Moral Motivation Across Ethical TheoriesWhat Can We Learn.docx

Moral Motivation Across Ethical Theories:
What Can We Learn for Designing
Corporate Ethics Programs?
Simone de Colle
Patricia H. Werhane
ABSTRACT. In this article we discuss what are the
implications for improving the design of corporate ethics
programs, if we focus on the moral motivation accounts
offered by main ethical theories. Virtue ethics, deonto-
logical ethics and utilitarianism offer different criteria of
judgment to face moral dilemmas: Aristotle’s virtues of
character, Kant’s categorical imperative, and Mill’s greatest
happiness principle are, respectively, their criteria to
answer the question ‘‘What is the right thing to do?’’ We
look at ethical theories from a different perspective: the
question we ask is ‘‘Why should I do the right thing?’’ In
other words, we deal with the problem of moral moti-

vation, and we examine the different rationale the main
ethical theories provide. We then point out the relation
between moral motivation and the concept of rationality
in the different approaches – is acting morally seen as an
expression of rational behavior? Our analysis of moral
motivation provides a useful framework to improve the
understanding of the relationships between formal and
informal elements of corporate ethics programs,
emphasizing the importance of the latter, often over-
looked in compliance-focused programs. We conclude
by suggesting that the concept of moral imagination can
provide a unifying approach to enhance the effectiveness
of corporate ethics programs, by providing an intangible
asset that supports the implementation of their formal
components into management decision making.
KEY WORDS: moral motivation, moral imagination,
corporate ethics programs, Kant, Aristotle, Mill
Introduction

Virtue ethics, deontological ethics, and utilitarianism
are often presented and discussed as different ethical
theories by reason of the different criteria of judgment
they are based upon. Aristotle’s ethics of virtue, Kant’s
categorical imperative and Mill’s greatest happiness principle
are their different moral criteria to find an answer to
the question ‘‘What is the right thing to do?’’ when facing
a moral dilemma. Various authors – such as Donaldson
and Werhane (1979), Velasquez (1982), De George
(1986), Boatright (1993), Beauchamp and Bowie
(1997), and many others – have provided examples of
how different ethical theories can be applied to
analyze and discuss ethical issues in business (the year
refers to the date of the first edition).
Since the aim of this article is to discuss the
implications of the main ethical theories for
improving the design of today’s corporate ethics
programs, we look at ethical theories from a

different perspective. Our focus is less on the situ-
ation and more on the actor who is taking a moral
decision: the question we asks is not ‘‘What is the
right thing to do?’’ but rather ‘‘Why should I do the
right thing?’’ In other words, we deal with the
problem of moral motivation.
The structure of the article is the following: in the
first three sections, we examine the different per-
spectives on moral motivation elaborated within
Aristotelian ethics, of virtue, Kantian deontological
ethics and Mill’s utilitarianism. After summarizing the
main argumentations they offer to judge what
determines the moral worth of an action – that is, their
normative content – we discuss what kind of rationale
they provide to support the motivational aspects of
their theory – that is, their descriptive explanation of
causation of moral behavior. A particular aspect that
we will point out is the relation between moral

motivation and the concept of rationality in the dif-
ferent ethical perspectives: is acting morally seen as an
expression of rational behavior? If so, how is rational
behavior defined in each perspective?
Journal of Business Ethics (2008) 81:751–764 � Springer 2007
DOI 10.1007/s10551-007-9545-7
On the basis of this analysis, in the following
section, we discuss the implications for promoting
ethical behavior within organizations in light of the
different moral motivation perspectives. How would
Aristotle, Kant, and Mill design a corporate ethics
program, if they were the Ethics Officers of a
modern corporation? What elements would they
emphasize, to ensure an effective implementation of
the formal elements of a corporate ethics program,
considering their conceptualization of the moral
motivation problem? After presenting this hypo-

thetical conversation among these three great moral
philosophers, we conclude by suggesting that the
concept of moral imagination (Werhane, 1999) offers a
unifying perspective from which any ethical theory
can converge. We argue that – within each of the
three different moral motivation accounts discussed
– moral imagination can be recognized as a valuable
intangible asset that can support an effective imple-
mentation of the formal components of corporate
ethics programs into daily management decision
making. We believe that Aristotle, Kant, and Mill
would all agree, if they were Ethics Officers in to-
day’s corporations.
Aristotelian virtue ethics: morality as
fulfillment of natural capacities
In Nichomachean Ethics (EN) Aristotle begins his
ethical inquiry by stating that happiness (eudaimonia)
is what any rational human being seeks to achieve:

happiness is ‘‘the highest of all the goods achievable in
action’’ (EN: I, 1095a). In order to avoid misleading
conceptions, Aristotle clarifies that the real meaning
of happiness consists in ‘‘a certain sort of activity of the
soul in accord with virtue’’ (EN: I, 1099b). Happiness is,
therefore, an activity that entails the true fulfillment
of the human nature: living in happiness means to
live the good life for a rational human being.
How can human beings reach happiness?
According to Aristotle, the answer relies on the
development of virtue. A virtue is defined as the
actualization of a potential: human beings are not
born good or bad by nature, but have the capacity to
become good if they develop their virtues, or bad if
indulge in vices.
By developing and practicing virtues, we develop
our capacities and natural dispositions to do the right
thing in any situation. And, we can actually do

more: in fact, we develop our willingness to do the
right thing as well. This is a crucial passage for the
purposes of our discussion on moral motivation, and
deserves to be emphasized. According to Aristotle,
developing her virtues not only help the rational
agent to identify the right conduct to pursue: they
also provide a motivation for doing the right thing,
because by doing so she will live the good life: ‘‘The
belief that the happy person lives well and does well also
agrees with our account, since we have virtually said that
the end is a sort of living well and doing well’’ (EN: I,
1098b).
Among the virtues of thought, practical wisdom
(phronesis, also translated as ‘prudence’) plays a very
important role in the real, hard choices of day life
that support the development of virtues: it is the
ability of a person to ‘‘to deliberate finely about things
that are good and beneficial for himself...about what sort of

things promote living well in general’’ (EN: VI, 1140a).
Still, people of good character sometimes make the
morally wrong decisions, even if they know that
what they are doing is wrong. Why can this happen?
Aristotle describes a number of these puzzling
examples of ‘irrational behavior’ and argues that they
are explained by ‘‘incontinence,’’ which can be
described as the prevalence of (wrong) emotions on
(correct) reason: ‘‘The continent person seems to be the
same as one who abides by his rational calculation; and the
incontinent person seems to be the same as one who
abandons it. The incontinent person knows that his actions
are base, but does them because of his feelings, whereas the
continent person knows that his appetites are base, but
because of reason does not follow them’’ (EN, VII,
1145b).
Emotions can, therefore, fade the moral motiva-
tion of well-intended person, but it is important also

to note that for Aristotle this does not imply that we
have to deny our emotions to be able to act ethically:
rather, what we need to do is to cultivate the right
emotions, as these will in fact reinforce our moral
motivation. As Hartman (2000) points out, coher-
ently with his assumption that the virtuous person
has a disposition not only to do the right thing, but
to enjoy doing the right thing, Aristotle does not
consider emotions being in general a threat for
correct decision making but, on the contrary, thinks
that emotions in the virtuous person are aligned with
reason.
1
752 Simone de Colle and Patricia H. Werhane
As we will discuss later, this account of moral
motivation raises one fundamental issue, concerning
the problematic relation between the ‘‘free will’’ and
the ‘‘natural disposition’’ elements of Aristotelian

theory. But, before addressing this issue, let’s
examine how the other ethical theories address the
issue of moral motivation.
Kantian ethics: morality springing from
reason
One key element of Kantian ethics is the idea that
the moral worth of any action relies entirely on the
motivation of the agent: human behavior cannot be
said good or bad in light of the consequences it
generates, but only with regards to what moved the
agent to act in that particular way. Kant states this
very clearly in the opening line of the Groundwork of
the Metaphysics of Morals: ‘‘It is impossible to think of
anything at all in the world, or indeed even beyond it, that
could considered good without limitation except a good
will’’ (AK 4: 393).
But what are the motives that guide human
action? Kant introduces the key concept of duty to

clarify the rationale underpinning his moral theory,
by analyzing three different types of motivation:
• Actions from duty: These are actions that are
really undertaken for the sake of duty itself,
that is, done because the agent think they
are the right thing to do. No consideration
of purpose of the action matters, but only
whether the action respect a universal moral
law;
• Actions by immediate inclination: Everyone has
some inclinations, such as to preserve one’s
life, or to preserve honor. These are also
duties that have worth in their own sake.
But acting according to the maxim that these
inclinations might suggests – such as taking
care of one’s own health – lacks for Kant
true moral worth. For example, a charitable
person who donates some goods to poor
people might do it following her inclination

to help the others – that is, because she
enjoys helping the others.
2
This for Kant is
not a moral motivation, even if the action is
in conformity with duty. The person acting
from duty would in fact donate to the other
because she recognizes that helping the others
is her moral obligation;
3
• Actions impelled by some other inclination: This
third type of motivation include actions that
can be done in conformity with duty, yet
are not done from duty, but rather as a mean
to some further end. In order to illustrate
this type of motivation, Kant provides the
following example. A shopkeeper who does
not overcharge the inexperienced customer
and treats all customers in the same way

certainly is doing the right thing – that is,
acts in conformity with duty – but we
cannot say for sure that he is acting in this
way because he is moved by the basic princi-
ples of honesty: ‘‘it is his advantage (preserving
his reputation with clients) that requires it’’.
Moreover, we cannot say that he is moved
by a immediate inclination toward his
customers, since he gives no preference to
one with respect to another. Therefore,
concludes Kant, ‘‘his action was done neither
from duty nor from immediate inclination but
merely for purposes of self-interest’’ (AK 4: 397).
This explains why for Kant what makes an action
‘the right thing to do’ has to be found in the agent’s
intention: ‘‘For, in the case of what is to be morally good it
is not enough that it conform with the moral law but it must
also be done for the sake of the law; without this, that

