Community governance and peacebuilding

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Community governance and
peacebuilding in Nepal
Keshav Kumar Acharya
a
a
School of Behavioral Cognitive and Social Science, University of
New England, Armidale, NSW 2350, Australia
Published online: 27 Apr 2015.
To cite this article: Keshav Kumar Acharya (2015) Community governance and peacebuilding in
Nepal, Rural Society, 24:1, 65-84, DOI: 10.1080/10371656.2014.1001477
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Community governance and peacebuilding
in Nepal
Keshav Kumar Acharya*
School of Behavioral Cognitive and Social Science, University of New England, Armidale, NSW 2350,
Australia
This study is based on an institutional analysis of twenty-six grass-roots level
organizations which is examined by organizational surveys and three focus group
discussions. Findings show that community-based organizations are key actors of
community governance in Nepal and their functions are supportive in
reinforcing the peacebuilding process in many ways. First, it plays a significant
role in addressing inequality and isolation. Second, its continual practice fosters
awareness creation, promote democratic exercise, imparts “voice to the voiceless”
and gives clout to the powerless. Third, it inspires the partners to create an
enabling environment for mobilizing local resources. Finally, it strengthens the
structure of accountability and contributes to peacebuilding. However, results
indicate that the overall practice of governance at the community level was
moderate to efficient. Following the discussion of results, this study proposes
some recommendations regarding the operation of a sound peace process at
grass-roots level through community governance.
Keywords: community-based organizations; community governance; exclusion;
peacebuilding; Nepal
Introduction
Peacebuilding is a post-conflict action, predominately a diplomatic course for
improving the economic and social aspects of people (Latifi, 2011). It is a process
of cultivating new environments and new cultures which involves obliging con-
tacts between opponents and establishing normalized relations of the political,
social, economic and humanitarian kind between ordinary citizens on both
sides of a conflict (Reychler, 2006). In a peacebuilding process, a multiple set of
*Email: keshavlacharya@gmail.com
Rural Society, 2015
Vol. 24, No. 1, 65–84, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10371656.2014.1001477
© 2015 Taylor & Francis

initiatives from a diverse range of actors including the state, market, civil society/
local citizens and international communities is imperative to address the root
causes of violence and to protect the people before, during and after the period
of aggression (Ricigliano, 2003). Through these, the root causes of conflicts
and violence are addressed, the logical end of conflict is achieved, a strong and
legitimate national authority is established, democratic political processes
are instituted, responsibility and resources for development are transferred to
the new government, the economy is strengthened and social and human capital
are promoted (Rondinelli & Montgomery, 2005). Nevertheless, the conflicting
societies to a greater extent are psychologically, physically and materially
obstructed by violent forces (Staub, 2012). Such obstructions are positioned
robustly in both tangible (killing civilians, destroying development infrastruc-
tures and damaging basic service facilities) and intangible (collapsing state
institutions, mistrusting in government and the destruction of social relation-
ships) manners (Abeysekera, 2011). As a means of addressing both types of
impediments in conflict-affected societies, peacebuilding is a “way forward”
inventiveness, which fosters reconciliation of the conflicting parties and
encourages broader communities to address the conflict agendas through
peacebuilding lenses. However, many critics assert that the peacebuilding process
is only an outside intervention that has abandoned the real interest and influence
groups (Nussbaum & Sen, 1993).
In Nepal, the notion of peacebuilding has resulted in the settling of armed
combat, which was led by Communist Party of Nepal Maoist (CNM-M) from
1996 to 2006. The politically based armed battle lasted for 10 years, leading to
the deaths of an estimated 15,000 people and displacing many thousands more
(Robins, 2011). In 2006, the violence stopped after the “12 Points Peace
Agreement” was signed between the Communist Party of Nepal Maoist and the
Seven Party Alliance (SPA). In 2006, a “Comprehensive Peace Agreement”
(CPA) was reached between the government of Nepal and the rebellion party,
CPN-M. Since that period, the peace process has been operational in the country
and various actors have been engaged to uphold a sustainable peace in the society
(Bhatta, 2012).
Regardless of such enormous initiatives in Nepal, the collapse of the state
institutions, social/economic exclusion and the malfunction of governance are
familiar characterstics of the society and yielded numerous wicked practices.
First, a centralized institutional structure and inbuilt decision-making system are
standard arrangements (Winther-Schmidt, 2011). Second, the decision-making
system from central to bottom has apparently been influenced by elitist bias in
that it is not prepared to hear public grievances (Khanal, 2006). Third, limited
numbers of people have domination over the resources and opportunities.
Fourth, an unholy connection between aid agencies, bureaucracy and political
leaders has inhibited the deployment of opportunities to the specific target
66 K.K. Acharya

