Earnings Management, the Influence of Size, Indebtedness and Performance The Case of Moroccan Listed Companies

International Journal of Trend in Scientific Research and Development (IJTSRD)
Volume: 3 | Issue: 2 | Jan-Feb 2019 Available Online: www.ijtsrd.com e-ISSN: 2456 - 6470
@ IJTSRD | Unique Reference Paper ID – IJTSRD21387 | Volume – 3 | Issue – 2 | Jan-Feb 2019 Page: 712
Earnings Management, the Influence of Size, Indebtedness
and Performance: The Case of Moroccan Listed Companies
Baghar Nezha
Professor, National School of Commerce and Management,
Université Hassan-1er, Settat, Morocco
ABSTRACT
This study attempts to contribute to the research literature in the field of managementof earningsresultsandhowitisputinto
practice by Moroccan listed companies. The main question thatthepaper attempted to investigateiswhetherthese companies’
managers use accounting results management in an opportunistic way. The study was conducted on asampleof 54 companies
on the Casablanca Stock Exchange between 2014 and 2016.Thefindingsindicatethattheguaranteeof astock market valuation
to influence investors’ decisions is not at the heart of results management in Moroccan listed companies. Nevertheless, the
importance of the size factor and the satisfaction of the conditions imposed by the creditors to justify the level of the
discretionary behavior of the managers in terms of accounting and financial information are noteworthy.
Keywords: Accounting, Moroccan listed companies, Results management, political finance, Size, Stock exchange performance.
INTRODUCTION
For the last decades, the rhythm of the economic game’s
mutations has been happening at a high speed and the new
techniques have experienced a great development. The role
played by the financial markets has also become essential
and more destabilizing. Moreover, their hold on the life of
companies has increased with the growth of the number of
listed companies and with the large number of individual
shareholders making use of stock markets.Anewdimension
is conferred on the accounting. Accounting no longer
consists of recording simple monetary transactions
materialized by supporting documents and characterized by
payment deadlines very close to the delivery dates, but it
also aims to understand phenomena requiring valuations,
namely, estimation, expectations, as well as speculations:
depreciation of fixed assets, depreciation of inventories etc.
However, the assignment of values to operations or
phenomena presupposes a certain capacity of judgmentand
leads to a selection of arbitrary, disputable and disputed
choices. Thus, with rudimentary knowledge and a little
practice in reading company accounts, it appears that the
balance of the income statement is not an arithmetic
objective balance but rather the result of construction and
the outcome of evaluation, which can lead to different
figures. Thus, the accounting results are a variable that
managers can act upon. That is what has been referred to as
results management (Shipper, 1989).
While it is legal, the management of accounting results
remains problematic insofar as it results in the reduction of
the transparency of the financial statements and alters their
comparability.
Two decades ago In Morocco, the financial market has
undergone several reforms. These focused on: institutional
reorganization, product development (setting up of market
derivatives) and strengthening of the regulatory actions of
incumbents. The stock market has been shaken by several
financial scandals since the financial crisisof2007.Thecases
of accounting combinations are characterized by their
frequency but also by the fact of reaching more and more
important amounts. It is the massive accounting
manipulations giving a false image of the situation whichare
at the origin of the vast majority of financial scandals. In
Morocco, most listed companies abide by the IFRS and
publish their accounts in accordancewiththisnewstandard.
The objective of this article is to analyze the management of
results at the level of Moroccan listed companies. It tries to
seek answers to the question abouthowthepublicperceives
of the reliability and transparencyof thefinancialstatements
of listed companies. It is therefore about answering the two
following questions:
What are the determinants of the management of
accounting results at the level of listed Moroccan
companies? (Taxation, the constraints exerted by the
banks or the stock market performance).
What are the means of highlighting the management of
results in the accounts established by listed Moroccan
companies?
To answer these questions, this article is divided into three
sections. In the first section, we will introduce the literature
review concerning the definitions and the forms of results
management. Then, the second sectionwillbedevotedtothe
analysis of explanatory theories. And attheend of thearticle,
we will present the sample,themethodologyof the empirical
study as well as the results.
1. Literature Review
1.1 Definitions:
Result based managementisdifferentfromaccountingbased
management. The results management means the different
accounting practices that take place in compliance with
accounting standards. On the other hand, the account
management includes all the practices that are done within
the limits and outside the accounting rules. It is often
associated with the notion of fraud.
According to Davidson (1987), the earnings management
consists of taking deliberate measureswithinthe constraints
of accounting standards in order to reach a result goal. It
occurs in total respect of the legalframeworkwhileusingthe
room for maneuver left bytheaccountingframeofreference.

