arguments in the paper is that West Africa poses some of the greatest dilemmas to the
prospects for demilitarisation in Africa. At the same time, it offers a potentially useful peace
mechanism for regional security with implications for (de)militarisation in the African
context. While the paper recognises the historico-structural dimensions of militarisation as
well as the behavioural obstacles to demilitarisation, it captures the challenges and prospects
in terms of the complexity of the State-civil society relations and suggests a holistic
understanding of security. This, it does with a view to de-emphasising force as the key
mechanism for conflict resolution and promoting an inclusive institutional framework for the
demilitarisation and development agenda.
0
2. Beyond Presentability: Civil-Military Relations and the Future of Democratic
Consolidation in West Africa.*
By
J ’Kayode Fayemi**
Introduction
Militarisation is a multi-dimensional process containing
phenomena such as rearmament, the growth of armed forces, an
increasing role for the military in decision making process, an
increasing role for force in conflict resolution and the spread of`
militaristic values. In general…militarisation is a process
whereby the ‘civilian’ sphere is increasingly militarised towards
a state of excess, usually referred to as ‘militarism’ (Hettne,
1988,18)
It is no exaggeration to say that the West African region presents Africa with some of its
greatest challenges to demilitarisation today. In reviewing the current security situation in
Africa and, exploring the relationship between militarisation, armed conflict and
underdevelopment, an understanding of the security challenges of demilitarisation in the
region should help illuminate our assessment of the prospects for solutions. If one takes the
incidence of conflicts in the region, the increased flow of arms, the activity of private armies,
the prime place occupied by force in conflict resolution and the continued influence of the
military in the political-decision making process as the militarisation index, West Africa is
one region that ought to worry observers deeply.
For conceptual clarity however, demilitarisation is understood to be both a qualitative
and quantitative concept in this paper. It is therefore its central premise that although
demilitarisation in all its ramifications constitute an essential feature of establishing a stable
civil-military relations, economic development and therefore democratic consolidation, there
can be distorting consequences especially when demilitarisation is reduced to a bean-
counting exercise. The academic and policy implications of this can be negative, especially
1
3. when the results expected do not fit the eventual outcomes. A good example of this is the
trade-off hypothesis popular in studies on disarmament and development, even when there is
evidence that a decrease in defence expenditure does not necessarily translate to an increase
in social spending.i In West Africa where political leaders have been known to pursue
“guns” and “butter” objectives, military spending does develop a life of its own, mixed in its
overall impact and autonomous of overall national spending. Often times, reduction in
military spending leads to non-consumer defence spending, not increased expenditure on the
productive aspect of the civil sector nor on long-term social welfare spending like education
or health.ii The caution here is that demilitarisation should not be seen as a set of technical
and administrative arrangements that automatically flow from post conflict reconstruction
efforts, but part of complex political processes which must address the root causes of
conflict.iii
This paper therefore looks at the material base of militarisation as well as its behavioural and
socio-cultural dimensions, in our recognition of the need for a holistic approach to security,
democratisation and development. To enable us synthesise the structural and the symptomatic
issues relevant to the militarisation-demilitarisation debate, conflict is examined at the
political and psychological levels. Since the issues involved cannot be captured simply
through a theorisation of historical experiences premised upon the separation of the
“domestic” and the “international”, the “economic” and the “political”, the demilitarisation
dilemma is also seen in terms of its global, regional, national and sub-national complexities.
Primacy is however given in our analysis to the state-civil society relations in West Africa;
how state power relates to the key economic and social forces in the affected societies. This
way, militarisation would be properly contextualised and the problems and prospects of
demilitarisation in Africa would not be reduced to a number crunching exercise.
The Paradox of Democratisation and Demilitarisation in West Africa
The experience of Africa, a decade after the post-cold war “third wave” democratic dawn
underlines the enormity of the task of demilitarising politics and ensuring a stable civil-
military relations in a democracy. Although African countries are democratising in the formal
sense, they are not democratic. Although significant strides were made in the areas of civil-
military relations and reduced military expenditure, it may be misleading to speak of
democratic governments if by this it is understood that the formal end of authoritarian
structures also marks a definitive break with past patterns of rights abuse, conflict
2
4. exacerbation by the state and the militarism of decision-making processes. Of the several
countries that democratised during the past decade however, none can as yet boast of a
serious movement beyond the formal legitimisation via “free” and “fair” elections. Hence,
General Eyadema could brazenly rig elections and usurp the powers of the electoral
commission in the belief that the essential defining feature is his declaration as a winner in
election, rigged or not. The tendency in the international community is to often support these
fundamentally flawed processes on the strength of the risk of instability if it didn’t. Given the
authoritarian character of the democratisation processes in these countries, and to the extent
that stability and security have now replaced erstwhile concerns about the nature of rule and
the rights of citizens to choose their rulers, several scholars like Diamond, Mkandiware and
Olukoshi have criticised these new democracies as electoral, illiberal or pro-forma
democracies.
West Africa, which appeared to have led the democratic reform agenda in the
immediate post cold war era, seems to typify this obsession with elections as representing
democracy. In the past five years, the region has regressed to one of “home-grown”
democraduras, quasi-dictatorships, personalised autocracies, pacted democracies, stolen
elections and endless transitions.iv A cursory glance at the West Africa region will show
nominally civilianised ex-military rulers/warlords in Burkina-Faso, Ghana, the Gambia,
Niger, Togo, Benin, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Chad and Liberia, “debilitating democracies” in
Cote d’Ivoire, Senegal, Cameroon and Mauritania and a full blown military dictatorship in
the region’s largest country – Nigeria. Even in Mali, originally seen as a strong beacon of
hope for democratic consolidation, things are now beginning to look a bit uncertain.
An essential feature of peace-building and conflict management is often the degree to
which consensus can be achieved among parties in conflict. In situations where elections
have become the sole “legitimate” means of consolidating political exclusion and disguised
authoritarianism, opposition’s responses have often resorted to other means of challenging
this dominant tendency; and this could be a potential source of domestic instability,
especially in countries where the nationality question is yet to be resolved to the satisfaction
of all players. In a sense, this is the paradox of the democratisation-demilitarisation complex.
On the one hand, asking authoritarian governments with little or no answers to their
countries’ economic and social problems to demilitarise would only be seen as political
suicide. On the other hand, advising those excluded from the political process to put their
faith in “electoral democracy” on a field stacked against them only promotes the efficacy of
military power. The militarist option now prevalent in the West Africa region must be seen,
3
5. in part, as the inevitable consequence of the acute nature of internal contradictions and the
near total absence of any mediating mechanisms for managing conflict and seeking enduring
resolutions. There are however other challenges that must be taken into account in assessing
the future of demilitarisation on the continent. These challenges are discussed below.
The Challenge of the Military Psyche
In spite of the rather pessimistic picture painted above, military disengagement from politics
is still the important first step towards democratic reform, even if it does not equate with
civilian, democratic control. Indeed, from the evidence available, demilitarisation of politics
has widened the space within which concrete democratic reform is possible and sustainable.
