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Research Process: A Step-by-Step
Guide: 4b. Outline the Paper
Get Started Step 1: Develop a Topic Step 2: Locate Information
Step 3: Evaluate
Why Outline?
Oultines provide a means of
organizing your information in an
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amounts of information.
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Thesis: Federal regulations need to foster laws that will
help protect wetlands, restore those that have been
destroyed, and take measures to improve the damange
from overdevelopment.
I. Nature's ecosystem
A. Loss of wetlands nationally
B. Loss of wetlands in Illinois
1. More flooding and poorer water quality
2. Lost ability to prevent floods, clean water and store
water
II. Dramatic floods
A, Cost in dollars and lives
1. 13 deaths between 1988 and 1998
2. Cost of $39 million per year
B. Great Midwestern Flood of 1993
1. Lost wetlands in IL
2. Devastation in some states
C. Flood Prevention

1. Plants and Soils
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4. If applicable, continue to sub-divide each supporting
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Journal of Contemporary Asia
ISSN: 0047-2336 (Print) 1752-7554 (Online) Journal homepage:
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Social Media and the Successful Anti-Mining
Campaign in Bangka, Indonesia
Kristina Großmann
To cite this article: Kristina Großmann (2018) Social Media and
the Successful Anti-
Mining Campaign in Bangka, Indonesia, Journal of
Contemporary Asia, 48:5, 835-854, DOI:
10.1080/00472336.2018.1432675
To link to this article:
https://doi.org/10.1080/00472336.2018.1432675
Published online: 06 Feb 2018.
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Social Media and the Successful Anti-Mining Campaign in
Bangka, Indonesia
Kristina Großmann
Faculty of Arts and Humanities, University of Passau, Passau,
Germany
ABSTRACT
This article elaborates on the functionalities of Facebook and
WhatsApp, and the possibilities and limitations of their usage in
the anti-mining campaign in Bangka, Indonesia, with special
focus
on the participation and offline–online intertwining of
communi-
cation processes. The research reported in this article
contributes
to a deeper understanding of the relationship between social
media and political protest in the context of discriminatory
natural
resource extraction in Indonesia. In 2017, the alliance against
the

mining activities of the Chinese company PT Mikgro Metal
Perdana
in Bangka, which consisted of villagers, activists, tourism
operators
and divers, succeeded in ousting PT MMP from Bangka. Social
media enhanced mobilisation, communication, knowledge trans-
fer, transparency, and solidarity in this anti-mining campaign.
Through WhatsApp, the rapid transmission of information and
communication was facilitated when urgent action was needed.
The Facebook group Save Bangka Island not only provided gen-
eral information but also enhanced solidarity, cohesion and the
creation of an “imagined community.” However, it is also found
that social media sites are stratified spaces where villagers – the
primary affected group – are excluded because of their lack of
Internet access.
ARTICLE HISTORY
Published online 07
February 2018
KEYWORDS
Social media; Facebook;
WhatsApp; Indonesia; social
movement; mining
In February 2017, the Supreme Court of Jakarta revoked the
production permit of the
Chinese owned mining company PT Mikgro Metal Perdana (PT
MMP) to extract iron
ore in Bangka. This court decision marked an important success
in the struggle of an
anti-mining alliance against the company’s activities on the
small island located in the
northeastern tip of the province North Sulawesi. One aspect of
the successful opposi-
tion was the online campaign called Save Bangka Island, which

started in 2011, and the
use of commercial social media such as Facebook and
WhatsApp.
Bangka, only 48 square kilometres and inhabited by roughly
3,000 people, was
developed to become an exclusive diving site owing to its high
marine biodiversity
and paradise-like beaches.1 The small island is recognised as
deserving environmental
protection, as it is part of the huge Coral Triangle stretching
over Indonesia, Malaysia,
Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Solomon Islands and
Timor-Leste and is located
close to the Bunaken National Park.2 However, in 2008, the
then regent (bupati) of
CONTACT Kristina Großmann [email protected] Faculty of Arts
and Humanities, University of
Passau, Dr. Hans-Kapfinger-Str. 14 b, Passau 94032, Germany.
JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY ASIA
2018, VOL. 48, NO. 5, 835–854
https://doi.org/10.1080/00472336.2018.1432675
© 2018 Journal of Contemporary Asia
http://www.tandfonline.com
18.1432675&domain=pdf
North Minahasa, Sompie Singal, issued a permit (izin
eksplorasi) allowing PT MMP to
explore for iron ore on the island. The permit covered 1,300
hectares, which is almost

one-third of the island, and the mining company was soon
conducting exploratory
drilling. In 2011, villagers, activists, tourism operators and
divers increasingly organised
their resistance by bringing their complaints to the national
parliament and initiating
online and offline campaigns. In 2012, residents of Bangka and
tourism operators sued
the former bupati and the mining company to stop the mining
activities under Law 27/
2007, which forbids mining on islands that are less than 2,000
square kilometres. In the
following years, several court cases were filed, and the success
of the anti-mining
alliance culminated in the decision by the Supreme Court in
2017 that officially declared
the mining activities illegal.
The online campaign was a critical component in this anti-
mining victory. A key
person responsible for the design and implementation of the
online campaign was Eku
Wand. A professor of media design and multimedia at the
Braunschweig University of
Art in Germany, he is a media designer, social media
professional and scuba diver, who
visited Indonesia regularly and returned to live in Jakarta in
2014. Having known
Bangka as a diving site since 2007, he confronted the mining
problems in Bangka in
2011. In October the same year, supported by tourism operators,
he began to devise and
implement the online anti-mining campaign known as #Save
Bangka Island. With his
background as social media professional and scuba diver, he
established the online

campaign to stop PT MMP and to save the environment and
people’s livelihood. His
view was that he wanted to implement an “all-encompassing
example” in the field of
social media marketing (Interview, Eku Wand, Jakarta, March 8,
2016). The social
media campaign, according to Eku Wand, should aim at
mobilising, sharing knowledge
and developing solidarity amongst the members of the anti-
mining alliance by enhan-
cing transparency and addressing the information and
knowledge deficit in Indonesia
with special focus on the Bangka case. Furthermore, he wants to
build trust and
teamwork amongst the members of the alliance. For him, social
media should also
act as an intermediary between the involved actors and create a
space where users
establish their own rules and as a counterweight to political and
social restrictions. But,
also aware of the limitations of social media, he states that the
role of social media,
being a mirror of society and politics, is dependent on the
engagement and capacities of
the involved people and on the will of the political regime. Eku
Wand’s idealism and his
professional challenge materialised in a time-consuming
orchestration and maintenance
of diverse social media sites such as Facebook, Twitter, and
Google+.
Online protest, like Eku Wand’s engagement, links to debates
about the intertwine-
ment of social media and political participation. Numerous
scholarly discussions refer
in a binary way to the question of whether people can

strengthen their political
participation and citizen rights through social media. Soon after
the development of
the internet in the 1960s, digital technology and cyberspace
were described as a space
beyond the control of governments (Drissel 2006). In this vein,
Shirky (2008, 2011),
Castells (2009, 2012) and Jenkins (2008) tend to ascribe social
media an important role
in enhancing a participatory culture and user empowerment.
Fuchs (2008, 2010, 2011)
and van Dijck (2009), however, oppose such simplistic views.
They assert that com-
mercial social media serves corporate interests and that
participation is dependent on
the financial strength and social class of the user. Morozov
(2011, 179) goes further in a
836 KRISTINA GROßMANN
dystopian approach and perceives online activism as banal and
ineffective, using the
term “slacktivism.” By using this pejorative compound word of
“slacker” and “activism”
he argues that people easily form Facebook groups for speaking
out against something
because the effort required is low, which also prevents them
from organising. In the
wake of the political revolts in North Africa and the Middle
East in 2010, debates on
political participation and social media took on new dimensions
and dynamics, mostly
without moving away from dichotomous descriptions. These
revolts are often depicted