International Journal of Trend in Scientific Research and Development (IJTSRD) @ www.ijtsrd.com eISSN: 2456-6470
Meanwhile, K.Shipper (1989) defines this practice as “the
deliberate intervention in the process of the presentation of
financial information in order to make personal gains». It
results from the wiggle room available to leaders in terms of
accounting options and of evaluation even if the accounting
information is standardized. For example, the leaders exert
their discretionary choices particularly in termsof valuation
of depreciations and provisions. This refers to a valuation
that is subjective since it is based on hypotheses of the
evolution of a market, a cost, and a risk. Besides, some
management decisions takenbythemanagersmayinfluence
the result. It’s about cutting the research budget or reducing
spending on advertising or the early transfer or delayed
assets. It is the same for the choice between different stock
accounting methods (CMUP, FIFO…) and also the choice
between linear or declining balance methods.Thepublished
results are thus bound to be influenced by accounting and
management choices.
Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser (1999) indicate that
earnings management is "the use of managerialdiscretion to
influence the outcome disseminated to stakeholders" while
Stolowly and Breton (2003) have defined it as: “the attitude
of increasing or decreasing the recorded net result”.
These definitions are not limited to the consideration of
opportunistic motivations to explain earnings management.
Besides, other factors can be at the origin of the modulation
of the results (the efficiency of the contracts or a will of
signal). They basically refer to accounting options. However,
the leaders may want to edit the publications of accounting
data through other modes of action (schedule of
investments, methods of financing, modulation of current
expenditure from one year to another). They do not include
the possibility of managing the results through the actual
activities of the company.
1.2 Earnings management Techniques:
According to Scott, earnings results management takes the
following forms:
Clearing accounts (big bath accounting): this
management mode consists of publishing a very
important loss that is uncommon with the company’s
economic results. This happens in caseof organizational
stress such as change of leaders. Indeed, the policies
adopted by the new leaders consist of reducing the first
exercise’s results to better increase them in the next
exercise. Thus, the losses that are the responsibility of
the predecessor are written off and thereputationofthe
leader is preserved.(Murphy et Zimmeran,1993)
The minimization of results: it consists of minimizing
(but not necessarily making negative) the published
results. It aims at minimizing political costs, namely
reducing tax costs.
The maximization of the results:itaimsatincreasingthe
published result instead of its real value. This is done
opportunistically: to mask thevisibilityof adeteriorated
performance or to avoid a contractual clause or to
maximize profitability. (Skinner, 1993; Gupta, 1995;
Pfeiffer, 1998)
The smoothing of the results: it is not about choosing a
direction at the evolution of the published results butan
evolution rhythm. Moreprecisely, resultsare considered
smoothed when the earnngs management results in
reducing the variance of the published results. The
results’ fluctuations are reduced by transferring sums
from one year to another. The profits produced follow a
regular growth curve. This resultsinthereductionof the
informative value of the declared results.(for a
synthesizer, check Chalayer, 1995)
2. Explanatory theories,:
Earnings results management complies with current
accounting standards. Among the explanatory theories of
results management, we can state the theory of the agency,
the economic theory of regulation and the positive theory of
accounting (in particular, the politico-contractual theory)
which borrows its model from the first two theories.
2.1 Agency theory:
According to this theory, Jensen and Meckling (1976)
consider that the shareholders agree to deliver a
management mandate to the managers in exchange for
transparency of theiractions andperformance.However, the
informed agents can privilege their own interests at the
expense of other agents (the shareholders, the
creditors).Because of these latent conflicts of interest and
the consequences they engender, accounting measures play
a key role in the monitoring of contracts. Accountingisatthe
heart of agencies' rulings. Thus, the problem of the choice of
accounting methods (or norms) must be formulated from
models referring to the economic rationality of the agents.
2.2 The theory of economic regulation:
This theory developed by Posner (1974) postulates that the
political process is apprehended as a competition between
individuals in order to maximizetheirinterests.Thepremise
adopted by this theory is that the aim of regulation is to
make transfers of wealth. The earning results accounting is
used as a technical argument to achieve this objective.
Because of their "political visibility", large companies are
most exposed to thesepoliticaldecisions.Thistranslatesinto
costs called political costs. To make such costs, these
companies will tend to manage their outcome so as to not
attract too much attention from the legislator and policies.
This translates into costs called political costs. Tomakesuch
costs, these companies will tend to manage theiroutcome so
as not to attract too much attention from the legislator and
politicians.
2.3 The positive accounting theory (political-contract
heory)
The third theory is the positive accounting theory (Watts
and Zimmerman 1985, 1990). According to this theory, the
published accounting documents, far from being the
synonym of transparency, may be subject to non-fraudulent
manipulations. They skew the investor’s opinions. This
theory is based on a political and contractual vision of the
organizations. This theory adopts the following postulate:
The leaders, the shareholders, the regulators, and the
politicians are rational and try to maximize their usefulness.
That usefulness is directly tied to their remuneration, and
therefore to theirwealth (Belkaoui,1992).AccordingtoDupy
and Al (2000), this theory allows “the understanding of the
companies’ accounting choices from the agency’s
relationships and political costs». Itborrowsits modelsfrom
the agency theory and the economic regulation theory. The
company’s political and contractual obligations, such as the
debt contracts, the remuneration system of its employees
and the potential political costs can bring the leaders to
manage the results.

