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Dr.C.Loganathan, M.S.Annie Christi / International Journal of Engineering Research and
                 Applications (IJERA) ISSN: 2248-9622 www.ijera.com
                    Vol. 2, Issue 5, September- October 2012, pp.250-255
                      Fuzzy game value of the Interval matrix
                              1
                                  Dr.C.Loganathan, 2M.S.Annie Christi
                        1
                            Department of Mathematics, Maharaja Arts and Science College
                                            Coimbatore – 641407, India
                            2
                             Department of mathematics, Providence College for Women,
                                              Coonoor-643104, India


ABSTRACT:
         In this paper we present a method to               point) and the corresponding strategies which give
identify the fuzzy game value of the matrix with            the saddle point are called optimal strategies.[1] and
interval data. The ideas of crisp matrix games are          [6].The amount of payoff at an equilibrium point is
extended to fuzzy matrix games. This result is              called the crisp game value of the matrix.
applied to a three player game.                              In (1), a11 is the crisp game value of the matrix.

Keyword: Crisp game value, Fuzzy game value,                That is   a11  1.
crisply related, fuzzily related and saddle value.
                                                            1.3 Interval Data:
1. Introduction                                                       Due to uncertainty, the payoffs in a matrix
        Game theory has been used extensively to            are not fixed numbers. Hence fuzzy games have
analyze conflict and co-operative situations in             been studied. For further studies see [3], [5] and [7].
Economics, sociology, etc. One of the basic                 To model such uncertainty, we use interval valued
problems in the game theory is the two- player zero         matrix.
sum game.
                                                            1.4 Definition:
 A fundamental problem of classical game theory is                   Let A=   a  be an mxn rectangular interval
                                                                                 ij
that the player makes decisions with crisp data.
                                                            valued matrix. This matrix defines a zero sum
However, in a real life world, most games always
                                                            interval matrix game provided whenever, the row
take place in uncertain environments. Because of
                                                            player X uses his ith strategy and the column player
uncertainty in real world applications, payoffs of a
                                                            Y uses his jth strategy. Then X wins and Y loses a
matrix game may not be a fixed number. This
situation forces us to introduce fuzzy matrix game.         common value x  aij . 
In this paper, we consider the payoffs as interval          1.5 Example:
numbers.

1.1 Crisp game value of the Matrix:                               [1,2]   [7,8] [3,1] [5,3]
 A game can be expressed as                                   A=
                                                                  [4,6]   [0,8] [1,3]   [4,5] 
                                                                                               
          1  3 2                                               [7,3] [2,1] [1,1]   [4,5] 
          0 4 3                                                                            
A=                                    (1)
                  
          1 5 1 
                                                          In this game if X chooses row one and Y chooses
                                                            column two, then X wins an amount x  [7, 8] and
                                                            Y loses the same amount.
In this game, the players X and Y have 3 and 4
strategies respectively. For player X, minimum
value in each row represents the least gain (payoff)        2. Interval Arithmetic
to him if he chooses his particular strategy. He will                 The extension of ordinary arithmetic to
then select the strategy that maximizes his minimum         intervals is known as interval arithmetic.
gain.                                                       Let A  [aL , aR ], B  [bL , bR ]           be two
Similarly, for player Y, the maximum value in each          intervals.
column represents the maximum loss to him if he             Then,
chooses his particular strategy. He will then select        (i) A     B  [aL  bL , aR  bR ] .
the strategy that minimizes his maximum losses.
                                                            (ii)   A  B  [aL  bR , aR  bL ] .
1.2 Definition:
                                                            (iii) AB = [min{ a L       bL , a L bR , a R bL , a R bR },max {
         If the maximum value equals the minimax
value, then the game is said to have a saddle                      a L bL , a L bR , a R bL , a R bR }]
value(equilibrium



                                                                                                     250 | P a g e
Dr.C.Loganathan, M.S.Annie Christi / International Journal of Engineering Research and
                   Applications (IJERA) ISSN: 2248-9622 www.ijera.com
                      Vol. 2, Issue 5, September- October 2012, pp.250-255
(iv)    A= [  a L ,  a R ], if   0 and = [  a R ,
        a L ], if  <0.                                      ab        = 1, if a = b or     a R < bL , a  b; or a L < bL
Similarly the other binary operations are defined             <    a R < bR .
                                                                                                 0, if   bR < a L , bL <
2.1Coimparison of Intervals
          Comparison of two intervals is very                 a L < bR < a R .
important problem in interval analysis. In this                                                   bL  a L
section we consider the order relation (≤ and ≥)                                                           , if       aL <
between intervals. Let a and b be two non-empty                                                   aR  aL
intervals.                                                    bL < bR < a R .
2.2 Disjoint Intervals:                                                                            bR  a R
                                                                                                            , if bL < a L
         Case (i): If a= [ a L , a R ], b= [ bL , bR ] and                                        bR  bL
if a R < bL then a<b or b>a crisply, which is similar         <    a R < bR .
to the definition of comparisons used in [4]
                                                                              bL  a L      b a
                                                              These values             and R  R moves from
                                                                              aR  aL      bR  bL
aL         aR        bL       bR
                                                              0 to 1 when x moves a L to bL and a R to bR from
2.3 Example:                                                  left to right. Only when a=b, a  b takes the value
                                                              1.Using simple algebraic operations, it can be seen
a = [2, 3] and b= [5, 6] be two intervals. Here a < b.        that the membership value for b  a =1- a  b.

