MRAP Vehicle Program Saves Lives

UV1090
Jan. 21, 2009
This case was prepared by Tom Cross, Senior Director of
Executive Education, Darden School Foundation.
Foundation, Charlottesville, VA. All rights reserved.
The U.S. Navy and its educational partners are licensed to make
copies of this document and to distribute those
copies to Navy personnel for educational purposes. To order
copies, send an e-mail to
[email protected] No part of this publication may be
reproduced, stored in a retrieval system,
used in a spreadsheet, or transmitted in any form or by any
means—electronic, mechanical, photocopying,
recording, or otherwise—without the permission of the Darden
School Foundation.
MINE RESISTANT AMBUSH PROTECTED (MRAP)
VEHICLE
U.S. soldiers were dying in Iraq and Afghanistan from
improvised explosive devices
(IEDs), roadside bombs, and suicide car bombs. Up-armored
high mobility multipurpose
wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs), also called Humvees, offered

inadequate protection. Mine-
resistant ambush protected vehicles (MRAPs) provided much
improved protection to soldiers.
Getting MRAPs into the field to replace Humvees was a top-
priority project.
The MRAP Vehicle Joint Program Office was created on
November 1, 2006, to respond
to a validated CENTCOM Joint Urgent Operational Need
Statement (JUONS). MRAP became a
Major Defense Acquisition Program in February 2007; the Navy
was designated the Executive
Agent.
The MRAP team had achieved remarkable results. As of May
31, 2008, 9,121 MRAP
vehicles had been produced, and 5,493 were in the field,
primarily in Iraq. This was the fastest
vehicle procurement since the Jeep in World War II.
This case examines the MRAP program at its beginning in late
2006 from a strategic-
sourcing perspective. The strategic-sourcing model is used to
examine the challenges faced. The
strategic-sourcing discussion is followed by an MRAP team
members’ briefing to discuss the
program results, the actions taken, and why.
The Burning Platform
Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003 had been a success with the

toppling of Saddam
Hussein’s regime and occupation of Baghdad in less than 90
days. The United States and
coalition forces had used their fast-paced, mechanized,
combined arms operations to overwhelm
the Iraqi army. Since then, counterinsurgency operations in the
complex Iraq urban terrain had
been problematic.
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This document is authorized for educator review use only by
Ramon Torres, Universidad Interamericana de Puerto Rico until
December 2012. Copying or posting is an infringement of
copyright. [email protected] or 617.783.7860
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Iraqi soldiers, now part of the insurgency, had gained extensive
knowledge and
experience with IEDs during the 1983–88 Iran/Iraq war. Iraq

was one of the most mine-infested
nations in the world with 10 million mines in the ground—8
million antipersonnel and 2 million
antitank. IED explosions were a widespread problem: 600 per
month in Iraq and 64 per month in
Afghanistan. There had been a total of 1,795 U.S. IED fatalities
in Iraq from July 2003 to June
2008, peaking at 90 in the month of May 2007. IEDs accounted
for 60% of all U.S. combat
casualties in Iraq and for 50% in Afghanistan.
IEDs were the greatest threat to convoys. Traffic circles,
bridges, and overpasses in the
extensive and modern Iraqi highway system caused chokepoints
where vehicles were vulnerable
to attack. Built-up medians with vegetation and trash along
highways added to the danger.
Predictable traffic routes by coalition convoys made them easy
prey for the insurgents. Humvees,
the primary transportation vehicles, were not designed to
protect U.S. forces against IEDs, nor
were they upgradeable to be able to do so. The enemy knew this
and attacked the weak spot of
the U.S. forces.
There were many reasons that IEDs had become the
insurgency’s weapon of choice.
IEDs were low in cost, were simple to make, and made a
forceful impact. There was an almost
inexhaustible supply of materials for making IEDs and a low
risk of exposure for the enemy. It
was psychological warfare at its most vicious level.