The positive accountingtheory, in particularthepoliticaland
contract theory branch, consistsof explainingandpredicting
the accountants’ or the leader’s behavior in terms of
accounting methods.
Three hypotheses are at the origin of the result’s
management in the frame of this theory: the hypothesis of
the remuneration, the hypothesis of the debt and the
hypothesis of the size. These hypotheses have aroused a big
amount of empirical research that are often divergent.
2.3.1 the hypothesis of remuneration:
In the context of the conflict of interest between
shareholders and managers, the companies that are seeking
to limit the opportunistic behavior of managers, granting
them profit-sharingplansrefer to accountingindicators.This
leads to the formulation of the "remuneration hypothesis"
according to which managers tend to favor accounting
methods like increasing the result. Table 1 below
summarizes the results of thestudiesthatwere conducted to
validate this hypothesis.
Table 1: A Synthesis of the studies validating the remuneration hypothesis
Authors date Study context Results hypothesis
Healy 1985 USA
The correlation between the change in accounting procedures
and the adoption or modification of a bonus scheme.
Validated.
Holthaus
En&al
1995 USA
managers manipulate profits down when their bonuses are at
their maximum
Validated.
Gaver&al. 1995 USA
when the result falls below the lower limit, managers choose the
discretionary expenses that increase the result (and vice versa)
Validated.
Jeanjean 2001 France abandons the hypothesis of remuneration validated
Source: developed by the author.
2.3.2 The debt hypothesis:
This hypothesis is formulated taking into account theloancontracts,which includerestrictionsintheformof accountingratios.
The inclusion of these clauses aims to restrict the action of leaders and limit the transfer of wealth at the expense of creditors.
According to this hypothesis, indebted companies prefer increasing the result as an accounting method.
The following table highlights the results of the studies carried out to validate this hypothesis in America and France.
Table 2- Results of studies testing the hypothesis of debt:
Authors Date Study context Results Hypothesis
Duke & Hunt 1990 USA
The debt ratio is not enough on its own to be a
proxy for the existence of debt commitments
Partially validated
Press & Weintrop 1990 USA Using another proxy, such as leverage Partially validated
DeAngelo & al. 1994 USA
companies' accounting choices reflect their difficult
financial situations
Not validated
Jeanjean 2001 France different economic and social context Not validated
The respect of the restrictive clauses incites the leaders to increasethe results.Thesearecurrentpractices thatare widespread
especially in the United States or in Canada. On the other hand, in France or in Morocco, it is the real guarantees which ensure
the protection of the social creditors.
2.3.3 the size hypothesis.
In relation with the political environment, companies seeking to avoid the risk of emergence of tax or administrative
regulations, reduce their "political visibility" adopting the most neutral profile in their dealings with the general public or the
political class. The assumption of the size of large firmsin favorof discountingaccountingmethodsisformulated. Thefollowing
table presents the results of studies of the size hypothesis.
Table 3: A synthesis of studies using the Size hypothesis
Authors Date Study context Results Hypothesis
Zmijewski &
Hagerman
1981 USA
the political costs are an incentive for a strategic
management of the result chosen by the leaders
Validated
Daily & Vigeland 1983 USA
the political costs encourage companies to choose the
method of accounting for R & D costs
Validated
Bowen, Noreen
& Lacey
1981 USA
Large firms capitalize the interests that are tied to
capitals
Not
validated
Jones
Kahan
Key
1991
1992
1997
USA
- Companies targeted by the SEC
-Companies investigated for antitrust
-Business enterprises in the cable industry
Validated
The motivations that can lead to the management of the accounting results are thus specified according to the positive
accounting theory. This theory is therefore based on the use of accounting figurestomanagecontractualissuesthataremainly
related to the debt contract, the remuneration contract and political costs.