groups. These factors have served to intensify the armed conflict, which ended
in 2006.
Experiences confirm that the failure of the market mechanism in the late
1970s forced the neo-liberal policy to be a prominent discourse in development.
It has encouraged pluralism, competition and efficiency. Under these conditions,
it has been assumed that access to economic and political opportunities is
increased for all segments of society and that inequality and impartiality in
decision-making is reduced. It further explores the effective role of the formal
and informal institutions to achieve the strategic goals and operational objectives
through structured frameworks, rules, relationships, systems and processes
(O’Mahony & Ferraro, 2007). However, it could not promote the genuine
participation of communities in the decision-making process (Cheshire, 2000).
In Nepal, it was the realization of formal entry into neo-liberalization in the late
1980s that offered multiple actors the possibility of engagement in the
development discourse to address institutional crises, poor governing systems,
economic vulnerability and ambiguities of service delivery. However, neo-
liberalism’s denial approach towards rural communities forced not only a crisis
of poverty, but also created the gap between rich and poor that has pushed
society into the gorge of battle. From this perspective, neo-liberalism’s preference
is towards individualism rather than communities’ welfare which has made
communities dysfunctional in creating social safety nets (Cheshire & Lawrence,
2005).
Although Nepal made efforts at governance at grass-roots level under the
Panchayat system in the early 1960s, the Panchayats remained largely extensions
of the central government and were primarily centrally driven with little
emphasis on strengthening local governance. In 1990, democracy was reinstated
in Nepal which was introduced in 1951, and this brought some hope and
aspiration to the people for improving the national economy and government
actions at the macro level, while promoting inclusion of pro-poor people and
various other excluded or marginalized sections at the micro level. Experiences
indicate that Nepalese communities practise governing systems within their
communities that encourage the local people to become involved in the devel-
opment of community plan formulation, consultation and resource manage-
ment. In such a context, community governance bestows power and control
to the communities, so that citizens, governments and non-governments can
act together in setting and implementing policies, establishing networking
and linkages and designing roles and responsibilities at the community level
(Somerville, 2005). Through these processes, community governance plays an
active role in empowering people, by giving them civic “voice”, stimulating
democracy and improving their efficiency in building strategies to settle the
conflict (Taylor, Braveman, & Hammel, 2004).
Nonetheless, the governance system at grass-roots level in Nepal is at risk due
to several reasons. First, the complex social structure and elite domination have
Rural Society 67

led to a low-level public participation. This enables powerful people to benefit
from monopolization in the power structure. Second, the realization of com-
munity governance and its effectiveness are largely denied, as they are either
being misused or manipulated (Kavada, 2010). The major deficiency of the
peacebuilding process in Nepal is guided by the neo-liberal agenda, which not
only inspires the peacebuilding actors to design its modalities based on a
“deregulation, denationalization and privatization” framework, but also restricts
grass-roots representation in the peacebuilding process. In such a context, the
peacebuilding process in Nepal is inept in achieving substantial success, in spite
of the high priority given to it by the government and funding agencies. Thus,
this study examines the contribution of community governance, which is a major
apparatus in strengthening local communities, fostering the peacebuilding
process and acquiring ownership in peacebuilding activities at the local level, to
the facilitation of the peacebuilding process in Nepal.
Literature review and theory
Post-World War II, many structural and pluralist theories emerged which
highlighted the state-centric concept that provided more administrative and legis-
lative power to the state in controlling the national economy (Pankaj, 2007).
However, many limitations came into existence in the late 1970s that led to a
failure of the state-centric structure in Africa, Latin America and some parts of
Asia. Kohli (2004) points out that the neo-patrimonial ties in Africa, clientelistic
patterns in Latin America and the colonial setup in the Asia sector were causes of
the failure of the state-centric structure. In the 1970s, a common agreement was
made through neo-liberalization to address state failure and to recover national
economic growth through open markets, deregulation and enhancing the role of
the private sector (Kotz, 2002). At the same time, the “third wave” democracy
brought new challenges to the existing system through the sources of authority
(Huntington, 1991). By the mid-1990s, the cycle was turned back and this
created a serious threat to neo-liberalism for its reservation on social justice, social
cohesion and local democracy. This led to large sections of society not only being
structurally handicapped to work and remain sustained in the competitive labour
market, but also to the “stripping down” of public services with the result that
many societies became split and endangered by the resultant unemployment and
social exclusion (Campbell, 2001).
Contemporary peacebuilding practices seem to be rooted in the same false
assumptions as neo-liberalization theory (Paris, 2010). In response to this
misapprehension, policymakers, practitioners and scholars have turned towards
governance in systems and structures. Some authors contemplate that governance
is the paradigm shift from “government to governability” (Howlett, Rayner, &
Tollefson, 2009; O’Toole & Burdess, 2004). Governance is an action of
governing that relates to power and performance, and rules and responses. It is a
self-organizing, self-motivating and self-regulating process of state and non-state
68 K.K. Acharya