Even so, a complete overhaul of politics from its military roots, especially in a body politic
that has become so atomised and, in which the symbols, values, and ethos of the military are
replicated by large sections of the civil-society, still appears difficult to attain.v Given the
prevailing political culture bred by three decades of militarisation and authoritarian control,
perhaps the greatest challenge is in dealing with the psychology of militarism and the aura of
invincibility that this has created. As the introductory quotation indicates, it is quite possible
to have militarism in a state without the military in power. As recently noted in a joint
conference report by the ECA and GCA, “in some African countries, political transition has
involved a reconfiguration of political, economic and military elites, rather than an opening
up of the political system and broadening of participation.”vi Indeed, this is more likely to be
the case if the ‘new democrats’ come from a military background as the situation largely is in
West Africa where what we have are “shadow military states”, rather than democratic
countries.
The post cold war array of non-state actors who have set up rival factions to challenge
the militarised State is the result of this mindset. The same can be said of child soldiers who
have exchanged their school pens and pencils for rifles and grenades and university graduates
who have dropped their diplomas for military commission. A critical task therefore in
consolidating democracies and rebuilding stable civil-military relations is reclaiming the
militarised mind, which has been fed by a deep-seated feeling of social exclusion.
Traumatised by violence and prolonged existence under military and authoritarian structures,
the tendency to have a low regard for civilians in societies where traditional norms and the
rule of law have little or no meaning is very high. Violence has therefore become the
acceptable means of communication.
4
6. The Legacy of Colonialism
Tied to the challenge of the military psyche has been the military’s colonial legacy and an
understanding of the colonial character of the military is a crucial factor in the determination
of the praetorian instincts of several West African armies. The history of many of these
armies can be traced from the small mercenary forces that had been used to establish British
and French rule in West Africa.vii The nationalist leaders of the pre-independence era saw the
army in West Africa as a reactionary force being the legitimisation force of the Colonial
power. They were convinced that it couldn’t be trusted in the task of nation building. Since
many of these nationalist leaders went on to become the leading figures in the post-colonial
states, there was always a deep seated suspicion among them and the people they governed
that the military was an institution to be wary of, if the process of co-optation failed. In
addition to this was the perception of the military establishment as the place for drop-outs
from the popular professions like Medicine, Law, Commerce, Teaching and Public
Administration.
Given the long history of interaction with the metropolitan force and its crucial role in
the victory of the allies in World War II, Africans in the colonial armies developed a more
confident political and social outlook that did not exclude direct involvement in political
affairs. As Michael Crowder argued:
Africans had fought alongside white men, killed white men, seen
brave Africans and white cowards, slept with white women, met
white soldiers who treated them as equals, or who were like
themselves, hardly educated….Above all, having fought in the
defence of freedom, they considered it their right that they should
share in the government of the land [my emphasis]viii
Yet in spite of the above and the latent suspicion of the army as colonial and
reactionary by the nationalist leaders, the post-independence army remained essentially
colonial in character. For a long time after independence, there was little or no attempt to
articulate and codify defence policies in any of the countries involved. In no time, the
military soon became a pliant instrument of the ruling elite in post-independence Africa.
Since the Post-colonial State inherited, and in most cases expanded the hegemonic tendencies
5
7. of the colonial period, there was a sense in which this ought to have been expected. The
involvement of the military in coups d’etat for much of the last three decades resulted, in
part, from some encouragement from politicians who had found themselves excluded in the
competition for power, and quite often those regimes that had depended on the military for
their political survival. Having discovered its own indispensability to the political society,
and spurred on by the modernisation theories of the period, the place of the military was
enhanced in civil society much to the detriment of the civilians. The consolidation of the
army’s place in society was partly facilitated by the fact that it controlled all the instruments
of coercion and radiated order amid disorder and chaos. For example, the near total
dependence of the Tolbert regime on the Armed Forces of Liberia during the 1979 Rice Riots
has been cited as a major factor in the eventual overthrow of the Tolbert regime? Legitimacy
was therefore bought with that control, even at a time the wider civil society saw the military
as an occupation forceix. This historical situation was later to be compounded by the all
pervasive ignorance of the military that enveloped the political and civil society, especially
among the ruling elite.
The Challenge of an Ignorant Civilian Political Elite
The deep resentment exhibited against the military by the civilian political elite arising from
its colonial antecedents and the military’s post-independence involvement in politics resulted
in a civilian elite that remained on the one hand dependent on the military for survival, and on
the other hand, ignorant about the military institution.. Even when civilians are in charge,
knowledge of the military is at best of times, sketchy and at worst, virtually non-existent.
Any close study of civilian governments’ defence policies and practices in West Africa
would immediately reveal the reluctance to develop independent knowledge about the
sociological underpinnings of the military institution. The inability of the civilian political
elite to challenge military judgement on operational as well as security issues aided the
military in the struggle for political power.
In the regional behemoth – Nigeria, for instance, the military has always preyed on
this lack of public knowledge, which has in turn precluded the development of a civilian,
strategic understanding of the operational requirement of accountable armed forces. In effect,
since the military has been responsible for both operational and policy control over defence
and political matters, there was no alternative, countervailing system to scrutinise its
decisions. This lack of effective oversight is perhaps the single most important factor
6
8. responsible for the demise of the few civilian, democratic governments and the incipient
return of military ‘democrats’ under various guises in West Africa. The military profession,
like any other, finds it difficult to respect a Commander-in-Chief or a Defence Minister who
lacks a basic understanding of the institution, yet this is more often than not the situation in
most West African democracies. The experienced Defence Minister in Ghana, Alhaji
Mahama Idrissa recently referred to the difficulty of penetrating the cordon of secrecy that
continued to surround the Armed Forces in Ghana, after 13 years as head of the Defence
Ministry.x In Nigeria, during the second republic, the Minister of Defence was generally
clueless about the decisions made by the military, and had no independent means of assessing
military judgements placed before him. In short, the military maintained virtually total
control over military decision-making process.xi The question of civilian ignorance is largely
replicated across the board among political elite in West Africa.
Ironically, when civilians choose to study the military, this is often left to the
technocrats and the academics who wield no political power to ultimately effect significant
change. The need to invest the Defence ministry with considerable political power and the
administrative and political leadership with institutional knowledge is crucial to earning the
respect and confidence of the armed forces. The challenge remains one of overcoming
civilian political elite’s historical reluctance to become the source of countervailing
machinery capable of subjecting military led policy to critical scrutiny. In any situation
where the civilian political elite does not take the task of formulating military policy on
control seriously, the vacuum is often usurped by the military, which ends up presenting the
civilian leadership with repeated military fait accompli. At the level of the executive, the
parliament and the civilian bureaucracy, the consciousness to direct policy must be regained
and sustained in the same way this has happened in Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay to
mention a few countries that have moved from prolonged military rule to democracy.
The Challenge of a Mission
In addition to the lack of effective oversight from the civilian political elite and the general
populace must be added the overarching absence of a clear and identifiable military mission
tied closely to its traditional duties and professional training. The threat of a military without
a mission therefore becomes real in countries where the military is caught in the duality of
responsibility for political and defence matters, which is not unusual in several West African
states. Ideally, military missions are determined largely by objective security threats faced by
7
9. any country, which must of necessity be subject to periodic review. By overextending its
responsibilities beyond defence duties or redefining its defence duties to include other
elements like nation-building and internal security, the efficiency of the fighting force is
inevitably undermined. There is no doubt that the professionalism of soldiers has had its own
setbacks due to their involvement in politics. The political usurpation of military talents, for
instance, has been shown to be bad in areas where the military is now needed to function like
a fighting force.xii Although some countries in West Africa have armies with a fine
reputation in their commitment to international peacekeeping duties, the same soldiers have
been found wanting on such missions largely because of the disorientation that automatically
flows from bad military leadership. Yet, international peacekeeping seems to offer the
solution to the challenge posed by a lack of mission for a military out of government since
this is one role that is not far removed from its primary duties of defence of territorial
integrity and state sovereignty.