2.4 the measurement model of results management:
To measure earnings management, several models have been developed and have been the subject of several improvements.
We distinguish the accrual-based models of Healy (1985) and De Angelo (1986). Healy considers thatanyvariationin thelevel
of the total accruals between two periods is awarded at the discretion of the managers.
Empirical studies are necessary to investigate the hypotheses in the Moroccan context by using the model of evaluation of the
earnings management based on the discretionary accruals. To measure the earnings management of the results starting from
the accruals, one needs to extract total accruals part at the discretion of the directors («accruals" discretionary).
3. Methodology and results
3.1 Methodology:
This section introduces the sample of the study, the data as well as the description of the variables.
3.1.1: The sample
The analysis is based on a hypothetic deductive approach inspired by theory. This approach aims to validate the following
hypotheses:
H1: Debt is linked to upward management of earnings.
H2: The size of the company influences the management of earnings downward (political costs)
H3: The stock market performance affects earnings’ management upward.
The hypothesis of remuneration is not retained because it requires information on the variable of the remuneration of the
managers. This choice is also justified by the difficulties in accessing the information needed on the ground.
The study focuses on all the companies listed on the Casablanca StockExchangeduringtheyear 2017 (ourinitialsample), in 75
companies. Excluding financial companies: banks, finance companies,insurancecompanies(becauseof thespecificitiesrelated
to their accounting data and their financial communication). Our final sample include exclusively industrial and commercial
companies: 55 companies. The accounting data was mined from the website of the Moroccan Capital Market Authority (the
AMMC) for the years 2014 to 2016. The financial data are from the financial year?????
3.1.2: the variables:
The size: the logarithm of total assets.
The debt: debt rate=financial debts fin/ Equity fin N
Stock market performance: change in the stock market price.
Discretionary “accruals” (AC DISC): As indicated in the literature on this subject, the totals of the year and the average of the
total accruals for the last three years. The total accruals are calculated for each year by extracting the net result from the free
cash flow.
AC DISC= total accruals N- average of total accruals for the last three years.
Total accruals= net profit-free cash flow.
Free cash flow= CAF- variation of the WCR- investment expenditure.
3.2: Results:
Table 1: The sample companies’ characteristics: the size, debt and market performance.
Total sample Average median standard deviation minimum maximum
CA(millions of dirhams) 1508,59 529,78 2092,6 0,136549 8172,84
Total assets(millions of dirhams) 2963,82 1061,83 4816,87 41,98 21900,14
Indebtedness 17,34% 5,91% 81,49% -445% 290%
Change in the stock market price 51,73% 20,84% 109,76% -71% 447%
Size 20,7643 20,7833 1,54530 17,55 23,81
There is a slightly low debt ratio in our total sample. It is 17.34% on average. The stock market performance is positive + 51%
on average and + 20% on the median with a strong dispersion towards high values. The average size of our sample is 20.76.
Table 2: Measurement of the management of statistical results for total accruals and discretionary accruals
Average Standard deviation Minimum Maximum Median
Total accruals N-2 (millions of dirhams) 29,9575 436,2806 1016,6262 -2464,3875 21,3278
Total accruals N-2/total assets N-2 0,0446 0,11039 -0,24 0,40 0,388
Total accrualsN-2(millions of dirhams) -6,1011 380,2095 -973,6995 2044,86 5,9454
Total accruals N-1/total assets N-1 0,0551 0,29027 -0,58 1,82 0,189
Total accruals N(millions of dirhams) 296,1284 1854,5542 -1010,4269 12658,4920 3,5709
Total accruals N/total assets N 0,0620 0,31770 -0,83 1,58 0,0105
DISC Accruals 195,7916 1234,6194 770,0726 8455,6361 -0,1507
DISC Accruals/Totals assets N 0,0141 0,17935 -0,59 0,67 -0,0005

