The Peoples Democratic Party prepares and offers this working paper on J&K as an act of hope. The hope lays in the belief that if the decision-makers and responsible political parties discern the categorical imperatives that have impelled this formulation, realize its intent and motive and examine its contents on merits, objectively and realistically, and not on partisan considerations or with chauvinistic mind-set, it will be possible to forge a consensus on the way forward.

1. JAMMU & KASHMIR PEOPLES DEMOCRATIC PARTY
Jammu & Kashmir
The Self-Rule Framework for Resolution
Srinagar
October, 2008
Issued by: Jammu & Kashmir Peoples Democratic Party, Srinagar
Printed by: AB&C Communications, Delhi

2. Jammu & Kashmir:
The Self-Rule Framework for Resolution
Contents
Preface 2
Executive Summary 2
Chapter I: The Overall Context of Resolution:
i) International: Globalisation 6
ii) National: Democracy & Conflict 8
iii) Regional: Resistance to Representation 10
Chapter II: Contours of Resolution:
i) Demilitarisation 12
ii) Challenges 13
Chapter III: Framework for Resolution: Self-Rule
i) New political superstructure 22
ii) Economic Integration 25
iii) Constitutional Restructuring 31
Main Proposals 38

3. in the traditional notions of sovereignty, self-determination, national
and ethnic borders.
2. Self-rule is a formulation that will integrate the region without
disturbing the extant sovereign authority over delimited territorial
space. It doesn't impair the significance of the line of control as
territorial divisions but negates its acquired and imputed
manifestations of state competition for power, prestige, or an
imagined historical identity. It is a way of "sharing sovereignty",
without need or commitment to political merging. It is based on the
creation of innovative international institutional arrangements that
have a political, economic and security character. Self-rule
encompasses the society, the state, and the economy. Self-rule, being
a trans-border concept, has a pan-Kashmir dimension but at the same
time seeks to regionalise power across J&K.
3. Self rule as a political philosophy is being articulated around the
conception of federalism and confederation that allow for sharing of
power between two levels of government, for the sharing of
sovereignty in a coordinated but not subordinated to one another,
each exercising supreme sovereignty in its constitutional
prerogatives. The comprehensive formulation of self-rule has three
subcomponents:
i. A new political superstructure that integrates the region and
empowers sub-regions
ii. A phased economic integration that transcends borders
iii. Constitutional restructuring that ensures sharing of
sovereignty without comprising political sovereignty of either
nation state.
New political superstructure:
4. The centrepiece of the governance structure under self-rule is the
cross border institution of Regional Council of Greater Jammu and
Kashmir. The Regional Council of Greater Jammu and Kashmir will
replace the existing Upper House of state assembly, and will be a kind
of a regional senate. Members of the Regional Council will be from
J&K as well as from Pakistan administered Kashmir. At present the
state assembly of J&K holds 20 seats for representatives from across
the line of control. These will be given up and replaced by the same
number of seats in the Regional Council of Greater Jammu and
Kashmir. This will serve as a major cross-border institution, which
will ensure long-term coordination of matters and interest relating to
the state.
5. Moreover, such an institutional structure will provide a framework
within which certain matters between the two parts of the State and
PREFACE
The Peoples Democratic Party prepares and offers this working
paper on J&K as an act of hope. The hope lies in the belief that if the decision-makers
and responsible political parties discern the categorical imperatives
that have impelled this formulation, realize its intent and motive and examine
its contents on merits, objectively and realistically, and not on partisan
considerations or with chauvinistic mind-set, it will be possible to forge a
consensus on the way forward.
The Peoples Democratic Party is not presenting a solution; nor does it
pretend to have one. Indeed, it is our belief that roadmaps prejudge the issue;
readymade solutions make the problem a distorted image of what it actually is;
and models make a mockery of specificity of the issue. As such, what we have
attempted in this document is an internally consistent framework and
indicative direction for resolution. We have tried to contextualise the issue at
various levels and drawn the contours of a process for building sustainable
peace in the State and the region. The essence of this document lies in trying to
suggest a creative framework for resolution of the issue without
compromising the sovereignty of the two nation states involved.
We are convinced that various proposals and measures, as fleshed out
in this document, address both the internal and the external dimensions of the
problem in, and about Jammu and Kashmir, in a manner that is realistic and
practical. Our effort has been to root these in the ideals of justice and
empowerment for all the people of the State. We see our recommendations, as
catalysts for change and instruments for fulfilling the aspirations of all the
peoples of J&K, and regions and sub-regions of the State.
We have not looked for solutions in the past, but we have made an
effort find a way in the future. A return to the past may not be possible - indeed,
if may not even be desirable. The past offers no hope. Our party recognises that
we are living through a period where definitions of cultures, societies,
sovereignty, and nationality are changing very rapidly and radically. All these
issues have gone through a large number of transformations and sometimes,
dramatic shifts. The world has undergone a change and we have to be a part of
that changed system.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1. The J&K issue cannot be resolved on the basis of exclusively intra-state
level initiatives. It requires a combination of intra-state
measures with inter-state and supra-state measures. This approach,
which is underlying the concept of self-rule, is a practical way that
would eliminate the sources of ethno-territorial conflicts, entrenched
2 3

4. their respective mainland, that need to be sorted out to infuse in
people a sense of empowerment and a feeling of belonging. This will
require devising an improved constitutional, political and economic
relationship between the two parts of the State and their respective
main lands.
6. In order to empower various sub-regions within the J&K state, a tier
of sub-regional councils, will be added to the domestic legislative
structure. While the national Parliament will have representations to
the sovereign, the state assembly will continue to be a sub-national
institution, the sub-regional councils will complete representative
character of governance by bringing in the territorial representation
in the state.
Economic Integration:
7. A critical element of self-rule is the economic integration across the
line of control. This integration can be pursued in different degrees,
deepening the process as we go along and as the system and society adapts
to change. The process can be started by declaring the intention to
establish common economic space and sign an agreement with a roadmap
which envisages:
i. Establishing a common economic space;
ii. Instituting a dual currency system
iii. Coordinating economic policy, harmonization economic
legislation and synergising regulations
8. The process of economic integration of the two parts of Jammu and
Kashmir can start with the easiest form of economic integration, a
Preferential Trade Agreement. In the PTA the two countries, India
and Pakistan would offer tariff reductions, or eliminations confined
to the geographical boundaries of “Greater Jammu and Kashmir” and
restrict it to some product categories. Stage II would be to make
GJAK a regional free trade area, with no tariffs or barriers between
with GJAK, while maintaining their own external tariff on imports
from the rest of the world, including India and Pakistan. GJAK will
set a common external tariff on imports from India and Pakistan.
9. Further, instead of looking for a monetary union, a new system of
“Dual Currency” will be created, where the Indian and Pakistani
rupees are both made legitimate legal tenders in the geographical
areas of GJAK. A better description of this system is a “co-circulation
of two currencies” in J&K. It is being proposed that Indian and
Pakistani rupees should be the medium of exchange in J&K. To be
more precise, it means, allowing circulation of the Pakistani rupee in
the Indian part of J&K currency and circulation of Indian rupee in the
Pakistan administered Kashmir. This has to be done if we want cross
the Line of control trade to flourish.
10. Our vision is to move towards an economic union, which will
maintain free trade in goods, and services, set common external
tariffs, allow the free mobility of capital and labour, and will also
relegate some fiscal responsibilities to a supra-national agency.
11. Consistent with our legislative design, the economic integration will
be deepened through sub-regional integration; that is formation of
different sub-regional groups. Appearance of different sub-regional
projects can generate multi-speed integration. It needs to be
understood that GJAK is being proposed as a regional organisation to
facilitate political cooperation as well as promote cooperation
between India and Pakistan, and regaining Kashmir's place at the
heart of Central Asia.
Constitutional Restructuring:
12. Self-rule cannot exist without adequate constitutional safeguards. As
the Constitutional position stands today, Article 356, undermines the
core of Self-rule and has to be made non-applicable to J&K. In a
similar vein, Article 249, applied to the State in amended form,
should be rolled back so that the Parliament cannot exercise
legislative jurisdiction over a matter that, otherwise, falls under the
State jurisdiction.
13. Sixth Amendment of the Constitution of the State that undermines its
original scheme of a comprehensive and accountable executive
(inclusive of the Head of the State) a critical component of Self-rule,
will have to be repealed. Prior to this amendment, the State
Legislature elected Sadar-e-Riyasat, the head of the State.
14. The proviso, limiting the powers of State Legislature, has been added
to Article 368, which deals with the powers of the Parliament to
amend the Constitution of India and not the power of State
Legislature to amend its own Constitution. The proviso is, therefore,
totally and grossly out of place and ultra vires the constitutional
scheme. The State Legislature's constitutional power of amendment
is the core of empowerment or Self-rule of the State and this cannot
be destroyed by an order passed under Article 370. All India Service
Act, 1951 and Article 312 be rolled back and the local human
resources are provided clear and unhindered opportunity to develop
their full potential and it is trusted to manage the affairs of the State.
15. It is a part of the design of self-rule that Head of the State be elected
from the regions of Jammu and Kashmir by rotation. This shall give
to the people of all the regions an equal and equitable sense and
feeling of empowerment and shall strengthen their bonds.
4 5

