iOS Forensics: where are we now and what are we missing?

Reality Net System Solutions
Reality Net System SolutionsReality Net System Solutions
FOR408 Windows Forensic Analysis<YOUR COURSE NAME HERE>
SANS DFIR
Prague, 3rd October 2017
© 2017 Mattia Epifani | All Rights Reserved |
iOS Forensics: where are we
now and what are we missing?
•iOS acquisition challenges
•Search and seizure of iOS Devices
•Acquisition techniques
•Alternative options
2
Overview on iOS Forensics
3
Why iOS Forensics?
September 2017 – Mobile OS (source Statcounter.com)
4
Why iOS Forensics?
September 2017 –Tablet OS (source Statcounter.com)
•iOS devices use full disk encryption
•Other protection layers
(i.e. per-file key, backup password)
•JTAG ports are not available
•Chip-off techniques are not useful
because of full disk encryption
• But some experimental techniques are just out!
5
iOS Acquisition Challenges
•Turned off device
•LEAVE IT OFF!
•Turned on device
(locked or unlocked)
•DON’T TURN IT OFF AND
THINK!
6
iOS Forensics RULES!
1.Activate Airplane mode
2.Connect to a power source
(i.e. external battery)
3.Verify the model
4.Verify the iOS version
7
PRESERVATION -Turned ON and LOCKED
8
PRESERVATION - Activate Airplane Mode on a Locked Device
9
IDENTIFICATION - Identify the model (I)
10
IDENTIFICATION - Identify the model (II) and the iOSVersion
•Libimobiledevice (Linux/Mac)
http://www.libimobiledevice.org/
•iMobiledevice (Windows)
http://quamotion.mobi/iMobileDevice/
•ideviceinfo -s
•They also work on locked devices!
11
IDENTIFICATION - Identify the model (II) and the iOSVersion
12
IDENTIFICATION - iPhone Model Chart
Device name Model number Internal Name Identifier Year Capacity (GB)
iPhone 7 Plus A1784 D111AP iPhone9,4 2016 32, 128, 256
iPhone 7 Plus (China/Japan) A1661 – A1785 – A1786 D11AP iPhone9,2 2016 32, 128, 256
iPhone 7 A1778 D101AP iPhone9,3 2016 32, 128, 256
iPhone 7 (China) A1660 – A1779 – A1780 D10AP iPhone 9,1 2016 32, 128, 256
iPhone SE A1662 – A1723 – A1724 N69AP iPhone8,4 2016 16, 32, 64, 128
iPhone 6s Plus A1634 – A1687 – A1699 – A1690 N66AP iPhone8,2 2015 16, 64, 128
iPhone 6s A1633 – A1688 – A1700 – A1691 N71AP iPhone8.1 2015 16, 64, 128
iPhone 6 Plus A1522 – A1524 – A1593 N56AP iPhone7,1 2014 16, 64, 128
iPhone 6 A1549 – A1586 N61AP iPhone7,2 2014 16, 64, 128
iPhone 5S (CDMA) A1457 – A1518 – A1528 – A1530 N53AP iPhone6,2 2013 16, 32
iPhone 5S (GSM) A1433 – A1533 N51AP iPhone6,1 2013 16, 32, 64
iPhone 5C (CDMA) A1507 – A1516 – A1526 – A1529 N49AP iPhone5,4 2013 16, 32
iPhone 5C (GSM) A1456 – A1532 N48AP iPhone5,3 2013 16, 32
iPhone 5 rev.2 A1429 – A1442 N42AP iPhone5,2 2012 16, 32, 64
iPhone 5 A1428 N41AP iPhone5,1 2012 16, 32, 64
iPhone 4s (China) A1431
N94AP iPhone4,1
2011 8, 16, 32, 64
iPhone 4S A1387 2011 8, 16, 32, 64
iPhone 4 - CDMA A1349 N92AP iPhone3,2 2011 8, 16, 32
iPhone 4 - GSM A1332 N90AP iPhone3,1 2010 8, 16, 32
iPhone 3GS (China) A1325
N88AP iPhone2,1
2009 8, 16, 32
iPhone 3GS A1303 2009 8, 16, 32
iPhone 3G (China) A1324
N82AP iPhone1,2
2009 8, 16
iPhone 3G A1241 2008 8, 16
iPhone 2G A1203 M68AP iPhone1,1 2007 4, 8, 16
1. Prevent the phone locking!
I. Don’t press power button!
II. Disable Auto-lock!
2. Verify if a lock code is set!
3. Activate Airplane mode
4. Acquire the data as soon as possible, keeping the phone
unlocked!
