Haiti faced many challenges before and after the 2010 earthquake: - The earthquake killed hundreds of thousands and displaced over 1.5 million people in Port-au-Prince. - The response faced difficulties due to Haiti's weak government, the influx of thousands of unqualified aid groups, and lack of experience with urban disasters. - Problems included an unequal distribution of aid, uncontrolled influx of donations, lack of land title records, and over-focus on camps rather than community support. - Coordination of the massive response was challenging without involvement of Haitian groups and authorities. The cholera outbreak in 2010 added further crisis.

1. Case Study – Haiti 2010
Timo Lüge
IDHA 39, Berlin
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2. Situation in Haiti before the quake
 Haiti: 9.7 million people
 Metro Port-au-Prince (PAP): 2.4 million people
 80 % of all economic activity in PAP
 67 % of PAP population in “informal areas”
 Average living space in informal areas: 1,98
m2/person
 30 % in PAP have access to sanitation
 54 % in PAP have access to clean water
 Very prone to natural disasters (hurricanes, floods)
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3. Political situation
 Violent political history
 Upcoming presidential elections
 Unpopular UN peacekeeping operation since
2004 (MINUSTAH)
 Recent food riots after food prices rose 40 %
 Remittances make up 20 % of GDP
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4. 2010 earthquake
Photo: UNDP
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5. 2010 earthquake
 7.0 magnitude earthquake struck near
capital Port-au-Prince
 More than 300,000 people were injured
 Close to 200,000 houses were badly
damaged and 100,000 were destroyed
 1.5 million people were displaced
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7. Casualties
Number of deaths according to different sources:
 Government of Haiti: 316,000
 United Nations: 230,000
 Group of US academics: 158,000
 USAID: 85,000
Compared with 2004 tsunami:
230,000 deaths across 13 countries
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8. Casualties
 25% of civil servants in Port-au-Prince died
 60% of Government and administrative buildings,
 80% of schools in Port-au-Prince and 60% of schools in the
South and West provinces were destroyed or damaged
 Over 600,000 people left their home in Port-au-Prince and
stayed with host or own families
 100,000 IDPs lived in camps that were at critical risk from
storms and flooding
 Also: UN HQ destroyed and 115 UN staff dead
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9. Logistical Challenges
 Haiti is an island
 The hub, Port-au-Prince, severely affected
 Airport not operational
 Harbours not operational
-> Logistics pipeline through Santo Domingo
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10. Initial rapid response
 First Search and Rescue teams in Haiti 22
hours after the earthquake
 First Red Cross teams 36 hours after the quake
 All large organisations show up quickly
 Stockpiles are quickly distributed
 US Air Force takes over airport; later criticised
for prioritisation of flights
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11. Achievements: First six months
 4 million people have received food aid
 1.2 million people have access to safe water daily
 1.5 million people have received emergency shelter materials
 2.1 million household Non-Food Items (NFIs) have been distributed
 11,000 latrines have been installed
 195,000 children have benefited from temporary learning spaces
 550,000 children and pregnant/lactating women have received
supplementary feeding
 1 million people have benefited from Cash-for-Work programmes
 5,900 people have been relocated from imminently dangerous
locations
 142,000 households have received agricultural inputs for spring
planting
Source: OCHA
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12. Health
From the 12th of January to the 31st of March:
 MSF carried out 11,749 operations and
treated 173,757 cases in total
 The International Red Cross Red Crescent
Movement treated another 95,000 cases
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13. But…
 Despite massive efforts, not enough
 Unequal distribution of aid:
• Port-au-Prince / rural areas
• Safe / unsafe areas of Port-au-Prince
 Unequal quality of aid
 No control/accountability mechanism for
many new actors arriving
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14. Harmful aid – too many “helpers”
 Influx of thousands of “NGOs”
 No language skills or interpreters
 No previous experience in developing countries
or outside their country
 No “back office” (transportation, food,
accommodation, materials), creating new case
load for humanitarians
 No long-term strategy
 Help or grievous bodily harm?
 Lots of unwanted gifts in kind, i.e. junk
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18. Rubble
 10 million cubic meters of rubble
 Rubble contains human remains
 In 2010, 2 million cubic meters were removed
 Many residents didn’t want rubble removed
w/o compensation or land title
 Nowhere to put the rubble
 Positive: quick assessment of buildings in Port-
au-Prince
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19. Land titles / land disputes
 Available land at a premium after the earthquake
 Official land titles exists for only 5 % of land
 Office holding these titles was destroyed
 Squatters are being evicted
 NGOs reluctant to build shelter on land where
ownership is not clear
 Government owns 50 % of land yet made only
two pieces of land available in first four months.
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20. Aid too focused on camps
 Rationale: Easier to serve people in camps
 Services concentrated in camps and not in
communities
 Families maintained “a presence” in (multiple)
camps to access services even if they lived
somewhere else
 Very uneven standards in different camps
 Not enough support for host
families, particularly outside PAP
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25. Coordination challenges
 At the beginning only in English
 Meeting on the UN Logistics Base which only
allowed access to some
 Haitian authorities and Haitian NGOs were
marginalised
 Coordinators received 1 email per second
 Too many actors
 Little experience in coordinating with the military
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26.  Cluster leads and OCHA were not part of the
Coordination Support Committee or strategic
level
 Decisions not always based on humanitarian
principles
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27. Money
 Many pledges were not fulfilled
 Haitian government out of the loop and
without control over the funds
 History of corruption meant most donors
didn’t trust GoH
 Over 90 % of money went to international
actors (UN, private sector, NGOs)
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28. New York Times, 23 December 2012
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29. Interim Haiti Recovery Commission
 Charged with approving recovery projects which
could then be funded by the Haiti Reconstruction
Fund
 Led by Bill Clinton (UN Special Representative for
Haiti) and Jean-Max Bellerive (Prime Minister)
 Partly created because donors didn’t trust GoH
 Completely dysfunctional
 Mandate ended in Oct 2011, not replaced yet
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30. Communication
Photo: Julien Goldstein, IFRC
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31. Communication
 Establishment of a cluster-like mechanism for
“Communication with Disaster Affected
Communities” (CDAC)
 39 million SMS sent by humanitarian
organisations
 Over 900,000 calls to Red Cross hotline
 Dedicated radio and TV shows for
beneficiaries
 Volunteer and Tech Community as new actor
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32. Ushahidi
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33. Open Street Map
12 January 2010 15 January2010
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35. Cholera
Photo: Julien Goldstein, IFRC
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36. Cholera
 Started in October 2010
 Source: Nepalese peace keepers
 648,000 people infected (MoH)
 8,000 people died (MoH)
 Haiti has had twice as many cholera patients
as all of Africa (MSF)
 UN rejects claims for compensation
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37. Elections
Photo: Andre Lambertson
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38. Main problems of Haiti response
 Weak government
 Influx of too many unqualified actors
 Chronic poverty that increased vulnerability
 Lack of involvement of Haitian civil society
 Little experience with urban disasters
 Not enough support for IDPs and their families
outside urban camps
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39. Questions?
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40. Thank you!
Timo Lüge
timo.luege@gmail.com
Twitter: @timolue
Tel: +49 170 311 22 43
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