Impact of Information Environment and Corporate Governance on M&A Decisions in Vietnam

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THE UNIVERSITY OF DANANG
UNIVERSITY OF ECONOMICS
LE THUY DUNG
RESEARCH ON THE IMPACTS OF INFORMATION
ENVIRONMENT AND CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS ON MERGERS AND
ACQUISITIONS ACTIVITIES IN VIETNAM
Major: Finance and Banking
Code: 62.34.02.01
SUMMARY OF DISSERTATION
(DOCTORAL THESIS)
DaNang – 2022

The thesis was completed at
UNIVERSITY OF ECONOMICS, THE UNIVERSITY OF DANANG
Supervisors:
1. Assoc.Prof. Nguyen Hoa Nhan, Ph.D
2. Assoc.Prof. Dang Huu Man, Ph.D
Reviewer 1: Assoc.Prof. Nguyen Thi Minh Hue, Ph.D
Reviewer 2: Assoc.Prof. Nguyen Thi My Linh, Ph.D
Reviewer 3: Assoc.Prof. Pham Thi Hoang Anh, Ph.D
The dissertation defended at the doctoral examination council
from University of Economics, The University of Danang On
July 29th, 2022
The thesis can be found at:
-National Library of Vietnam

-The University of Da Nang - The Center for Learning Information Resources
and Communication.

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
1.1. The importance and necessity of the study
“Information asymmetry” is not a strange concept for investors. This is when one of
the transaction parties doesn’t know all and exactly what information needs to be known
about the other party to make the right decision in the transaction. Therefore, information
transparency in the stock market is always concerned by investors. In the context that
individual investors are increasingly participating and playing a key role in Vietnam’s stock
market, ensuring the transparency of the market with deterrent and punitive sanctions pays
more attention.1
In light of Vietnam’s miracle growth, it is of high urgency to study the
effects of information asymmetry, focusing on the corporate information environment and
corporate governance mechanism, on the merger & acquisition (M&A) market in Vietnam.
Some of the main reasons are as follows:
Firstly, Vietnam’s M&A market has continuously set new milestones, becoming a
large capital attraction channel and an attractive market for domestic and foreign investors.
Despite the negative impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, foreign investment flows into
Vietnam, including capital flows through M&A activities, still grew by 9.2% compared to
2020, reaching US$31,15 billion. In the first 10 months of 2021, it attracted more than
US$8,8 billion, an increase of 17,9% compared to 2020 and an increase of 13,7% compared
to the time before the COVID-19 pandemic.2
It is the huge potential of this market that
makes it very important to study the typical motives and factors affecting the M&A market.
Secondly, foreign investment activities in Vietnam through capital joint-venture and
share purchase have been simplified since the application of the 2014 Investment Law and
the new 2020 Investment Law. In Vietnam, regulations on M&A have not been developed
in a synchronous manner, but are distributed in different laws such as the Law on
Enterprises, the Law on Investment, and the Competition Law (Ta Thi Bich Thuy, 2020).
Also, anti-takeover regulations have not been established in the market (Pham et al., 2015;
Dang Huu Man et al., 2019). In addition, most domestic companies still have limited
management capacity, are not properly aware of creating a transparent information
environment, which reduces investor confidence (Dang Huu Man and Hoang Duong Viet
1
One of the shocking “scandals” in early 2022 on the Vietnamese stock market was the decision by the authorities to
criminally prosecute and arrest Mr. Trinh Van Quyet, Chairman of the Board of Directors of the FLC Group Joint Stock
Company for the act of “Manipulating the stock market”, “Hiding information in securities activities”. This is
considered as a warning bell for non-transparent and disturbing acts in the stock market.
2
https://nhandan.vn/kinhte/xu-huong-moi-tren-thi-truong-mua-ban-sap-nhap-doanh-nghiep-681708/

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Anh, 2019; Dang Huu Man et al., 2019). The legal regulations related to M&A activities are
not synchronized, the information system on M&A activities is still weak, which has
directly affected the M&A decision making of the acquiring companies, especially the
foreign companies.
Thirdly, a necessary condition for a successful M&A deal is transparency in the
value of both the acquiring company and the target company. However, once there is
information asymmetry in 1 or both partners in the deal, it will lead to a situation where the
company’s value is blown up too high or pushed down too low, affecting the sustainability
of the deal and both partners involved. Identifying the mechanisms or channels through
which information asymmetries influence the success or failure of deals as well as strategic
decision-making in deals becomes essential in Vietnam. The Government and the State
Securities Commission are attempting to control the market in the spirit of the rule of law,
ensuring discipline and transparency of the market.
This thesis focuses on the internal information environment and corporate
governance mechanism of the company in order to identify the mechanism and direction of
their influence on the establishment of M&A decisions. Existing empirical studies have
shown that the information environment and corporate governance structure is one of the
important keys that are particularly interested in the M&A strategy of the acquiring
companies (Zhu et al., 2011; Liao, 2014; Jenter and Lewellen, 2015; Dang and Henry, 2016;
Hu and Yang, 2016; Dang et al., 2017; Field and Mkrtchyan, 2017; Dang et al., 2019; Dang
et al., 2021; Dang et al., 2022). For example, the study by Dang and Henry (2016) found
that the quality of corporate governance affects the decision-making process of parties in
M&A deals, and thereby affects the success or failure of the deals. In fact, the difference in
information environment and governance mechanism at national- and company- level leads
to diverse research results on the impact of information environment and internal
governance quality on strategic M&A decisions.
Under imperfect market conditions in developing countries, target companies with
large levels of asymmetric information are more likely to leak or distort information prior to
the M&A announcement event (Huddart and Ke, 2007; Dasgupta et al., 2010), and lower
financial statement quality compared to companies with better financial transparency,
leading to bias in M&A valuation (Lim and Chang, 2017).