5. Chapter I
The Overall Context of Resolution
International Context: Globalisation
1. The world of the early twenty-first century displays three striking
patterns. Increasing globalisation, whether defined as economic
integration, or more broadly, to include trans-border politics and
cultural exchange, appears to reduce the importance of conventional
territorial boundaries created by nation states.
2. Integration implies as its end point an elimination of the significance
of such boundaries for flows of goods, capital, and people. At the
same time, citizens' territorial attachments to their home regions and
countries have shown few signs of weakening. Territory remains a
powerful means for the mobilization of populations. That power lies
at the heart of the third pattern: the persistence of violent conflicts
fought over territorial stakes.
3. Territorial disputes continue to be the most common source of
conflict between states, and territory has increasingly become the
most frequent reason for violent conflict within states. Territorial
boundaries may be less important as a barrier to the movement of
capital, people, and goods, but control of these borders and the
territory that they encompass often remains a central goal for nation
states and citizens.
4. In many ways, globalisation — particularly global economic
integration — has been eroding or “hollowing out” the role of the
nation-state as governance has moved to global and regional
international institutions and devolved to sub-national units.
5. Finally, militarised conflict also has undergone re-examination as
the Cold War and its “long peace” among the great powers ended.
Rather than witnessing a resumption of great power rivalry and war,
which had been predicted by some, a very different pattern has
emerged. War between states has continued its decades-long decline
while war within states has significantly increased.
6. As such, globalisation has posed a unique and historically
unprecedented challenge to the “classic” territorial state. It has
managed to disengage, if not separate, sovereignty from
territoriality. In the contemporary era of state-defined territoriality,
the claim of many juridical states to exercise actual territorial
control within clearly delimited boundaries has also been
challenged. This has introduced fluidity in the territoriality and
sovereignty relationship.
7. Increasingly, there is sovereignty is being subsumed into territorial
governance. In this framework, the two principal dimensions of
territorial governance are border delimitation and jurisdictional
congruence. Border delimitation captures the means by which
political units separate themselves from other units, means that can
in turn be characterized by more or less precision and permanence.
Jurisdictional congruence measures the degree to which exclusive
political authority across policy domains coincides with those
boundaries. In this there is a considerable variation that is possible
and a wide range of possibilities can coexist.
8. Jurisdictional congruence — exclusive political control across
policy realms within the delimited boundaries can be used to find a
practical solution to all such conflicts that confront us today. There is
an identity and political space that can be preserved while the
decision space can be shared.
9. Since 1945, and particularly since 1980, the clash of national policy
jurisdictions has grown as globalisation has led the more powerful
states to extend their norms and practices to other parts of the world
that are now more closely integrated with one another. Policies that
used to lie well “behind the border” have been placed on the
international agenda.
10. Among economic equals that share similar values and policies,
regimes of mutual recognition or policy harmonization are typically
negotiated: the European Union is a principal example of this
strategy for dealing with territorial limits and jurisdictional conflict.
Regional and international institutions are also deployed at the
global level to reduce conflict.
11. Globalisation also reduces the importance of territory as a tangible
stake in conflict between states. Even as it reduces the importance of
land it tends to increase the importance of certain tradable resources
that are linked to territory; be this water, gas, oil et al. Further,
globalisation may also provide incentives and instruments for
resolving territorial conflict. Incorporating the links between
globalisation and territorial conflict may force the adaptation of
conventional instruments of conflict resolution. Perhaps the most
important hypothesis that emerges regarding globalisation and the
resolution of territorial disputes between states lies in the economic
incentives for settled boundaries provided by economic integration.
The opportunity costs of trade and investment foregone become
more apparent as economic exchange burgeons at the global level.
Globalisation creates strong incentives for porous national
boundaries leading to less conflict between states.
12. Along with the end of political bi-polarity, an equally important set
of factors has been the pressures and opportunities of globalisation.
6 7

6. Technological innovations in communication and transportation,
and in particular, the movement of capital across borders, have
circumvented or eroded traditional state sovereignty not only in the
conduct of international finance and trade, but increasingly, in their
own domestic affairs. This is a crucial fact that will have to be borne
in mind for any future dispensation that we might conceive for
Jammu and Kashmir.
13. The vacuum left behind after the Cold War, coupled with the
vagaries of globalisation has created serious external strains on the
traditional nation-state apparatus, particularly in the developing
world. Many developing states that were already weakened or
failing due to a variety of internal factors will be under greater
pressure now. All this will lead to newer and more relevant
definitions of sovereignty.
14. Indeed, the seeds of a solution lie in using the logic of this change
that is spearheaded by globalisation to evolve a framework for new
political dispensation in Jammu and Kashmir. This will resolve the
issue on a long-term bias.
National Context: Democracy and Conflict
15. The growth of conflicts within India has coincided with the de-institutionalisation
of the Indian state. Both the normative and
organisational pillars of post-independence India – secularism,
socialism and democracy – have undergone some radical redefining
and changes. The three were operating in tandem, one supporting
and complementing the other. The three, individually and
collectively, were the ideological underpinning of Indian
nationalism.
16. All these three have weakened. Secularism is has been redefined.
Socialism has been abandoned. The character of democracy,
intensive as it may be, especially from the stand point of J&K, has
been altered. More than democracy, for most of the time it has
operated as democratic authoritarianism for the state of J&K.
Nationalism and Indian nation, which was a composite of these three
ideological pillars, also did undergo a change, necessarily. We are in
that transition phase where nationalism is being redefined.
17. As a result a major challenge has been posed to the structure of
nationhood inherited from the nationalist struggle and consolidated
over the early decades of independent India. New forces appeared
on the political horizon leading to a redrawing of the cultural
boundaries of the nation. And a result, a change in the concept of
Nationalism.
18. These new forces are represented by the emergence of the return of
the repressed discourses of caste and community, and the eruption of
`sub-national' assertions. Simultaneously occurred a political
churning leading to the growth of the Hindu right. As a consequence
the terms of public discourse were refashioned, even turned upside
down. Secular nationalism hence came under severe strain and the
Hindu communal or nationalist discourse gained ground in the void
created by the retreat of secular nationalism.
19. These developments point to a certain kinship between the
hegemonic secular nationalist discourse and the resurgence of the
right. As such it was a political transformation not rooted in
changing social and cultural consciousness. It is, however, true that
whenever under strain nationalism in India revealed Hindu colours.
In fact, Indian nationalism always betrayed an undercurrent of
Hindu religious sensibility, which has adversely affected its secular
character.
20. This change, which had and continues to have a major impact on the
way in which political discourse and dialogue is conducted in J&K,
points more to the weaknesses of secular practice, rather than the
concept of secularism. The social and political space that the Hindu
right seized was created partly by the retreat of secularism due to the
weaknesses of its practice. The place of minorities and Dalits in the
nation is an important factor in the fortunes of secular nationalism.
As such the very project of Indian nationalism was an impossible
one, precisely because it was impossible to have one common
history.
21. The different histories of communities and intercommunity
relations that provided the ingredients for different imaginations of
selfhood led to different articulations of nationalism in Hindus and
Muslims. It is not that there is no shared cultural ground between
Hindus and Muslims but that it did not comprise the entire arena of
inter community relations. That it was so is in the least surprising, as
it would never be the case in any intercommunity relations. Today,
the biggest challenge facing the nation is how to conduct dialogue
with the masses who had already been constituted as Hindus,
Muslims and, Christians. How to design an institutional framework
that provides enough space yet hold the nation together. The success
of secular nationalism would partly depend upon the answer to this
question.
22. The same is true of the regionalism. The rise of regionalism in India,
has meant an improved articulation of political, social and economic
aspirations of the sub-nations, like J&K. The illegitimate symbiotic
relationship with the state and its repressive measures and civil
8 9

7. bureaucracy, which had imparted an authoritarian stand to
governance of the Centre has been substantially broken in many
parts of the country. As such what may have been acceptable for the
larger system to create an enclave of federalism within a unitary
system, and combine the advantages of a loose federation with those
of a centralized system, without impairing its functioning, seems to
be possible today. The situation has changed with regional parties
gaining prominence and the Centre being ruled by a coalition of
parties. Even though it is the same constitution, the spirit is far more
federal today and the autonomy issue may not suffer from the same
ills as it did earlier. A fact nobody could have foreseen is this
development of regional aspirations and regional forces coming to
the fore. Symbolizing regional aspirations while maintaining
commitment to the national integrity or unity of the nation are the
states of Andhra Pradesh, West Bengal, Tamil-Nadu, and North-east.
Jammu and Kashmir: From resistance to representation
23. It is now a well-accepted fact that the peace process in the sub-continent
is irreversible. It may move in fits and starts, but the
direction is clear. There can be no denying the fact that since 2003,
political initiatives – Line of control, domestic, bilateral and
international – have all been moving in a positive direction, albeit at
a slow pace. There are a few remarkable features about this peace
process, which have a bearing on its sustainability, that were not in
evidence in the earlier initiatives. First, is that it is for the first time in
the history that J&K state and its government has initiated, catalysed
and driven the peace process. From being a passive recipient of
bilateral initiatives, the state, immediately after the election of 2002,
took centre-stage and drove the peace process at the bilateral level.
In other words, for the first time in the troubled history of our state,
the PDP-led State Government was not in an adversarial role. This
has stopped the marginalisation of moderates in the political
spectrum of Kashmir.
24. In doing so, the government revived social collaboration, political
reconciliation, and democratic participation, through innovations
and indeed historic steps. Be it the opening of the Srinagar-
Muzzaffarabad Road or the Sialkot - Rawlakote road, or the
allowing of travel on permit and not passport basis, it all added up to
a collective political engagement and consequent reduction in the
structural and individual alienation. These were not events but
processes that catalysed the peace process.
25. This reversal of roles – the state government driving these steps and
the Union government endorsing it ---- has meant a much wider
grounds-feel of peace process in the state, which has been seen, felt
and heard. The net result has been that there have been local stake in
the peace process. It has generated consensus among principal
stakeholders -- the people of Jammu and Kashmir -- on the
resolution of the “Kashmir issue”. What this has done is to create a
new basis of legitimacy by the only and ultimate source of authority,
namely, the people itself.
26. The earlier rounds of bilateral diplomacy over the years, many as
these were, aimed at normalising relations had either been futile or
resulted in failure. Lately, several international actors have played a
significant role in prompting a new round of dialogue. However,
given the previous failed attempts at resolution and Delhi's
continued resistance to international intervention in what it
considers a bilateral issue, there was some pessimism about the role
of further dialogue. The challenge therefore was in not only
sustaining this new round of dialogue but also ensuring that it is
insulated from the day-to-day setbacks that have often derailed the
process in the past. A lot has been achieved here in a relatively small
period of time.
27. The major breakthrough was to engage the civil society of J&K in
the process. The cooperation between the civil state and the state
increased and resolution of the problem is no longer only the
responsibility of the state – be it the centre or the state. The
involvement of the principal stakeholders – people was gaining
ground. It is this that was the greatest achievement and it should not
be let to slip away.
28. We are now at the threshold of our third step: empowering the
legitimate democratic institutions of the state to the extent that they
are not manipulated by anyone. For instance, if the current or future
legislature of the state that has been democratically elected makes
recommendations that are within the purview of the constitution of
the state and the country, it is obligatory on the part of the Centre to
seriously consider the proposals.
29. To supplement the peace process, make it sustainable, and catalyse
its pace, the PDP-led Government, in consultation with the
Government of India, decided to proceed with economic
reconstruction in a manner that is acceptable to all. The basic
premise is of the new strategy is peace through economic
reconstruction. The reconstruction of the J&K economy has been
designed in a manner that supports the transition from conflict to
peace through the rebuilding of the economic framework.
10 11

