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2015 Chatham County Hurricane Conference
Lori R. Dauelsberg, Mark A. Ehlen
National Infrastructure Simulation & Analysis
Center
April 7, 2015
NATIONAL PROTECTION AND PROGRAMS DIRECTORATE
OFFICE OF CYBER AND INFRASTRUCTURE ANALYSIS
OCIA Overview
• OCIA assesses strategic risks to
the Nation’s critical infrastructure to
inform risk management decisions
by Federal, State, and local
partners.
• Critical infrastructure consequence
analysis and prioritization
• Includes operational and strategic
analysis of incidents and emerging
risks
• Supports interagency,
intergovernmental, international,
and private sector partners with risk
and consequence analysis
Infrastructure
Prioritization
Operational
Analysis
Strategic
Analysis
Capability
and Capacity
Development
• OCIA oversees the National Infrastructure
Simulation and Analysis Center (NISAC)
program, which is comprised of analysts
from OCIA, Los Alamos National
Laboratory and Sandia National
Laboratory. NISAC conducts modeling,
simulation, and analysis of the Nation's
critical infrastructure.
• The purpose of the analysis is to assess
potential critical infrastructure risk,
vulnerabilities, dependencies,
interdependencies, and potential
consequences resulting from manmade—
deliberate or accidental—or natural
events.
• NISAC analysis supports Federal, State,
and local stakeholders in developing or
improving risk mitigation strategies and
policy planning.
OCIA-NISAC Enterprise
All Hazards
Natural Disasters
– Hurricane
– Drought
– Earthquake
– Flood
– Storm surge
– Ice storm
– Pandemic
– Wildfire
Terrorism Events
– Biological
– Chemical
– Explosive
– Radiological
– Nuclear
– Physical assault
– Insider
– Cyber
• NISAC provides crisis action analysis support for hurricanes, floods,
ice storms, wildfires, and other natural disasters.
• NISAC Analysis Team uses the full range of capabilities to provide
actionable information about population, economic, and
infrastructure impacts, and resilience and recovery strategies.
NISAC Analyses
Supply Chain
Analysis
Restoration Recovery
Prioritization
Planning for Natural Disasters
• Short-term
• Informing first responders and
leadership decision making
• Pre-positioning supplies and
resources
• Understanding potential impacts to
critical infrastructures
• Describing criticality of an event
• Long-term
• Exercises, including modeling
hypothetical events
• Increasing maintenance programs
• Improving systems based upon
risks
• Incorporating new technologies
Hurricane Scenario Analysis Sequence
Savannah Hurricane Scenario
• Category 3 hurricane diminishing to a Category 1
• Loses strength as it passes through South Carolina and into North Carolina
• Modeling and simulation parameters:
– Maximum wind intensity: 120 miles per hour (mph)
– Forward speed: 11.5 mph
– Landfall: 31.2 ºN, 81.3 ºW (near Brunswick, GA)
– Radius of 50-knot winds: 144 statute miles
– Radius of 34-knot winds: 201 statute miles
• Hypothetical track and strength similar to Hurricane David in 1979 and
similar in width to Hurricane Ivan in 2004
Savannah Projected Electric Power Outage Areas
Projected outage areas are
based on wind speed, wind
direction, and orientation of
transmission grid:
–Red area: 76 to 100%
outage
–Orange area: 51 to 75%
outage
–Yellow area: 26 to 50%
outage
–Light green area: 11 to 25%
outage
–Dark green area: <10%
Electric Power Restoration
 An estimated 1.7 million
people live in areas where
projected damage to the
electric power system
exceeds 75 percent
 Approximately 2.95 million
people (about 1.34 million
utility customers) will
experience some level of
electric power outage due to
the scenario hurricane
 Approximately 95 percent of
customers should have
power restored in just over
16 days, with complete
power restoration requiring
up to 24 days
Electric Power Restoration
Storm Surge Projection
Analysts use projected inundation areas as
a basis for further sector and population
analysis, as well as for restoration time
estimates Storm Surge Marker, Tybee Island, GA, 2014
Source: L. Inkret
Storm Surge Impacts
• About 42,300 people live in areas projected to experience at least 2 feet of storm surge
Surge
(feet)
Population
ages 0–16
Population
ages 17–64
Population ages
65+
> 8 2,900 9,700 2,200
6–8 1,200 3,800 900
4–6 1,900 5,700 1,400
3–4 1,600 5,200 1,900
2–3 800 2,600 500
Electric Power: Kraft Power Plant
• The Kraft Power Plant, located on the west bank of the
Savannah River just north of Savannah in Port Wentworth is
the only asset within the storm-surge inundation area
• The power plant contains three coal-fired steam-turbine
generating units with a combined capacity of 200 MW, one