conformity is only very contingent and precarious, since a
ground that is not moral will indeed now and then produce
actions contrary to the law’’. (AK, 4:390).
4
And ulti-
mately, what gives to the agent’s morally good
volition the force to cause her action in accordance
with it – in other words, what morally moves the
agent to act in conformity with the moral law orig-
inates from the agent’s reason itself. It is the reason,
by enabling human beings to develop their moral
thoughts, that at the same time provides an incentive
for us to behave in conformity with them: we make,
using Kant’s words, our moral thoughts become our
own maxim to act in the way they suggest.
5
Kant does not disregard the role of emotions in
providing a support to act in conformity with the
moral law, recognizing the fact that it is both

impossible to know when an action is done purely
Moral Motivation Across Ethical Theories 753
from duty and that is in any case ‘‘unlikely to occur given
the complexity of humans’ moral psychology’’ (Muthu,
2003: 151). Therefore, even if the influence of
emotions, feelings, and passions ultimately represents
for Kant non-moral motivations to act, as they can at
least support human behavior and guide it toward
actions that respect the others as ends in themselves.
Mill’s utilitarianism: morality based on ‘the
social feelings of mankind’
Utilitarianism’s answer to the question ‘‘What is the
right thing to do?’’ is apparently simple and
straightforward, and can be summarized as follows:
‘‘in every situation, one should act in such a way that
will result in the greatest overall happiness.’’ This
expresses the founding principle of utilitarianism

called by Mill (1871) the ‘‘Greatest Happiness Prin-
ciple’’ (GHP): ‘‘Actions are right in proportion as they
tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce
the reverse of happiness’’ (Utilitarianism, 2.2.2). The
consequentialistic approach of utilitarian ethics was
almost naturally adopted by the self-interest, utility-
maximization axioms of the neoclassical homo
economicus, which dominated economic theory for
almost a century and still represents the mainstream
model of human behavior currently applied by
economists, despite a growing literature demon-
strating its theoretical fallacies – see for example, the
key contribution by Simon (1955) and Sen (1977) –
and providing empirical evidence of its inconsistence
with real human behavior (e.g., Kahneman and
Twersky, 1979). However, to reduce Mill’s utilitar-
ianism to the selfish utility-maximization paradigm
would be a simplistic understanding of his moral

theory, failing to recognize a number of key aspects,
as Werhane (1991) and Gustafson (2001) have
pointed out.
6
But, what is Mill’s answer to the question ‘‘Why
should I do the right thing?’’ Mill explicitly address
the issue of moral motivation in the third chapter of
Utilitarianism, entitled ‘‘Of the ultimate sanction of the
principle of utility,’’ which he opens by asking the
fundamental question that concerns ‘‘any supposed
moral standard: What is its sanction? What are the
motives to obey to it? Or more specifically, what is the
source of its obligation? Whence does it derive its binding
force?’’ (Utilitarianism, 3.1.1). The use of the word
sanction in the title of the chapter is already indicating
the direction toward which Mill is looking for an
answer. According to Mill, there are two types of
moral sanctions, on which any moral theory – not
just utilitarianism – is grounded upon: external and

internal sanctions. External sanctions refers to two
different external powers able to influence one’s
moral behavior: the judgment of other people and
God: ‘‘they are, the hope of favour and the fear of
displeasure from our fellow creatures or from the Ruler of
the Universe, along with whatever we may have sympathy
or affection for them, or of love and awe for Him, inclining
us to do his will independently of selfish consequences.’’
(Utilitarianism, 3.3.4). As Gustafson (2001) points
out, despite the fact that usually we think at sanctions
only in negative terms, it is clear that in Mill the
concept of sanction must be understood in both
positive and negative sense: they include both the
fear of punishment or reprimand from external
powers (our peers, the Government, God) and the
hope of favor with other people, and sympathy and
affection for others. On the other hand, internal
sanctions refer to the sense of duty, which is present

in human consciousness. Mill defines the internal
sanction of duty as ‘‘a feeling in our own mind; a pain,
more or less intense, attendant on violation of duty, which
in properly cultivated moral natures rises, in the more
serious cases, into shrinking from it as impossibility’’
(Utilitarianism, 3.4.2). If external sanctions refers to
external consequences (positive or negative) due to
the influence of other people (or God), internal
sanctions deal with the power of the individual
themselves: the idea of duty is in fact based on the
essence of conscience, the ‘‘compiled collections of inner
feelings, desires, and sentiments which themselves constitute
a motivating power within us, apart from any outside
responsibility’’ (Gustafson, 2001). Internal moral
sanctions seem therefore to be, according to Mill,
the most important ground for morality: ‘‘the ultimate
sanction, therefore, of all morality (external motives apart)
being a subjective feeling in our own minds...’’ (Utilitari-

anism, 3.5.1). Toward the end of chapter three, Mill
states his final answer: the foundation of morality –
or, in other words, the most important support for
moral motivation – is based on a feeling of sympathy
toward others in society: ‘‘This firm foundation is that
of the social feelings of mankind; the desire to be in unity
with our fellow creatures, which is already a powerful
principle in human nature, and happily one of those which
tend to become stronger, even without express inculcation,
from the influences of advancing civilization.’’ (Utilitari-
anism, 3.10.1). But, upon what basis are such social
feelings grounded? Mill says that the moral feelings
are not innate, but can be acquired through educa-
tion and habituation to the sense of community, the
value of cooperation and concern for the others. In
this process of moral education and socialization,

literature, poetry, and other forms of art play a
crucial role in developing moral sensitivity, as
discussed by Gustafson (2001).
Moral motivation explanations and rational
behavior
We have seen that for Aristotle, Kant, and Mill
acting according to the moral criterion of their
general ethical theories – namely according to virtue,
the categorical imperative and the greatest happiness
principle – represents at the same time acting in
accordance with the agent’s rationality. But what
concept of rationality these thinkers had in mind? It
appears that their ideas of human rationality differ in
substantial ways.
A distinction between two types of rationality
suggested by the philosopher and economist John
Harsanyi – namely between goal-directed and criterion-
satisfying rationality – seems to be useful for discussing

the concept of rationality in Aristotle, Kant and Mill.
As Harsanyi (1999) points out, our understanding of
rational behavior is often referring to behavior
involving a choice of the best means available for
achieving a given end – that is, we are thinking at a
goal-directed behavior. The means-ends conception of
rationality became the main assumption of economic
theory, where it has been used to predict human
behavior – such as the choices of the producer or the
consumer – assuming that their rational choices will
simply coincide with what they should do in order
to attain their given preferences, or ends.
7
However,
this is not the only conception of rationality, and
even in every day life we use another model of
rational behavior. Harsanyi makes the example of
someone whose aim is to climb the highest moun-

tain in California: for this person, climbing Mount
Whitney would be the rational thing to do. But
climbing Mount Whitney cannot be said to be the
best means to achieve her aim, as climbing that
particular mountain is her aim. In other words,
saying that for this person climbing Mount Whitney
is the rational thing to do, we are not referring to a
goal-oriented idea of rationality, but to another type
of rational behavior. Harsanyi argues that this second
type of rationality can be defined as criterion-satisfying
rationality.
In Aristotelian virtue ethics, we find a similar idea.
According to Aristotle, the problem of moral
motivation is in some way a false problem: there is
an intrinsic coherence between the end, living the
good life (by developing the virtue of character) and
the mean, developing a virtuous character (by acting
virtuously). The motivation for doing the right thing

arises from the fact that the virtuous person will
rationally (and through habit) become aware of this,
and naturally enjoy doing the right thing. As Hart-
man notes, ‘‘...the question whether there is any selfish
reason to be moral is not a straightforward question: for a
person of good character, being moral is selfish in the sense
that it is what one enjoys’’ (Hartman, 1998: 549).
Aristotle believes that rational (and virtuous) agents
will, therefore, act morally and in accordance with
their self-interest. It is precisely the capacity to be
aware and autonomously deliberate what are the
right things to do that qualifies ethical behavior for
Aristotle: an action is not good or bad in se, because
to assess whether someone’s behavior is ethical it
depends on the intentions that moved that person to
act in that way.
One fundamental issue with this view lies in the
duality between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation for

virtue ethics. On one side, the good life is the external
end that any rational agent is autonomously trying to
achieve. At the other side, however, the good life is
the fulfillment of the intrinsic function of human
beings. In other words, the good life is at the same time
the expression of an autonomous, subjective choice of
free rational agents, and the necessary, objective end of
human nature. The Kantian principle ‘ought implies
can’ clearly points out how Aristotle’s view generates a
paradox: if the good life is an intrinsic end, how can
one claim that it is the object of autonomous delib-
eration of the free will as well?
According to Kant, morality is first of all a matter
of the free (and good) will: the moral law is the only
constraint to the will that a free, rational agent accept
to impose to herself, therefore, the idea of fulfilling
a pre-ordinated plan constrained by nature is unac-

ceptable. Kant’s concept of rationality is criterion-
satisfying as in Aristotle, but the role of reason is much
more central in his moral theory. Reason not only
enables the agent to identify the moral law, but also
provides her with the incentives to act in accordance
with it: moral motivation is springing from pure
reason.
On the relation between morality and self-inter-
est, Kant rejects Aristotle’s view of ‘harmony’:
morality ultimately concerns how one treats the
other human beings, and therefore cannot always
coincide with self-interest.
8
In Mill, the concept of rationality is closer to the
first type described by Harsanyi, expressing the goal-
directed rational behavior. Without falling into the
simplistic – and hugely problematic – Bentham’s
‘hedonic calculus’ meant to measure the amount of