OR
Connect to a computer to «pair» the iPhone
OR
1. Connect to a power source (i.e. external battery)
2. Identify the model
3. Identify the iOS version
13
PRESERVATION -Turned ON and UNLOCKED
14
PRESERVATION
PREVENT LOCK STATE! (Disable Auto-Lock)
15
PRESERVATION - Activate Airplane Mode on an unlocked device
• iTunes Backup Can be password protected!
• Apple File Relay Zdziarski, 2014 – Up to iOS 7
• Apple File Conduit Result depends on iOS version
• iCloud Already stored data or forced
• Full file system Possible only on jailbroken devices
File System
• Available up to iPhone 4
• Possible on jailbroken devices
Physical
16
ACQUISITION - Acquisition techniques
• Physical acquisition is always
possible
• In case of simple passcode all data
will be decrypted
• In case of complex passcode you
will get in any case native
applications data (i.e. address book,
SMS, notes, video, images, etc.)
17
ACQUISITION - iPhone 4 and below
18
ACQUISITION –
Turned ON and unlocked –Turned OFF and without passcode
• Always possible doing some kind of file
system acquisition
• The obtained data strongly depends on
the iOS version
• General approach
• Connect the phone to a computer
containing iTunes or a mobile
forensics tool
• ”Pair” the phone with the computer
• Acquire the data with the various
possible techniques/protocols
19
ACQUISITION –
Turned ON and unlocked –Turned OFF and without passcode
• Possible problems:
• Backup password
• Managed devices
 Connection to PC inhibited
• iOS 11 (!!!)
20
iOS 11 – Lockdown generation
https://blog.elcomsoft.com/2017/09/new-security-measures-in-ios-11-and-their-forensic-implications/
• Establishing Trust
(“pairing”) with a PC now
requires the passcode!
21
ACQUISITION -Turned ON and LOCKED
•Search for a lockdown certificate on
a synced computer
•Unlock through fingerprint
•Try to force an iCloud backup
•Specific iOS version vulnerability for
bypassing passcode
22
ACQUISITION – Lockdown certificate
• Stored in:
• C:Program DataAppleLockdown Win 7/8/10
• /private/var/db/lockdown Mac OS X
• Certificate file name  Device_UDID.plist
• The certificate can be extracted from the computer
and used in another with some forensic tools or
directly with iTunes
• Lockdown certificate stored on a computer is valid
for 30 days
• Lockdown certificate can be used within 48 hours
since last user unlocked with the passcode
• To configure Touch ID, you must first set up a
passcode. Touch ID is designed to minimize
the input of your passcode; but your passcode
will be needed for additional security
validation:
• After restarting your device
• When more than 48 hours have elapsed
from the last time you unlocked your device
• To enter the Touch ID & Passcode setting
• https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT204587
23
ACQUISITION – Fingerprint Unlock
24
iOS 11 – SOS Mode
• Apple has added an new emergency
feature designed to give users an
intuitive way to call emergency by
simply pressing the Power button
five times in rapid succession
• This SOS mode not only allows
quickly calling an emergency number,
but also disables Touch ID
https://blog.elcomsoft.com/2017/09/new-security-measures-in-ios-11-and-their-forensic-implications/
25
ACQUISITION – Force iCloud backup
• Be careful when using this option and try other
methods first!
• Possible overwriting of already existing backup
• Risk of remote wiping
• Follow this approach:
• Bring the device close to a known Wi-Fi network
• Connect to a power source
• Wait a few hours
• Request data from Apple or download it
• Legal authorization
• Credentials or token is needed
• A comprehensive and continuously updated list
is maintained at:
• http://blog.dinosec.com/2014/09/bypas
sing-ios-lock-screens.html
• Latest available for iOS 10.3
• CVE-2017-2397
• “An issue was discovered in certain Apple
products. iOS before 10.3 is affected. The
issue involves the "Accounts" component. It
allows physically proximate attackers to
discover an Apple ID by reading an iCloud
authentication prompt on the lock screen.”
