Evolution of Flight Safety Regulations

Running Head: EVOLUTION OF FLIGHT SAFETY 1
Evolution of Flight Safety
Salil Rai
Middle Tennessee State University
AERO 6120
Fall 2014

EVOLUTION OF FLIGHT SAFETY 2
Abstract
This paper evaluates the origin and the necessity of flight safety. The paper highlights why there
was a need of flight safety to start with. This paper goes back in time, i.e. the time when
“Barnstorming” was a famous sport. The need of flight safety was really evident in these times.
The paper travels through time chronologically from the 1920’s to the present state of the flight
safety. This paper explores the plethora of accidents that took place to really push the envelope
on flight safety forward. It was because of such accidents that new rules were formed and
various acts were passed. The paper talks about these accidents that passed and mandated flight
safety. This paper takes you through such various important acts which made the skies much
safer than it was in the barnstorming days. This paper also describes the latest steps taken in the
area of flight safety. This paper covers why there was a need to constantly improve flight safety
and how it has evolved over the years.

Evolution of Flight Safety
The Barnstorming Era
The first ever major form of civil aviation in the history of flight was these exciting daredevils of
those days. Stunt pilots and aerialists – or “Barnstormers” as they were popularly known –
performed almost any trick or feat with an airplane that people could imagine. These were a
group of pilots and their machines, who would fly to different towns and cities and land their
aircrafts on a local barn (hence the name “barnstormers”) and negotiate with the farmer for the
use of one of his fields as a temporary runway from which to stage an air show and offer airplane
rides to customers (Onkst, 2003).
Two main factors that led to the gaining popularity of barnstormers were the number of World
War I aviators who wanted to make a living flying, and a surplus of Curtiss JN-4 “Jenny”
biplanes. These two factors coupled with the fact that there were no federal regulations
governing aviation at that time made barnstorming flourish (Onkst, 2003). Anyone who was rich
enough to buy an airplane could easily fly, even without any experience or certification, under no
one’s supervision.
Barnstorming thrived in North American during the first half of the 1920s, but by 1927, new
safety regulations forced the demise of the popular entertainment. The federal government--
spurred by a perceived need to protect the public after several aircraft accidents, and responding
to local pilots who were upset that barnstormers were stealing their customers--enacted several
laws that began to regulate the fledgling civil aviation business (Onkst, 2003). The pilots needed
to be certified to fly. Their machines needed to pass a maintenance test in order to be operated.

Such laws made it nearly impossible for barnstormers to keep their already fragile Jenny’s up to
specifications (let alone in the air), and outlawed several forms of aerial stunts.
The Birth of the Air Mail
The air mail took birth on 15 may 1918 in Washington D.C., United States. This auspicious duty
to fly the first ever mail contract was given to Lt. George Leroy Boyle, unfortunately. He was
flagged off by the then President and the First Lady. Lt. Boyle took off with great pride and
applauds from people gathered all around him. But, in the wrong direction (Christy & Cook,
1994).
The federal role in flight safety originated because of the air mail contracts or the U.S Air Mail
Service. The initial elements of the safety program were, regular medical checks of the pilots,
strict screening for recruiting pilots, aircraft maintenance was scrutinized, and regular engine
overhaul every 100 hours of flying. Herbert Hover said in 1922 “It is interesting to note that this
is the only industry that favors having itself regulated by government”. Basic rights and laws
governing the aviators and the aviation in those times, only the federal government could provide
(Department of Transportation [DOT], 2008).
The Air Mail Act (1925) & the Air Commerce Act (1926)
The Kelly airmail act was passed in 1925, with the intention of giving off the airmail contracts to
the private bidders. This made federal regulations very important. The air commerce act (ACA)
was passed in the year 1926, inside of which an Aeronautics Branch (AB) was formed under the
Department of Commerce (DOC). The job of licensing and maintaining air worthiness of the
aircrafts was under the AB. The safety activities which were performed under the Air regulations