The Humvee was an all-purpose, large, modern-day Jeep. With
its four-wheel drive,
automatic transmission, and diesel power, it was among the
most capable all-terrain vehicles in
the world. There were 132,000 Humvees in the fleet and more
than 21,000 in Iraq. Many had
been retrofitted with bolt-on armor, which provided some
protection from roadside IEDs, but not
from buried IEDs, the insurgents’ weapon of choice at the time.
Strategic-Sourcing Process
On May 20, 2005, the U.S. Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) directed that all
federal agencies use the strategic-sourcing process in their
acquisition of commodities. OMB
defined the process as follows:
Strategic sourcing is the collaborative and structured process of
critically
analyzing an organization’s spending and using this information
to make business
decisions about acquiring commodities and services more
effectively and
efficiently. This process helps agencies optimize performance,
minimize price,
increase achievement of socio-economic acquisition goals,
evaluate total life
cycle management costs, improve vendor access to business
opportunities, and
otherwise increase the value of each dollar spent.1

1 “Implementing Strategic Sourcing,” Clay Johnson III, OMB
Deputy Director for Management, to Chief
Acquisition Officers, Chief Financial Officers, and Chief
Information Officers, May 20, 2005. Do
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In January 2005, at the Public Sector Strategic Sourcing
Roundtable, Censeo Consulting
Group and the Darden School of Business defined strategic
sourcing as a disciplined end-to-end
process to systematically analyze and develop optimal strategies
for buying goods and services
based on data-driven, fact-based analysis to drive decision-
making. It was a holistic process that

addressed customer needs, market conditions, organizational
goals and objectives, and other
environmental factors. The approach was crossfunctional to
support an organization’s mission
and develop organization-wide strategies. The five-step process
is shown in Figure 1:2
Figure 1. Commodity strategic-sourcing process.
Sourcing strategies typically involved one or more of the five
generic strategies shown in
Figure 2:3
2 ©2004 Censeo Consulting Group, used with permission.
3 ©2004 Censeo Consulting Group, used with permission. Do
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Figure 2. Five generic sourcing strategies.
Source: ©2004 Censeo Consulting Group, used with permission.
While he was with Booz-Allen, Darden Assistant Professor Tim
Laseter first articulated
the term “balanced sourcing,” based on his field research to
identify industry best practices in
acquisition. That research identified four key practices—
leveraging supplier innovation, building
and sustaining relationships, modeling total cost, and creating
sourcing strategies. This insight
resulted in the basic framework (Figure 3), originally termed
balanced sourcing, for committing
to competitive pricing and cooperative relationships:4
Figure 3. Framework for committing to competitive pricing and
cooperative relationships.
4 Dr. Tim Laseter, University of Virginia Darden Graduate
School of Business Assistant Professor of Business
Administration, former Senior Partner at Booz Allen Consulting
and author of “Balanced Sourcing.” Do
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MRAP: Opportunity Assessment
As can be seen in Figure 4, soldiers were dying at an increasing
rate from IEDs in Iraq.
A solution was needed immediately.
Figure 4. Monthly fatalities from IEDs in Iraq.5
There was an all-out effort on multiple fronts to neutralize the
IED threat. The Joint IED
Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) was formed to coordinate and
focus the efforts. JIEDDO had the

following three priorities:
1. Prevent IEDs from being planted—attack the insurgency.
2. Prevent planted IEDs from exploding.
3. When “all else fails, survive the blast.”
In 2004–05, JIEDDO worked on electronic jammers, unmanned
surveillance aircraft,
better intelligence, force education, and improved armor
protection. Up-armoring Humvees to
improve their survivability against roadside IEDs was a priority.
JIEDDO purchased 122
commercially available MRAPs and used them primarily for
IED clearing. By 2007, JIEDDO
had had some success, as insurgents had to plant six times as
many IEDs as they did in 2004 to
inflict the same number of casualties.
In 2006, the insurgents stepped up the IED threat by burying
more of the explosives in
the roads and developing a more sophisticated version packed
with as much as 100 pounds of
explosives. Still, up-armored Humvees offered little protection
because the explosives blasted
through the vehicles’ vulnerable underbellies. And in 2007,
insurgents began to use explosively
formed projectiles (EFPs), molten-metal projectiles able to
penetrate the armored steel of a
M1A1 Abrams tank, further increasing the threat to U.S. forces.