happiness generated by any action, Mill thinks that
people use their reason to identify the best way to
achieve their ultimate end, according to the Greatest
Happiness Principle. However, we can also read
Mill’s utilitarianism as expressing a criterion-satisfy-
ing rationality, if we look at the explanation of moral
motivation discussed above, which points out the
key role of moral feelings in choosing which ends the
person is going to try to achieve, and not just which
means are best to achieve a given end. In fact, Mill
does not give to reason the highest place of impor-
tance in his moral theory, nor in his account for
moral motivation. More important is the role of
moral sentiments, which determine the use that any
person will do of her reason: acting unethically is not
a failure of reason, but a lack of appropriate moral
feelings. A person who fails to develop her moral
feelings will for Mill use her reason to adopt the

utilitarian principle in an egoistic, self-interested
way, looking for consequences that maximizes her
own welfare, without any concerns for the welfare
of others. Once moral sentiments are acquired, on
the contrary, Mill’s utilitarianism becomes a much
more socially oriented moral theory, in which the
self-oriented interests tend to converge and find
their own satisfaction in the appreciation of the
welfare of society at large:
9
‘‘The deeply rooted
conception which every individual even now has of himself
as a social being, tends to make him feel it one of his
natural wants that there should be harmony between his
feelings and aims and those of his fellow creatures.’’
(Utilitarianism, 3.11.11).
The table below provides an overview of the key
elements on moral motivation within the ethical

theories by Aristotle, Kant and Mill, their concept of
rationality and the role of emotions for moral
motivation (Table I).
Implications of different moral motivation
accounts for ethics programs design
Corporate ethics programs include a range of
different activities, processes and management tools,
such as promulgating codes of ethics or ethics poli-
cies, nominating an ethics and/or compliance officer,
establishing a confidential hot/help line, promoting
communication activities on the organization’s ethics
policies and standards, providing ethics training
courses to managers and employees, setting up an
internal ethical audit and monitoring system, and
many other approaches.
In practice, all the above-mentioned elements are,
according to the US Federal Sentencing Guidelines
(2005), the formal elements that organizations should

consider when designing an ethics and compliance
program. As indicated by Tenbrunsel et al. (2003),
formal elements of corporate ethics programs can be
defined are ‘‘those that are documented and stan-
dardized, visible to anyone inside or outside the
organization.’’ In addition, the Guidelines also
emphasize the importance of informal elements
(namely: organizational culture, values and other
intangibles aspects): the Guidelines states clearly that,
in order for the ethics compliance program to be
effective, corporations should ‘‘promote an organiza-
tional culture that encourages ethical conduct.’’
10
Both
formal and informal components are therefore
essential elements for an effective implementation of
corporate ethics programs. However, the Guidelines
say very little about how organizations can address
and strengthen the informal part of their ethics

programs.
In this section, we try to throw light on this rather
dark side of ethics programs. We here discuss what
are the implications of the different perspectives
underpinning moral motivation within each major
ethical theory for enhancing the effectiveness of
corporate ethics programs. In other words, we ask
what is, in light of each moral motivation perspec-
tive, the best way to support ethical behavior within
organizations? If Aristotle, Kant or Mill were the
Ethics Officer of a modern corporation in charge of
the design of the organization’s ethics program, what
would they do to differently to strengthen employ-
ees’ moral motivation within organizations?
Aristotle as ethics officer: building the manager with
‘good character’

For Aristotle ethical behavior is about virtue, not
compliance with rules or principles: therefore, from
the perspective of virtue ethics, an ethics program
merely focused on a compliance-approach would
not able to generate the necessary moral motivation
to support its implementation. Instead, to be
effective a corporate ethics program designed
according to Aristotelian ethics should focus pri-
marily on creating an organizational environment
that supports the development of good character
for managers and employees. This could mean, for
example, engaging in ethics discussions, workshops
and other training activities within the organiza-
tion, rather than focusing on the creation of prin-
ciples and rules of conduct to comply with. As we
have pointed out above, the importance of ethics
training is widely recognized and emphasized
within compliance-oriented ethics programs as

well: ‘‘conducting effective training programs and other-
wise disseminating information appropriate to [such]
individuals respective roles and responsibilities’’ is one of
the key elements indicated by the US Federal
Sentencing Guidelines. However, what is impor-
tant to note is that ethics training courses designed
in the Aristotelian perspective would have some
distinctive characteristics: they would not aim at
teaching different ethical analytical frameworks or
communicating general principles for ethical deci-
sion-making (‘top-down’ approach generated and
controlled by the management), but would rather
aim at providing a dialectical conversation
encouraging individual participants to develop
their own character (‘bottom-up’ approach,
promoting employees participation and individual
TABLE I
Moral motivation across ethical theories

Ethical
theory
Normative
moral
criterion:
What is the right
thing to do?
Moral
motivation
narrative:
Why should I
do the right thing?
Moral
motivation
locus
Concept
of rationality
Role of emotions

for moral motivation
Aristotelian
virtue ethics
Act
according
to virtue
Be virtuous: it
will make you
happy as well
Intrinsic
(natural
pre-disposition)
and extrinsic
(happiness)
Criterion-
satisfying
(moral action =
action by virtue)

Reinforcing:
right emotions
(to be developed)
can reinforce
moral motivation
Kantian ethics Act
according
to the categorical
imperative
Follow your
reason: act
according to
the moral law
within yourself
Intrinsic
(reason)
Criterion-
satisfying

(moral action =
action from duty)
Residual:
emotions can
induce actions in
conformity with
the moral law,
but they are only
non-moral motivation
Mill’s
utilitarianism
Act
according to
the Greatest
Happiness
Principle (GHP)
Act according
to the GHP

(for society):
it will also bring
happiness (to you)
Intrinsic
(conscience)
and extrinsic
(external
sanctions)
Goal-directed
(utility maximization)
and criterion-satisfying
(rule-utilitarianism)
Fundamental:
the (acquired)
moral feelings
are the ultimate
binding force
for moral behavior

responsibility), for example discussing case-studies,
helping them to focus on the virtues and practical
wisdom they need to acquire in order to become a
good manager and a good employee. They would
also probably challenge some common assumptions
of the mainstream business paradigm, such as the
creed that financial performance is the only mea-
sure of corporate success, and suggest the idea that
the values the virtuous person lives by should be
the same at home as well as in the office: in an
Aristotelian perspective, having to abide to inco-
herent principles ‘‘would be no way to flourish, for the
same reason that a deceptive life is no way to flourish’’
(Hartman, 2000: 69). In Table II we summarize the
key elements of an Aristotelian approach to ethics
programs, offering as well a ‘corporate motto’ that

could be used as a communication tool.
Kant as ethics officer: developing the company’s values and
principles
Probably the most useful implication of the Kan-
tian ethics for management theory is the idea that
stakeholders are to be considered like ends in
themselves, and not as means to achieve some
other (corporate) end. But, on a more practical
level, it is difficult – and probably not very useful
– the attempt to translate a strict Kantian approach
in corporate ethics programs. In fact, one can
agree with ethicist – such as Norman Bowie –
who have argued that the application of the
categorical imperative should not be taken as an
absolutistic approach, but, on the contrary, as an
overarching principle that ‘‘provides flexibility in
ethics’’ (Bowie 1999: 25). According to Bowie, the
Kantian perspective suggest to consider the

corporation as a ‘moral community’ based on
organizational structure and rules that support
human freedom, encourage workers participation
and treat in a fair way all stakeholders.
The Kantian idea of the moral law can be inter-
preted within the context of a business organization
as the search for corporate values and principles,
stated in the corporate Mission or code of ethics,
which identify a set of principles-based ethics.
Nevertheless, one must also recognize that the
‘ought’ language of universal moral laws or corpo-
rate codes of ethics is not a familiar way of thinking
in managerial decision-making. In front of the
complexity of the many different ‘communities’ that
need to be taken into consideration in today’s
business decision making, a somehow more prag-
matic approach seems to be more useful.
11
In conclusion, a corporate ethics program

designed according to Kantian ethics would focus on
the identification of corporate values and principles
norms best reflecting the moral law that should
guide all the members of that particular organization.
The moral motivation to support the program’s
implementation is for Kant to be found in the
managers themselves – namely in their capacity of
moral reasoning, enabling them to discover the
reasons to make business decisions ‘for duty.’
Mill as ethics officer: balancing internal and external
sanctions
What are the implications of Mill’s explanation of
moral motivation for enhancing ethical decision-
making within organizations? Looking at Mill’s
analysis of the different types of moral sanctions, its
main implication seems to be the need for a balance
between internal and external sanctions. Translated
into the business world, his account of moral

motivation suggests that manager will be motivated
to act morally – that is, they will orient their deci-
sions toward the Greatest Happiness Principle – if
they demonstrate two kinds of capacities:
(a) The capacity to acquire appropriate moral
feelings to appreciate the value of coopera-
tion and society’s welfare (thereby taking
decisions that are satisfying not only their
own interests, or the interests of the share-
holders, but also by trying to achieve the
greatest happiness for all the company
stakeholders, in general); and
(b) The capacity of being aware (and thereby
proactively act in managerial terms) of the
possible external benefits of ethical behavior
(such as corporate awards; reputational
effects; customer and employee loyalty, etc.)
and negative sanctions (such as fines by regula-

tive public authorities; cost of litigation; loss
of customers; high employee turn over, etc.)
of unethical behavior.
In terms of designing corporate ethics programs,
these two considerations seems to imply that Mill, as
an Ethics Officer, would recommend a balanced
approach between two core elements:
(a) Moral education programs – such as ethics
training courses – specifically designed to
help managers and employees in acquiring
the appropriate moral feelings (the most
powerful factors of moral motivation accord-
ing to Mill); and
(b) Sustainability management/Corporate Social
Responsibility (CSR) processes – such as
sustainability reporting initiatives or CSR