organizations that the society and state have exercised to manage efficient public
services, an independent judicial system, accountable administration and public
funds and a pluralistic institutional structure (Rhodes, 1996).
Nevertheless, the government, non-government bodies and donors in Nepal
are reluctant to endorse governance in their actions and approaches (Dahal,
2012). A trend of governance becoming weaker confirms that, in 2011, Nepal’s
rank on corruption was 154th among 182 nations, whereas it was in the 146th
position among 178 nations in 2010. A Washington-based institution, “Fund for
Peace”, analysed the index of Failed States of 177 countries around the world
and noted that Nepal’s rank remained 25th in 2009 and 26th in 2010 (Graner,
2001). In contrast, the Nepal Human Development Report 2009 shows the
Human Development Index (HDI) was 0.534 in 2007/08, 0.509 in 2006 and
0.471 in 2001 (UNDP/N, 2009). These indicate that governance is in a
vulnerable position with weak institutions and procedures, lack of ownership in
development programmes, mismanagement of resources and failure to deliver an
effective public service system. Experience points out that a number of factors are
responsible for the weakening of governance. First, there is the hierarchical power
structure which is secured by the feudal elites. Second, the inappropriate
development models that concentrate on allocating more resources for politically
beneficial development projects ignore local agendas and the social context.
Third, an imposed policy intervention in development discourse disregards indi-
genous knowledge (Metz, 1995). Additionally, Nepalese society is characterized
by a feudal system, ethnic diversification and complex power structures (Dahal,
2012). Such structural constraints have fertilized political and social oppressions
and bureaucratic dishonesty.
In the Panchayat period, a common ideology for national unity and national
integration was fleshed out, with distinctive national characteristics such as the
Nepali language, culture and costume, the acceptance of Hinduism as the
national religion and King being the symbol of unity. Principally, this ideology
suppressed and excluded the people; those who were disadvantaged socially,
economically and geographically. However, efforts were made to abolish feelings
of suppression and exclusion as the government formulated a legal document,
“Muluki Ain”, in 1963. Nevertheless, weak implementation of legal actions,
government dishonesty and the Panchayati elites’ domination of the political
system led to its ineffectiveness.
Although the restoration of democracy in 1990 brought some hope and
aspiration to the people, the national economy and government actions largely
failed to fulfil the people’s expectations owing to the chaotic patterns of political
instability, lapses in governance and unequal resource distribution (Kumar,
2005). Experience confirms that when CPN-M was capitalized and articulated
the existing muddled political and economic context it began to oppose the
system through a “40-points demand” to the government. Later, CPN-M
declared a “People’s War” on the foundation of this “40-points demand”.
Rural Society 69

However, the central demand of CPN-M was replacement of the monarchy with
a secular republic and ethnic autonomy. In this context, the “People’s War” was
declared in 1996 and ended in 2006, disrupting communities’ social capital and
leading to the collapse of the development process at grass-roots level
(Upadhayaya, Müller-Böker, & Sharma, 2011).
Communities can acquire confidence under a community governance system
through engaging members, measuring results and achieving results of acts. This
constitutes a community governing system which helps communities to make
critical decisions and facilitate them to address the peace process from the bottom
(Gaynor, 2013). Some authors believe that it is a new intervention of the late
twentieth century (Armstrong, Francis, & Totikidis, 2005) which encourages
the devolution of centralized power and authority to the local level and the
empowerment of local communities to mitigate local disputes and scarcity (Avis,
2009). It symbolizes a number of normative values, such as a network-based
collaboration and coordination in a complex society, self-government, public
involvement and democratic innovation (Stoker, 1998).
Blair (2000) suggests that community governance creates an environment to
voluntarily involve ethnic minority groups, such as women, the poor and the
marginal farmers, in many ways. First, the poor are encouraged to build their
own organizations and seek support from the state and broader civil society.
Once established, such organizations can influence the local and central govern-
ment, private sector, civil societies and NGOs. Second, it ensures an effective
service delivery in a participative and collaborative manner (Gaventa, 2004).
O’Toole (2006) argues that an institutional vacuum may already exist in the
community and therefore local residents, through community associations, may
participate in community governance activities and thus have the potential
to create a more enhanced form of community governance. In the late 1980s,
community governance emerged as a “communitarian movement” that empha-
sized the pluralism of power distribution within local communities and the
power of association with the civil space in market-based societies (Turner,
2012). Many community-based organizations (CBOs) are now emerging. These
focus on inclusive decision-making systems, adequate bargaining power, eco-
nomic and social security and community empowerment (Opare, 2007).
CBOs hold great promise as potential partners in the peacebuilding process.
They are the most genuine and viable organizations and possess great knowledge
and a wealth of experience, especially in working through governance issues at
grass-roots level. The development of CBOs at grass-roots level equips the local
self-governing system, which can be described as community governance, with
an approach that makes a shift from the notion of government to governance
(O’Toole & Burdess, 2004). A flexible approach, which extends beyond govern-
ment, is imperative for effective and equity-based resource distribution at the
community level. First, it plays a significant role in addressing inequality, isolation
and poverty (Chaskin, 2001). Second, it fosters awareness creation, democratic
70 K.K. Acharya