26
ACQUISITION – Specific iOS version vulnerability
• Try to use a lockdown
certificate
• It works well on iOS 7 (AFR and AFC)
• It can still get some data on iOS 8 (AFC)
• Not useful on iOS 9/10/11
• Some specific unlocking tools
• They work on iOS 7 and iOS 8
• UFED User Lock Code Recovery Tool
• IP-BOX
• MFC Dongle
• Xpin Clip
27
ACQUISITION –Turned OFF and LOCKED
28
ACQUISITION –Turned OFF and LOCKED (iPhone 7)
29
ACQUISITION –Turned OFF and LOCKED (iPhone 7)
30
ACQUISITION – CAIS (Cellebrite Advanced Investigative Services)
https://www.cellebrite.com/en/services/unlock-services/
31
Alternative options
• Local backup stored on user’s computer
• Other data stored on user’s computer
• iCloud acquisition
• Experimental techniques (chip-off)
32
Backup stored on the user’s computer
33
Encrypted backup
34
iOS Backup password cracking on Mac OS X
35
Dumpkeychain
36
Dumpkeychain
37
Other data stored on the user’s computer
• Windows
• C:ProgramDataAppleComputer
• iTunesiPodDevices.xml  Connected iOS devices
• C:Users[username]AppDataRoamingApple Computer
• MobileSyncBackup  Device Backup
• Logs  Various device logs
• MediaStream  PhotoStream information
• iTunes  iTunes Preferences and Apple
account information
• Mac OS X
• https://www.mac4n6.com/resources/
• Sarah Edwards
• Ubiquity Forensics - Your iCloud and You
38
iPodDevices.xml
39
MobileMeAccounts.plist
40
Logs Folder
41
Logs folder
• Installed applications list and usage
• Various logs like PowerLog, Security, OnDemand
• iTunes username
• itunesstored.2.log file
• File name of e-mail attachments
• MobileMail logs
• List of Wi-Fi networks and history of latest
connections
• Wi-Fi logs
42
OnDemand log
43
itunesstored.2.log
44
MobileMail Log
45
Wi-Fi log
• You need
• User credentials
OR
• Token extracted from a computer (Windows/Mac)
• Only if iCloud Control Panel is installed!
• You can obtain
• iCloud Device Backup
• iCloud Calendars
• iCloud Contacts
• Photo Streams
• Email
• Specific application data
46
iCloud Acquisition
47
ACQUISITION – iCloud Acquisition
48
ACQUISITION – iCloud Acquisition
49
ACQUISITION – iCloud Acquisition
50
ACQUISITION – iCloud Acquisition
51
ACQUISITION – iCloud Acquisition
52
ACQUISITION – iCloud Acquisition
53
ACQUISITION – iCloud Acquisition
• You can request:
• Subscriber information
• Mail logs
• Email content
• Other iCloud Content
• iOS Device Backups
• iCloud Photo Library
• iCloud Drive
• Contacts
• Calendar
• Bookmarks
• Safari Browsing History
• Find My iPhone
• Game Center
• iOS Device Activation
• Sign-on logs
• My Apple ID and iForgot logs
• FaceTime logs
54
Apple support
https://images.apple.com/legal/privacy/law-enforcement-guidelines-outside-us.pdf
• Recently published research by Sergei Skorobogatov
• The bumpy road towards iPhone 5C NAND mirroring
• http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~sps32/5c_proj.html
• https://arxiv.org/pdf/1609.04327v1.pdf
• https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tM66GWrwbsY
55
Chip Off (Experimental)
56
iOS ForensicsTools
Forensic Tools
Cellebrite Physical Analyzer
Magnet IEF/AXIOM/Acquire
Oxygen Forensic
Elcomsoft Phone Breaker
Elcomsoft Phone Viewer
Elcomsoft iOS Forensic Toolkit
XRY
MPE+
Paraben Device Seizure
X-Ways/FTK/Encase
Other tools
iTunes
Libimobiledevice
iMobiledevice
iBackupbot
iPhone Backup Extractor
iFunBox
iTools
iExplorer
Plisteditor
SQLite Database Broswer
57
Learning iOS Forensics – Second Edition
https://www.packtpub.com/networking-and-servers/learning-ios-forensics-second-edition
58
SANS FOR 585 - Advanced Smartphone Forensics
https://www.sans.org/course/advanced-smartphone-mobile-device-forensics
59
SANS FOR 585 - Advanced Smartphone Forensics
https://www.sans.org/course/advanced-smartphone-mobile-device-forensics
60
Q&A
Mattia Epifani
• CEO @ REALITY NET – System Solutions
• Digital Forensics Analyst
• Mobile Device Security Specialist
• Member of Clusit, DFA, IISFA, ONIF, Tech&Law
• GCFA, GCFE, GASF, GREM, GNFA, GMOB, GCWN
• CEH, CHFI, CCE, CIFI, ECCE, AME, ACE, MPSC
mattia.epifani@realitynet.it
@mattiaep
http://www.linkedin.com/in/mattiaepifani
http://www.realitynet.it
http://blog.digital-forensics.it
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iOS Forensics: where are we now and what are we missing?