8. Chapter II
The Contours of Resolution
Setting the stage for Resolution: Demilitarisation
30. Prior to conceiving and debating the issue of resolution and
outlining its contours, it is imperative we create an enabling
environment for it. This would be the phase where mental, material
and motivational reconciliation takes place on both sides. The
Indian nation-state must make up its mind that the only way to
forward is the non-military way. There is no room for armed
interventions in J&K. If there is one lesson that has come through in
the last 15 years of militancy it is that the gun is not solution – be it in
the hands of the army or the militants.
31. If this is the basic premise, then a decisive move has to be made to
reduce not only the physical presence of the armed forces in the state
but also their influence in the decision making at a political and
administrative level. Even in the sphere of operational matters of
security, the armed forces should be a part of the J&K police
hierarchy rather than being a parallel institution of power. This
entire change is what we refer to under the rubric of
“demilitarisation”.
32. To be sure, demilitarisation is first about the mind-set and then about
the withdrawal of troops in the state. It has an operational, and a
symbolic aspect to it, besides having a strategic objective. The
simple fact of withdrawal is indicative of the preconditions for
resolution and resolution-oriented measures. It symbolises a
conceptual change in governance by the government, a growing
leadership confidence in the state, and a politically courageous pro-active
leadership at the national level.
33. Further, the symbolism of demilitarisation is that the balance of
power on governing, which has since the elections of 2002, titled in
favour of civil institutions, should now lead to a situation where the
democratic and civil society institutions are now given full charge of
the situation to consolidate the peace process. At this crucial
juncture, when public confidence is waning in the whole process,
only a resolute effort propelled by political wisdom and vision could
restore it.
34. It also needs to be emphasized that not only is a complete withdrawal
of troops a pragmatic need, it is also a strategic objective. It needs to
be understood that a withdrawal of the armed forces from all civilian
areas, will create and enhance the stakes of the people in the peace
process.
35. The process of demilitarisation will then create pockets of peace
along with it and there can be no better way of generating an organic
movement of peace than this. As such, the term demilitarisation
refers to a nuanced process that not only has an impact on the ground
at the Line of controlal, and state level; it also has national and
international ramifications. The former strengthens our claims and
the latter our case.
36. And above all, the move towards demilitarisation has to be seen, and
made to be seen, in the context of the larger paradigm of resolution
rather than the probability of increased violence in the state. This is
based on ground realities.
37. The enabling legislative part of demilitarisation relates to Armed
Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA). For almost two decades
AFSPA has been in force in the State. There is no justification for
this to operate any further and must be repealed to enable
normalisation to take root. Its operation and enforceability have no
bearing to the level, scale and intensity of violence in the state. The
most important fall out of this will be that it will empower and
facilitate the State Government in assuming its full role in
revitalizing and pushing forward the control of civil society over the
governance of the state.
Jammu & Kashmir Issue: Challenges
38. There is no denying the fact that a lot of complications in the issue
exist with the intra-state relationships between Delhi and Srinagar
and between Islamabad and Muzaffarabad.* These intra-state
relationships are further compounded by the emergence of a host of
political parties and militant groups on all sides of the conflict. Yet
another factor in the mix is the Kashmiri diaspora, whose
involvement has witnessed noticeable ascendancy in the post-Cold
War period.
39. In all these discourses – Indian, Pakistani, international – the only
viewpoint that has not been adequately highlighted is that of the
* For the past five decades India, Pakistan and J&K have been involved in high stakes negotiations for
resolving what is called the “Kashmir dispute”. Shorn of all its complexity, it is essentially related to the two
countries effort to define their respective borders in a situation where control of territory has not meant so
much a control of resources as improved strategic positions. Strong-arm politics, economic pressures,
shadowy backroom deals, nationalist sentiments, public dissatisfaction and an environment of mutual
mistrust have marked this process. The resolution of the border issue peacefully and transparently would
have a huge positive impact on regional security, economic cooperation, ethnic relations and efforts to
combat arms trafficking and religious extremism. But progress has been slow, and no immediate
breakthrough can be seen in an all too often antagonistic process.
The current difficulties can be traced directly back to the partition in 1947. That process in relation to J&K
followed neither natural geographic boundaries nor strict ethnic lines. This has been further compounded by
the repeated efforts at redefining Indian nationalism and the pervasive search for an identity of Pakistan's
nation state. All these factors combined to create a complex stew of territorial claims and counterclaims. An
12 13

9. people of Jammu and Kashmir. There, of course, is the argument for
the inclusion of the people of Jammu and Kashmir into the
resolution process to ensure that India and Pakistan do not walk
away from the negotiating table too easily in bilateral talks. The
problem is that the heterogeneity of views from within Jammu and
Kashmir have become an easy excuse for their exclusion. As such
there is need for a well-articulated set of views to emerge from the
state that can form the basis of bilateral and international dialogue.
We are making an effort to fill this most critical gap.
40. Conceptually, the challenge in J&K is to integrate the region without
disturbing the extant sovereign authority over delimited territorial
space. There is no need to negate the significance of the line of
control as territorial divisions but it is imperative to negate its
acquired and imputed manifestations of state competition for power,
prestige, or an imagined historical identity. The idea is to retain the
former and change the latter. Therein lies the key to the solution of
J&K dispute. And one way to do so, is through economic
integration.
41. To put the issue in analytical terms, we have to find ways and means
of “sharing sovereignty". This makes it “more than an alliance"
(where "alliance" means that a group of nations forms a selective
agreement without the need of giving up relevant pieces of
sovereignty). Yet there is no need or commitment to develop a
common plan of political merging.
42. The operational challenge in J&K is to establish innovative
international institutional arrangements that have a political,
economic and security character. The two countries have to resolve
the very difficult problem of “domestic” integration within a split
international political and economic structure. Our basic premise is
that the search for solution to the issue of Jammu & Kashmir is a
search for an inter-nation state institutional arrangement that
preserves sovereignty of the two nation-states but still has a
supranational basis. This is possible by giving the institutional
arrangement an economic, rather than a political, basis. To redefine
the concept, in addition to being the territorial limits, a border of an
line of control is a barrier to people, commodities and capital. The
idea is to remove the barrier – or to put it more accurately – let
markets override these boundaries.
43. This approach of according primacy to the economic over political,
in some ways, turns the current paradigm, on its head. Due to
historical reasons the entire state of J&K remains an important
political, though not an economic, partner of both India and
Pakistan. This fact can be attributed mostly to the heritage of
partition. Even as political significance is paramount for both,
economic links between India and J&K and Pakistan and POK are
limited. The political significance of two parts of Kashmir to their
respective mainlands is disproportionate to their economic
significance.
44. Our basic premise is that the time has come to work out some form of
integration and move forward. Even though the integration design
may appears to be constitutionally and legally incomplete and
politically premature, a start has to be made simply because the cost
of not doing it will be much higher than the cost of implementing it.
45. It is not necessary to work out a full architecture of integration. It has
to start with a some critical steps. For instance, the euro nations are
being forced to achieve more and more integration in the future
because the single currency management requires a growing degree
of political and economic harmonization. At the same time, such a
"convergence by necessity" does not imply that a real "Political
Union" will be automatically born.
46. In view of the past history, the stated positions and the emotional
surcharge a one-point-one-time solution for resolution of the
conflict is a near impossibility. What is required is a sequence of
measures, which would resolve the situation. These initiatives need
to be less dramatic and inciteful than a plebiscite which would
inevitably carry a huge baggage of rhetoric and arouse all the
polemical furies. What is needed is a practical, step-by-step
artifical and temporary line – the line of control – has become a border, de jure and de facto, that has over the
years become internationalised with a major significance in international politics.
Long-standing industrial and transportation links have been disrupted and discarded. Border crossings are
banned throughout the region. Demands for visas, only available in capitals and at a high price for local
people, have made freedom of movement increasingly difficult. As cross-border travel became difficult,
interaction between populations that once shared many aspects of a common culture and way of life has
become impossible. As new lines are drawn on the map, so new borders and new stereotypes are being
created in people's minds. Ethnic populations that had long enjoyed access to friends and family just across
borders were now isolated and often faced visa requirements and other access difficulties. Much of the
population views these new restrictions with hostility and has felt the disruption in traditional patterns of
commerce and society acutely.
Limiting cross-border movement has, in the recent past, been done in the name of security, yet few border
services are sufficiently proficient to prevent determined traffickers or terrorists from crossing frontiers. And
the means used to secure borders have had a directly negative impact on the lives of local people. There are
regular reports of deaths in unmarked minefields, shooting of villagers who have strayed into foreign
territory, and huge social and economic costs from the destruction of cross-border transport infrastructure.
Resolving this lingering and substantial border disputes has become critical. Bilateral relations have often
been uneasy for a variety of reasons, and tensions over borders have only made cooperation in other areas,
such as trade, impossible. The worst part is that this disputes has also become an important domestic political
issue. Concessions made in border negotiations can be rich fodder for political oppositions and this has
served to further constrain the latitude of governments to compromise.
The resolution of territorial disputes is obviously emotional and goes directly to each country's definition of
national interests. No nation wants to make territorial concessions. Especially when it can have strategic
implications. Nonetheless, the failure to resolve or atleast bypass such territorial issues has prevented the two
neighbours from normalising relations and dealing with pressing social and economic issues. Thus it is
important that any territorial differences be resolved or bypassed on a mutually acceptable basis in
accordance with economic rationality and political sagacity.
14 15