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These are also barriers and challenges posed in the coming years for the merger and
acquisition market in Vietnam, especially related to cross-border M&A deals. In general, the
success or failure of an M&A transaction is directly influenced by different motivations.
Therefore, understanding the motivation for participating in the M&A process, especially
the role of the company’s information environment and governance mechanism, is expected
to help target companies in Vietnam change their governance mechanism, proactively
creating a transparent information environment, thereby helping to select friendly
investment partners, increasing the ability to withstand risks during negotiations.
This study provides valuable empirical evidence to confirm the influence of the
target company’s internal information environment and corporate governance mechanism
on strategic M&A decision making in Vietnam. The research results add to the evidence on
the relationship between the information environment, the corporate governance mechanism
considered from the perspective of the target company and the strategic decisions of the
acquiring company in developing countries. In addition, based on the findings, this study
provides some recommendations for investors, companies, to ensure transparency and
competition in the Vietnamese M&A market.
1.2. Research objective
The general objective of this thesis is to assess the impact of the internal information
environment and governance mechanism of the target company on the strategic decision
making of the acquiring companies in the Vietnam M&A market. The study focuses on 02
main decision groups including equity ownership and acquisition location decisions. The
thesis then provides some recommendations for stakeholders when participating in
Vietnam’s M&A market, as well as state regulatory agencies.
1.3. The objects and scopes of research
1.3.1. Research objects
1.3.1.1. The analytical objects
The object of analysis in this study is the internal information environment and
management mechanism (in lenses of the target company) and their impacts on the strategic
decisions of the acquiring company in the Vietnam M&A market. The M&A decisions
studied in this thesis include the equity ownership (before, during, and after the deal is
completed) and acquisition location (domestic and cross-border acquisitions).
1.3.1.2. The surveyed objects

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Surveyed objects in this study are all target companies participating in M&A deals in
Vietnam market. These companies must be listed on the Vietnamese stock market and the
data are available for research.
1.3.2. The scope of the study
The thesis focuses on studying M&A deals completed in the Vietnam market over
the period of 2005 – 2020. The study limits the impact of the internal information
environment, corporate governance mechanism, only from the lens of the target company,
on the strategic decisions of the acquirers, including the decision on share ownership ratio
and domestic/cross-border acquisition decisions. In which, the internal information
environment is represented by earnings management and stock illiquidity. The corporate
governance mechanism mentioned in this study is represented by three proxies, including
the independence of the board of directors, the power of the chief executive officer, and the
role of blockholders.
In addition, within the scope of this thesis, the author also divides the research
sample into various subsample groups, including (i) Group classification by equity
ownership. Current studies have divided into 2 groups of deals according to different equity
ownership: Minority and Majority shareholding deals, in which minority is defined as deals
in which the acquirer holds less than 50% of the shares of the target company, and majority
means that the acquiring company holds more than 50%. The 50% threshold is generally
uniform in Corporate Law in most countries. (ii) Group classification by corporate profit
management. In this study, the author based on existing studies to divide the whole sample
into groups of deals in which the target company with high profit management and the
target with low profit management. The author uses the median value for each year of the
deal, then if the target company’s earnings management in year t is higher than the median
of the entire sample in that year, the target belongs to the group with high profit
management, on the contrary, belongs to the group with low profit management. (iii) Group
classification by stock liquidity. Group of deals in which the target company has low
liquidity and the target group with high liquidity. Similar to the earnings management
group, for the group classification by stock liquidity, the author uses the median value for
each year of the deal, then if the stock liquidity of the target company taking place in year t
is higher than the median value of the entire sample in that year, then it belongs to the group
with high stock liquidity, otherwise, it belongs to the group with low stock liquidity.

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1.4. Methodology
1.4.1. Research approach
To solve the above research objectives, the thesis uses a deductive approach,
specifically:
Based on the existing literature to formulate hypotheses, collect data, select and
apply appropriate econometric techniques and empirical models to address the research
problems. The research results are then employed for responding to the research hypotheses
and making recommendations and empirical conclusions.
1.4.2. Methodology
The thesis uses quantitative research methods to address the research problems.
Specifically, the study uses the least squares method for cross-sectional data to estimate the
coefficients of the multivariable regression models. In addition, this thesis also employs
Probit regression model for binary variables and Multinomial logistic regression model for
polynomial variables.
1.5. Research contributions
1.5.1. Theoretical contribution
First, the research findings of this thesis have confirmed the importance of the
corporate information environment from the target firms’ perspective in the implementation
of strategic decisions of acquiring firms. To the best of our knowledge, the current literature
provides very little evidence on examining the influence of information environment on
equity ownership decision of acquiring firms from the lenses of the target companies’
information environment. Therefore, the results from this study add to the empirical
evidence on the association between corporate information environment and corporate
restructuring decision-making process, and confirm the role of information transparency for
the implementation of strategic M&A decisions in an emerging and dynamic M&A market.
Second, although the content of M&A has been regulated and adjusted in different
laws, there is still no complete legal framework to help orient, regulate and supervise M&A
activities in Vietnam. In that context, weak corporate governance capacity is one of the
reasons why companies have been taken over via M&A deals. This study provides new
evidence confirming the importance of corporate governance in the strategic decisions of
acquiring companies during the formulation and implementation of M&A plans in a typical
emerging market without any anti-takeover regulations. The research results of the thesis

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add new knowledge about the behavior of the parties involved in the M&A deal.
Specifically, the acquiring companies are likely to consider the governance mechanism of
the target company as one of the motives for planning M&A decisions; meanwhile, the
target companies focus their efforts on perfecting the independence and supervisory
capacity of the board of directors, management team and large shareholders to be able to
find friendly investment partners, and improve defense capabilities and minimize the
situation of being taken over.
1.5.2. Practical contribution
Based on investigating a comprehensive sample of all M&A deals in Vietnam up to
2020, the thesis examines the impacts of the internal information environment and corporate
governance mechanism on equity ownership and cross-border acquisition decisions in
Vietnam’s M&A market. The findings from the study have important practical implications
for acquiring companies and target companies participating in the M&A process.
For acquiring companies, our findings help identify specific motivations for pursuing
M&A deals, and categorize strategic investment partners. Acquiring companies should pay
much attention to board structure, CEO duality, and large shareholder ownership before
negotiating agreements, because internal factors directly affect the decision to enter the deal
of the target companies. In addition, acquiring companies should have a professional
valuation team to assist in determining the intrinsic value of potential target companies. This
is one of the measures to help them assess the information transparency of target companies,
thereby saving costs in M&A transactions, and properly assessing the growth potential of
target company’s shares on the stock market.
Regarding target companies, the results of the thesis indicate that it is necessary to
make specific decisions in the search and selection of members, the number of independent
members on the board of directors. Also, the companies need to establish internal
regulations that control the maximum equity ownership for major shareholders and
determine the limit of the CEO’s power in the company. Further, the target firms need to
detail the responsibilities and obligations of the individuals and organizations involved with
the internal members of the company to reduce non-transparent shares transferring
activities. In addition, the target companies need to take measures to strengthen the
supervisory ability of the board of directors through the establishment of supervisory
subcommittees, setting the ratio of the number of independent external members to