This table shows that the total accruals are trending upwards during the 2014-2016 period. The table alsoshowsthatthetotal
accruals are negative over the period 2015. This situation assumes the existence of a management of the downward earnings.
They become positive in 2016 thus representing 6.20% of the total assets during this period. This trend is not significant
enough to make 2016 accruals too important.
In relation to previous empirical studies, this finding is justified by the fact that our study concerns a sample made up of
companies that are subject to the rules of the stock market, one of the characteristics of which is transparency through the
publication of quality information unlike unlisted companies.
This finding is also confirmed by the fact that the discretionary accruals only represent 1.41% of total assets in average.
Table 3: Correlations.
AC DISC
Indebtedness
Pearson’s correlation
Sig. (bilateral)
N
-,024
,866
51
Size
Sig. (bilateral)
N
,290
,037
52
Course variation
Sig.(bilateral)
N
-0,25
,863
50
This table shows that in 95% of the cases, there is a positive significant correlation between the discretionaryaccruals andthe
size of the company (which means that the bigger the size of the company, the higher the discretionary accruals are, and vice
versa. In other terms, the larger the size, the more likely the leaders of companies will adopt accounting choices that influence
the results); however, this correlation remains rather weak.
On the other hand, there is no significant dependence between discretionary accruals and indebtedness, as well as between
discretionary accruals and price movement with a 95% level of significance.
The respect of indebtedness contracts is not an objective of earnings managementforthetargetedMoroccanlisted companies.
In the Moroccan context, the bank loans are accompanied by important guarantees (hypotheses or pledges of trade funds)
therefore, even in the presence of a bankable balance sheet; it is not possible for the company to access loans without
guarantees. This justifies the absence of link between the debt and the management of the results among the listed Moroccan
companies. However, this observation must be verified through the analysis of the total accruals at the level of the highly-
indebted companies and those which are low indebted by selecting three categoriesof companies:thelargest,the large andthe
smaller.
Moreover, given a positive average market performance at the level of listed Moroccan companies, earnings management
cannot be intended to mask the visibility of poor performance.
For an in-depth analysis, we subdivided the study sample into three sub-samples: the largest companies (size>21.73), large
companies (size between 19.6 and 21.73), and the smallest companies (size<19.6).
The results of the descriptive statistics for CA variables, total assets, debt, and price change for the three sub-samples are
summarized in the table below:
Table 4: relationship size, CA, total assets, indebtedness, variation
Size_moy
(grouped by lockers)
CA N
(millions of dirhams)
Total assets N
(millions of dirhams)
Indebtedness
N
Variation
course
Average
Median
<19,60 Standard deviation
Minimum
Maximum
166,92
72,032
188,96
0,13
563,75
190,37
207,94
102,60
41,98
316,19
5,05%
0%
10,41%
0%
32%
0,4996
0,0145
1,44898
-0,56
4,47
Average
Median
19,60-21.72 Standard deviation
Minimum
Maximum
877,03
531,67
962,56
239,62
3944,40
1220,02
1023,13
1063,17
196,86
5469,81
5,37%
11,06%
100,59%
-445%
152%
0,5322
0,1678
1,12133
-0,71
4,37
Average
Median
21,73+ Standard deviation
Minimum
Maximum
3723,96
3943,29
2646,64
3,40
8172,84
8273,81
6019,18
6438,21
2540,20
21900,14
47,46%
35,40%
73,48%
0%
290%
0,5064
0,5957
0,80654
-0,54
2,60

