1 Security Vulnerability Self-Assessment Guid.docx

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Security Vulnerability
Self-Assessment
Guide for Small
Drinking Water
Systems Serving
Populations Between
3,300 and 10,000
Association of State Drinking Water
Administrators
National Rural Water Association
November 13, 2002

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This document contains sensitive
information about the security of your
water system. Therefore, it should be
treated as Confidential Information and
should be stored in a secure place at your
water system. A duplicate copy should
also be stored in a secure off-site
location.
Acknowledgments
This document is the result of collaboration among the
Association of Drinking Water Administrators
(ASDWA), the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (U.S.
EPA), the U.S. EPA Drinking Water Academy,
and the National Rural Water Association (NRWA).
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Contents

SECURITY VULNERABILITY SELF-ASSESSMENT GUIDE
FOR SMALL WATER SYSTEMS ................ 4
Introduction
...............................................................................................
.................................................... 4
How to Use this Self-Assessment Guide
...............................................................................................
....... 4
Before Starting this Assessment
...............................................................................................
.................... 5
Keep this
Document................................................................................
...................................................... 5
SECURITY VULNERABILITY SELF-ASSESSMENT
................................................................................... 6
Record of Security Vulnerability Self-Assessment Completion
.................................................................... 6
Inventory of Small Water System Critical Components
................................................................................ 7
SECURITY VULNERABILITY SELF-ASSESSMENT FOR
SMALL WATER SYSTEMS ............................. 8
General Questions for the Entire Water
System....................................................................................
....... 8
Water Sources
...............................................................................................
............................................. 11
Treatment Plant and Suppliers
...............................................................................................

.................... 11
Distribution
...............................................................................................
................................................... 13
Personnel
...............................................................................................
..................................................... 14
Information/Storage/Computers/Controls/Maps.........................
................................................................. 15
Public Relations
...............................................................................................
........................................... 16
ATTACHEMENT 1. PRIORITIZATION OF NEEDED
ACTIONS ................................................................ 18
ATTACHEMENT 2. EMERGENCY CONTACT
LIST.................................................................................. 19
Section 1 System Identification
...............................................................................................
.................... 19
Section 2 Notification/Contact
Information.............................................................................
..................... 20
Section 3 Communication and Outreach
...............................................................................................
..... 24
ATTACHMENT 3. THREAT IDENTIFICATION
CHECKLISTS................................................................... 25
Water System Telephone Threat Identification Checklist
........................................................................... 25
Water System Report of Suspicious
Activity..................................................................................

............. 27
CERTIFICATION OF
COMPLETION........................................................................
.................................. 29
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Security Vulnerability Self-Assessment
Guide for Small Drinking Water Systems
Serving Populations Between 3,300 and
10,000
Introduction
Water systems are critical to every community. Protection of
public drinking water systems should be a
high priority for local officials and water system owners and
operators to ensure an uninterrupted water
supply, which is essential for the protection of public health
(safe drinking water and sanitation) and safety
(fire fighting).
Adequate security measures will help prevent loss of service
through terrorist acts, vandalism, or pranks.
If your system is prepared, such actions may even be prevented.
The appropriate level of security is best
determined by the water system at the local level.

This Security Vulnerability Self-Assessment Guide is designed
to help small water systems determine
possible vulnerable components and identify security measures
that should be considered in order to
protect the system and the customers it serves. A “vulnerability
assessment” (VA) is the identification of
weaknesses in water system security, focusing on defined
threats that could compromise its ability to
meet its various service missions - such as providing adequate
drinking water, water for firefighting,
and/or water for various commercial and industrial purposes.
This document is designed particularly for
systems that serve populations of 3,300 up to 10,000. This
document is meant to encourage smaller
systems to review their system vulnerabilities, but it may not
take the place of a comprehensive review by
security experts. Completion of this document will meet the
requirement for conducting a Vulnerability
Assessment as directed under the Public Health Security and
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response
Act of 2002. Community Water Systems (CWSs) serving more
than 3,300 and fewer than 50,000 people
must submit their completed vulnerability assessment to the
Administrator of U.S. EPA no later than June
30, 2004 in order to meet the provisions of the Act.
The Self-Assessment Guide has a simple design. Answers to
assessment questions are “yes” or “no,”
and there is space to identify needed actions and actions you
have taken to improve security. For any
“no” answer, refer to the “comment” column and/or contact
your state drinking water primacy agency.

How to Use this Self-Assessment Guide
This document is designed for use by water system personnel.
Physical facilities pose a high degree of
exposure to any security threat. According to the Bioterrorism
Law, vulnerability assessments should
include, but not be limited to, a review of pipes and constructed
conveyances, physical barriers, water
collection, pretreatment, treatment, storage and distribution
facilities, electronic, computer or other
automated systems which are utilized by the public water
system, the use, storage, or handling of various
chemicals, and the operation and maintenance of such system.
This self-assessment should be
conducted on all components of your system (wellhead or
surface water intake, treatment plant, storage
tank(s), pumps, distribution system, and other important
components of your system).
The Assessment includes a basic emergency contact list for your
use; however, under the Public Health
Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of
2002, all systems serving a population
greater than 3,300 must complete or revise an emergency
response plan based on their vulnerability
assessment. Systems must certify to the U.S. EPA
Administrator that incorporates the results of the VA
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that have been completed or revised within six months of

submitting their vulnerability assessment to U.S.
EPA. The list included as Attachment 2 will not meet the
requirements of the Bioterrorism Act, but it will
help you identify who you need to contact in the event of an
emergency or threat and will help you
develop communication and outreach procedures. You may be
able to obtain sample Emergency
Response Plans from your state drinking water primacy agency.
Development of the emergency
response plan should be coordinated with the Local Emergency
Planning Committee (LEPC).
Security is everyone’s responsibility. This document should
help you to increase the awareness of all your
employees, governing officials, and customers about security
issues. Once you have completed the
questions, review the actions you need to take to improve your
system’s security. The goal of the
vulnerability assessment is to develop a system-specific list of
priorities intended to reduce risks to threats
of attack. Make sure to prioritize your actions based on the
most likely threats to your system. Once you
have developed your list of priority actions, you have completed
your vulnerability assessment. Please
complete the Certificate of Completion on page 29 and return
only the certificate to your state drinking
water primacy agency. Unless your state has its own
requirement that the vulnerability assessments be
submitted to the state for review (e.g. New York) do not include
a full copy of your self-assessment with
the certification submitted to the state primacy agency. Please
check with your state drinking water
primacy agency to find out what is required for your state. In
addition, under the Bioterrorism Act all
systems serving a population greater than 3,300 and less than
50,000 must submit their completed

vulnerability assessment and a Certificate of Completion to the
U.S. EPA Administrator by June 30, 2004.
Before Starting this Assessment
Systems should make an effort to identify critical services and
customers, such as hospitals or power
facilities, as well as critical areas of their drinking water system
that if attacked could result in a significant
disruption of vital community services, result in a threat to
public health, or a complete shut down of the
system (e.g. inability to provide an adequate supply of water for
fire prevention, inability to provide safe
potable water, or release of hazardous chemicals that could
cause catastrophic results). When
prioritizing the potential water system vulnerabilities and
consequences factor into the decision process
the critical facilities, services, and single points in the system
that if debilitated could result in significant
disruption of vital community services or health protection. To
help identify priorities for your system, the
table on page 7 provides a column where you can categorize the
assets that you consider critical into one
of three categories – high (H), medium (M), or low (L).
When evaluating a system’s potential vulnerability, systems
should attempt to determine what type of
assailants and threats they are trying to protect against.
Systems should contact their local law
enforcement office to see if they have information indicating
the types of threats that may be likely against
their facility. Systems should also refer to the U.S. EPA
“Baseline Threat Information for Vulnerability
Assessments of Community Water Systems” to help assess the
most likely threats to their water system.

This document is available to CWSs serving greater than 3,300
people. If your system has not yet
received instructions on how to receive a copy of this document,
then contact your Regional U.S. EPA
Office immediately. You will be sent instructions on how to
securely access it via the Water Information
Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC) website or obtain a hard
copy that can be mailed directly to you.
Some of the typical threats to your facility may be vandalism,
an insider (i.e. disgruntled employee), a
terrorist, or a terrorist working with a system employee.
Keep this Document
This is a working document. Its purpose is to start your process
of security vulnerability assessment and
security enhancements. Security is not an end point, but a goal
that can be achieved only through
continued efforts to assess and upgrade your system. This is a
sensitive document. It should be stored
separately in a secure place at your water system. A duplicate
copy should also be retained at a secure
off-site location. Access to this document should be limited to
key water system personnel and local
officials as well as the state drinking water primacy agency and
others on a need-to-know basis.
Security Vulnerability Self-Assessment
Record of Security Vulnerability Self-Assessment Completion
The following information should be completed by the

individual conducting the
self-assessment and/or any additional revisions.
Name:
Title:
Area of
Responsibility:
Water System
Name:
Water System
PWSID:
Address:
City:
County:
State:
Zip Code:
Telephone:
Fax:
E-mail:
Date Completed:

Date Revised: Signature:
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Inventory of Small Water System Critical Components
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Component Number &
Location (if
applicable)
Description Critical Asset
or
Single Point of
Failure (H/M/L)

Source Water Type
Ground Water
Surface Water
Purchased
Treatment Plant
Buildings
Pumps
Treatment Equipment (e.g., basin, clear well, filter)
Process Controls
Treatment Chemicals and Storage
Laboratory Chemicals and Storage
Storage
Storage Tanks
Pressure Tanks
Power
Primary Power
Auxiliary Power
Distribution System
Pumps
Pipes
Valves
Appurtenances (e.g., flush hydrants, backflow
preventers, meters)
Other Vulnerable Points
Offices

Buildings
Computers
Files
Transportation/
Work Vehicles
Personnel
Communications
Telephone
Cell Phone
Radio
Computer Control Systems (SCADA)
Critical Facilities Served
Power Plant Facilities
Hospitals
Schools
Waste Water Treatment Plants
Food/Beverage Processing Plants
Nursing Homes
Prisons/Other Institutions
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Security Vulnerability Self-Assessment for Small Water
Systems
The first 15 questions in this vulnerability self-assessment are

general questions designed to apply to all components of your
system (wellhead or surface
water intake, treatment plant, storage tank(s), pumps,
distribution system, and offices). These are followed by more
specific questions that look at
individual system components in greater detail.
QUESTION ANSWER COMMENT ACTION NEEDED/TAKEN
1. Do you have a written
emergency response plan
(ERP)?
Yes “ No “ Under the provisions of the Public Health
Security and Bioterrorism
Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 you are required to
develop and/or update an ERP within six months after
completing
this assessment. If you do not have an ERP, you can obtain a
sample from your state drinking water primacy agency. As a
first
step in developing your ERP, you should develop your
Emergency
Contact List (see Attachment 2).
A plan is vital in case there is an incident that requires
immediate
response. Your plan should be reviewed at least annually (or
more
frequently if necessary) to ensure it is up-to-date and addresses
security emergencies including ready access to laboratories
capable
of analyzing water samples. You should coordinate with your
LEPC.