2.4 Equal Intervals:                                          3.2 Definition:
                                                                        The binary fuzzy operator ≥ of two
Case (ii): a=b iff a≤b and a≥b.                               intervals a and b is defined as
                                                              a ≥ b= 1 if a = b ;or bR < a L or bL < a L < bR < a R .
2.5: Overlapping Intervals:
                                                                         0 if a R < bL a  b, a L < bL < a R < bR
 If a L < bL < a R < bR then for any x in [ a L , bL
                                                                           a R  bR
], a<b.That is x  a, is less than every payoff in b.                                 if a L < bL < bR < a R .
If x  [ bL , a R ], then every x  a, is less than or                     aR  aL
equal to b. Therefore a≤b (crisply).                                       a L  bL
                                                                                     if bL < a L < a R < bR .
 Similarly if y  [ a R , bR ], then y in b is greater than                bR  bL
or equal to a. That is b≥a crisply.
                                                              The relations of two intervals can now be either
3. Nested sub intervals                                       crisp of fuzzy as described below.
           In terms of fuzzy membership
               bR  a R                                       3.3 Definition:
       a≤b=                                                            If the values of a ≤ b is exactly one or zero
              bR  bL                                         then we say that a and b are crisply related otherwise
If b  a then                                                 we say that they are fuzzily related.
                bL  a L
        a≤b=                                                  4. Crisp Game value of the Matrix:
                aR  aL                                                The ideas and concept of crisp game value
                                                              if the matrixes can be extended to the matrix games
Consolidating the above discussions we define the             with interval data where entries are crisply related.
fuzzy operations  and  as follows.
                                                              4.1 Definition:
3.1 Definition:                                                         Let A be an mxn interval game matrix such
         The binary fuzzy operator  of two                   that all the intervals in the same row (or column) of
intervals a and b returns a real number between 0             A are crisply related. If there exists a            g
and 1 as follows The binary fuzzy operator  of
                                                              ij    A  aij       is simultaneously crisply less than or
two intervals a and b returns a real number between
0 and 1 as follows                                            equal      to     a ik k  1..........n   and   crisply    ≥



                                                                                                           251 | P a g e
Dr.C.Loganathan, M.S.Annie Christi / International Journal of Engineering Research and
                       Applications (IJERA) ISSN: 2248-9622 www.ijera.com
                          Vol. 2, Issue 5, September- October 2012, pp.250-255
g lj l  1...m , then the interval g ij is called a   5. Fuzzy game value of the interval matrix
                                                                      The crisp relativity may not be satisfied for
saddle interval of the game. The value of the saddle
                                                            all intervals in the same row (or column) .We now
interval is called the crisp game value of interval
                                                            define the fuzzy memberships of an interval being a
matrix game.
                                                            minimum and a maximum of an interval vector R
By the definition above, to determine whether an
                                                            and then we define the notion of a least and greatest
interval game matrix has a crisp game value, one
                                                            interval in R.
needs to verify the following:-
(i) For each row( 1 ≤ j ≤m) find the entry a ij , that is   5.1 Definition:
crisply less than or equal to all other entries of the      The least interval of the vector R is defined as max
ith row.                                                    {min { ri  r j }} =l
(ii) For each column (1 ≤ j ≤m) find the entry a ij               1≤ i ≤ n ,1 ≤ j ≤m
that is crisply greater than or equal to all other          and similarly the greatest interval of the vector R is
entries of the j th column.                                 defined as min {max { ri  r j }} =g
(iii) Determine if there is an entry a ij ,that is                             1≤ j≤ m, 1 ≤ i ≤n
simultaneously the minimum of the i th row and the
maximum of the jth column.                                  5.2 Example:
 (iv) If any of the above values cannot be determined                  Find the least and the greatest interval of
for the matrix game, the crisp game value cannot be         the vector R= {[1, 5], [2, 8], [3, 5]}
determined.                                                 (i) [1, 5] ≤ [2, 8] =1
                                                                [1, 5] ≤ [3, 5] = 1
4.2 Example:
Y                                                           Therefore min [1, 5] =1.
                      A=     X
 1, 2           7,8    3,  1  5,  3                         (ii) [2, 8] ≤ [1, 5] =0
                                                       