10. extrication of the state from current impasse towards a resolution.
47. In this context, it is proposed to move step-by-step, taking the path of
least resistance and build confidences as we go along. Each move,
small or insignificant as it may be, will have to be a part of a larger
resolution design with a broad end-result in view. Depending on the
nature of successes, the course can be modified and calibrated
depending on the emerging political situation.
48. At a practical level, it should be obvious that the J&K issue has not
been and cannot be solved on the basis of the exclusively on an intra-state
level (i.e within India or within Pakistan). It requires a
combination of intra-state measures (across India and Pakistan)
with inter-state and supra-state (international) measures. Thus, it
would seem prudent to advocate a three-step approach to resolution
of the issue – introducing fundamental principles of a solution,
which would reduce uncertainty and provide a 'road map'; creating a
dual power-sharing arrangement, which would be based on equal
relationships between people of J&K across the border at both sub-state
and national levels; and combining this power-sharing
arrangement with regional and national integration.
49. It needs to be appreciated that political positions range from self-determination
and sovereignty, secession and territorial integrity,
partition and co-existence, and also democratic methods of conflict
resolution and management based on respect of individual and
group rights.
50. It would be useful to mark the material difference between the stands
of India and Pakistan vis-à-vis the State of Jammu and Kashmir.
India claims that the entire State is a part of Indian Territory. Its
constitution (Article 1) as well as the Constitution of Jammu and
Kashmir (Section 3) provides so. Its claim is based on the Instrument
of Accession and the ratification of accession by the Constituent
Assembly of the State. On the other hand, Pakistan does not claim
that the State, or even that of the State which is under its control, is a
part of Pakistan. It is so because there is no treaty or instrument
executed between the State and Pakistan that could support any such
claim of Pakistan. Pakistan's Constitution, therefore, does not
include the State or any part thereof in its territories (Article 1 of the
Constitution of Pakistan). Pakistan's only limited claim is based on
its alleged right to administer the part of the State under its control by
virtue of UNCIP resolution. However, there are provisions in the
Constitution of Pakistan which make it mandatory to support the
ideology of the State's accession with Pakistan.
51. Briefly stated, India's claim is based on the assertion and recognition
of a fact, whereas Pakistan's traditional claim was based on the
16
declaration and pursuit of a desire. The leaders and diplomats of
Pakistan, no longer advance the claim that Pakistan expects, as a
matter of right, that State should accede to it. They have
traditionally taken the ground that let the people of the State decide
who they want to go with. If their decision turns out to be against
Pakistan, so be it.
52. However, there is a need to meet the moral argument advocating
ascertainment of people's will. The question is, how this “will” can
be ascertained. The following methods commend for consideration:
a. A plebiscite held simultaneously throughout the entire State
of Jammu and Kashmir.
b. A plebiscite held in stages in different specified regions of
the State.
c. An election held under international supervision in both
parts of the State to choose representatives for holding
negotiations regarding the future of the State with both India
and Pakistan.
d. An election held in both parts of the State to choose
representatives who would then hold negotiations with their
own country.
e. The framing of a broad frame-work on the future of the two
parts of the State to be formulated by India and Pakistan.
f. The elected representatives of each part of the State would
then hold negotiations with their respective country for a
resolution framework within the given parameters.
53. The broad spectrum of public opinion, gathered from the elected and
un-elected representatives of different sections of society, in each
part of the State, could be forged into a consensus within their own
respective country. The two formulations emerging from the two
parts could then be discussed between India and Pakistan for a
workable settlement.
54. So far as options (a) and (b) are concerned, they will not be
acceptable primarily because they are based on the plea of religious
divide and two-nation theory. India, being a secular country with
diverse religious communities, can ill-afford to accept another
partition based on religion. Even Pakistan recognizes the fact that
UN resolutions on this subject are not mandatory and are outdated.
Such solutions may jeopardize the strategic interests of both the
countries in the region and a change borders is not acceptable to
either country. Option (c) also does not appear to be practicable.
There are too many imponderables involved in the game. Besides,
this may not lead to an equitable or just conclusion – much less a
17

11. consensus – because members of a particular religious community
or region may dominate the outcome of the negotiations. Option (d)
would fail in case of our part of the State, where the three regions
Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh, may each demand irreconcilable
goals in a formal negotiating process. Option (e) is more practical
and has a precedent in Ireland. But Irish situation was not as diverse
and region – centric as is the case in our part of the State. In our view
option (f) is the most practicable and least complicated way out.
55. Our aim is not to discuss the complexities of history and geopolitics,
but instead, to shift the focus to more practical policy-oriented
discussion of a possible solution to the J&K issue. It is argued that
solution of the J&K issue must be built on three essential elements:
a. introduction of clearly defined fundamental principles on
which the solution must be based;
b. creation of a proper system of integration between the state
across the borders backed by institutional arrangements;
and
c. the combining of this arrangement into the framework of
Indian and Pakistan polity.
56. Being fully conscious of the shortcomings of exclusive reliance on
intra-state solutions, it can be argued that in order to achieve a stable,
sustainable and just solution to the J&K issue, we should combine
intra-state measures (decentralisation and power-sharing) with
inter-state and supra-state measures. This approach, which is
underlying the concept of self-rule is the only way that would
eliminate the sources of ethno-territorial conflicts, entrenched in the
traditional notions of sovereignty, self-determination, national and
ethnic borders.
Chapter III
Self-rule: Concept, Design and Operation
57. Self-rule encompasses the society, the state, and the economy. It
comprises a nexus of multiple loyalties of an individual as a member
of the society, duties and rights of the citizen in a reciprocal political
arrangement with the state, and the role of the individual as a
producer and consumer in the economy.
58. What sets apart "self-rule" from "autonomy" is the political context
in which they are conceived and operate. Self-rule refers to
autonomy from the nation-state of India, whereas autonomy
connotes relative autonomy from the Government of India. The two
are vastly different in substance and style. The change -- from
“autonomy” to self-rule” -- means is a fundamental shift in the
terrain of political discourse and the existing status of the Kashmir
issue.
59. Autonomy refers to empowerment of the Government of Jammu
and Kashmir vis-a-vis the Government of India. As such it becomes
a part of the centre-state debate in the Indian federal set up. Self-rule
on the other hand refers to the empowerment of the people of Jammu
and Kashmir, vis-a-vis the nation of India.
60. Further, autonomy is for an institution of governance, self-rule is for
a region, or geography. Therefore, while autonomy doesn't have a
territorial element to it, the concept of self-rule has an element of
territoriality to it. This is a reasonable compromise between
demanding a new state and redefining the existing one. As such,
self-rule gets a pan-Kashmir dimension. It is about the Kashmir on
either side of the line of control. It is a trans-border concept rather
than a local domestic issue which autonomy is.
61. Self-rule seeks to regionalise the concept power, while autonomy
seeks to move it across levels of government. This distinction and its
operational importance is very significant in the historical context of
J&K. The experience has been that most governments formed in the
state have been severely compromised as far as legitimacy -- J&K
where peoples mandate is often vitiated -- is concerned. Hence, even
if the government is empowered that power has never been
exercised in a genuine manner.
62. Self-rule has four separate components: autonomy, control,
legitimacy and identity. Autonomy refers to the independence a state
has in making policy. Control refers to the actual ability of the state
to produce the outcomes it desires. Legitimacy refers to its process
through which the people in power have reached that position.
Identity refers to the capacity of the state to endow people with an
overriding sense of who they are as a collective group.
63. The problem in J&K has been that while it has been fairly
autonomous, it has been ineffective in bringing about the results it
desires. It lacks control. The problem with the pure autonomist
viewpoint is that it is confuses autonomy with empowerment. The
fact is that autonomy is only a framework, not an empowerment.
Empowerment of people comes from having instrumentalities of
control and then having the legitimacy to exercise those. And of
course, the element of identity puts it all together.
64. Self rule as a political philosophy can be articulated around the
conception of federalism and confederation that allow for sharing of
power between two levels of government, for the sharing of
sovereignty in a coordinated but not subordinated to one another,
18 19