exercise, community building, advocacy and coordination, linkage and network-
ing development. Third, it facilitates the mobilization of local resources
(Chapagain & Banjade, 2009) while fourth, it provides “voice to the voiceless”
and clout to the powerless. Finally, it strengthens the structure of accountability
and promotes decentralization (Acharya, 2010).
In Nepal, the emergence of community-based organizations, as key actors in
service delivery at grass-roots level, plays a significant role in overcoming poverty
and disadvantage, knitting society together and deepening democracy. Initially, the
functions of these grass-roots champions, such as Guthis, Rodis, Bhejas and Bhajans
Kirtan groups amongst others, undertook social and economic activities at grass-
roots level (Bhattachan, 2002). However, a formalization process of CBO activity
in Nepal was instituted early in the 1950s through the Tribhuvan Gram Vikas
Project which aimed to improve rural livelihoods (Shrestha, 2004). By the early
1970s, the numbers of CBOs had grown, and donors began emphasizing the
CBO’s role in development (Dhakal, 2007). The Small Farmers Development
Program (SFDP), Productive Loan Development Program (PLDP) and other
regional relevant programmes were implemented as key CBO-led initiatives in
Nepal with external support. Under this framework, a community governance
system has been gaining popularity within the public and community discourses,
which enables the community actors to achieve the strategic goals and operational
objectives through structured frameworks and procedures within society.
The formal realization of a community-based governance system in Nepal
was made after formulation of the Forestry Sector Master Plan in 1989 (Kanel &
Dahal, 2008). This widely encouraged the communities to participate in
decision-making, including the management of local forest resources. In such a
context, community governance encourages local actors, mainly communities
and their organizations, to perform their roles effectively, enhance internal and
external capacity and develop collaboration to improve service qualities. In
addition, the mantra of “Self-reliance for Rural Development” emerged in the
1980s to make grass-roots communities independent and capable of managing
their livelihood systems. This motivated locally constituted CBOs which had
been operating in different and varying public concerns, ranging from economic
and educational to cultural development. Additionally, community-based social
mobilization, through savings and credit functions, was promoted by local and
international NGOs. This concept has brought actors more closely together to
determine their needs and demands locally. In such a setting, various CBOs have
received greater autonomy through the Forestry Master Plan 1989, the Social
Welfare Act 1992, the Cooperative Act 1992 and the Local Self-Governance Act
1999. These have encouraged the local communities to organize, mobilize and
systematize the local level planning, implementing, monitoring and coordination
systems through providing roles, responsibilities and powers that reinforce the
peacebuilding process at the community level.
Rural Society 71

Community-based institutions in Nepal, however, are overlooked by the
political power structure and bureau pathology. This arguably places them in
setback and paralysis, such that all CBOs are not strong enough to institute the
governance system intensively in their decisions and actions. Nevertheless, the
majority of CBOs have strong institutional, human and material capacity to help
carry out their envisioned activities. Their high capability for community-based
service delivery during the civil war was very effective and their governance was
much more appreciated by international aid agencies (UNDP/N, 2009). So far, the
appreciation of community governance and community-based power structures at
the highest levels has served to assist the peacebuilding process and remove social,
political and economic barriers. In Nepal, there are more than 396,466 community
groups that have contributed to maintaining social harmony, indigenous demo-
cracy and community governance at grass-roots level. This indicates grass-roots
governance is highly inspiring and strengthens the local democracy. It empowers
the community, citizens, government and private organizations to participate in
the governance process (Biggs, Gurung, & Messerschmidt, 2004).
Research methods
The Tawa Khola watershed of Nepal was chosen for the study area because it
exhibits the necessary levels of rural endemic poverty and long-term margin-
alization or exclusion from the basic service structures or mechanisms. The
selected Village Development Committees (VDCs) are located in the most
remote and poverty-stricken pockets of Nepal, farthest from the district
headquarters and major urban centres. The national poverty profile of Nepal
reveals that poor households (HHs) in the study area constituted 60.80% of the
population (WFP/N, 2006). Similarly, HHs having access to safe drinking water
and sanitation facilities constituted 33.52% and 43.60% respectively (Water-
Aid, 2012).
For the sample, 26 groups were chosen intentionally from three broad CBO
categories. They were: nine from the Community Forestry User Groups (CFUGs);
10 from the Community Development Organization Groups (CDGOs); and
seven from the Women Development Groups (WDGs). The CFUGs were directly
involved in natural resource management activities as per government regulations
while the CDGOs conducted social, economic and infrastructural development
activities at grass-roots level, supported by local government and other develop-
ment partners. WDGs ensured women’s participation and gender inclusion in
local development activities at grass-roots level. Overall, the aim of these groups
was to promote community governance to facilitate the peacebuilding process.
A mixed-method approach was adopted that triangulated both quantitative
and qualitative techniques for data collection, analysis and presentation. Nine
different parameters with 95 indicators were designed by employing a
participatory consensus in group meetings of CBOs. Experience indicates that
such parameters are functional activities of the CBO groups, which were
72 K.K. Acharya