Since no country in West Africa faces any huge external threats, one would expect the
military to redefine its role and mission to accommodate the changing geopolitical realities.
However, for a military that has always been in search of a mission to justify its place in the
body politic, the search has, ironically, led the institutions to engage in unnecessary forays
into areas with little or nothing to do with the protection and defence of their countries’
territorial integrity. Objective security threats have therefore assumed the perception and
realities of the ruling elite with little attention paid to explaining the nature of the state and
the complexity of the State-civil society relations. The effect of this has been a situation
where only the ‘ideas of the ruling regime have become the ruling ideas’ in terms of national
security, thus concentrating on the best way to enhance regime security under successive
military government. To this end, military professionals are provided management
experience and rent-seeking opportunities through the running of bureaucracies, special task
forces, internal security, humanitarian and disaster management as well as social welfare
projects and those with a more ‘foundational’ objective, like the Rawlings military regime
use this as a means of creating popular support via organs like the APDCs which later formed
the template for Jerry Rawlings’ nominal return as a civilian president.
While it may be superficially correct, as some scholars have argued that providing
rent-seeking opportunities for the military in a civilian democracy may help curb their
interest in direct governance, and consolidate democracyxiii , there are serious implications in
at least two broad areas for sustainable civil-military relations in a democracy. First, because
the ruling military elite has now acquired extensive experience running all kinds of civilian
8
10. based projects with good opportunities for rent seeking, the experience and clout gained from
mere participation in such activities have eroded any notion of the military being an
aberration in civilian administration. Second, as Louis Goodman argues, “a real danger exists
that involvement of the military in alternate missions may lead the military to neglect its core
mission by failing to maintain combat readiness.”xiv
Although there is often an attraction, especially among civilians to encourage military
involvement in developmental roles in civil society, as has been the case in countries like
Tanzania, Ghana and Senegal – and these countries seem to enjoy a fairly stable civil-military
relations, it is my contention that this notion poses enormous danger to the objective of
demilitarising the political society. At the root of that danger remains what to do with
authoritarian enclaves left behind by ex-military rulers especially where these enclaves are
determined to frustrate the consolidation of democracy in societies that have just emerged
from prolonged military cum authoritarian rule.
The Challenge of Ethno-nationalism and Globalisation
In the overwhelming crisis that has engulfed post-cold war Africa, the nation-state is caught
in between the paradox of ethno-nationalism and globalisation. Both reduce the prospects for
demilitarisation and democratisation in West Africa. During the cold war era, traditional
power politics ensured the integrity and primacy of the nation-state and the state monopoly of
violence was taken for granted. With the increasing challenge to the existing system of
nation-states, the military has become a pawn and a player in these latest developments. In
the event, weapons accumulation has become diffuse and demilitarisation, which was largely
dependent on state conduct now, has sub-national actors to contend with. At the level of
ethno-nationalism, the military has become in many West African states an instrument of the
ethnic struggle for power. The perception is strong that West African armies are the
conclaves of certain ethnic groups associated with the ruling elite, civilian or military. In its
recent assessment of civil-military relations in Africa, the US-based National Democratic
Institute has confirmed that ethnic tensions are more prevalent and exacerbated within
African militaries or in relations between the military and civilian leadership.xv According to
the study, of particular concern is the “politicisation of ethnicity within African armies”
which creates “an imbalance of membership of the armed forces as a whole and/or in the
composition of special units.” In Togo, approximately 90 per cent of the members of the
armed forces come from the same ethnic group. According to Lida Moise, of the 13,000
9
11. strong Togolese Armed Forces (FAT), only 3,000 are from the southern part; of the 10,000
from the North, 7,000 come from the Kabre ethnic stock of President Eyadema. Of the 26
units in the command, a Southerner supervises not a single one.xvi
In other countries where the ethnic cleavages do not appear as striking, there is still
the perception that the military is not an equal opportunity profession. The Christian
Association of Nigeria recently raised alarm about what it perceived as the lopsided
recruitment of more Moslems into the Nigerian army. This perception was reinforced by the
creation of the Special Bodyguard Service – a countervailing power-centre set up by the late
General Abacha and virtually dominated mostly by recruits from General Abacha’s ethnic
group. The domination of the Krahn elements in Liberia under President Doe, which
contributed to the loss of confidence in the objective control of that army, has become an
issue in post-conflict Liberia. In spite of the provisions of the Abuja Accords that ECOMOG
should supervise disarmament and restructure the Liberian Army, the current government has
asserted its right to carry out the restructuring. All the armed factions have opposed this as it
is suspected that this is an attempt to ensure that the restructured army is essentially President
Taylor’s army. Even in countries where the army on the surface appears to be ethnically
balanced, there is a strong perception of ethnic bias in special units set up primarily for
regime security. In Ghana for example, there exists the apprehension that Ewes, President
Rawling’s ethnic group, dominate special units like the 64th Commando.
In addition to the challenge of ethno-nationalism is the international dimension to the
crisis of governance in the region – commonly known as globalisation. The collapse of
communism encouraged the notion that proxy wars propped up by the superpowers will fade
away, if not totally disappear in Africa. Such optimism may not be unfounded since it is true
that global military expenditure has plummeted and indeed Africa’s share of it has declined
on an average of 1.3% during the last ten years. However, as the recent tragedies in Tanzania
and Kenya have shown, Africa is still a proxy zone for conflicts to which African countries
are only peripherally linked. Yet, to posit a strong relationship between arms reduction and
political stability, between demilitarisation and development and between arms control and
the cold war, must be an examination of the relationship between arms procurement and
authoritarian regimes, weapons accumulation in Africa and capital accumulation in the
industrial world; structural adjustment programmes and arms procurement, militarisation,
militarism and arms reduction as well as the tortuous democratic experiments in Africa, and
their impact on the future of arms races in the next millennium would amount to a superficial
treatment of the issues in question. xvii
10
12. With the end of the Cold War came economic globalisation and trade integrationxviii –
factors that have, ironically, deepened economic problems in new democracies, weakening
the nation-state and exacerbating ethno-jingoism as a result. Poverty remains the greatest
threat to democratic consolidation in Africa today. The overriding majority of the African
populace is completely detached from the democratisation process and there is little
indication that their lot will be improved under democratisation. Departing authoritarian
regimes bequeath a poisoned chalice to their democratic successors, who sometimes have
very little time to understand the depth of the state crisis, before the contradictions between
the State apparatus and the civil society come to a head. The ruling democrats thus resort to
the same instruments of coercion as a means of safeguarding regime security and capitalist
development. The Structural Adjustment Programmes undertaken by virtually every state in
the region is the best example of this phenomenon. SAPs correlate to repression in its usual
demand for devaluation, de-subsidisation, de-nationalisation and deregulation, all of which
are possible only in an atmosphere of absolute suppression of citizens’ rights. Promoted by
the same international financial institutions (IFIs) that argue for ‘good governance and
democracy’, there is little doubt now that these policies promoted internal social inequalities,
and, consequently increased political tension. This served to consolidate instability and
authoritarianism rather than democracy since the political stability required for direct foreign
investment makes the use of force commonplace, and militarisation inevitable.