management standards
12
– that help the
management to integrate in their decision-
making processes a careful considerations of
the social, ethical, and environmental
impacts of corporate activity on all the orga-
nization’s stakeholder.
A unifying approach: enabling moral
imagination to support ethics
programs implementation
After having pointed out some specific elements that
differentiate the application of the main ethical
theories to the design of corporate ethics programs,
we want to emphasize a concept that, we believe,
can provide a unifying approach to support a more
effective implementation of ethics programs within
organizations – namely the concept of moral imagi-

nation.
Moral imagination has been defined as ‘‘a neces-
sary ingredient in responsible moral judgment’’ that can
enable in particular circumstances to ‘‘discover and
evaluate possibilities not merely determined by that cir-
cumstance, or limited by its operative mental models, or
merely framed by a set of rules or rule-governed concerns.
In managerial decision-making, moral imagination entails
perceiving norms, social roles, and relationships entwined
in any situation.’’ (Werhane, 1999: 93). The
importance of moral imagination resides in the
following idea: within organizations – especially
profit-driven corporations – managers who strive to
success and excellence risk in many cases to find
themselves bounded in a cognitive trap, where only
a narrow, partial perspective on reality emerges as
possible. In such cases, managers’ interpretation of
reality can become distorted and their ability to

exercise moral judgment impeded. In the worse
scenarios, as organizational psychologists demon-
strate, the competitive culture may degenerate into
a neurotic tendency of ‘‘search of glory’’ (Horney,
1950), managers tend to confuse reality with a self-
created world of fiction characterized by collective
folie á deux processes, such as psychotic forms of
illusion of grandeur or depressive delusion of per-
secution (Kets De Vries, 1980), and managerial
decision making may be heavily biased by phe-
nomena of over-confidence – unreasonable optimism
on future outcomes, inconsistency in risk-taking
decisions and excessive confidence on personal
skills (Kahneman and Lovallo, 1993; Camerer and
Lovallo, 1999).
In order to ameliorate these risks, and actively
promote a healthy environment where ethical
decision-making does not require the exercise of

exceptional qualities, and does not constitute a
last-resource process to be activated to face
exceptional circumstances, but rather represents a
normal feature – something like a ‘‘Intel-inside’’
component of strategic managerial processes – the
capacity of moral imagination is a key asset. Its
validity as a mechanism supporting the imple-
mentation of ethics programs, we believe, can be
demonstrated across the different moral motivation
accounts of the main ethical theories. In order to
illustrate this, we identify three different stages in
the process of enabling moral imagination, and
show how they emphasize three separate aspects
that are traceable back to Aristotle, Kant and Mill
respectively.
Disengagement from the context
The first stage of activating moral imagination is to
try to disengage from the particular issue and its

context to discover what mental models are at play.
Ethical failures of managerial decision making are
often the result not of weak moral development or a
lack of understanding of what is right or wrong, but
rather of a poor awareness of the moral implications
and social consequences of ‘business decisions.’
13
Moral imagination begins to act at this level. Starting
with the particular event, behavior or decision that
are at stake, it enables free reflection and imaginative
thinking on the ethical standards to be applied in
complex business decisions: ‘‘Moral imagination begins
with a particular case, scenario, or event in which we be-
come engaged as thick social selves’’ (Werhane, 1999:
103).
14
This means asking questions, such as: ‘‘What

motivates the decision-makers in this context?,’’
‘‘What conflicts are at stake?,’’ and ‘‘Is anyone in-
volved in the decision-making process over-confi-
dent or deluded into a distorted perspective?’’ From
the Aristotelian perspective, as we have already
pointed out, since moral motivation relies on the
development and practicing of virtues, corporate
ethics programs should be designed to facilitate a
dialectic conversation among corporate members, as
a way to provide a process for training their capacity
of moral judgment and thereby contributing to a
virtuous ‘character’ building – which ultimately
support ethical decision-making within organiza-
tions. We argue that the role of moral imagination in
this process would be essential: to develop and apply
moral principles, managers need first to reach an
appropriate understanding of the complex circum-
stances of reality that they are facing (perception); in

this activity, it is their imagination (phantasia) that
guides their understanding: ‘‘Aristotle sometimes say
that nous (understanding) is at work in correct perception’’
(Hartman, 2000: 60). By exercising their under-
standing and disengagement in the process of
developing a capacity of moral imagination,
managers will be less inclined to underestimate
salient aspects – e.g., the ethical implications – in-
volved in complex decisions.
Delving into possibilities
Moral imagination would at the same time be a core
factor supporting the implementation of a ‘neo-
Kantian’ corporate ethics program, because the
capacity of moral imagination is a necessary
complement of practical moral reasoning. This is
because the second stage of developing a robust
moral imagination involves delving into possibilities.
What are some new alternatives in approaching a

particular issue? What societal, corporate and per-
sonal values are at stake? Do any of these challenges
the status quo? In this stage, it is the combination of
moral imagination with moral reasoning that enables
creative moral managerial decision making. A cor-
porate ethics program embracing the idea of moral
imagination (i.e., aiming at training decision makers
in exercising their capacity for imaginative thinking)
would therefore be consistent with a neo-Kantian
approach, in the sense that it would still aim at
developing moral standards representing the balance
between the initial, context-based moral intuitions
and the imaginative reflection that de-contextualize
the thinking from the thick self.
15
Moral imagination
here can be seen as activating a thought process
similar to the Rawls’s notion of reflective equilibrium:
by continuously going back and forth between the

(specific) case at hand and the (general) company
mission and values; between the local culture, social
norms and traditions and more abstract personal
values and moral principles, managers will be able to
think through the issues they are facing and reinforce
their motivation to ethical decision making. This
does not mean that managers engaging in this pro-
cess will have to deny their local identities and
parochial interests. On the contrary, they will start
from there, but will put these contextual elements
under moral scrutiny, until, as Rawls (1971) points
out, their ‘considered judgments’, duly pruned and
adjusted, will be in equilibrium with their more
general principles. Instead of the Kantian universal
moral law, however, the kind of moral standards that
we are considering here are rather moral minimums in
the sense that Walzer (1994) and Donaldson (1989)
have pointed out. Moral minimums do represent

widespread agreement across different cultural, social
and historical contexts about what actions are mor-
ally justifiable or (more easily) morally questionable,
but with no claim to be absolute. Their validity
needs to be continuously reaffirmed over time, open
to revision and refinement if new situations or
innovative thinking might enable so – a practical
application example of this dynamic process can be
seen, for example, in the evolution of environmental
standards.
Focus on consequences
Finally, promoting the use of moral imagination
within organizations to support the implementa-
tion of ethics programs would be also justified
from the social utilitarian of John Stuart Mill.
This is because the third stage of developing

moral imagination takes into account practical
issues and consequences. Here one questions the
viability of alternatives at stake. Can these be
operationalized? And what might be the conse-
quences, negative and positive, for all the stake-
holders involved? This approach to moral
imagination is, in fact, consistent with some
fundamental concepts affirmed by Mill, such as
the idea that the Greatest Happiness Principle is
not simply a ‘value-free’ utility-maximization
exercise, but requires to recognize and appreciate
social norms and rules of behavior, and the idea
that to develop ‘moral sensitivity’ is one crucial
task to enable every person to behave ethically.
Too often in modern corporations managers find
themselves trapped in narrow decision-making
frameworks, biased by short-term pressures that
burden their roles and responsibilities, and fail to

integrate in their thinking an adequate apprecia-
tion of social norms and ethical principles. In a
utilitarian perspective, moral imagination allows
managers to connect with the external word, to
‘feel a concern for the welfare of others’, in
Mill’s words – or to take into consideration the
impacts of corporate action on all the organiza-
tion’s stakeholders, to use a modern management
language.
TABLE II
Moral motivation and corporate ethics programs
Ethical theory Characteristics of corporate ethics programs Role
of moral
imagination to
support the
ethics program
Main aim Method Key ethical lead-
ership skills

Corporate
motto
Aristotelian
virtue ethics
Develop the
manager with
‘good character’
Ethics training
based on case
studies and
leadership examples
Practical wisdom
Personal integrity,
Good character
Use the same
rules at home as
well in the office
Moral imagina-

tion enables dis-
engagement from
the context and
discernment
Kantian ethics Develop the
manager’s
capacity of
moral reasoning
to act ‘from
duty’ (accord
ing to the
corporate
Mission)
Discuss case-
studies to
develop/chal
lenge moral
minimums

via a process of
continuous adap-
tation (reflective
equilibrium)
Moral reasoning
Compliance (with
corporate ethics)
Walk the
talk (demon
strating to live
up with the
corporate
Mission and
values)
Moral imagina
tion enables
investigating
new alternatives

and promotes
awareness of
what values are
at stake
Mill’s
utilitarianism
Develop the
manager’s
appropriate
moral feelings
and
Develop man
agerial under
standing of
external
sanctions
Ethics training
designed to

develop moral
feelings;
Ethics/CSR
management
programs & tools
to identify and
measure external
benefits and neg-
ative sanctions for
ethical behavior
Moral feelings
Cost/benefit
analysis (for
all stakeholders)
Act to maximize
overall stake
holder
satisfaction

Moral imagina
tion enables
evaluating the
viability and
consequences of
novel possibil
ities for all
corporate stake
holders involved
In summary, the use of moral imagination can be
considered as a crucial element to enhance the
effectiveness of corporate ethics programs regardless,
whether your Ethics Officer is more incline toward a
virtue ethics, a social utilitarian or a Kantian
perspective: in designing corporate ethics programs
one should not forget this.