as prototypes of technological revolutions. An oversimplified
celebration of so-called
Facebook revolutions stresses the importance of social media in
bringing down political
systems. Castells (2012) claims that in the Egyptian protest
movement, social media had
an outstanding role for mobilisation. Howard and Hussain
(2011, 2013) ascribe digital
media a major role in the uprisings in several Middle Eastern
and North African
countries, especially in providing a new infrastructure for social
movements.
However, in the Egyptian case, surveys of Egyptian protesters’
use patterns of media
showed a more diverse picture. Wilson and Dunn (2011) state
that personal interaction
was the most important source of protest-related information,
followed by television,
phone calls, and SMS, with Facebook being the least important.
More recent studies on social media and political protest are
aimed at overcoming
binary descriptions by taking seriously the potential usefulness
of digital media in
campaigns without applying technological determinism (see
Martin 2014; Della Porta
and Mattoni 2015). Furthermore, they aim at providing insights
into the complexity of
political protest and social media (see Dencik and Leistert 2015;
Gerbaudo 2012). In
providing a more nuanced picture, they elaborate on the
contexts of and relationship
between political protest and social media, on opportunities and
restrictions, and on
how the intertwinement between offline and online can be
grasped, a path that indicates

the direction of my arguments in this article. This article seeks
to work against the
oversimplified celebration of Facebook revolutions and the
illusionary perception that
hierarchies are dissolved in social media. Research on political
participation and social
media in Southeast Asia exists.3 However, it is relatively under-
represented in compar-
ison to literatures referring to the US, Europe, the Middle East,
and North Africa (see
Martin 2014). This article seeks to add to the discussion on
Southeast Asia.
Taking Eku Wand’s aims as a starting point, this article delves
into the role and
potential of Facebook and WhatsApp in regard to mobilisation,
co-ordination and co-
operation, development of solidarity, enhancement of
transparency and the relationship
between offline and online in the frame of the anti-mining
campaign in Bangka. A special
focus is the social stratification of members of the multinational
anti-mining alliance
according to their networks, aims, communication structures
and community formation.
Special attention is given to the access, control and power
within communication pro-
cesses. In addition, the functionalities, possibilities and
limitations of Facebook and
WhatsApp will be taken into consideration. This research
contributes to a deeper under-
standing of the intertwining of technology/social media and
political transformations/
protest in the context of discriminatory and non-transparent
natural resource extraction
in Indonesia. The data collected for this article were accessed

during fieldwork in March
and April 2016. The author lived in Bangka and conducted
participant observation, focus
group discussions and semi-structured and narrative interviews
with 23 villagers (19
opposing and four supporting the mining activities) and six
resort owners on topics
JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY ASIA 837
such as the company’s activities, the anti-mining campaign and
networks and participa-
tion of members of the alliance. In addition, semi-structured and
narrative interviews were
conducted with members of three civil society organisations in
Manado and Jakarta
regarding the anti-mining campaign in general and networks,
and the participation of
members of the alliance. Semi-structured interviews were also
conducted with eight
members of the Facebook group Save Bangka Island. A network
analysis of the involved
actors in the anti-mining alliance that focused on
communication channels provided
insights into the structure of the network, the position of
members, and the relationships
amongst individual actors (Borgatti, Everett, and Johnson
2013).4 In addition, since 2015,
the author has been a member of the Facebook group Save
Bangka Island, which in
October 2016 had 7,728 members, and several WhatsApp
groups. This permitted content
and network analyses on postings and comments in the
Facebook group Save Bangka

Island from March 22 to July 1, 2016. Triangulation using data
obtained through quali-
tative and quantitative methods and from offline and online
activities enabled an analysis
of the participation of actors and their use of social media,
power structures, and com-
munity formation within the network.
Social Media and Political Protest in Indonesia
In Indonesia, the use of the internet by political protesters
started with the anti-Suharto
movement in 1998, where the establishment of email news
groups enhanced commu-
nication amongst protesters and served as a source of
information then beyond
government control (Luwarso 2004). During the preparation of
the referendum in
East Timor in 1999, local groups could disseminate information
via the internet to
the international community despite censorship by the
occupying army (Hill and Sen
2005). The Islamic group Lashkar Jihad used the internet for
self-representation,
information dissemination, and recruitment (Lim 2003). During
the conflict in the
Moluccas, websites and mailing lists served as a tool for
community building, repre-
sentation of conflict parties and recruitment (Bräuchler 2003,
2007, 2013). Research has
increased in recent years, focusing on diverse media such as
newspapers, television,
radio and cinema, and covering topics such as democratisation
and media (Sen and Hill
2011), democratisation and the internet (Hill and Sen 2005), the
press and politics

(Romano 2003) and media and conflict (Bräuchler 2013). In her
research on websites
and mailing lists as tools for community building, Bräuchler
(2013) refers to Anderson’s
(1983) concept of imagined communities. She argues that
“Internet communities are
also often composed of conglomerates of users spread widely
across the globe. As with
national consciousness, in these cases a feeling of community
and identity is conveyed
and imagined in cyberspace via the media.” Collective identities
in the internet “are
bound to common goals, values and ideas, a certain symbolism,
existing notions of
friends and enemies, a common history, events in certain offline
contexts, etc.”
(Bräuchler 2013, 28).
Facebook and Protests
In Indonesia, only 31% of the population uses social media,
what is relatively low in
contrast to other Southeast Asian countries.5 But as Indonesia’s
population is more than
260 million, the number of social media users is high. In fact,
Indonesia has the highest
number of social media users in the region. Moreover, the
number of people using
social media increased rapidly at about 10% per year between
2014 and 2016 (We Are
Social 2016).

Facebook is currently the most popular social media site in
Indonesia (eMarketer
2016). In 2015 about 30% of the population were active on
Facebook (We Are Social
2015a). In addition, the number of users who access their
Facebook account via mobile
phones is relatively high, with Indonesians being the third
largest mobile phone
Facebook audience in the world, after the US and India
(eMarketer 2015). Generally,
the rate of use of mobile phones for private and professional
communication is high,
with mobile access being 125% of the population, meaning that
some people typically
use several SIM cards, slightly more than the average in
Southeast Asia (We Are Social
2015b).6
Although instances in which social media, predominantly
Facebook, played a vital
role in political protest and political campaigning in Indonesia
have gained attention
in recent years, relatively few academic publications exist on
the topic. Nyarwi and
Popa (2014) and Johansson (2016a) focused on the use of social
media in election
campaigns of party candidates and explained the increase in
social media use with
the low costs and the high impact of reaching people for the
promotion of the
candidates. Furthermore, social media provides the possibility
of advertising political
party candidates who stand outside the Jakarta political
establishment, as the election
of President Joko Widodo in 2014 showed (Chen and

Priamarizki 2014; Johanssen
2016b; Nyarwi and Popa 2014). Johansson (2016b, 35–36)
considers that social
media has gained growing importance in Indonesia’s electoral
processes because of
the “complementary and to some extent even substitutive role
social media has
alongside traditional media.” Social media thus serves as an
alternative channel for
the distribution of oppositional information and the promotion
of political agendas
outside the mainstream. Lim (2013) and Hamideh (2015) have
elaborated on the role
of Facebook in the successful anti-corruption movement in 2009
(known as the
Gecko v. Crocodile case, Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi
[KPK], or Support Bibit-
Chandra) and the Coins for Prita Mulyasari case, also in 2009.
Lim (2013) states that
simple narratives, actions with low risk, and congruence with
meta-narratives made
the cases successful. She argues that, with most people
accessing Facebook via mobile
phones, the narratives that go viral “are of a light package, they
tap into headline
appetites and they embrace a trailer version” (Lim 2013, 644).
Hamideh (2015, 101;
103) points out that in the above-mentioned cases, the diffusion
of the movements’
message into the public sphere and the supportive stance of
politicians were main
factors for success.
Looking beyond Indonesia, analyses of the protests and social
media in the Middle
Eastern and North African upheavals of the early 2010s also

provide insights for
drawing a nuanced picture of the contexts and relationship
between political protest
and social media. Tufekci and Wilson (2012, 374–377) stressed
in their research on
Egypt’s Tahrir Square protests that besides the use of social
media, the organisation of
event logistics, the likelihood of the protester’s success and the
spread of visual content
from participants were important. Moreover, political activists
used and augmented
social network sites that existed before the uprising for political
information and
mobilisation; those networks were more likely to participate in
politics online and
offline (Salem 2015; Sayed 2011).
Social Media and the Bangka Campaign
This article now turns to the juridical background, anti-mining
alliances and offline and
online campaigns in Bangka. It then delves more deeply into the
opportunities and
restrictions of Facebook and WhatsApp in the anti-mining
campaign, predominantly
focusing on communication processes, participation and
transparency, as well as on
community formation.
Juridical Struggle