developed under the criterion of governance at grass-roots level. Both secondary
and primary data were collected. Whereas 26 organisational surveys and three
focus group discussions (FGDs) were administered for the primary data collec-
tion, institutional records, such as government policies, government Acts, opera-
tional plans and minutes of group meetings, were collected for the secondary
data. Research ethics standards, as set out in the guidelines for Human Research
Ethics at the University of New England, Australia applied to the processing of
the primary data collection. The researcher gained approval for all components of
the research, the organizational survey and FGDs.
For the FGDs, three scheduled discussions were employed. The participants
were chairpersons and secretaries of organizations concerned with the governance
pattern, public access to basic services and peacebuilding process. Each FGD
lasted approximately 90 minutes. Proceedings were recorded electronically and
later transcribed. An organizational survey was conducted by employing a
simple random sampling method in which data was collected during the period
of scheduled group meetings. A close-ended structure with multiple choice
questionnaires was employed for data collection using 95 indicators with response
options “Yes” and “No”, where “Yes” denoted the activities completed and “No”
otherwise. Responses were weighted by assigning 1 for completed activities and
0 for otherwise.
For the data analysis, both quantitative and qualitative techniques were
applied. Initially, a composite index technique was employed to analyse the
quantitative data. The composite index technique is a scaling method that
measures responses with respect to quantitative attributes or traits. For example,
a scaling technique might involve estimating an individual level of extraversion,
or the perceived quality of products. A grouping of indices or other factors
combined in a standardized way provides a useful statistical measure of overall
market or sector performance over time (Foa & Tanner, 2011). The following
composite index technique (CIT) (Booysen, 2002; Haase et al., 2014) was
administered to analyse the quantitative data:
Cj ¼
X X
Wi=nI
Cj = Composite Index Technique of activities, weight given to individual institutions
as per the performing activities
Wi = 1 and 0 (1 = activities performed, 0 = not performed)
n = Number of organizations under the particular categories
I = Number of indicators taken under each category of broad functional groups.
This method assists to measure and compare the organizations’ contribution and
performance in the different service activities. Based on composite index values,
the CBOs’ contribution was categorized into four classes, as follows: efficient =
above 0.75; moderate = 0.50–0.75; weak = 0.25–0.50; and very weak = less than
Rural Society 73

0.25. Composite indices had a numerical value, which ranged between 1 and 0,
where 1 was the best condition and 0 was the worst. Later, the quantitative result
was triangulated by employing qualitative data analysis.
Findings
CBOs’ involvement in the practice of community governance is an augmentation
of the peacebuilding process at grass-roots level. Their engagement at the
community level has brought many changes to social transformation, economic
and livelihood systems, behavioural change and political participation. CBOs’
contribution to the peace process started with the identification of needs-based
programmes, the formulation of proper planning, utilizing resources, implement-
ing projects and ensuring inclusive social participation, all of which filled the
gaps in resources, skills, knowledge and basic services at grass-roots level. In
addition, the CBOs’ contribution strengthened local democracy, linkages and
networking development. This ensured social justice and inclusive participation
through community governance in the conflict-affected areas.
Empirical findings indicate that the CBOs’ contribution to the peacebuilding
process at grass-roots level through community governance was in the moderate
to efficient categories (CI = 0.71). In the functional activities, CBOs efficiently
contributed to the empowerment process (CI = 0.81), social capital develop-
ment (CI = 0.81), institution building (CI = 0.78) and participatory planning
and implementation activities (CI = 0.76). The remaining activities resulted
in moderate to efficient ratings. Figure 1 depicts the CBOs contribution to the
Figure 1. CBOs’ functional contribution in community governance.
74 K.K. Acharya

