Infrastructure Interdependencies: Connections that Alter Consequences


Published on

Keynote Speaker – "Infrastructure Interdependencies: Connections that Alter Consequences" - Michael J. Collins III, Infrastructure Analyst, Infrastructure Assurance Center, Argonne National Laboratories

1 Like
  • Be the first to comment

No Downloads
Total views
On SlideShare
From Embeds
Number of Embeds
Embeds 0
No embeds

No notes for slide

Infrastructure Interdependencies: Connections that Alter Consequences

  1. 1. Infrastructure Interdependencies: Connections that Alter Consequences<br />Prepared for<br />Rhode Island Hurricane Conference<br />Crowne Plaza Hotel, Warwick, RI<br />June 9, 2010<br />Prepared by<br />Michael Collins<br />Infrastructure Assurance Center<br />
  2. 2. Argonne National Laboratory<br /><ul><li>U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) national laboratory managed by UChicago Argonne, LLC
  3. 3. First national laboratory (1946)
  4. 4. Multi-purpose mission; broad R&D portfolio and user facilities
  5. 5. More than 2,900 employees and 5,000+ facility users
  6. 6. National/Homeland Security is a core competency</li></ul>Chicago<br /><br />
  7. 7. Prevent<br />Protect<br />Respond<br />Recover<br />Argonne Infrastructure Assurance Center (IAC)<br /><ul><li>Established June 1998
  8. 8. Mission: </li></ul> Apply Argonne’s expertise, knowledge, modeling and simulation capabilities, and technologies to solve national and homeland security problems<br /><ul><li>Areas of focus:</li></ul>“Systems” aspects of critical<br /> infrastructure and key resources (CIKR)<br /> Interdependencies and their potential for<br /> cascading effects on other infrastructures<br />3<br />
  9. 9. IAC Models Are Used to Analyze CIKR<br />National<br />Regional<br />Natural, accidental, and man-made events (physical and cyber)<br />Local<br /><ul><li>Identify physical and cyber vulnerability and criticality
  10. 10. Estimate service restoration time
  11. 11. Analyze risk
  12. 12. Analyze infrastructure interdependencies</li></ul>Restoration Analysis<br />Interdependence Analysis<br />
  13. 13. Transportation<br />WALL ST.<br />WALL ST.<br />Business<br />Wall Street<br />Oil & Gas Production and Storage<br />Government<br />Satellite<br />Electric Power<br />Banks/Finance<br />Telecom<br />Emergency Services <br />Government<br />Water Supply <br />Information<br />What is Infrastructure?<br /><ul><li>The framework of interdependent networks and systems consisting of identifiable industries, institutions, and distribution capabilities that provide a reliable flow of products and services essential to the economy and smooth functioning of government at all levels, and society as a whole
  14. 14. Infrastructure includes physical, cyber, and/or human elements</li></li></ul><li>Linkages among Infrastructures Are Complex<br />Petroleum<br />Transportation<br />Electricity<br />Natural Gas<br />Telecommunications<br />Water<br />
  15. 15. Definition of Interdependencies<br />The multi- or bi-directional reliance of an asset, system, network, or collection thereof, within or across sectors, on input, interaction, or other requirement from other sources in order to function properly*<br />Goods/Services<br />Infrastructure j<br />Infrastructure k<br />Goods/Services<br />*United States Department of Homeland Security National Infrastructure Protection Plan<br />
  16. 16. Scope of CIKR Makes Interdependency Issues Complex <br /><ul><li>18 CIKR sectors
  17. 17. Primarily owned/operated by private sector
  18. 18. Increasingly interconnected (physical and cyber)
  19. 19. Operate in an all-hazards environment
  20. 20. Regulated and non-regulated</li></ul>Complex linkages among CIKR<br />
  21. 21. The Interdependencies Concern…<br />9<br />Interdependencies lead to the possibility that our infrastructures may be vulnerable in ways they never have been before<br />Physical<br /> Cyber<br />Threats<br />Complexity<br />Interdependencies<br />A series of incidents could interact (cascade) across critical infrastructures to degrade the service upon which all depend<br />Intentional exploitation of these new vulnerabilities could have severe consequences for our economy, security, and way of life<br />
  22. 22. Illustrative Infrastructure Interdependencies<br />10<br />Fuels, Lubricants<br />Fuel Transport,<br />Shipping<br />Power for<br />Signaling,<br />Switches<br />Fuel for Generators, Lubricants<br />Transpor-<br />tation<br />Oil<br />Fuels, Lubricants<br />Fuel<br />Transport, Shipping<br />Power for Pumping Stations, Storage, Control Systems<br />Shipping<br />Power for Compressors, Storage, Control Systems<br />Power for Pump<br /> and Lift Stations,<br />Control Systems<br />Water for Production, Cooling, Emissions Reduction<br />Natural<br />Gas<br />Electric<br />Power<br />SCADA,<br /> Communications<br />SCADA, Communications<br />Fuel for Generators<br />Water for<br />Cooling,<br />Emissions Reduction<br />SCADA,<br /> Communications<br />Heat<br />SCADA,<br /> Communications<br />Water<br />Water for Cooling<br />Power for Switches<br />Telecom<br />SCADA, Communications<br />Shipping<br />Fuel for Generators<br />Emissions Reduction<br />Cooling, <br />Production, <br />Water for<br />