 4, 6                                                                                        1
                  0, 8    1, 3 4, 5            
                                                                             [2, 8] ≤ [3, 5] =
                                                                                                 6
  7,  3      2,  1 1,1       4, 5             Therefore min [2, 8] =0.
                                                      
                                                                       (iii) [3, 5] ≤ [1, 5] =0
                                                                                                 1
  We see that in the above game matrix a 14 , a 23 , a                      [3, 5] ≤ [2, 8] =
                                                                                                 2
31   are the minimum of rows 1, 2 and3 respectively         Therefore min [3, 5] = 0.
                                                            Therefore max {1, 0, 0} = 1.
and a 21 , a 12 , a 23 , a 34 are the maximum of column
                                                            Hence [1, 5] is the least interval.
1,2,3, and 4 .Therefore a 23 is the saddle interval of
the matrix A. The value of this interval is the crisp       (i)[1, 5]  [2, 8] =0
game value of the interval matrix game. The                    [1, 5]  [3, 5] =0
corresponding strategies which give the saddle              Therefore max [1, 5] =0.
interval values are the optimal strategies of the crisp     (ii) [2, 8]  [1, 5] =1
game value. That is the optimal strategies for both X                              1
and Y in a crisp interval valued matrix game are                [2, 8]    [3, 5] = .
defined as
                                                                                   2
                                                            Therefore max [2, 8] =1.
 (a) X should select any row containing a saddle
interval and
                                                                                     1
 (b)    Y should select any column containing a             (iii)        [3, 5]    [1, 5] =
saddle interval.                                                                     2
                                                                                     1
4.3 Definition:                                                     [3, 5]  [2, 8] = .
         The game value of a crisply interval valued                                 6
matrix game is its saddle interval. This interval                                    1
game is fair, if its saddle interval is symmetric with         Therefore max [3, 5] = .
respect to zero. That is in the form of [-a, a], a≥0.                                2
In the above example, the saddle interval is a 23 = [0,                          1
                                                               Hence min {0, 1, }= 0.
1].Here 0.5 is the midpoint. Hence the game is                                   2
unfair since the row player has an advantage of 0.5.        This corresponds to [1, 5] which is the largest
                                                            interval.


                                                                                                     252 | P a g e
Dr.C.Loganathan, M.S.Annie Christi / International Journal of Engineering Research and
                 Applications (IJERA) ISSN: 2248-9622 www.ijera.com
                    Vol. 2, Issue 5, September- October 2012, pp.250-255
Hence we define fuzzy game value of interval
matrix as follows.

5.3 Definition:
          Let R be an mxn interval game matrix. If
there is an rij  R  rij is simultaneously the least
and the greatest interval for the ith row and jth
column of R , then that interval value is the fuzzy
game value of the interval valued matrix game.
                                                           Then as in the above case find the saddle interval of
6. Three player game                                       the vectors {[ c1 , d1 ],[ c 2 , d 2 ],[ c3 , d 3 ],[ c 4 , d 4 ]}.
The above result can be extended to three player
game. This will be a special case where the players        If the saddle interval falls into the column of X2,
A and B had the choice of choosing the strategies          then the player C has a choice of winning the game
X1 and X2, whereas the player C will have a fixed          with the fuzzy membership corresponding to the
strategy.                                                  interval. Otherwise he loses the game. This result
For example if the matrix game is given as follows:        can be extended to many strategies X1, X2, X3
                                                           …Xn provided each time the payoff matrices are
                                                           given when the third player C chooses one of the
                                                           strategies. This is illustrated in the following
                                                           example.

                                                           6.1 Example:

                                                           Case (i):
                                                           When C chooses X1, if the payoff matrix is given as
                                                           below, then
Here the players A and b have strategies X1 and
X2.We assume that in the first case the player C
chooses X1 and in the second case he chooses X2.
Case (i):
When the player C chooses X1, if the payoff matrix
is given as:




                                                           We find the saddle interval of {[1, 6], [7, 8], [2, 6],
                                                           [3, 4]}

                                                           Least interval:
Find the saddle interval of the vectors {[ a1 ,b1 ], [
a 2 ,b2 ], [ a3 ,b3 ], [ a 4 ,b4 ]} if it exists. If the   I     (a) [1, 6]    [7, 8] =1
saddle interval falls into the column corresponding                                 1
to the strategy X1, then the player C has a choice of            (b)    [1, 6]    [2, 6]=
winning the game with the fuzzy membership                                          5
corresponding to that interval. Otherwise, he looses                                2
the game.                                                      (c) [1, 6]  [3, 4]=
                                                                                    5
Case (ii):                                                                   1 2      1
                                                           Therefore min {1,  , } =
Similarly, when the third player C chooses X2, if the                        5 5      5
payoff matrix is given as follows:
                                                           II    (a)      [7, 8]    [1, 6]=0
                                                                 (b)     [7, 8]     [2, 6] =0
                                                                 (c)     [7, 8]     [3, 4]=0