The litigation between residents, tour operators and activists
against PT MMP and
politicians took several years and ended up with the success of
the anti-mining alliance,
in contrast to many other cases in Indonesia where villagers are
unable to assert their
rights against companies. The juridical process was
characterised by state authorities
withholding information, as the copies of the initial mining
permits were only handed
out to villagers several years after the issuance and court orders
were also retained for
months. Furthermore, the company repeatedly landed drilling
equipment on the island,
backed by provincial police units and local militia, despite court
orders having already
annulled permits.7 Villagers reported that the company also
threatened resisting villa-
gers and bribed five of the plaintiffs during litigation.
In 2012, residents of the island and tourism operators sued the
former regent and PT
MMP at the Manado Administrative Court. On August 30, 2012,
the court rejected the
lawsuit and the plaintiffs appealed at the High Administrative
Court of Makassar, South
Sulawesi. On March 1, 2013, the judges accepted all points of
the applicants. The former
bupati and the mining company then appealed before the
Supreme Court, which
dismissed the appeal on September 24, 2013. On July 31, 2013,
ignoring the High
Administrative Court’s verdict, the former bupati issued a
decree (surat keputusan) on
the environmental feasibility of iron ore mining, which included
the construction of a

smelter, a steel plant and a pier for Bangka island. In September
2013, to intensify the
protest against the mining company that again tried to force the
unloading of drilling
equipment, an online petition on change.org was launched. In
November 2013, three
Bangka plaintiffs, backed by local and national civil society
organisations, intensified
lobbying in Jakarta at 18 ministries and national agencies to
enforce the Supreme
Court’s decision. In early 2014, the company again landed
equipment and constructed
infrastructure on the island. The online and offline protests
showed some success in
2014. In June 2014, the central government ordered the
suspension of the mining
activities. Despite the court decisions and governmental
interventions, on July 18, 2014,
the then Minister of Energy and Minerals Jero Wacik issued the
operation permit to PT
MMP. On September 3, 2014, Wacik was suspended from office
and the Anti-
Corruption Commission (KPK) investigated him on various
corruption allegations in
several diverse cases (Tribune News, August 31, 2015). On
October 2, 2014, the original
Bangka plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against Wacik for violating the
Supreme Court ruling.
By the end of 2015, the company had removed heavy machinery
from the island but, in
March 2016, once more landed material and equipment,

seemingly ignored by
Governor Olly Dondokambey and the authorities. In April 2016,
representatives of
the KPK arrived in Manado and Bangka and investigated
corruption by the governor.
At the end of the month, most of the company’s equipment was
removed from Bangka.
Finally, in February 2017, all permits issued to PT MMP were
annulled by the Supreme
Court.
Impact on the Villagers
Initially most villagers welcomed PT MMP’s plans for mining
because in information
events before the drilling the company promised good wages,
high compensation for
land and improvements to the island’s infrastructure. However,
after illegal expropria-
tion of land, the destruction of forests, fields and houses
without compensation,
irregular wages and violence against opponents, an increasing
number of villagers
began to oppose PT MMP. The company’s exploratory drilling
and the construction
of roads and premises had resulted in negative consequences on
the livelihood of the
villagers and dive resort owners, who complained about
sedimentary deposits on corals,
reduced fish stocks, the destruction of agricultural land and
trees as well as polluted
drinking water.
Moreover, inhabitants of the village which is in immediate
proximity to the com-
pany’s main premises were divided over the mining activities.

As a consequence, in
2013, the original village separated into two smaller villages:
Kahuku (about 130
families) and Ehe (about 150 families). The relationship
between the inhabitants of
the two villages has been tense, as residents in Ehe largely
support the mining activities
and work for the company, whereas in Kahuku, the residents are
mostly opponents of
the mining activities. Therefore, most inhabitants of Kahuku
and some residents of the
other two villages – Lihunu and Libas – support the anti-mining
campaign.
Anti-Mining Campaign
The anti-mining campaign shares features of a social movement,
such as collective
action that is motivated by political, economic and cultural
goals, operating outside
state branches but aiming to act upon it, being temporal and
relational – as it is a
network that exceeds a single organisation – having shared
beliefs, and solidarity (Della
Porta and Diani 1999; Della Porta and Mattoni 2015). The anti-
mining campaign is
multi-layered, as it has members on the local, national and
international levels; com-
prises several strategies; and includes diverse online and offline
activities.
Members of the Campaign
At the beginning, the campaign was small, with only a handful
of members and
organisations joining successively, sometimes after being

invited several times. The
Manado-based activists Jull Takaliuang, director of Yayasan
Suara Nurani Minaesa
(Voice of the Heart of Minahasa) and Didi Koleangan, director
of Aliansi Masyarakat
Menolak Limbah Tambang (Alliance Against Mining Waste)
were key actors in the
alliance. Owing to their engagement in previous anti-mining
campaigns in North
Sulawesi, both were experienced organisers who were well-
connected to local and
national activists. Liga Mahasiswa Nasional untuk Demokrasi
Sulut (National League
of Students for Democracy for North Sulawesi) and Tunas Hijau
(Green Sprout) also
provided local-level support.
Of the six diving resorts on Bangka, some have existed for
many years. The resorts
have three to 20 bungalows and are managed and directly run by
the owners. They
provide work opportunities for villagers and usually buy fish
and agricultural products
from them. The operators of the resorts opposed mining
activities as a threat to their
businesses and the natural resources they relied on and became
important actors in the
anti-mining alliance. Tourism operators on Bangka and the
resorts on the mainland
established the Bangka Conservation Fund (BCF) and the
Manado North Sulawesi

Watersport Association, which are the main platforms for
information sharing, strategy
planning and funding of anti-mining activities. The members of
the BCF ask every
tourist who stays in their resort to donate $7.60 for the anti-
mining campaign and some
members of the BCF manage the funds of the donation platform
betterplace.org.
Villagers in Bangka who oppose the company’s activities act as
plaintiffs, lobby at the
regency, provincial and national levels, and are engaged in
holding the company’s
activities on the island by blocking the jetty and supply roads to
inland premises.
The international supporting organisations such as Greenpeace
Indonesia and World
Wide Fund For Nature, strengthen the campaign through their
good reputation and
provide networks for spreading the campaign, but joined only in
2013. National
organisations such as the KPK, which joined in 2014, and
Jaringan Advokasi
Tambang (Mining Advocacy Network), which joined in 2012,
predominantly helped
in preparing and financing lobbying visits by villagers and
Manado-based activists to
Jakarta and in exerting pressure on politicians and judges. Other
supporting organisa-
tions at the national level were Wahana Lingkungan Hidup
Indonesia (Friends of the
Earth Indonesia) and the Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia,
Komnas (National
Human Rights Commission). Some key actors of the anti-mining
alliance had known

each other since before the anti-mining campaign started as they
were involved in
protests against mining activities preceding the Bangka case.
Aims of the Anti-Mining Alliance
The main aim of the anti-mining alliance is to stop the activities
of PT MMP in Bangka
and to enforce a judicial decision prohibiting mining on the
island. Therefore, the
general strategy is to enhance pressure on key actors in politics,
the legal system, and
the company. For gaining the support of politicians and judges,
lobbying at the regency,
provincial and national levels is a main activity of the involved
activists. In addition,
they must carefully prepare for court sessions by instructing the
witnesses and lawyers
so that they can argue convincingly. Other means to augment
pressure are public
protest, physical resistance against the company’s activities and
online and offline
reports on the Bangka case in Indonesian local and national
newspapers, international
dive magazines and on television. Additional activities include
the composition of a
Wikipedia article about Bangka island, with a special focus on
the anti-mining cam-
paign, and fundraising by, for example, providing an
information booth at the boat fair
in Dusseldorf, Germany, with a raffle yielding several thousand
dollars (Interview,

resort owner, Kahuku, March 16, 2016). An important element
of the protest against
mining activities has been the online campaign, which is
detailed in the following
section.
The Online Campaign
The online campaign, which started in 2011, was supported by
diverse actors, one of
them being the well-known Indonesian singer Kaka Slank, who
joined the campaign in
September 2013. He composed an anti-mining song and
travelled with his band to
North Sulawesi to perform in Manado and Bangka, lobbying
against the mining
activities on the island. This campaigning tour was documented
and disseminated in
social media and pictures of the tour are used as profile pictures
in several social media.
The visit by the group, including famous musicians from
Jakarta, strengthened the
solidarity amongst the alliance, stressed the importance of
villagers’ criticism, legiti-
mised their concerns, and motivated individuals in their protest.
The online campaign has comprised several elements, such as
online petitions at
change.org, thepetitionsite.com, rainforest-rescue.org and
avaaz.org. However, in
Indonesia, online petitions have not been very successful,
usually with hundreds to
several thousand signatures. In contrast, in Germany, signatures
were usually ten times
higher (see Table 1).