Conclusion
By analyzing the different moral motivation rationales
underpinning Aristotelian virtue ethics, Kantian
ethics and Mill’s utilitarianism, we have argued that
this discussion carries two relevant implications:
(a) The explanation of what is the ‘ultimate
binding force’, to use Mill’s words, that
motivates us to do the right thing according to
each ethical theory – that is, their answer to
the problem of moral motivation – brings us
inevitably to consider what concept of
human rationality they are based upon;
(b) The combination of the moral motivation
explanation, the concept of rationality
embedded in any ethical theory, and the
role of moral imagination, have, in turn,
significant implications concerning their
practical application to the design of corpo-

rate ethics programs.
The table below presents a summary of the key as-
pects discussed with regard to the implications for
corporate ethics programs. It is not intended to
provide conclusive arguments, but rather offer a basis
for discussion and suggest further research and
application. In front of the growing – and already
overwhelming – body of corporate social responsi-
bility management standards, stakeholder engage-
ment methods, sustainability reporting
methodologies and other ethics standards that are
currently available or being developed,
16
we believe
that our analysis on moral motivation can provide an
useful framework to improve our understanding of
the factors able to lead to a more effective imple-
mentation of corporate ethics programs, pointing
out the relationship between formal and informal

elements embedded in such programs – an aspect so
far not adequately addressed.
Notes
1
See Ed Hartman (2000: 64).
2
See the comments by Christine M. Korsgaard in
her Introduction of the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of
Morals, Cambridge University Press, 1997.
3
Norman Bowie argues that it is possible to defend
a more flexible interpretation of Kant on this issue, by
recognizing that there might be multiple motives to act –
that is, it is possible that an action is done from duty
and for practical prudence at the same time. See Bowie
(1999: 120–125).
4
The citation method used here refers to the
volume and page number of the Academy (AK) edition.
5

The idea that moral motivation can spring from
reason is rejected by many other philosophical
approaches. W.M. Sibley, for example, refers to the
moral philosophy of Hume (1739), who famously stated
that ‘‘Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the pas-
sions’’ to argue that Kant was wrong in trying to derive
moral behavior from reason: ‘‘...what reason then tells me
is not simply: ‘‘Be reasonable!’’ but rather: ‘‘Be reasonable –
if you have to!’’ It issues only hypothetical imperatives. Hume
is thus correct in seeing that morality does not spring from rea-
son alone.’’ See Sibley (1953: 558).
6
As our purpose here is to discuss the issue of moral
motivation within utilitarian theory, we cannot further
elaborate on this. However, as discussed in Gustafson
(2001), at least the following three points must be no-
ted:
(i)
Utilitarianism is not just about myopian, short-term

maximization: The GHP does not states that the moral
action is the one which generates the greatest actual and
immediate happiness, but the one which tends (as a
general rule) to promote happiness in society in the
long-term;
(ii)
Utilitarianism is not selfish, but social: by differenti-
ating between act and rule utilitarianism, Mill in fact
recognizes the importance of acting in conformity with
rules that ultimately provide for the greatest happiness,
meaning that the theory allows to act in such a way
that is not directly linked with the agent’s immediate
self-interest, if it supports socially desirable rules of con-
duct (in other words, it recognizes the intrinsic impor-
tance attached to following certain rules of behavior,
beyond their instrumental use);
(iii)
Utilitarianism distinguishes higher from lower plea-
sures: ‘‘It is quite compatible with the principle of utility to

recognize the fact that some kinds of pleasure are more desir-
able and more valuable than others.’’ (Utilitarianism,
2.4.26). Higher pleasures – such as justice, noble
feelings and moral sentiments – are ‘intrinsically supe-
rior’ as they are what qualifies human beings; they arise
from the intellect and stimulate our imagination to
think beyond the world of sense.
7
See Harsanyi (1999: 272).
8
As we have discussed in the previous section, for
Kant actions done for self-interest can be in conformity
with duty, but if self-interest is the agent’s primary
motivation, her actions have no genuine moral worth.
9
In fact, Gustafson (2001) uses the term Social Utilitar-
ianism with reference to Mill.
10

US Federal Sentencing Commission Guidelines
Manual, Chapter 8 – Sentencing of Organizations. Part
B – Remedying Harm from Criminal Conduct, and
Effective Compliance and Ethics Program; §8B2.1.
Effective Compliance and Ethics Program.
11
See on this aspect the interesting discussion on the
‘Problem of community’ in Dunham et al. (2006).
12
Such as AA1000 for Stakeholder engagement pro-
cesses; SA8000 for monitoring working conditions
along the supply-chain; OHSHA18000 for health and
safety issue, and many others (see, for example, Leipzi-
ger, 2003).
13
A problem that Freeman (2007) has defined as the
Separation Fallacy: ‘‘It is useful to believe that sentences
like, ‘‘x is a business decision’’ have no ethical content or any
implicit ethical point of view. And, it is useful to believe that
sentences like ‘‘x is an ethical decision, the best thing to do all

things considered’’ have no content or implicit view about
value creation and trade (business)’’. This way of thinking,
suggests Freeman, fails to recognize that almost every
business decision has some ethical content.
14
Rorty (2006) has assumed a more radical position
concerning moral imagination, affirming that ‘‘Her
(Werhane, 1999) book argues that moral imagination is a
necessary but not a sufficient condition for moral decision-mak-
ing. I suspect that it may, in fact, be sufficient as well’’.
Rorty thinks that moral reasoning skills are not useful at
all in the process of moral deliberation: ‘‘I think of moral
imagination not as a supplement to moral theory and moral
reasoning skills, but as pretty much all you need. [...] When
it comes to ‘moral reasoning skills’, I am less certain than
Werhane that there are such things’’. Rorty concludes that
moral motivation is fundamentally time and context-
depending: ‘‘There is no connection between skill at justify-

ing one’s beliefs – rhetorical effectiveness – and having the
right beliefs. Being able to have the right beliefs and to do the
right thing is largely a matter of luck – of being born in a cer-
tain place and a certain time.’’ While the first part of the
argumentation seems valid – there is not a causal rela-
tionship between the agent’s ability to exercise imagina-
tive moral thinking and her actual moral behavior –
Rorty’s conclusion appears dangerous: it risks to throw
the baby out with the bath water. As noted in Werhane
(2006: 405), Rorty’s idea that moral imagination is
‘‘pretty much all you need’’ threatens to reduce moral
judgments to intuition and story-telling. Refusing the
direct causal link between moral imagination and moral
behavior does not imply that moral reasoning skills have
no role to play at all. On the contrary, we believe that
moral reasoning skills can enable the agent to ‘see’ what
is the right thing to do, that is, they help the agent in
identifying possible alternatives for moral actions – which

we do not see how one could reasonably argue as not
being a key phase in the process of choosing to do the
right thing.
15
In ‘‘Thick and Thin’’ Walzer (1994) explains the dis-
tinction between a thin set of universal principles,
which we can think of as a ‘‘core morality’’ shared
across different cultures, which become thick through a
process (or, more precisely, the many different pro-
cesses) of elaboration which reflect cultural, political,
social and historical differences.
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Simone de Colle
The Darden School of Business,

University of Virginia,
P.O. Box 6550, Charlottesville, VA, 22906-6500,
U.S.A.
E-mail: [email protected]
Patricia H. Werhane
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and
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Risky Situations
CMGT/400 Version 2

University of Phoenix Material
Risky Situations
Identify three types of sensitive information involved with each
situation. Then, describe three ways in which each information
item could be misused or harmed. For each of these, note at
least one likely finding that you would include in a risk analysis
report of the organization. Finally, answer the questions at the
end.
Situation 1 – Online Banking System
Information Affected
Potential Harm (Risk)
Likely Finding in Risk Analysis Report

Situation 2 – Facebook Page
(organization or personal – specify which)

Situation 3 – Picture Phones in the Workplace

Situation 4 – E-Commerce Shopping Site

Situation 5 – Real-World Application
(such as CRM, ERP, other internal or external organizational
systems – pick one and specify)

Questions
1. What is the most effective way to identify risks like those
you noted in the tables?
2. What are some important factors when weighing the depth of
a formal risk analysis? How would you balance the interruption
needed for depth and the need to continue ongoing
organizational activity?
3. What should an organization’s risk management specialist do
with the information once a potential risk has been identified?
What information would be needed for senior management to
know the danger of each risk and the proper way to handle the
risk?
4. How would this specialist properly prioritize these risks to

make sure the most important ones were mitigated first?
5. Who is responsible for ensuring that an identified risk is
addressed by the organization? What role does the analyst play?
What role does senior management play? What roles do the
analyst and senior management each play in addressing
organizational risks?
Corporate Reputation Review,
Vol. 10, No. 4, pp. 261–277
© 2007 Palgrave Macmillan Ltd,
1363-3589 $30.00
Corporate Reputation Review Volume 10 Number 4
261www.palgrave-journals.com/crr
ABSTRACT
The need to investigate the link between rep-
utation and responsibility is well established.
This paper answers calls to conduct this com-
parison from a stakeholder perspective. In so
doing a literature review identified models of
reputation that engage with stakeholders from
their inception to measurement, while no such
models of corporate responsibility were found.
A qualitative study to conceptualize responsi-
bility from the perspective of stakeholders was
then conducted. Following this, a formal com-
parison between this conceptualization and