Division, divided them into six parts: inspections, licensing, medical, engineering, statistical, and
enforcement (DOT, 2008).
Minimum standards were set by the DOC. The engine manufactures had to send the blue prints
to the DOC and get them approved. If not, the inspector would go to the plant and inspect if they
were following the standards laid down by the DOC. If not, they were given a temporary license
to rectify their mistakes and come back to them when they are done. The engines finally
approved by the DOC had to undergo a severe endurance test followed by a tear-down and an
inspection. These tests were hard to pass, a reason for which many engines failed in the initial
years (DOT, 2008).
Sooner than later the AB in the year 1930 mandated that any company that wishes to start and
passenger airliner would need a certificate of authority to do that. To be certified, the airliner had
to prove that it had sufficient men with them, which included licensed maintenance people,
licensed pilots and up to date machines to fly which all met the government recommendations.
The Aeronautics Branch (AB) became the Bureau of Air Commerce (BAC) in 1935. Some new
rules and regulations were laid down by the BAC as multi-engine aircrafts came into existence.
These were, limit in hours of flying per pilot, BAC certification for air traffic controllers and
airport employees also became mandatory (DOT, 2008).
TWA airliner crashed with Senator Bronson Cutting in 1935. This led to a rising sentiment
amongst the public. They wanted the federal aviation activities re-organized. In conclusion, all
safety matters were shifted outside the department of commerce (DOT, 2008).

The Civil Aeronautics Act of (1938)
The Civil Aeronautics Act, passed on June 23, 1938, created the Civil Aeronautics Authority
(CAA), consisting of an Administrator and a five-member board, along with a three-person Air
Safety Board. The CAA heard complaints, determined rates for mail and passenger service,
issued route certificates, promulgated safety routes. The sole purpose of the Air Safety Board in
CAA was to investigate accidents. The CAA inherited the safety regulation responsibilities of
that belonged to the BAC (AoC, 1938).
The inspectors were, as before, underpaid and over worked. One inspector was reported to have
had 23 pilots awaiting tests on a single day. These instructors had to cut corners due to the
excessive workload. Because of this huge workload, there was a huge backlog. So, rather than
keeping a repaired aircraft grounded until an inspector inspected it, the CAA granted a 30-day
waiver. The administrative structure created under the CAA did not last long. There were
disputes between the administrator and the chairman of CAA (AoC, 1938).
Roosevelt proposed and the congress approved, a re-organization that shifted administrative
powers from the CAA board, renamed the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), to the administrator.
Roosevelt and the congress abolished the Air Safety Board, made the CAB responsible for
accident investigation and placed CAA administrator back in the Department of Commerce.
Under the administrator, the office of safety regulation was assigned the safety regulation
mission which included 5 divisions,
a. General Inspection Division: It looked after private fliers, examining and testing pilots
and other airmen, as well as inspecting aircraft for airworthiness.

b. Air carrier Division: It oversaw airlines, with inspectors specializing in maintenance,
operations or radio.
c. Aircraft Engineering Division: It reviewed aircraft design documents and stress analysis
of new aircraft models to see if proposed plane is structurally sound.
d. Flight engineering & Factory Inspection Division: It checked the factories to make sure
that each manufacture aircraft was built according to the approved drawing of its
prototype (AoC, 1938).
The aviation operation became more confident, and thus less vigilant, after a period of safe
operation. In the eight months after the reorganization, there were five fatal airline crashes, and
the 1940 fatality nearly tripled that for 1939. A congress select committee, led by Oklahoma
Congress man Jack Nichols, was created to investigate the increased in the accident rate. The
committee didn’t prove much of a benefit (DOT, 2008).
Soon Theodore Wright was appointed for CAA administrator. Soon enough Wright took up
serious issue and made serious accusation. Charges included conflict of interests, favoritism,
bribery, absenteeism and other forms of malfeasance. Wright left his mark. He led a change in
the CAA’s approach to safety oversight; from one that focused on direct inspection from civil
servants to one that delegate this function to others, recasting the government’s role as one of
“inspecting the inspectors”. This innovation was known as the “designee program”. Because of
this the CAA was able to achieve an order-of-magnitude for its safety systems (AoC, 1938).
Criticisms were being made from all over that the system had become “oversafetied”. On Dec
16, 1951, a Curtis Commando C46 crashed while attempting to return to Newark Airport because
of an engine failure, killing all 56 on board. Instead of a few crashes, safety was improving.

