t3t5t7t9t11EENG 43505340 Project 2.docx

t3t5t7t9t11
EENG 4350/5340: Project 2
Assigned: June 9,2015
Due: June 23, 2015
Rules
• Use C or C++ with BLAS/LAPACK for completion of this
assignment.
• Produce a LATEX-generated PDF of your report.
• Ask plenty of questions to ensure you have a good
understanding of the project.
• The code (and reports) should look vastly different for
different groups. Very similar code will incur a
hefty penalty.
Consider the function f(t) = −t3 + 2t2 + t + 2 on the closed
interval t ∈ [−2, 2].

Part 1
1. Sample f(t) to produce f(tk) where k ∈ [1, 10] ⊂ Z. The tk
should be randomly chosen points on the
interval [−2, 2]. Produce a table with columns tk and f(tk).
Ensure that the tks are not sorted.
2. Solve the normal equations using QR decomposition and
calculate the error, E. Write your approximated
function, f̂1(t).
3. Solve the normal equations using the SVD and calculate the
error, E. Write your approximated function,
f̂2(t).
4. Plot f(t), f̂1(t) and f̂2(t) on the same plot.
Part 2
In this part we will see how additive random noise affects our
solution.
1. Create a new dataset by doing the following:
• Sample f(t) to produce f(tk) where k ∈ [1, 1000] ⊂ Z. The tk
should be randomly chosen points
on the interval [−2, 2]. Use a different random seed than used in
the previous part.
• Add columns y1(tk) = f(tk) + n1(tk) and y2(tk) = f(tk) + n2(tk)
where n1(t) ∼ N(0, 1) and
n2(t) ∼N(0, 5) to the dataset.
2. Solve the normal equations for this new dataset. NOTE: This
dataset should be solved simultaneously
with 3 right hand sides.

3. Include the error in your report.
1
tp1tp4tp5tp6tp7tp8
Gulf Daily News
February 19, 2009
Eurocentrism adding fuel to the fire
I HAVE been keeping in touch with developments in Bahrain
through the GDN even after I moved to the US
several years ago.

As noted by many readers, there is a disturbing trend of
intolerance among certain MPs in Bahrain. To add
fuel to the fire, this trend also seems to invoke another trend of
Eurocentrism and Western supremacy
among many readers.
Basically, what some of these readers (who I suspect are
Western) are saying to Bahrainis is: "Give up the
Western way of life and let's see how you can survive with the
simple, backward, pre-mediaeval, Islamic
life." The term "Western lifestyle" is wrongly used, particularly
by people from the Western hemisphere, for
any lifestyle that is progressive and modern. I would like to
point out three valid reasons for this:
olution and scientific
revolution is Indian mathematics, starting all
the way from Brahmic (sometimes called Arabic) numerals to
advanced concepts such as trigonome-
try. But you don't hear us Indians say "The West is Indianised".
Golden age of Indian civilisation
was succeeded by Golden age of Islam that made many
significant contributions to mathematics (al-
gebra), science (ibn sinna) and many other fields.
Western nations. Japan's proprietary

consumer technology is ahead of many Western countries. South
Korea is catching up and leading
many Western nations with hi-tech brands like Samsung, LG,
etc.
immigrants from non-Western nations. I
know this because I live in the US. Companies like Bose,
Sandisk, Sun Microsystems, Hotmail were
founded or co-founded by Indians. Vinod Dham, the father of
the Pentium processor, is also a pio-
neer of the flash memory technology. Arun Netravali, former
CEO of Bell Labs, is responsible for
significant contribution to digital video, including HDTV. A lot
of the reasons why the West has
military and industrial strength over many nations are owed to
years of power-hungry colonisation.
I am not undermining the achievements of the West. We owe a
lot to the brilliant minds of Europe and
America for their inventions: efficient transportation
(aeroplane, automobile, railway), electricity, phone,
vaccinations, etc. But we still need to keep things in
perspective. Almost every civilisation has contributed
very useful things to mankind.
So next time, address the issues of religious or national
intolerance using rational terms and not irrational,

Eurocentric words like Western.
Samuel Thomas
Copyright 2009 Gulf Daily News - Hilal Publishing and
Marketing Group.
Provided by Syndigate.info, an Albawaba.com company
All Rights Reserved
The End of Eurocentrism
Author(s): Mark Mazower
Source: Critical Inquiry, Vol. 40, No. 4, Around 1948:
Interdisciplinary Approaches to Global
Transformation, edited by Leela Gandhi and Deborah L. Nelson
(Summer 2014), pp. 298-313
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/676409 .
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The End of Eurocentrism
Mark Mazower
Georges Bidault, the French foreign minister, in London for the
first
United Nations General Assembly meeting in January 1946,
looked around
the room and noted his surprise at “the extent to which Europe
is absent.”1
A few months later, Gilbert Murray, who was a supporter of the
League of

Nations and a prominent internationalist, touched on the same
theme. In
an article entitled “Retrospect and Prospect” on the shift from
the League
of Nations to the United Nations, he wrote that we need to
restore Europe
to restore civilization: “Some great movement for unity and
constructive
reconciliation in Europe is an absolute necessity for
civilization. . . . Of
course Europe is not everything. There are other continents.”2
From one viewpoint, the years from 1945 to 1948 can be seen as
a story
about European reconstruction; from another, they emerge as
the opening
chapter of decolonization. Putting these two stories together
raises the
question of how Europe’s relations with the world changed in
these years
and, in particular, how contemporaries thought about Europe’s
changing
place in the world. This in turn was bound up with the ways in
which they
read the war and how the experience itself shaped their sense of
Europe’s
relationship with the world. This helps explain both Bidault’s
surprise and
Murray’s anxious discovery that there are other continents.
The Second World War marked the end of a long period of
European
ascendency, whose critical starting point was not the sixteenth
century, let
alone the Renaissance, but somewhere at the end of the
eighteenth or the

1. Quoted in Mark Mazower, No Enchanted Palace: The End of
Empire and the Ideological
Origins of the United Nations (Princeton, N.J., 2009), p. 151;
hereafter abbreviated N.
2. Gilbert Murray, “Retrospect and Prospect,” From the League
to the U.N. (New York,
1948), pp. 191, 197.
Critical Inquiry 40 (Summer 2014)
© 2014 by The University of Chicago. 0093-1896/14/4004-
0007$10.00. All rights reserved.
298
2014 19:23:43 PM
early nineteenth century. The age of Eurocentrism spanned the
period
from 1800 to 1945 in several senses. First, it marked the
emergence of Eu-
rope as a center of world power through its formal colonialism
and the
technology gap created by the Industrial Revolution.
Concurrently, there
was the rise of settler societies, of which the “Anglo-world,” as
James Belich
tells it, was the most successful—although there was also the
German-