5 Graph created by case writer with data from
http://www.icasualties.org. Do
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In 2006–07, a phased transition began. Humvee up-armoring,
which cost approximately
$14,000 per vehicle, continued at as fast a pace as possible.
Simultaneously and as expeditiously
as feasible, MRAPs, which cost between $600,000 and $1
million per vehicle, were purchased
and fielded.
MRAP: Profile Commodity

Commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) capability existed for MRAP
vehicles. MRAP
technology had been developed in South Africa and Rhodesia
(now Zimbabwe) in the 1970s.
BAE Systems had been manufacturing mine-resistant vehicles in
South Africa since 1977. The
MRAP V-shaped hull and larger ground clearance deflected
blasts and greatly increased soldier
survivability. A vehicle such as the Humvee with its one foot of
ground clearance received 16
times more blast impact through the floor than an MRAP with
its 3- to 4-foot ground clearance
(Figure 5).
Figure 5. MRAP comparison with Joint Light Tactical Vehicle
and Humvee.
1Unclassified
MRAP Cat 1 / JLTV Cat B / HMMWV
Characteristics
16,560 lbs
6,580 lbs**
23,140 lbs
Transport
Weight
Curb
Payload
GVW

35,504 lbs
5,564 lbs
41,068 lbs*
10,900 lbs
5,500 lbs***
15,400 lbs
No C-130 due to height
No helo transport
1 x C-130 at GVW
1 x CH-47 at ECC (ext)
2 x C-130 at GVW
1 x CH-47 at GVW (ext)
*ECP Variant Payload ~ 49,000 lbs with
automotive performance degradation
***Payload includes frag kit armor
Mission
Profile
JLTV - ICMRAP – IMG
(IMG used as example)
M1114 (w/frag kit 5)
30/30/4045/40/15 30/30/40
Note: Mission Profile numbers represent primary/secondary/x-
country terrain

**Payload includes B-Kit armor
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1Unclassified
JLTV - IC
120
99
153

254
MRAP – IMG
(IMG used as example)
M1114 (w/frag kit 5)
Max Height for
C130 Transport
(102)
90.5
130
196
MRAP Cat 1 / JLTV Cat B / HMMWV
Dimensions (pictures are approximately to scale)
159
220
76
(92 - Combat Ht)
96
75
There were three categories of MRAP vehicles based on the
major mission profiles:

—Used for small-unit combat operations in urban
or confined areas, the Mine
Resistant Utility Vehicle (MRUV) weighed 7 tons and had a 6-
crew capacity.
—Used for convoy security, combat engineering,
ambulance duty, and troop
and cargo transportation, the Joint Explosive Ordnance Disposal
(EOD) Rapid Response
Vehicle (JERRV) weighed 19 tons and had a crew capacity of 6
to 10.
—Used for clearing routes of IEDs, mines, and
other explosive devices, the
vehicle weighed 22.5 tons and had a 12-crew capacity.
In addition, there were variants within the three categories by
branch of military service,
meaning 16 variants had to be tested, produced, and equipped
(Figure 6). And an MRAP II
vehicle was being considered to counter the EFP threat and
evolution based on ongoing field
experience with the MRAP vehicle.
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Figure 6. Variants that had to be tested, produced, and
equipped.
5Unclassified
BAE CAT I
RG-33L
259
GDLS-C CAT I
RG31 Mk 5 (Pre-
MRAP)
50
MRAP Vehicle Fleet
Army
BAE CAT II