The Eisenhower Years
The republicans came into power, the OAS faced a new challenge. The regional approach to
administering safety oversight was scrapped; inspectors now directly reported to Washington.
The designee system was expanded to include airlines, and the federal inspection progress was
changed to focus more on recognized trouble spots. OAS’s responsibilities were further reduced
in 1954 when safety regulation enforcement was transferred to the office of general council
(Rochester, 1976).
The shortcomings of the air navigation and air traffic control system were becoming more
evident as the skies become crowded, and the looming aspect of introducing jet aircraft into
commercial service posed challenges that demanded a creative government response.
On June 30, 1956, TWA flight 2 and United Flight 718 collided over the Grand Canyon, killing
all 128 aboard. This calamity could be directly pointed to the shortcomings of the air traffic
control system when it came to maintaining a safe distance over one other (Rochester, 1976). In
the words of Senator McCarran: “There are still those in industry who have the same state of
mind as the manufacturer who once told a former CAA administrator: ‘You can wipe out all pilot
regulations for all I care. The more they crack ‘em up, the more planes I build.’” (DOT, 2008).
Responding to these events, the CAA was again reorganized in late 1956. This reorganization
also effected safety. The OAS was renamed the office of flight operations and air worthiness.
This new office was ordered to change the designee system. The changes were also from the
pressure of the congress, now democrats, about the potential conflict of interest when a
mechanics employed by an airline was certifying that airlines operations. While CAA said that
spot-checking eradicated this problem, congress did not agree (Rochester, 1976).

The Federal Aviation Agency
At 12:01 AM on January 1, 1959, the Federal Aviation Agency (FAA) assumed responsibility
for the nation’s aviation system. Its responsibilities included all those of the CAA, the FAA took
over safety rulemaking activities that was previously under the CAB and also took over the task
of developing air traffic control and navigation systems. The proximate cause of to this major
change in aviation governance was the recommendation of Edward P. Curtis who was appointed
by Eisenhower 3 years earlier to undertake a long-range study of nation’s aviation requirements
(Kraus, 2008).
He proposed to separate civil and military aviation. Safety rulemaking responsibility was
divided into two parts under the FAA
1. The Bureau of Flight standards dealt with all aspects of safety regulation except aircraft
collision.
2. The Bureau of Air Traffic management dealt with aircraft collision and air traffic routing
(DOT, 2008).
Ellwood Quesada, a distinguished military aviator was the youngest Air force Lieutenant
General who retired at the age of 47, was appointed as the first administrator. He announced a
plan for an aviation safety featuring four F’s
 Firmness in application
 Fairness in considering the interests of the public and airspace user
 Faster enforcement proceedings
 Factual basis for legal and administrative decisions

Quesada’s safety campaign focused on pilots, equipage, and carrier maintenance. A long-
standing rule requiring flight crewmembers to remain at their stations was rigorously enforced,
while a program giving pilots immunity when reporting near-misses was ended. The FAA also
succeeded, after a lengthy, acrimonious proceeding, in forcing airline pilots to retire at the age of
60. He proposed airborne weather radar was to be installed on all passenger aircraft with an
exception to the retiring aircrafts (Kraus, 2008).
When a series of accidents occurred in 1969, the FAA responded by focusing on
improved flight crew procedures and mandated that aircrafts must be equipped with altitude
warning devices. When four Boeing 727’s crashed during landing in 1965 and 1966, the FAA
soon concluded the problem was in the high rate of descent, and instituted a set of changes in
flight landing procedures, training requirements, and inspector monitoring designed to ensure
that pilots could properly control the aircraft during approach (Kraus, 2008).
The Department of Transportation
In 1966, congress passed and then President Johnson signed legislation creating the Department
of Transportation (DOT), which included the FAA – now the Federal Aviation Administration
along with Bureau of Public Roads, the Coast Guards and several other agencies. The idea of
creating a DOT went back to the World War II, and Halaby had urged moving in this direction in
his letter to the President after departing the FAA (The United States Department of
Transportation. n.d.).
Aviation safety issues played a huge part in forming the DOT. Accident Investigations
was transferred to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) from the CAB. To keep