Russian settlement expansion south and eastwards, as well as its
smaller
Ottoman version.3 Subsequently, there was a kind of diplomatic
intellec-
tual counterpart to this European ascendancy: a new discipline
of interna-
tional law, one that enshrined the notion of a standard of
civilization, that
Gerrit Gong wrote about and that rested on a differentiated
categorization
of sovereignties in different parts of the world.4 This was
accompanied by
a changing conception of Europe. Paradoxically, as Europe
expanded in
power, Europe as a concept shrank. In 1840, for instance, the
European
powers could plausibly propose to Mehmet Ali that if he
stopped threat-
ening to invade Istanbul they would allow him to become part
of the
system of Europe. Forty years later, that was not an offer
anybody was
making. The geographical conception of Europe had become
more fo-
cused even as Europe became more powerful.
In this epoch, the rest of the world increasingly functioned as a
place
for exploration and scientific inquiry, as a resource base for
commod-
ities and labor, and as a proving ground for ruling virtues and
the
spread of civilization. The notable exception to most of this
was, of
course, the Western hemisphere. It was of enormous
significance that

the Americas came to define themselves, or to be defined by
Washing-
ton, as a place where European states could not do as they
pleased. The
emergence of the United States initially, as a hemispheric power
(as
distinguished from a world power) pitted against European
ascen-
dancy, was critical to later developments.
Taking the story through to 1945 implies that this great age of
European
expansion did not, as it is sometimes presented in older history
books, end
with the Scramble for Africa between 1880 and 1914. It would
be more
3. See James Belich, Replenishing the Earth: The Settler
Revolution and the Rise of the Anglo-
World, 1783–1939 (New York, 2009).
4. See Gerrit W. Gong, The Standard of “Civilization” in
International Society (New York,
1984).
M A R K M A Z O W E R is Ira D. Wallach Professor of
History at Columbia
University. His most recent work is Governing the World: The
History of an Idea,
1815 to the Present (2012).
Critical Inquiry / Summer 2014 299
2014 19:23:43 PM

accurate to identify a longer process of acute imperial rivalry
that began
with the Scramble for Africa but that continued into the 1950s.
It was, after
all, the scramble for the Middle East between 1914 and 1939
that saw the
emergence of a new British empire in the region, while the
Second World
War was, among other things, an attempt by the Axis powers,
their allies,
and supporters to continue this struggle in the Mediterranean.
We can
date the start of this phase to 1935, when the Italians invaded
Ethiopia, or
perhaps further back to 1911 and the invasion of Libya. After
Abyssinia
came further efforts to overthrow the Mediterranean status quo
in Albania
and Greece. The French defeat in 1940 and the German desire to
bring
Spain into the war that summer and autumn once again threw
into ques-
tion the early twentieth-century North African settlement.
Trying to ad-
judicate among the impossibly contradictory claims of three
powers that
had once been on the same side (the Spaniards, the Italians, and
the
French), the Germans complicated an already impossible task by
looking
for territories of their own. The following year, Germany also
became the

arbiter of the Balkans and potentially, if only Adolf Hitler had
woken up to
this, of the Middle East, too. Fortunately he failed to do so.
These events underscored the importance of the Middle East in
an on-
going intra-European imperial contestation. If the Germans
failed to un-
derstand its significance, the British certainly did not. At the
heart of the
British involvment was the extraordinary figure of Robert
Jackson, the
young Australian naval officer who ran the Middle East Supply
Center,
which started off trying to unblock supply bottlenecks in the
ports of the
eastern Mediterranean and ended up essentially coordinating the
entire
Middle East as a regional economy. (Apparently, more than one
British
general had received a telegram from Churchill instructing him
that “when
Jackson appears in front of him, do whatever this man says.”)5
Jackson
virtually ran the Middle East as a unified realm. When the war
ended, the
British tried to preserve this unity politically through a new
creation, the
Arab League, which was founded just as the Middle East Supply
Center
wound down.
The key new element of the 1940s was the emergence of the
United
States as a world power, as a result of the war. The shift from
its hemi-

spheric to global role can be traced through the discussions that
took place
in 1939 and 1940 about the Monroe Doctrine. These discussions
began
among historians, who were joined by political commentators
once Hitler
started talking about a Monroe Doctrine for Europe. (The
Japanese had
5. Anecdote conveyed in Robert Jackson oral testimony, Oral
History Archives, Butler
Library, Columbia University.
300 Mark Mazower / The End of Eurocentrism
2014 19:23:43 PM
been talking about a similar doctrine for Japan for some years
prior.) In
this period, the Monroe Doctrine was redefined to justify a
vastly intensi-
fied American air presence, including bases and new flight
paths through
South America in the middle of the war in order to stop the
Germans. The
Americas thus become an American zone in a way that they had
not been
before. By the end of the war, the American Navy was moving
toward a
view that permanent bases in the Pacific Ocean were necessary
for Amer-

ican national security. Even Africa came to be defined as an
American
security concern; after all, there were American technicians all
over the
Belgian Congo by the end of the war because of its uranium. If
a European
diplomat in the 1880s had been told that in the spring of 1943
American
diplomats would be sitting in Morocco deciding the future of
Europe, he
would have thought the prospect completely ludicrous.
At this point, two things are worth bearing in mind. First, it was
not in
any way predetermined that the United States would commit to
a peace-
time global role of the kind that it did when the war ended. A
massive
demobilization of the American army took place in 1945 that
was only
reversed well into the cold war. The year 1947 was obviously a
critical
turning point—the moment when the Truman administration
overcame
the considerable political opposition within Congress to any
major redef-
inition of America’s peacetime role in the world. But the real
break with
Eurocentrism did not come until 1949. Second, the European
empires
obviously did not simply roll over and die. Fred Cooper has
been helping
us reassess the degree to which the Europeans, on the contrary,
came out of
the war and the attendant experiences of occupation and
humiliation de-

termined not only to hang on to empire but also to reconquer
lost territo-
ries wherever possible. Where necessary, the Europeans
deployed a very
high level of force, as at Setif in Algeria in May 1945, in the
Dutch East
Indies, or briefly in Syria. Is the explanation for this simply that
they did
not recognize that the age of empire was over? Perhaps. It was
not only that
empire and European hierarchy had been assumptions
naturalized in peo-
ples’ minds but also the fact that wartime thinking about the
causes of the
war itself had actually helped to reinforce older views about
Europe’s re-
lationship with the rest of the world. This confirmed the
economic and
strategic importance of colonies and thus helped to explain the
tenacity of
the procolonial argument.
This brings us to the question of what people during the war
thought
the war was about. In 1948, the crucial year for this special
issue, an émigré
Russian demographer named Eugene Kulischer published his
magnum
opus, still worth reading, called Europe on the Move—a study
of popula-
2014 19:23:43 PM