  • 1. FOR408 Windows Forensic Analysis<YOUR COURSE NAME HERE> SANS DFIR Prague, 3rd October 2017 © 2017 Mattia Epifani | All Rights Reserved | iOS Forensics: where are we now and what are we missing?
  • 2. •iOS acquisition challenges •Search and seizure of iOS Devices •Acquisition techniques •Alternative options 2 Overview on iOS Forensics
  • 3. 3 Why iOS Forensics? September 2017 – Mobile OS (source Statcounter.com)
  • 4. 4 Why iOS Forensics? September 2017 –Tablet OS (source Statcounter.com)
  • 5. •iOS devices use full disk encryption •Other protection layers (i.e. per-file key, backup password) •JTAG ports are not available •Chip-off techniques are not useful because of full disk encryption • But some experimental techniques are just out! 5 iOS Acquisition Challenges
  • 6. •Turned off device •LEAVE IT OFF! •Turned on device (locked or unlocked) •DON’T TURN IT OFF AND THINK! 6 iOS Forensics RULES!
  • 7. 1.Activate Airplane mode 2.Connect to a power source (i.e. external battery) 3.Verify the model 4.Verify the iOS version 7 PRESERVATION -Turned ON and LOCKED
  • 8. 8 PRESERVATION - Activate Airplane Mode on a Locked Device
  • 10. 10 IDENTIFICATION - Identify the model (II) and the iOSVersion •Libimobiledevice (Linux/Mac) http://www.libimobiledevice.org/ •iMobiledevice (Windows) http://quamotion.mobi/iMobileDevice/ •ideviceinfo -s •They also work on locked devices!
  • 11. 11 IDENTIFICATION - Identify the model (II) and the iOSVersion
  • 12. 12 IDENTIFICATION - iPhone Model Chart Device name Model number Internal Name Identifier Year Capacity (GB) iPhone 7 Plus A1784 D111AP iPhone9,4 2016 32, 128, 256 iPhone 7 Plus (China/Japan) A1661 – A1785 – A1786 D11AP iPhone9,2 2016 32, 128, 256 iPhone 7 A1778 D101AP iPhone9,3 2016 32, 128, 256 iPhone 7 (China) A1660 – A1779 – A1780 D10AP iPhone 9,1 2016 32, 128, 256 iPhone SE A1662 – A1723 – A1724 N69AP iPhone8,4 2016 16, 32, 64, 128 iPhone 6s Plus A1634 – A1687 – A1699 – A1690 N66AP iPhone8,2 2015 16, 64, 128 iPhone 6s A1633 – A1688 – A1700 – A1691 N71AP iPhone8.1 2015 16, 64, 128 iPhone 6 Plus A1522 – A1524 – A1593 N56AP iPhone7,1 2014 16, 64, 128 iPhone 6 A1549 – A1586 N61AP iPhone7,2 2014 16, 64, 128 iPhone 5S (CDMA) A1457 – A1518 – A1528 – A1530 N53AP iPhone6,2 2013 16, 32 iPhone 5S (GSM) A1433 – A1533 N51AP iPhone6,1 2013 16, 32, 64 iPhone 5C (CDMA) A1507 – A1516 – A1526 – A1529 N49AP iPhone5,4 2013 16, 32 iPhone 5C (GSM) A1456 – A1532 N48AP iPhone5,3 2013 16, 32 iPhone 5 rev.2 A1429 – A1442 N42AP iPhone5,2 2012 16, 32, 64 iPhone 5 A1428 N41AP iPhone5,1 2012 16, 32, 64 iPhone 4s (China) A1431 N94AP iPhone4,1 2011 8, 16, 32, 64 iPhone 4S A1387 2011 8, 16, 32, 64 iPhone 4 - CDMA A1349 N92AP iPhone3,2 2011 8, 16, 32 iPhone 4 - GSM A1332 N90AP iPhone3,1 2010 8, 16, 32 iPhone 3GS (China) A1325 N88AP iPhone2,1 2009 8, 16, 32 iPhone 3GS A1303 2009 8, 16, 32 iPhone 3G (China) A1324 N82AP iPhone1,2 2009 8, 16 iPhone 3G A1241 2008 8, 16 iPhone 2G A1203 M68AP iPhone1,1 2007 4, 8, 16
  • 13. 1. Prevent the phone locking! I. Don’t press power button! II. Disable Auto-lock! 2. Verify if a lock code is set! 3. Activate Airplane mode 4. Acquire the data as soon as possible, keeping the phone unlocked! OR Connect to a computer to «pair» the iPhone OR 1. Connect to a power source (i.e. external battery) 2. Identify the model 3. Identify the iOS version 13 PRESERVATION -Turned ON and UNLOCKED
  • 14. 14 PRESERVATION PREVENT LOCK STATE! (Disable Auto-Lock)
  • 15. 15 PRESERVATION - Activate Airplane Mode on an unlocked device
  • 16. • iTunes Backup Can be password protected! • Apple File Relay Zdziarski, 2014 – Up to iOS 7 • Apple File Conduit Result depends on iOS version • iCloud Already stored data or forced • Full file system Possible only on jailbroken devices File System • Available up to iPhone 4 • Possible on jailbroken devices Physical 16 ACQUISITION - Acquisition techniques