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participate in the board of directors and strengthen efforts to make transparent information
disclosed to the market. The research results of the thesis also suggest that the target
companies should soon come up with appropriate policies and actions to increase the ability
to control the earnings management behavior of the management team, improving the
quality of information disclosed to the outside, contributing to attracting investment through
a public offer to buy shares from potential partners. In cases of receiving hostile takeovers,
the target firms need to put in place some measures to limit the increase in the percentage of
shares owned by large shareholders, increase the level of oversight by the board of directors,
and develop appropriate defense mechanisms.
1.6. Thesis structure
In addition to the conclusion, this thesis is structured into 5 Chapters, including:
Chapter 1: Introduction
Chapter 2: Theoretical background and research overview
Chapter 3: Research designs
Chapter 4: Research results
Chapter 5: Conclusions and recommendations
CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL BASIS AND RESEARCH OVERVIEW
2.1. Concepts of mergers and acquisitions, internal information environment,
corporate governance mechanism
This section introduces the concepts of mergers and acquisitions, information
environment and corporate governance mechanism.
2.1.1. Mergers and Acquisitions
A merger is the combination of two or more companies into one company in which
the merged company ceases to exist (Aswath, 1997; DePamphilis, 2003; Gaughan, 2007).
According to Agarwal and Mittal (2014), acquisition is the process by which one
acquiring company takes over another, but the target company still exists independently and
is under the control of the acquirer.
2.1.2. Internal information environment
The internal information environment is a set of factors within a company that reflect
information that affects a company’s operations.

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2.1.3. Internal corporate governance mechanism
In this study, the internal governance mechanism, reflected through the corporate
governance structure, is understood as the regulation of key members including the board of
directors and management groups operating the company's operations company.
2.2. Theories of mergers and acquisitions, information environment, corporate
governance related to mergers and acquisitions activities
2.2.1. Theories of mergers and acquisitions
The fundamental theories of mergers and acquisitions mentioned in the thesis
include: Theory of efficiency, Theory of corporate control, Hubris theory of corporate
takeovers, Theory of moral hazard and self-interest.
2.2.2. Theories of the information environment
The theories related to the information environment used in the thesis include:
Asymmetric information theory, Cost of ownership theory, Signalling theory.
2.2.3. Theories of corporate governance
The thesis mentions some fundamental theories related to corporate governance,
including agency theory, management theory, and stakeholder theory.
2.3. Research overview
This section reviews relevant empirical studies on the influence of internal
information environment and corporate governance on strategic decisions of the acquiring
firms.
Betton et al. (2008) found a positive relationship between deal premium and price
raising behavior, and confirmed that the acquiring company adjusted the bid price after the
announcement of the deal. Brigida and Madura (2012) find that acquirers do not reduce
their bid prices to compensate for the cost of raising the target's stock price. Doukas and
Zhang (2020) find that acquiring companies tend to do more profit management before
announcing M&A than target companies.
The implication from the study of Graham et al. (2008) indicates that the higher the
stock liquidity, the higher the probability of cross-border acquisitions of the acquiring
companies. The research results of Yang et al. (2017) also show that acquiring companies
have more acquisition efforts when the company’s liquidity is high, which reflects the
higher the liquidity of the target company, the more likely it is increasing majority share

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repurchase deals. Dang Huu Man (2019) found that companies from other countries tend to
choose domestic targets with high stock liquidity to minimize risks when entering new
markets.
Dang and Henry (2016) find that acquiring companies often look for target
companies with a large number of independent directors in minority acquisitions compared
to majority acquisitions, the probability of partial acquisitions is higher when the target
companies have greater CEO power. Miletkov et al. (2014) examined the impact of board
independence on foreign ownership decisions based on a sample of more than 45,000
companies from 130 countries and found that foreign ownership higher when the company's
board of directors is more independent. Dang Huu Man et al. (2017) provide evidence
confirming that foreign companies tend to acquire banks with poor governance.
2.3.4. Research gaps
On the basis of investigating and analyzing existing studies in the current literature,
we find that the association between the information environment, corporate governance
mechanism and strategic decisions of the acquiring companies in M&A deals has received
much attention from Vietnamese and international researchers. However, the approach of
each study, the scope of the study, and the method of sample selection are different, leading
to inconsistent research results.
First, current studies have examined the relationship between corporate governance
mechanism and strategic decisions of acquiring companies in developed countries. In
Vietnam, the governance capacity of domestic companies is still limited, regulations on
M&A are inconsistent among legal documents, cumbersome administrative procedures, and
lack of clear regulations on M&A transactions are barriers and limitations for companies
when entering the Vietnam M&A market. The difference in the legal environment can
influence the behavior of the acquiring company and the target company when participating
in an M&A deal. The results from the study are expected to provide stronger confirmation
of the influence of the target company’s corporate governance mechanism on the strategic
decision of the acquiring company.
Second, existing studies are still very limited in clarifying the impact of the
information environment, characterized by stock liquidity and earnings management from
the perspective of the target company, on acquisition decisions of companies in M&A deals.
To the best of the author’s knowledge, there is still no research that examines the impact of

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the information environment reflected through the impact of earnings management and
stock liquidity on the equity ownership choice, particularly in the Vietnam M&A market.
Third, the current literature provides very little evidence on the influence of corporate
governance mechanism on cross-border acquisition decisions in the Vietnam M&A market.
Fourth, there are no studies showing the influence of the information environment on
the acquisition location decision from the perspective of the target company, in the Vietnam
M&A market.
CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH DESIGN
3.1. Research hypotheses
Existing studies have identified the existence of stock price appreciation, and the
impact of bullish behavior on transaction costs (Erickson and Wang, 1999; Louis, 2004). In
addition, the quality of information published in the market will directly affect the stock
liquidity, the success of the acquisition (Buehlmaier, 2015; Mazboudi and Khalil, 2017).
Yang et al. (2017) found that the probability of a majority share acquisition increases in
companies with high stock liquidity. The first hypothesis proposes:
Hypothesis H1: There is a positive relationship between the target firm’s internal
information environment quality and the equity ownership choice of acquiring companies.
The study by Barth et al. (2013) found that companies with less earnings
management behavior will have lower capital costs and more accurately reflect firm value.
Graham et al. (2008) show that the probability of cross-border transactions is higher when
firms that acquire are highly liquid. In addition, stemming from information asymmetry,
acquiring companies often look for well-run foreign target companies to easily value,
calculate synergies, and propose a price rational acquisition (Ye, 2014). The second
hypothesis is defined as follows:
Hypothesis H2: Acquiring firms tend to acquire target companies with more
transparent internal information environment.
The issue of conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers of the target
companies is likely to arise in an M&A deal. As a result, the role of independent members
of the board of directors, major shareholders becomes more important and provides an
effective monitoring mechanism (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Quan and Zhang, 2021;
James et al., 2021). Some previous research results have shown that minority acquisition