tion movements in Europe between 1917 and 1947.6 In it,
Kulischer, who
had been doing a lot of work for the Office of Strategic Services
and the
International Labor Organization during the war, presented a
picture in
which population movements formed, as he puts it, the
mechanical foun-
dations of history (a view he learned, of course, from his
imperial Russian
geography teachers). In particular, Kulischer was inclined to
posit a very
close connection between war and migration; migration caused
by over-
population becomes in his telling a major source of
international conflict.
History, in his view (and, for that matter, in the Nazis’ view,
too) is essen-
tially a movement of peoples from east to west. It had been thus
for
G. W. F. Hegel, too. Europe’s surplus population had been
bottled up
between the wars by American immigration quotas and the
impact of the
Russian Civil War, but actually erecting barriers to migration
was futile
because that simply provoked conflict (as it will always do). In
Kulischer’s
words, “millions in desperate search of outlets may become an
aggressive
force, especially if led by totalitarian governments.”7 In 1948,
everybody

was terribly worried that the Germanies were going to turn into
another
Weimar, that there was another Hitler waiting in the wings, in
fact, that it
was going to be far worse the second time because there were
far more
millions of refugees in Germany than there had been in 1919.
As late as 1956,
Elizabeth Wiskemann (an English commentator who was very
knowledge-
able about Germany) wrote a very good book about Germany’s
eastern
neighbors. The preface reflects her disbelief that there had been
no return
to the problems of the interwar period.8
For Kulischer, and for many other people, the basic problem
was that
Europe was overcrowded; the only solution was for the surplus
to be set-
tled in underdeveloped areas by what he calls migratory and
colonizing
movements.9 There was an international aspect to this because,
if war in
Europe meant world war—and two wars in Europe had just
meant world
war—then world peace meant solving Europe’s demographic
problems.
Of course, the connections among overpopulation, refugees, and
the
growth of war tensions in Europe had been around since the late
1930s, and
in 1938 an international conference at Evian had attempted to
find a solu-
tion and failed. After that, as we learn in Neil Smith’s
biography of Isaiah

Bowman, Franklin D. Roosevelt approached Bowman, the most
famous
6. See Eugene Kulischer, Europe on the Move: War and
Population Changes, 1917– 47 (New
York, 1948).
7. Ibid., p. 312.
8. See Elizabeth Wiskemann, Germany’s Eastern Neighbours:
Problems Relating to the Oder-
Neisse Line and the Czech Frontier Regions (London, 1956).
9. See Kulischer, Europe on the Move, chap. 2.
2014 19:23:43 PM
geographer in America at that time, and asked him to try and
find unin-
habited parts of the world where Europeans could be settled.10
This was the
origin of a secret Washington wartime project called the M
project (M
stood for migration). Kulischer himself had worked for the M
project, in
which dozens of geographers were set to work, eventually
producing hun-
dreds of studies of different bits of the world in the search for
places where
surplus Europeans might be settled. Thus, there was a postwar

vision in the
air that, as part of this new international organization of the
globe, there
would be an international settlement agency to rationally
resettle surplus
Europeans all around the world, thus carving out a path to world
peace.
Of course, none of that happened, and refugee resettlement was
han-
dled instead as if it was a temporary problem. One of the
reasons for that
was the wartime shift in attitudes to minority rights. The war
saw the
demise of the idea that had been prevalent in the interwar period
(or that
at least had been tried in the interwar period), that minority
rights schemes
were the way to solve the problem of minorities; the League of
Nations had
aimed to be the guarantor of minority rights in Eastern Europe,
and the
hope in 1919 had been that these would be rights enshrined in
international
law and connected to the peace treaties that the various new
states of
Eastern Europe would sign. In effect, it tied international
recognition of
new states to their commitment to minority rights. By 1939 the
general
view on all sides was that this had been a complete failure. In
fact, many
said that it had been worse than a failure. Because of the
minority rights
regime of the Germans in Eastern Europe, the largest minority
there had

been exploited or had allowed themselves to be exploited by
Berlin and
turned into a fifth column. Consequently, Europe had slid to
war much
faster than if there had been no minority rights regime and the
Poles and
the Czechs had been able to do what they wanted with their
minorities.
And so, somewhere in the middle of the war, sentiment shifted
rather
abruptly toward the idea of transfer. (It is in this context that
Palestine took
on a new significance in Zionist thought.) Transfer was a policy
that was
implemented initially by the Nazis. Indeed one of the first
things the Nazis
did in October 1939 was to draw up the agreement with Italy to
repatriate
German speakers from northeastern Italy. As in the case of
Israel/Palestine,
there were dimensions both of homecoming and of expulsion to
it. From
1944 onwards, this was the policy that was in effect put into
place in Eastern
Europe by the conquerors of the Nazis as well. Perhaps this
helps to explain
why the 1947 UN General Assembly resolution on Palestine,
calling for
10. See Neil Smith, American Empire: Roosevelt’s Geographer
and the Prelude to
Globalization (Berkeley, 2003).

2014 19:23:43 PM
partition and minority rights in the two halves of Palestine,
made no men-
tion of monitoring compliance (which would have been too
reminiscent
of the old international minority rights regime).
This comprehensive shift of attitudes had implications far
beyond Eu-
rope. Take the plan, cooked up (or reheated) in the German
foreign office
in the summer of 1940 to resettle Jews in Madagascar. This was
one of
many instances that might be seen as a kind of common
conversation or
repertoire of attitudes and policies running right across war
lines. In the
late 1930s there had been lots of discussion, already involving
Polish dip-
lomats, the French, and some Zionists, about how to “evacuate”
Poland’s
surplus Jewish population outside Europe. The Polish
ambassador in
Washington discussed the possibility of using Angola, for
instance. In 1941
David Ben-Gurion and Lord Moyn discussed the possibility of
using South
America and Madagascar (see N, chap. 3). So around the time
that Fritz
Rademacher in Berlin was suggesting using Madagascar as—he
actually

uses the term, bizarrely—a Nazi mandate, Ben-Gurion and Lord
Moyn
were discussing much the same thing.11
Such thinking did not end in 1941. In 1943, Jan Smuts called
for the
international management of Jewish refugee resettlement in
Africa be-
cause, at least in his mind, they would have counted as white
and thus
helped to build a larger white population in Africa (see N, p.
121). Behind
all this lies the broader idea of seeing the world as a resource to
solve
Europe’s problems. Of course, it is not surprising that Nazis and
anti-
Nazis should have shared this outlook, as almost everyone in
Europe was
inclined to see things that way, at least at the turn of the
century. J. A.
Hobson talks about international control of Africa as a way of
insuring the
impartial and equitable sharing of its resources.12 What he
doesn’t like is
private sector selfishness. In the 1920s it was common for white
racial
theorists to see Africa in much the same way, as a kind of
common pos-
session of the white race. The American Lothrop Stoddard, who
in 1920
wrote the bestselling The Rising Tide of Color against White
World-
Supremacy, worried about whether Europeans could hang on in
Africa
precisely because, as he put it, Africa is the natural source of
Europe’s