You should designate someone to be contacted in case of
emergency regardless of the day of the week or time of day.
This
contact information should be kept up-to-date and made
available to
all water system personnel and local officials (if applicable).
Share this ERP with police, emergency personnel, and your
state
primacy agency. Posting contact information is a good idea
only if
authorized personnel are the only ones seeing the information.
These signs could pose a security risk if posted for public
viewing
since it gives people information that could be used against the
system.
2. Have you reviewed U.S.
EPA’s Baseline Threat
Information Document?
Yes “ No “ The U.S. EPA baseline threat document is
available through the
Water Information Sharing and Analysis Center at
www.waterisac.org. It is important you use this document to
determine potential threats to your system and to obtain
additional
security related information. U.S. EPA should have provided a
certified letter to your system that provided instructions on
obtaining
the threat document.
3. Is access to the critical

components of the water
system (i.e., a part of the
physical infrastructure of the
system that is essential for
water flow and/or water
quality) restricted to
authorized personnel only?
Yes “ No “ You should restrict or limit access to the critical
components of your
water system to authorized personnel only. This is the first step
in
security enhancement for your water system. Consider the
following:
Issue water system photo identification cards for employees,
and
require them to be displayed within the restricted area at all
times.
Post signs restricting entry to authorized personnel and ensure
that assigned staff escort people without proper ID.
General Questions for the Entire Water System
http://www.waterisac.org/
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4. Are all critical facilities
fenced, including wellhouses
and pump pits, and are gates
locked where appropriate?
Yes “ No “ Ideally, all facilities should have a security fence
around the
perimeter.
The fence perimeter should be walked periodically to check for
breaches and maintenance needs. All gates should be locked
with
chains and a tamper-proof padlock that at a minimum protects
the
shank. Other barriers such as concrete "jersey" barriers should
be
considered to guard certain critical components from accidental
or
intentional vehicle intrusion.
5. Are all critical doors,
windows, and other points of
entry such as tank and roof
hatches and vents kept
closed and locked?
Yes “ No “ Lock all building doors and windows, hatches and
vents, gates, and
other points of entry to prevent access by unauthorized
personnel.
Check locks regularly. Dead bolt locks and lock guards provide
a
high level of security for the cost.

A daily check of critical system components enhances security
and
ensures that an unauthorized entry has not taken place.
Doors and hinges to critical facilities should be constructed of
heavy-
duty reinforced material. Hinges on all outside doors should be
located on the inside.
To limit access to water systems, all windows should be locked
and
reinforced with wire mesh or iron bars, and bolted on the inside.
Systems should ensure that this type of security meets with the
requirements of any fire codes. Alarms can also be installed on
windows, doors, and other points of entry.
6. Is there external lighting
around all critical
components of your water
system?
Yes “ No “ Adequate lighting of the exterior of water
systems’ critical
components is a good deterrent to unauthorized access and may
result in the detection or deterrence of trespassers. Motion
detectors that activate switches that turn lights on or trigger
alarms
also enhance security.
7. Are warning signs

(tampering, unauthorized
access, etc.) posted on all
critical components of your
water system? (For example,
well houses and storage
tanks.)
Yes “ No “ Warning signs are an effective means to deter
unauthorized access.
“Warning - Tampering with this facility is a federal offense”
should be
posted on all water facilities. These are available from your
state
rural water association.
“Authorized Personnel Only,” “Unauthorized Access
Prohibited,” and
“Employees Only” are examples of other signs that may be
useful.
8. Do you patrol and inspect all
source intake, buildings,
storage tanks, equipment,
and other critical
components?
Yes “ No “ Frequent and random patrolling of the water
system by utility staff
may discourage potential tampering. It may also help identify
problems that may have arisen since the previous patrol.

All systems are encouraged to initiate personal contact with the
local
law enforcement to show them the drinking water facility. The
tour
should include the identification of all critical components with
an
explanation of why they are important. Systems are encouraged
to
review, with local law enforcement, the NRWA/ASDWA Guide
for
Security Decisions or similar state document to clarify
respective
roles and responsibilities in the event of an incident. Also
consider
asking the local law enforcement to conduct periodic patrols of
your
water system.
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9. Is the area around all the
critical components of your
water system free of objects
that may be used for
breaking and entering?
Yes “ No “ When assessing the area around your water
system’s critical
components, look for objects that could be used to gain entry

(e.g.,
large rocks, cement blocks, pieces of wood, ladders, valve keys,
and
other tools).
10. Are the entry points to all of
your water system easily
seen?
Yes “ No “ You should clear fence lines of all vegetation.
Overhanging or
nearby trees may also provide easy access. Avoid landscaping
that
will permit trespassers to hide or conduct unnoticed suspicious
activities.
Trim trees and shrubs to enhance the visibility of your water
system’s critical components.
If possible, park vehicles and equipment in places where they
do not
block the view of your water system’s critical components.
11. Do you have an alarm
system that will detect
unauthorized entry or
attempted entry at all critical
components?
Yes “ No “ Consider installing an alarm system that notifies
the proper
authorities or your water system’s designated contact for
emergencies when there has been a breach of security.
Inexpensive
systems are available. An alarm system should be considered
whenever possible for tanks, pump houses, and treatment

facilities.
You should also have an audible alarm at the site as a deterrent
and
to notify neighbors of a potential threat.
12. Do you have a key control
and accountability policy?
Yes “ No “ Keep a record of locks and associated keys, and
to whom the keys
have been assigned. This record will facilitate lock replacement
and
key management (e.g., after employee turnover or loss of keys).
Vehicle and building keys should be kept in a lockbox when not
in
use.
You should have all keys stamped (engraved) “DO NOT
DUPLICATE.”
13. Are entry codes and keys
limited to water system
personnel only?
Yes “ No “ Suppliers and personnel from co-located
organizations (e.g.,
organizations using your facility for telecommunications)
should be
denied access to codes and/or keys. Codes should be changed
frequently if possible. Entry into any building should always be
under the direct control of water system personnel.
14. Do you have an updated

operations and maintenance
manual that includes
evaluations of security
systems?
Yes “ No “ Operation and maintenance plans are critical in
assuring the on-
going provision of safe and reliable water service. These plans
should be updated to incorporate security considerations and the
on-going reliability of security provisions – including security
procedures and security related equipment.
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15. Do you have a neighborhood
watch program for your
water system?
Yes “ No “ Watchful neighbors can be very helpful to a
security program. Make
sure they know whom to call in the event of an emergency or
suspicious activity.
Water Sources

In addition to the above general checklist for your entire water
system (questions 1-15), you should give special attention to the
following issues,
presented in separate tables, related to various water system
components. Your water sources (surface water intakes or
wells) should be secured.
Surface water supplies present the greatest challenge. Typically
they encompass large land areas. Where areas cannot be
secured, steps should be
taken to initiate or increase law enforcement patrols. Pay
particular attention to surface water intakes. Ask the public to
be vigilant and report suspicious
activity.
16. Are your wellheads sealed
properly?
Yes “ No “ A properly sealed wellhead decreases the
opportunity for the
introduction of contaminants. If you are not sure whether your
wellhead is properly sealed, contact your well
drilling/maintenance
company, your state drinking water primacy agency, your state
rural
water association, or other technical assistance providers.
17. Are well vents and caps
screened and securely
attached?
Yes “ No “ Properly installed vents and caps can help prevent
the introduction
of a contaminant into the water supply.

Ensure that vents and caps serve their purpose, and cannot be
easily breached or removed.
18. Are observation/test and
abandoned wells properly
secured to prevent
tampering?
Yes “ No “ All observation/test and abandoned wells should
be properly capped
or secured to prevent the introduction of contaminants into the
aquifer or water supply. Abandoned wells should be either
removed
or filled with concrete.
19. Is your surface water
source secured with fences
or gates? Do water system
personnel visit the source?
Yes “ No “ Surface water supplies present the greatest
challenge to secure.
Often, they encompass large land areas. Where areas cannot be
secured, steps should be taken to initiate or increase patrols by
water utility personnel and law enforcement agents.
Treatment Plant and Suppliers
Some small systems provide easy access to their water system
for suppliers of equipment, chemicals, and other materials for
the convenience of both
parties. This practice should be discontinued.