There is a sense in which the current militarisation in West Africa must be seen as a
function of a dominant elite cartel comprising of arms manufacturers, mineral exploiters,
corporate mercenaries and Africa’s authoritarian governments and warlords as junior partners
– people who believe that dependent capitalist development must by its very nature be
authoritarian for it to pursue unbridled profiteering with military despatch.
The most evident example of the way this cartel functions is the upsurge in the
activities of private peacekeepers, light weapons proliferation and the linkage to resource
exploitation in troubled West African states. In exploring the causes and potential cures of
conflict in Africa, the United Nation’s Secretary-General – Mr Kofi Annan recently referred
to “interests external to Africa”, who “in the competition for oil and other precious resources
in Africa continue to play a large and, sometimes decisive role, both in suppressing conflict
and sustaining it.”xix The Secretary-General also referred to the role of international arms
merchants in African conflicts”, and “how access to resources by warring parties…has
highlighted the impact that international business interests can have on the success or failure
of peace efforts.”xx This has wider implications for the demilitarisation agenda and
11
13. democratic consolidation in West Africa. In the aftermath of the Cold War and with the
exacerbation of internal conflicts, the region has witnessed the rise of corporate mercenaries,
a phenomenon, which poses a mortal danger to the survival of democracy in the region.
Ironically, in a globalised world in which public interest in international peacekeeping has
waned considerablyxxi , the security vacuum created is now effectively occupied by
unregulated private military armies often linked to international business interests intent on
resource exploitation in countries in conflict. The affected countries are also often those in
areas of no strategic importance to the great powers. This increasing legitimisation of the role
of mercenaries by established governments and multilateral institutions, has come under a
sharper focus by the recent revelation of the linkage between Sandline International – a
British private military organisation, the British Foreign Office and the ousted civilian
government in Sierra Leone. Interestingly, Sandline shares its London premises with
DiamondWorks – a Canadian owned diamond prospecting corporation with major
concessions in Sierra Leone, and one of DiamondWorks’ Directors, Mr Tony Buckingham is
the founder of Sandline International. These linkages are replicated in several instances in
other parts of Africa, especially in Angola and Mozambique.xxii In spite of these ulterior
motives in the activities of private security organisations, opinion remains divided on their
destabilising influence and some analysts still view them with a degree of altruistic mission in
conflict management and peace building.xxiii
The incidence of light weapons and small arms proliferation is closely linked to the
private security firms operating in Africa and it also poses a serious challenge to the
demilitarisation agenda in West Africa. This has been the subject of debate in multilateral
circles in recent times. For example, a Panel of Government Experts appointed by the UN’s
Secretary-General identified uncontrolled availability of small arms and light weapons as
both a causal and exacerbating factor in Africa’s conflicts. According to the panel, not only
did the weapons contribute to “fuelling conflicts but also exacerbating violence and
criminality.”xxiv
For the long term stability of any democracy transiting from prolonged
military/authoritarian rule, changes in the military, security and defence structures are
imperative and they must examine comprehensively the challenges posed by these various
aspects of the weakening nation-state in the era of globalisation. In policy specific terms,
solutions to the upsurge of mercenaries on the continent must be sought through the
revamping of existing legislation both at the OAU, and UN levels whilst ECOWAS is
encouraged to legislate against the involvement of private armies in conflict. Ultimately,
12
14. holistic solutions to the root causes of conflict must be found by drawing the necessary
linkages between underdevelopment, instability and the presence of mercenary operations in
the region. To this end, there is a need to critically assess what the new forms of private
military activities on African territories mean for African security.xxv
The Nigeria factor in the Demilitarisation and Democratisation Agenda in West Africa
Beyond the challenges to a successful demilitarisation programme already identified, one
challenge that is particularly unique to West Africa is the position of Nigeria in all of these.
The demonstration effect of continued military rule in a strategic country such as Nigeria in
West Africa impinges significantly on the future of demilitarisation and democratisation in
the region. With a quarter of the entire African population - a population roughly equal to the
combined total of its fifteen west African neighbours, a military that is by far the largest and
best equipped in the region, and an oil wealth unmatched by any of the neighbouring
countries - Nigeria has been the source of envy and pride to most African countries. In its
good days, its resources have provided, and in some cases - still provide the pivot for
common good in the region. Hence, put in the simplest of terms, if Nigeria disintegrates, so
will regional security.
As the military regime in Nigeria tightens its grip on civil society, it is bound to give
more confidence to other praetorians in the region waiting in the wings to upset the fledgling
democratic culture. This can happen in a number of ways, but the most worrying source is
through the contagion effect of its coup culture, already prevalent in the sub-region, or as a
result of the refugee crisis a descent to anarchy in Nigeria is bound to trigger. Just as
apartheid South Africa affected the security and stability of the entire Southern African
region, there is little hope of consolidated democracy or a leadership focus on demilitarisation
in West Africa without a democratic and demilitarised Nigeria. Already, Nigeria’s descent
into crisis is having a wider impact in West Africa in particular, and Africa in general.
Although there is no conclusive evidence of its involvement in the 1994 military coup in
Gambia - it is hard to dispute that inspiration for the coups in the Gambia and Niger have
been drawn from the presence of a military regime in Nigeria. The transformation of the two
military rulers – Yaya Jammeh and Barre Mainasara into civilian presidents received more
explicit support from the Nigerian rulers.
Equally, it is arguable that the ‘election’ of General Kerekou in Benin republic in
1996, the re-election of Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings of Ghana in December 1996 and the
13
15. fraudulent ‘re-election’ of President Eyadema in 1998, have all benefited, in part, from the
absence of leadership by example in the most significant country in the region that can
dissuade coups d’etat and brazen transformation from military fatigues to civilian garbs in the
region. Commendable as Nigeria’s efforts in Sierra Leone and Liberia might appear, the
democratic reversals which seriously threaten regional stability overwhelm these success
stories. The fate of democracy in Nigeria not only impacts significantly on the rest of the sub-
region, but it is also inextricably tied to the sustenance of democratic development elsewhere
in the region. This explains why tackling the narrowness of the democratic focus in
individual countries within the region without dealing decisively with the situation in the
regional hegemon - Nigeria amounts to a superficial treatment of the regional crisis – which
may prove costly for existing fledgling democracies in the region.
THE REGIONAL MILITARY & SOCIO ECONOMIC BALANCE OF POWER – 90 -95
Country Population GNP ME ME/GNP % ME/CGE %
(millions) ($USbillion) ($USm)
Nigeria 100.2 39.1 402 1.1 4.4
Cote d’Ivoire 13.3 6.7 87 1.5 5.2
Ghana 16.2 5.3 37 0.8 4.7
Senegal 8.2 3.7 89 2.4 8.2
Burkina Faso 9.6 1.8 54 3.0 17.6
Mali 8.6 2.0 34 1.9 4.7
Niger 8.4 1.5 17 1.1 5.6
Guinea 6.2 3.0 47 1.6 7.1
Benin 5.0 1.4 27 1.9 15.4
Togo 4.0 1.0 29 3.0 11.6
Chad 5.2 0.8 56 3.5 6.4
Mauritania 2.1 0.9 36 4.0 14.2
Sierra Leone 4.4 0.7 22 3.5 14.4
Liberia 2.6 NA 36 NA NA
The Gambia 1.0 0.4 13 3.5 17.5
Guinea Bissau 1.0 0.2 8 3.6 8.2
14
16. SOURCES: IISS, Military Balance,(1989-1995), UNDP, Human Development Report,
(1990-95) World Bank, World Debt Tables (1989-95) Brian MacDonald, Military
Expenditure in Developing Countries (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1997).