tropical raw materials and food stuffs.13 In the late 1930s, there
were very
similar arguments when the Germans briefly raised the issue of
colonial
compensation in Africa, and some British and French politicians
toyed
with the idea that the Germans might be bought off in Africa.
11. See Mazower, Hitler’s Empire: How the Nazis Ruled Europe
(New York, 2008), p. 119.
12. See J. A. Hobson, Imperialism: A Study (London, 1902).
13. See Lothrop Stoddard, The Rising Tide of Color against
White World-Supremacy (New
York, 1920).
2014 19:23:43 PM
As for the war itself, surely one thing it did, or could be
forgiven for
seeming to do, was demonstrate the indispensability of empire.
Britain
survived solely because of its empire, along with the help of a
former
colonial possession in North America; the Free French similarly
survived
thanks to the fact that Vichy and the Nazis really could not gain
full control
over the French colonies. Likewise, the fact that they hung on to

their
colonies and that the Germans couldn’t really control them
meant that the
Nazis also treated Belgium and the Netherlands very differently
when they
were occupied, compared to how they would have been treated
if they
hadn’t had colonies. The Dutch and Belgians retained some
leverage in
negotiations with the German occupying power because the
latter had no
direct control over those colonial resources. This outlook
continued after
the war. Hjalmar Schacht, the former Nazi economics minister,
believed
that while he was in Allied captivity he could gain a
sympathetic hearing
among his captors if he offered to help the Allies by drawing up
a plan for
the mass migration of Germans to Africa, as this would
simultaneously
bring peace to Germany by removing overcrowding and secure
white con-
trol in Africa.14
The problem for those who took these racial fears seriously was
that
much of the world seemed indifferent. Smuts feared that “the
world is
reeling between the two poles of white and color”; it was “in a
precarious
and dangerous position such as has not existed since the fall of
Rome”
(quoted in N, p. 183). Yet, whenever he approached Whitehall
with
schemes for increasing white settler population in Africa the

British civil
servants basically responded that they had enough problems
with white
settlers as it was. As I have written elsewhere: “settler
colonialism in general
was an expensive proposition for the modern state” (N, p. 121).
That was
another lesson of the war.
All of this raised in the mind of Smuts, but also of Smuts’s
opponents,
the question of world organization and what the proposed new
world
organization was really going to be about. Smuts himself had
been very
clear when he proposed to the League of Nations back in 1917
that its great
advantage would be that it would bolster the power of the
British empire in
the world—keeping the empire in existence at a time when it
would oth-
erwise decline. As the discussion turned to the successor of the
league in
1945, the people asked what a future United Nations
organization would be
for. Was it to rescue or to marginalize Europe? To preserve
empire or to
end it? Nobody in 1945 was quite clear.
As others and I have described elsewhere in greater detail, this
new
14. See Mazower, Hitler’s Empire, p. 595.

2014 19:23:43 PM
United Nations organization became the crucial forum for this
debate. In
particular, the domestic racial policies of Smuts in South Africa
brought to
the fore the confrontation between the older assumption of
imperial hier-
archy and the new claims, for instance, of Indian nationalists
and pan-
Asianists. The critical ideological preparation for this was
provided by
arguments that had been going on from the late 1930s onwards
about the
collapse of European civilization. And two brief illustrations.
First, in the
mid-1940s, one can chart a crisis of intellectual orientation, a
shift from an
older vision of civilization based on the classics—by which,
obviously, was
meant ancient Greek and Latin and a belief in the applicability
of the
eternal truths of Hellenism—to the universalism of science and
scientific
humanism. That shift from a world dominated by elites with one
forma-
tion to a world dominated by elites with a different formation,
happens, I
think, exactly then. You can map it very precisely in UNESCO.
The pre-
cursor to UNESCO under the League of Nations, the Institute

for Intellec-
tual Cooperation (IIC), had no mention of science in the title
because,
perhaps, it was run by classicists. These were men like Murray
and, more
directly, the once-deputy director of the IIC Alfred Zimmern. In
1945,
Zimmern organized the meeting that gave rise to IIC’s successor
organi-
zation, UNESCO (now with science in the title), and hoped to
be named its
first director general. In fact, Zimmern was passed over for that
post in
favor of the biologist and science popularizer Julian Huxley.
Evidently
there was, at the war’s end, no problem in anyone’s mind in
having a
stalwart member of the British Eugenics Society at the head of
UNESCO.
What was preposterous in Zimmern’s mind was that they’d
choose a sci-
entist instead of a classicist. But he was now outgunned. That’s
the key
point.
We can also see a deep crisis in what remained of a Victorian
conception
of an international civilization among those who hoped that
international
law would become the instrument of world government and
world peace.
In fact, they learned from the 1930s that international law
norms had failed
to win sufficient adherence to stem the move to war or regulate
the way it
was waged; worse than that, a prominent European power,

Germany, had
led the charge against the old assumptions. Wolfgang
Friedmann, a young
émigré international lawyer in London, writes before migrating
to the US
that the rise of the Third Reich itself means the disintegration
of European
civilization. This was a very typical sentiment for the time and
one that
raised the question of the very future of international law. US
Secretary of
State Cordell Hull said that international law was seriously
discredited and
on the defensive (see N, p. 123). And, in fact, the diplomatic
uses of the term
standard of civilization, which had provided the criteria for the
recognition
2014 19:23:43 PM
of new states in international legal discourse at the end of the
nineteenth
and early twentieth century, basically vanished in this new
world of the
United Nations. There was a much more open attitude to the
basis upon
which a new state could obtain recognition, and many more new
states
were recognized as a result. It was not that they conformed to a