20. Are deliveries of chemicals
and other supplies made in
the presence of water
system personnel?
Yes “ No “ Establish a policy that an authorized person,
designated by the
water system, must accompany all deliveries. Verify the
credentials
of all drivers. This prevents unauthorized personnel from having
access to the water system.
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21. Have you discussed with
your supplier(s) procedures
to ensure the security of
their products?
Yes “ No “ Verify that your suppliers take precautions to
ensure that their
products are not contaminated. Chain of custody procedures for
delivery of chemicals should be reviewed. You should inspect
chemicals and other supplies at the time of delivery to verify
they are
sealed and in unopened containers. Match all delivered goods

with
purchase orders to ensure that they were, in fact, ordered by
your
water system.
You should keep a log or journal of deliveries. It should include
the
driver’s name (taken from the driver’s photo I.D.), date, time,
material delivered, and the supplier’s name.
22. Are chemicals, particularly
those that are potentially
hazardous (e.g. chlorine
gas) or flammable, properly
stored in a secure area?
Yes “ No “ All chemicals should be stored in an area
designated for their
storage only, and the area should be secure and access to the
area
restricted. Access to chemical storage should be available only
to
authorized employees. Pay special attention to the storage,
handling, and security of chlorine gas because of its potential
hazard.
You should have tools and equipment on site (such as a fire
extinguisher, drysweep, etc.) to take immediate actions when
responding to an emergency.
23. Do you monitor raw and
treated water so that you

can detect changes in water
quality?
Yes “ No “ Monitoring of raw and treated water can establish
a baseline that
may allow you to know if there has been a contamination
incident.
Some parameters for raw water include pH, turbidity, total and
fecal
coliform, total organic carbon, specific conductivity, ultraviolet
adsorption, color, and odor.
Routine parameters for finished water and distribution systems
include free and total chlorine residual, heterotrophic plate
count
(HPC), total and fecal coliform, pH, specific conductivity,
color, taste,
odor, and system pressure.
Chlorine demand patterns can help you identify potential
problems
with your water. A sudden change in demand may be a good
indicator of contamination in your system.
For those systems that use chlorine, absence of chlorine residual
may indicate possible contamination. Chlorine residuals provide
protection against bacterial and viral contamination that may
enter
the water supply.

24. Are tank ladders, access
hatches, and entry points
secured?
Yes “ No “ The use of tamper-proof padlocks at entry points
(hatches, vents,
and ladder enclosures) will reduce the potential for of
unauthorized
entry.
If you have towers, consider putting physical barriers on the
legs to
prevent unauthorized climbing.
25. Are vents and overflow
pipes properly protected
with screens and/or grates?
Yes “ No “ Air vents and overflow pipes are direct conduits
to the finished water
in storage facilities. Secure all vents and overflow pipes with
heavy-
duty screens and/or grates.
13
26. Can you isolate the storage

tank from the rest of the
system?
Yes “ No “ A water system should be able to take its storage
tank(s) out of
operation or drain its storage tank(s) if there is a contamination
problem or structural damage. Install shut-off or bypass valves
to
allow you to isolate the storage tank in the case of a
contamination
problem or structural damage.
Consider installing a sampling tap on the storage tank outlet to
test
water in the tank for possible contamination.
Distribution
Hydrants are highly visible and convenient entry points into the
distribution system. Maintaining and monitoring positive
pressure in your system is
important to provide fire protection and prevent introduction of
contaminants.
QUESTION ANSWER COMMENT ACTION/NEEDED TAKEN
27. Do you control the use of
hydrants and valves?
Yes “ No “ Your water system should have a policy that
regulates the
authorized use of hydrants for purposes other than fire
protection.
Require authorization and backflow devices if a hydrant is used
for

any purpose other than fire fighting.
Consider designating specific hydrants for use as filling
station(s)
with proper backflow prevention (e.g., to meet the needs of
construction firms). Then, notify local law enforcement officials
and
the public that these are the only sites designated for this use.
Flush hydrants should be kept locked to prevent contaminants
from
being introduced into the distribution system, and to prevent
improper use.
28. Does your system monitor
for, and maintain, positive
pressure?
Yes “ No “ Positive pressure is essential for fire fighting and
for preventing
backsiphonage that may contaminate finished water in the
distribution system. Refer to your state primacy agency for
minimum
drinking water pressure requirements.
29. Has your system
implemented a backflow
prevention program?
Yes “ No “ In addition to maintaining positive pressure,
backflow prevention
programs provide an added margin of safety by helping to

prevent
the intentional introduction of contaminants. If you need
information
on backflow prevention programs, contact your state drinking
water
primacy agency.
14
Personnel
You should add security procedures to your personnel policies.
30. When hiring personnel, do
you request that local police
perform a criminal
background check, and do
you verify employment
eligibility (as required by the
Immigration and
Naturalization Service,
Form I-9)?
Yes “ No “ It is good practice to have all job candidates fill
out an employment
application. You should verify professional references.
Background
checks conducted during the hiring process may prevent
potential

employee-related security issues.
If you use contract personnel, check on the personnel practices
of
all providers to ensure that their hiring practices are consistent
with
good security practices.
31. Are your personnel issued
photo-identification cards?
Yes “ No “ For positive identification, all personnel should
be issued water
system photo-identification cards and be required to display
them at
all times.
Photo identification will also facilitate identification of
authorized
water system personnel in the event of an emergency.
32. When terminating
employment, do you require
employees to turn in photo
IDs, keys, access codes,
and other security-related
items?
Yes “ No “ Former or disgruntled employees have knowledge
about the
operation of your water system, and could have both the intent
and
physical capability to harm your system. Requiring employees

who
will no longer be working at your water system to turn in their
IDs,
keys, and access codes helps limit these types of security
breaches.
33. Do you use uniforms and
vehicles with your water
system name prominently
displayed?
Yes “ No “ Requiring personnel to wear uniforms, and
requiring that all vehicles
prominently display the water system name, helps inform the
public
when water system staff is working on the system. Any
observed
activity by personnel without uniforms should be regarded as
suspicious. The public should be encouraged to report
suspicious
activity to law enforcement authorities.
34. Have water system
personnel been advised to
report security vulnerability
concerns and to report
suspicious activity?
Yes “ No “ Your personnel should be trained and
knowledgeable about security
issues at your facility, what to look for, and how to report any
suspicious events or activity.
Periodic meetings of authorized personnel should be held to

discuss
security issues.
35. Do your personnel have a
checklist to use for threats
or suspicious calls or to
report suspicious activity?
Yes “ No “ To properly document suspicious or threatening
phone calls or
reports of suspicious activity, a simple checklist can be used to
record and report all pertinent information. Calls should be
reported
immediately to appropriate law enforcement officials.
Checklists
should be available at every telephone. Sample checklists are
included in Attachment 3.
Also consider installing caller ID on your telephone system to
keep a
record of incoming calls.
15
Information/Storage/Computers/Controls/Maps
Security of the system, including computerized controls like a
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system,
goes beyond the physical
aspects of operation. It also includes records and critical

information that could be used by someone planning to disrupt
or contaminate your water
system.
36. Is computer access
“password protected?” Is
virus protection installed and
software upgraded regularly
and are your virus definitions
updated at least daily? Do
you have Internet firewall
software installed on your
computer? Do you have a
plan to back up your
computers?
Yes “ No “ All computer access should be password
protected. Passwords
should be changed every 90 days and (as needed) following
employee turnover. When possible, each individual should have
a
unique password that they do not share with others. If you have
Internet access, a firewall protection program should be
installed on
your side of the computer and reviewed and updated
periodically.
Also consider contacting a virus protection company and
subscribing
to a virus update program to protect your records.
Backing up computers regularly will help prevent the loss of

data in
the event that your computer is damaged or breaks. Backup
copies
of computer data should be made routinely and stored at a
secure
off-site location.
37. Is there information on the
Web that can be used to
disrupt your system or
contaminate your water?
Yes “ No “ Posting detailed information about your water
system on a Web site
may make the system more vulnerable to attack. Web sites
should
be examined to determine whether they contain critical
information
that should be removed.
You should do a Web search (using a search engine such as
Google, Yahoo!, or Lycos) using key words related to your
water
supply to find any published data on the Web that is easily
accessible by someone who may want to damage your water
supply.
38. Are maps, records, and
other information stored in a
secure location?
Yes “ No “ Records, maps, and other information should be
stored in a secure

location when not in use. Access should be limited to authorized
personnel only.
You should make back-up copies of all data and sensitive
documents. These should be stored in a secure off-site location
on a
regular basis.
39. Are copies of records,
maps, and other sensitive
information labeled
confidential, and are all
copies controlled and
returned to the water
system?
Yes “ No “ Sensitive documents (e.g., schematics, maps, and
plans and
specifications) distributed for construction projects or other
uses
should be recorded and recovered after use. You should discuss
measures to safeguard your documents with bidders for new
projects.
16
40. Are vehicles locked and

secured at all times?
Yes “ No “ Vehicles are essential to any water system. They
typically contain
maps and other information about the operation of the water
system.
Water system personnel should exercise caution to ensure that
this
information is secure.
Water system vehicles should be locked when they are not in
use or
left unattended.
Remove any critical information about the system before
parking
vehicles for the night.
Vehicles also usually contain tools (e.g., valve wrenches) and
keys
that could be used to access critical components of your water
system. These should be secured and accounted for daily.
Public Relations
You should educate your customers about your system. You
should encourage them to be alert and to report any suspicious
activity to law enforcement
authorities.
41. Do you have a program to

educate and encourage the
public to be vigilant and
report suspicious activity to
assist in the security
protection of your water
system?
Yes “ No “ Advise your customers and the public that your
system has
increased preventive security measures to protect the water
supply
from vandalism. Ask for their help. Provide customers with
your
telephone number and the telephone number of the local law
enforcement authority so that they can report suspicious
activities.
The telephone number can be made available through direct
mail,
billing inserts, notices on community bulletin boards, flyers,
and
consumer confidence reports.
42. Does your water system
have a procedure to deal
with public information
requests, and to restrict
distribution of sensitive
information?
Yes “ No “ You should have a procedure for personnel to
follow when you
receive an inquiry about the water system or its operation from
the
press, customers, or the general public.