  23. 23. Type of <br />Failure<br />Infrastructure<br />Characteristics<br />Common<br />Cause<br />Cascading<br />Organizational<br />Loose/<br />Tight<br />Normal<br />Escalating<br />Operational<br />Linear/<br />Complex<br />Coupling and<br />Response Behavior<br />Temporal<br />State of Operation<br />Spatial<br />Physical<br />Business<br />Adaptive<br />Inflexible<br />Stressed/<br />Disrupted<br />Repair/<br />Restoration<br />Public<br />Policy<br />Cyber<br />Logical<br />Security<br />Economic<br />Health/<br />Safety<br />Legal/<br />Regulatory<br />Geographic<br />Technical<br />Social/<br />Political<br />Types of Interdependencies<br />Environment<br />A Range of Interdependencies Dimensions Must be Considered<br />
  24. 24. Types of Infrastructure Interdependencies<br />12<br /><ul><li>Physical (e.g., output of one infrastructure used by another)
  25. 25. Cyber (e.g., electronic, informational linkages)
  26. 26. Geographic (e.g., common corridor)
  27. 27. Logical (e.g., dependency through financial markets)</li></li></ul><li>Physical Interdependencies<br />13<br />Railroads<br /><ul><li>Electricity – signals, switches, control centers
  28. 28. Locomotives (electrified rail)</li></ul>Physical Linkage <br />Coal Power Plant<br /><ul><li>Coal for fuel
  29. 29. Delivery of repair parts</li></li></ul><li>Cyber Interdependencies<br />14<br /><ul><li>Monitors
  30. 30. Controls
  31. 31. Collects Data</li></ul>SCADA - Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition System <br />Computerized Systems<br />
  32. 32. Geographic Interdependencies<br />15<br />Rail & Transmission Lines<br />Airport<br />Pipeline & Electric Transmission Lines<br />Tank Farms<br />Pipeline & Highway<br />Telecom & Sewer<br />
  33. 33. Logical Interdependencies<br />16<br />(No direct physical, cyber, or geographic connection) <br /><ul><li>Seasonal weather conditions
  34. 34. Human decisions/habitual behaviors
  35. 35. Public policy (i.e., environmental regulations)
  36. 36. Economic impacts:
  37. 37. Government regulations
  38. 38. Consumer prices
  39. 39. Utility companies
  40. 40. External market prices
  41. 41. Lack of investments to meet growing demand</li></li></ul><li>Types of Interdependency Failures<br />17<br /><ul><li>Cascading failure– a disruption in one infrastructure causes a disruption in a second infrastructure
  42. 42. Escalating failure– a disruption in one infrastructure exacerbates an independent disruption of a second infrastructure
  43. 43. Common cause failure – a disruption of two or more infrastructures at the same time because of a common cause (e.g., natural disaster, right-of-way corridor) </li></li></ul><li>Interdependencies Have Local, Regional, National, and International Dimensions that May Vary by Threat <br />Man-Made Events(Terrorism)<br />Accidents/System Failures<br />Natural Disasters<br />
  44. 44. Interdependencies Have No Borders<br />North American Electric Grid<br />U.S. & Canadian Crude Oil Pipelines<br />North American Natural Gas Pipelines<br />
  45. 45. Cross-Border Linkages Introduce Risks <br /><ul><li>Cross-border supply chains
  46. 46. Overall level of imports
  47. 47. Limited source providers (key goods and services)
  48. 48. Threats (accidents, natural disasters, terrorism -- physical and cyber)</li></li></ul><li>End-to-End Systems<br />Facilities/Assets<br />Communities<br />Interdependencies Can be Considered at Multiple Levels<br />Networks<br />Regions<br />
  49. 49. C = f(Deaths, Economic Losses, Strategic Mission Impacts, Psychological Impacts, …)<br />T = f(Capability, Intent)<br />Innovative Targeting to Exploit Interdependencies<br />Threats<br />Cascading and Escalating Interdependent Consequences<br />V = f(Physical, Cyber, Human)<br />Vulnerabilities<br />Consequences<br />Expanded Set of Vulnerabilities Due to Interdependencies<br />Interdependencies Influence all Components of Risk<br />Risk = f(Threat, Vulnerability, Consequence) <br />Interdependencies: “Risk Multiplier”<br />
  50. 50. Damaged Storage Facility<br />Projected Storm Track<br />New Orleans Flooding<br />Natural Gas<br />Refinery Impacts<br />Projected Impacts<br />Natural Gas Production<br />Oil<br />Days After Landfall<br />Interdependencies Change during Events<br />Pre-Event<br />Trans-Event<br />Post-Event<br />
  51. 51. Recent Interdependency Analysis Examined Cascading Impacts for New Madrid and Wabash Valley Earthquakes<br />Earthquake Zone<br /><ul><li>Assessment of impact on natural gas interstate transmission pipelines
  52. 52. Identification of specific pipelines affected
  53. 53. Identification of probable location of pipeline breaks
  54. 54. Assessment of downstream impacts in terms of population and business customers affected (e.g., electricity customers)
  55. 55. Estimate of restoration time from the perspective of industry experts </li></ul>Natural Gas System Disruptions<br />Pipeline Break in Wabash<br />Pipeline Break in New Madrid<br />Electric Power System Impacts<br />24<br />