European
norm; it was rather that the European norm was discredited and
ceased to
apply.
This suggests that a reinvigorated international law regime did
not
emerge from the United Nations in 1945, as some have argued.
Take, for
example, the debates inside the UN over the genocide
convention and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). These two
international
law achievements took place concurrently and were enacted
within a day
of one another. Yet, rather then seeing them as emerging in
tandem, we
should see them as pulling in entirely opposite directions, which
is how
they were seen by many of the lawyers involved in the drafting
at the time.
The genocide convention was basically a one-man show—
Raphael Lem-
kin trying to shore up the older idea of a powerful international
law re-
gime. Yet Lemkin angered many of his former colleagues who
were at the
time trying to draft and get support for the UDHR precisely
because he
insisted it was still possible to have a powerful and binding
legal regime and
to make states obey international legal obligations that would
cut deep into
their domestic jurisdiction.15 Bear in mind that the UN charter,
unlike the
league, in its article 2.7—not some article buried down in the

charter—has
a powerful domestic jurisdiction clause, which suggested real
limitations
to Lemkin’s approach from the outset. Lemkin got his genocide
conven-
tion, but it was eviscerated. He was obliged to drop the clause
that he really
cared about, concerning the criminalization of cultural
genocide, some-
thing that would have been smuggled in through the back door
of minority
rights. Basically, Lemkin wanted to bring minority rights back
in more or
less single-handedly. In fact, he failed. Once the genocide
convention was
passed, no international panel tribunal was established as it had
envisaged.
The US refused ratification, and it took a very long time for the
genocide
convention to reemerge as a kind of diplomatic achievement. As
for the
UDHR, it was promoted by many of Lemkin’s colleagues
because they had
come to the conclusion—again, based on their own interwar
experience
and what they were reading about the war—that in the era of
power poli-
tics (and that was certainly how they read the post-1945 era),
only the most
sensitive gradualism in matters of international law would give
the rule of
15. See Mira Siegelberg, “Unoffical Men, Efficient Civil
Servants: Raphael Lemkin in the
History of International Law,” Journal of Genocide Research 15
(Sept. 2013): 297–316.

2014 19:23:43 PM
law any kind of chance of success at all. The diplomatic
process, for exam-
ple, makes it perfectly obvious that neither Joseph Stalin nor
the US Con-
gress were going to pass any kind of binding human rights
regime. In fact,
shortly after George Marshall had hailed the draft declaration as
necessary
to “free men in a free world” in September 1948,16 John Foster
Dulles, who
was actually one of America’s most stalwart internationalists at
this time,
started worrying, as he sat in a hotel room in Paris with some
other Amer-
ican diplomats, that perhaps they had actually committed the US
to some-
thing concrete and far-reaching. His younger colleague, the
legal advisor
Benjamin Cohen, reassured him that they hadn’t committed
themselves to
anything. They were all very relieved. Hans Kelsen, maybe the
most au-
thoritative figure in international law at that time, agreed, and
he used the
words “empty phrases” to describe the UDHR.17 In other
words, by the late

1940s international law had really been evacuated of a lot of its
power and
prestige; it had not gained it. And that I think is probably
connected with
the collapse of this hierarchical Eurocentric world upon which
an older
and paradoxically more powerful conception of international
law had
been based. If you look at the composition of the League of
Nations as-
sembly in 1920, twenty-two of the forty-eight members were
European and
sixteen were American. That is a very significant weighting
toward Europe
in particular. A mere four members were Asian. At the founding
compo-
sition of the UN in 1945, a mere fourteen out of fifty-one were
European.
That explains Bidault’s earlier comment. There was a
consolidation of
European influence with the big expansion of the United
Nations in 1955
when a large number of European powers came in, but then
between the
late 1950s and the late 1960s there was a complete
reorientation, and the
majority of new members of the United Nations general
assembly were
from Africa and Asia. Hence, internationalists like Murray, who
had been
fervent liberals in the 1900s and supporters of the League of
Nations, could
not prevent their most conservative and indeed racist impulses
from
emerging when they looked at the UN General Assembly.
Murray himself

was a supporter of the premiership of Anthony Eden later in
life; he thus
changed from pro-Boer, anti-British-imperialist in 1900 to pro-
League of
Nations between the wars, and finally to pro-Eden and anti-UN
by the
mid-1950s.
The end of Eurocentrism, which Murray deplored, meant for
some-
body like Jawaharlal Nehru the possibility of the rise of Asia
and the rise of
16. Quoted in Mazower, “The Strange Triumph of Human
Rights, 1933–1950,” Historical
Journal 47 (June 2004): 396.
17. Quoted in ibid., p. 393.
2014 19:23:43 PM
the rest of the world (see N, chap. 4). Of course, before the rise
of India,
there was the rise of Japan—whose wartime East Asia
coprosperity sphere
was premised on the idea that the Europeans’ days in Asia were
over and
that Asia should be for the Asians. Based on a very limited
reading of the

Indian Congress Party attitude, we could wager that the
Congress Party
hedged its bets as long as the war was on. Subhas Chandra Bose
went with
the Japanese (and the Germans); and Nehru, if he did not
exactly go with
the British, remained in a position from which he could install
India as the
successor to British rule in the event of a British victory in
Europe. Thus,
the Congress Party was going to win either way. Nehru’s
Asianism went
back well into the 1930s, of course, and it was not
opportunistic; he be-
lieved in it very deeply (see N). For him, Japan’s defeat was
India’s oppor-
tunity. But why did the British let India into the running in the
UN General
Assembly in 1946 over South Africa? That was not the normal
procedure
for settling questions of internal empire, of which this was one.
India was
not even independent in 1946. It had an interim government. So
it is an
interesting commentary on the British, as well as the Indian
attitude to
empire and its aftermath, that in 1946 Nehru was able very
successfully to
take the case of the treatment of Indians in South Africa to the
General
Assembly and to force a vote against South Africa. This
shocked Smuts,
who believed the treatment of Indians in South Africa to be
entirely a
matter of domestic jurisdiction in South Africa and therefore
contrary to

any strict reading of the UN Charter. He was probably right
about that, but
people didn’t care. And when the Indian delegation took this
course of
action, the charge they brought did not concern minority rights,
which
they might well have chosen by claiming that the rights of the
Asian mi-
nority in South Africa were being infringed. In fact nobody,
least of all the
Indian delegation at that point, actually wanted to raise the
issue of mi-
nority rights. Preferring to see it buried, they couched their
accusation in
terms of racial discrimination. On that ground, they could be
sure to ob-
tain wide global acceptance, and South Africa found itself in the
dock.
There were other dimensions to Nehru’s achievement as well.
The
inter-Asia relations conference in Delhi in 1947 was a major
assertion that
the center of diplomatic gravity was moving outside Europe.
That is what
it meant to have such a conference at all, and that is when
Nehru hailed the
centrality of Asian civilization and the departure of the British.
Why did he
see things this way? Because they had cut India off from the
rest of Asia,
when it was really, as he put it, a vital bridge (see N). The
following year,
India again assumed a leading role, this time where the Dutch
East Indies
were concerned; India became a leader of the cause of