Nigeria, which is supposed to act as a countervailing force to countries intent on
destroying the brittle fabrics of democracy in the region, just like the trio of South Africa,
Zimbabwe and Botswana did in stopping a coup in Lesotho in 1995xxvi , is now widely
believed to be exporting its coup culture to the rest of the region. There are strong arguments
therefore that a democratic Nigeria can only help improve the democratic credentials and the
quest for international peace in the region. There are other negative security implications for
contiguous states. Already, as a result of the porous borders that permeate the region,
financial fraud, money laundering, drug trafficking, and arms smuggling into every part of
the region now constitute major security problems.xxvii The Nigerian contingent, which
formed the bulk of the ECOMOG peacekeeping force in Liberia - is now seen as an army of
occupation, rather than a peacekeeping force in that traumatised country.xxviii
Designing a Holistic Security Agenda for Demilitarisation and Democratic Development
Rethinking Regional Security Mechanism for Peace-building.
Caught between the extremes of supra-nationalism as represented by globalisation,
and the reactionary sub-nationalism that has been exacerbated by the politicisation of
ethnicity, regionalism offers the best panacea for the weakened nation-state in West Africa.
Indeed, it would appear that any prospect for demilitarisation and democratisation in West
Africa must build on the tender fabrics of regionalism if it were to have any chance of
success. Given the declining external security threats and the need to curb the rising tide of
internal strife, the promotion of a professional peace-building mechanism within the global
framework of preventive diplomacy would seem critical in the region. The last decade in
West Africa has witnessed the strengthening of regional autonomy, especially in its conflict
management capacity. Although seen in several circles as a standard feature of Nigeria’s sub-
imperialist agenda, there is a strong perception of ECOMOG as a potential mechanism for an
effective conflict management model in Africa.xxix Yet, regional autonomy can be influenced
by national and sub-national factors. They are also susceptible to super-power influence and
control, which may be opposed to the goals of demilitarisation and democratic consolidation,
especially if the latter does not offer the required stability for capitalist development.
15
17. For example, Nigeria’s consistent commitment to regional peacekeeping might have
arisen from the unresolved tensions at home. Ironically, the concentration on the pacification
of sub-regional threats resulted in a simultaneous neglect of internal threats. Although the
recognition of internal threats as the most serious in the region may question the necessity of
a standing army, our overall perspective still supports a standing, peace-keeping army within
the region whose role is clear and measurable, but whose size reflects the identified needs of
the States involved in the regional peace-keeping mechanism.
Yet, in rethinking regionalism, we must go beyond the pro-forma creation of a peace-
keeping force that remains technical in form and content only. For regionalism to be an
effective antidote to globalisation and ethnicisation – it must permeate the nation-state in a
more deeply rooted manner. Otherwise, if the current non-state actor challenges to the nation
state in West Africa is a measure of what to expect in the future, then the prospects for
demilitarisation is slim, if not non-existent. It is for this reason that a recognition of the
necessity for a multi-dimensional understanding of security without a re-orientation of
sovereignty undermines the search for a holistic security agenda. In arguing for a
reorientation of the sovereignty concept in the sub-region which de-emphasises colonial
artificial boundaries, the motive is not territorial revisionism. Instead, we are revisiting the
territorial state where the artificial boundaries have formed the legitimising force for arrested
development in several states that are just juridical entities in name only. Translated to a
sustainable security agenda, it is safe to argue in favour of a confinable West-Central Africa
security and development mechanism, but one that is properly structured, rather than a victim
of ad-hocery as ECOMOG. If a structured mechanism is available and deployable at a
moment’s notice, it should be possible to convince small states like Sierra Leone and Gambia
that the protection of their territorial integrity does not necessarily depend on a standing
army, if there is a standing peace-keeping command to which they too can contribute
soldiers.
A systemic change of the type that we are suggesting requires extensive work. A
good place to start might be a review of the ECOWAS Defence protocols and similar
provisions from other parts of the world; developing a peacekeeping model with an
accountable command, control and information system, developing the necessary linkages
between security, democracy and development in the regional integration process and,
finally, conceptualising an architecture of conflict management for 21st Century Africa in
which militarism and militarisation are less significant.xxx
16
18. Redefining the Mission and Role of the Military
If militarisation is to become less significant, then the military mission needs to be
redefined. Within the context of the identified challenges, the entrenchment of the West
African militaries in all aspects of civic and economic life makes their eventual permanent
removal an area that will demand considerable skills. This will have to be done by assuaging
their fears about their future in a post-military dispensation and finding an appropriate role
and mission for those left behind in the institution, in terms of maintaining their professional
autonomy. Equally important will be the need to develop a civilian, democratic defence
policy expertise and create the necessary opportunities for networking and dialogue between
military representatives and the civil society. As much as possible, the military must be
restricted to its traditional external combat role as a means of strengthening civil-military
relations. If it must get involved in any internal security operations, then proper criteria must
be drawn up for evaluating the involvement of armed forces in non-combat operations. At all
times, the unifying theme in all of the political elite negotiations is the determination to assert
civilian (not necessarily democratic) supremacy and oversight and the subordination of the
military to objective civilian control. Looking at the experience of countries emerging from
prolonged military rule to civilian, democratic politics, the experience is not uniform. In
smaller countries like Costa Rica, Panama and Haiti, they succeeded in getting rid of their
standing armies. In bigger countries with some regional influence like Indonesia, Philippines,
Thailand, Pakistan, South Korea and Bangladesh, the military retains a significant influence
in the post-military state. In other categories, (in Latin America and the Russian republic. For
example, there are consolidating democracies where the military is still actively involved in
politics and others where armed forces have moved from completely ‘satrapic’ orientation
into stable, conventional roles. The military in Poland would qualify as an army that is now
fully comfortable in its new conventional role.
In all of these cases, there are still problems with creating stable civil-military
relations where roles are clearly defined and missions fully worked out. But the fact that the
mission has been refocused, especially in countries like South Africa, Argentina and Poland
gives real cause for hope that military obstacles to sustainable civil-military relations are not
insurmountable. The consolidating democracy in South Korea, for example, seemed to have
succeeded where others had failed by seeking reconciliation via accountability for past
human rights abuse. Two former heads of state were sent to life jail for their role in the
massacre of student demonstrators in the early 1980s. The recent election of a candidate
17
19. perceived as a threat to the military establishment may have stemmed from the
demystification process carried out by the last regime, even though the deteriorating economy
contributed to the success of the left-wing president elect, Kim Dae Jung, who eventually
released the convicted former Heads of State as a gesture of reconciliation. So far, what the
South Korean example seems to show is that Faustian bargains with some progressive
elements within the military constituency may be inevitable in order to deal with the
challenges of demilitarisation and/or in the quest for consolidated democracy. However, such
pacts should be dependent on whether they guarantee the complete subordination of the
armed forces to the democratic authority completely, and not to either individual officers or
influential military cabals. Nor should pacts be engineered for the consolidation of personal
autocracies in exchange for military privileges, which precludes the military from being
accountable to democratic institutions.