  • 17. • Physical acquisition is always possible • In case of simple passcode all data will be decrypted • In case of complex passcode you will get in any case native applications data (i.e. address book, SMS, notes, video, images, etc.) 17 ACQUISITION - iPhone 4 and below
  • 18. 18 ACQUISITION – Turned ON and unlocked –Turned OFF and without passcode • Always possible doing some kind of file system acquisition • The obtained data strongly depends on the iOS version • General approach • Connect the phone to a computer containing iTunes or a mobile forensics tool • ”Pair” the phone with the computer • Acquire the data with the various possible techniques/protocols
  • 19. 19 ACQUISITION – Turned ON and unlocked –Turned OFF and without passcode • Possible problems: • Backup password • Managed devices  Connection to PC inhibited • iOS 11 (!!!)
  • 20. 20 iOS 11 – Lockdown generation https://blog.elcomsoft.com/2017/09/new-security-measures-in-ios-11-and-their-forensic-implications/ • Establishing Trust (“pairing”) with a PC now requires the passcode!
  • 21. 21 ACQUISITION -Turned ON and LOCKED •Search for a lockdown certificate on a synced computer •Unlock through fingerprint •Try to force an iCloud backup •Specific iOS version vulnerability for bypassing passcode
  • 22. 22 ACQUISITION – Lockdown certificate • Stored in: • C:Program DataAppleLockdown Win 7/8/10 • /private/var/db/lockdown Mac OS X • Certificate file name  Device_UDID.plist • The certificate can be extracted from the computer and used in another with some forensic tools or directly with iTunes • Lockdown certificate stored on a computer is valid for 30 days • Lockdown certificate can be used within 48 hours since last user unlocked with the passcode
  • 23. • To configure Touch ID, you must first set up a passcode. Touch ID is designed to minimize the input of your passcode; but your passcode will be needed for additional security validation: • After restarting your device • When more than 48 hours have elapsed from the last time you unlocked your device • To enter the Touch ID & Passcode setting • https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT204587 23 ACQUISITION – Fingerprint Unlock
  • 24. 24 iOS 11 – SOS Mode • Apple has added an new emergency feature designed to give users an intuitive way to call emergency by simply pressing the Power button five times in rapid succession • This SOS mode not only allows quickly calling an emergency number, but also disables Touch ID https://blog.elcomsoft.com/2017/09/new-security-measures-in-ios-11-and-their-forensic-implications/
  • 25. 25 ACQUISITION – Force iCloud backup • Be careful when using this option and try other methods first! • Possible overwriting of already existing backup • Risk of remote wiping • Follow this approach: • Bring the device close to a known Wi-Fi network • Connect to a power source • Wait a few hours • Request data from Apple or download it • Legal authorization • Credentials or token is needed
  • 26. • A comprehensive and continuously updated list is maintained at: • http://blog.dinosec.com/2014/09/bypas sing-ios-lock-screens.html • Latest available for iOS 10.3 • CVE-2017-2397 • “An issue was discovered in certain Apple products. iOS before 10.3 is affected. The issue involves the "Accounts" component. It allows physically proximate attackers to discover an Apple ID by reading an iCloud authentication prompt on the lock screen.” 26 ACQUISITION – Specific iOS version vulnerability