Indonesian inde-
pendence inside and outside the UN. They did not succeed
immediately,
2014 19:23:43 PM
but by the end of 1949 (in fact thanks in no small part to Indian
diplomatic
pressure) America had completely altered its policy on
Indonesian inde-
pendence, and the Indonesians were in fact independent. So the
reality was
that power had been swept well away from the British and the
Dutch into
the hands of governments like Nehru’s.
It’s true, South Africa was put in the dock in 1946, 1947, and
1948; but
what outcome did such a move produce? As Smuts warned
Nehru, in fact,
an election victory for the nationalists in 1948 marked the onset
of the
apartheid regime, and neither Nehru nor the United Nations
could do
anything about that. The other limitation was to the very
conception of a
common Asian policy at all. How real was it? How often could
you pit Asia
against Europe? Was this in fact just like the dying moment of

an older
interwar discourse of pan-Asianism, one that would go into the
dustbin of
history along with pan-Islamism and pan-Arabism and turn out
to be
unsuited to the modern world? You could say that the war with
China
marks the definitive end of any pan-Asianism, but I think one
should go
back earlier than that. A close reading of the Bandung
Conference would
suggest that it brought up real arguments amongst the members
over this
very issue. Nehru himself asserted in 1955 that “to talk about
[Asia] as one
entity is to confuse ourselves” (quoted in N, p. 188).
So there was a moment, an end-of-Europe moment, where to
talk about
Asia was to gain a kind of diplomatic standing. But then one
had to face the
question of whether or not Asia really existed, especially as
Europe re-
mained central even after this moment, if only in a more subtle
way. It was
scarcely to be expected that the significance of a power center
that had
lasted for so long would vanish overnight in every domain just
because its
military and political predominance was shrinking. Look in
particular at
the continued intellectual influence of European thought—
especially its
slowly waning nineteenth-century influence. In the 1940s
everybody was
still reading and printing Mazzini. His life through the era of

decoloniza-
tion would richly repay systematic investigation; what is clear
is his appeal
to Third World intellectuals and activists. In India alone, this
included
everyone from the founders of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak
Sangh (RSS) to
Congress. But it was not just an Indian story; everywhere,
nationalism—as
a kind of nineteenth-century doctrine on which people like
Mazzini were
felt to have a lot to say—was very widely diffused;
anticolonialism fosters
this and certainly did not close it down. With nationalism,
moreover, a
whole series of discussions emerged about the role of the state
and the
state’s role in the economy in urban planning manuals. I think
of the
interesting German geographer Walter Christaller, who had
worked for
2014 19:23:43 PM
the SS on optimizing settlement planning in Eastern Europe.18
By the end
of the 1940s, everyone was reading him from the Punjab to
Israel—anyone,
that is, with a ministry or agency to run who wanted to know

where to
settle people properly.
More specifically, for the US, I think there is a sense in which
Europe
retained its importance. Making Europe secure and safe in 1945
was the
first task—to reconstruct it in both the short- and the long-term;
that was
more important to Washington than any other foreign policy
issue. The
real question was under whose aegis: the United Nations (with
UNRRA or,
later, the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe) or
Washing-
ton (with the Marshall Plan and the World Bank). Let us recall
that what
ended up as the World Bank started life as the International
Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), a United Nations
agency dis-
bursing reconstruction loans to European states; only when the
Marshall
Plan came along with sums of money that dwarfed the IBRD did
the IBRD
rebrand itself as the World Bank and start the process of turning
itself into
a development bank.
For policy makers charged with reconstruction, Europe was a
labora-
tory, a series of technics that one could then apply around the
world. And
it was Paul Hoffman, the head of the Marshall Plan, who
provided a series
of lessons that could be applied around the world.19 Hoffman

became head
of the Ford Foundation and then ran the UN development
program. He is,
in a sense, a segue from the European experience of US-led
reconstruction
to a global development experience in the 1950s and 1960s. A
very similar
trajectory was followed by Robert Jackson, the man who had
shot to fame
running the wartime Middle East Supply Center before working
for UN-
RRA where he had a long career in development and crisis
management
inside and outside the UN.
This notion of Europe as a laboratory for a series of technics
that can be
applied to the rest of the world was central to understanding
what was to
happen globally and, in particular, under American control. The
story of
development and modernization theory can only be told as a
story that
starts in Europe and then ramifies around the world. Walt
Rostow pro-
vides a classic case at the heart of postwar US policy making.
His wartime
service was in and of Europe: he was with the US bombing
survey, involved
in the Marshall Plan, and then he went back to MIT where he
constructed
a series of policy prescriptions that were dressed up as
economic history,
18. See Mazower, Hitler’s Empire, pp. 599–600.
19. See Mazower, Governing the World: The History of an Idea,

1815 to the Present (New
York, 2012), p. 289.
2014 19:23:43 PM
based partly on the experience of reconstructing Germany and
partly on
his reading of the Industrial Revolution, to provide a kind of
policy blue-
print for modernization around the world.
One could perhaps construct a parallel narrative for the USSR,
but the
Soviet case involved less ambition and a less steep learning
curve. The
Soviet Union was, after all, the heir, in the way that the US was
not, to
an older globalizing imperium. For all the developmentalist
rhetoric
and—on a much more restricted budget—policy, it was
following es-
sentially the czarist security program in Eastern Europe and in
the South-
ern Tier. Only when Stalin died and the borders in Europe were
largely
stabilized could Khrushchev experiment (and even then in the
most ten-
tative way) by dabbling in Egypt and the Middle East, with

possible ways
into Africa. But actually, in the late 1940s, there was only one
global power
that had an activist sense of itself as a global power and that
was the United
States.
Finally, what was it that happened in Western Europe under
American
auspices? One of the things that Murray had talked about was
the impor-
tance of reconciliation in Europe, as a necessity for the
restoration of civ-
ilization. Reconciliation however involved a kind of
introversion. The new
sense of an incipient unitary legal community was one
expression of what
this produced. One European reading of the war experience
confirmed the
need to reinvigorate laws—with a robust legal system to shackle
parlia-
ments and executives—in order to avoid a replay of anything
like the Third
Reich and everything that followed from it. Accordingly, when
the UDHR
was promulgated, the Council of Europe and many Europeans
felt that this
was a weak, nonbinding form of legal regime. The proposal in
Europe was
that something more binding was needed for Europe. Thus
began the
discussions that were to lead to the European Convention on
Human
Rights. This is at once much humbler than any European
document would
have been before—there is no mention of civilized states—but it

did even-
tually establish a much more robust legal regime than any
previously.
The policies that led to integration and the creation of a new
economic
community involved a similar deepening of relations among
European
states at the expense of their connections overseas. This was
most obvious
in the institutionalization of agricultural protectionism and the
creation of
a common external tariff on overseas trade. The Americans did
not get
their way on what had been dearest to the heart of Secretary of
State Hull:
the building of a global free trade regime after 1945. This was
something in
which Hull had invested a great deal of hope and which
collapsed in the
American Congress after the Havana meeting. Although that had
pro-
duced a blueprint for an international trade organization,
Truman realized
2014 19:23:43 PM
that he would never get the proposal for a global free trade
regime through