The YouTube videos of the campaign involving Kaka Slank
were published with
moderate resonance, with some 20,000 views over three years.
A donation platform on
betterplace.org was established in 2011 and about $15,000 was
collected from 164
donors by October 2016. The donations were mostly used for
the travel expenses in
lobbying visits to Jakarta by Manado-based activists, for the
court cases, and to support
villagers. Information on the campaign was published in diverse
blogs. A Google+
account was also established, with a moderate following of 172
(on October 10, 2016).
The Facebook group Save Bangka Island is the most vibrant
social network site in the
online campaign, having 7,728 members (on October 10, 2016)
and approximately 20
new members each week. In addition, several WhatsApp groups
were established
among members of the anti-mining alliance, such as one general
group for all involved
villagers, resort owners, activists, journalists and other
interested persons, and one
group amongst the members of the BCF.8 The Facebook and
WhatsApp networks are
embedded in existing personal and online networks.
Table 1. Online petitions in Indonesia and Germany
Total no. of signatures
(per week or day) Period and year online Platform
Indonesia 3,769 (157/week) 6 months, October 2011
thepetitionsite.com
22,012 (423/week) 12 months, October 2013 change.org

2,619 (218/week) 3 months, September 2015 change.org
259 (32/week) 2 months, October 2014 change.org
Germany 32, 695 (4,087/week) 2 months, December 2014
rainforest-rescue.org
672 (224/day) 3 days, December 2012 avaaz.org
Source: Author calculations from listed platforms.
Communication, Participation and Transparency
Vibrant discussions in academia circle around the question of
whether the internet and
social network sites have the potential to enhance
communication, to further the access
to information, and to strengthen participation in deliberative
processes. Manuel
Castells (2009) argues with his visionary model of the network
society and his elabora-
tions on power and communication in multimedia networks that
hierarchies tend to be
undermined. However, Paolo Gerbaudo (2012) counters that in
contemporary move-
ments, leaders make use of social media for choreographing
protest; therefore, hier-
archies and power structures are maintained rather than
dissolved. In the following, a
nuanced picture of the relationship between political protest and
social media in the
context of Bangka is constructed with attention to the
dissemination of information to
enhance transparency, participation in different online and

offline communication
channels, and means to overcome exclusions.
Transparency, Access, and Communication Channels
The Facebook group Save Bangka Island provides general and
up-to-date information
about the Bangka case. It includes, in the Files section, court
decisions, letters from
courts and ministries, press releases and summaries from
members. In the Discussion
section, current information and background knowledge on the
Bangka case and
related topics are posted and discussed. This section also
includes links to newspaper
articles, pictures, reports and comments on the maritime world,
the company’s activ-
ities and lobby meetings, as well as on activities of activists
from other parts of
Indonesia. As mentioned earlier, the disclosure of information
by the company, courts
and political institutions with respect to the mining activities in
Bangka is poor.
Therefore, the Facebook group enhances transparency by
providing documents and
articles to those who have access to it, reinforcing Johansson’s
(2016b, 25, 36) argument
that social media serves as an alternative channel for the
dissemination of oppositional
information.
Social media transgress time boundaries as they offer a platform
for the immediate
transmission of information and communication. Therefore,
mobile phones with
access to the internet were important tools for members of the

anti-mining cam-
paign, as they could disseminate information about current
activities and develop-
ments immediately via social media. In March 2016, PT MMP
landed material
without providing information about their activities to villagers
and activists, who
feared the company would expand. One resort owner took
pictures of the unloading
and sent them via WhatsApp and email to the other members of
the anti-mining
alliance. Manado-based activists then sent the information and
the images instantly
via WhatsApp to the bupati and journalists. Eku Wand
distributed the information
via all social media sites. In the next few days, articles about
the secretive landing
appeared in local newspapers in which Bupati Foni Pananbunan
criticised the
renewed activities of the mining company (BeritaManado.com,
March 28, 2016,
March 30, 2016). The images, which showed one barge full of
building materials,
cranes and unloading trucks, were used as striking evidence of
the company’s illegal
activities. Following the publicity, the company stopped further
unloading. Therefore,
social media facilitated the rapid transmission of information
and pictures, as well as
fast communication, amongst members of the networks. The
company was caught in

the act, proven by the images transmitted, which convinced
local politicians and
journalists to speak out against the company’s disregard of
court decisions. The
networks used in social network sites such as WhatsApp and
Facebook as part of
Web 2.0 are more expanded than before, as they provide
simultaneous interaction
with anyone located anywhere in the networks (Ogan 2014,
VIII).
By legitimising the struggle against the company and providing
the example of a
“clean,” not-corrupted politician, the supportive stance of
politicians such as Bupati
Foni Pananbunan further promoted the anti-mining campaign
(see Hamideh 2015).
Newly elected in 2016 and strongly opposed to the mining plans
on Bangka, she
demanded the immediate end to all illegal activities. She
successfully started investiga-
tions regarding illegal employment by PT MMP, as most of the
company’s workers with
Chinese nationality stayed on a tourist visa in Indonesia. Her
actions were documented
by a local newspaper, posted to the Save Bangka Island
Facebook group and enthusias-
tically followed by users. Comments to Facebook showed
appreciation for using her
position and her actions. For example, one user (June 22, 2016)
stated, “Good Job
Madame. . ..”
In addition to transmitting information fast, scholars point out
the low cost of social
media content transfer, as “[s]ocial network sites allow for an

easy and cheap transfer of
content from one platform to another” (Della Porta and Mattoni
2015, 54). This
observation is generally valid for Indonesia, where a person has
access to an internet-
connected mobile phone. In Bangka, the internet is hardly
accessible via the mobile
phone network because of a weak signal, except in tourist
resorts which provide an
external modem. This restricted internet access for villagers
underlines the observation
of Willnat and Aw (2014, 4) on the digital gap in some Asian
countries, adding: “This
digital gap is closing slowly, as smartphones linked to the
Internet are increasingly
affordable. Yet large population segments in less-developed
Asian nations will remain
excluded from the digital world for the foreseeable future.”
Communication amongst
villagers opposing the mining activities is most often carried
out personally. Usually, in
each village, a handful of villagers gather knowledge and
information about court
rulings, strategies of activists in Manado, reactions of
politicians or media coverage,
and pass it on to others. Villagers also communicate with resort
owners personally or
get information from other villagers who work at resorts. The
flow of information is
two-way. One diving resort, is located close to Kahuku village,
where some of the
employees of the resort reside. The workers who oppose the
company’s activities get
information about developments on the nearby company’s
premises from Kahuku
villagers and share them with the resort owners, who in turn can

disseminate informa-
tion to other tourism operators.
Communication between villagers and activists in Manado is
either by phoning or
sending SMS, by travelling to Manado and meeting personally,
or villagers may ask
resort owners to post information at social networks. Activists
in Manado often
personally transfer information, knowledge and documents – as
photocopies of the
court decisions or newspaper articles – to villagers who travel
to Manado and meet
them. Sometimes they also pass on documents to villagers who
work in Manado so that
they can transfer them to Bangka when they visit their families.
Members of resort owner networks such as the BCF
communicate mostly via their
established WhatsApp group, which is also the case between
them and activists in
Manado. Usually two to three tourism operators interact
regularly with activists in
Manado to keep them updated about the situation, to transfer
pictures and to discuss
strategies. This group of resort owners and activists in Manado
establishes contacts with
the local press and with politicians to inform them, to organise
press conferences and
invite them to Bangka. The Manado activists maintain contact
with journalists, activists
and politicians in Jakarta to exchange information, discuss