natural gas-fired steam-turbine generating unit with a 115-MW
capacity, and one natural gas-fired gas-turbine generating unit
with a 17-MW capacity
• The loss of these units is unlikely to have a significant effect
on the power grid because there is less demand in the
aftermath of a storm. The substation just west of the power
plant is not affected
Nuclear Power Plants
• 4 nuclear power plants located in the 26- to 75-percent electric
power outage areas
– Edwin I Hatch, Johnson Corner, GA
– Vogtle in Girard, GA
– C. Summer in Monticello, SC
– H.B. Robinson in North Hartsville, SC
• Even though the plants would remain online, because nuclear power
plants rely on offsite power provided by neighboring substations, an
outage of the local substation that provides power for safety systems
will impede operations
• If a utility takes a nuclear facility offline for this reason, it would likely
keep it on hot standby, forestalling the need to complete the entire
start-up process, which takes several days
Natural Gas
• There are no gas-processing plants in the projected electric
power outage or storm-surge inundation areas
• According to available data, there are no compressor stations
within the storm-surge inundation zones. Loss of compression
would not stop the flow of pipeline gas, but it would likely
reduce pipeline delivery capacity to downstream customers
• Natural gas deliveries would likely continue to electric power
outage areas, including Savannah and Brunswick
• Due to interconnections in the subsector’s infrastructure, the
ability to deliver gas to customers outside the storm area
would be impacted only minimally
Transportation Fuels
• Widespread regional disruptions are
not expected, but shortages of
transportation fuels are likely to
occur locally along the coast,
especially around Savannah and
Brunswick, GA
• Drawing down inventory and
transporting fuel from operating
facilities in the region would enable
partial mitigation of the local impacts
Food and Agriculture
• National-level impacts from this
hurricane scenario are limited
• More than 12 million acres of crop
and other vegetation production is at
risk from storm-surge inundation
and/or damaging winds in excess of
50 mph
• Significant local and regional impacts
are possible to agricultural products
(i. e., hay, grasses, and hog and
poultry production) especially in
Georgia and South Carolina
• Poultry production in GA and the
Carolinas is at risk.
• Hog production in South Carolina will
also be impacted
Forsyth Farmer’s Market, Savannah
Source: Forsyth Farmer’s Market
Financial Services
• Impacts to the Financial
Services sector are unlikely
• 20 bank branches are located
in areas projected to receive
surge inundation of 2 feet or
more. Many of these
branches are part of large
national banks
• The population in the directly
affected areas will likely
experience ATMs and an
inability to process credit and
debit card transactions
Wells Fargo Branch, Savannah
Credit: FlickrRiver
Chemical Sector
• No national-level impacts to
commodity chemical supply chains
are expected, but regional and
specialty-chemical shortages are
possible
• Most-severe disruptions to
Chemical Sector activity are
expected in Georgia and South
Carolina, but Chemical Sector
activity in the Southeast is
relatively diffuse
Emergency Services
Facility Type
Facilities in
76-100%
Electric
Power
Outage Area
Facilities in
More Than 4
Feet of Surge
Emergency Medical
Responder Station
77 4
Fire Station 226 0
Fire Station and
Emergency Medical
Response Station
196 4
Law Enforcement Office 152 1
Total Emergency Services
Facilities
651 9
• Chatham County has the most
• 651 facilities within the 76- to 100-
percent likelihood of electric power
outage area
• Storm-surge inundation and the 76-
to 100-percent electric power
outage will likely result in increased
requests for emergency responders
• Limited access to roads will cause
logistical difficulties and increased
response times for law
enforcement, fire, and medical
services responding to
emergencies, possibly
necessitating the use of aerial
operations
Healthcare
• 4 hospitals are within ½ mile of or
within areas with 5 feet
• These hospitals have about 400
patients who will likely require
evacuation
• Relocating these patients is likely to
affect up to 24 hospitals in the
surrounding area
• 2 nursing homes in 3 feet of storm
surge
Evacuated Hospitals
Communications Services
 No national impacts are
expected
 Local access and transport
areas that cover southeastern
South Carolina and eastern
Georgia are most at risk
 This impact represents a
potential service area of over
680,000 households.