that of reputation models is undertaken. The
results suggest that there is considerable simi-
larity between the concepts of responsibility
and reputation. Implications may include the
use of reputation models as potential measures
for many of the aspects conceptualized as
responsibility. Questions about the causal
relationship between the two concepts are also
discussed.
Corporate Reputation Review (2007) 10, 261 – 277.
doi: 10.1057/palgrave.crr.1550057
KEYWORDS: corporate reputation ; corporate
responsibility ; stakeholders
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, practitioners and academics
have become increasingly interested in rep-
utation and how it relates to other concepts
such as responsibility (eg Brammer and
Pavelin, 2006 ; Fombrun, 2005 ; Andriof and
Waddock, 2002 ). In part, this is because ele-
ments of responsibility have been viewed as
key drivers of reputation. Antecedents of
a good reputation have been suggested
to include embracing CSR standards
( Fombrun, 2005 ), philanthropic giving
( Brammer and Millington, 2005 ) and the
development of trusting relationships with
stakeholders ( MacMillan et al ., 2004 ;
Waddock, 2002 ; Jones, 1995 ).
On the other hand, some theorists suggest
that rather than being an antecedent of rep-
utation, issues relating to the responsibilities
of a business are key attributes in terms of

which an organization ’ s reputation is judged.
Schnietz and Epstein (2005) , for example,
identify social responsibility as a key dimen-
sion of reputation; Tucker and Melewar
(2005) see social responsibility as a critical
element of reputation relevant to crisis man-
agement and Lindgreen and Swaen (2005)
Corporate Responsibility and Corporate
Reputation: Two Separate Concepts
or Two Sides of the Same Coin?
Carola Hillenbrand
The John Madejski Centre for Reputation, School of
Reputation and
Relationships, Henley Management College , Greenlands,
Henley-on-Thames, Oxon , UK
Kevin Money
The John Madejski Centre for Reputation, School of
Reputation and
Relationships, Henley Management College , Greenlands,
Henley-on-Thames, Oxon , UK
Corporate Responsibility and Corporate Reputation
Corporate Reputation Review Vol. 10, 4, 261–277 © 2007
Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. 1363-3589 $30.00262
argue that issues relating to responsibility are
embedded within the functional relation-
ships that underpin business activities. They
suggest, therefore, that there will be a sig-
nifi cant overlap between the reputation for

these activities and the reputation for issues
relating to responsibility.
It is thus not clear from the current lit-
erature how responsibility and reputation
interact. Does responsibility lead to a good
reputation? Or is reputation judged in terms
of issues relating to responsibility and other
characteristics? The key difference between
these two approaches is the following: The
fi rst approach sees responsibility as preceding
reputation, or in other words as bringing
about a good or bad reputation. The second
approach sees responsibility as an inherent
part of reputation, in other words as a key
element in terms of which reputation is des-
cribed. At this stage both, one or neither of
these propositions might be true. This paper,
therefore, sets out to compare these two con-
cepts. To achieve this, the paper follows fi ve
related steps:
1. First, literature relating to reputation is
reviewed.
2. Second, literature relating to responsibility
and its related constructs such as CSR is
reviewed.
3. Third, stakeholder literature is reviewed
with the aim of developing an approach
to bring together literature on reputation
and responsibility.
4. Fourth, the fi ndings of a qualitative
research study are presented.

5. Finally, the conceptualizations of respon-
sibility and reputation are compared and
contrasted with a view to reaching a
better understanding how these concepts
interact.
CORPORATE REPUTATION
Corporate Reputation is a multi-stakeholder
concept that is refl ected in the perceptions
that stakeholders have of an organization
( Smidts et al ., 2001 ). There is much evidence
that reputations with different stakeholder
groups interact. In particular, reputation with
employees is seen to have an impact on
reputation with customers and communities
( Carmeli, 2005 ). When managing their
Corporate Reputation, organizations should
therefore take account of not only their
relationships with stakeholders but also
monitor how stakeholders infl uence each
other ( Dutton et al ., 1994 ).
A review of existing models of Corporate
Reputation reveals a relatively small number
of widely used models, the most prominent
of which seem to be variations of Fortune ’ s
Most Admired Companies List (MAC) and
the Reputation Quotient (RQ) ( Fombrun
and Van Riel, 2004 ; Fombrun, 1996 ). Also
popular but to a lesser extent are models
such as the Corporate Personality Scale
( Davies et al ., 2003 ) and the Stakeholder
Performance Indicator and Relationship
Improvement Tool (SPIRIT) ( MacMillan

et al ., 2004 ). These models differ considerably
in terms of their underlying approach, the
stakeholder they survey and what they meas-
ure ( Mahon, 2002 ).
For example, the MAC List surveys CEOs
and fi nancial analysts about their view of
listed companies in terms of issues such as
innovation, fi nancial soundness, use of cor-
porate assets and social responsibility. The
list was developed by the Fortune ’ s edito-
rial panel in discussion with business leaders
and fi nancial analysts and sought to identify
characteristics that executives and fi nancial
experts admire in companies. Subsequent
analysis of the data revealed that all compo-
nents factored on one underlying dimension,
which can best be described as a fi nancial
dimension ( Fryxell and Wang, 1994 ).
The RQ, on the other hand, can be app-
lied to obtain data on a company ’ s reputation
from the point of view of the general pub-
lic, customers, employees, suppliers and
investors. Although, in practice, surveys with
the general public and customers have been
Hillenbrand and Money
© 2007 Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. 1363-3589 $30.00 Vol. 10, 4,
261–277 Corporate Reputation Review 263
the main focus of research. The model meas-
ures perceptions of an organization in terms

of social expectations of dimensions such as
products and services, vision and leadership,
work place environment and social respon-
sibility. The scale was developed through a
literature review of existing reputation
models followed by focus groups conducted
in ten different countries. The focus groups
asked members of the general public to ans-
wer questions such as ‘ What is Corporate
Reputation? And what aspects make it up? ’
The statistical analysis found evidence for
two distinct factors: those relating to emo-
tional appeal and those relating collectively
to all the other dimensions.
The Corporate Personality Scale surveys
customers and employees in terms of their
perceptions of organization ’ s personality,
focusing on dimensions such as agreeableness,
machismo, competence and enterprise. The
scale was developed by extending the Aaker
branding scale from the level of brands to
that of organizations. This was done by ana-
lyzing corporate websites for descriptions of
corporate character, conducting focus groups
in which customers and employees were
asked to describe the characteristics of orga-
nizations ‘ as if they had come to life ’ and
searching for terms used to describe person-
ality. Items were generated and tested on
thousands of customers and employees. A
factor analysis was used to confi rm and
refi ne the components in the scale.
The SPIRIT model can be applied to
survey Corporate Reputation from the per-

spective of many stakeholder groups of a
business including, for example, customers,
employees, suppliers, investors and commu-
nity groups. SPIRIT measures Corporate
Reputation in terms of three areas, namely,
the experience, feelings and intentions of
stakeholders towards a business. Experiences
of stakeholders include the way a business
informs and listens to stakeholders, the
material and non-material benefi ts a business
provides to stakeholders and outside
infl uences such as experience of what the
media has to say about a business or how a
business treats other stakeholder groups.
Feelings refer to the level of trust and posi-
tive emotions that stakeholders feel towards
a business. Intentions of stakeholders meas-
ure the likelihood that stakeholders will sup-
port the business in the future, for example
through stakeholder retention, advocacy and
cooperation. The scale was developed
through a literature review of reputation,
marketing and psychology literature and fol-
lowed by focus groups and interviews. The
concepts in the model were modifi ed and
refi ned and questionnaires were developed
to measure aspects in the model. These were
distributed to 8,000 stakeholders of different
kinds across three different continents. Sta-
tistical Techniques, such as factor analysis and
structural equation modeling, confi rmed the
independence of the measures and the pro-
posed links between reputation, its causes
and consequences.

These models are now summarized in
Table 1 with reference to their main features.
As described in Table 1 , models differ from
each other according to their underlying
approach, the stakeholders they survey and
what they measure. The way a model is
developed and the underlying assumptions
of theorists have an impact on when it is
most appropriate to use different models. For
example, it is important to consider when it
is appropriate to use a personality metaphor
or a relationship metaphor and to consider
what useful data could be obtained from dif-
ferent stakeholder groups. We have already
stated we will take a stakeholder perspective
and this means focussing on models that
ely up on stakeholder expectations in their
underlying approach. Since the RQ and
SPIRIT models are developed with stake-
holder perceptions and expectations as
their fundamental starting points, these
two models will be used as a basis for the
comparison with a conceptualization of
responsibility developed from a similar
methodology. While others, such as Davies
et al . (2003) also incorporated customers and
employees in the refi nement of their scales,

their conceptualization does not begin with
stakeholder expectations, but rather with the
application of a personality metaphor.
CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY
Corporate Responsibility (CR) is a concept
in business research with roots in Business and
Society literature ( Andriof and Waddock,
2002 ). In this arena it is used as a broad term
to describe the issues relating to the respon-
sibilities of business. CR is closely linked to
other concepts in the Business and Society
literature, most importantly the concept of
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) (eg
Lockett et al ., 2006 ; Windsor, 2006 ; Moir,
2001 ), but has been differentiated from
CSR as being broader and encompassing
Table 1 : Summary of Reputation Models
Measures of
reputation
Underlying approach Who is surveyed What is measured
MAC list
(Fortune
Magazine)
Reputation described in terms
of characteristics that are
admired by fi nancial analysts,
CEO and journalists
CEOs and

fi nancial analysts
Eight characteristics of reputation (innovation,
fi nancial soundness, employee talent, use of
corporate assets, long-term investment value,
social responsibility, quality of management,
quality of products and services)
Statistical analysis suggest that all eight
characteristics factor on one dimension
Reputation
quotient (RQ)
( Fombrun, 1996 )
Reputation described in
terms of stakeholder
expectations of organizations
Many stakeholder
groups of a business
including the general
public, customers,
employees, suppliers,
investors, etc
Six pillars of reputation (emotional appeal,
products and services, vision and leadership,
workplace environment, fi nancial
performance, social responsibility) Statistical
analysis suggests that the six pillars group
into two dimensions of reputation:
emotional appeal as one dimension and the
remaining pillars as second dimension