peace process through community governance. To strengthen the community
governance and capacity enhancement of communities, the government had
launched the Integrated Rural Development Programs (IRDPs) during the
1970s. This programme focused on the partnership concept between govern-
ment and local communities to deliver basic services at grass-roots level. In this
sense, the Forestry Sector Master Plan, designed in 1989, endowed autonomy to
the community in managing and utilizing the local forest resources. This
provided a sense of confidence and independence to the communities in
mobilizing local resources at grass-roots level for different community-based
infrastructure, social awareness and income-generating initiatives. These roles
helped to address inequality, isolation and poverty. The construction of school
and community buildings and small bridges, the establishment of informal
literacy programmes for women and the poor, the provision of education
scholarships for the children of poor and marginal families and the funding for
community schools, in addition to other emergency actions, contributed to the
quick recovery of conflict-prone areas.
Similarly, CBOs’ efficiency (CI = 0.81) in social capital development
activities shows that many CBO groups created new social forums for public
gatherings that helped the people to share their views, interact with different
stakeholders including marginal communities, identify need-based public
demands and review their past experiences. This contributed to the maintenance
of equilibrium in the communities by easing the social tensions through cross-
cultural understanding, mutual respect, iteratively renegotiating and maintaining
a level of balance in the power relations, resources, functioning and capacities
between potentially conflicting groups or cultural distinctions. These fostered a
greater range of awareness, promoted democratic and governance practice and
enabled strong advocacy and coordination. A CFUG participant’s comment
shows how CBOs’ activities have resulted in increasing social capital and
inclusive participation:
Our engagement not only aims to exploit the local resources, but also actively contributes
to develop social harmony among the communities and creates an enabling environment
to the poor and marginal groups for participating in the decision-making process.
In addition, the CBOs contributed to the development of strong institutional
mechanisms that created social awareness of gender balance, social equity and
social tradition that then enabled them to express their opinions and put pressure
on the development agencies for the effective implementation, management and
sustainability of services. Correspondingly, most CBO groups’ practices show
that they developed a systematic organizational culture for institution building
which included: regular group meetings; developing collective agendas and
articulating systematic discussion and a participatory decision-making system;
effective information and communication flow; interpersonal cooperation; and
documentation of agendas of all activities that increased the ownership by the
Rural Society 75

people of the group activities. Apart from these, many groups developed a
common approach, including the three basic components of social mobilization,
namely: “organization, saving and skill”, which reinforced the development of
self-reliance; economic and social independence; and confidence. The tangible
and effective functions of the communities and their institutions were apparent
during the period of conflict:
When Kriparam joined the police department, his family received many threats
including the death penalty and abduction by Maoist rebels. Due to his low economic
position and lack of other alternative income sources, he was not ready to quit his job.
On 3 September 2003, he was abducted; however, due to the intensive effort of the
locally constituted CBO groups, he was released on 8 September without the
conditional demand to resign from his job.
While the practice of participatory planning and the implementation activities of
the CBOs were in the weak to moderate (CI = 0.76) range, it contributed to a
reduction in the overlapping and parallel activities of the development agencies,
minimizing the duplication of resources and programmes and streamlining local-
level planning according to community concerns. This process not only
contributed to improving the resource allocation and service delivery system,
but also institutionalized the bottom-up approach by bringing people in the
decision-making process closer. As such practices attest, CBO facilitation in
mobilizing local resources was prominent:
We have formulated annual plans and programmes in close consultation with CBO
groups, employing participatory approaches. When we forwarded plans and programmes
for … approval, it’s often tragic. The forms of the plans and programmes are changed.
Many community needs-based projects were replaced by window projects. In this
situation, CBOs’ advocacy and lobbying are extremely worthwhile in taking a stand
against this manipulation.
CBOs’ contribution to community governance in some functions was weak to
moderate. Table 1 shows the community development and resource manage-
ment activities (CI = 0.69); inclusive decision-making and downward account-
ability process (CI = 0.69); local democratic practice (CI = 0.68); transparency
and accountability system (CI = 0.66); and network and linkage (CI = 0.55)
were in the moderate range. Although such functional indices show that CBOs’
competencies in these activities were minimal, the institutionalization process
indicates that they focused on, as previously mentioned, giving “voice to the
voiceless”, giving clout to the powerless and that they strengthened the structure
of accountability and decentralization. For example, the CBOs’ democratic
system enhanced communities’ managerial and leadership capacity, empowered
bargaining and determined competencies, which gradually replaced the com-
munity power structures and monopoly of the local elites. These led to
reciprocity and more public trust in CBOs, and new networks with different
76 K.K. Acharya