Your personnel should be advised not to speak to the media on
behalf of the water system. Only one person should be
designated
as the spokesperson for the water system. Only that person
should
respond to media inquiries. You should establish a process for
responding to inquiries from your customers and the general
public.
43. Do you have a procedure in
place to receive notification
of a suspected outbreak of a
disease immediately after
discovery by local health
agencies?
Yes “ No “
It is critical to be able to receive information about suspected
problems with the water at any time and respond to them
quickly.
Written procedures should be developed in advance with your
state
drinking water primacy agency, local health agencies, and your
local
emergency planning committee and reviewed periodically.

17
place to advise the
community of contamination
immediately after discovery?
Yes “ No “ As soon as possible after a disease outbreak, you
should notify
testing personnel and your laboratory of the incident. In
outbreaks
caused by microbial contaminants, it is critical to discover the
type of
contaminant and its method of transport (water, food, etc.).
Active
testing of your water supply will enable your laboratory,
working in
conjunction with public health officials, to determine if there
are any
unique (and possibly lethal) disease organisms in your water
supply.
It is critical to be able to get the word out to your customers as
soon
as possible after discovering a health hazard in your water
supply.
In addition to your responsibility to protect public health, you
must
also comply with the requirements of the Public Notification
Rule.
Some simple methods include announcements via radio or
television, door-to-door notification, a phone tree, and posting

notices in public places. The announcement should include
accepted uses for the water and advice on where to obtain safe
drinking water. Call large facilities that have large populations
of
people who might be particularly threatened by the outbreak:
hospitals, nursing homes, the school district, jails, large public
buildings, and large companies. Enlist the support of local
emergency response personnel to assist in the effort.
place to respond immediately
to a customer complaint
about a new taste, odor,
color, or other physical
change (oily, filmy, burns on
contact with skin)?
Yes “ No “
It is critical to be able to respond to and quickly identify
potential
water quality problems reported by customers. Procedures
should
be developed in advance to investigate and identify the cause of
the
problem, as well as to alert local health agencies, your state
drinking
water primacy agency, and your local emergency planning
committee if you discover a problem.
Now that you have completed the “Security Vulnerability Self-
Assessment Guide for Small Water Systems Serving Populations

Between 3,300 and
10,000,” review your needed actions and then prioritize them
based on the most likely threats. A Table to assist you in
prioritizing actions is provided
in Attachment 1.
Attachment 1. Prioritization of Needed Actions
Once you have completed the “Security Vulnerability Self-
Assessment Guide for Small Drinking Water Systems
Serving Populations Between 3,300 and 10,000,” review the
actions you need to take to improve your system’s
security. Note the questions to which you answered “no” on
this worksheet. You can use it to summarize the
areas where your system has vulnerability concerns. It can also
help you prioritize the actions you should take to
protect your system from vulnerabilities. You can rank your
priorities in numerical order or based on the
categories of high, medium, and low.
Use the following information and the information you have
generated by completing this assessment to prioritize
and rank the most important security vulnerabilities to your
system:
1. Any information from local law enforcement office about the
likelihood of a terrorist attack or other threats.
2. The U.S. EPA “Baseline Threat Document” to determine the
most likely types of threats to protect against.
3. The primary mission of your system (i.e. serve potable water,
sufficient water for fire protection, etc.).
4. Single points of failure (i.e. disabling pump) that severely
limit your capability to conduct your primary mission.

5. Critical customers – such as hospitals, power plants, schools
or waste water treatment facilities.
6. The vulnerabilities identified by completing this assessment.
Question
Number
Needed Action Scheduled
Completion
Priority/
Ranking
18
Attachment 2. Emergency Contact List
All community water systems serving populations greater than

3,300 and less than 10,000 must adopt an
emergency response plan (ERP) based on their vulnerability
assessment. Emergency response plans are action
steps to follow if a primary source of drinking water becomes
contaminated or if the flow of water is disrupted. You
can obtain sample ERPs from your state drinking water
administrator, or from your state primacy agency.
This sample document is an “Emergency Contact List.”
Although, it can be an essential part of your ERP, this will
not satisfy the Bioterrorism Act requirement to develop or
update your emergency response plan based
on your vulnerability assessment. It contains the names and
telephone numbers of people you might need to
call in the event of an emergency. This is a critical document to
have at your disposal at all times. It gives you a
quick reference to all names and telephone numbers that you
need for support in the case of an emergency.
Filling out this Emergency Contact List reminds you to think
about all of the people you might need to contact in
an emergency. You should also talk with these people about
what you and they would do if an emergency were to
occur.
Section 1. System Identification
Public Water System (PWS) ID Number
System Name
Town/City
Telephone Numbers

System Telephone Evening/Weekend Telephone
Other Contact Information
System Fax Email
Population Served and Number of
Service Connections People Served Connections
System Owner (The owner must be listed
as a person’s name)
Name, title, and telephone number of
person responsible for maintaining this
emergency contact list Name and title Telephone
19
Section 2. Notification/Contact Information – Update regularly
and display clearly next to telephones
Responders
ORGANIZATION CONTACT NAME/TITLE PHONE (DAY)
PHONE (NIGHT) E-MAIL
Fire Department
Police Department

FBI Field Office (for terrorism or
sabotage)
Emergency Medical Service
Local Health Department
National Spill Response Center 24 Hour Hotline 1 (800) 424-
8802
State Spill Hotline 24 Hour Hotline
Local Hazmat Team (if any)
Local/Regional Laboratory
Water System Operators
20
Local Notification List

Government Officials
Emergency Planning Committee
Hospitals
Pharmacy
Nursing Homes
Schools
Prisons
Neighboring Water Systems
Critical Industrial/Commercial
Water Users
Others

21
Service/Repair Notification List
Electrician
Electric Utility Company
Gas Utility Company
Sewer Utility Company
Telephone Utility Company
Plumber
Pump Specialist
“Dig Safe” or local equivalent
Soil Excavator/Backhoe Operator
Equipment Rental (Power
Generators)
Equipment Rental (Chlorinators)
Equipment Rental (Portable
Fencing)
Equipment Repairman
Equipment Repairman
(Chlorinator)

Radio/Telemetry Repair Service
Bottled Water Source
Bulk Water Hauler
Pump Supplier
Well Drillers
Pipe Supplier
Chemical Supplier
22
State Notification List
Drinking Water Primacy Agency
Department of Environmental
Protection (or state equivalent)
Department of Health
Emergency Management Agency
Hazmat Hotline
Media Notification List

Designated Water System
Spokesperson
Newspaper - Local
Newspaper – Regional/State
Radio
Television
23
Section 3. Communication and Outreach
Communication
Communications during an emergency poses some special
problems. A standard response might be to
call “911” for local fire and police departments. But what if
your emergency had disrupted telephone lines
and over-loaded cell phone lines? Talk with your local
Emergency Management Agency, Health
Department representative, or your Local Emergency Planning
Committee (LEPC) about local emergency
preparedness and solutions to these problems. Increasingly,

state emergency agencies are establishing
secure lines of communication with limited access. Learn how
you can access those lines of
communication if all others fail.
Outreach
If there is an incident of contamination in your water supply,
you will need to notify the public and make
public health recommendations (e.g., boil water, or use bottled
water). To do this, you need a plan.
How will you reach all customers in the first 24 hours of an
emergency?
Appoint a media spokesperson—a single person in your water
system who will be authorized to
make all public statements to the media.
Make arrangements for contacting institutions with large
numbers of people, some of whom may
be immuno-compromised:
- Nursing homes
- Hospitals
- Schools
- Prisons
24

Attachment 3: Threat Identification Checklists
Water System Telephone Threat Identification Checklist
In the event your water system receives a threatening phone
call, remain calm and try to keep the caller on the line.
Use the following checklist to collect as much detail as possible
about the nature of the threat and the description of
the caller.
1. Types of Tampering/Threat:
� Contamination
� Biological
� Chemical
� Threat to tamper
� Bombs, explosives, etc.
� Other (explain)
2. Water System Identification:
Name:
Address:

Telephone:
PWS Owner or Manager’s Name:
3. Alternate Water Source Available: Yes/No If yes, give
name and location:
4. Location of Tampering:
� Distribution
Line
� Other (explain):
� Water Storage
Facilities
�Treatment Plant � Raw Water Source � Treatment Chemicals
5. Contaminant Source and Quantity:
7. Date and Time of Tampering/Threat:
8. Caller’s Name/Alias, Address, and Telephone Number:
9. Is the Caller (check all that apply):

� Male � Female � Foul � Illiterate � Well Spoken �
Irrational � Incoherent
25
10. Is the Caller’s Voice (check all that apply):
� Soft
� Slurred
� Deep
� Old
� Calm
� Loud
� Nasal
� High
� Angry
� Laughing
� Clear
� Cracking

� Slow
� Crying
� Lisping
� Excited
� Rapid
� Normal
� Stuttering
� Young
� Familiar (who did it sound like?)
� Accented (which nationality or region?)
11. Is the Connection Clear? (Could it have been a wireless or
cell phone?)
12. Are There Background Noises?
� Street noises (what kind?)
� Machinery (what type?)
� Voices (describe)

� Children (describe)
� Animals (what kind?)
� Computer Keyboard, Office
� Motors (describe)
� Music (what kind?)
� Other
13. Call Received By (Name, Address, and Telephone
Number):
Date Call Received:
Time of Call:
14. Call Reported to: Date/Time
15. Action(s) Taken Following Receipt of Call:
26
Water System Report of Suspicious Activity