strategies and engage in
lobbying activity in Jakarta, also mostly via WhatsApp and
telephone. Eku Wand edits
the information and posts it to the Facebook Save Bangka Island
group and other social
media where he is an administrator and responsible for
moderation. According to Eku
Wand, moderation means maintaining the information flow to
keep the communica-
tion going, increasing awareness and promoting the member
engagement.
Including, Excluding and Bridging
As suggested above, amongst the alliance, different members
have different levels of
access to information and information channels. Activists and
resort owners use mainly
WhatsApp, while villagers use predominantly personal meetings
as their regular base to
communicate and share information. Consequently, there is no
equitable generation
and distribution of information in social media networks by
different members of the
alliance. As villagers in Bangka have little access to Facebook
and WhatsApp in contrast
to other members of the alliance, they sometimes lack
information about newspaper
articles or statements by politicians at multiple levels, which is
usually shared via
WhatsApp or Facebook. Those members in turn, if they do not
live in Bangka or
regularly meet villagers, have little insight on the situation in
the villages. Within the
alliance, encapsulated groups are formed – villagers,
activist/resort owners in Bangka/

Manado, Jakarta-based actors – who generate their own
knowledge about the mining
activities, the campaign and about the other groups. To ensure
constant information
transfer and co-operation within the alliance, the respective
groups rely on members
who bridge the disruptions within the communication by
informing other group
members and sharing information and knowledge. The ability
and capacity to establish
social networks between socially heterogeneous groups and to
bridge diverse social
cleavages can be linked to the concept of bridging capital as a
form of social capital (see
Putnam 2000). Resort owners and the Manado-based activists
bridge the gap to villagers
by transferring information to them via telephone or through
personal meetings. These
villagers then transfer information to other villagers in personal
communication.
Manado-based activists sum up events and activities at the
village, regency and pro-
vincial levels, and sometimes translate the information into
English and transfer it via
social media to Jakarta-based actors. They in turn process the
information to a global
audience by summarising important activities, giving
background information, some-
times translating into German, and posting the information to
social media. When the
mining company was landing equipment in 2016, key members
of the respective groups
shared information and bridged information gaps. When some
members requested
more information or further explanation, it mostly was provided
quickly. Therefore, in

situations of mixed internet access, strong personal networks,
interpersonal
relationships, bridging capital and communication channels
through which information
of villagers’ concerns are spread through national and
international actors are one
factor for success.
In contrast to the protest in 2016, a co-operative and quick
communication and
sharing of information is not always the case. Members of the
alliance mentioned
that the transfer of information is sometimes halting. Moreover,
there are barriers
due to different languages, as the communication on social
media is carried out in
Indonesian, English and German. Villagers, by contrast,
communicate in their local
language.
Participation and Representation
The limited access of villagers to social media leads to their
exclusion from discussions
and information shared by different actors at the provincial,
national and international
levels on Facebook and WhatsApp. In addition, because of their
limited access to
WhatsApp, villagers tend to be less informed of strategic
planning by resort owners
and Manado-based activists. Some villagers feel this exclusion

and express a lack of
awareness about joint actions with the Manado- and Jakarta-
based activists. At the
same time, Manado- and Jakarta-based activists complain that
villagers could be more
active in joint activities. Villagers tend to plan protest activities
amongst themselves,
and as most villagers and activists have little capacity to
communicate, for example, via
telephone on a regular basis, villagers tend to not communicate
about their protest
activities with other alliance members.
Those who are directly affected by the mining activities are
villagers and resort
owners, but only the latter are active in social media. Those
who predominantly
communicate via Facebook and WhatsApp do not live in Bangka
and are not
directly threatened by the mining activities but nevertheless
fight with and for
villagers against the mining company. Their online fight may be
linked with
Salem’s (2015, 183) stress that in social media, inclusions and
exclusions according
to social class are reproduced. In the Bangka case, the point is
not to criticise the use
of social media and the practice and strategies of the online
campaign, as it strongly
supported the successful anti-mining campaign. Rather, the
over-simplified celebra-
tion of Facebook revolutions in the Middle East and elsewhere
should be modified to
acknowledge illusions that social media hierarchies are
dissolved and undermined,
and against perceptions that social media used in protest

movements automatically
mirrors the voice of the oppressed. However, as stratified
spaces, Facebook and
WhatsApp do facilitate participation among certain actors while
social structures
separating participants are maintained. This reinforces Fuchs’
(2008, 2010, 2011) and
van Dijck’s (2009) critical discussions of representation in
commercial social media
where participation is highly dependent on the financial
strength and social class of
the user. One possibility for reducing technical hindrances
which exclude villagers in
Bangka in certain processes would be to improve internet access
by providing
smartphones and external modems. Nevertheless, stressing the
importance of the
inter-connections between offline and online activities, with
strong networks always
linking locals without access to social media with other actors,
Facebook and
WhatsApp function to support local campaigns.
Facebook, Solidarity and an Imagined Community
Of the 7,728 members of the Save Bangka Islands Facebook
group, only approximately
0.2% post regularly and approximately 1% comment on
postings. The majority of those
who post contributions are activists, divers, tourism operators
and their relatives or
friends. Those who post also comment frequently on the

postings of others. Most of the
active users have been to Bangka and have met some of the
other contributors but after
that only communicate via Facebook, as they live in different
parts of Indonesia or
different countries. The active users attest and reassure through
comments, photos and
videos, and links to their positions, views, moral standards and
political opinions
related to the activities of PT MMP. Furthermore, the display of
their engagement
and individual standpoint on Facebook is closely related to their
communication with
others in the form of comments on posted texts, images and
videos. During the 2016
crisis when PT MMP landed equipment and the governor did not
intervene, posted
newspaper articles criticising the company’s activities or photos
which showed these
were posted, prompting comments such as: “I cannot understand
this. If Indonesia
again colony under chinese?” [sic] (June 19, 2016) or “D:
[emoticon sadness] feeling
shocked” (April 12, 2016). In addition, the immediate activities
of the anti-mining
campaign received affirmative comments, for example, “Oh. .
.[thumbs up emoticon]
hope everything will be OK” (April 13, 2016). Active users of
the Facebook group stated
in interviews that the affirmative comments of others on their
postings motivate them
in their engagement against PT MMP. In turn, active users aim
at motivating others in
the group and show their support and solidarity through their
supportive comments.
Users described feeling a part of a group of individuals

scattered across the world who
are engaged against mining activities in Bangka. This was
strengthened through posts
and comments on texts, pictures or videos posted by the
Facebook group. For example,
two Facebook group members posted a picture on June 30, 2016
of their visit to the
Komodo National Park in Eastern Indonesia, depicting them
holding a banner with the
text: “Save Bangka Island in North Sulawesi. Chase PT MMP
away. Solidarity for
Earth.” This solidarity action saw positive responses like: “Thks
for All. . .Gb” and
“Terima kasih Mathilde Chanvin dan kawan-kawan (Thanks,
Mathilde, Chanvin, and
friends)” (June 30, 2016). Therefore, the Facebook group not
only delivers, informs and
reports but also is intertwined with social worlds; thus,
technological and social infra-
structures are in a mutual relationship.9 Furthermore, for active
Facebook users,
online–offline levels more likely complement each other and are
both parts of the
same reality. The active user group of the Facebook site Save
Bangka Island could be
conceived as an “imagined community” (Anderson 1983). Their
Facebook activities
convey a feeling of belonging, community and shared identity
although they are not
bound to the same place or territory. They create common
visions, are involved in joint
projects and share common social and historical contexts.
Participation in the imagined
community reinforces social ties with people located in
different places, enhancing
cohesion within the alliance. The active user group shares a