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increases if the target company has a larger number of independent members, the CEO is
concurrently the chairman of the board of directors (Dang and Henry, 2016). The following
hypothesis is proposed:
Hypothesis H3: The target firm’s strong internal governance mechanism reduces the
acquiring firm’s share ownership.
Some studies have found that foreign acquirers tend to look for target companies
with independent boards of directors, CEO is not the chairman of the board (Miletkov et al.,
2014; Kling and Weitzel , 2014). Focusing on the target company, Leuz et al. (2009), Dang
et al. (2017), Dang Huu Man et al. (2017) pointed out that the target partners have good
governance mechanisms. The stronger a company is, the more likely it is to be a target in
cross-border acquisitions. The final hypothesis is proposed:
Hypothesis H4: Acquirers tend to seek acquisitions of target companies with strong
governance mechanisms.
3.2. Measurement of research variables
3.2.1. Dependent variable
3.2.1.1. Equity ownership proxies
- SHARE SOUGHT: The percentage of shares in the target firm that the acquiring firm seeks
to acquire in the transaction (Nguyen and Le, 2018).
- SHARE ACQUIRED: The percentage of shares purchased by the acquiring firm in the deal
(Nguyen and Le, 2018).
- SHARE OWNED: The percentage of share ownership in the target firm that the acquiring
firm holds after the acquisition is completed (Nguyen and Le, 2018).
3.2.1.2. Acquisition location proxy
- CROSS-BORDER: A binary variable taking the value of 1 if the foreign acquiring firm
acquires a Vietnamese target firm and of 0 if the acquiring firm and the target firm are
domestically Vietnamese firms.
3.2.2. Independent variables
3.2.2.1. Corporate information environment (CIE)
CIE is reflected through illiquidity (ILLIQUID) and earnings management (EM).
- Earnings management (EM):

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EM is the difference between expected accruals and actual accruals.
3
+ Expected accruals:
Ai,t-1: Total assets at the end of year t-1 of company i
ΔREVi,t: The difference in net sales between year t and year t-1
GPPEi,t: Fixed assets at the end of year t
α1, α2, α3: Parameter of each company
The parameters of the model α1, α2, α3 are estimated from the OLS regression
model:
: Actual accruals of company i in year t
: Estimation results of α1, α2, α3 using OLS regression
+ Actual accruals (ACCi,t): is estimated based on the adjusted
Jones model Actual accruals = Net profit – Net cash flows from
operating activities
- Stock liquidity (ILLIQUID)
Based on Amihud (2002), the ILLIQUID variable is defined:
| |
∑ )
: Trading return of stock i per day d in each year t;
: Number of trading days that stock i trades in each year t;
: Volume of stock i traded per day d in each year t
3.2.2.2. Internal governance mechanism (GOVERNANCE)
- The number of independent directors (IND.DIRECTORSi,t-1) : The more
independent members on board, the higher its independence (Bange and Mazzeo, 2004;
Dang and Henry, 2016), implying a stronger corporate governance mechanism.
- CEO duality (CEODualityi, t-1): The binary variable takes the value of one if the
CEO has just held the position of chairman of the board, and zero otherwise. The CEO has
greater power when the CEO is concurrently the Chairman of the Board (Pathan, 2009;
Dang and Henry, 2016; Nguyen and Le, 2018; Dang Huu Man et al., 2019).
3
Accruals reflect the difference between income and cash flow.
- ACCi,
t
- a1, a2,
a3

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- Blockholder shareholdings (BLOCKHOLDERi,t-1): This variable is a continuous
variable, determined by the percentage of shares owned by large shareholders whose
shareholdings are more than or equal to 5% (Masulis et al., 2007; Nguyen and Le, 2018;
Dang Huu Man et al., 2019). The higher the ownership of large shareholders, the higher the
degree of control over the board’s activities, leading to stronger corporate governance
quality.
3.1. Summary of variables and expected signs
Expected sign
No. Variables Acronym Influence Influence Reference sources
on equity on
ownership acquisition
location
Independent variables
1 The number IND.DIRECTORS - + Dang and Henry
of (2016), Miletkov et
independent al. (2014)
directors
2 CEO duality CEO Duality - + Pham et al. (2015)
3 Blockholder BLOCKHOLDER + + Dang and Henry
shareholdings (2016)
4 Stock ILLIQUID - - Dang Huu Man
liquidity (2019), Yang et al.
(2017)
Control variables
5 Payment CASH - + Dang and Henry
methods (2016), Bae et al.
(2013), Dang Huu
Man et al. (2018)
6 Related RELATEDNESS - + Dang and Henry
acquisitions (2016),
Dang Huu Man
(2019)
7 Shareholding TOEHOLD - - Hamberg et al. (2013)
stake by the
acquirer in
the target
firm before
the deal
8 Firm size SIZE - + Pham et al. (2015),
Zhou et al. (2019),
Xie (2014)
9 Return on ROA - - Dang and Henry

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assets (2016), Zhou et al.
(2019), Bauguess et
al. (2009)
10 Loan ratio LEVERAGE + - Huang and Ho
(2020), Dang Huu
Man (2019)
11 Sale growth SALES GROWTH - - Zhou et al. (2019),
Basuil and Datta
(2017)
12 Market-to- M/B + + Miletkov et al.
book ratio (2014), Huang and
Ho (2020),
3.3. Estimation method
The thesis uses a multivariable regression model with cross-sectional data and OLS
estimation technique to test the relationship between the dependent variable and
independent variables. In addition, this study uses Probit and Multinomial logistic
regression to test the association between corporate governance, information environment
and the acquiring firms’ local decisions.
3.4. Research models
3.4.1. The influence of the internal information environment on the acquiring firm’s
equity ownership decisions
SHARE SOUGHTi,t = + CIEi,t-1 + CONTROLSi,t-1 + γj + δt (1)
SHARE ACQUIREDi,t = + CIEi,t-1 + CONTROLSi,t-1 + γj + δt (2)
SHARE OWNEDi,t = + CIEi,t-1 + CONTROLSi,t-1 + γj + δt (3)
3.4.2. The influence of internal information environment on cross-border acquisition
decisions
Prob (CROSS-BORDERi,t =1) = + CIEi,t-1 + CONTROLSi,t-1 + γj + δt (4)
3.4.3. The influence of the internal corporate governance on the acquiring firm’s equity
ownership decisions
SHARE_SOUGHTi,t = β0 + β1GOVERNANCEi,t-1 + β2CONTROLSi,t-1 + γs + δt (5)
SHARE_ACQUIREDi,t = β0 + β1GOVERNANCEi,t-1 + β2CONTROLSi,t-1 + γs + δt (6)
SHARE_OWNEDi,t = β0 + β1GOVERNANCEi,t -1+ β2CONTROLSi,t-1 + γs + δt (7)
3.4.2. The influence of internal corporate governance on cross-border acquisition
decisions