NTSB away from political influence, their decisions were considered “administratively final”.
The FAA administrator had the final authority on matters of safety (DOT, 2008).
In 1970’s another aviation safety issue came up; hazardous materials. Passenger and cargo, both,
flights were allowed to fly with hazardous materials. Until 1973, the FAA had a perfect
hazardous material safety record. In 1973, Pan Am flight crashed because of a fire involving
hazardous material that blinded the crew. Another incident happened where the passengers of
Delta flight were exposed to radiation of Iridium-192 (DOT, 2008).
In 1974, flight standards conducted an assessment of its hazardous materials program.
The FAA was not very interested in these happenings. Yes, the rules were made, but rarely
followed. The regulatory philosophy of the FAA was education rather than enforcement and that
discipline actions were too time-consuming. Congress soon passed the Hazardous materials act,
which regulated the amount of radioactive cargo on airlines (The United States Department of
Transportation. n.d.).
There were a series of Pan Am 707 crashes. In September of 1974, an Eastern Airlines
DC-9 crashed on approach at Charlotte, North Carolina. Three months later, a TWA flight 514 –
a Boeing 727 flew into a ridge as it attempted to land at Dulles. Post these accidents, there was a
special report by ABC News “Crashes: An Illusion of Safety”.
These crashes led the FAA and then administrator Butterfield to come up with many
safety regulations which could have prevented these accidents, such as,
1. The FAA clearly communicated the meaning of approach clearance, which made it clear
that the pilots could not immediately descent when they cleared a 3400-foot hill.
2. The introduction of Ground Proximity warning system (GPWS) was mandated.

3. Prevention of post-crash fires was thought on. NTSB recommended lavatory smoke
detectors and protective breathing devices for flight attendants.
4. Flammability of the flight attendants uniform was checked and acted upon (The United
States Department of Transportation. n.d.).
In 1975, Butterfield retired. James Dow took over, a firm believer in flat organization. He
eliminated associate administrator for aviation safety, creating a direct reporting line to Flight
Standards. The Biennial Airworthiness review initiated by Butterfield eventually yielded 225
rule changes and a similar operations regulations review in 1975 generated 900 proposals for
changes (The United States Department of Transportation. n.d.).
The Deregulation Era
In 1978, Congress passed the Airline Deregulation Act (ADA), which called for immediate
liberalization of economic regulation of fares and route entry, and the gradual curtailment of
CAB authority, culminating with its abolition in 1985. It was thought that ADA would expand
and take control of the safety aspect as well. But in 1982, the FAA proposed a new approach to
safety oversight, called Regulation by Objective (RBO) that would replace detailed rules with
broad objectives (Airline Deregulation, 1996).
The means of attainment of these objectives was left to the airlines, subject to the FAA’s
approval. The RBO was revoked the next year due to a lot of negative comments. The
deregulation act created a new challenge by:
 Doubling up the no. of air carriers from 1979 to 1983. The process of licensing the,
created an additional workload for the FAA.

 Many new air carriers contracted their maintenance to some other company making the
investigation more convoluted.
 Lack of economic protection afforded by regulation increased concerns that carriers in
financial trouble would skip on maintenance in an effort to cut costs.
 The increasing emphasis on the precise flight schedules and avoiding the delays was
putting the maintenance officials and the pilots under pressure, which led them to cut
corners (Smith & Cox, n.d.).
The safety oversight system was responding to these challenges, in may 1979, American Airlines
Flight 191, a DC-10, just after takeoff from Chicago O’Hare, crashed. The NTSB determined
that the crash occurred due to the separation of the engine from the aircraft, making it impossible
for the pilots to control. The crash this raised questions towards the FAA’s maintenance
oversight. A committee was made including outside experts; they laid down a priority list:
 Establish a central organization of top-caliber engineer who would guide the rulemaking
which would eventually guide the FAA inspector’s airworthiness certificate activities.
 Perform more frequent and intensive inspections of manufacturers engaged in production
of type-certified aircraft.
 Periodically reassign inspectors to different manufacturers and carriers.
 Require mandatory reporting of any damage to aircrafts primary structure.
 The FAA initiated the development of the Aviation Safety Analysis System (ASAS). The
role of ASAS was to provide support to the FAA safety oversight by decision making
using computer technology. This also reduced the paper work for the inspectors, so they
could spend more time on field.