 Over 90 percent of the wire
centers that provide cellular
service are also at risk
Transportation
• Storm surge and debris are likely to
have significant local and regional
impacts on the roads in and around
Savannah, GA
• The Ports of Savannah and
Brunswick will suffer some damage
from storm surge and high winds
• All airports in the region will suffer
electric power outages
• Light-to-moderate rail disruption is
expected at a regional level, with
nearly complete recovery within 1 to
2 days of storm passage
• Transportation impacts from storm-
surge inundation will be confined to
the counties along the Atlantic Coast
of Georgia and the southern portion
of South Carolina
Flooded Road, Tybee Island, GA
Credit: J. Evans, Georgia Sea Grant
Water and Wastewater
• There are 12 water
treatment plants located
within the 76- to 100-
percent electric power
damage contour
• These facilities serve
more than 376,000 people
in Georgia and South
Carolina
State
Water Treatment Plant
Electric Power Percent Damage
(%)
76–100 51–75 26–50 11–25 0 – 10
Georgia 6 1 1 4 1
North
Carolina
0 0 14 13
14
South
Carolina
6 4 21 5
5
Virginia 0 0 0 0 1
Total 12 5 36 22 21
State
Number of Wastewater Treatment Facilities
Electric Power Percent Damage
(%)
76–100 51–75 26–50 11–25 0–10
Georgia 32 10 20 9 8
North
Carolina
0 0 109 55
92
South
Carolina
31 30 26 16
13
Virginia 0 0 0 0 1
Total 63 40 155 80 114
• 2 wastewater treatment
facilities in Georgia and 1 in
South Carolina located within
the 76- to 100-percent electric
power damage contour
• These facilities serve
approximately 91,500 people
Government Facilities
• National-level impacts to
Department of Defense (DOD)
sites are not expected
• Storm surge is expected to
significantly impact Marine Corps
Recruit Depot at Parris Island in
South Carolina
• Likely significant impacts to Kings
Bay Naval Submarine Base and
Fort Stewart’s Hunter Army
Airfield in Georgia
Business Interruptions
• The estimated range of the direct
gross domestic product (GDP)
reduction resulting from this
hurricane scenario is $3.5 to $5.3
billion
• Estimated total national reduction
to the GDP is between $9.0 and
$13.7 billion, which includes lost
regional economic output and its
indirect effect on total output
For more information contact:
National Protection and Programs Directorate
Office of Cyber and Infrastructure Analysis
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
OCIA@hq.dhs.gov

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LUNCH NISAC Presentation

  • 1. 2015 Chatham County Hurricane Conference Lori R. Dauelsberg, Mark A. Ehlen National Infrastructure Simulation & Analysis Center April 7, 2015 NATIONAL PROTECTION AND PROGRAMS DIRECTORATE OFFICE OF CYBER AND INFRASTRUCTURE ANALYSIS
  • 2. OCIA Overview • OCIA assesses strategic risks to the Nation’s critical infrastructure to inform risk management decisions by Federal, State, and local partners. • Critical infrastructure consequence analysis and prioritization • Includes operational and strategic analysis of incidents and emerging risks • Supports interagency, intergovernmental, international, and private sector partners with risk and consequence analysis Infrastructure Prioritization Operational Analysis Strategic Analysis Capability and Capacity Development
  • 3. • OCIA oversees the National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center (NISAC) program, which is comprised of analysts from OCIA, Los Alamos National Laboratory and Sandia National Laboratory. NISAC conducts modeling, simulation, and analysis of the Nation's critical infrastructure. • The purpose of the analysis is to assess potential critical infrastructure risk, vulnerabilities, dependencies, interdependencies, and potential consequences resulting from manmade— deliberate or accidental—or natural events. • NISAC analysis supports Federal, State, and local stakeholders in developing or improving risk mitigation strategies and policy planning. OCIA-NISAC Enterprise
  • 4. All Hazards Natural Disasters – Hurricane – Drought – Earthquake – Flood – Storm surge – Ice storm – Pandemic – Wildfire Terrorism Events – Biological – Chemical – Explosive – Radiological – Nuclear – Physical assault – Insider – Cyber • NISAC provides crisis action analysis support for hurricanes, floods, ice storms, wildfires, and other natural disasters. • NISAC Analysis Team uses the full range of capabilities to provide actionable information about population, economic, and infrastructure impacts, and resilience and recovery strategies.