RG-33L
1323
BAE CAT II
HAGA
123
FPII CAT II
Cougar
300
GDLS-C CAT I
RG31 Mk 5e
600
BAE TVS CAT I
Caiman
1822
IMG CAT I
MaxxPro
4120
FPII CAT I
Cougar
1545
FPII CAT II
Cougar

605
FPII CAT III
Buffalo
62
NavyUSMC SOCOMAir Force
FPII CAT I
Cougar
397
FPII CAT II
Cougar
147
FPII CAT I
Cougar
397
FPII CAT II
Cougar
147
IMG CAT I
MaxxPro
329
CAT I

AUV
27
The number of vehicles required in Iraq increased rapidly and
changed every few weeks.
The initial requirement was for 1,185 vehicles, but total
requirements would exceed 20,000 if all
the Humvees in Iraq were replaced with MRAPs. The long-term
goal was to replace all Humvees
by September 2009 with early fielding of as many MRAPs as
possible, and it was an urgent one.
The near-term goal was to have 1,525 MRAPs in theater by
December 31, 2007. The acquisition
goal was outcome-oriented—to deliver the maximum number of
survivable vehicles, with
performance proven by tests, in the shortest time.
MRAP: Supply Market Analysis
A company called Force Protection fielded the first MRAP-style
vehicle in 2003 and was
the only U.S. manufacturer making them for the U.S. military.
Two other manufacturers were
known to be producing MRAP-style vehicles in South Africa
and Australia. Recent U.S. MRAP
production had been fewer than 10 units per month. The
deadline for delivering 1,525 MRAPs
by the end of December 2007 meant that production lines would
have to be staffed, equipped, up
and running, and producing more than 1,000 units per month.
The incentives and support that
suppliers needed to ramp up production this fast and the number

of suppliers who would be
willing to commit the resources necessary for rapid production
ramp-up without knowing future
production requirements beyond the initial 24 months were
issues that needed to be resolved.
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Ten manufacturers said they were capable of delivering
variations of the MRAP based on
COTS designs. All the variations shared two main features—
raised chassis and V-shaped,
monocoque hulls to deflect the impact of IEDs. In November
2006, the nine manufacturers listed
below responded to a request for a quote that included required
delivery of four test vehicles

within 60 days:
—Oshkosh, Wisconsin
s, Inc.—North Charleston, South Carolina
—Ontario, Canada
(York, Pennsylvania,
manufacturing)
—Ladson, South Carolina
—Sealy, Texas
—New Orleans, Louisiana
—New Haven, Michigan
—Warrenville,
Illinois
—Santa Clara, California
It was not known which of these vehicles would pass the testing
process, nor was the production
and quality-assurance capability of these suppliers. Several
suppliers indicated they could
initially gear up their production rates within 30 to 90 days
after receiving production orders
based on successful test results, production capacity, and
operational requirements.
Challenges dictated by the production requirements were
daunting. More than 36

prototypes would have to be evaluated and assessed for
performance, protection, and payload by
the U.S. Army Aberdeen Test Center (ATC)—both
developmental and operational testing,
typically done in sequence: DT-C1 threshold-level survivability,
DT-C2 safety testing, DT-C3
overmatching threat testing, and IOT&E (Initial Operational
Test and Evaluation). What would
be the standards for vehicle reliability? How long and how
many miles would be required for
durability testing? The testing would need to ensure that the
vehicles were survivable and usable,
could support rapid procurement and fielding, and could meet
statutory requirements for live-fire
test and evaluation.
There were internal process challenges as well. Three of the
nine manufacturers were
small and not cash-rich. How would payments to suppliers be
done on time? Who would provide
the dedicated resources to oversee the supplier’s production and
quality assurance? How would
final inspection issues and damage in transit be handled? Would
budget money be available in a
timely manner so the suppliers could commit resources? How
would the complex
communication and coordination be handled among all the
manufacturers and other
stakeholders?
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After the vehicles were built, the Space and Naval Warfare
Systems Center in Charleston,
South Carolina, had to fit them with government-furnished
equipment (GFE)—turrets, radios,
sensors, and jammers—which typically took 30 days. How could
that time be reduced to seven
days to reach the goal of processing 50 vehicles per day or
1,000 vehicles per month? Could the
Army and Marine Corps agree on installation-kit
interchangeability to simplify the process?
Could Six Sigma and Lean systems be used to speed up the
process?
There were two options offered by the U.S. Transportation
Command to ship completed
MRAPs to the theater. Airlift took two days, but only three
Category I MRAPs could fit in each
C-17 aircraft and one per C-131 aircraft. Sealift took between