In the event personnel from your water system (or neighbors of
your water system) observe suspicious activity, use
the following checklist to collect as much detail about the
nature of the activity.
1. Types of Suspicious Activity:
“ Breach of security systems (e.g., lock cut, door forced
open)
“ Unauthorized personnel on water system property.
“ Presence of personnel at the water system at unusual
hours
“ Changes in water quality noticed by customers (e.g.,
change in color, odor, taste) that were not planned or
announced by the water system
“ Other (explain)
2. Water System Identification:
Name:
Address:
Telephone:
PWS Owner or Manager’s Name:

3. Alternate Water Source Available: Yes/No If yes, give
name and location:
4. Location of Suspicious Activity:
� Distribution Line
� Other (explain):
� Water Storage
Facilities
�Treatment Plant
� Raw Water Source
� Treatment
Chemicals
27

5. If Breach of Security, What was the Nature of the Breach?
� Lock was cut or broken, permitting unauthorized entry.
Specify location
� Lock was tampered with, but not sufficiently to allow
unauthorized entry.
Specify location
� Door, gate, window, or any other point of entry (vent, hatch,
etc.) was open and unsecured
Specify location
� Other
Specify nature and location
6. Unauthorized personnel on site?
Where were these people?
Specify location
What made them suspicious?
� Not wearing water system uniforms
� Something else? (Specify)

What were they doing?
7. Please describe these personnel (height, weight, hair color,
clothes, facial hair, any distinguishing
marks):
8. Call Received By (Name, Address, and Telephone
Number):
Date Call Received:
Time of Call:
9. Call Reported to: Date/Time:
10. Action(s) Taken Following Receipt of Call:
28
Certification of Completion of Assessment
A final step in completing the “Security Vulnerability Self-

Assessment Guide for Small Drinking Water Systems Serving
Populations
Between 3,300 and 10,000” is to notify the state drinking water
primacy agency that the assessment has been conducted. Please
fill in the
following information and send this page only to the appropriate
state drinking water primacy agency contact so that this
certification can be
included in the records that the state maintains on your water
system.
• DO NOT send the completed vulnerability assessment (VA) to
your state primacy agency unless your state requires VA
submittals.
• DO send the completed VA to the U.S. EPA Administrator by
June 30, 2004 to satisfy the requirements of the Federal
Bioterrorism
Act. You must also certify to the U.S. EPA Administrator that
you have developed or updated your emergency response plan
based on your VA within six months of submitting your VA to
the U.S. EPA. The Agency will be providing instructions to
water
systems to follow when submitting your VA and certification.
Please follow these U.S. EPA procedures when released.
Public Water System
(PWS) ID: Number:
System Name:
Address:
Town/City: State:

ZIP Code:
Phone: Fax:
Email:
Person Name:
Title:
Address:
Town/City: State:
ZIP Code:
Phone: Fax:
Email:
24 Hour Emergency Contact Information for Your
System:
Contact Person: First Name: Last Name:
Daytime Phone: Fax:
Emergency Phone :
E-mail :
Cell Phone:
I certify that the information in this vulnerability assessment
has been completed to the best of my knowledge and that the

appropriate
parties have been notified of the assessment and recommended
steps to be taken to enhance the security of the water system.
Furthermore, a copy of the completed assessment will be
retained at the public water system, in a secure location, for
state review as
requested.
Signed_______________________________________________
_____ Date_______________________
29
30
DISCLAIMER
This document contains information on how to plan for
protection of the
assets of your water system. The work necessarily addresses
problems in a
general nature. You should review local, state, and Federal laws
and
regulations to see how they apply to your specific situation.
Knowledgeable professionals prepared this document using
current
information. The authors make no representation, expressed or
implied, that
this information is suitable for any specific situation. The
authors have no
obligation to update this work or to make notification of any

changes in
statutes, regulations, information, or programs described in this
document.
Publication of this document does not replace the duty of water
systems to
warn and properly train their employees and others concerning
health and
safety risks and necessary precautions at their water systems.
Neither the Association of State Drinking Water Administrators,
the National
Rural Water Association, the U. S. Environmental Protection
Agency, or the
Drinking Water Academy assume any liability resulting from
the use or
reliance upon any information, guidance, suggestions,
conclusions, or
opinions contained in this document.
IntroductionHow to Use this Self-Assessment GuideKeep this
DocumentSecurity Vulnerability Self-AssessmentRecord of
Security Vulnerability Self-Assessment CompletionInventory of
Small Water System Critical ComponentsComponentGeneral
Questions for the Entire Water SystemSecurity Vulnerability
Self-Assessment for Small Water SystemsWater
SourcesDistributionAttachment 1. Prioritization of Needed
ActionsAttachment 2. Emergency Contact ListSection 1. System
IdentificationSection 2. Notification/Contact Information –
UpdState Notification ListMedia Notification ListSection 3.
Communication and OutreachCommunicationAttachment 3:
Threat Identification ChecklistsWater System Telephone Threat
Identification ChecklistCertification of Completion of
Assessment

Case Name:
Davis VS Alabama State Bar
Citation Information:
676 So.2d 306 1996
Facts:
Issue:
Rule of Law:
The model code of professional responsibility
Analysis

Conclusion
Water and terrorism
Peter H. Gleick
Pacific Institute, 654 13th Street, Oakland, California, USA.
www.pacinst.org. Tel: 510 251 1600. Fax: 510 251 2203.
E-mail:[email protected]
Received 31 July 2006; accepted in revised form 14 August
2006
Abstract
The importance of freshwater and water infrastructure to human
and ecosystem health and to the smooth
functioning of a commercial and industrial economy makes
water and water systems targets for terrorism. The

chance that terrorists will strike at water systems is real;
indeed, there is a long history of such attacks. Water
infrastructure can be targeted directly or water can be
contaminated through the introduction of poison or disease-
causing agents. The damage is done by hurting people,
rendering water unusable, or destroying purification and
supply infrastructure. More uncertain, however, is how
significant such threats are today, compared with other
targets that may be subject to terrorist attack, or how effective
such attacks would actually be. Analysis and
historical evidence suggest that massive casualties from
attacking water systems are difficult to produce, although
there may be some significant exceptions. At the same time, the
risk of societal disruptions, disarray, and even
overreaction on the part of governments and the public from any
attack, may be high. This paper reviews the
history of past attacks on water systems and the most pressing
vulnerabilities and risks facing modern water
systems. Suggestions of ways to reduce those risks are also
presented.
Keywords: Biological warfare; Chemical warfare; Distribution
systems; Eco-terrorism; Environmental
terrorism; Water and terrorism; Water supply

Introduction
Water is a fundamental resource for human and economic
welfare and modern society depends
on complex, interconnected water infrastructure to provide
reliable safe water supplies and to remove
and treat wastewater. This infrastructure is vital for human
welfare and economic development
and it is vulnerable to intentional disruption from war, intrastate
violence and, of more recent
concern, terrorism.
doi: 10.2166/wp.2006.035
Water Policy 8 (2006) 481–503
q IWA Publishing 2006
There is a long history of using water as a political or military
target or tool, going back over 2,500
years (Gleick, 2004). Water resources and systems are attractive
targets because there is no substitute for
water. Whether its lack is due to natural scarcity, a physical
supply interruption or contamination, a
community of any size that lacks sufficient fresh water will
suffer greatly. Furthermore, a community

does not have to lack water to suffer. Too much water at the
wrong time can also lead to death and
great damage.
The chance that terrorists will strike at water systems is real but
poorly understood by water managers
and the public. This paper reviews the history of past attacks on
water systems and the most pressing
vulnerabilities and risks facing modern water systems.
Suggestions for ways to reduce those risks are
also presented.
Water infrastructure can be targeted directly or water can be
contaminated through the intentional
introduction of poison or disease-causing agents. The damage is
done by hurting people, rendering water
unusable, or destroying purification and supply infrastructure.
Some important water facilities, such as
dams, reservoirs and pipelines, are easily accessible to the
public at various points and there are new
worries that computer control systems may be accessible to
hacking. Many large dams are tourist
attractions and offer tours to the public, while many reservoirs
are open to the public for recreational
boating and swimming. Pipelines are often exposed for long
distances. Water and wastewater treatment

plants dot our urban and rural landscape.
What is less clear, however, is how significant such threats are
today, compared with other targets
that may be subject to terrorist attack, or how effective such
attacks would actually be. Analysis
and historical evidence suggest that massive casualties from
attacking water systems are difficult to
produce, although there may be some significant exceptions. At
the same time, the risk of societal
disruptions, disarray, and even overreaction on the part of
governments and the public from any attack,
may be high.
As an example of the economic and human chaos even moderate
disruption or contamination might
cause, an outbreak of Cryptosporidium in Milwaukee in 1993
killed over a hundred people, affected the
health of over 400,000 more (MacKenzie et al., 1994; Smith,
1994) and cost millions in lost wages and
productivity. That outbreak, completely unrelated to terrorism,
gives some sense of the vulnerability of
modern water systems to similar undetected, intentionally
caused, contamination events.
This article will not offer any new information for those hoping

to harm water systems and all
information used here is derived from open sources and readily
accessible materials. The purpose is to
identify where productive and protective efforts to reduce risks
would be most useful on the part of water
managers and planners and to reduce unnecessary fear and
worry. Proper and appropriate safeguards can
reduce the risks identified here significantly and reduce the
consequences should an event occur.
The worry
The typical scenario for a terrorist attack on domestic water
supplies involves putting a chemical or
biological agent into local water supplies or using conventional
explosives to damage basic
infrastructure such as pipelines, dams and treatment plants. This
is not as straightforward as it sounds.
The number of casualties that would result from such an attack
depends on the system for water
treatment already in place, the type and dosage of poison
ingested, individual resistance, the timing of an
attack and the speed and scope of discovery and response by
local authorities.
P. H. Gleick / Water Policy 8 (2006) 481–503482

Most biological pathogens cannot survive in water and most
chemicals require very large volumes
to contaminate a water system to any significant degree. Many
pathogens and chemicals are
vulnerable to the kinds of water treatment used to make it
potable for human use. Indeed, the whole
purpose of municipal water systems is to destroy biological
pathogens and reduce the concentration of
harmful chemicals through chlorination, filtration, ultraviolet
radiation, ozonation and many other
common treatment approaches. Many contaminants are also
broken down over time by sunlight and
other natural processes. Most infrastructure has built-in
redundancy that reduces vulnerability to
physical attacks.
Because of these safeguards, one early commentator noted: “it
is a myth that one can accomplish
[mass destruction] by tossing a small quantity of a ‘super-toxin’
into the water supply. . .it would be
virtually impossible to poison a large water supply: hydrolysis,
chlorination and the required quantity of
the toxin are the inhibiting factors” (Kupperman & Trent,
1979).