  • 6. Planning for Natural Disasters • Short-term • Informing first responders and leadership decision making • Pre-positioning supplies and resources • Understanding potential impacts to critical infrastructures • Describing criticality of an event • Long-term • Exercises, including modeling hypothetical events • Increasing maintenance programs • Improving systems based upon risks • Incorporating new technologies
  • 8. Savannah Hurricane Scenario • Category 3 hurricane diminishing to a Category 1 • Loses strength as it passes through South Carolina and into North Carolina • Modeling and simulation parameters: – Maximum wind intensity: 120 miles per hour (mph) – Forward speed: 11.5 mph – Landfall: 31.2 ºN, 81.3 ºW (near Brunswick, GA) – Radius of 50-knot winds: 144 statute miles – Radius of 34-knot winds: 201 statute miles • Hypothetical track and strength similar to Hurricane David in 1979 and similar in width to Hurricane Ivan in 2004
  • 9. Savannah Projected Electric Power Outage Areas Projected outage areas are based on wind speed, wind direction, and orientation of transmission grid: –Red area: 76 to 100% outage –Orange area: 51 to 75% outage –Yellow area: 26 to 50% outage –Light green area: 11 to 25% outage –Dark green area: <10%
  • 10. Electric Power Restoration  An estimated 1.7 million people live in areas where projected damage to the electric power system exceeds 75 percent  Approximately 2.95 million people (about 1.34 million utility customers) will experience some level of electric power outage due to the scenario hurricane  Approximately 95 percent of customers should have power restored in just over 16 days, with complete power restoration requiring up to 24 days
  • 12. Storm Surge Projection Analysts use projected inundation areas as a basis for further sector and population analysis, as well as for restoration time estimates Storm Surge Marker, Tybee Island, GA, 2014 Source: L. Inkret
  • 13. Storm Surge Impacts • About 42,300 people live in areas projected to experience at least 2 feet of storm surge Surge (feet) Population ages 0–16 Population ages 17–64 Population ages 65+ > 8 2,900 9,700 2,200 6–8 1,200 3,800 900 4–6 1,900 5,700 1,400 3–4 1,600 5,200 1,900 2–3 800 2,600 500
  • 14. Electric Power: Kraft Power Plant • The Kraft Power Plant, located on the west bank of the Savannah River just north of Savannah in Port Wentworth is the only asset within the storm-surge inundation area • The power plant contains three coal-fired steam-turbine generating units with a combined capacity of 200 MW, one natural gas-fired steam-turbine generating unit with a 115-MW capacity, and one natural gas-fired gas-turbine generating unit with a 17-MW capacity • The loss of these units is unlikely to have a significant effect on the power grid because there is less demand in the aftermath of a storm. The substation just west of the power plant is not affected
  • 15. Nuclear Power Plants • 4 nuclear power plants located in the 26- to 75-percent electric power outage areas – Edwin I Hatch, Johnson Corner, GA – Vogtle in Girard, GA – C. Summer in Monticello, SC – H.B. Robinson in North Hartsville, SC • Even though the plants would remain online, because nuclear power plants rely on offsite power provided by neighboring substations, an outage of the local substation that provides power for safety systems will impede operations • If a utility takes a nuclear facility offline for this reason, it would likely keep it on hot standby, forestalling the need to complete the entire start-up process, which takes several days
  • 16. Natural Gas • There are no gas-processing plants in the projected electric power outage or storm-surge inundation areas • According to available data, there are no compressor stations within the storm-surge inundation zones. Loss of compression would not stop the flow of pipeline gas, but it would likely reduce pipeline delivery capacity to downstream customers • Natural gas deliveries would likely continue to electric power outage areas, including Savannah and Brunswick • Due to interconnections in the subsector’s infrastructure, the ability to deliver gas to customers outside the storm area would be impacted only minimally
  • 17. Transportation Fuels • Widespread regional disruptions are not expected, but shortages of transportation fuels are likely to occur locally along the coast, especially around Savannah and Brunswick, GA • Drawing down inventory and transporting fuel from operating facilities in the region would enable partial mitigation of the local impacts