                                                                                                           253 | P a g e
Dr.C.Loganathan, M.S.Annie Christi / International Journal of Engineering Research and
                   Applications (IJERA) ISSN: 2248-9622 www.ijera.com
                      Vol. 2, Issue 5, September- October 2012, pp.250-255
Therefore min {0, 0, 0} =0                                                      2 1 2 2
III     (a)  [2, 6]  [1, 6] =0                                    Therefore max {, , }= .
                                                                                5 4 5 5
            (b)   [2, 6]      [7, 8] =1                                      2 1    2 2
                                                                   Hence min { , ,1 , }=
                                                                              5 2    5 5
                                          1
            (c)   [2, 6]     [3, 4] =
                                          4               This corresponds to the interval [3, 4].and [1, 6]
                                                          Since [3, 4] is the least and the greatest interval, it is
                             1                            the saddle interval whose membership is 0.4.
            Therefore min {0, 1,}=0
                             4                            If the third player C chooses X2, he wins and the
                                 2                        game value lies in the interval [3, 4] with the fuzzy
IV     (a)     [3, 4]  [1, 6] =                          membership 0.4.If he chooses X1, he loses the
                                 5                        game.
                                 1
       (b)    [3, 4]  [2, 6] =
                                  2                       Case (ii):
       (c) [3, 4]  [7, 8] =1                             Similarly when C chooses the strategy X2 if the
                                                          payoff matrix is given as below, then in the same
                      2 1        2                        manner we find the saddle interval. If it falls in the
   Therefore min {     , , 1}= .
                      5 2        5                        second column the player C wins with the fuzzy
                 1       2 2                              membership of that interval. Otherwise he loses the
   Hence max { , 0, 0, }=                                 game.
                 5       5 5
This corresponds to the interval [3, 4]        [1, 6].
Therefore the least interval is [3, 4].

Greatest interval:
I (a)      [1, 6]  [2, 6]=0

     (b)         [7, 8] = 0
              [1, 6]
                           2
   (c) [1, 6]  [3, 4] =
                           5
                        2    2
   Therefore max {0, 0, }= .                              We find the saddle interval of the vectors {[ 3,12 ], [
                        5    5
                           1                              7,10 ],[ 5,10 ],[ 4,5 ]}
II   (a) [2, 6]  [1, 6] =
                           5                                                                    4
                                                          I             (a)    [3, 12]    [7, 10] =
     (b) [2, 6]  [7, 8] = 0                                                                    9
                                                                                                2
                          1                                             (b) [3, 12]  [5, 10] =
      (c)     [2, 6]      [3, 4] =                                                             9
                          2                                                                   1
                       1 1  1                                          (c) [3, 12]  [4, 5] =
    Therefore max {0, , }=                                                                    9
                        5 2 2                                                     4 2 1 1
III  (a) [7, 8]  [1, 6] =1                                                 Min { , , }= .
                                                                                  9 9 9 9
       (b) [7, 8]         [2, 6] =1
                                                                                                   2
       (c) [7, 8]         [3, 4] =1                          II      (a) [7, 10]      [3, 12]=
                                                                                                   9
 Therefore max {1, 1, 1} =1
                                                                      (b) [7, 10]      [4, 5]=0
                                      2                               (c)   [7, 10]    [5, 10] =0
IV          (a) [3, 4]    [1, 6]=
                                      5
                                   1                                                  2
            (b) [3, 4]      [2, 6] =                                         Min {     , 0, 0} =0
                                   4                                                  9
                                  2
             (c) [3, 4]  [7, 8] = .
                                  5


                                                                                                       254 | P a g e
Dr.C.Loganathan, M.S.Annie Christi / International Journal of Engineering Research and
                    Applications (IJERA) ISSN: 2248-9622 www.ijera.com
                       Vol. 2, Issue 5, September- October 2012, pp.250-255
                              2                             7.   W. Winston, Operations Research –
III    (a) [5, 10]       [3, 12]=                               Applications       and    Algorithms,
                              9                                  Brooks/Cole, 2004.
                               2                            8.   S. Wu, and V. Soo, A Fuzzy Game
       (b) [5, 10]  [7, 10] =
                               5                                 Theoretic Approach to Multi-Agent
       (c) [5, 10]  [4, 5] =0                                   Coordination, LNCS Vol. 1599, (1998),
                                                                 pp. 76-87.
                         2 2
                Min {     ,  , 0}=0
                         9 5

                                      7
 IV        (a) [4, 5]    [3, 12] =
                                      9
           (b) [4, 5]     [7, 10]    =1

           (c) [4, 5]    [5, 10]     =1

                   7           7
               Min { , 1, 1} =
                   9           9
                  1      7 7
           Max {0, ,0 , }=
                  9      9 9
This corresponds to the interval [4, 5].