12. each exercising supreme sovereignty in its constitutional
prerogatives. When Indian Independence Act was passed and the
two dominions of India and Pakistan came into being, J&K became
an independent country. It is for the reason that J&K fell in the
category of fully empowered Indian States. It is this sovereign status
of the ruler of the State that is supposed to provide legal foundation
to the instrument of Accession with the dominion of India.
65. The relevant provisions of the Instrument of Accession with regard
to the status of the State and the retention of its internal sovereignty
are as under:
a. “7; nothing in this instrument shall be deemed to commit me
in any way to acceptance of any future Constitution of India
or to fetter any discretion to enter into arrangements with
the Government of India under any such future constitution.
b. 8; nothing in this instrument affects the continuance of any
sovereignty in and over this State, or save as provided by or
under this Instrument, the exercise or any powers, authority
and rights now enjoyed by me as Ruler of this State or the
validity of any law at present in force in this State”.
66. There is credible body of thought, which holds that the State retains
the internal sovereignty despite executing the Instrument of
Accession. Sovereignty was divided between the Union of India and
the State – external or over-arching sovereignty vested in the Union
and internal sovereignty remained with the State. The Constituent
Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir always maintained that State had
retained internal sovereignty. Even the Delhi Agreement of 1952,
clearly states the same:
a. “In view of the uniform and consistent stand taken up by the
Jammu and Kashmir Constituent Assembly the sovereignty
in all matters other than those specified in the Instrument of
Accession continues to reside in the State, the government
of India agreed that, while the residuary powers of
legislature vested in the Centre in respect of all States other
than Jammu and Kashmir, in the case of the latter they
vested in the State itself”.
67. The Instrument of Accession was given the constitutional
formulation by and under Article 370. Article 370 provided that it
could be amended or abrogated by the President of India only if so
requested by the Constituent Assembly of the State. The Constituent
Assembly of the State ratified Accession on 15th of February, 1954
and also resolved that Article 370 should be retained in its present
form. Accordingly, Article 370, which was originally supposed to be
temporary, became a permanent feature of the Constitution of India
and a bridge between the Union and the State. It cannot now be
repealed and amended. Assuming, without conceding, that it is
repealed, it will have wide ranging consequences.
68. Article I of the Constitution, which declares the State to be a territory
of India, has been made applicable to the State only by virtue of
Article 370. If Article 370 is repealed, Article I will cease to apply to
the State. Thereafter, the only relation between Union and the State
will be the Instrument of Accession. That will revive many
controversies including the issue on the provisional or conditional
nature of the Accession.
69. In its essence, Self-Rule is based on the premise that the
constitutional architecture and political institutions of Jammu and
Kashmir must be rooted in the cardinal principle that power must, in
word and deed, be exercised by the citizens of the State.
70. Self-Rule, therefore, has two dimensions:
a. The scope within which a community or a society can
decide and administer its own affairs. This is a question of
extent of powers. Every State, by definition, is sovereign.
Yet, however, it may be sharing its sovereignty with various
political and geographical units of which it may be
constituted. There are situations where a state may be
exercising over-arching and external sovereignty whereas
internal sovereignty may be vested in its constituents. In
such a case, the state, commonly known as country,
exercises powers over such subjects as defence, security,
foreign affairs and communications. These are the powers
which ensure the integrity and unity of a State including all
its constituents. In this system, all other affairs are left in the
charge of constituents, over which they exercise internal
sovereignty. Generally speaking, this system is known as
federalism.
b. The second dimension of Self-rule relates to the manner in
which sovereign power is exercised. If this power is
exercised without the will, representation and participatory
involvement of people, there is no Self-rule. This dimension
is the process and method in which powers of the State and
its constituents are exercised.
71. In view of the terms of the Instrument of Accession executed by the
Maharaja of the State with the dominion of India and the provisions
of Article 370 of the Constitution of India, the Union of India is
possessed with the over-arching external sovereignty over our State,
whereas internal sovereignty remains vested in the State.
72. Self-rule is aimed at providing the central element for a
20 21

13. present the legislative assembly of J&K holds 25 seats for
representatives from Pakistan Administered Kashmir. These could
be given up and held as Pakistan Administered Kashmir's
representation in the Regional Council. This will serve as a major
cross-border institution, which will ensure long-term coordination
of matters and interest relating to the state.
76. Moreover, such an institutional structure will provide a framework,
within which certain matters between the two parts of the State and
their respective mainlands, which need to be sorted out to infuse in
people a sense of empowerment and a feeling of belonging. This will
require devising an improved constitutional, political and economic
relationship between the two parts of the State and their respective
mainlands.
77. The Regional Council of Greater Jammu and Kashmir will have 50
members. The respective state assemblies of J&K and Pakistan
Administered Kashmir shall elect 40 members. The remaining 10
members will be nominated, five each, by the Governments of India
and Pakistan.
78. The Regional Council of Greater Jammu and Kashmir will be
entrusted to ensure that the executive is functioning satisfactorily in
all “cross-Line of control” matters and coordinate if there are inter-governmental
initiatives especially in relation to matter like the
operation of dual currency, creation of common economic space
with specific reference to joint management of water resources and
creation of a common energy market.
79. Within J&K, there are certain regional issues that have the potential
of snowballing into a dangerous situation. Occasionally, voices are
raised from Ladakh and Jammu for trifurcation of the State. PDP
believes that the unity of the State reflects the essence of our secular
culture, and its preservation is of the utmost critical importance,
both on principle and for legitimate strategic reasons. Its unity is also
in the enlightened self-interest of the people of all the regions and
also accords with their wholesome historical character and
experience. The reason, however misconceived, offered to justify
the nefarious slogan for trifurcation is the alleged discrimination
suffered by the people living in the regions of Jammu and Ladakh. It
is, therefore, not only imminently desirable but practically
mandatory to ensure that all the regions share a sense of equal and
equitable empowerment.
80. The promotion of genuine sub-regional political and economic
empowerment is certainly one of the crucial components of self-rule.
Under the self-rule, institutional mechanisms are provided for
comprehensive architecture to be devised for the final and strategic
settlement of the Kashmir issue. Self-rule will not be a mid-point in a
journey or a tactical or evasive prescription. Instead:
a. Self-Rule must also form the basis of relationship between the
people of Pakistan Administered Kashmir and Pakistan.
b. Self-rule will entail the rolling back of, and also retention of,
various provisions of the Constitution of India made
applicable to the State, according to the normative tests that
meet the genuine requirements of both the Union and the
State.
c. Self-rule cannot exist without adequate constitutional
safeguards and necessary political will. It will mandate due
co-operation and trust between the State and the Union.
d. Self-rule cannot sustain itself without a fair and realistic
degree of self-reliance. It will, therefore, entail a policy and
action of responsible, sustainable and universally accessible
economic and human development, full mobilization and
utilization of the resources of the State and a reliable and
substantial fiscal support by the centre for valid reasons and
on legitimate equitable grounds.
73. The most tangible results of the self-rule will be first evident in the
creation of a particular networks in governance and economic arena,
and also, more gradually, in the polity. The main agenda to start with
would be economic affirmation -- the power to set up economic and
financial institutions as required along with the necessary enabling
legislations.
New Political Superstructure:
74. In line with the concept of sharing sovereignty and recognizing sub-regional
needs and requirements, there has to be put in place a
legislative system and structure. Given the complexity of the notion
of representation and the multifunctional nature of modern
legislatures, there is an incipient new rationale for an innovative set
up. Of course, in our case, the added reason for going in for a multi
layered representative system is that regional differences or
sensitivities in J&K require more explicit representations, with the
second and the third tier representing the constituent territories
75. Towards this end, the Legislative Council will be restructured to
form the Regional Council of Greater Jammu and Kashmir. It will be
a kind of a regional senate. Members of the Regional Council will be
from J&K as well as from Pakistan Administered Kashmir. At
22 23