The positive developments in the above countries notwithstanding, the experience of
countries where the military has become so entrenched in the body politic gives much cause
for worry about how successful the agenda for sustainable relations with the military can be
in West Africa.xxxi This is especially so when one confronts the inevitable issue of amnesty or
accountability for human rights and political abuse committed by successive military
authorities, especially in Nigeria, but also in Sierra Leone, the Gambia, Ghana and Liberia.
To take the example of Argentina and Chile, one can only be cautiously optimistic about the
future for democratic consolidation. After seven years of democratic restoration in Chile,
General Pinochet’s grip on the military has blocked every effort to punish human rights
abuses of his seventeen years rule as Chilean Head of State. Through his preserved core of
hard right supporters, some of whom describe him as the greatest ‘visionary’ Chile has ever
known, the elected Chilean government headed by President Frei has not been able to
exorcise the terrible ghosts of those repressive years. This represents a benchmark of failure
for those who fought for democratic reform, although some argue that there is wisdom in
exercising some patience for General Pinochet to leave the scene. For all practical purposes,
he remains the undemocratic spirit guiding Chilean democracy? But the question still
remains to be answered: Can there be an acceptable balance between truth and justice, can
there be reconciliation in traumatised society without restitution and reparation?xxxii
Although General Pinochet has now stepped down this year as Commander-in-Chief,
a position he retained in 1990 after giving way to the democrats, the octogenarian’s influence
still runs deep within the civilian, political structure of the country, not just because he
remains a Senator for Life, but also as a result of the ‘authoritarian enclaves’ he established
18
20. over the years. For example, there are still ten non-elected seats he unilaterally allocated to
himself and his subordinate Generals in the Chilean Senate. With this power base, he has
xxxiii
managed to sabotage any attempt to try the army for past misdeeds. The Chilean
scenario definitely leaves a sour taste in the mouth of many about the future of any
consolidating democracy in the West African sub-region, given the fact that some states in
the region are already adopting similar measures. Senegal’s democracy is, to all intents and
purposes, a replica of this, if one considers the place of the military in that dispensation.
Equally, given the evidence in Nigeria that efforts to militarise society for the eventual
transformation of military rulers into ‘elected’ civilian rulers are continuing apace with
entrenchment in other sectors, the threat of the authoritarian enclave must worry close
watchers of political transition and economic development in the region. In Ghana where the
ruling NDC government is now trying to address the constitutional term limit which bars
President Jerry Rawlings from contesting in the next election, there are genuine fears about
the possibility of a democratic reversal in the year 2000. How these various strands of
demilitarisation are untangled and resolved has implications for the future of democratic
consolidation in Ghana and democratic development in the rest of West Africa. One can’t
help but recall that it was the changes to Liberia’s constitution, which blocked all the
legitimate avenues of ousting President Samuel Doe which finally convinced his opponents
of the need to resort to other means of ousting him. The country is still reeling from the
negative impact of that seven-year civil war.
Ensuring Civilian oversight and Military autonomy on professional military matters
Provided the overall case for regionalisation is acceptable to the affected states, the
other issue for consideration at the nation-state level is the separation of operational and
policy control over broad defence matters such as size, shape, organisation, equipment,
weapon acquisition and pay/conditions in the services on the one hand, and administrative
control over the services on the other. The point has been made earlier about how the lack of
any expertise on the part of elected civilian authorities has prevented effective oversight of
the various arms of the armed forces. Any redirection of the defence policy process will
inevitably require a different kind of expertise, which must be a mixture of civilians and
military professionals. To sustain this, there is a need for a significant thawing process
through changes in relationships between the military and civilian political elite, and a
significant increase in contacts between opinion moulders and the outside world. The process
19
21. of agreeing an appropriate role for the military can only be successfully achieved in a climate
of sustained dialogue.
Presently, contact is virtually non-existent, or just on a social basis and in an
unstructured manner. In introducing civilian expertise however, care must be taken not to
substitute military incompetence in a political setting with civilian inexperience, neither
should power be given to technocrats who are not wholly accountable to the electorate. If
civilian control is to be democratic, it must empower those who have political platforms to
lead the confidence building relationship. This is not to suggest however that professional
civilian expertise is unnecessary in these countries. In fact, a possibility worth exploring is
the creation of a Strategic Cell that may serve in an advisory capacity between a civilian
presidency and the military professionals. At all times, the military should not be left to
conduct its affairs without ‘interference’, at least not in terms of broad policy formulation, but
political elite should leave the military alone in designing wholly operational matters in areas
where the broad policy questions have been settled. In ensuring civilian supremacy and a
democratic pattern of civil-military relations, the civilian leadership in a post military state
must help the military with the definition of the role it must play in a clear and precise
manner. As much as possible, this must be restricted to its traditional external combat role as
a means of strengthening civil-military relations. If it must get involved in any internal
security operations, then a proper criteria must be drawn up for evaluating the involvement of
armed forces in non-combat operations.
Resolving the Challenge of Ethno-Nationalism in recruitment
The resolution of the highly volatile question of recruitment is only possible to the
extent that the nationality question is resolved in individual countries. Various military
regimes have used the strategy of ethnic favouritism as a safety valve for survival in office.
While this is a political problem that cannot be resolved on a rational basis, central to the
issue of military recruitment pattern in terms of military professionalism ought to be three
central questions: Should armed forces in a democratic dispensation be an equals
opportunities institution? Should it be a combat effective, battle ready force recruited from
the most able in the most rigorous and competitive manner? Should the manner of
recruitment matter – if the training is standardised and geared towards bringing out the best in
every recruit?xxxiv Although the above are the rational questions to which answers must be
20
22. found, they are not necessarily more important that the structural issues. Yet, political issues
are structural.
If good personnel are at the core of any effective military organisation, the concern
about representation is a legitimate one, especially in ethnically diverse societies where the
armed forces are seen as key instruments of national integration. If the military is not
inclusive and broadly representative of the religious, ethnic and geographical configurations,
the process of confidence building and conflict management mechanisms will be significantly
hampered. Getting recruitment wrong from the outset has implications for the level of
discipline, attrition rate and the organisation’s institutional cohesion in the long run, all of
which must be situated within the context of the perceptions and misperceptions bred by
ethnic, religious and geographic domination. Therefore, attempts at demilitarisation and
stable military relations must ensure a balance between merit and equal opportunity. This
can only be done in a situation where the military is not seen as the fastest route to political
power, but as a professional institution serving the interests of all citizens. What becomes of
utmost importance within this context is what the military mission is, what objective threats
every nation faces? What are the necessary force levels, rather than manpower levels
necessary for the accomplishments of the missions arising from the threats envisaged? Are
the personnel procured for and retained in the armed forces suitable for the types of missions
the military may be called upon to perform? Are the manpower levels cost-effective, and
most importantly, does the institutional recruitment process procure individuals that are
wholly dedicated to their military duties in a democracy?
Another way this has been addressed is through compulsory military service. In
countries like Tanzania and Senegal, that have experienced long years of stable civil-military
relations, compulsory military service is an integral part of their armed forces. Besides, this
can also complement the task of demilitarisation and demobilisation because armies in this
mould tend to be political in orientation, even when they refrain from partisan politics. A
much reduced, but highly mobile deployment force within a streamlined recruitment process
can still achieve a credible deterrent doctrine in many countries in West Africa whilst
addressing the huge concerns about ethnic monopoly with the democratisation of military
training and discipline. These are crucial issues that must be addressed in trying to deal with
the question of demilitarisation in a holistic and democratic manner.