stakeholders emerged. Further, these outcomes continued to transform the
patron-client relationships from the individual to the community, and up-down
accountability. Through this process, the voices of communities began to be
heard at the policymaking level so that policymakers were obligated to formulate
community-friendly policies and strategies. Likewise, they advanced the
empowerment framework, mainly for women and marginal communities, by
focusing on five levels of equality such as welfare, access, conscientization,
participation and control. One participant expressed his view about the CBOs’
engagement in community development activities:
All people of this community are Dalits (marginal). We are illiterate and lack
aware[ness] about our positions and rights. In the past, we did not have resources,
ideas, and connections to receive the basic services and uphold citizen rights. We were
mobilized by peripheral elites, who came to us only for their business, and mobilized to
their benefit. However, the reality has been changed now days. Sanstha le garda Gaun
ma Vikas Ayo, Janta Le Kam Payo (Due to CBOs, development comes to the village
and the people have received the work).
The information further shows many CBO groups created an enabling
environment through inclusive policies, which were legitimized by state
regulations. In the community development activities, equal participation of
males and females and disadvantaged communities in the planning and project
selection process, resource allocation, benefit sharing and other types of decision-
making processes were very encouraging. In this system, the inter-sectorial
connections of services were highly effective. Many cases were found where
people’s participation ensured that the services reached the needy, and where
Table 1. CBOs’ functional contribution in community governance for peace-building.
Functional Activities
CFUGs
(n = 9)
CODGs
(n = 10)
WDGOs
(n = 7) Average
Institution-building activities 0.87 0.77 0.71 0.78
Community development and resource
management
0.74 0.69 0.65 0.69
Inclusive decision-making and downward
accountability
0.62 0.76 0.68 0.69
Social capital development 0.84 0.81 0.77 0.81
Local democratic practice 0.59 0.76 0.68 0.68
Participatory planning and implementation 0.81 0.74 0.72 0.76
Community empowerment 0.74 0.82 0.88 0.81
Transparency and accountability 0.63 0.74 0.61 0.66
Network and linkage 0.56 0.57 0.52 0.55
Average 0.71 0.74 0.69 0.71
Note: efficient = above 0.75; moderate = 0.50–0.75; weak = 0.25–0.50; and very weak = less than 0.25.
Source: Field survey of Tawa Khola micro watershed (2012).
Rural Society 77

downward accountability was practised, so unnecessary complexities, and the risk
of corruption and elite capture, were diminished.
Many arguments support the contention that these actions were guided by
two different approaches: the “transactional approach” and the “transformational
approach”. The transactional approach focused on the economic dimensions of
empowerment and service delivery, mainly of assets and services. The
transformational approach was more participatory and contributed to empower-
ing members to raise their voices, claim assets and services and have an influence
on the decisions, procedures and the formal and informal rules of the game.
Further examples point out that many CBOs were involved in strengthening
leadership of school management committees, water and sanitation committees
and other groups, and in a voice-raising mechanism in decision-making and
resource management. Finally, these practices institutionalized transparency,
accountability and community governance. In this regard, some groups adopted
a number of best practices, such as a social accountability system; a public and
social audit system; regular group and assembly meetings; preparation of working
guidelines; publicized annual programmes, budgets and expenses through media
(FM Radio); establishment of hoarding boards at each project site; establishment
of monitoring committees to check for irregularities; formation of social
intelligence groups; preparation of citizen charters; citizen report cards; and a
participatory evaluation process. These actions provided people with a social
platform to resolve inter-community disputes. It also inspired the voiceless
people to present their grievances and difficulties. The following comment of a
participant expresses the importance of a social intelligence system:
In order to pay greater attention to community services, we have formed a “Samudaik
Sarokar Samiti” (community surveillance system) to investigate the realities of public
services’ misuse and circulate information to the people and encourage them [to take]
necessary actions.
Examples show that CBO groups developed networks and linkages with
development partners such as sectoral agencies, local government, donor
agencies, NGOs, civil society organizations and the private sector. Through
this linkage, CBOs had received significant hardware and software assistance to
facilitate the local communities in the absence of local government. This created
a platform for negotiation and deliberation of the democratic culture in the
communities. However, many observations and findings show that community
governance has yet to be accomplished in a harmonious way.
Discussion and conclusions
In Nepal, the condition of “no-war-no-peace” has prevailed in the country since
2006. In order to institutionalize the peacebuilding process and link it with the
self-governance system, a number of initiatives and reforms have commenced.
The interim constitution of 2007 is a major benchmark to institutionalize the
78 K.K. Acharya