It is important to note, however, that terrorist attacks that fail to
kill or injure large numbers of people
may still have important political repercussions by affecting
public perception, reducing confidence in
institutions and forcing inappropriate political responses.
Society reacts differently to natural and
human-caused disasters: we often accept large casualties from
natural disasters with a degree of
sanguinity not matched by our response to intentional acts of
violence (Wardlaw, 1989). Terrorism
destroys our sense of safety and normality and introduces new
and often substantial stress and
uncertainty in individuals and communities (Ursano et al.,
2003).
Even a plausible public threat has the potential to cause fear and
anxiety. The best defenses against
such threats are public confidence in water management
systems, rapid and effective water quality
monitoring, and strong and effective information dissemination.
While many water districts and
providers have regular mechanisms for communicating with
customers, new tools may be valuable in
countering the threat of water-related terrorism and ensuring
public confidence and calm.

As we have seen in the past several years, responses to the
threat of terrorism can often be ineffective
or ill-considered. Even governmental and public responses to
natural disasters, for which planning – in
theory – is well advanced, are often inadequate when actual
disasters occur. As a result, the adverse
reactions resulting from an intentional effort to contaminate or
damage public water systems may be
both significant and underestimated. The solution to this must
include efforts both to prevent such
attacks and to educate the public and media about actual risks
and consequences.
Defining terrorism: the context of water systems
As many previous observers have noted, defining “terrorism” is
problematic (Hoffman, 1998;
Wardlaw, 1989; Schmid, 1997; Martin, 2006) A detailed review
of the challenges of defining
“terrorism”, especially in the context of water systems, is
provided by Gleick (2006: Chapter 1). No
standard or consistent definition is used by federal or state
agencies in the United States, although most
follow the form of that adopted by the US Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI): “the unlawful use of

force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or
coerce a government, the civilian
population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political
or social objectives” (US Code of Federal
Regulations (28 CFR Section 0.85)). Similarly, Title 22, Section
2656 of the US Code states, “Terrorism
means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated
against non-combatant targets by
sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to
influence an audience.”
P. H. Gleick / Water Policy 8 (2006) 481–503 483
Both of these definitions focus on motive – the “furtherance of
political or social objectives”. Such
motives can also include religious, cultural, economic or
psychological factors. Increasingly important,
however, is the question of targets. In traditional discussions
about terrorism, targets are usually
governments, political figures, objects of economic or social
significance, or random civilians. But both
motives and targets can include environmental and ecological
resources such as water and built
water systems.

The social and cultural value and importance of water systems
also make them attractive targets. By
calling attention to the inability of governments to protect vital
symbols of civilization, terrorists can
raise doubts about controlling authorities. As Thornton (1964)
noted: “The relatively high efficiency of
terrorism derives from its symbolic nature. If the terrorist
comprehends that he is seeking a
demonstration effect, he will attack targets with a maximum
symbolic value.” There are few natural
resources with more symbolic power than water.
Environmental terrorism, eco-terrorism, and environmental
warfare
Important distinctions should be made between two different
categories: environmental terrorism
and eco-terrorism. The focus of this article is on the first of
these, but I discuss the second to provide
some perspective.
In recent years, US law enforcement agencies have had to deal
with a range of concerns and
activities increasingly defined as “terrorism” with an
environmental or ecological context. For example,
in 2006 the FBI announced arrests in several cases of property
destruction thought to have been

caused by extreme animal rights or groups with “environmental”
agendas. Indeed, FBI Director Mueller
said one of the Bureau’s “highest domestic terrorism priorities”
is prosecuting people who commit
crimes “in the name of animal rights or the environment”
(Janofsky, 2006). This kind of activity,
however, should be considered “eco-terrorism”, not
“environmental terrorism” (Schwartz, 1998;
Schofield, 1999).
There is an important distinction between the two. The term
“environmental terrorism” should
exclusively refer to the unlawful use of force against
environmental resources or systems with the intent
to harm individuals or deprive populations of environmental
benefit(s) in the name of a political or social
objective. This distinguishes it from “eco-terrorism”, which
should only be considered the unlawful use
of force against people or property with the intent of saving the
environment from further human
encroachment and destruction. The professed aim of eco-
terrorists is to slow or halt exploitation of
natural resources and to bring public attention to environmental
issues (see Lee, 1995; Chalecki, 2001).

Simply put, environmental terrorism involves targeting natural
resources for a political, social or
economic objective. Eco-terrorism involves targeting social,
political or economic resources for an
environmental objective. The former is the subject of this
article.
History of water-related terrorism
There is a long history of the use of water resources as both a
target and tool of war and terrorism
(Gleick, 1993, 2004). Water resources or systems can be used as
delivery vehicles to cause violence to a
human population. Water supplies can be poisoned; dams can be
destroyed to harm downstream
populations. Table 1 lists examples from the Water and Conflict
Chronology that can be described as
terrorism. Even popular culture reflects public interest and
concern over these issues. Box 1 lists some
popular novels and films that use water-related terrorism in the
plot or theme.
The recorded history of attacks on water systems goes back
4,500 years ago, when Urlama, King of

Lagash from 2450 to 2400 BC, diverted water from this region
to boundary canals, drying up boundary
ditches to deprive the neighboring city state of Umma of water.
His son Il later cut off the water supply to
Girsu, a city in Umma. In an early example of biowarfare (or
bioterrorism, depending on one’s
understanding of “states” and “governments” at the time) Solon
of Athens besieged Cirrha around 600
BC for a wrong done to the temple of Apollo and put the poison
hellebore roots (or rye ergot – reports
differ) into the local water supply. This reportedly caused the
Cirrhaeans to become violently ill and
facilitated the subsequent capture of the city (Eitzen &
Takafuji, 1997).
Many of the recorded instances of violence by individuals and
non-state groups concerning water
focus on perceived inequities associated with water
development projects or controversial decisions
about allocations of water. Often, marginalized groups faced
with the construction of water systems that
appropriate local water resources have responded by threatening
or attacking those systems. This
violence may be related to both absolute deprivation, where
access to the most basic of needs is denied to

a group or region, and to relative deprivation, where basic needs
are met, but water allocations or control
are perceived to be unfair or inequitable. Examples of violence
related to both absolute and relative
deprivation of water can be found in Table 1. In one of the
earliest reported acts, an angry mob in New
York in 1748 burned down a ferry house on the Brooklyn shore
of the East River, reportedly as revenge
for unfair allocation of East River water rights (Museum of the
City of New York (MCNY), no date). In
the 1840s and 1850s, groups attacked small dams and reservoirs
in the eastern and central USA because
of concerns about threats to health and to local water supplies
(Table 1). In a now famous case, between
1907 and 1913, farmers in the Owens Valley of California
repeatedly dynamited the aqueduct system
being built to divert their water to the growing city of Los
Angeles (Reisner, 1993).
Box 1. Environmental terrorism, eco-terrorism, water and
popular culture.
Popular culture often portrays terrorism in dramatic ways that
either influence perceptions of
threats (Jenkins, 2000) or reflect public fears and concerns.
Environmental and eco-terrorism

involving water have long been included among those threats.
Kurt Vonnegut’s classic book Cat’s
Cradle (1963) describes an amoral genius who creates “ice-
nine” – a chemical that freezes water at
room temperature and ends up destroying the world. Edward
Abbey’s (1975) novel The Monkey
Wrench Gang and Johnson and Bent’s film Christie Malry’s
Own Double Entry featured blowing up
dams, poisoning water supplies and attacking resources for
political or environmental purposes.
Wilson and Leeson’s 2002 movie The Tuxedo starring Jackie
Chan features a power hungry bottled-
water mogul trying to destroy the world’s natural water supply
to force everyone to drink his bottled
water. The movie Batman Begins, released in 2005, portrayed a
terrorist attempt to destroy Gotham
by introducing a vapor-borne hallucinogen into the water system
and releasing it throughout the city.
In early 2006, an independent feature film, Waterborne, was
released, which follows the fictional
aftermath of a bio-terrorist attack on the water supply of Los
Angeles. And V for Vendetta (2006)
features corrupt government leaders contaminating London’s
water supply to kill people, spread fear

and consolidate power.
Table 1. Water and terrorism chronology
1
.
Date Parties involved
Violent conflict
or in the context
of violence? Description
1748 United States Yes Ferry house on Brooklyn shore of East
River burns down. New Yorkers accuse
Brooklynites of having set the fire as revenge for unfair East
River water rights.
1841 Canada Yes A reservoir in Ops Township, Upper Canada
(now Ontario) was destroyed by neighbors
who considered it a hazard to health.
1844 United States Yes A reservoir in Mercer County, Ohio was
destroyed by a mob that considered it a hazard
to health.
1850s United States Yes Attack on a New Hampshire dam that
impounded water for factories downstream, by local

residents unhappy over its effect on water levels.
1853–1861 United States Yes Repeated destruction of the banks
and reservoirs of the Wabash and Erie Canal in southern
Indiana by mobs regarding it as a health hazard.
1887 United States Yes Dynamiting of a canal reservoir in
Paulding County, Ohio by a mob regarding it as a health
hazard. State militia called out to restore order.
1890 Canada Yes Partly successful attempt to destroy a lock on
the Welland Canal in Ontario, Canada either
by Fenians protesting against English Policy in Ireland or by
agents of Buffalo NY grain handlers unhappy at the diversion of
trade through the canal.
1907–1913 Owens Valley,
Los Angeles, California
Yes The Los Angeles Valley aqueduct/pipeline suffers repeated
bombings in an effort to prevent
diversions of water from the Owens Valley to Los Angeles.
1965 Israel, Palestinians Yes First attack claimed by the
Palestinian National Liberation Movement Al-Fatah is on the
diversion pumps for the Israeli national water carrier. Attack
fails.