Corporate
Personality
Scale ( Davies
et al. , 2003 )
Reputation described
in terms of a
personality-metaphor
Customers and
employees
Seven dimensions of corporate personality
(agreeableness, enterprise, competence, chic,
ruthlessness, machismo, informality) Distinct
dimensions are supported by statistical
analysis
SPIRIT
( MacMillan
et al. , 2004 )
Reputation described in
terms of stakeholder
expectations in business
relationships
Many stakeholder
groups of a business
including customers,
employees, suppliers,
investors, etc

Three dimensions: experiences (including
for example sub-dimensions such as
communication, material benefi ts, experience
of outside infl uences), feelings (including
sub-dimensions trust and positive emotions)
and intentions (including sub-dimensions of
supportive behaviors such as advocacy and
retention of stakeholders towards a business)
Distinct dimensions and sub-dimensions are
supported by statistical analysis
day-to-day operating practices and strategies
of business as well as impacts on society and
the environment ( Ahmad et al ., 2003 ; An-
driof and Waddock, 2002 ). The term CR
drops the word social from previous concep-
tualizations ‘ to signal an emerging sense that
responsibilities are fundamental to all actions,
decisions, behaviours and impacts of business ’
( Waddock, 2003: 15 ). CSR, on the other
hand, can thus usefully be seen as relating
to the specifi c social, philanthropic and
community focussed responsibilities of
business.
CR rather than any of its related concepts
is investigated in this paper for two reasons:
First, there is a growing use and acceptance

within both the practitioner (eg Eco
Conference, 2006 ; EABIS Conference, 2006 ;
Zadek, 2004 ) and academic (eg Andriof and
Waddock, 2002 ; Waddock, 2003 ) communi-
ties for the term CR. Second, CR being a
broad concept, allows for the investigation of
both the social and other aspects of respon-
sibility within the same study ( MacMillan
et al . 2004 ; Waddock, 2003 ). A discussion
about the link between reputation and the
different aspects of responsibility should
therefore ensue.
Despite this distinction, a fundamental
problem in Business and Society literature is
that there is no universally agreed defi nition
of CR or CSR ( Windsor, 2006 ; Garriga and
Mele, 2004 ; Waddock, 2003 ). The lack of
agreement in terms and defi nitions has not
stopped academics and practitioners from
conceptualizing and measuring CR and its
related constructs in many different ways.
Academic examples include categorizing
corporate social performance in terms of
people and products ( Johnson and Greening,
1999 ) and in terms of social issues, such as
employee relations, diversity issues, product
issues, community relations and environ-
mental issues ( Hillman and Keim, 2001 ).
Practitioner examples include the triple
bottom line of fi nancial, social and environ-
mental performance ( Elkington, 1997 ) and
the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI)
that includes reports on employees, custo-

mers, community, supply chain and business
partners among other aspects. While these
conceptualizations often survey stakeholder
opinion, few actually involve stakeholders
in a rigorous and systematic way from the
defi nition of the concept through to meas-
urement. This leaves an opportunity for
stakeholders to be involved in defi ning
responsibility and identifying issues that are
relevant to them. It is clear from our review
above that researchers in the Corporate
Reputation domain have already developed
conceptualizations and models of Corporate
Reputation by engaging stakeholders in
concept development and through the map-
ping of their perceptions (eg MacMillan
et al ., 2004 ; Fombrun, 1996 ). It is also now
clear that researchers in the area of Business
and Society have yet to carry out similar
conceptual development for CR and its
related constructs ( Windsor, 2006 ; Neville
et al ., 2005 ). Before we can understand how
responsibility and reputation interact, it
follows that we fi rst have to have conceptu-
alizations of both concepts that are derived
from a similar approach. This will allow us
to compare and contrast the concepts more
easily and rigorously.
A number of scholars have thus called for
a conceptualization of CR to be developed
from a stakeholder perspective ( Wood et al .,
2006 ; Waddock, 2002 ). Taking account of
how stakeholders make sense of CR would
also add to the legitimacy of any models and
measures developed. This is because the

opinions of key groups such as customers,
employees or suppliers would be acknowl-
edged in an explicit way ( Wood et al ., 2006 ).
For these reasons, this paper sets out to
develop a conceptualization of CR that is
built through an engagement with stake-
holders from the inception stage. Before
this is done, the next section reviews key
elements of stakeholder theory relevant to
this approach.
STAKEHOLDER THEORY
Stakeholder theory is developed from stra-
tegic management literature ( Freeman, 1984 ).
Its core theme is that businesses have obliga-
tions to a broader group of stakeholders than
just shareholders. Freeman (1984) defi nes
stakeholders as ‘ ( … ) any group or individu-
al who can affect or is affected by the
achievement of the organization ’ s objective ’ .
Stakeholder theory has developed to view
the fi rm as a nexus of relationships ( Jones,
1995 ). This approach suggests that mutual
trust between organizations and stakeholders
are key drivers of long-term sustainable suc-
cess ( Jones, 1995 ).
Stakeholder theory also moved forward
signifi cantly with the contribution of

Donaldson and Preston (1995) . They suggest
that work conducted with stakeholders could
be viewed as descriptive, instrumental and
normative. Put simply, descriptive approach-
es seek to investigate and describe ‘ how ’
organizations and stakeholders relate to each
other. Instrumental approaches investigate
‘ what happens if ’ organizations relate to
stakeholders in certain ways. Normative
approaches suggest how a fi rm ‘ should ’ relate
to its stakeholders. When applied to a
research setting, it seems reasonable that the
Donaldson and Preston taxonomy could in
some ways be viewed as sequential. This is
because it follows that concepts fi rst need to
be described before their instrumental or
normative value can be established.
Another key tenant of stakeholder theory
is that concepts, such as responsibility, are
multifaceted and possess multiple criteria
that can change over time ( Harrison and
Freeman, 1999 ). This is because concepts
should refl ect the different views and needs
of stakeholders ( Mitchell et al ., 1997 ). It
is thus suggested that criteria should be
esta blished and measured in a process of
consultation and engagement between orga-
nizations and stakeholders ( Wood et al ., 2006 ;
Jones, 1995 ). This is supported by Neville
et al . (2005) , who state that the extent of an
organ ization ’ s responsibilities is framed with-
in the context of an organization ’ s relation-
ship with its stakeholders.

Much of the research examining stake-
holders in the business and society literature
is concerned with instrumental issues and
normative issues. In the realm of descriptive
research, little empirical work has looked
into what stakeholders think responsibility
is. This is, however, particularly important
if we are to accept the thesis of both
Connolly et al . (1980) and Jones (1995) , who
suggest that instrumental and normative
research should be built upon the foundation
of strong descriptive research. This paper
aims to provide such a foundation.
The Need for a Conceptualization of CR
from a Stakeholder Perspective
The conceptualizations of reputation
developed by MacMillan et al . (2004) and
Fombrun (1996) reviewed in the reputation
literature involved stakeholders in their
development. They drew upon the key
tenants of stakeholder theory outlined above.
As was outlined in the previous section,
current conceptualizations of responsibility
have been produced without systematically
and rigorously engaging stakeholders in their
development. Furthermore, current measures
often focus primarily on the social activities
of a business such as charitable donations,
community involvement and employee vol-
unteerism ( Maignan and Ferrell, 2004 ).
It is not clear however, whether these
issues are similar or different to stakeholder
conceptualizations of the social elements of
responsibility, let alone what the views of

stakeholders would be regarding a wider
notion of responsibility ( Dawkins and
Lewis, 2003 ). As a result, the indicators cur-
rently used by companies to demonstrate
CR are often said to be pragmatic or public
relations-based responses to pressure from
non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
( Esrock and Leichty, 1998 ; Sumner,
2004 ) and are seen to lack credibility with
stakeholders ( Barone et al ., 2000 ; Mohr et al .,
2001 ). There is, however, a consensus among
practitioners and academics alike that it is
important to understand and address
stakeholder expectations of CR ( Wood et al .,
2006 ; MacMillan et al ., 2004 ; Waddock,
2002 ). It is our aim to import the appro aches
and rigor around which reputation measures
were developed to the fi eld of CR. In
particular to apply similar techniques used
by Fombrun and Van Riel (2004) and
MacMillan et al. (2004) .
This paper continues by describing a re-
search project that sets out to defi ne respon-
sibility from the perspective of stakeholders
and fi lls this gap. Customers and employees
of a fi nancial institution are the participants
and sources of data in this study. As such

the study provides a fi rst step to conceptua-
lize responsibility from a stakeholder per-
spective. A formal comparison with the
reputation models, as outlined in the intro-
duction, is then given.
METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN
The research was conducted with a fi nancial
service company in the UK and was part of
a larger project investigating responsibility
and its impact in the fi nancial service sector.
Data gathering for the research reported in
this paper included 15 in-depth interviews
with employees of three different branches.
Furthermore, data gathering included four
focus groups with 8 – 12 customers each in
three different areas of the UK. The views
of a total of 56 customers and employees
were used as data in the qualitative analysis.
The design of the interviews was informed
by Kvale (1996) . The design of the customer
focus groups was informed by Marshall and
Rossman (1995) .
The study was based upon an inductive
research design. Following key qualitative
research techniques, the discovery of emp-
loyee and customer construction of reality
as a basis for conceptual understanding builds
on elements of grounded theory ( Glaser and
Strauss, 1967 ; Easterby-Smith et al ., 2002 ). In
a similar way to Fombrun (1996) , who asked
general questions such as ‘ What is Corporate
Reputation ’ and ‘ What does it entail ’ , the
current research study also used general

questions, such as ‘ What is Corporate
Responsibility ’ and ‘ What does it entail ’ .
While Fombrun asked stakeholders to think
of business in general and good and bad
companies, this research study is carried out
in the context of a relationship between
stakeholders and a target business. This is
done to take account of stakeholder theorists
and social psychologists who suggest that
issues are more richly understood when
they are embedded into experience.
It should be noted that the aim of the
research is to investigate mental conceptu-
alizations of CR among customers and
employees. Therefore, the design did not
employ existing conceptualizations of CR,
or aspects thereof, as practical research
guidelines. In the same way, no organiza-
tional value propositions such as mission
and vision statements of the participating
research organization were employed as
guidelines.
DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
The fi eld notes and transcripts were analyzed
in an inductive way based on Miles and
Huberman (1994) who suggest a systematic
process for making sense of and displaying
data, including the following stages that are
now outlined:
1. Preparation of written-up fi eld notes.
2. Qualitative clustering to identify trends
in the data.