peace process in Nepal. It ensures the state shall have the responsibility to adopt
fundamental human rights, multi-party democracy, sovereign authority, suprem-
acy of the people, rule of law, social justice and equality, an independent
judiciary and transparency and accountability in the activities of the political and
bureaucratic system, together with people’s participation in the state mechanism.
In addition to the constitutional mechanism, a number of policy reforms, such as
devolution as a form of hybrid decentralization, inclusiveness, pro-poor agendas,
equality and rights-based policies and governance reform have created a wide
space for the peacebuilding process.
However, the impact of the decade-long civil war has been deeply entrenched
at grass-roots level, and this has gravely affected the socio-economic structure. At
this level, the CPN-M was established in many Aadhar Ilakas (base camps) and
Jana Sattas (People’s regime), and these forced people to live in tragic conditions.
People’s mobility, livelihood activities, social interactions and ideologies were
under the control of rebellions. At this level, the common people, grass-roots
leaders, people’s institutions, local government, extension service organizations
and rural elites were all highly suppressed, oppressed and depressed.
In 2006, an extensive effort was made to extinguish the civil war by various
individuals, politicians, civil society activists, statespersons and international
panels. Through their efforts, peace initiatives were underway through the reform
of political, economic and legal agendas. A common consensus was developed to
abolish the monarchical system and conduct an election of a constitutional
assembly for the promulgation of an inclusive constitution. However, the
peacebuilding process could not reach its endpoint and the socio-economic
structure of the country was not transformed from conventional bureaucratiza-
tion to inclusiveness. These prime reasons led to institutional failure and
ineffective peacebuilding agendas.
The major flaw in the existing approach of peacebuilding in Nepal is guided
by a neo-liberal agenda which focuses only on macro-level political issues that are
prescribed by international agencies as the process of market democracy
(Ahearme, 2009). In addition, these agendas constitute top-down social
engineering and strengthen the conditions of a foreign presence (Miklian, Lidén,
& Kolås, 2011). Experience indicates that the lack of a big gap in identifying the
root cause of the conflict and a weak methodology were the critical challenges of
the peacebuilding process. In Nepal, the modality used for the peacebuilding
process was the blanket approach, which completely failed to address the agendas
of peace at the bottom level. The interests of public involvement and solidarities
were varied from the central to the local levels.
In response, policymakers, practitioners and scholars have turned away from
general templates of liberal peacebuilding and have replaced it with the idea of
supporting local actors and structures through community governance. This is a
vital element which not only fosters the peacebuilding process, but also creates
a safety net for sustainable rural livelihoods at grass-roots level. Experience
Rural Society 79

determines the number of community safety nets, such as the empowerment and
involvement of community to harness local resources such as local forests, water
resources and land management; the establishment of a strong collaboration
between public and private agencies in service-delivery mechanisms; and
communication with and education of communities under the governance
framework. In Nepal, more than 300,000 community-based organizations and
similar numbers of NGOs (Biggs et al., 2004) have played a catalytic role in
accommodating multiple development interests and providing a forum for the
discussion of grass-root concerns.
Nevertheless, the current mechanism to operate community governance is
facing serious challenges in its implementation. It suffers from gaps in credibility
and a lack of commitment from politicians, bureaucrats and aid agencies. In Nepal,
the triangular effect of exclusion and poor governance has contributed to fragility,
inaccessibility and marginality in the local power structure, causing it to lag behind
in the communities. More importantly, because of the absence of local bodies over
the past 12 years, state machinery has been unable to resolve the peacebuilding
agendas and has failed to achieve socio-economic development, security and
justice. In this context, the practice of community governance brought locally
constituted organizations, state and other non-state actors into the main frame of
peacebuilding. Supposedly, this ensured local ownership and participation in the
peacebuilding process, which resolved the lack of efficiency of top-down
approaches and sought essential legitimacy, efficiency and accountability.
Community governance in the peacebuilding process focuses on the role and
accountability of communities in increasing public confidence, settling internal
disputes and creating an enabling environment. Unless the role of communities
has been ensured, the possibilities of inclusive peacebuilding, social justice and
equal opportunities are difficult to achieve. In Nepal, the significance of
community governance for peacebuilding materializes in many ways. First, it
plays a significant role in addressing inequality, isolation and poverty. Second, its
continual practice at grass-roots level fosters awareness creation, democratic
exercise, institution building, advocacy, coordination, linkage and networking
development. Third, it inspires local partners to create an enabling environment
for mobilizing local resources. Fourth, it imparts “voice to the voiceless” and
gives clout to the powerless. Finally, it strengthens the structure of accountability
and contributes to peacebuilding. By virtue of being closest to the citizens, CBOs
are better positioned to match supply of a given service to the citizens’ demands,
transforming citizens from service recipients to clients, and ensuring citizens
greater accountability for service quality. However, some CBOs are too fragile to
play a major role in meeting communities’ demands, ensuring social empower-
ment and economic improvement. The peacebuilding process is designed under
the neo-liberal agenda, which necessarily excludes the communities’ interests and
puts them in an unsafe position. This study has identified two factors, internal
and external, that highlight the existing threats and challenges in Nepal.
80 K.K. Acharya

Considering grass-root experiences, this study suggests that internal factors which
are considered to be major components of community governance cannot be
eliminated unless greater initiatives of peacebuilding have been instigated at the
national level.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank A/Prof Habib Zafarullah and Professor John Scott, University of
New England; Dr Andrea Crampton, Associate Editor, Journal of Rural Society; and the
anonymous reviewers, for their highly valuable input on an earlier draft of this paper.
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