7.Conclusion
          In this paper we have introduced two
person zero-sum interval valued matrix games. The
fuzzy game value of rectangular matrices can be
obtained by verifying whether the given matrix is
fuzzily related or not.
In some cases, during the comparison of intervals
will satisfy both  and  . But depending upon the
membership values we can draw conclusions. The
concept is extended to a three player game. This can
also be extended to a multi-player game.

                        REFERENCES
      1.     W.Dwayne Collins and Chenyi Hu, Fuzzily
             determined Interval matrix games.
      2.     P.Dutta, Strategies and Games: Theory and
             Practice, MIT Press, 1999.
      3.     de Korvin, C. Hu, and O. Sirisaengtaksin,
             On Firing Rules of Fuzzy sets of Type II, J.
             Applied Mathematics, Vol. 3, No.2, (2000),
             pp. 151-159.
      4.     D. Garagic and J.B. Cruz, An Approach to
             Fuzzy Noncooperative Nash Games, J.
             Optimization Theory and Applications,
             Vol. 118, No.2, (2000), pp. 475-491.
      5.     R. E. Moore, Methods and applications of
             Interval analysis, SIAM Studies in Applied
             Mathematics, 1995.
      6.     S.Russell and W. A. Lodwick, Fuzzy Game
             Theory and Internet Commerce: e-Strategy
             and Metarationality, NAFIPS 2002
             Proceedings, 2002.




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Fuzzy Game Value of Interval Matrices