 In September 1980, the Special Aviation Fire and Explosion Reduction (SAFER)
advisory committee released a report that was initiated due to many incidents involving
post-crash fire. Aircrafts cabin were made more fire-resistant and cabin-evacuation was
facilitated in the event of fire under the SAFER (DOT, 2008).
In the early 1980’s, the FAA came out with the Supplemental Structural Improvement Program
(SSIP) which called for manufactures to create some special programs featuring additional
inspections for aircraft with high in service time. The SSIP inspections became mandatory in
1985. Despite these efforts, on April 28, 1988, a Boeing 737 suffered a structural fault in its
fuselage while in flight. This incident triggered renewed concern about the airworthiness of
aging aircraft to a 3-day international conference (Airline Deregulation, 1996).
Crashes of an Air Florida 737 departing National Airport in 1982, a Ryan International
DC-9 carrying mail out of Cleveland in 1991, and a USAir Fokker F-28 departing La Guardia in
1992 were all attributed to excessive ice build-up on the aircraft wings. In the face of repeated
NTSB recommendations, the FAA issued regulations calling for pilot and ground personnel
training on the detection and removal of ice from wings and specifying conditions under which
such procedures are required. An FAA official explained the lag: “when you think about the de-
icing issue, we counted on pilots to do what was expected of them to do… So, we now recognize
we can’t count on them, you’ve got to do something different. There’s a safeguard we can build
in.” (NewMyre, Thiesse, Jhonson & Kasp, 1992).
The ValuJet Crash and the 90-day Safety Review
On May 11, 1996, ValuJet Flight 592, a DC-9 crashed into the Florida everglades 10 minutes
after takeoff from Miami, killing all 110 passengers on board. The NTSB investigation

concluded that a fire in a cargo area on the underside of an aircraft caused the accident. At the
time of the crash, ValuJet was a rapidly growing carrier with a fleet that had grown from 2 to 52
DC-9’s since operations began in late 1993. (“Aircraft accident report”, n.d.)
Its business model revolved around using highly depreciated aircraft, whose substantial
maintenance requirements were outsourced to a number of widely dispersed repair stations. The
combination of such factors led to the worry of the FAA. Administrator David Hinson, testifying
before the congress a few weeks after the crash gave two mistakes that the FAA made in relation
to ValuJet. These were:
1. Failing to understand and deal with the effects of rapid growth.
2. Failing to see the difficulties created by virtually completely outsourcing of
maintenance (DOT, 2008).
In view of these, the FAA proposed a 90-Day safety review that would access the applicability of
federal aviation regulations to contract services. The 90-day safety review was carried out by a
task force with 14 core members, predominantly Aviation Flight Standards service (AFS)
personnel under a steering committee considering primarily of FAA senior executives, chaired
by deputy administrator Linda Hall Daschle. Its focus was short term—to examine “areas of
immediate concern” and “make recommendations that could be implemented in the near term.”
To bring the concept of targeted surveillance to a realizable plan for oversight
improvement, AFS formed a Surveillance Improvement Process (SIP). Following the SIP
recommendations, each airline was assigned a team of inspectors, which helped the correct
measures to be taken under constant inspection (DOT, 2008).

The Present Era
These new technologies are added to maintain and improve this safety. Next Generation Air
Transport System (NextGen) provides a far better air navigation services to support the doubling
of the airspace which is, believe it or not, happening. It also emphasizes on being environment
friendly through advanced aircraft capabilities and alternate fuel. NextGen will change the air
traffic control to air traffic management. Data will be shared almost entirely in different form.
NextGen promises that, the right information will be with the right person at the right time.
NextGen has come up with five programs which will change the way we communicate, navigate
and manage air traffic. They are,
a) Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broad Cast (ADS-B), this technology uses the
Global positioning system (GPS) to show the location and the intent of the aircraft. It
transmits these date to the air traffic managers and to other pilots as well. It allows a
more distinct separation of planes than radar.
b) System Wide Information Management (SWIM), this technology brings together the
industry needs and the commercially available products. This is likely to effect the
important decisions regarding the operations.
c) NextGen data Communications, this technology is far beyond the voice-only
communications. The flight data is shared digitally and aircraft trajectory is also
shared.
d) NextGen Network enabled Weather (NNEW), this technology will standardize the
weather data. Aviation weather information from multi-agency sources will be
developed which can be directly and commonly accessed by all. The virtual database
will consist of vast array of ground, airborne, and space based weather observations