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Prob (CROSS-BORDERi,t = 1) = β0 + β1GOVERNANCEi,t-1 + β2CONTROLSi,t-1 + γs + δt
(8)
3.5. Data
This study examines a comprehensive sample of 674 completed M&A deals in
Vietnam in the period 2005-2020. Data is collected from reliable sources: (1) Thomson
Reuters SDC Platinum. (2) Mint Global - Bureau Van Dijk and FiinPro - Stoxplus; (3)
annual report and management report at the financial year-end prior to acquisition
announcement.
CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH RESULTS
4.1 Descriptive statistics of the deal characteristics and the target firm’s financial
characteristics
This section presents descriptive statistics of the characteristics of the deal and the
target firm’s financial characteristics according to equity share ownership, and the
acquisition locations.
4.2. Internal information environment and equity ownership decision
4.2.1. Characteristics of the internal information environment in the acquisition
announcement year between forms of holding shares
4.2.2. Characteristics of the information environment in the year prior and after
acquisition announcement
4.2.3. Deal characteristics and financial characteristics according to the criteria of the
information environment
4.2.4. The target firms’ internal information environment and the acquiring firms’ share
ownership desire
Table 4.6. Target company’s internal information environment and acquiring firms’
share ownership desire
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6
ILLIQUID 0,001 0,002 -0,001
(0,37) (0,67) (-0,94)
EM -0,023 -0,039 -0,047*
(-0,94) (-1,53) (-1,68)
CROSS-BORDER 0,004 0,012 -0,010 0,005
(0,13) (0,48) (-0,35) (0,16)
RELATEDNESS 0,104* 0,106* 0,096* 0,109**
(1,76) (1,77) (1,88) (2,06)

16
CASH 0,035 0,034 0,027 0,028
(1,63) (1,55) (1,06) (0,03)
FRIENDLY 0,096*** 0,095*** 0,104*** 0,100***
(4,74) (4,70) (4,59) (4,39)
TOEHOLD -0,062*** -0,062*** -0,073*** -0,073***
(-3,63) (-3,47) (-3,55) (-3,50)
SIZE -0,012 -0,013
(-1,26) (-1,52)
LEVERAGE 0,001 0,014
(0,03) (0,29)
ROA -0,121 -0,101
(-1,48) (-0,87)
M/B 0,007 0,003
(0,63) (0,24)
SALES GROWTH -0,012** -0,013**
(-2,07) (-2,09)
INTERCEPT 0,206** 0,129 0,166** 0,227*** 0,148* 0,213**
(2,23) (1,39) (2,64) (2,64) (1,68) (2,14)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 294 294 292 232 232 230
R-squared 0,07 0,18 0,20 0,10 0,22 0,24
F ratio 1,05 2,38 2,15 1,56 2,85 2,43
t-ratios are shown in parentheses.
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels
Source: Author's calculations
4.2.5. The target firms’ internal information environment and the share ownership degree
achieved during and after the completed transaction
Table 4.7. Target firms’ internal information environment and share
ownership acquired and owned after the deals
Variables
Shares acquired Shares owned
1 2 3 4
ILLIQUID 0,001 0,008*
EM
(0,24)
-0,050**
(1,75)
-0,036
(-1,99) (-0,75)
CROSS-BORDER 0,005 -0,001 0,003 0,005
(0,19) (-0,02) (0,10) (0,15)
RELATEDNESS 0,111* 0,110 0,053 0,051
(1,95) (1,32) (1,10) (0,83)
CASH 0,029 0,027 0,035 0,021
(1,37) (1,15) (1,50) (0,73)
FRIENDLY 0,095*** 0,098*** 0,129*** 0,134***
(4,81) (4,26) (5,29) (4,77)
TOEHOLD -0,061*** -0,066*** 0,125*** 0,125***
(-3,44) (-3,04) (5,37) (4,70)
SIZE -0,009 -0,014* 0,005 -0,005
(-0,93) (-1,68) (0,50) (-0,54)
LEVERAGE 0,004 0,016 -0,034 -0,022

17
Variables
Shares acquired Shares owned
1 2 3 4
(0,12) (0,34) (-0,73) (-0,40)
ROA -0,113 -0,096 -0,024 0,032
(-1,38) (-0,86) (-0,23) 0,24)
M/B 0,011 0,011 0,002 -0,014
(0,97) (0,82) (0,18) (-0,86)
SALES GROWTH -0,009* -0,011 -0,007 -0,008
(-1,68) (-1,11) (-0,67) (-0,64)
INTERCEPT 0,165 0,193* 0,091 0,127
(1,54) (1,74) (1,10) (0,12)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 292 230 292 230
R-squared 0,23 0,27 0,30 0,32
F ratio 2,87*** 2,83*** 4,22*** 3,65***
4.2.6. The target firms’ internal information environment and equity ownership decision
(using the lagged independent variable method)
The author re-estimated the above regression in which independent variables
ILLIQUIDt-1, EMt-1 are the stock illiquidity and earnings management with 1-year lag. The
use of lagged values of the independent variables aims to limit the influence of
autocorrelation.
4.3. The target firms’ internal information environment and cross-border acquisition
decisions
4.3.1. Characteristics of the information environment in the year deal announcement
4.3.2. Characteristics of the internal information environment in the year prior and post
acquisition announcement
4.3.3. The influence of internal information environment on the location decisions Table
4.11. Influence of internal information environment on the location decisions
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ILLIQUID -0,069** -0,060* 0,013
EM
(-2,10) (-1,73) (0,28)
-0,912** -1,118*** -0,720**
(-2,31) (-2,79) (-1,98)
RELATEDNESS 1,189*** 0,961*** 0,697 0,396
(3,19) (2,62) (1,35) (0,71)
CASH 0,192 0,343 0,575** 0,787**
(0,78) (1,39) (1,98) (2,52)
FRIENDLY -0,071 0,050 0,325 0,606*
(-0,28) (0,18) (1,08) (1,84)
TOEHOLD -0,290 -0,387 -0,429 -0,427
(-1,17) (-1,48) (-1,63) (-1,54)
SIZE 0,325*** 0,365***
(3,07) (3,01)