Resolution of Human Rights Issues as a key plank in the demilitarisation process
21
23. The desperate need to negotiate a process of reconciliation (Argentina/South Africa) or
restitution (South Korea) between the military and the civil society that takes account what is
in the long term best interests of human rights and fundamental freedoms remains the
ultimate neuralgic issue in countries emerging from prolonged authoritarian rule. In several
countries in West Africa where the military has had a long and chequered history of political
intervention and human right abuse, citizens are insisting on a reconciliation or restitution
mechanism for dealing with the past. The idea of assuaging the fears of the military by a
declaration of amnesty poses a serious challenge to the strengthening of stable civil-military
relations. Equally, the approach in some countries of literally hauling everyone connected to
a military regime to jail without adequate investigations of their role is fraught with
limitations in countries seeking genuine reconciliation. Ultimately, the question must be
asked, as others must have asked themselves in Chile, Argentina and Philippines: While
restitution may be a necessary, even cathartic exercise, in terms of a sustainable, civil-
military relations, it might exacerbate tensions rather than attenuate them in conflict ridden
societies. Indeed, some will argue that one key reason why ex-military rulers turned-
nominally-civilian presidents are reluctant to vacate the seat of government is this fear of the
unknown when ‘enemies’ take charge of government. This is one of the areas where the right
balance must be struck between the search for immediate justice and the need for long term
stability. It is difficult to see a situation where abuses can be wished away if democracy is to
be sustainable, in the long term. Countries that are emerging from prolonged authoritarian
dispensation must examine mechanisms for dealing with this major problem area in seeking
long-term demilitarisation strategies.xxxv
Conclusion and Policy Recomendations
From the foregoing analysis, militarism and militarisation still pose a major problem in West
Africa. We have tried in this paper to integrate the broad issues with the specific concerns
that relate to the subject of demilitarisation and democratisation within the context of a
weakening nation-state. In suggesting the structural mechanisms for de-emphasising force in
conflict resolution, the paper recognises the futility of violent challenge to ethno-nationalistic
responses to domination. Caught in the vortex of rampaging globalisation and ethno-
nationalistic responses to domination, the weakening nation-state must recognise the value of
accommodating a high degree of autonomy and decentralisation if it is to remain a viable
unit. Equally, the nation-state must see the process of regionalisation, especially given West
22
24. Africa’s recent experience with a degree of enthusiasm without necessarily losing the
symbolism of sovereignty. The quality of political leadership will ultimately make a
difference in straddling these difficult strands. The ‘political’ military has always preyed on
divisions among the civilian political elite; in several instances it has actively promoted these
divisions in the ranks of the political and civil society, only to use this as an excuse to
intervene. It is common knowledge that some civilian political leaders have in the past either
participated actively or encouraged the military to stage coups against their opponents. This
not only undermines the fragile political system, but also destroys military professionalism.
That is why the clarity and quality of the post-military leadership will necessarily determine
how these complex issues are resolved in a sustained framework.
Before then, scholars of public policy on democratisation, demilitarisation and civil-
military relations must address issues that are germane to the eventual consolidation of
democracy by recognising that the process is a marathon, not a dash. The major task is the
search for a stable and sustainable civil military relations and democratic consolidation in
West Africa. If this search is holistic, it may not necessarily result in cost-savings in military
expenditure since the bulk of it is spent on personnel and recurrent areas in Africa, than on
capital products like weapons. Even if the personnel is downsized, resettlement and
reintegration in civil societies also cost money, and could be more expensive than retention,
in some cases. Neither will the search automatically lead to the elimination of standing
armies – the ultimate peace dividend expected in the post cold-war era – especially where
there are no guarantees that the territorial integrity of the states in question can be protected
by other mechanisms. The search is likely to help create more democratic and accountable
militaries whose needs are subjected to a wide and varied debate both within the military and
in the larger civil society. The inclusive nature of the process is bound to affect the
perceptual problem that the military is faced with when dealing with the civil society whilst
ensuring that the knowledge of political leaders on the military is more than peripheral. The
process leading up to the Defence Policy formulation in post-apartheid South Africa remains
a good example in this regard.xxxvi
To assist in the process of achieving the above in West Africa, the Centre for
Democracy and Development is working on the development of an institutional framework
for the understanding of the military, the articulation of a new mission and in the promotion
of sustained dialogue process between the military and the civil society – all of which are
aimed at promoting the goals of security, democracy and development. We consider the
23
25. following tasks essential to the confidence building process and we are developing initiatives
along these linesxxxvii :
1. Given the recognition of the paucity of knowledge on military matters among the civilian
political elite, the Centre is designing a research and training agenda whose main goal is a
thorough understanding of the sociological imperatives driving praetorian armies,
especially as these relate to West Africa, but drawing lessons from other places. This
information will be disseminated in the form of seminars, workshops and round-tables
where representatives of the military and the civil society are always present;
2. Provide assistance to fledgling democracies in the region in the articulation of a clearly
defined role for the military in a democracy;
3. The Centre considers it a matter of priority to co-ordinate the development of sustained
interaction between the military and the civil society on a functional basis which should
help in building bridges across divides;
4. Provision of assistance in building capacity and training civilians with a view to
developing a large pool of national security knowledge in the political arena, the mass
media, think-tanks, universities and other civil-society sectors; and
5. Advocating the maintenance of military autonomy in professional defence matters and
effective oversight of defence matters by the elected civilian authority.
Notes
*Paper prepared for workshop on “Crisis and Renewal in Africa: State, Market, Law and Democracy” held at
Emory University, Atlanta USA, November 12-14, 1998.
**Dr Fayemi is the Executive Director of the Centre for Democracy & Development, a public policy research
and training institution with offices in London, England and Accra, Ghana. The Centre focuses on issues of
democratic development, conflict management and peace building in West Africa.
i
See United Nations, Study on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development: Report of the
Secretary-General (New York: United Nations, 1981) for a good example of this positive correlation argument.
ii
For an expansion of this argument, see J ‘Kayode Fayemi, Threats, Military Expenditure and National
Security: Analysis of Trends in Nigeria’s Defence Planning, 1970 – 1990, Unpublished PhD Dissertation,
University of London, 1994.
iii
See Mats R Berdal, “Disarmament and Demobilisation after Civil Wars: Armed soldiers and the termination
of armed conflicts”, Adelphi Paper 303 (Oxford: Oxford University Press for IISS, 1996)
nbiv See Nicolas Van de Walle, “Reversal, Survival or Consolidation? The Prospects for Democracy in
Africa”, Paper presented at the 38th Annual Meetings of the African Studies Association, Orlando, Florida,
November 3 – 6, 1995 and Richard Joseph, “Africa, 1990 – 1997: From Abertura to Closure”, Journal of
Democracy, Volume 9, No.2, April 1998. For a less pessimistic viewpoint, see E.Gyimah-Boadi, “The Rebirth
of Liberalism”, ibid.