and forecasts updated as needed in real-time, into a single, national-eventually global-
picture of the atmosphere.
e) National Airspace System Voice Switch (NVS). In current times sharing of airspace
within and across facility boundaries, and reconfiguration cannot be done quickly.
This technology will allow FAA’s air traffic control to evolve into a more flexible
communication system (FAA Flight Plan).
Safety has always been the number one issue for the FAA. We could see this the safety records,
that there were no commercial fatalities in the year 2007-2008. The question arrives here, where
do you put your focus, when your safety is going so well?
To address this challenge, we are moving from a reactionary way of dealing to a precautionary
way of dealing. Safety Management System (SMS) is being put into action. It examines the data
and isolates the trends which could lead to an accident. SMS is being implemented by the
airlines, the airports and even by the air traffic controllers. To sustain or improve these safety
standards in such complex times, FAA needs to be proactive and innovative. SMS is the solution.
It looks ahead in the future. The benefits of SMS would be increased safety and more effective
and an efficient oversight (FAA Flight Plan).

CONCLUSION
The first eight decades (from the Air Mail Service of the early 1920s to the outsourcing problems
of the 1990s) of federal involvement in the safety oversight system have been reviewed with a
few lines on the present development relating to flight safety. It is obvious that from the very
beginning, the fundamental purposes of the flight safety system were to both promote and
protect. The level of safety achieved by the Air Mail System compared to the private sector
commercial operations—a 60-fold reduction in fatality rates—was a remarkable achievement.
The lessons learned from accident investigations became a major impetus for change in the flight
safety system as well as in the rules that the system enforces. As an entity, the flight safety
system has evolved from a hybrid craft/coping agency to a procedural one.

References
2009-2013 FAA Flight Plan. (n.d.). Retrieved from
http://www.faa.gov/about/plans_reports/media/flight_plan_2009-2013.pdf
Aircraft accident report: ValuJet airlines flight 592. (1997). National
transportation safety board, 1-271.
Authority of Congress. Civil Aeronautics act of 1938. (1938). United States
Statutes at Large, 52, 973-1038.
Christy, J., & Cook, L. (1994). Birth of the air mail. In American Aviation: An
Illustrated History (2nd ed.). McGraw Hill. (Christy & Cook, 1994)
Department of Transportation (2008, July 1). History of Aviation Safety Oversight
in the United States. Retrieved from
http://www.tc.faa.gov/its/worldpac/techrpt/ar0839.pdf
L. Kraus, T. (2008, January 1). The Federal Aviation Administration: A historical
perspective 1903-2008.
L. Smith, F., & Cox, B. Airline Deregulation. Retrieved from
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/AirlineDeregulation.html#
NewMyre, D.A., Thiesse, J.L., Johnson, C.N., & Kasp, R.W., (1992). Airline
Unions Since Deregulation: The Views of Selected Airline Unions. The
Journal of Aviation/Aerospace Education & Research, 2(2).
Onkst, D. (2003, December 17). Barnstormers. Retrieved October6, 2014.
Rochester, S. (1976). Takeoff at mid-century: Federal civil aviation policy in the
Eisenhower years, 1953-1961.Washington: U.S. Dept. of Transportation,
Federal Aviation Administration.
The United States Department of Transportation. Retrieved from
Http://ntl.bts.gov/historian/history.htm
U.S. GAO. Airline Deregulation: Changesin Airfares, Service, and Safety at
Small, Medium-Sized, and LargeCommunities. April 1996. Reportonline at:
http://www.gao.gov/archive/1996/rc96079.pdf.

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