1970 United States No: threat The Weathermen, a group
opposed to American imperialism and the Vietnam war,
allegedly attempt to obtain biological agents to contaminate the
water supply systems
of US urban centers.
1972 United States No: threat Two members of the right-wing
“Order of the Rising Sun” are arrested in Chicago with
30–40 kg of typhoid cultures that are allegedly to be used to
poison the water supply in
Chicago, St. Louis and other cities. It was felt that the plan
would have been unlikely to
cause serious health problems owing to chlorination of the
water supplies.
1972 United States No: threat Reported threat to contaminate
water supply of New York City with nerve gas.
1973 Germany No: threat Threat by a biologist in Germany to
contaminate water supplies with bacilli of anthrax and
botulinum unless he was paid US$8.5 million.
1977 United States Yes Contamination of a North Carolina
reservoir with unknown materials. According to Clark:
“Safety caps and valves were removed, and poison chemicals
were sent into the reservoir....
Water had to be brought in.”

1978–1984 Sudan Yes Demonstrations in Juba, Sudan in 1978
opposing the construction of the Jonglei Canal led
to the deaths of two students. Construction of the Jonglei Canal
in the Sudan was forcibly
suspended in 1984 following a series of attacks on the
construction site.
Continued
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Table 1. (continued)
Violent conflict
or in the context
1980s Mozambique, Rhodesia/
Zimbabwe, South Africa
Yes Regular destruction of power lines from Cahora Bassa Dam
during fight for independence
in the region. Dam targeted by RENAMO (Mozambican
National Resistance).
1982 United States No: threat Los Angeles police and the FBI
arrest a man who was preparing to poison the city’s water

supply with a biological agent.
1983 Israel No The Israeli government reported that it had
uncovered a plot by Israeli Arabs to poison
the water in Galilee with “an unidentified powder”.
1984 United States Yes Members of the Rajneeshee religious
cult contaminate a city water supply tank in
The Dalles, Oregon, using Salmonella. A community outbreak
of over 750 cases occurred
in a county that normally reports fewer than five cases per year.
1985 United States No: threat Law enforcement authorities
discovered that a small survivalist group in the Ozark
Mountains of Arkansas known as The Covenant, the Sword, and
the Arm of the Lord
(CSA) had acquired a drum containing 30 gallons of potassium
cyanide, with the apparent
intent to poison water supplies in New York, Chicago and
Washington, DC. CSA members
devised the scheme in the belief that such attacks would make
the Messiah return more
quickly by punishing unrepentant sinners. The objective
appeared to be mass murder in the
name of a divine mission rather than to change government
policy. The amount of poison

possessed by the group is believed to have been insufficient to
contaminate the water
supply of even one city.
1991 Canada No: threat A threat is made via an anonymous
letter to contaminate the water supply of the city of
Kelowna, British Columbia, with “biological contaminates”
[sic]. The motive was apparently
“associated with the Gulf War”. The security of the water
supply was increased in
response and no group was identified as the perpetrator.
1992 Turkey Yes Lethal concentrations of potassium cyanide
were reported discovered in the water tanks of a
Turkish Air Force compound in Istanbul. The Kurdish Workers’
Party (PKK) claimed credit.
1993 Iran No A report suggests that proposals were made at a
meeting of fundamentalist groups in
Tehran, under the auspices of the Iranian Foreign Ministry, to
poison water supplies of
major cities in the West “as a possible response to Western
offensives against Islamic
organizations and states”.
1994 Moldavia No: threat Reported threat by Moldavian
General Nikolay Matveyev to contaminate the water supply

of the Russian 14th Army in Tiraspol, Moldova, with mercury.
1998 Tajikistan No: threat On November 6, a guerrilla
commander threatened to blow up a dam on the Kairakkhum
channel if political demands were not met. Col. Makhmud
Khudoberdyev made the threat,
reported by the ITAR-Tass News Agency.
Continued
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Violent conflict
or in the context
1998 (1994) United States No The Washington Post reports a
12-year old computer hacker broke into the SCADA
computer system that runs Arizona’s Roosevelt Dam, giving
him complete control of the
dam’s massive floodgates. The cities of Mesa, Tempe and
Phoenix, Arizona are downstream
of this dam. No damage was done. This report turns out to be
incorrect. A hacker did break

into the computers of an Arizona water facility, the Salt River
Project in the Phoenix area.
But he was 27, not 12, and the incident occurred in 1994, not
1998. And while clearly
trespassing in critical areas, investigators concluded that the
hacker never could have had
control of any dams and that no lives or property were ever
threatened.
1998 Democratic Republic
of Congo
Yes Attacks on Inga Dam during efforts to topple President
Kabila. Disruption of electricity
supplies from Inga Dam and water supplies to Kinshasa.
1999 Lusaka, Zambia Yes Bomb blast destroyed the main water
pipeline, cutting off water for the city of Lusaka,
population 3 million.
1999 South Africa Yes A home-made bomb was discovered at a
water reservoir at Wallmansthal near Pretoria.
It was thought to have been meant to sabotage water supplies to
farmers.
1999 Angola Yes 100 bodies were found in four drinking water
wells in central Angola.
1999 East Timor Yes Militia opposing East Timor independence

kill pro-independence supporters and throw
bodies in water well.
1998–1999 Kosovo Yes Contamination of water supplies/wells
by Serbs disposing of bodies of Kosovar Albanians
in local wells. Other reports of Yugoslav federal forces
poisoning wells with carcasses
and hazardous materials.
2000 Belgium Yes In July, workers at the Cellatex chemical
plant in northern France dumped 5000 liters of
sulfuric acid into a tributary of the Meuse River when they were
denied workers’ benefits.
A French analyst pointed out that this was the first time “the
environment and public
health were made hostage in order to exert pressure, an
unheard-of situation until now”.
2000 Australia Yes In Queensland, Australia, on 23 April, 2000,
police arrested a man for using a computer
and radio transmitter to take control of the Maroochy Shire
wastewater system and release
sewage into parks, rivers and property.
2001 Israel, Palestine Yes Palestinians destroy water supply
pipelines to West Bank settlement of Yitzhar and to
Kibbutz Kisufim. Agbat Jabar refugee camp near Jericho was

disconnected from its water
supply after Palestinians looted and damaged local water
pumps. Palestinians accuse Israel
of destroying a water cistern, blocking water tanker deliveries
and attacking materials for
a wastewater treatment project.
Continued
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Violent conflict
or in the context
2001 Pakistan Yes Civil unrest over severe water shortages
were caused by a long-term drought. Protests began in
March and April and continued into summer, with riots, four
bombs in Karachi (June 13), one
death, 12 injuries and 30 arrests. Ethnic conflicts arose as some
groups “accuse the government
of favoring the populous Punjab province [over Sindh province]
in water distribution”.

2001 Macedonia Yes Water flow to Kumanovo (population
100,000) was cut off for 12 days in conflict between
ethnic Albanians and Macedonian forces. Valves at plants on
Glaznja and Lipkovo Lakes
were damaged.
2001 Philippines No Philippine authorities shut off water to six
remote southern villages after residents
complained of a foul smell from their taps, raising fears Muslim
guerrillas had contaminated
the supplies. Abu Sayyaf guerrillas, accused of links with
Osama bin Laden, had threatened to
poison the water supply in the mainly Christian town of Isabela
on Basilan island if the
military did not stop an offensive against them.
2002 Nepal Yes The Khumbuwan Liberation Front (KLF) blew
up a hydroelectric powerhouse of 250 kW
in Bhojpur District on January 26. The power supply to Bhojpur
and adjoining areas was
cut off. Estimated repair time was six months; repair costs were
estimated at 10 million
Rs. By June 2002, Maoist rebels had destroyed more than seven
micro-hydro projects as
well as an intake of a drinking water project and pipelines
supplying water to Khalanga

in western Nepal.
2002 Rome, Italy No: threat Italian police arrest four
Moroccans allegedly planning to contaminate the water supply
system in Rome with a cyanide-based chemical, targeting
buildings that included the
United States embassy. Ties to Al-Qaida were suggested.
2002 United States No: threat Papers seized during the arrest of
a Lebanese national in Seattle included “instructions on
poisoning water sources” from a London-based Al-Qaida
recruiter. The FBI issued a
bulletin to computer security experts around the country
indicating that Al-Qaida terrorists
may have been studying American dams and water-supply
systems in preparation for new
attacks. “US law enforcement and intelligence agencies have
received indications that
Al-Qaida members have sought information on supervisory
control and data acquisition
(SCADA) systems available on multiple SCADA-related
websites” reads the bulletin,
according to SecurityFocus. “They specifically sought
information on water supply and
wastewater management practices in the US and abroad.”

2002 Colombia Yes The Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia (FARC) detonated an explosive device
planted on a German-made gate valve located inside a tunnel in
the Chingaza Dam, which
provides most of Bogota’s water.
2002 United States No: threat Earth Liberation Front threatens
the water supply of the town of Winter Park. Previously,
this group claimed responsibility for the destruction of a ski
lodge in Vail, Colorado that
threatened lynx habitat.
Continued
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Violent conflict
or in the context
2003 United States No: threat Al-Qaida threatens US water
systems via a call to a Saudi Arabian magazine. Al-Qaida does
not “rule out. . .the poisoning of drinking water in American
and Western cities”.