14. that will convert unhealthy latent as well as patent regionalism into
effective region building.
81. The three basic requirements for efficient policy towards
constructive regionalisation are:
a. Building and strengthening of regional decision-making
powers
b. Effective institution-building
c. Creation of economic networks
82. The recognition of sub-regionalization with the aim of improving
inter-ethnic and inter-religious relations in the region is of
paramount importance in the framework of self-rule. Empowered
sub-regionalization, as distinct from administrative and
bureaucratic decentralization, will ensure the co-existence of
different ethnic, religious and linguistic groups in the region that is
otherwise a constant cause of inter-ethnic and inter religious
disagreements and tensions.
83. The building of effective structures of sub-regional democracy
depends on the development of a strong economic relationship and
on the political will to implement it. It would be desirable to find
appropriate means of building a social consensus across the regions
about the need for decentralization of political structures.
84. This can be done by creation of sub-regional councils as the third tier
of the legislative system. While the national Parliament will have
representations to the sovereign, the state assembly will continue to
be the sub-national institution, the sub-regional councils within
J&K will complete the representative character of the governance
by bringing the territorial representation within the state.
Effectively, J&K will be a regional federation. The federal system of
government will mean that powers and responsibilities will be
divided between the legislative assembly and the sub-regional
councils.
85. All the regions must be brought to the conviction that
regionalization is a process that makes a region stronger, not weaker.
In addition to these, there are three development motives to promote
the role of sub-regional councils.
a. Firstly, a regional structure is the best basis for allocating
money (top-down perspective). When it comes to achieving
pre-defined goals, a geographical approach is preferable to
sectoral policies, which can otherwise get easily lost
b. Secondly, recent experiences show that the regional
approach to the promotion of development is much more
effective than the national or supra-national one (bottom-up
perspective). Regions are a better environment for
integrating a variety of particular interventions necessary
for executing a development plan as they are closer to the
citizens and to the particular characteristics of a certain area.
This makes it easier to understand the challenges of the
moment.
c. Thirdly, from the sustainable development perspective,
regions are in the best position to co-ordinate and manage
relevant activities on a horizontal level – with similar
structures in other regions and even across borders.
86. In this context, sub-regional council will become the most important
instrument for responding to development challenges. In parallel
with economic integration in Greater Jammu and Kashmir and the
decentralization of development trends, decision-making processes
are shifting towards the regional and local levels in order to bring the
instruments of regulation closer to the people and to the
environment where events occur.
87. The appropriate division of powers between different levels of
government can be addressed from an efficiency standpoint using
the economics of multi-tier government. However, using the
distinction between the allocation, stabilization and redistribution
functions of government, stabilization and redistribution functions
are best performed at the regional level, while the local function is
usually best exercised at more local levels where it can respond to
differences in preferences for public goods.
Economic Integration:
88. This comprehensive solution can be accomplished through
economic integration and sharing of sovereignty without
comprising sovereignty of either nation state. The key lies in
institutionalised problem-solving mechanism, which would allow
constantly transforming conflicts in a positive, non-violent and
imaginative ways.
89. For a variety of reasons it often makes sense for the two parts of
Jammu and Kashmir to coordinate their economic policies.
Coordination can generate benefits across different segments of the
economy. If the two parts of Jammu and Kashmir cooperate and set
zero tariffs against each other, then both parts are likely to benefit
24 25

15. relative to the case when both countries attempt to secure short-term
advantages by setting optimal tariffs. This is just one advantage of
cooperation. Benefits will also accrue if labour and capital
movements across borders were to be were to liberalized, fiscal,
financial sector policies and sectoral resource allocation especially
towards agriculture were coordinated. Any such type of an
arrangement will result in economic integration.
90. Depending on the political will, economic integration can be
pursued in different degrees, deepening the process as we go along
and as the system adapts to change. The process can be started by
declaring the intention to establish common economic space and
sign an agreement with a roadmap which envisages:
i. Establishing common economic space;
ii. Instituting a dual currency system
iii. Coordinated economic policy, harmonization of
economic legislation and synergistic
regulations
91. The process of economic integration of the two parts of Jammu and
Kashmir can start with the weakest form of economic integration – a
“Preferential Trade Agreement”. In the PTA the two countries, India
and Pakistan would offer tariff reductions, though perhaps not
eliminations, confined to the geographical boundaries of “Greater
Jammu and Kashmir (GJAK)” and restricted it to some product
categories. Higher but non-discriminatory tariffs, would remain in
all remaining product categories.
92. Stage II would be to make GJAK a free trade area. It can be called a
“Regional Free Trade Area”. Creating a bilateral free trade area will
mean an agreement to eliminate tariffs between the two parts of
J&K, while maintaining their own external tariff on imports from
the rest of the world, including India and Pakistan. Because of the
different external tariffs, the Regional Free Trade Area will have to
develop elaborate "rules of origin".
93. In stage III, it can be agreed to eliminate tariffs between the two parts
of GJAK and set a common external tariff on imports from India and
Pakistan. This could be later applied to rest of the world. A customs
union avoids the problem of developing complicated rules of origin,
but introduces the problem of policy coordination. This can be
followed by a common market establishes free trade in goods and
services, set common external tariffs and also allows for the free
mobility of capital and labour across countries.
94. At this stage, we can do with some innovation. Instead of looking for
a monetary union, we may like to have a situation where the Indian
and Pakistani rupees are both made legitimate currencies in the
geographical areas of GJAK. A better description of this system is a
“co-circulation of two currencies” in J&K. It is being proposed that
Indian and Pakistani rupees should be the medium of exchange in
J&K. To be more precise, it means, allowing circulation of the
Pakistani rupee in the Indian part of J&K currency and circulation of
Indian rupee in the Pakistani Administered Kashmir.
95. At the moment, circulation of national currencies of India and
Pakistan coincides with the territorial frontiers of the two nation
states. In other words, there is geography of money. But, to be clear
and well informed, circulation of national currencies no longer
coincides with the territorial frontiers of nation states. The idea
being put forth here is in the realm of deterritorialization of money.
96. This proposition has to be contextualised in the transformation of
today's global monetary environment. The implications of
deterritorialization for the survival of national currencies are only
beginning to be understood. First, currency competition compels
governments to choose from among a limited number of strategies,
only one of which involves preservation of traditional territorial
money. Second, a good number of national monies will indeed
disappear, leading to an increasing population of regional
currencies of one kind or another – a distinctly new geography of
money. But, third, there is no sure way to predict what that new
geography of money will ultimately look like. We have a fairly good
idea of the principal factors that are likely to influence state
preferences, but many configurations are possible and even
probable. It also involves significant issues about the geography of
Money. This facet has to be taken in account if we genuinely want
cross-border trade to flourish.
97. If all this works well, finally, we can move to an economic union
which typically will maintain free trade in goods and services, set
common external tariffs, allow the free mobility of capital and
labour, and will also relegate some fiscal spending responsibilities
to a supra-national agency.
98. In principle, the process of integration includes three key
components:
i. Trade component. By trade component we mean in fact
trade regime or in practice elimination of trade barriers. It
can be preferential trade arrangement.
ii. Regulatory component. This component has two
dimensions – shallow and deep. By shallow dimension we
mean that partners are solving issues related to trade, while
deep integration means in fact that cooperation on
regulatory issues goes beyond pure trade issues and concern
26 27

16. economic issues
iii. Political component. At the moment this component is one
of the most important one. In fact this aspect refers to the
problem of striking delicate balance between liberalization
at the national level and reaching certain level of supra-nationality
in terms of managing different integration
schemes. A lot of economic arrangements have to have a
distinct political content.
99. The first one can be tentatively called “broad” integration
embracing all districts of GAJK. This “broad integration” concept
can result in establishing a common economic space. As this is done,
a number of agreements can pave road to the closer integration like
an Free Trade Zone Agreement. One of the steps towards a FTZ and
custom union can be Agreement on the Single Agricultural Market.
In fact formation of GK integration's economic component can start
form signing bilateral agreements on economic issues of two types:
free trade agreements and agreements on production cooperation.
These bilateral agreements can differ from each other in terms of
coverage of goods, etc.
100. This logic behind these agreements has to be to re-establish
production relations in a new economic environment which had
been broken by the partition. At the same time “broad” integration
has to have from the very beginning a strong political component
(security cooperation, for example). The second tendency can be
named sub-regional integration that is formation of different sub-regional
groups. Appearance of different sub-regional projects can
generate multi-speed integration.
101. It needs to be understood that GJAK is proposed to be formed as a
regional organisation to facilitate political cooperation as well as
promote cooperation between India and Pakistan, developing a road
network linking Central Asia and India. In fact, the regional free
trade area of GJAK will be an interesting example in a number of
aspects. First, this grouping will not be dominated politically and
economically by either India or Pakistan. If anything it will be
dominated by market forces and prudent economic policies. In a
strategic perspective this grouping of GJAK may become the
nucleus of bigger regional arrangement.
102. The GJAK will face challenging geographic and economic
circumstances, including the relatively small size of their
economies; remoteness from world markets; long-term isolation
from global technology and capital flows; heavily dependency on
primary production, minerals, and other commodities; dependence
on Indo-Pak economy (which would still be the largest market for
their exports); and industrial structure from the legacy era that is
hardly compatible with an open economy.
103. That's why this organization has to be seen as a tool to create sub-regional
market, which will facilitate overcoming their relative
isolation from world markets, rapid industrialization and in the end
contributes to sustained economic growth. These arrangements are
in fact meant to intensify economic cooperation while the actual
level of internal economic links trade is rather small.
104. It is important to recognize that though to start with economic
integration can be pursued either through an intergovernmental
approach, for it to contribute to the political resolution of the
problem, it has to graduate from inter-governmentalism to super-nationalism,
i.e., to economic integration with a supranational
approach. Supra-nationalism implies that India and Pakistan agree
to exercise some of their sovereignty jointly. Operationally, this
means that a law passed at the regional level in those areas where the
region is granted competence prevails over national legislation and
is binding directly on both countries and citizens of those states.
Only if this is done can economic integration through supra-nationalism
be a stepping stone to a federal political structure or
confederation or a more diversified political outcome in which
sovereignty and power is shared at various levels and interacts in
complex ways.
105. A key issue with supranational arrangements is ensuring the
democratic participation of stake-holders, the transparency of
supranational decision-making and the accountability of regional
institutions. In their absence, the shift of sovereignty to
supranational bodies may weaken democratic control and
strengthen the political influence of groups able to organize
effectively at the regional level. It is here that the Regional Council
of Greater Jammu & Kashmir will play a critical coordinating role.
106. In addition to regional trade integration, we need to look at many
forms of regional cooperation can take place around specific
projects or thematic issues. Such sectoral cooperation can have
advantages such as: decreasing duplication of functions in the two
sub-national areas; enhancing efforts to deal with issues such as
human, animal and plant diseases which know no borders;
facilitating the sharing of regional resources and experience in
activities such as research and training; or building a regional
infrastructure. Characteristic for many of these activities is that they
are regional public goods.
107. One can offer a number of examples of regional public goods, which
can be defined as “public goods that must be delivered on the
28 29