This table shows that the smallest companies achieve an average sales of 167 dirhams and their total assets represent 190
million on average. These are low-indebted companies (average debt ratio is 5%) and whose price variation is positive.
On the other hand, large companies whose size is between 19.6 and 21.73 achieve an average sales of 877 milliondirhamsand
have total assets of 1220 million dirhams on average. Their average debt ratio is also very low (5.37%) and the pricechangeis
positive.
Finally, the largest companies are characterized by an average turnover of 3724million dirhamsandtotalassetof 8273 million
dirhams. Their average debt ratio is high at 47.46% and the price variation is also positive. The largest companies in our
sample are the most indebted companies.
Table 5: the size-accrual relationship expressed in function of the total active period
Size Moy(grouped by lockers) Average N Standard deviation
<19,60
Pair 1
Acc_totac N-2
Acc_totac N-1
0,0713
0,1378
12
12
0,08572
0,56449
Pair 2
Acc_totac N-1
Acc_totac N
0,1378
0,1680
12
12
0,56449
0,19792
19,60-21,72
Pair 1
Acc_totac N-2
Acc_totac N-1
0,0471
0,0369
25
25
0,09755
0,09610
Pair 2
Acc_totac N-1
Acc_totac N
0,0369
-0,0157
25
25
0,09610
0,13439
21,73+
Pair 1
Acc_totac N-2
Acc_totac N-1
-0,0045
0,0192
15
15
0,10494
0,18140
Pair 2
Acc_totac N-1
Acc_totac N
0,0192
0,1065
15
15
0,18140
0,21285
The analysis of the calculated accruals for the three sub-samples shows that the most indebted companies have high total
accruals that follow a rising trend (10.65% of total assets).In fact, the interest paid by creditors to their lengthoftimeand thus
to their profitability encourages the management of earnings. Our first hypothesis is thus confirmed. On the other hand,large,
low-income companies record negative accruals; showing a downward trend. This situation supposes the existence of a
downward management of earnings which aims at the minimization of the fiscal costs. This leads to the confirmation of our
second hypothesis.
For companies in the first sub-sample, although they have little debt, their accruals represent on average of 16.80%of alltotal
assets in N. It is necessary to take into account other characteristics to justify this result (shareholding structure control
mechanism). The analysis does not allow the confirmation of our third hypothesis.
The comparison tests of the average accruals expressed in function of the total active assets of over the period of 2014-2016
are presented below. These tests are analyzed for the three sub-samples.
Table 6: test matched sample test (means comparison)
Size Moy(grouped by lockers) Average N Standard deviation
<19,60
Pair 1
Acc_totac N-2
Acc_totac N-1
-0,06651
-0,03019
0,55710
0,20344
-0,414
-0,514
Pair 2
Acc_totac N-1
Acc_totac N
0,01012
0,05260
0,13037
0,22349
,388
1,177
19,60-21,72
Pair 1
Acc_totac N-2
Acc_totac N-1
-0,02375
-0,08729
0,24515
0,23580
-0,375
-1,434
Pair 2
Acc_totac N-1
Acc_totac N
-0,06651
-0,03019
0,55710
0,20344
-0,414
-0,514
21,73+
Pair 1
Acc_totac N-2
Acc_totac N-1
0,01012
0,05260
0,13037
0,22349
,388
1,177
Pair 2
Acc_totac N-1
Acc_totac N
-0,02375
-0,08729
0,24515
0,23580
-0,375
-1,434
The average comparison test makes it possible to detect any
abnormal increase in accruals during the period from 2014
to 2016.
For the period N-2 / N, at the level of the smaller companies
(no hypothesis is verified by these companies), the average
comparison test reveals an increase of the total accruals.
This test shows a management of the earnings that is on the
rise, the average of the meansbeingnegative. Theincreaseof
the total accruals is greater between N-2 and N-1.
At the level of large companies (it is the companies that
verify our second hypothesis); the average comparison test
reveals a decrease of the total accruals.
This test shows a management of earnings withadownward
trend, the average of the means being down. However, this
earnings management is not significant according to the
student test at the threshold of 5%. The decrease in total
accruals is greater between N-1 and N.