Congress, and it languished until a few years ago when the
World Trade
Organization was founded in place of the ITO. Thus what
emerged in
Europe in the 1950s was a new trading community in which
Europe was
essentially defined as a series of tariff walls protecting
increasingly inte-
grated markets.
The mid-1940s, then, may have marked the moment when
contempo-
raries began to talk about the end of the European era, if not
quite the end
of Eurocentrism. For it was only with the loss of China, the
Korean War,
and Stalin’s death that Americans finally felt that Europe had
been stabi-
lized and that they could and should go on to think about other
things.
Nobody remembers it now, but in 1955 the expansion of UN
membership
seemed terribly important. If the Americans and the Russians
had not been
able to agree on an expansion of membership, the UN would not
have
turned into a universal organization. The expansion, then, was
essentially
a European bargain. The Americans wanted Spain and Portugal
in, the
Russians wanted Bulgaria and Rumania in; those were the
countries that
still counted for them in 1955. It was from that point onwards
that the US
moved from a Europe-first policy to something closer to a Third
Worldist

stance. Algeria was a kind of test case, as Matthew Connelly
has persua-
sively argued; the point at which Washington could prioritize
Algeria
marked the US belief that France itself—and by extension
Western Eu-
rope—had become stable.20 Was it a coincidence that this was
both the
moment of geographical and generational transition and the
moment at
which the presidency of the US moved from the man who
commanded
victorious American armies in Europe to the much younger
figure who
had been a naval commander in the South Pacific?
20. Matthew Connelly, A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria’s
Fight for Independence and the
Origins of the Post-Cold War Era (New York, 2003).
2014 19:23:43 PM
Pomeranz, Kenneth. Great Divergence : China, Europe and the
Making of the Modern World Economy. Princeton, NJ, USA:
Princeton University Press, 2000. ProQuest ebrary. Web. 6 May
2015.
Copyright © 2000. Princeton University Press. All rights
reserved.

2015.
reserved.
2015.
reserved.
2015.
reserved.
2015.
reserved.

2015.
reserved.
Fritzsche_titleFritzsche_01Fritzsche_03Fritzsche_04Fritzsche_0
5Fritzsche_06Fritzsche_07Fritzsche_08Fritzsche_09
Barnett, S. J.. Enlightenment and Religion : The Myths of
Modernity. Manchester, GBR: Manchester University Press,
2004. ProQuest ebrary. Web. 6 May 2015.

reserved.
reserved.
reserved.
reserved.

reserved.
Chacour_titleChacour_115Chacour_117Chacour_119Chacour_1
21Chacour_123Chacour_125Chacour_127Chacour_129Chacour_
131
Name: Fatimah Alsadah
Professor name: Mathieu Billings
World History 202
Day: Monday
06/08/15
Exam 2#

1. What is a primary source? Give an example from our
syllabus.
Primary sources are those sources that are directly written by
authorizes, or stories or
autobiographies. They are directly about the topic by time or
participation. The maps and
images of important historical events covered in the syllabus are
the primary sources.
2. What is a secondary source? Give an example from our
syllabus.
The secondary sources are those sources that interpret or
analyze the primary sources.
The textbook, “Traditions & Encounters" A global perspective
on the past” is a
secondary source because it analyzes and interprets the primary
sources.
3. What are the fundamentals of historical analysis?
The fundamental of historical analysis is to look for change
over time. The time and place
and the changes taking place over time are very important when
analyzing history. The
questions that can help in historical analysis are: what happened
(subject), why did it

happen (argument), how do we know (argument), and why do
we care about the event.
4. Why are time and place so important to historical thinking?
Time and place are important to historical thinking because they
tell important things
about the event and help in historical analysis and historical
thinking by telling about
when the event occurred and where the event occurred.
5. What is historiography?
Historiography in simple events can be defined as the history of
historical events. The
importance of the original historical work, the way it has been
analyzed, the way
Comment [T1]: From our syllabus?
Comment [T2]: Good.
Comment [T3]: Give an example of how
impossible it would be to make sense of the world
without one or the other….
Comment [T4]: Partly. I also want you to think of
it as the “competing interpretations” of history.

World History 202
Day: Monday
06/08/15
Exam 2#
historians look and study the event and the sources used are the
points related to
historiography.
275 words
1. What was the Industrial Revolution? Why did it happen? Why
do we care?
The Industrial Revolution was a period of technological
revolution that took place during
the eighteen and nineteen century. It brought about a great
change in the industries and
more and more machines were introduced. The people wanted
everything fast and people
were working hard to make new machines. People were seeking
development and with
the increase in population the demands for good was increasing
and therefore there was a
necessity for the production to be increased. The handmade
tools or the basic machines
used by people at home were not enough to meet the demands of

people and there was a
necessity to use new machines to increase manufacturing.
People also wanted an easy life
and therefore there was a necessity to improve the means of
communication and
transportation. People wanted more facilities and a better
standard of living and this was
also one of the reasons behind the Industrial Revolution. We
care about the Industrial
Revolution because it laid down the foundation of modern world
and technological
development. Industrial Revolution changed the lifestyle of
people. People became more
and more urbanized and there was a shift from agriculture to
Industry. We care about
Industrial Revolution because it brought economic development
and also it created social
differences between rich and poor. People started shifting jobs
and our lives became
easier after the revolution. We also care about Industrial
Revolution because it gave more
Comment [T5]: Where?

World History 202
Day: Monday
06/08/15
Exam 2#
power to the capitalist countries and the Industrial Revolution
could be the reason behind
people getting greedier for power. It is also possible that the
Industrial Revolution could
have been responsible for the World Wars too. Therefore it is
important to analyze all the
important events related to the Industrial Revolution.
2. What was modernization? What caused it? Why does it
matter?
Modernization can be associated with enlightenment. It can be
defined as the process of
progress and development that changed the lifestyle of people.
Modernization can also be
defined in terms of scientific, political, social, economic,
environmental, geographic,
agricultural and religious changes. The causes behind
modernization are enlightenment
and the scientific development. People started questioning the
previous beliefs and started

reasoning everything. The traditional and religious beliefs were
also questioned and
people wanted reasons for everything. The scientific
development also led to
modernization. People started developing new machines and the
scientific inventions led
to the development of modern machines and technology. The
economic, social,
environmental, agricultural, religious and political changes
were all prompted by the
scientific development.
Modernization matters to us because it brought many changes.
The traditional outlook of
people changed, and people started thinking in an open manner.
The social and cultural
views of people started to changed and led to a modern outlook.
Agricultural practices
changed and people started to move towards urban areas.
Medical practices changed and
people started to use modern medicines and they also came to
know the reasons behind
diseases. Economic development too place and new terms like
capitalism and

Comment [T6]: Some historical examples? Your
sources?
World History 202
Day: Monday
06/08/15
Exam 2#
imperialism were introduced. Religious thinking changed and
people started questioning
the role of church. Population increased, demands increased and
this led to development
of industries and technology. Modernization brought many good
changes, but it also
brought some negative changes, such as the environmental
pollution increased with
modernization. Political revolution can be associated with
modernization and the political
changes also led to social changes as people demanded equality
and freedom.
Modernization laid down the foundation of the modern and
technological world.
3. What was Imperialism? Why did it occur? Why do we care?