17. supranational level by the two sub-national governments acting in
concert”. They include: financial market regulation issues; co-ordination
of cross-border transport networks, telecommunications,
power grids and data transmission; agricultural research and
extension; law enforcement environmental management issues
including watershed management, pollution, management of
natural reserves and scientific research on issues of eco-zone
management; public health issues including management of
infectious disease and basic research on diseases endemic to a
particular region. All these will be within the purview of the
Regional Council of Greater Jammu and Kashmir.
108. The prospect of overall welfare gains from regional co-operation
will make the negotiation of such agreements easier than trade
agreements. Regional Trade Agreements can be a help in
cooperating on non-trade issues. Three arguments are relevant here.
First, Regional Trade Agreements can help in brokering regional
cooperation agreements by putting more issues on the table and
embedding them in a wider agreement, which may lower the
transfers necessary to ensure that all parties feel they have
something to gain from sustaining the agreement. Second, the habits
of cooperation and frequent interactions at policy level generated by
some Regional Trade Agreements may raise the degree of trust
between parties, which was shown above to be important in reaching
cooperative regional agreements. Third, regional cooperative
agreements will often need specialized institutions such as dispute
settlement procedures, and rather than custom-build a separate
institutional structure for each regional agreement, it may be more
efficient and effective to make use of the institutional structures of a
Regional Trade Agreements
109. Given the fact that there is a demand by market actors for greater
integration and that market actors perceive a significant potential for
economic gains from extending market exchange within the region,
the process of integration will eventually gather a non-political
momentum. Market players will have an incentive to lobby for
regional institutional arrangements that render the realization of
these gains possible.
110. It needs to be clarified that while we are discussing the economic
motivations for regional integration and the likely trade and welfare
consequences of forming Regional Trade Agreements, the idea is to
present ways and explore the extent to which Regional Trade
Agreements can be used as a instrument to share sovereignty in the
policy areas covered by the Regional Trade Agreements.
111. The other potential areas of economic cooperation are water, energy
and transport sectors. Moving forward one area where significant
synergies have to build and cooperation cemented is the area of
energy. It is important that efforts are made to design and develop a
regional energy market. The Greater Kashmir Regional Energy
Basin, based primarily on hydro resources, should be able to provide
modern and liberalised gas and electricity systems to the entire
region and not just J&K alone.
112. The key to such a regional energy market based on international
standards, transparent rules will be mutual trust. It will set the right
environment for the optimal development of the energy sector in the
region. Most importantly, it will make energy tradable and the joint
agreement governing energy trade that can be visualized will
substantially contribute to attracting investment into this strategic
sector.
113. Where transport infrastructure is concerned, an integrated regional
transport strategy, consistent with the trans-national networks and
taking into account the pan-J&K corridors, can be an area of high
priority.
114. Both India and Pakistan should also support, and indeed will find it
useful to support, joint projects of regional significance and regional
initiatives in the areas of environmental protection, science and
technology, information and communication technology.
Constitutional Restructuring:
115. Finally, for self-rule to function effectively, there has to be a degree
of restructuring the Constitutional relationship of the State with the
Union. Based on normative test of harmful effect on the people of
the State, the following constitutional restructuring should take
place:
a. Article 356, which undermines the core of Self-rule i.e., the
will and determination of the people to have a legislature
and government of their own choice, elected democratically
and based on their free exercise of adult suffrage has to be
made non-applicable to J&K. Article 356 is treated, for
legitimate reasons, with suspicion and consternation by
even other states of the Union. In the State of Jammu and
Kashmir, people have valid reasons to dread this provision
even more. We need not count or mention the number of
times the will and the choice of the people, though
expressed through imperfect and, occasionally, even
subverted and corrupted political processes, was thwarted
in the State. This is a long and treacherous history – better
30 31

18. left alone in this paper. Therefore, there is a compelling
reason for rolling back Article 356 for that shall not only
impart to people a sense of democratic security but shall
also be in the enlightened national interest. However, if
there is a real and present danger to the security or integrity
of the Union or the State, there is already Article 352 which
provides adequate machinery to take care of the situations
of external aggression and internal disturbances. This is in
addition to Section 92 of the Constitution of the State which
vests, in essence, similar power in the Governor of the State.
Section 92 can be amended to provide for situations beyond
six months subject to certain safeguards. Here it may be
recalled that Delhi Agreement of 1952 itself had recorded
the position that both the State and the Union had regarded
the extension of Article 356 to State as unnecessary.
b. Article 248 as applicable to the State in its amended form
should confer concurrent jurisdiction on the State under (i)
to legislate on the subject of terrorist activities.
c. Article 249, applied to the State in amended form, should be
rolled back so that the Parliament cannot exercise
legislative jurisdiction over a matter which, otherwise, falls
under the State jurisdiction.
d. Article 251, in its application to the State, should omit
reference to Article 249.
e. Sixth Amendment of the Constitution of the State which
undermines its original scheme of a comprehensive and
accountable executive (inclusive of the Head of the State) a
critical component of Self-Rule, must be repealed. Prior to
this amendment, Sadar-e-Riyasat, the head of the State, was
elected by the State Legislature. The Sixth Amendment
altered this position and provided for appointment and
removal of the Governor by the President of the Union. The
original provision imparted a great comfort to the people
that the head of the State, being accountable to them, would
act as their agent, free from any external and extraneous
pressures or chain of command. Since the Governor has the
power to dismiss the state government and dissolve the
State Assembly under Section 92 of the Constitution of
State, the issue whether he can be appointed and removed
by the representatives of the people or by the Central
Government assumes great political and psychological
significance in the State. The appointment of the Governor
by the Union Government is one of the important features of
the Constitution of India which makes it less than truly
federal in character. In the case of our State, the original
constitutional scheme had enshrined a sound federal
principle of election of the head of the State by State itself.
The change in this scheme undermined the basic structure
of the State's Constitution and is legally suspect.
116. Be that as it may, despite this amendment, the provisions in Part VI
Ch. II of the Indian Constitution relating to Governor were not made
applicable to the State. Legally, therefore, the state legislature could
anytime, by following the constitutional provision contained in
Section 147 of the Constitution of the State, repeal the Sixth
Amendment and restore the erstwhile scheme of an elected Head of
the State. Prior to Sheikh–Indira Accord of 1975, this was the legal
position. Sheikh Abdullah insisted for restoration of the erstwhile
constitutional position viz-a-viz the office of Sadar-e-Riyasat and
the Prime Minister. However, while Sheikh–Indira Accord
postulated further discussions on this subject, actually
Constitutional Order 101 was promulgated by the President under
Article 370, adding the following Clause to Article 368 in its
application to the State:
a. “[(b) After Cl (3) of Article 368, the following clause shall
be added, namely:-
i. “(4) No law made by the legislature of the State of Jammu
and Kashmir seeking to make any change in or in the effect
of any provision of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir
relating to:
1. appointment, powers, function, duties, emoluments,
allowances, privileges or immunities of the Governor; or,
2. superintendence, direction and control of elections by the
Election Commission of India, eligibility for inclusion in
the electoral rolls without discriminations, adult suffrage
and composition of Legislative Council being matters
specified in Section 138, 139, 140 and 50 of the
Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir.
3. Shall have any effect unless such law has, after having been
reserved for the consideration of the President, received his
assent”.
117. With respect to this proviso, relating to Governor, added to Article
368, the following points should be noted:
a. The proviso, limiting the powers of State Legislature, has
been added to Article 368, which deals with the powers of
the Parliament to amend the Constitution of India and not
the power of State Legislature to amend its own
32 33