On the other hand, the average comparison test shows a
strong increase in total accruals for the N-2 / N period in the
third sub-sample (these arecompanieswith ahigh debtratio
and which verify our first hypothesis). The increase of
accruals is greater between N-1 and N.
Conclusion:
The results of this research shed lightonfinancialpolicy, size
and market performance and the earnings results
management. The analysis of the results confirms the
existence of the practices of earnings management in
Moroccan listed companies and its correlation with the size
of the company. However, the association between market
performance and discretionary accruals is not confirmed.
The analysis also confirms the debt hypothesis. The
indebtedness level is likely to incite the earnings
management of the accounting results. On the other hand,
the decrease of the political costs is the concern of the
largest companies sample.
However, this research has limitations. Indeed, the earnings
management can be explained by studying other
characteristics of the company (the sector of activity, the
distribution of dividends, the control by the auditorsandthe
ownership structure).
The relevance of the accounting and financial information
provided by the managers is improved through the
governance mechanisms,by thecontrolsoftheshareholders,
the administrators and the auditors. However, these
governance mechanisms remain insufficient to limit the
practices of the earnings management. An accounting
framework that minimizes the possibility of making
accounting «manipulations» is necessary.For this,itappears
that the IFRS is more efficient than the national accounting
framework provided that there is more standardization
recommendations and more controloveritsimplementation
by the regulatory authorities (the Moroccan CapitalMarkets
Authority). In Morocco, the transition to IFRS standards by
the majority of listed companies will have an impact on the
management of results.
An empirical study is needed to highlight the methods used
to manage earnings used by Moroccan listed companies and
to analyze the discretionary accruals calculated in bothIFRS
and Moroccan standards (through the components). Such a
study will identify the specificities of the Moroccan context
and determine if the management of the financial results is
higher in Moroccan standards than in IFRS. It is therefore
possible to deepen this study to the analysis of the
components of accruals calculated to determine the
accounting choices made in listed companies in terms of
results management. The study can also be carried out on
unlisted companies in order to eliminate the impact of the
financial market and to take into account other factors more
present at the level of the small and medium-sized
companies (notably the taxation and the absence of the
mechanisms control)
References:
[1] Catherine Grima. (juillet 2017) : « Impact des normes
IFRS sur la manipulation comptable des sociétés
françaises cotées ». Thèse de doctorat en Sciences de
Gestion, Conservatoire national des arts et métiers –
CNAM.
[2] El maguiri Issam et Mrabet Rachid(2014). Gestion du
résultat : la gouvernance peut-elle limiter l’action des
dirigeants » L’économiste N°4390, 30/10/2014
[3] Casta Jean-François (2009), Théorie positive de la
comptabilité, Coordonné par B.Colasse. Encyclopédie
de comptabilité, contrôle de gestion et audit,
Economica, Paris, p. 1393-1402, 2009.
[4] Elleuch Hamza Sarra. (Mai 2008), Les spécificitésdela
gestion des résultats des entreprises tunisiennes à
Travers une analyse qualitative. La Comptabilité, Le
Contrôle et L'audit entre Changement et Stabilité,
France.
[5] Hoarau Christian. (janvier 2008), « La gestion des
résultats comptables : IFRS vs USGAAP » Revue
Française de comptabilité n°406.
[6] Ramond Olivier et al.(2007), « Résultat et performance
financière en normes IFRS :quelestlecontenu informatif
du compréhensive income ? », Comptabilité-Contrôle-
Audit 2007/3 Tom13, pp.129-154.
[7] Mansouri Nader (2007), La tétranormalisation et la
gestion des résultats comptables. Étude exploratoire :
cas LVMH, XVIème Conférence Internationale de
Management Stratégique, Montréal, 6-9 Juin 2007
[8] Capron Michel. (Mai 2006), « Les normes comptables
internationales, instruments du capitalisme financier »
Revue Management & Sciences Sociales N° 68 Éditée
par les Presses Universitaires du Mirail (Toulouse).
[9] De Blic Damien (2004), la comptabilité à l’épreuve du
scandale financier, Comptabilité-Contrôle-Audit
2004/3 Tom10, pp.7-27
[10] Jeanjean T., (2003), Gestion du résultat : mesure et
démesure, Cahier de Recherche du CEREG, Université
Paris Dauphine, n°2003-13
[11] Stolowy Hervé et Gaétan Breton (2003), La gestion
des données comptables : une revue de la littérature,
Comptabilité - Contrôle - Audit, 2003/1 Tome9, p.125-
151.
[12] Jeanjean T., (2001), Contribution à l’analyse de la
gestion du résultat des sociétés cotées, Actes du XXII
congrès de l’association Française de comptabilité,
Metz.
[13] Jeanjean T., (2001), Incitations et contraintes à la
gestion du résultat, Comptabilité - Contrôle – Audit,
Tome 7, Vol 1, pp61-67
[14] Degeorge, F., Patel J. et Zeckhauser R. (1999),
EarningsManagementtoExceed hresholds,TheJournal
of Business, Vol.72, n°1, pp.1-33
[15] Périer S. (1998) : « Gestion des résultatscomptableset
introduction en bourse » Thèse dedoctoratenSciences
de Gestion, université Pierre Mendez, France, ESA
Grenoble
[16] Chalayer, S. et Dumontier P. (1996), Performances
Economiques et Manipulations Comptables : Une
Approche Empirique, Actes du congrès de l’AFC,
pp.803-818.
[17] Dechow. P, Sloan. R et Sweeney A. (1996), Cause and
consequences of earnings manipulation: an analysis of