  • 27. • Try to use a lockdown certificate • It works well on iOS 7 (AFR and AFC) • It can still get some data on iOS 8 (AFC) • Not useful on iOS 9/10/11 • Some specific unlocking tools • They work on iOS 7 and iOS 8 • UFED User Lock Code Recovery Tool • IP-BOX • MFC Dongle • Xpin Clip 27 ACQUISITION –Turned OFF and LOCKED
  • 28. 28 ACQUISITION –Turned OFF and LOCKED (iPhone 7)
  • 29. 29 ACQUISITION –Turned OFF and LOCKED (iPhone 7)
  • 30. 30 ACQUISITION – CAIS (Cellebrite Advanced Investigative Services) https://www.cellebrite.com/en/services/unlock-services/
  • 31. 31 Alternative options • Local backup stored on user’s computer • Other data stored on user’s computer • iCloud acquisition • Experimental techniques (chip-off)
  • 32. 32 Backup stored on the user’s computer
  • 34. 34 iOS Backup password cracking on Mac OS X
  • 37. 37 Other data stored on the user’s computer • Windows • C:ProgramDataAppleComputer • iTunesiPodDevices.xml  Connected iOS devices • C:Users[username]AppDataRoamingApple Computer • MobileSyncBackup  Device Backup • Logs  Various device logs • MediaStream  PhotoStream information • iTunes  iTunes Preferences and Apple account information • Mac OS X • https://www.mac4n6.com/resources/ • Sarah Edwards • Ubiquity Forensics - Your iCloud and You
  • 41. 41 Logs folder • Installed applications list and usage • Various logs like PowerLog, Security, OnDemand • iTunes username • itunesstored.2.log file • File name of e-mail attachments • MobileMail logs • List of Wi-Fi networks and history of latest connections • Wi-Fi logs
  • 46. • You need • User credentials OR • Token extracted from a computer (Windows/Mac) • Only if iCloud Control Panel is installed! • You can obtain • iCloud Device Backup • iCloud Calendars • iCloud Contacts • Photo Streams • Email • Specific application data 46 iCloud Acquisition
  • 54. • You can request: • Subscriber information • Mail logs • Email content • Other iCloud Content • iOS Device Backups • iCloud Photo Library • iCloud Drive • Contacts • Calendar • Bookmarks • Safari Browsing History • Find My iPhone • Game Center • iOS Device Activation • Sign-on logs • My Apple ID and iForgot logs • FaceTime logs 54 Apple support https://images.apple.com/legal/privacy/law-enforcement-guidelines-outside-us.pdf
  • 55. • Recently published research by Sergei Skorobogatov • The bumpy road towards iPhone 5C NAND mirroring • http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~sps32/5c_proj.html • https://arxiv.org/pdf/1609.04327v1.pdf • https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tM66GWrwbsY 55 Chip Off (Experimental)
  • 56. 56 iOS ForensicsTools Forensic Tools Cellebrite Physical Analyzer Magnet IEF/AXIOM/Acquire Oxygen Forensic Elcomsoft Phone Breaker Elcomsoft Phone Viewer Elcomsoft iOS Forensic Toolkit XRY MPE+ Paraben Device Seizure X-Ways/FTK/Encase Other tools iTunes Libimobiledevice iMobiledevice iBackupbot iPhone Backup Extractor iFunBox iTools iExplorer Plisteditor SQLite Database Broswer
  • 57. 57 Learning iOS Forensics – Second Edition https://www.packtpub.com/networking-and-servers/learning-ios-forensics-second-edition
  • 58. 58 SANS FOR 585 - Advanced Smartphone Forensics https://www.sans.org/course/advanced-smartphone-mobile-device-forensics
  • 59. 59 SANS FOR 585 - Advanced Smartphone Forensics https://www.sans.org/course/advanced-smartphone-mobile-device-forensics
  • 60. 60 Q&A Mattia Epifani • CEO @ REALITY NET – System Solutions • Digital Forensics Analyst • Mobile Device Security Specialist • Member of Clusit, DFA, IISFA, ONIF, Tech&Law • GCFA, GCFE, GASF, GREM, GNFA, GMOB, GCWN • CEH, CHFI, CCE, CIFI, ECCE, AME, ACE, MPSC mattia.epifani@realitynet.it @mattiaep http://www.linkedin.com/in/mattiaepifani http://www.realitynet.it http://blog.digital-forensics.it