common project – stopping
the mining activities in Bangka – with a joint vision and
identity, which is to fight
against the opacity and injustice of the state and the company.
They reinforce social ties
with people located in different places, enhancing solidarity and
cohesion within the
community. Thus, one of their motivations is the maintenance
and the strengthening of
existing relationships.10 Members share their aims and ideas,
exchange emotional
support, and develop a transnational communication culture
(Cottle 2011) in which
sharing of visual pictures of injustice (Olesen 2013) contributes
in forming their
collective identity. This collective identity is seen in online
activism. Following PT
MMP landing material in 2016, angry comments included
“Hunting these criminals
from the island!” (March 22, 2016) or “Mana KAPOLDA, Mana
KAPOLRES, Mana
KAPOLSEK, Mana aparat pengayom masyarakat ??? Apakah
wewenangnya masih
mencakup P.Bangka ??? (Where are the national and the local
police, where are the
security forces protecting the people??? Does their area of
responsibility still cover the
island of Bangka???) (July 24, 2016), or “Whats happened to
Indonesian dignity and
pride! Lawlessness and pillage is now the rule??” (April 13,
2016). The posted text,

pictures and videos express the same concerns, viewpoints and
social goals with other
members, building the imagined community that proves its
existence in the collective
actions of members identifying with the ideals of the protest. In
this sense, Facebook is
a tool not only for sharing information but also for enhancing
solidarity and establish-
ing an imagined community.
“The Effect of the Whole is Greater than the Effect of the Sum
of the Parts”
In the context of the anti-mining campaign, the emergence of
the internet, smartphones
and social media as new infrastructures has fundamentally
changed the possibilities of
how people can disclose and gather information and are able to
discuss contentious
political issues with others (Howard and Hussain 2011, 2013;
Johanssen 2016a).
Facebook and WhatsApp were useful in organising events,
spreading content and
providing a platform for encountering information. The social
network platforms and
smartphones enhanced mobilisation, communication, knowledge
transfer and transpar-
ency for those who have access to social media. WhatsApp
supported the daily com-
munication, co-ordination, and rapid information transfer among
key actors of the
alliance and was especially important during urgent actions, as
shown in the example of
the protest in 2016, where immediate response was made
possible.

However, social media sites are stratified spaces where villagers
– the main affected
group – were excluded owing to their lack of internet access.
This could be countered
by interpersonal relationships and personal communication
channels through which
villagers could be informed of the campaign, and villagers’
concerns could be spread
through national and international actors in social media.
Therefore, an important
factor for the success of the anti-mining alliance was the
interaction between offline and
online activities. Also essential were personal social networks
which already existed
before the anti-mining campaign to which activists could refer,
also described as
important for the protest in the Middle East and North Africa
(see Salem 2015; Sayed
2011).
Another success factor of the anti-mining campaign was the
simple narrative and its
linkage to an ideological meta-narrative, which Lim (2013) also
pointed out for the
successful anti-corruption movement in 2009 and the case of
Coins for Prita Mulyasari
in Indonesia. In Bangka, the narrative was that a “fierce”
foreign mining company
destroys the “paradise” that provides the livelihood of “poor”
villagers. This could be
linked to the ideological meta-narrative of victimised villagers
and intact nature

threatened by a foreign company. The success of the anti-
mining campaign thus was
celebrated as a success of “David against Goliath.” Therefore, a
broad range of people
such as human rights activists and environmental
conservationists could be addressed
by the campaign.
Other key aspects were the experience, determination and
engagement of members
of the Manado-based organisations who prepared lawsuits and
lobbied in Manado and
Jakarta. They also functioned as an important link between the
local and national levels.
In addition, the high solidarity, endurance and effectiveness
amongst key members of
the alliance contributed to the success, as they were, despite
exclusions and various
interests, characterised by high idealism, determination,
experience and good
networking.
Social media are not the saviour of oppressed people and not the
panacea for
participation. Through social media, certain processes in the
anti-mining campaign
were enhanced, amplified and accelerated. WhatsApp enhanced
the daily communica-
tion, the co-ordination of events and the rapid information
transfer. Facebook was
important to disseminate information to a broader range of
people and to strengthen
their solidarity and their sense of community. The active users
of the Save Bangka
Island Facebook group became an imagined community sharing

common visions,
solidarity and a collective identity. The site helped in
community building within the
anti-mining alliance and enhanced cohesion. Through solidarity,
voluntary work was
strengthened, which helped in turn to further the dissemination
of information and to
smoothen communication. Moreover, through solidarity and
community formation,
financial resources were acquired online and offline, which
were necessary to finance
lobby visits and lawyers. Consequently, the successful court
sessions enhanced enthu-
siasm, engagement, and solidarity amongst the members of the
alliance.
The anti-mining campaign was not predominantly orchestrated
by villagers but
fulfilled their aim of stopping mining activities. In summary,
the success of the
campaign was due to the interplay of diverse online and offline
activities, mutually
reinforcing each other, which were organised and maintained by
engaged and experi-
enced members of the alliance and, as Eku Wand put it, “The
effect of the whole is
greater than the effect of the sum of the parts.”
Notes
1. The island stretches 4,778 hectares and is inhabited by 2,829
people who live in the four
villages of Kahuku, Lihunu, Libas and Ehe. These people make
their livelihood by fishing,
agriculture, a few cash crops and wage labour. Almost all
villagers are Protestants and the

local language is a mixture of the languages Bahasa Manado,
Bahasa Sangihe and
Minahasa.
2. In addition, Bangka is part of the Sulu Sulawesi Marine Eco-
Region Action Plan, and the
Coral Triangle Initiative on Coral Reefs, Fisheries and Food
Security (CTI-CFF). The CTI-
CFF, established in 2009, is a multilateral agreement between
the involved countries of the
Coral Triangle to address poverty reduction through economic
development, food secur-
ity, sustainable livelihoods for coastal communities, and the
protection of biodiversity.
The regional office of the CTI-CFF is situated in Manado, the
provincial capital of North
Sulawesi. In 2009, the first meeting of the Coral Triangle
Summit, the World Ocean
Conference, and in 2014, the World Coral Conference was held
also in Manado. However,
the institutions engaged in maritime conservation who met in
Manado did not strengthen
the engagement of the anti-mining alliance to protect Bangka’s
marine biodiversity.
Moreover, the organisers of the World Coral Conference
requested activists demolish
their information booth about the mining plans on Bangka.
3. For example, articles in a 2013 Journal of Contemporary Asia
special issue on “New Media
in Asia” deals with the social and political impact of new

information communications
technologies and social media (Abbott 2013), the article by
Leong Mei Lin, Pan, Ractham
and Kaewkitipong (2011) on community empowerment through
social media during
flooding in Thailand in 2011 and Rodan (1998) on political
control and the internet in
Singapore.
4. While network theories are not the conceptual framework for
this article, they relate to
aspects of it by referring to connections between actors to
analyse power relations.
Analyses of networks are aimed at more accurately describing
how people connect, relate
and affiliate, as focusing on networks better describes people’s
initiative and maintenance
of relationships than bounded local groups (Wellman 1979).
Therefore, networks can be
physical or digital (Hogan and Wellman 2014).
5. We Are Social states that the average percentage of social
media users in Southeast Asia in
2016 was 37%. Indonesia is situated in the lower third, with
31% of the population using
social media. The highest was Brunei (69%), followed by
Singapore (67%), Malaysia
(59%), Thailand (58%), Philippines (47%) and Vietnam (40%).
Below Indonesia are
Timor-Leste (24%), Cambodia (22%), and Laos, as well as
Myanmar (14%) (We are
Social 2015c).
6. Commercial social media like Facebook and WhatsApp are
owned by media companies
which generate profit through advertising and by selling users’