3. Further analysis to identify high-level
themes and links between clusters.
Field Notes
The focus groups with customers were
audio- and videotaped and subsequently
transcribed. Interviews with employees
could not be taped due to reasons of
confi dentiality. Therefore, a second research-
er who took notes during the interviews
accompanied the facilitator.
Qualitative Clustering to Identify Trends
in the Data
The written up fi eld-notes and transcripts
were then analyzed by identifying dominant
trends that were repeatedly mentioned by
customers and employees. The method of
identifying trends was based on a qualitative
clustering technique described by Miles and
Huberman (1994) . Qualitative clustering
helps to understand data by grouping and
then conceptualizing units that have similar
patterns or characteristics. Based on this
technique, eight distinct clusters of respon-
sibility were identifi ed from the data that
represent customer and employee thoughts

on what a business is responsible for. These
eight clusters are responsibility for: (1) com-
munication with them, (2) the kind of ben-
efi ts a business offers them, (3) behaving with
integrity, transparency and accountability
towards them, (4) how a business makes
them feel, (5) how a business relates to local
communities, (6) how a business relates to
the wider society, including the environ-
ment, (7) how business behaves towards
other exchange stakeholders and (8) being
a fi nancially stable and successful business
in the long term.
HIGH-LEVEL THEMES AND LINKS BET-
WEEN CLUSTERS OF RESPONSIBILITY
These eight clusters were then categorized
in three high-level themes that refl ect who
these responsibilities are addressed to in the
minds of stakeholders. So, in the minds of
stakeholders a business is responsible for how
it relates to (1) ‘ me ’ , (2) ‘ others ’ and (3) ‘ it-
self ’ . These three themes with corresponding
clusters are shown in Table 2 .
Table 3 gives some specifi c examples of
how these themes and clusters are expressed
in the customer and employee data from the
fi nancial service organization studied.
It should be noted that there is a high
degree of overlap between the themes and
the clusters that underpin customer and em-
ployee understanding of CR. Expression of
these clusters seems to be more similar when

referring to issues removed from their own
relationship, such as how business relates to
others and to itself. While this is the case,
Table 2 : Themes and Clusters of Responsibility from a
Stakeholder Perspective
Three themes of responsibility Eight clusters of
responsibility
A business is responsible for …
… how it relates through communication
to ME through the kind of benefi ts it offers to me
through the way it behaves with integrity, transparency
and accountability
and how that makes me feel
… how it relates to OTHERS
(that includes stakeholders and
society in large)
The local community
The wider society
Towards other direct exchange stakeholders (ie employees,
customers, suppliers and shareholders)
… how it relates to ITSELF Long-term business success

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an
d
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t
•

P
ro
vi
di
n
g
a
go
o
d
sa
la
ry
•
P
ro
vi
di
n
g
ca
re
er
o

pp
o
rt
u
n
it
ie
s
•
T
ra
in
in
g
an
d
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t

th
ro
u
gh
t
h
e
w
ay
i
t
be
h
av
es
w
it
h
i
nt
eg
ri
ty
, t
ra

ns
pa
re
nc
y
an
d
ac
co
un
ta
bi
lit
y
•
B
ei
n
g
h
o
n
es
t

•
A
ck
n
ow
le
dg
in
g
pr
o
bl
em
s
in
a
n
o
pe
n
w
ay
•
N

o
t
al
lo
w
in
g
bo
rr
ow
er
s
to
o
ve
r-
st
re
tc
h
t
h
em
se

lv
es
•
B
ei
n
g
h
o
n
es
t
•
H
av
in
g
cl
ea
r
in
te
rn

al
t
ar
ge
ts
•
T
ak
in
g
re
sp
o
n
si
bi
lit
y
fo
r
em
pl
oy

ee
b
eh
av
io
r
to
w
ar
ds
cu
st
o
m
er
s
an
d
h
ow
t
h

at
m
ak
es
m
e
fe
el
•
B
ei
n
g
pr
o
u
d
o
f
be
in
g
a
cu

st
o
m
er
•
B
ei
n
g
pa
rt
o
r
so
m
et
h
in
g
in
sp
ir
in
g

•
T
ru
st
in
g
th
e
bu
si
n
es
s
•
F
ee
lin
g
re
sp
ec
te
d

•
B
ei
n
g
en
th
u
si
as
ti
c
ab
o
u
t
th
e
co
m
pa
ny
•
T

ru
st
in
g
th
e
bu
si
n
es
s
…
h
ow
i
t
re
la
te
s
to

O
T
H
E
R
S
(
th
at
i
n
cl
u
de
s
st
ak
eh
o
ld
er
s
an
d

so
ci
et
y
in
l
ar
ge
)
T
h
e
lo
ca
l
co
m
m
un
ity
•
A
b
u

si
n
es
s
th
at
a
re
a
w
ar
e
o
f
pr
o
bl
em
s
in
l
o
ca
l
co

m
m
u
n
it
ie
s
an
d
pa
rt
ic
ip
at
es
i
n
p
ro
vi
di
n
g
so
lu
ti

o
n
s
•
K
ee
pi
n
g
lo
ca
l
br
an
ch
es
o
pe
n
•
G
et
ti
n

g
in
vo
lv
ed
i
n
l
o
ca
l
pr
o
je
ct
s
an
d
co
m
m
u
n
it
y
ac

ti
vi
ti
es
T
h
e
w
id
er
s
oc
ie
ty
•
Su
pp
o
rt
in
g

n
at
io
n
al
a
n
d
in
te
rn
at
io
n
al
c
h
ar
it
ie
s
an
d
vo
lu

n
ta
ry
o
rg
an
iz
at
io
n
s
•
C
o
n
si
de
ri
n
g
a
bu
si
n
es

s
im
pa
ct
o
n
t
h
e
en
vi
ro
n
m
en
t
•
Su
pp
o
rt
in
g
n
at

io
n
al
a
n
d
in
te
rn
at
io
n
al
c
h
ar
it
ie
s
an
d
vo
lu
n
ta

ry
o
rg
an
iz
at
io
n
s
•
C
o
n
si
de
ri
n
g
a
bu
si
n
es
s
im

pa
ct
o
n
t
h
e
en
vi
ro
n
m
en
t
T
ow
ar
ds
o
th
er
d
ir
ec

t
ex
ch
an
ge
s
ta
ke
ho
ld
er
s
(i
e
em
pl
oy
ee
s
,
cu
st
o
m

er
s
, s
u
pp
lie
rs
a
n
d
sh
ar
eh
o
ld
er
s
)
In
p
ar
ti
cu
la
r,

em
pl
oy
ee
s
w
er
e
id
en
ti
fi
ed
as
a
k
ey
g
ro
u
p,
t
h
at

t
h
e
bu
si
n
es
s
sh
o
u
ld
:
•
R
et
ai
n
l
o
ca
l
em
pl
oy

m
en
t
•
P
ro
vi
de
s
ta
bl
e
lo
n
g-
te
rm
e
m
pl
oy
m
en

t
•
T
re
at
s
ta
ff
f
ai
rl
y
In
p
ar
ti
cu
la
r,
cu
st
o
m

er
s
w
er
e
id
en
ti
fi
ed
a
s
a
ke
y
gr
o
u
p,
t
h
at
t
h
e
bu

si
n
es
s
sh
o
u
ld
p
ro
vi
de
w
it
h
•
G
o
o
d
se
rv
ic
e

(e
g
tr
ea
ti
n
g
cu
st
o
m
er
s
w
el
l,
an
d
a
fr
ie
n
dl
y
m

an
n
er
)
•
A
cc
es
si
bl
e
se
rv
ic
e(
eg
o
ff
er
in
g
fa
ce

-t
o
-f
ac
e
se
rv
ic
e
to
c
u
st
o
m
er
s
an
d
a
di
re
ct
p
h

o
n
e
lin
e)
•
G
o
o
d
pr
o
du
ct
s
(e
g
co
m
pe
ti
ti
ve
p
ro

du
ct
s,
pr
ic
es
a
n
d
qu
al
it
y)
…
h
ow
i
t
re
la
te
s

to
IT
S
E
L
F
L
on
g-
te
rm
b
us
in
es
s
su
cc
es
s
•
B
ei

n
g
fi
n
an
ci
al
ly
s
u
cc
es
sf
u
l
•
B
ei
ng
e
st
ab
lis
he

d
in
b
us
in
es
s
in
t
he
lo
ng
t
er
m
•
L
o
n
g-
te
rm
p

ro
fi
ta
bi
lit
y
•
H
av
in
g
ex
ce
lle
n
t
m
an
ag
em
en
t

Moral Motivation Across Ethical TheoriesWhat Can We Learn.docx

Moral Motivation Across Ethical TheoriesWhat Can We Learn.docx

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