22 to 30 days, and 360 vehicles
per month could be shipped.
Tier-two vendor requirements were huge. Heavy-duty tire
production was currently only
1,000 tires per month. Production of 1,300 MRAPs would
require 6,000 tires, which would take
six months to produce. A production rate of at least 20,000 tires
per month was needed. Diesel
engines, axles, and other components offered similar supply
challenges. Requiring common
components among the manufacturers could cause further
delays. But the greatest challenge was
obtaining the ballistic-grade steel required.
Category I MRAPs each required between four and five tons of
steel, which usually had
to be ordered six months in advance. Only two steel mills in the
United States made the rolled
homogenous armor required for up-armoring Humvees, and only
one, International Steel Group
(ISG), was currently in operation. ISG already had increased its
armored-plate production to
35,000 tons in 2004 from 6,500 tons in 2003 for the Humvee.
Although total Department of
Defense (DoD) demand for armored steel was only 21,000 tons
per month—a fraction of the 8
million tons per month of U.S. production—the limited supply
of armored steel (U.S. production
of 8,400 tons per month) was the result of its complexity, which
required that it be heated and
continuously rolled to produce the chemical and physical
requirements of hard armored steel.

Finally, what would be the field sustainment program—spare
parts, training, retrofitting
future upgrades, etc.? Manufacturers could provide the
recommended spare parts but was that
acceptable?
In many respects, this was the largest mobilization of industry
to support the military
since World War II. In addition to the vehicle assemblers, steel
mills, automotive-component
manufacturers, and parts fabricators, others would be involved.
Should the team request the
Priority Allocation of Industrial Resources (PAIR) Task Force
to put a DX rating on the MRAP
project (Exhibit 1)?
According to section 2533b of title 10, United States Code and
section 8024 of the DoD
Appropriations Act, FY 2007 (PL 109–289) domestic sources
were required to provide specialty
metals including armored steel plates. Was it possible to get
exceptions so non-U.S. sources
could be tapped?
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The project team pursued a very aggressive schedule while
working through many issues
that could delay fielding vehicles or increasing costs. But there
were still questions for the initial
team of eight people to answer. What additional people
resources would the team need, and
where would the resources come from? How fast could the
resources be added? How would the
work of a larger team be coordinated? Could the Defense
Contract Management Agency
(DCMA) Industrial Analysis Center assist the team?
Assignment Questions
1. What is strategic sourcing?
2. What sourcing strategies would you use and why do those
strategies make sense?
3. How would you apply effects-based thinking to derive actions
and outcomes?

4. What metrics would you use to measure outcomes?
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Exhibit 1
MINE RESISTANT AMBUSH PROTECTED (MRAP)
VEHICLE
What is the Priority Allocation of Industrial Resources (PAIR)
Task Force?