  56. 56. 25<br />Case Study: Colonial Pipeline and the Gulf Coast Hurricanes<br />
  57. 57. Colonial Pipeline System Overview<br />26<br /><ul><li>World’s largest volume of refined petroleum products pipeline system in the world
  58. 58. Provides the majority of petroleum products (e.g., gasoline, heating oil) to northeast US
  59. 59. Maintains approximately 5,350 miles of pipe</li></ul>The average transit time from Houston to New York is 18 days<br />The average length of haul on the system is more than 1,000 miles<br />
  60. 60. Electric Power Impacts from Katrina<br />According to DOE, Hurricane Katrina left some 2.3 million customers without electric power in Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Florida, and Georgia<br />
  61. 61. Sector Impacts from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita<br /><ul><li>Water
  62. 62. The US Environmental Protection Agency estimated more than 1,220 drinking water systems (many small in terms of customers served) and more than 200 wastewater treatment facilities in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama had been affected
  63. 63. Communications (according to the Federal Communications Commission)
  64. 64. 3 million customer lines down
  65. 65. More than 1,000 cell sites lost
  66. 66. 37 of 41 radio stations (two AM and two FM survived) lost
  67. 67. More than 30% of cell sites were disabled </li></li></ul><li>Sector Impacts from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita (cont.)<br />Public Health<br /><ul><li>Widespread loss of life
  68. 68. Unsanitary conditions in flooded areas and at evacuation shelter
  69. 69. Area hospitals unable to sufficiently care for injured
  70. 70. Insufficient morgues for fatalities</li></ul>Emergency Services <br /><ul><li>Overwhelmed</li></ul>Dams<br /><ul><li>Levee failure (53 levee breaches) in New Orleans
  71. 71. Lake Livingston dam damaged north of Houston</li></ul>Conflicting Priorities (local, state, federal)<br />
  72. 72. What Really Happened<br />Crews began repairing local lines and substations after storm<br />DOE and Vice-President’s office requested crews shift to repair two substations feeding Colonial Pipeline<br />Utility managers had to balance local need versus federal request and potential national supply disruption<br />Local power association shifted crews accordingly<br />The substations serving Colonial Pipeline were restored in time<br />Shift delayed repair of lines to two rural hospitals and local water systems by at least 24 hours<br />Managers requested that guidelines be prepared for such national emergencies so they can be included in emergency plans<br />Source: Hattiesburg American 9/11/2005<br /><><br />
  73. 73. Interdependency Impacts<br />31<br /><ul><li>Decision makers at the local and national levels often possess differing priorities and face differing choices in response to catastrophic events
  74. 74. To better synchronize response and recovery activities at all levels and sectors of government, it is critical to identify and reconcile these differences
  75. 75. Local and national decision makers must develop a framework for mutual understanding and compromise prior to an event
  76. 76. The activities that resulted in the restoration of power to Colonial Pipeline following Hurricane Katrina provide insight regarding:
  77. 77. The differing priorities among local and national</li></ul>decision makers during a catastrophic event<br /><ul><li>The need to reconcile prioritization differences </li></ul> and develop guidelines that institutionalize <br /> agreement between local and national decision <br /> makers<br />
  78. 78. Impacts of Infrastructure Interdependencies on Responders and Preventers<br />Protection/restoration of critical infrastructure is a vital mission of emergency management<br />Certain CIKR provide services necessary for life/safety (e.g., water, electric power, natural gas, communication)<br />Other CIKR provide services necessary for economic sustainability (e.g., banking and finance, IT)<br />Without knowledge of interdependencies, strategic planning and prioritization of procedures might be based on incomplete knowledge<br />The order of restoration of critical functions can impact the recovery process<br />32<br />
  79. 79. Impacts of Infrastructure Interdependencies on Responders and Preventers (cont.)<br />Disasters/incidents in other jurisdictions can affect the quality of life of citizens<br />Resilience of critical infrastructure, including redundancy of critical products and services, can reduce the impact of interdependencies<br />All CIKR rely on the Emergency Services Sector (ESS) for response and recovery<br />ESS depends on several sectors/subsectors, including petroleum, water, transportation, communication, electric power, and other sectors in order to operate<br />33<br />
  80. 80. Entering<br />HILLSVILLE<br />FOUNDED 1802<br />ALTITUDE 620<br />POPULATION 3700<br />TOTAL 6122<br />A Defendable Process is Essential for Making Decisions<br />
  81. 81. Contact Information<br />Michael Collins<br />Infrastructure Assurance Center<br />Argonne National Laboratory<br />Phone: 630-252-7934<br />Email:<br />