Imperialism can be defined as a process by which one can
country can rule over the
country by using political means or by economic means.
Imperialism can be related to
greed because every country and every empire wanted to expand
and grow. They wanted
to make strong boundaries and gain more economic power and
for this more and more
resources were required, so the empires and countries started
controlling other countries
and empires to help in economic growth and also to gain more
and more resources. The
kings led their people to wars to conquer near and far lands and
there were major wars in
the European region for the sake of power. Modernization and
industrial development are
also closely related to imperialism. With the development of
industries and
modernization, the production of goods increased multifold and
the imperialist powers
needed some place to dump their goods and at the same time
they needed resources for
the production of goods. The imperialistic powers also needed
cheap resources for their

economic development and they needed cheap manpower too. It
was possible to gain
Comment [T7]: Some historical examples? Your
sources?
Comment [T8]: Who? Where and when?
World History 202
Day: Monday
06/08/15
Exam 2#
cheap resources and cheap manpower by controlling other
countries and this was also the
main cause behind imperialism.
We care about imperialism because it brought a great change in
the world. It brought an
economic revolution and many historical events are related to
imperialism. In fact,
modernism, imperialism, industrial revolution, and capitalism
are all related to each
other. Imperialism was also the reason for the development of a
global world and the
discovery of the new world and other countries are also because

of imperialism.
Imperialism was also the reason behind slavery and the
development of racism. Historical
analysis shows the relation of imperialism with many historical
events and therefore we
care about imperialism.
500 words
Do you think the World History since 1700 is essentially
Eurocentric- a story of European
power and culture? Whether you agree or disagree, be sure to
identify which historical event
was the most Eurocentric, and which was the least? Dedicate
one paragraph to each of the
following, the Industrial Revolution, Modernization and
Imperialism.
The European power had a lot of control over most of the
countries of the world. The
historical events that occurred since 1700 are somehow or the
other related to Europe or
European countries. Therefore it would not be wrong to say that
the World History since
1700 is essentially Eurocentric- a story of European power and
culture. The most Eurocentric

event was modernization and the least Eurocentric event was
Industrial Revolution because
Industrial Revolution had begun in almost all the countries
around the world, but more
Comment [T9]: Okay. Good. Link this with
Kipling’s “White Man’s Burden”…or the political
cartoons I showed in class.
World History 202
Day: Monday
06/08/15
Exam 2#
obvious changes of modernization were visible in Europe. The
World History is still
Eurocentric because of the relation of historical events with
Europe.
The Industrial Revolution began in almost all the countries.
The Industrial and scientific
revolution had its foundation in India because the Brahmic
numerals and the concepts of
trigonometry developed in India. The Golden Age of Islam also
introduced many new
concepts. Japan had advanced modern technology and it helped

later in its fast development
(Thomas, 2009). Industrial Revolution had begun in almost all
the countries and therefore
Industrial Revolution is the least Eurocentric historical event.
Europe had money, power and
resources to exploit the industrial development, but other
countries lacked in one or the other
area , for example Japan and India had many internal wars and
therefore they could not
exploit their scientific and industrial development on a larger
scale like Europe.
Modernization was the most Eurocentric historical event and it
brought many changes in
Europe that affected the entire world. The development in
transportation, communication,
and health and electrical industries that began in Europe
revolutionized the whole world.
Europe had power and resources to develop the scientific ideas
and work in perfect
coordination for the betterment of society. Most of the scientists
and scientific theories have
developed in Europe. Most of the important and famous
inventions of the world happened in
Europe and then developed in later parts of the world.

Imperialism is also a Eurocentric event to a great extent. As
European countries started ruling
the different countries in Asia, Africa and America, imperialism
can be considered a
Eurocentric event. The concepts of capitalism and
industrialization are associated with
Comment [T10]: Thesis.
Comment [T11]: No. It started in Britain.
Comment [T12]: Okay. Good. This is basically
how I want you to cite your sources.
World History 202
Day: Monday
06/08/15
Exam 2#
imperialism and capitalism and industrialization are also closely
associated with European
powers. The history of Imperialism and the events of
conquering other countries is also
Eurocentric. Britain, France, Portugal, Dutch occupied many
other countries for the sake of

acquiring political and economic dominance after 1700 and
therefore Imperialism is a
Eurocentric event.
The World History tells us about the events around the world,
but after 1700 most of the
historical events are related to Europe, or are about the
European power and dominance.
Industrialization had begun in many other countries apart from
the European powers, so
Industrialization is the least Eurocentric event. Modernization
and Imperialism are more
Eurocentric because most of the historical events about
modernization and imperialism are
related to Europe. Analyzing the historical events, the historians
can see that European
countries were involved directly or indirectly in most of the
events and therefore it would be
right to say that the World History since 1700 is more
Eurocentric.
References
Thomas, S. (2009). Eurocentrism adding fuel to the fire.
Retrieved June 7, 2015, from Gulf Daily News:
http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Eurocentrism+adding+fuel+to+th
e+fire.-a0194040785

World History 202
Day: Monday
06/08/15
Exam 2#
Excellent Good Fair Poor Points
1. Historical Discipline (20) 16
2. Short Essays (45) 31
Accurately answers the entire question X
References time and place throughout X
Employs Source-Based Evidence to Support
Answers
X
Synthesizes a Variety of Sources X

3. Long Essay (60) 43
Accurately answers the entire question X
References time and place throughout X
Employs Source-Based Evidence to Support
Answers
X
Synthesizes a Variety of Sources X
Argues logically and effectively X
Overall Grade (125 points) 90 (C-)
Okay. In some ways, this is an improvement over your last
exam. But you need to take a look
at the “A” examples on ACE. As I state in my comments, you
need to elaborate upon your
main points by supporting them with historical information and
citing where you got your
information. (To be clear: only sources from our syllabus. I
know that you did that here, but I
want there to be no doubt). The same goes for your long essay.
Remember, you can always

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