  • 18. Food and Agriculture • National-level impacts from this hurricane scenario are limited • More than 12 million acres of crop and other vegetation production is at risk from storm-surge inundation and/or damaging winds in excess of 50 mph • Significant local and regional impacts are possible to agricultural products (i. e., hay, grasses, and hog and poultry production) especially in Georgia and South Carolina • Poultry production in GA and the Carolinas is at risk. • Hog production in South Carolina will also be impacted Forsyth Farmer’s Market, Savannah Source: Forsyth Farmer’s Market
  • 19. Financial Services • Impacts to the Financial Services sector are unlikely • 20 bank branches are located in areas projected to receive surge inundation of 2 feet or more. Many of these branches are part of large national banks • The population in the directly affected areas will likely experience ATMs and an inability to process credit and debit card transactions Wells Fargo Branch, Savannah Credit: FlickrRiver
  • 20. Chemical Sector • No national-level impacts to commodity chemical supply chains are expected, but regional and specialty-chemical shortages are possible • Most-severe disruptions to Chemical Sector activity are expected in Georgia and South Carolina, but Chemical Sector activity in the Southeast is relatively diffuse
  • 21. Emergency Services Facility Type Facilities in 76-100% Electric Power Outage Area Facilities in More Than 4 Feet of Surge Emergency Medical Responder Station 77 4 Fire Station 226 0 Fire Station and Emergency Medical Response Station 196 4 Law Enforcement Office 152 1 Total Emergency Services Facilities 651 9 • Chatham County has the most • 651 facilities within the 76- to 100- percent likelihood of electric power outage area • Storm-surge inundation and the 76- to 100-percent electric power outage will likely result in increased requests for emergency responders • Limited access to roads will cause logistical difficulties and increased response times for law enforcement, fire, and medical services responding to emergencies, possibly necessitating the use of aerial operations
  • 22. Healthcare • 4 hospitals are within ½ mile of or within areas with 5 feet • These hospitals have about 400 patients who will likely require evacuation • Relocating these patients is likely to affect up to 24 hospitals in the surrounding area • 2 nursing homes in 3 feet of storm surge Evacuated Hospitals
  • 23. Communications Services  No national impacts are expected  Local access and transport areas that cover southeastern South Carolina and eastern Georgia are most at risk  This impact represents a potential service area of over 680,000 households.  Over 90 percent of the wire centers that provide cellular service are also at risk
  • 24. Transportation • Storm surge and debris are likely to have significant local and regional impacts on the roads in and around Savannah, GA • The Ports of Savannah and Brunswick will suffer some damage from storm surge and high winds • All airports in the region will suffer electric power outages • Light-to-moderate rail disruption is expected at a regional level, with nearly complete recovery within 1 to 2 days of storm passage • Transportation impacts from storm- surge inundation will be confined to the counties along the Atlantic Coast of Georgia and the southern portion of South Carolina Flooded Road, Tybee Island, GA Credit: J. Evans, Georgia Sea Grant
  • 25. Water and Wastewater • There are 12 water treatment plants located within the 76- to 100- percent electric power damage contour • These facilities serve more than 376,000 people in Georgia and South Carolina State Water Treatment Plant Electric Power Percent Damage (%) 76–100 51–75 26–50 11–25 0 – 10 Georgia 6 1 1 4 1 North Carolina 0 0 14 13 14 South Carolina 6 4 21 5 5 Virginia 0 0 0 0 1 Total 12 5 36 22 21 State Number of Wastewater Treatment Facilities Electric Power Percent Damage (%) 76–100 51–75 26–50 11–25 0–10 Georgia 32 10 20 9 8 North Carolina 0 0 109 55 92 South Carolina 31 30 26 16 13 Virginia 0 0 0 0 1 Total 63 40 155 80 114 • 2 wastewater treatment facilities in Georgia and 1 in South Carolina located within the 76- to 100-percent electric power damage contour • These facilities serve approximately 91,500 people
  • 26. Government Facilities • National-level impacts to Department of Defense (DOD) sites are not expected • Storm surge is expected to significantly impact Marine Corps Recruit Depot at Parris Island in South Carolina • Likely significant impacts to Kings Bay Naval Submarine Base and Fort Stewart’s Hunter Army Airfield in Georgia
  • 27. Business Interruptions • The estimated range of the direct gross domestic product (GDP) reduction resulting from this hurricane scenario is $3.5 to $5.3 billion • Estimated total national reduction to the GDP is between $9.0 and $13.7 billion, which includes lost regional economic output and its indirect effect on total output
  • 28. For more information contact: National Protection and Programs Directorate Office of Cyber and Infrastructure Analysis U.S. Department of Homeland Security OCIA@hq.dhs.gov