data to private companies
that use these profiles to target their advertising strategies
(Fuchs 2010). Scholars criticise
this accumulation of capital through the exploitation of users
and low-paid employees
(Fuchs 2008; Knoche 2005). However, amongst the members of
the anti-mining alliance,
those critics were not mentioned.
7. The relationship between PT MMP, state representatives and
the military in this case
underlines the continuing ubiquity of elite money politics,
corruption and the failure of
state institutions to enforce laws in post-Suharto Indonesia
(Hadiz 2013). However, it also
shows that the anti-mining alliance could successfully challenge
patrimonial structures
with the support of legal institutions at the national level.
Therefore, in Indonesian’s new
democratic order, patronage and state power can be newly
negotiated in some contexts
(Aspinall 2013).
8. WhatsApp Messenger, owned by Facebook since 2014, is an
instant messaging service
established in 2009. It is a cross-platform mobile messaging app
for smartphones, using
the standard mobile phone number and the internet for sending
messages, and cost only
$0.98 per year in 2016. In addition to sending text messages,
users can send an unlimited
number of images, video and audio files, and can create groups
of users. WhatsApp had
one billion active users per month worldwide in April 2016. In
Asia, it is the second most
popular social media platform, based on the frequency with

which users log in. It is a
common messaging service in Indonesia, used frequently for
private and work-related co-
ordination and communication; thus, many people in Indonesia
install the app and use it
frequently.
9. Although creating new identities online plays a role in
discussions about the role of social
media, scholars assert that slipping into a non-self-identity is
rare (Gross 2004).
Participation in communities like Facebook tends to require a
certain degree of authen-
ticity due to the constant monitoring by online and offline
friends. Back and colleagues
(2010) assert that social network sites serve as a medium for
self-expression rather than
for constructing an idealised virtual identity.
10. Generally, scholars affirm that Facebook users draw their
contacts commonly from
existing social networks and aim at strengthening them rather
than establishing new
networks (see Boyd and Ellison 2007; Ellison, Steinfield, and
Lampe 2007).
Acknowledgements
My deepest respect is expressed to the people in Bangka who
risked their lives in resisting mining
activities. I thank the families in Bangka, Manado and Jakarta
who hosted me, and the villagers,

resort owners and activists who welcomed and helped me.
Furthermore, I want to thank the
members of the academic network Contested Plural Ecologies:
Anthropological Perspectives on
Southeast Asia. My special thank goes to Birgit Bräuchler, Eku
Wand, three anonymous
reviewers for commenting on earlier versions of this article, and
Sophia Bäurle.
Disclosure Statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
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http://de.slideshare.net/wearesocialsg/digital-in-
2016/216AbstractSocial Media and Political Protest in
IndonesiaFacebook and ProtestsSocial Media and the Bangka
CampaignJuridical StruggleImpact on the VillagersAnti-Mining
CampaignMembers of the CampaignAims of the Anti-Mining
AllianceThe Online CampaignCommunication, Participation and

TransparencyTransparency, Access, and Communication
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RepresentationFacebook, Solidarity and an Imagined
Community“The Effect of the Whole is Greater than the Effect
of the Sum of the Parts”NotesAcknowledgementsDisclosure
StatementReferences
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Journal of Management Information Systems
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Two Formulas for Success in Social Media:
Learning and Network Effects
Liangfei Qiu, Qian Tang & Andrew B. Whinston
To cite this article: Liangfei Qiu, Qian Tang & Andrew B.
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Two Formulas for Success in Social Media:
Learning and Network Effects
LIANGFEI QIU, QIAN TANG, AND ANDREW B. WHINSTON
LIANGFEI QIU (corresponding author; [email protected]) is an
assistant
professor of information systems at the Warrington College of
Business Administration,
University of Florida. He received his Ph.D. in economics from
the University of Texas at
Austin. His research focuses on analytical and empirical studies
of location-based social
networks, smart mobile data pricing, prediction markets,
procurement auctions, and
applied game theory. His work has appeared in Journal of
Management Information
Systems and Decision Support Systems.
QIAN TANG is an assistant professor of information systems at
the School of Information
Systems, Singapore Management University. She received her
Ph.D. in management
information systems from the University of Texas at Austin. Her
research interests include
economics of information systems, social media, social
networking, online and offline
markets, and economics of cyber security. Her work has
appeared in Journal of
Management Information Systems, Decision Support Systems,
and Information and
Management.

ANDREW B. WHINSTON is Hugh Cullen Chair Professor in
the Information, Risk, and
Operation Management Department at the McCombs School of
Business at the University
of Texas at Austin. He is also the director of the Center for
Research in Electronic
Commerce. His recent papers have appeared in Information
Systems Research, Journal
of Management Information Systems, MIS Quarterly,
Management Science, Marketing
Science, Journal of Marketing, and Journal of Economic
Theory. He has published over
300 papers in the major economic and management journals and
has coauthored 27 books.
ABSTRACT: Recent years have witnessed an unprecedented
explosion in information
technology that enables dynamic diffusion of user-generated
content in social networks.
Online videos, in particular, have changed the landscape of
marketing and entertainment,
competing with premium content and spurring business
innovations. In the present study,
we examine how learning and network effects drive the
diffusion of online videos. While
learning happens through informational externalities, network
effects are direct payoff
externalities. Using a unique data set from YouTube, we
empirically identify learning and
network effects separately, and find that both mechanisms have
statistically and economic-
ally significant effects on video views; furthermore, the
mechanism that dominates
depends on the video type. Specifically, although learning
primarily drives the popularity

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Journal of Management Information Systems / 2015, Vol. 32,
No. 4, pp. 78–108.
Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
ISSN 0742–1222 (print) / ISSN 1557–928X (online)
DOI: 10.1080/07421222.2015.1138368
mailto:[email protected]
http://www.tandfonline.com/mmis
http://www.tandfonline.com/mmis
of quality-oriented content, network effects also make it
possible for attention-grabbing
content to go viral. Theoretically, we show that, unlike the
diffusion of movies, it is the
combination of both learning and network effects that generate
the multiplier effect for the
diffusion of online videos. From a managerial perspective,
providers can adopt different
strategies to promote their videos accordingly, that is, signaling
the quality or featuring the
viewer base depending on the video type. Our results also
suggest that YouTube can play a
much greater role in encouraging the creation of original
content by leveraging the
multiplier effect.
KEY WORDS AND PHRASES: learning, network effects, social
contagion, social media,

user-generated content.
“You’ve got to create images they won’t accept. Make them
foam at the
mouth. Force them to understand that they’re living in a pretty
queer world.”
—André Malraux, Picasso’s Mask
With new products such as consumer goods, financial services,
and movies constantly
flooding the markets, consumers face an already
overwhelmingly large and rapidly
growing choice set. Meanwhile, consumers receive various bits
of information that
generate two types of externalities: informational externalities
and direct payoff external-
ities. Informational externalities exist when one’s payoff
depends on information that is
privately held by others, and therefore are created when
information about product quality
is conveyed through direct communication/observation or
indirect word of mouth [12, 16,
50, 61]. Positive payoff externalities exist when one’s payoff
depends positively on the
number of other people who consume the product, and therefore
are affected directly by
others’ actions [33]. Whereas the former is generally referred to
as “learning” or “observa-
tional learning” [16, 26, 52], the latter is often called “network
effects” or “network
externalities” [18, 22, 33].
For products with strong network effects, creating a large user
base is crucial in
attracting new adopters. In contrast, generating positive word of

mouth (WOM) is the
key for products with prevailing learning effects. Susarla et al.
[56] found that initial
WOM conversations generated early in the life of a YouTube
video have a persistent
impact on subsequent popularity. In many situations, both
mechanisms may be present at
the same time. Which mechanism exists or dominates then
depends on the specific
product in question. When choosing a mobile network operator,
network effects may
dominate because of free mobile-to-mobile calling. When
purchasing an HDTV, learning
becomes the primary force because consumers are mainly
concerned with quality.
Following the expectation–disconfirmation paradigm [43], we
estimate the learning
effects and network effects for social media content
consumption by identifying discon-
firmation/surprise resulting from a comparison of prior
expectations with the actual
consumption experience in the context of YouTube. According
to this paradigm, expecta-
tion is the reference for a comparative judgment, and a negative
(positive) surprise is rated
below (above) this reference point [43]. Selecting online videos
to watch is one of the most
SUCCESS IN SOCIAL MEDIA 79
common choices consumers make every day. According to
ComScore, the average user
spent about 43 minutes watching online videos in June 2013,