18
LEVERAGE -0,304 -1,16
(-0,74) (0,51)
ROA 0,940 1,635
(1,08) (1,34)
M/B 0,140 0,100
(1,10) (0,62)
SALES GROWTH -0,031 0,028
(-0,43) (0,33)
INTERCEPT -0,612 -0,455 -1,002 0,015 -0,266 -1,088
(-0,72) (-0,50) (-1,09) (0,02) (0,79) ( -1,32)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 252 252 250 195 195 193
Pseudo R2
0,14 0,19 0,25 0,14 0,18 0,26
Wald χ2
34,90 44,56 57,75 26,95 31,56 48,97
4.3.4. Influence of internal information environment on the location decisions (using
lagged independent variable method)
4.4. The target firm’s internal governance mechanism and the bidders’ stake
ownership decisions
4.4.1. Characteristics of the target corporate governance mechanism
4.4.2. The target corporate governance mechanism and the bidders’ sought equity
ownership decision

19
Table 4.14. The target corporate governance mechanism and the bidders’ sought
equity ownership decision
Variables 1 2 3 4
IND. DIRECTORS -0,015** -0,016**
(0,01) (0,01)
CEO DUALITY -0,036* -0,022
(0,02) (0,02)
BLOCKHOLDERS 0,161*** 0,162***
(0,04) (0,04)
RELATEDNESS -0,024 -0,017 -0,015 -0,012
(0,02) (0,02) (0,02) (0,02)
CASH -0,063*** -0,061*** -0,051*** -0,053***
(0,02) (0,02) (0,02) (0,02)
CROSS-BORDER 0,028 0,030 0,019 0,022
(0,03) (0,03) (0,03) (0,03)
TOEHOLD 0,018 0,031 0,013 -0,014
(0,07) (0,07) (0,08) (0,08)
SIZE 0,018*** 0,011* 0,009 0,010
(0,01) (0,01) (0,01) (0,01)
LEVERAGE -0,021 -0,005 0,006 -0,002
(0,05) (0,05) (0,05) (0,05)
ROA -0,341** -0,367*** -0,343** -0,309**
(0,13) (0,13) (0,14) (0,14)
M/B 0,031** 0,036*** 0,037*** 0,035**
(0,01) (0,01) (0,01) (0,01)
SALES GROWTH 0,013 0,012 0,013 0,014
(0,02) (0,02) (0,02) (0,02)
INTERCEPT 0,159* 0,151* 0,051 0,116
(0,09) (0,09) (0,08) (0,09)
N 522 530 505 495
R-squared 0,116 0,115 0,138 0,152
F-ratio 2,82*** 2,87*** 3,55*** 3,37***
Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses
4.4.3. Corporate governance mechanism and the acquired share ownership degree in
the acquisitions
Table 4. 15. The influence of corporate governance mechanism on the acquired
share ownership degree in the acquisitions
Variables 1 2 3 4
IND. DIRECTORS -0,017*** -0,020***
(0,01) (0,01)
CEO DUALITY -0,040** -0,026
(0,02) (0,02
(0,04) (0,04)
RELATEDNESS -0,035** -0,029* -0,029* -0,025

20
Variables 1 2 3 4
(0,02) (0,02) (0,02) (0,02)
CASH -0,054*** -0,051*** -0,043** -0,048***
(0,02) (0,02) (0,02) (0,02)
CROSS-BORDER 0,037 0,039 0,036 0,039
(0,03) (0,03) (0,03) (0,03)
TOEHOLD 0,012 0,026 0,012 -0,017
(0,07) (0,07) (0,08) (0,08)
SIZE 0,023*** 0,016** 0,015** 0,017**
(0,01) (0,01) (0,01) (0,01)
LEVERAGE -0,031 -0,015 -0,009 -0,015
(0,04) (0,04) (0,04) (0,04)
ROA -0,271** -0,291** -0,267** -0,233*
(0,13) (0,12) (0,13) (0,13)
M/B 0,020* 0,026** 0,025** 0,023*
(0,01) (0,01) (0,01) (0,013)
SALES GROWTH 0,010 0,009 0,010 0,010
(0,01) (0,02) (0,02) (0,02)
INTERCEPT 0,132 0,121 0,021 0,099
(0,08) (0,08) (0,08) (0,09)
N 522 530 505 495
R-squared 0,108 0,100 0,123 0,145
F-ratio 2,45** 2,47** 3,05*** 2,91***
4.4.4. The corporate governance mechanism and the acquiring firms’ shareholding
degree after the completed deal
Table 4. 16. The influence of corporate governance mechanism on the acquiring firms’
shareholding ratio after the completed deal
Variables 1 2 3 4
IND. DIRECTORS -0,012** -0,014**
(0,01) (0,01)
CEO DUALITY -0,032* -0,019
(0,02) (0,02)
(0,04) (0,040)
RELATEDNESS -0,023 -0,017 -0,013 -0,010
(0,02) (0,02) (0,02) (0,02)
CASH -0,045*** -0,042** -0,034** -0,037**
(0,02) (0,02) (0,02) (0,02)
CROSS-BORDER 0,022 0,025 0,020 0,022
(0,03) (0,03) (0,03) (0,03)
TOEHOLD 0,841*** 0,849*** 0,818*** 0,796***
(0,04) (0,03) (0,04) (0,04)
SIZE 0,015** 0,009 0,007 0,008
(0,01) (0,01) (0,01) (0,01)
LEVERAGE -0,030 -0,017 -0,011 -0,016
(0,04) (0,04) (0,04) (0,04)