  • 1. Dr.C.Loganathan, M.S.Annie Christi / International Journal of Engineering Research and Applications (IJERA) ISSN: 2248-9622 www.ijera.com Vol. 2, Issue 5, September- October 2012, pp.250-255 Fuzzy game value of the Interval matrix 1 Dr.C.Loganathan, 2M.S.Annie Christi 1 Department of Mathematics, Maharaja Arts and Science College Coimbatore – 641407, India 2 Department of mathematics, Providence College for Women, Coonoor-643104, India ABSTRACT: In this paper we present a method to point) and the corresponding strategies which give identify the fuzzy game value of the matrix with the saddle point are called optimal strategies.[1] and interval data. The ideas of crisp matrix games are [6].The amount of payoff at an equilibrium point is extended to fuzzy matrix games. This result is called the crisp game value of the matrix. applied to a three player game. In (1), a11 is the crisp game value of the matrix. Keyword: Crisp game value, Fuzzy game value, That is a11  1. crisply related, fuzzily related and saddle value. 1.3 Interval Data: 1. Introduction Due to uncertainty, the payoffs in a matrix Game theory has been used extensively to are not fixed numbers. Hence fuzzy games have analyze conflict and co-operative situations in been studied. For further studies see [3], [5] and [7]. Economics, sociology, etc. One of the basic To model such uncertainty, we use interval valued problems in the game theory is the two- player zero matrix. sum game. 1.4 Definition: A fundamental problem of classical game theory is Let A= a  be an mxn rectangular interval ij that the player makes decisions with crisp data. valued matrix. This matrix defines a zero sum However, in a real life world, most games always interval matrix game provided whenever, the row take place in uncertain environments. Because of player X uses his ith strategy and the column player uncertainty in real world applications, payoffs of a Y uses his jth strategy. Then X wins and Y loses a matrix game may not be a fixed number. This situation forces us to introduce fuzzy matrix game. common value x  aij .  In this paper, we consider the payoffs as interval 1.5 Example: numbers. 1.1 Crisp game value of the Matrix:  [1,2] [7,8] [3,1] [5,3] A game can be expressed as A=  [4,6] [0,8] [1,3] [4,5]     1 3 2  [7,3] [2,1] [1,1] [4,5]   0 4 3    A= (1)    1 5 1    In this game if X chooses row one and Y chooses column two, then X wins an amount x  [7, 8] and Y loses the same amount. In this game, the players X and Y have 3 and 4 strategies respectively. For player X, minimum value in each row represents the least gain (payoff) 2. Interval Arithmetic to him if he chooses his particular strategy. He will The extension of ordinary arithmetic to then select the strategy that maximizes his minimum intervals is known as interval arithmetic. gain. Let A  [aL , aR ], B  [bL , bR ] be two Similarly, for player Y, the maximum value in each intervals. column represents the maximum loss to him if he Then, chooses his particular strategy. He will then select (i) A  B  [aL  bL , aR  bR ] . the strategy that minimizes his maximum losses. (ii) A  B  [aL  bR , aR  bL ] . 1.2 Definition: (iii) AB = [min{ a L bL , a L bR , a R bL , a R bR },max { If the maximum value equals the minimax value, then the game is said to have a saddle a L bL , a L bR , a R bL , a R bR }] value(equilibrium 250 | P a g e
  • 2. Dr.C.Loganathan, M.S.Annie Christi / International Journal of Engineering Research and Applications (IJERA) ISSN: 2248-9622 www.ijera.com Vol. 2, Issue 5, September- October 2012, pp.250-255 (iv)  A= [  a L ,  a R ], if   0 and = [  a R ,  a L ], if  <0. ab = 1, if a = b or a R < bL , a  b; or a L < bL Similarly the other binary operations are defined < a R < bR . 0, if bR < a L , bL < 2.1Coimparison of Intervals Comparison of two intervals is very a L < bR < a R . important problem in interval analysis. In this bL  a L section we consider the order relation (≤ and ≥) , if aL < between intervals. Let a and b be two non-empty aR  aL intervals. bL < bR < a R . 2.2 Disjoint Intervals: bR  a R , if bL < a L Case (i): If a= [ a L , a R ], b= [ bL , bR ] and bR  bL if a R < bL then a<b or b>a crisply, which is similar < a R < bR . to the definition of comparisons used in [4] bL  a L b a These values and R  R moves from aR  aL bR  bL aL aR bL bR 0 to 1 when x moves a L to bL and a R to bR from 2.3 Example: left to right. Only when a=b, a  b takes the value 1.Using simple algebraic operations, it can be seen a = [2, 3] and b= [5, 6] be two intervals. Here a < b. that the membership value for b  a =1- a  b. 2.4 Equal Intervals: 3.2 Definition: The binary fuzzy operator ≥ of two Case (ii): a=b iff a≤b and a≥b. intervals a and b is defined as a ≥ b= 1 if a = b ;or bR < a L or bL < a L < bR < a R . 