24
26. v
Robin Luckham, “Democracy and the Military: An Epitaph for Frankenstein’s Monster?” Democratization,
Vol.3, No.2.Summer 1996, pp.1-16.
vi
Economic Community of Africa & Global Coalition for Africa, The Role of the African Military in Political
Transition and Economic Development: Co-Chairpersons’ Summary, Addis-Ababa, May 8-9, 1998, p.1.
vii
See Robin Luckham, The Nigerian Military: A Sociological Analysis of Authority and Revolt 1960 – 1967
(Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1971) and Simon Baynham, The Military and Politics in Nkrumah’s
Ghana, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1988)
viii
Michael Crowder, West Africa under Colonial Rule, (London: Hutchinson, 1970) p.505
ix
For a good background on the nature of civil-military relations in West Africa, see Eboe Hutchful &
Abdoulaye Bathily (eds), The Military and Militarism in Africa, (Dakar: Codesria, 1998); For good country case
studies, see J ‘Bayo Adekanye, Nigeria: In Search of a Stable Civil-Military Relations, (Boulder, Colo:
Westview Press, 1981). Also, see his “Military Occupation and Social Stratification, (Ibadan: University of
Ibadan, 1993), Eboe Hutchful, “Military Policy and Reform in Ghana”, Journal of Modern African Studies, 35,
2 (1997), pp.251-278 and Baffour Agyeman-Duah, “Liberia: The Search for a Stable Civil-Military Relations”,
Paper presented at the Workshop on “State Rebuilding after State Collapse in Liberia”, organised by the Centre
for Democracy and Development, London, June 19, 1998.
x
See Eboe Hutchful, “Military Policy and Reform in Ghana,” JMAS, ibid.
xi
General Ibrahim Babangida who was the Director of Army Plans and Staff Duties during the Shagari regime
once told a Conference on national security that “the amount of power vested in the civilian headed Ministry of
Defence could be a source of concern to the armed forces because the ministry consists mainly of civilians who
have little or no knowledge of the military profession…” See National Institute of Policy and Strategic Studies
Proceedings of Conference on National Security, (Kuru, Jos: NIPSS, 1981) P.130.
xii
This has been the major criticism of the peacekeeping activities of ECOWAS Monitoring Group – ECOMOG
in West Africa. See Funmi Olonisakin, Bridging the Conceptual Gap in Peace-keeping: Peace Creation in
Liberia, Centre for Democracy & Development Occasional Paper 2, (London: CDD, forthcoming)
xiii
See David Goldsworthy, “Civilian Control and the Military in Black Africa”, African Affairs, Vol.80.No.8,
1987, pp.49-74
xiv
Louis W.Goodman, “Military Roles: Past and Present”, in Larry Diamond and Marc Plattner (eds) Civil-
Military Relations and Democracy, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), p.39.
xv
Report of the Civil-Military Relations Assessment Mission: West and Central Africa. (Washington, D.C.:NDI,
April 1997)
xvi
Lida Koussi Moise, “National Armies and Ethnicity in Africa,” The Role of the African Armed Forces in the
Democratic Process Africa, Proceedings of the Regional Seminar held in Ouagadougou, 2-4 July, 1997 cited in
Agyeman-Duah, op-cit.
xvii
See Kayode Fayemi, “Africa’s Disarmament Illusions”, Africa Events, February 1993, pp.23-26
xviii
See Nicolas van de Walle, “Globalisation and African Democracy” in Richard Joseph (ed.) State, Conflict
and Democracy in Africa (Boulder, Colo:Lynne Rienner, forthcoming)
xix
UN Secretary-General explores potential causes, cures of conflict in Africa, (UN-IRIN West Africa News),
SG/2045 –AFR/50,SC/6501. 16 April 1998.
xx
ibid.
xxi
See a recent book co-authored by the UN Co-ordinator of the Peacekeeping Operations in Somalia, Robert
Oakley. In it, the authors conceded the inability of the UN to cope with the burden of peacekeeping operations
due to the lack of interests from member-nations. See Robert Oakley, Michael J.Dziedic, and Eliot M.Goldberg,
Policing the New World Disorder: Peace Operations and Public Security, (Washington,D.C.: National Defence
University Press, 1998)
xxii
See Africa Confidential, Volume 39, No 9, May 29, 1998.
xxiii
David Shearer and Herbert Howe have been positive in their analyses of mercenary activities in West Africa,
both concluding that what is needed to even out the rough edges of current practise is regulation. See Herbert
Howe, “Private Security Forces and African Stability: The Case of Executive Outcomes”, Journal of Modern
African Studies, Volume 36, 2, (1998) and David Shearer, Private Armies and Military Intervention, IISS
Adelphi Paper, (Oxford: Oxford University Press for IISS, 1997)
xxiv
“Report of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms”, (New York: United Nations, July 1997),
p.25 cited in Abdel-Fatau Musah, Africa: The Challenge of Light Weapons Destruction During Peacekeeping
Operations, BASIC PAPERS, Number 23, December 1997.
xxv
See J ‘Kayode Fayemi & Abdel-Fatau Musah (eds.), Mercenaries and African Conflicts, (London: Pluto
Books, forthcoming)
xxvi
See Joseph Garba & Jean Herskovits, “Militaries, Democracies and Security in Southern Africa”, Report of
the Southern Africa Security Project, International Peace Academy, January 1997.
25
27. xxvii
For the reach of Nigeria’s drug barons, see Philip Van Niekerk, “South Africa’s Drug Explosion”, The
London Observer, 28 January, 1996.
xxviii
This was a major issue at the recent National Conference in Liberia.
xxix
Countries like Senegal and others within the French axis, hitherto reluctant of the need for ECOMOG, now
actively campaign for its involvement in the recent crisis in Guinea-Bissau. Egypt has officially requested that
ECOMOG be adopted as a continental model in Africa.
xxx
This is the subject of a much larger research work at the Centre for Democracy & Development.
xxxi
In General Abacha’s recently aborted transition programme in Nigeria, at least a third of the Senators elected
into the National Assembly came from a military background. Indeed, the entrenchment has probably shut
down the notion of a level playing field in politics for some time to come in the assessment of some observers.
xxxii
For a good analysis of the Latin American experience, See Pion Berlin, “To prosecute or to Pardon: Human
Rights Decisions in the Latin American Southern Cone”, Human Rights Quarterly 16, (February 1994):pp.105-
30. An example of military brazenness was displayed in the Gambia when the military junta headed by Captain
Yaya Jammeh inserted a clause in the constitution granting amnesty to all military officers for human rights
abuse.
xxxiii
Young parliamentarians in the Chilean Assembly recently sought an injunction in the Court to block an
automatic seat for General Pinochet in the country’s Senate. Ironically, President Frei and several senior
politicians are not in the frontline of this challenge to the military.
xxxiv
See Kayode Fayemi, “The Politics of Military Recruitment in Nigeria: A Critical Appraisal”, Tempo
Magazine (Lagos), 28 August 1997, pp.4-5 for an extensive analysis of the Nigerian Armed Forces’ recruitment
politics under General Abacha.
xxxv
See Sonny Onyegbula, “Seeking Truth and Justice in West Africa: Lessons from South African experience”,
Centre for Democracy & Development’s Monograph Series (London: CDD, 1998).
xxxvi
See Rocky Williams, “Reallocating Defence Expenditures for Development: The South African
Experience”, African Security Review, Volume 7, Number 2, 1998 and Laurie Nathan, A South African Policy
Framework on Peace Initiatives in Africa, Paper presented for the Second Workshop with Civil Society: Draft
Policy Paper on Peace Support Operations, Department of Forteign Affairs, Pretoria, November 1997.
xxxvii
This is being done under the rubric of a research project on “The Military and Democracy: The Future of
Civil-Military Relations in West Africa.”
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27