2003 United States Yes Four incendiary devices were found in
the pumping station of a Michigan water-bottling plant.
The Earth Liberation Front (ELF) claimed responsibility,
accusing Ice Mountain Water
Company of “stealing” water for profit. Ice Mountain is a
subsidiary of Nestle Waters.
2003 Colombia Yes A bomb blast at the Cali Drinking Water
Treatment Plant killed three workers May 8. The
workers were members of a trade union involved in intense
negotiations over privatization
of the water system.
2003 Jordan No: threat Jordanian authorities arrested Iraqi
agents in connection with a failed plot to poison the
water supply that serves American troops in the eastern
Jordanian desert near the border
with Iraq.
2003 Iraq Yes Sabotage/bombing of main water pipeline in
Baghdad. The sabotage of the water pipeline
was the first such strike against Baghdad’s water system, city
water engineers said. An
explosive was fired at the six-foot-wide water main in the
northern part of Baghdad,
according to the chief engineer for the city’s water treatment

plants.
2003–2004 Sudan Yes The ongoing civil war in the Sudan has
included violence against water resources. In 2003,
villagers from around Tina said that bombings had destroyed
water wells. In Khasan
Basao they alleged that water wells were poisoned. In 2004,
wells in Darfur were reportedly
contaminated as part of a strategy of harassment against
displaced populations.
2004 Pakistan Yes In military action aimed at Islamic terrorists,
including Al Qaida and the Islamic Movement
of Uzbekistan, homes, schools and water wells were damaged
and destroyed.
2004 India, Kashmir Yes Twelve Indian security forces were
killed by an IED planted in an underground water pipe
during “counter-insurgency operation in Khanabal area in
Anantnag district”.
2006 Sri Lanka Yes Tamil Tiger rebels cut the water supply to
government-held villages in northeastern
Sri Lanka. Sri Lankan government forces then launched attacks
on the reservoir, declaring
the Tamil actions to be terrorism.
Sources: complete source information for each event is
available at www.worldwater.org and in Gleick (2006).

1
This table is a subset of water-related conflicts reported in the
Pacific Institute’s Water Conflict Chronology
(www.worldwater.org). Only included are those
incidents that fall under the broad definition of environmental
terrorism, defined here as: “the unlawful use of force against
environmental resources or systems
with the intent to harm individuals or deprive populations of
environmental benefit(s) in the name of a political or social
objective”. Please remember the
caution, described in the text, that one person’s “terrorist” is
another person’s “freedom fighter”. As a result, some of these
events as “terrorism” will be
controversial to some of the parties involved. My objective is
not to offend. Also, because of the evolution of the concept of
nations and states, I’ve excluded
from this list all water and conflict events before the mid-
1700s. I’ve also excluded numerous development disputes
where individuals or sub-national groups
take violent action as a result of water disputes, shortages or
allocation controversies, i.e. where people fight over water for
the sake of water. I note, however,
the difficulty of defining “terrorism” (as opposed to military
target, tool, or goal or other category) and caution readers to
use care in applying these categories.
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The first reported attack of the Palestinian National Liberation

Movement, Al-Fatah, was in 1965 on
the diversion pumps of the Israeli national water carrier (Naff &
Matson, 1984) and the region has seen
many more examples. In 2001, Palestinians attacked and
vandalized water pipes leading to the Israeli
settlement of Yitzhar to try to force the Israelis out of the
settlement. Around the same time, Palestinians
accused Israel of destroying a water cistern, blocking water
tanker deliveries and attacking materials for
a wastewater treatment project (Israel Line, 2001a,b; ENS,
2001).
Rivers and water supply infrastructure such as reservoirs can be
especially vulnerable to this type of
terrorism, since they are publicly accessible in many places. In
July 1999, engineers discovered an
unexploded bomb in a water reservoir near Pretoria, South
Africa. The bomb, which had malfunctioned,
would have been powerful enough to deprive farmers, a nearby
military base and a hydrological research
facility of water (Pretoria Dispatch Online, 1999). In 2000, a
simulated terrorist attack on the Lake
Nacimiento Dam caused some local panic in central California
until the media was belatedly notified
that the situation was merely a disaster preparedness drill

(Gaura, 2000).
Motives for such attacks can be economic as well as political.
In July 2000, workers at the Cellatex
chemical plant in northern France dumped 5000 liters of
sulfuric acid into a tributary of the Meuse River
when they were denied workers’ benefits. Whether they were
trying to kill wildlife, people, both or
neither is unclear, but a French analyst pointed out that this was
the first time “the environment and
public health were made hostage in order to exert pressure, an
unheard-of situation until now” (Christian
Science Monitor, 2000).
More recently, a series of events in India, Pakistan, the Persian
Gulf and the Middle East have
reaffirmed the attractiveness of water and water systems as
targets for terrorists in a wide range of
unrelated conflicts and disputes. The major water pipeline to
Baghdad was attacked in 2003. The same
year, Al-Qaida threatened US water systems in a call published
in a Saudi Arabian magazine: “Al-Qaida
does not ‘rule out. . .the poisoning of drinking water in
American and Western cities’” (Associated Press,
2003; Waterman, 2003). In 2004, twelve Indian security forces
were killed by an explosive device

planted in an underground water pipe during a “counter-
insurgency operation in Khanabal area in
Anantnag district” (TNN, 2004). In an unusual twist to this
problem, the United States responded to a
Palestinian attack on US diplomatic personnel in the Middle
East by canceling plans for a water-
development project in the Gaza Strip (Associated Press, 2004).
Vulnerability of water and water systems
Infrastructure attacks
The most traditional form of water-related terrorism involves
physical attacks on water infrastructure –
specifically water-supply dams and pipelines. One such attack
might target a large hydroelectric dam on a
major river or a major water supply system for a city. Terrorists
equipped with a relatively small
conventional explosive might not be able to cause serious
structural damage to a massive dam, which is,
after all, usually a giant block of rock, earth or concrete. But
the adverse consequences of a major dam
failure make the risk worth both assessing and reducing. A
major dam failure can kill thousands of people
and even more modest damage might interrupt power generation
or affect some other important water-

system operation.
Some natural disasters involving water infrastructure offer
insights into the risks of water-related
terrorism. In 1975, the Banqiao and Shimantan dams on
tributaries of the Huang He (Yellow) River in
China failed in sequence, contributing to the subsequent
destruction of dozens of lower dams and the
deaths of 85,000 people (Yi, 1998). The famous Johnston Flood
of 1889 killed more than 2,200 people
when the collapse of a poorly built dam sent a massive wall of
water through the poor steel town of
Johnston, Pennsylvania. At least 400 people died in California
in 1928 when the Saint Francis dam failed
in San Francisquito Canyon. Worldwide, millions of people live
in the floodplains below large dams and
reservoirs. In addition to the potential loss of life, there are also
secondary impacts including water
quality problems, loss of freshwater supply and hydroelectric
power, damage to property and
commercial fisheries, and recreation losses.

While many municipal water systems are built with redundancy
and backup systems, others have
particularly vulnerable points, such as single large pipelines,
pumping plants or treatment systems. The
bombing of the major water pipeline entering Baghdad in 2003
highlights such vulnerabilities (Tierney
& Worth, 2003).
A more modern infrastructure concern is the use of remote
computers to attack valves, pumps
and chemical processing equipment though computer-based
controls. If a group or individual could
gain control over the automated operations of water facilities,
water supplies or quality could be
seriously compromised. These control systems were typically
developed with no attention to security.
As a result, many of the supervisory control and data
acquisition (SCADA) networks used by water
agencies to collect data from sensors and control equipment
“may be susceptible to attacks and misuse”
(Heilprin, 2005).
There is growing recognition of this risk (Littleton, 1995). In
1990, the United States issued National
Security Decision Directive 42, which states in part:

Telecommunications and information processing systems are
highly susceptible to interception,
unauthorized access and related forms of technical exploitation
as well as other dimensions of the
foreign intelligence threat. The technology to exploit these
electronic systems is widespread and is
used extensively by foreign nations and can be employed, as
well, by terrorist groups and criminal
elements. (National Security Directive, 1990).
These risks are more than academic and theoretical. In
Queensland, Australia, on 23 April 2000,
police arrested a man for using a computer and radio transmitter
to take control of the Maroochy Shire
wastewater system and release sewage into parks, rivers and
property. This is one of the first documented
cases of cyber-terrorism in the water industry (Gellman, 2002).
Fears that Al-Quaida were seeking
information on SCADA systems materialized in 2002: “US law
enforcement and intelligence agencies
have received indications that Al-Qaida members have sought
information on supervisory control and
data acquisition (SCADA) systems” (McDonnell & Meyer,
2002; MSNBC, 2002).
Chemical and biological attacks

Of growing concern is the risk of chemical and biological
attacks on water systems. This type of attack
is often portrayed as follows. Terrorists introduce water-soluble
biological or chemical contaminants
into a publicly accessible city water supply. In the best-case
scenario, the contaminant is detected as it
enters the water treatment plant and the plant is shut down
while the contaminant is neutralized. This can
result in interruption of potable water service to the city and a
“boil water” alert for city residents. In the
worst-case scenario, the contaminant is undetected and people
begin to get sick, panic ensues and health
and economic damages soar.
Chemical and biological attacks on water may not be as easy as
often portrayed. In order to be
effective as a tool of water-related terrorism, a chemical or
biological weapon must be:
. (Weaponized: it must be produced and disseminated in
quantities sufficient to have the intended
effect.
. (Appropriate for water dissemination: it must be viable,

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