and Google websites
(primarily YouTube) account for approximately 40 percent of
that time, about 17 minutes.-
1 According to YouTube statistics, 100 hours of video are
uploaded to YouTube every
minute. Given the vast reservoir of online videos, choosing
videos to watch can become a
complicated issue. On the one hand, consumers receive various
pieces of information
from friends, which can help them infer video quality. Such
learning can take the form of
direct communication and discussion with, or interpersonal and
impersonal observation
of, others [16]. On the other hand, frequent social sharing
creates network effects when a
video becomes a fad. Frequent social sharing may not be due to
the quality of the video,
but instead to the emotional arousal while watching the video
[34]. Particularly for a viral
video, consumers have strong incentives to watch it so as to
discuss it in social encounters.
Many YouTube videos go viral with only pointless-seeming
jokes, funny pictures, weird
scenarios, or even offensive pranks, but they bring people
together around something.
Sharing allows people to engage with interesting people,
including those they otherwise
might not be aware of; furthermore, the way people interact
with social media content is
more about someone’s emotional or even intellectual reaction
[59]. The strength of
learning depends on the surprise of the video quality and the
accuracy of prior expectation,
whereas the strength of network effects is related to social
sharing that can be attributed to
the emotional arousal generated. Therefore, the relative

strengths of the two effects can
vary across different types of videos.
Most existing studies on social contagion have focused on the
Manski problem [37]:
distinguishing general social contagion from homophily—the
tendency of individuals to
associate with similar others [8, 13, 60]. Few of them
differentiated between the two
mechanisms of social contagion: learning and network effects.
To fill the gap, we are
interested in the diffusion angle of learning and network effects,
and we study user-
generated content in social media from the social contagion
perspective. Figure 1 shows
the conceptual framework of our study. Learning, the
informational externalities, affects
consumers through the quality information conveyed by peers,
whereas network effects,
the payoff externalities, influence consumers according to the
size of the user base.
Figure 1. The Conceptual Framework of Learning and Network
Effects
80 QIU, TANG, AND WHINSTON
Although these mechanisms lead to similar empirical outcomes,
their implications are
vastly different. If contagion is generated mainly by network
effects, then seeding
strategies, which determine the initial set of targeted
consumers, will by implication
have a strong influence on the success of viral marketing.

Accordingly, a firm can
amplify social contagion and accelerate product purchases by
offering introductory
discounts [31]. If learning is the dominant effect, however,
seeding will not be effective
unless the initial consumers generate positive word of mouth.
Consumers can infer that
the high demand among their peers is caused by the introductory
discount rather than the
high product quality [45]. Both cases are theoretically plausible
and need to be empiri-
cally distinguished.
Given the lack of prerelease marketing effort, these two
mechanisms of social
contagion are particularly important for user-generated content
(UGC). To the
best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to disentangle
consumer learning
and network effects in the context of online video sharing.
Previous studies on
online video sharing using the traditional Bass model to study
the diffusion
process have shown that the existing user base has a positive
effect on future
adoption but make no distinction between learning and network
effects regard-
ing the underlying mechanisms [55, 57]. To fill the gap, we
differentiate the
two mechanisms by examining how video consumers react to
different types of
information. In addition, we categorize popular videos into
high-quality videos
and attention-grabbing videos according to the consistency in
their ratings, and
examine the different impacts of the two mechanisms in their

diffusion process,
respectively. Our empirical results suggest that both
mechanisms affect the
diffusion of social media content significantly, with consumer
learning having
a greater influence on high-quality content, and network effects
having a
greater influence on attention-grabbing content. The
implications derived from
studying YouTube can carry over to other consumer choice
problems as well.
Figure 2. Daily Views for Videos with Different
Disconfirmation
SUCCESS IN SOCIAL MEDIA 81
Literature Review
Identification of social contagion has long been recognized as
an econometric
challenge [37]. Failure to account for contextual effects or
homophily often leads
to an overestimation of the effect of social contagion. Aral et al.
[7] distinguished
influence-based contagion from homophily-driven diffusion
using a dynamic
matched sample of global instant messaging users. Within the
framework of social
contagion, studies have focused on distinguishing learning from
other contagion
mechanisms such as saliency effect (i.e., observed choices are
more salient than
alternative choices) and conformity concerns (i.e., the social

pressure to adopt the
choice made by the majority). Cai et al. [19] used a field
experiment to show that
observational learning, rather than saliency effect, affects
customers’ choices. Shi
and Whinston [51] studied observational learning in the context
of location-based
networks.
Network effects, or network externalities, have been widely
studied as an impor-
tant driver of the diffusion of technology products or services,
such as standards
[22], software [27], and social networks [32, 46, 63]. These
products or services
become more valuable as more people use them. In information
technology (IT) and
electronic commerce areas, network externalities may develop
from exchange,
stability, or extrinsic benefits [27]. For the diffusion of UGC in
social media,
network effects result mainly from exchange; that is, each new
content consumer
adds potential value through exchange with other consumers
[24].
Whereas learning is generated by information externalities,
network effects are
created because of payoff externalities. In spite of this
fundamental difference, they
often coexist and even interact with each other in the diffusion
of products or
innovations [21, 23]. Rather than distinguishing informational
externalities from
payoff externalities, most studies have focused on using the
coexistence of both to

explain herding or informational cascades. Bikhchandani et al.
[16] argued that an
informational cascade resulting from observational learning is
very fragile to small
shocks, whereas the uniformity created by network externalities
does not display the
fragility. Moretti [40] showed that social learning is a more
important determinant of
sales in the movie industry than network effects. However, we
suspect that the same
can apply to online videos. Consumers have more precise prior
information such as
crew information, movie trailers, critics, and so on, to estimate
the quality of a
movie, but much less information for social media videos,
considering the limited
marketing campaigns and alternative information sources of
UGC. Therefore, it is
unlikely that a movie can go viral solely because of network
effects, but social media
videos might.
In this study, we adopt the expectation–disconfirmation
paradigm in marketing
literature [43]. Based on this paradigm, customer satisfaction
has three main ante-
cedents: prior expectations, ex post quality, and
disconfirmation/surprise. We intro-
duce these three key constructs in the analysis of online videos.
In consumer
satisfaction literature, prior expectations have been
conceptualized as the beliefs
about a product formed by consumers’ prior experiences and
exposure to firms’
82 QIU, TANG, AND WHINSTON

marketing efforts [42, 43]. In our context of YouTube videos,
when consumers
consider watching a video, they use ex ante information, such as
video providers’
reputation, to form their expectations of the underlying video
quality. Ex post quality
is defined as consumers’ post-usage evaluation about how a
product fulfills their
needs, wants, and desires [38]. In Susarla et al. [54], the
perception of an application
service provider’s service quality results from an ex post
evaluation of the service.
Disconfirmation/surprise is defined as discrepancies between
consumers’ expecta-
tions and the ex post quality [43]. Consumers’ expectations will
be negatively
disconfirmed if the product performs worse than expected and
positively discon-
firmed if performance is better than anticipated. We use this
paradigm to study
consumer learning, by which consumers use information to infer
product quality and
act accordingly [58]. The positive (negative) disconfirmation
thus leads to greater
positive (negative) word of mouth and more (fewer) people
watching the video
subsequently.
Hypothesis Development
A Simple Analytical Model
YouTube videos are experience goods whose quality cannot be

fully observed by
consumers ex ante but can be ascertained upon consumption.
Therefore, before
consumption, consumers are never certain about the quality, but
can always acquire
useful information from friends who have already watched the
videos. If the
revealed information suggests that the true video quality is
higher than the expected
value, we call it positive disconfirmation/surprise. If the
information suggests that
the true quality is lower than the expected value, we call it
negative disconfirmation/
surprise.
Learning is a process of adjusting beliefs about the quality
according to discon-
firmation. We build a simple analytical model of individual
belief updating that can
capture the underlying learning process discussed in our study.
The literature on
observational learning [12] examines the learning that occurs
through observing
other people’s behaviors. We consider a general learning model
through direct
communication and discussion with, and observation of others.
We capture the
learning process with a Bayesian learning model, where each
consumer receives
feedback from peers and updates the prior belief of the video
quality.2 The utility
that a representative consumer i obtains from watching a
YouTube video j is given
by:uij ¼ Vj þ ηij; ηij,N 0; 1=ρη
� �

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