firms subject to enforcement action by the SEC,
Contemporary Accounting Resarch, Vol.13 pp1-36.
[18] Chalayer S. (1995), Le lissage des résultats: éléments
explicatifs avancés dans la literature, Comptabilité -
Contrôle – Audit, Tome 1, Vol 2, pp89-104.
[19] Tremblay D., Cormier D. et Magnan M. (1994),
Théories et modèles comptables. Développement et
Perspectives, Presses universitaires duQuébec,Sainte-
Foy.
[20] Watts. R et Zimmerman J.(1990), Positive Accounting
Theory: a ten Year Perspective, TheAccounting.Review,
Vol.65, pp.131-156.
[21] Raffournier. B (1990), La théorie positive de la
comptabilité : une revue de la littérature, Économies et
Sociétés, Série Sciences de gestion, vol. 16, n° 11, p.
137-166.
[22] Schipper, K. (1989), Commentary on Earnings
Management, Accounting. Horizon, Vol 3, n°4, pp.91-
102.
[23] Healy P(1985), The effect of bonus schemes on
accounting decisions, Journal of Accounting and
Economics, Volume 7, P85-107
[24] Holthausen R.W. et Leftwich R (1983), The Economic
Consequences of Accounting of Costly Contracting and
Monitoring , Journal of Accountingand Economics,n°5,
p. 77-117.

Earnings Management, the Influence of Size, Indebtedness and Performance The Case of Moroccan Listed Companies

Recommended

Recommended

More Related Content

What's hot

What's hot (18)

Similar to Earnings Management, the Influence of Size, Indebtedness and Performance The Case of Moroccan Listed Companies

Similar to Earnings Management, the Influence of Size, Indebtedness and Performance The Case of Moroccan Listed Companies (20)

More from ijtsrd

More from ijtsrd (20)

Recently uploaded

Recently uploaded (20)

Earnings Management, the Influence of Size, Indebtedness and Performance The Case of Moroccan Listed Companies