21
Variables 1 2 3 4
ROA -0,267** -0,280** -0,245** -0,221*
(0,12) (0,12) (0,12) (0,12)
M/B 0,008 0,013 0,011 0,009
(0,01) (0,01) (0,01) (0,01)
SALES GROWTH -0,005 -0,005 -0,004 -0,004
(0,01) (0,01) (0,01) (0,01)
INTERCEPT 0,209*** 0,204** 0,108 0,165**
(0,08) (0,08) (0,08) (0,08)
N 522 530 505 495
R-squared 0,447 0,443 0,456 0,463
F-ratio 52,72*** 54,84*** 51,50*** 42,92***
4.4.5. Robustness tests on the influence of corporate governance on the acquiring
firms’ equity shareholding
4.5. The target firms’ corporate governance mechanism and acquisition location
decision of the acquiring firms
4.5.1. Characteristics of the target corporate governance mechanism in the M&As
according to domestic and cross-border deals
4.5.2. The influence of corporate governance mechanism on cross-border decisions
Table 4.22. The influence of corporate governance on cross-border M&A decisions
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
IND. DIRECTORS 0,093 0,076
(0,11) (0,116)
CEO DUALITY 0,548* 0,609*
(0,30) (0,32)
BLOCKHOLDERS 0,570 0,776
(0,72) (0,75)
RELATEDNESS -0,227 -0,276 -0,116 -0,143
(0,34) (0,34) (0,34) (0,34)
CASH 0,338 0,350 0,438 0,450
(0,28) (0,28) (0,28) (0,29)
SHARE SOUGHT 0,687 0,736 0,438 0,548
(0,62) (0,59) (0,64) (0,65)
TOEHOLD -1,597 -1,718 -1,908* -1,689
(1,02) (1,05) (1,15) (1,15)
SIZE 0,329*** 0,387*** 0,312*** 0,336***
(0,11) (0,11) (0,12) (0,12)
LEVERAGE -1,975*** -2,160*** -1,883*** -1,866***
(0,58) (0,58) (0,59) (0,58)
ROA 0,260 -0,074 0,130 -0,062
(2,13) (2,16) (2,29) (2,24)
M/B -0,009 0,010 0,015 0,014

22
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
(0,15) (0,16) (0,18) (0,18)
SALES GROWTH -0,274 -0,270 -0,231 -0,198
(0,23) (0,25) (0,23) (0,226)
INTERCEPT -2,899* -3,215** -2,875* -3,544**
N
(1,68) (1,49) (1,69) (1,62)
INTERCEPT 509 517 492 482
Pseudo R2
0,081 0,087 0,075 0,087
Wald χ2
36,09*** 38,77*** 30,89** 36,19**
4.5.3. Another robustness test using the alternative independent variable approach
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
5.1. General conclusions from experimental research results
In this thesis, the author has used different empirical models to test the influence of
internal corporate governance mechanism and information environment on M&A decision-
making of share ownership and cross-border M&A. Performing regressions with cross-
sectional data covering all M&A deals completed in the period 2005-2020 in Vietnam, in
which all the target companies are listed on stock exchanges in Vietnam. The study
indicates the importance of corporate governance mechanism and information environment
for strategic decisions in the process of implementing M&A plans. These research results
imply that the degree of success of a deal in Vietnam’s M&A market, in addition to the
intrinsic factors of the deal itself and the financial characteristics of the parties involved, is
influenced by the internal information environment and corporate governance mechanism of
the target company.
The results from this study have provided important evidence, adding to the
theoretical and empirical framework on the factors affecting the M&A market in developing
and emerging markets in general and the Vietnamese M&A market in particular.
Accordingly, this study confirms that companies with a small number of independent
members on the board of directors, less powerful CEOs, and high percentage of shares held
by major shareholders, are more likely to become targets sought in majority share
acquisitions. On the other hand, foreign acquiring companies tend to pursue Vietnamese
target companies with strong governance mechanisms and information environment,
ensuring risk reduction in international investment activities. These results support the

23
Strategic Market Entry Hypothesis and Signals Theory and are also in line with the previous
findings of Massa and Xu (2013), Yang et al (2017). Expanding research in Vietnam, one of
the emerging countries with unclear regulations on M&A, information transparency and
governance mechanisms have not been paid enough attention by companies and state
agencies. These results once again confirm the importance of improving the internal
information environment and corporate governance mechanism in the context that
Vietnam’s M&A market is becoming more attractive due to its potential for growth.
5.2. New contributions of the thesis
The research provides important scholarly contributions in financial economics and
practice for the M&A market in Vietnam. Specifically:
Firstly, this study contributes to expand the theoretical framework of corporate
governance, strategic decisions related to M&A activities and the influence of corporate
governance mechanism on the M&A decision-making process in a typical emerging market.
Secondly, through assessing the characteristics of the information environment
characterized by the target firms’ earnings management and stock liquidity, the study has
added new empirical evidence on the relationship between the information environment and
the corporate restructuring process through M&As.
Regarding practical implications, the findings from the study have important
practical implications for acquiring companies and target companies participating in the
M&A process.
5.3. Some recommendations to stakeholders
5.3.1. For target firms
The results of the thesis indicate that it is necessary to make specific decisions in the
search and selection of members, the number of independent members on the board of
directors. Also, the companies need to establish internal regulations that control the
maximum equity ownership for major shareholders and determine the limit of the CEO’s
power in the company. Further, the target firms need to detail the responsibilities and
obligations of the individuals and organizations involved with the internal members of the
company to reduce non-transparent shares transferring activities. In addition, the target
companies need to take measures to strengthen the supervisory ability of the board of
directors through the establishment of supervisory subcommittees, setting the ratio of the
number of independent external members to participate in the board of directors and

24
strengthen efforts to make transparent information disclosed to the market. The research
results of the thesis also suggest that the target companies should soon come up with
appropriate policies and actions to increase the ability to control the earnings management
behavior of the management team, improving the quality of information disclosed to the
outside, contributing to attracting investment through a public offer to buy shares from
potential partners. In cases of receiving hostile takeovers, the target firms need to put in
place some measures to limit the increase in the percentage of shares owned by large
shareholders, increase the level of oversight by the board of directors, and develop
appropriate defense mechanisms.
5.3.2. For bidder firms
For acquiring companies, our findings help identify specific motivations for pursuing
M&A deals, and categorize strategic investment partners. Acquiring companies should pay
much attention to board structure, CEO duality, and large shareholder ownership before
negotiating agreements, because internal factors directly affect the decision to enter the deal
of the target companies. In addition, acquiring companies should have a professional
valuation team to assist in determining the intrinsic value of potential target companies. This
is one of the measures to help them assess the information transparency of target companies,
thereby saving costs in M&A transactions, and properly assessing the growth potential of
target company’s shares on the stock market.
CONCLUSION OF THESIS
Based on a data set of all completed M&A deals in Vietnam for the period 2005-
2020, and using a combination of different econometric methods and empirical models to
test the effect of corporate governance and internal information environment on the equity
ownership and acquisition location decisions. The thesis has provided important empirical
evidences to solve the research objectives.
Research results show that companies with fewer independent members on the board
of directors, non-CEO duality, and high percentage of shares held by major shareholders,
are more likely to become targets in majority share acquisitions. Also, the probability of
cross-border acquisitions is higher for target companies with stronger governance
mechanism, lower earnings management behavior and higher stock liquidity.
Some limitations and their causes