19. constitution. The proviso is, therefore, totally and grossly
out of place and ultra vires the constitutional scheme.
b. The power to amend State Constitution is vested in the State
Legislature under Section 147. It permits the State
Legislature to amend any provision of Constitution except a
few specified provisions mentioned therein. The provisions
in Part V of the Constitution of the State relating to
Governor do not fall in the excepted category and the same
can be clearly amended by the State Legislature repealing
the relevant provision of the Sixth Amendment. No
provision of the Constitution of the State, except the
exercised specified provisions, can be made un-amendable,
nor can this constitutional power of amendment be
subjected to approval by the Union of India. This is for the
reason that, to achieve that result, Section 147 itself would
have to be amended. But Section 147 has been made un-amendable
by the Constitution itself. That is why the title
Sadar-e-Riyasat still finds place in this Article, though this
office has been dispensed with under Sixth Amendment.
Hence the proviso is ultra vires.
c. The State Legislature's constitutional power of amendment
is the core of empowerment or Self-rule of the State and this
cannot be destroyed by an order passed under Article 370.
This is a glaring example of colorable exercise of power.
d. Section 147 of the Constitution of the State confers the
power on the Legislative Assembly to abolish Legislative
Council. This power of the Assembly is un-amendable
because Section 147 is itself un-amendable. Constitutional
Order 101 on this ground is also ultra vires.
118. This provides another example how Article 370 has been used as a
Vehicle for excessive and, sometimes, illegal intrusion in the
domain of Self-rule of the State, instead of as a bridge to be used for
necessary and wholesome purposes.
119.The assault on the constitutional power of the State Legislature,
grossly manifested by the above discussed Constitutional Order
passed under Article 370, clearly establishes the necessity for
incorporating some fool-proof provisions in the Constitution of
India and J&K in the event a new scheme is devised and accepted
pursuant to the discussions of the working group appointed by the
Hon'ble Prime Minister.
120. It is therefore imperative that the relevant provisions of
Constitutional Order 101 be rolled back which, in any case, is ultra
vires the constitution. Instead, the erstwhile scheme prevalent prior
to Sixth Amendment be restored.
121. We further propose that the Head of the State be elected from the
regions of Jammu and Kashmir by rotation. This shall give to the
people of all the regions an equal and equitable sense and feeling of
empowerment and shall strengthen their bonds.
122. An argument is advanced by certain quarters that Governor is the
only link between the Union and the State and that if the Head of the
State is elected rather than appointed by the President of India this
link will break. This is an argument of mistrust. Union must respect
and trust the collective judgment of the people of the State rather
than rely only on the appointment of non-state subject as a guarantee
of linkage between the Union and the people of the State. Besides,
there is sufficient element of linkage and control in Articles 256 and
257 of the Constitution of India, which give the power to the Union
to issue directions to the State to behave in a manner that accords
with the executive power of the Union.
123. When Article 370 was inserted in the Constitution of India, it was
designated as temporary. It was for the reason that power to decide
whether this provision should remain in force or whether it should
be modified was vested with the Constituent Assembly of the State.
This Assembly decided in 1954 that the provision should remain in
force. Hence this became the permanent provision of the
Constitution of India. The Parliament of India should therefore,
remove the phrase “temporary” and substitute it by the word
“special” in Article 370.
124. Under Article 370 of Constitution of India certain entries of
schedule 7 List I (Central List) and List III (concurrent list) have
been made applicable to the State. List II (States List) not be made
applicable to the State, because the residuary legislative powers
including those in List II are vested in the State Legislature anyway.
Thus the legislative powers under entries 17 and 23 of list II, relating
to water and mines, vested in the State Legislature. In the Central
list, entry 54 vests in the Parliament, the power to make laws with
respect to mines and under entry 56 of the said list, Parliament has
power to make laws with respect to inter-state rivers, provided that
the development of such mines and rivers is declared by parliament
to be expedient in the Public interest. Clearly, therefore, the
jurisdiction over rivers Chenab, Jehlum and Sindh is vested in the
State. In the view of PDP, even if Union of India is bound to respect
Indus Water Treaty, the least it can do is to offer due and proper
compensation to the State for surrendering the use of its rivers to
Pakistan. All legal provisions, if any, which stand in the way of State
getting its legitimate due must be overcome.
34 35

20. 125. As is well known, while the executive authority of the State is
constitutionally vested in the Governor/Council of Ministers,
factually the bureaucracy exercises it. The All India Services Act,
1951 has been extended to the State, as a result of which officers
belonging to All India Services cadre hold all-important positions in
the civil and police administration. The local human resources are
under-utilized and are occasionally not trusted to hold sensitive
positions in the State Executive. Any idea of Self-rule is incomplete
without providing that the executive authority of the State is actually
exercised by the State subjects. It is, therefore, proposed that All
India Service Act, 1951 and Article 312 be rolled back and the local
human resources are provided clear and unhindered opportunity to
develop their full potential and it is trusted to manage the affairs of
the State. In so far as, the Central statutes extended to the State are
concerned, the same can be reviewed on merits, on case-to-case
basis.
126. It should be evident that the scheme of regional federalism of self-rule,
all religions and groups are taken care of it. What remains are
the minorities. Beyond participation across regions, it has to be the
effort of the governance structure as well as the legislative system to
maximise the participation of ethnic minorities. Principal among
these are the Kashmiri Pandits who have an important role to play in
the present and future of the State. The return and the rehabilitation
in the valley of this ethnic minority is critical to the peace process.
Beyond the peace process itself, Kashmiri Pandits are an integral
part of Kashmiri society and essential for the strengthening of the
composite, but, pluralistic culture that has defined Kashmir
historically.
127. In the existing situation, the return and rehabilitation of economic
and political migrant and recognition of their rights will not only be
the index of normalcy in the state but also of democratic maturity of
our civil society and state institutions. In this context, it is proposed
to guarantee minority representation for kashmiri pandits in the state
assembly.
128. To foster minority confidence in public institutions as well as ensure
responsiveness of these institutions to all segments of the kashmiri
society, it is also proposed to have a Minority Ombudsman for the
state. The Ombudsman will aim to create and expand the availability
and effectiveness of institutions addressing minority issues in J&K.
As a key institution, ombudsman will play a significant role in
minority issues, especially, in promoting good practices in minority
governance. The major contribution of this institution will be to
enhancing the understanding of issues surrounding migrants and
other migrant minorities and ensure their integration into society
and participation in public life.
129. A number of people and organisations have suggested setting up of a
Truth and Reconciliation Commission in and for J&K. To help the
civil society achieve its earlier integration this can be a very useful
initiative. The TRC is a commission tasked with discovering and
revealing past wrongdoing by a government, in the hope of
resolving conflict left over from the past. While they are
occasionally set up by states emerging from periods of internal
unrest, South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission is
generally considered a model Anybody, who felt they had been a
victim of violence could come forward and be heard at the TRC.
Perpetrators of violence could also give testimony and request
amnesty from prosecution. The TRC, if set up with honesty and
sincereity, can be was a crucial component of the transition to civil
strife towards harmony.
130. To conclude, notwithstanding anything – any formulation, proposal,
intention or gestures, one thing is very clear: status quo cannot be
maintained in the J&K. The assurances and promises, extended to
the State by Union of India, from time to time, are a part of the
history. All those assurances intend to convey to the people of the
State a solemn pledge that they can enjoy internal sovereignty or
Self-rule in the State.
131. Self-rule and its associated formulations in the sphere of polity,
economy and society of greater Jammu & Kashmir will not entail
major constitutional and political restructuring in India. This
formulation of Self-rule will prove efficacious and beneficial to the
extent if it is accompanied by other concomitant measures. As part
of the settlement process with Pakistan, both the countries should
proceed to improve the lives of the people of the entire State.
132. Once this formulation of self-rule is accepted in and by India, it can
be discussed with Pakistan for seeking a similar dispensation for the
people living in Pakistan Administered Kashmir and Northern
Areas. Along with the bilateral negotiations between the two
countries, it will be desirable to have institutional arrangements
between the two parts of Kashmir to work out a durable supra-national
institutional structure. This is an essential part of the
holistic concept of Self-rule.
36 37

21. Main Proposals
The comprehensive formulation of self-rule has three sub components:
1. A new political superstructure that integrates the region and
empowers sub-regions:
a. The centrepiece of the governance structure under self-rule
is the cross border institution of Regional Council of
Greater Jammu and Kashmir. The Regional Council will
replace the existing Upper House or the Legislative Council
of J&K, and will be a kind of a regional senate. Members of
the Regional Council will be from J&K, as well as from
Pakistan administered Kashmir, as well as nominees by the
Government of India and Pakistan. This will serve as a
major cross-border institution, which will ensure long-term
coordination of matters and interest relating to the state.
b. To empower various sub-regions within the J&K state, a tier
that of sub-regional councils, will be added to the domestic
legislative structure. While the national Parliament will
have representations to the sovereign, the state assembly
will continue to be a sub-national institution, the sub-regional
councils will complete representative character of
governance by bringing in the territorial representation in
the state.
2. A phased economic integration that transcends borders:
a. A critical element of self-rule is the economic integration
across the line of control. For the process of integration, the
following roadmap can be envisaged:
iv. Establishing common economic space;
v. Instituting a dual currency system
vi. Coordinating economic policy, harmonization
of economic legislation and synergistic
regulations;
b. The process of economic integration of the two parts of
Jammu and Kashmir can start with the easiest form of
economic integration – a “Preferential Trade Agreement”.
In the PTA the two countries, India and Pakistan would offer
tariff reductions, though perhaps not eliminations confined
to the geographical boundaries of “Greater Jammu and
Kashmir” and restricted it to some product categories.
Higher but non-discriminatory tariffs, would remain in all
remaining product categories. Stage II would be to make
GJAK a free trade area. It can be called a “Regional Free
Trade Area”. Creating a regional free trade area will mean
an agreement to eliminate tariffs between the two parts of
J&K, while maintaining their own external tariff on imports
from the rest of the world, including India and Pakistan. In
stage III, it can be agreed to eliminate tariffs between the
two parts of GAJK and set a common external tariff on
imports from India and Pakistan. This could be later applied
to rest of the world.
c. This can be followed by a common market establishes free
trade in goods and services, set common external tariffs and
also allows for the free mobility of capital and labor across
countries.
d. Further, instead of looking for a monetary union, a new
system of “Dual Currency” will be created, where the
Indian and Pakistani rupees are both made legitimate legal
tenders in the geographical areas of GJAK. A better
description of this system is a “co-circulation of two
currencies” in J&K. It is being proposed that Indian and
Pakistani rupees should be the medium of exchange in J&K.
To be more precise, it means, allowing circulation of the
Pakistani rupee in the Indian part of J&K currency and
circulation of Indian rupee in the Pakistan administered
Kashmir. This has to be done if we want cross the line of
control trade to flourish.
e. Our vision is to move towards an economic union which
will maintain free trade in goods and services, set common
external tariffs, allow the free mobility of capital and labor,
and will also relegate some fiscal spending responsibilities
to a supra-national agency.
f. Consistent with our legislative design, the economic
integration will be deepened through sub-regional
integration; that is formation of different sub-regional
groups. Appearance of different sub-regional projects can
generate multi-speed integration.
3. Constitutional restructuring that ensures sharing of sovereignty
without compromising political sovereignty of either nation
state.
a. For Self-rule to operate effectively, Article 356, which
undermines the core of Self-rule and has to be made non-
38 39