The PAIR Task Force’s mission is to ensure industrial resources
are allocated to DoD
procurement programs in accordance with operational priorities
in a comprehensive and
integrated manner. The purpose of the Task Force is not to
resolve Service unique needs. Rather,
the Task Force determines industrial resources required to
execute emergent plans, identifies any
conflicting demands on these resources, and devises alternative
approaches to resolving these
conflicts based on warfighting requirements established by the
Joint Staff.
The Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
(Industrial Policy) convenes and
chairs the Task Force. Task Force membership includes
representatives from the following
organizations: Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force
Service Acquisition Executives
(SAE); Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics);
Director, Strategic and Tactical Systems, Office of Assistant
Secretary of Defense (C31);
Defense Logistics Agency; Office of the Undersecretary of
Defense (Comptroller); Defense
Contract Management Agency (DCMA), the Joint Staff, the
Joint Materiel Priorities and
Allocation Board, and the Department of Commerce. Senior
DoD decision makers support the
efforts of the Task Force to ensure the Department speaks with
one voice to industry and
balances limited resources to meet warfighting priorities.
The Task Force addresses all issues brought by the members and

utilizes a variety of
means to mitigate production bottlenecks and resolve industrial
conflicts by requiring priority
performance of identified critical DoD contracts over any other
DoD or non-DoD contracts to
meet emergent and projected warfighting needs. An important
means available to the Task Force
is the authority provided by Title I of the Defense Production
Act, and its implementation tool,
the Defense Priorities and Allocations System (DPAS). The
Task Force can use the DPAS to
request Special Priorities Assistance and ensure critical defense
orders receive preferential
treatment from industry.
What is DPAS?
DPAS is the Defense Priorities and Allocations System. DPAS
provides the DoD with
powerful authorities to help protect our nation. Title I of the
Defense Production Act provides the
President the authority to require preferential performance on
contracts and orders, as necessary,
to meet national defense and emergency preparedness program
requirements. Executive Order
12919 delegates these authorities to various Federal
Departments and Agencies. The Secretary of
Commerce has been delegated the authority to manage industrial
resources. To implement its
authority, the Department of Commerce (DoC) administers the
Defense Priorities and
Allocations System (DPAS). The DPAS: Do
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Exhibit 1 (continued)
ensure timely delivery of
industrial products, materials and services to meet approved
national defense program
requirements; and
The DoC has delegated to DoD authority under the DPAS to:

approved national defense
programs. (DoD is precluded from rating orders for end items
that are commonly
available in commercial markets, however, and for items to be
used primarily for
administrative purposes such as office computers); and
pecial Priorities Assistance (SPA) to
resolve conflicts for
industrial resources among both rated and unrated (i.e.,
nondefense) contracts and orders;
and to authorize priority ratings for other U.S. federal agency
and friendly nation defense
orders in the United States when such authorization furthers
U.S. national defense
interests.
Except as noted above, all DoD contracts (including
construction contracts and Foreign
Military Sales contracts) are authorized an industrial priority
rating. DoD uses two levels of
rating priority, identified by the rating symbols “DO” or “DX.”
If a contractor cannot meet all
required delivery dates because of schedule conflicts, DO-rated
orders must be given preference
over unrated orders, and DX-rated orders must be given
preference over DO-rated orders and
unrated orders. Such preferential treatment is necessary even if
it requires the diversion of items
being processed for delivery against lower rated or unrated
orders. Only the Secretary of Defense

can approve programs to use a DX rating.
Although the DPAS is largely self-executing, if problems occur,
the contractor or the
DoD can ask the DoC for SPA to resolve the problem. This
includes requesting accelerated
delivery for urgent defense orders at the expense of other
defense orders. The Priority Allocation
of Industrial Resources (PAIR) Taskforce adjudicates such
requests.6
6 “Industrial Policy, Frequently Asked Questions,”
http://www.acq.osd.mil/ip/faq.html (accessed December 18,
2008). Do
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Module 7 Discussion
Theory Development and Evaluation
Examine the science and art of theory development and
evaluation.
Submission Instructions:
· Your initial post should be at least 500 words, formatted and
cited in current APA style with support from at least 2 academic
sources.
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