25
Although the thesis has provided a number of academic and practical significance
results, some limitations still exist45
, as follows:
- The first limitation, the thesis focuses on clarifying the influence of corporate
governance mechanism and internal information environment on strategic decisions of
acquiring companies from the lens of the target company. In other words, this study clarifies
how information transparency and governance quality influence the decision-making
behavior of acquiring companies. The study does not look at the lens of the acquiring
company. There are two main reasons:
Firstly, the existing theoretical and empirical framework has clarified the influence of
the acquiring company’s financial characteristics, governance mechanism and information
environment on the outcome of the deal (including the shareholding ratio, acquisition
location, payment method, and forms of acquisitions) using both developed and developing
market samples. The iterative study of the sample of deals in Vietnam will not make much
of significant contribution.
Second, stemming from the limitation of data and data sources relating to M&A
deals in Vietnam. Accordingly, information about the acquiring company in Vietnam’s
M&A market is not clearly mentioned in the SDC database, although this is the best M&A
database in the world. A lot of information about the acquiring company only briefly states
“Acquirer is an organization” or “Investment fund”, without the full company code to
collect data.
- The second limitation, this study does not consider endogeneity issues in the model. In
fact, the problem of endogeneity appears in the experimental model due to many different
reasons such as Sample selection bias, Reverse causality, Measurement error, or the Omitted
variables. Accordingly, it is likely that the acquiring company’s M&A decision-making may be
partly influenced by the characteristics of the CEO of the acquiring company or the
4
When the author presented this thesis at an annual scientific topic at the Faculty level, there was an opinion that the
research model has not controlled the influence of macro factors on the object of analysis such as the institutional
environment, inflation, financial system... The author acknowledges this comment but still maintains the view that these
macro factors should not be controlled in the empirical model. Main reason: this study was conducted with a single
country sample and the nature of M&A data is cross-sectional, so controlling for macro factors in a single country
sample is not has many values in terms of both economic significance and model value. Controlling for macro factors
will be necessary for the multinational sample or for panel or time series data.
5
There are also opinions that this study has not examined the interaction influence between corporate governance
mechanism and information environment on M&A decisions. The author would like to acknowledge this important
contribution and rerun the model by adding an independent variable, which is the interaction variable between the
information environment and the corporate governance mechanism. However, the results show that the coefficient of
the interaction variable is not statistically significant. Therefore, the author does not report this result in the Thesis.

26
passion to pursue and acquire the target company or simplicity due to the hubris. It is also
possible that results and experience from past deals are the basis for companies to make
decisions rather than relying too heavily on governance or information environment
characteristics. To solve the problem of endogeneity, the current studies have proposed to
use the Difference-in-Difference approach, which uses 02 sample groups, including the
group of companies with M&A activities (referred to as treatment group) and the control
group (the group of companies without deals), then run a regression to see the effect of the
M&A event on the performance of the target company before and after the deal. Another
way is to use an instrument variable and run the model with this instrument variable. In this
thesis, it is not necessary to use the Difference-in-Difference approach because this study
does not study the influence of the governance mechanism and the information environment
on the synergy in pre-period or after the transaction. For the second solution, which is to use
the instrument variable, the author would like to acknowledge this limitation due to the time
limit as well as the depth of knowledge about econometrics.
Recommendations for future research
Future research can develop towards:
- Expanding research issues to consider at the level of the acquiring company: CEO’s
behavior, non-financial factors viewed from the lens of the acquiring company, such as
market strategy, competitiveness, product and market policy.
- Studying the influence of the external information environment on the M&A
decision-making behavior of the acquiring company and the target company, such as policy
risks and quality of independent auditing.
- Studying the relationship between capital market development and M&A market.
- Conducting a research on the basis of samples including types of acquisitions: asset
purchases, leveraged buyout (LBO) deals, management buyout (MBO).
- Expanding the scope of consideration of the influence of the information
environment and corporate governance on cross-border acquisitions, considering completed
and incomplete deals.

LIST OF PUBLISHCATIONS DISCLOSED FROM THIS THESIS
No. Journal article Journal Year
1 Lựa chọn hình thức mua lại trong thị trường Tạp chí Kinh tế & Phát 01/2017
M&A ngành ngân hàng Việt Nam triển
2 Ảnh hưởng của môi trường thể chế quốc gia Tạp chí Nghiên cứu 02/2018
đến việc lựa chọn hình thức mua lại Kinh tế
Does target corporate governance affect the International
3 Conference on 2018
acquirers’ownership decisions? Evidence
Accounting and Finance
from Vietnam
(ICOAF 2018)
4
Môi trường thông tin của công ty và hành vi
Tạp chí Nghiên cứu 09/2019
nâng giá cổ phiếu trong thị trường M&A
Kinh tế
Việt Nam
5 Quản trị lợi nhuận và quyết định khu vực Tạp chí Kinh tế và phát 10/2019
sáp nhập ở Việt Nam triển
Giám đốc điều hành và tỷ suất sinh lời của
Tạp chí Nghiên cứu 12/2019
6 doanh nghiệp: Bằng chứng thực nghiệm tại
Kinh tế
Việt Nam
7
Thực trạng quản trị công ty và một số ảnh
Tạp chí Khoa học & 10/2019
hưởng đến hoạt động sáp nhập, mua lại tại
Công nghệ, ĐHĐN
Việt Nam
Book Chapter: “Test of the Strategic Market Book Series – Vietnam
8 and the Global 2020
Entry Hypothesis – Evidence from
Economy, World
Corporate Governance in Vietnam”
Scientific Publishing.
Proceedings of the 16th
International
Corporate governance and firm’s financial Conference on
9 performance: Case study of listed Knowledge-Based 11/2020
companies on HANOI stock exchange Economics and Global
Management, 301-306,
Southern Taiwan
Firm Financial Performance: A Review on
International Journal of
10 Business and 06/2021
Accounting & Market-Based Approach Management Invention
(IJBMI)

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