2.5: Overlapping Intervals: 0 if a R < bL a  b, a L < bL < a R < bR If a L < bL < a R < bR then for any x in [ a L , bL a R  bR ], a<b.That is x  a, is less than every payoff in b. if a L < bL < bR < a R . If x  [ bL , a R ], then every x  a, is less than or aR  aL equal to b. Therefore a≤b (crisply). a L  bL if bL < a L < a R < bR . Similarly if y  [ a R , bR ], then y in b is greater than bR  bL or equal to a. That is b≥a crisply. The relations of two intervals can now be either 3. Nested sub intervals crisp of fuzzy as described below. In terms of fuzzy membership bR  a R 3.3 Definition: a≤b= If the values of a ≤ b is exactly one or zero bR  bL then we say that a and b are crisply related otherwise If b  a then we say that they are fuzzily related. bL  a L a≤b= 4. Crisp Game value of the Matrix: aR  aL The ideas and concept of crisp game value if the matrixes can be extended to the matrix games Consolidating the above discussions we define the with interval data where entries are crisply related. fuzzy operations  and  as follows. 4.1 Definition: 3.1 Definition: Let A be an mxn interval game matrix such The binary fuzzy operator  of two that all the intervals in the same row (or column) of intervals a and b returns a real number between 0 A are crisply related. If there exists a g and 1 as follows The binary fuzzy operator  of ij  A  aij is simultaneously crisply less than or two intervals a and b returns a real number between 0 and 1 as follows equal to a ik k  1..........n and crisply ≥ 251 | P a g e
  • 3. Dr.C.Loganathan, M.S.Annie Christi / International Journal of Engineering Research and Applications (IJERA) ISSN: 2248-9622 www.ijera.com Vol. 2, Issue 5, September- October 2012, pp.250-255 g lj l  1...m , then the interval g ij is called a 5. Fuzzy game value of the interval matrix The crisp relativity may not be satisfied for saddle interval of the game. The value of the saddle all intervals in the same row (or column) .We now interval is called the crisp game value of interval define the fuzzy memberships of an interval being a matrix game. minimum and a maximum of an interval vector R By the definition above, to determine whether an and then we define the notion of a least and greatest interval game matrix has a crisp game value, one interval in R. needs to verify the following:- (i) For each row( 1 ≤ j ≤m) find the entry a ij , that is 5.1 Definition: crisply less than or equal to all other entries of the The least interval of the vector R is defined as max ith row. {min { ri  r j }} =l (ii) For each column (1 ≤ j ≤m) find the entry a ij 1≤ i ≤ n ,1 ≤ j ≤m that is crisply greater than or equal to all other and similarly the greatest interval of the vector R is entries of the j th column. defined as min {max { ri  r j }} =g (iii) Determine if there is an entry a ij ,that is 1≤ j≤ m, 1 ≤ i ≤n simultaneously the minimum of the i th row and the maximum of the jth column. 5.2 Example: (iv) If any of the above values cannot be determined Find the least and the greatest interval of for the matrix game, the crisp game value cannot be the vector R= {[1, 5], [2, 8], [3, 5]} determined. (i) [1, 5] ≤ [2, 8] =1 [1, 5] ≤ [3, 5] = 1 4.2 Example: Y Therefore min [1, 5] =1. A= X  1, 2 7,8  3,  1  5,  3 (ii) [2, 8] ≤ [1, 5] =0   4, 6  1  0, 8  1, 3 4, 5  [2, 8] ≤ [3, 5] = 6   7,  3  2,  1 1,1 4, 5  Therefore min [2, 8] =0.     (iii) [3, 5] ≤ [1, 5] =0 1 We see that in the above game matrix a 14 , a 23 , a [3, 5] ≤ [2, 8] = 2 31 are the minimum of rows 1, 2 and3 respectively Therefore min [3, 5] = 0. Therefore max {1, 0, 0} = 1. and a 21 , a 12 , a 23 , a 34 are the maximum of column Hence [1, 5] is the least interval. 1,2,3, and 4 .Therefore a 23 is the saddle interval of the matrix A. The value of this interval is the crisp (i)[1, 5]  [2, 8] =0 game value of the interval matrix game. The [1, 5]  [3, 5] =0 corresponding strategies which give the saddle Therefore max [1, 5] =0. interval values are the optimal strategies of the crisp (ii) [2, 8]  [1, 5] =1 game value. That is the optimal strategies for both X 1 and Y in a crisp interval valued matrix game are [2, 8]  [3, 5] = . defined as 2 Therefore max [2, 8] =1. (a) X should select any row containing a saddle interval and 1 (b) Y should select any column containing a (iii) [3, 5]  [1, 5] = saddle interval. 2 1 4.3 Definition: [3, 5]  [2, 8] = . The game value of a crisply interval valued 6 matrix game is its saddle interval. This interval 1 game is fair, if its saddle interval is symmetric with Therefore max [3, 5] = . respect to zero. That is in the form of [-a, a], a≥0. 2 In the above example, the saddle interval is a 23 = [0, 1 Hence min {0, 1, }= 0. 1].Here 0.5 is the midpoint. Hence the game is 2 unfair since the row player has an advantage of 0.5. This corresponds to [1, 5] which is the largest interval. 252 | P a g e
  • 4. Dr.C.Loganathan, M.S.Annie Christi / International Journal of Engineering Research and Applications (IJERA) ISSN: 2248-9622 www.ijera.com Vol. 2, Issue 5, September- October 2012, pp.250-255 Hence we define fuzzy game value of interval matrix as follows. 5.3 Definition: Let R be an mxn interval game matrix. If there is an rij  R  rij is simultaneously the least and the greatest interval for the ith row and jth column of R , then that interval value is the fuzzy game value of the interval valued matrix game. Then as in the above case find the saddle interval of 6. Three player game the vectors {[ c1 , d1 ],[ c 2 , d 2 ],[ c3 , d 3 ],[ c 4 , d 4 ]}. The above result can be extended to three player game. This will be a special case where the players If the saddle interval falls into the column of X2, A and B had the choice of choosing the strategies then the player C has a choice of winning the game X1 and X2, whereas the player C will have a fixed with the fuzzy membership corresponding to the strategy. interval. Otherwise he loses the game. This result For example if the matrix game is given as follows: can be extended to many strategies X1, X2, X3 …Xn provided each time the payoff matrices are given when the third player C chooses one of the strategies. This is illustrated in the following example. 6.1 Example: Case (i): When C chooses X1, if the payoff matrix is given as below, then Here the players A and b have strategies X1 and X2.We assume that in the first case the player C chooses X1 and in the second case he chooses X2. Case (i): When the player C chooses X1, if the payoff matrix is given as: We find the saddle interval of {[1, 6], [7, 8], [2, 6], [3, 4]} Least interval: Find the saddle interval of the vectors {[ a1 ,b1 ], [ a 2 ,b2 ], [ a3 ,b3 ], [ a 4 ,b4 ]} if it exists. If the I (a) [1, 6]  [7, 8] =1 saddle interval falls into the column corresponding 1 to the strategy X1, then the player C has a choice of (b) [1, 6]  [2, 6]= winning the game with the fuzzy membership 5 corresponding to that interval. Otherwise, he looses 2 the game. (c) [1, 6]  [3, 4]= 5 Case (ii): 1 2 1 Therefore min {1, , } = Similarly, when the third player C chooses X2, if the 5 5 5 payoff matrix is given as follows: II (a) [7, 8]  [1, 6]=0 (b) [7, 8]  [2, 6] =0 (c) [7, 8]  [3, 4]=0 253 | P a g e
  • 5. Dr.C.Loganathan, M.S.Annie Christi / International Journal of Engineering Research and Applications (IJERA) ISSN: 2248-9622 www.ijera.com Vol. 2, Issue 5, September- October 2012, pp.250-255 Therefore min {0, 0, 0} =0 2 1 2 2 III (a) [2, 6]  [1, 6] =0 Therefore max {, , }= . 5 4 5 5 (b) [2, 6]  [7, 8] =1 2 1 2 2 Hence min { , ,1 , }= 5 2 5 5 1 (c) [2, 6]  [3, 4] = 4 This corresponds to the interval [3, 4].and [1, 6] Since [3, 4] is the least and the greatest interval, it is 1 the saddle interval whose membership is 0.4. Therefore min {0, 1,}=0 4 If the third player C chooses X2, he wins and the 2 game value lies in the interval [3, 4] with the fuzzy IV (a) [3, 4]  [1, 6] = membership 0.4.If he chooses X1, he loses the 5 game. 1 (b) [3, 4]  [2, 6] = 2 Case (ii): (c) [3, 4]  [7, 8] =1 Similarly when C chooses the strategy X2 if the payoff matrix is given as below, then in the same 2 1 2 manner we find the saddle interval. If it falls in the Therefore min { , , 1}= . 5 2 5 second column the player C wins with the fuzzy 1 2 2 membership of that interval. Otherwise he loses the Hence max { , 0, 0, }= game. 5 5 5 This corresponds to the interval [3, 4]  [1, 6]. Therefore the least interval is [3, 4]. Greatest interval: I (a) [1, 6]  [2, 6]=0 (b)  [7, 8] = 0 [1, 6] 2 (c) [1, 6]  [3, 4] = 5 2 2 Therefore max {0, 0, }= . We find the saddle interval of the vectors {[ 3,12 ], [ 5 5 1 7,10 ],[ 5,10 ],[ 4,5 ]} II (a) [2, 6]  [1, 6] = 5 4 I (a) [3, 12]  [7, 10] = (b) [2, 6]  [7, 8] = 0 9 2 1 (b) [3, 12]  [5, 10] = (c) [2, 6]  [3, 4] = 9 2 1 1 1 1 (c) [3, 12]  [4, 5] = Therefore max {0, , }= 9 5 2 2 4 2 1 1 III (a) [7, 8]  [1, 6] =1 Min { , , }= . 9 9 9 9 (b) [7, 8]  [2, 6] =1 2 (c) [7, 8]  [3, 4] =1 II (a) [7, 10]  [3, 12]= 9 Therefore max {1, 1, 1} =1 (b) [7, 10]  [4, 5]=0 2 (c) [7, 10]  [5, 10] =0 IV (a) [3, 4]  [1, 6]= 5 1 2 (b) [3, 4]  [2, 6] = Min { , 0, 0} =0 4 9 2 (c) [3, 4]  [7, 8] = . 5 254 | P a g e
  • 6. Dr.C.Loganathan, M.S.Annie Christi / International Journal of Engineering Research and Applications (IJERA) ISSN: 2248-9622 www.ijera.com Vol. 2, Issue 5, September- October 2012, pp.250-255 2 7. W. Winston, Operations Research – III (a) [5, 10]  [3, 12]= Applications and Algorithms, 9 Brooks/Cole, 2004. 2 8. S. Wu, and V. Soo, A Fuzzy Game (b) [5, 10]  [7, 10] = 5 Theoretic Approach to Multi-Agent (c) [5, 10]  [4, 5] =0 Coordination, LNCS Vol. 1599, (1998), pp. 76-87. 2 2 Min { , , 0}=0 9 5 7 IV (a) [4, 5]  [3, 12] = 9 (b) [4, 5]  [7, 10] =1 (c) [4, 5]  [5, 10] =1 7 7 Min { , 1, 1} = 9 9 1 7 7 Max {0, ,0 , }= 9 9 9 This corresponds to the interval [4, 5]. 7.Conclusion In this paper we have introduced two person zero-sum interval valued matrix games. The fuzzy game value of rectangular matrices can be obtained by verifying whether the given matrix is fuzzily related or not. In some cases, during the comparison of intervals will satisfy both  and  . But depending upon the membership values we can draw conclusions. The concept is extended to a three player game. This can also be extended to a multi-player game. REFERENCES 1. W.Dwayne Collins and Chenyi Hu, Fuzzily determined Interval matrix games. 2. P.Dutta, Strategies and Games: Theory and Practice, MIT Press, 1999. 3. de Korvin, C. Hu, and O. Sirisaengtaksin, On Firing Rules of Fuzzy sets of Type II, J. Applied Mathematics, Vol. 3, No.2, (2000), pp. 151-159. 4. D. Garagic and J.B. Cruz, An Approach to Fuzzy Noncooperative Nash Games, J. Optimization Theory and Applications, Vol. 118, No.2, (2000), pp. 475-491. 5. R. E. Moore, Methods and applications of Interval analysis, SIAM Studies in Applied Mathematics, 1995. 6. S.Russell and W. A. Lodwick, Fuzzy Game Theory and Internet Commerce: e-Strategy and Metarationality, NAFIPS 2002 Proceedings, 2002. 255 | P a g e