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[G.R. No. 118708. February 2, 1998]
CRESER PRECISION SYSTEMS, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND FLORO INTERNATIONAL
CORP., respondents.
MARTINEZ, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari assails the decision[1]. The decision of the Court of
Appeals waspennedbyJustice GloriaC. Paras and concurredinbyJustice Salome A. Montoya and
Justice Hector L. Hofileña.
1 of the Court of Appeals datedNovember 9, 1994 in C.A.-G.R. SP. No. 34425 entitled “Floro
InternationalCorp. vs. Hon. Tirso D.CCruz and Creser PrecisionSystem, Inc.”, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, THE PETITION IS HEREBY GRANTED. THE COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTION AND
DAMAGES, CIVIL CASE NO. 93-1856 BEFORE THE RESPONDENT JUDGE IS HEREBY ORDERED
DISMISSEDAND HISORDERSTHEREIN OF DECEMBER29, 1993 AND MAY 11, 1994 ARE ORDERED SET
ASIDE.”
Private respondent is a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture, production,
distribution andsale ofmilitaryarmaments, munitions, airmunitions andother similar materials.[2]
On January23, 1990, private respondent wasgrantedbythe Bureau of Patents, Trademarks
and TechnologyTransfer (BPTTT), a Letters Patent No. UM-6938[3] covering anaerialfuze which was
published inthe September-October 1990, Vol. III, No. 5 issue of the Bureau of Patent’s Official
Gazette.[4]
Sometime in November 1993, private respondent, throughits president, Mr. GregoryFloro, Jr.,
discoveredthat petitioner submittedsamplesof its patented aerial fuze to the ArmedForces of the
Philippines (AFP) for testing. He learnedthat petitioner was claimingthe aforesaid aerial fuze as its
own andplanningto bidandmanufacture the same commerciallywithout license or authority from
private respondent. Toprotect its right, private respondent on December 3, 1993, sent a letter[5] to
petitioner advising it fro its existing patent andits rights thereunder, warning petitioner of a possible
court actionand/or applicationfor injunction, shouldit proceedwith the scheduled testing by the
military on December 7, 1993.
In response to private respondent’s demand, petitioner filed on December 8, 1993 a
complaint[6] for injunction and damages arising fromthe allegedinfringement before the Regional
Trial Court of QuezonCity, Branch 88. The complaint alleged, amongothers: that petitioner is the
first, true and actual inventor of an aerial fuze denominated as “Fuze, PDR 77 CB4” which is
developedas earlyas December 1981 under the Self-Reliance Defense Posture Program (SRDP) of
the AFP;that sometime in1986, petitioner begansupplyingthe AFPwiththe said aerial fuze; that
private respondent’s aerial fuze is identical ineveryrespect to the petitioner’s fuze; and that the
onlydifference betweenthe two fuzes are miniscule and merely cosmetic in nature. Petitioner
prayed that a temporaryrestraining order and/or writ of preliminaryinjunctionbe issuedenjoining
private respondent includinganyand all persons actingon its behalffrom manufacturing, marketing
and/or profiting therefrom, and/or from performing any other act in connection therewith or
tendingto prejudice anddeprive it of anyrights, privileges and benefits to which it is dulyentitled as
the first, true and actual inventor of the aerial fuze.
On December 10, 1993, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order. Thereafter,
hearings were held on the application of petitioner for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction, withbothparties presentingtheir evidence. After the hearings, the trial court directed
the parties to submit their respective memoranda in support of their positions.
On December 27, 1993, private respondent submitted its memorandum[7] alleging that
petitioner has nocause of action to file a complaint ofinfringement against it since it has no patent
for the aerial fuze whichit claims to have invented;that petitioner’s available remedy is to file a
petitionfor cancellationof patent before the Bureau of Patents; that private respondent as the
patent holder cannot be stripped ofits propertyright over the patented aerial fuze consisting of the
exclusive right to manufacture, use andsell the same andthat it stands to suffer irreparable damage
and injury if it is enjoined from the exercise of its property right over its patent.
On December 29, 1993, the trial court issued an Order[8] granting the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction against private respondent the dispositive portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, plaintiff’s applicationfor the issuance ofa writ of preliminary injunction is granted
and, uponposting of the corresponding bondbyplaintiff inthe amount of PHP 200,000.00, let the
writ of preliminaryinjunction be issuedbythe branchClerk ofthis Court enjoining the defendant
and anyand all persons acting onits behalf or by and under its authority, from manufacturing,
marketing and/or selling aerialfuzes identical, to those of plaintiff, and from profiting therefrom,
and/or from performing anyother act in connectiontherewith until further orders from this Court.”
Private respondent moved for reconsiderationbut this was denied by the trial courts in its
Order[9] of May 11, 1994, pertinent portions of which read:

2. “For resolutionbefore this Court is the Motionfor Reconsiderationfiledbythe defendant and the
plaintiff’s Oppositionthereto. The Court finds no sufficient cause to reconsider its order dated
December 29, 1993. During the hearingfor the issuance ofthe preliminaryinjunction, the plaintiff
has amplyproven its entitlement to the relief prayed for. It is undisputed that the plaintiff has
developedits aerialfuze wayback in1981 while the defendant began manufacturing the same only
in 1987. Thus, it is onlylogical to conclude that it was the plaintiff’s aerial fuze that was copied or
imitatedwhichgives the plaintiff the right to have the defendant enjoined “from manufacturing,
marketing and/or selling aerialfuzes identical to those of the plaintiff, and from profiting therefrom
and/or performinganyother act inconnectiontherewithuntil further orders fromthis Court.” With
regards to the defendant’s assertion that an action for infringement may only be brought by
“anyone possessing right, title or interest to the patentedinvention,” (Section42, RA 165) qualified
by Section 10, RA 165 to include only “the first true and actual inventor, his heirs, legal
representatives to assignees,” this court finds the foregoing to be untenable. Sec. 10 merely
enumerates the persons whomayhave aninventionpatented whichdoesnot necessarily limit to
these persons the right to institute anactionfor infringement. Defendant further contends that the
order in issue is disruptive ofthe status quo. On the contrary, the order issuedbythe Court ineffect
maintained the status quo. The last actual, peaceable uncontested status existing prior to this
controversywas the plaintiffmanufacturing andselling its own aerial fuzes PDR 77 CB4 which was
orderedstoppedthrough the defendant’s letter. Withissuance of the order, the operations of the
plaintiff continue. Lastly, this court believes that the defendant will not suffer irreparable injury by
virtue of said order. The defendant’s claim is primarilyhingedon its patent (Letters Patent No. UM-
6983) the validity of which is being questioned in this case.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby denied for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.”
Aggrieved, private respondent onJune 27, 1994, filed a petitionfor certiorari, mandamus and
prohibition[10]before respondent Court of Appeals raising as grounds the following:
a. Petitioner has nocause ofactionfor infringement against private respondent, the
latter not having anypatent for the aerial fuze whichit claims to have invented
and developed and allegedly infringed by private respondent;
b. The case beinganactionfor cancellation or invalidation of private respondent’s
Letters Patent over its own aerial fuze, the proper venue is the Office of the
Director of Patents;
c. The trial court acted ingrave abuse of discretion and or in excess of jurisdiction in
finding that petitioner hasfullyestablishedits clear title or right to preliminary
injunction;
d. The trial court actedingrave abuse of discretionand/or inexcess ofjurisdiction in
granting the preliminaryinjunction, it being disruptive of the status quo; and
e. The trial court acted in grave abuse of discretionand/or inexcessof jurisdiction in
granting the preliminaryinjunctiontherebydeprivingprivate respondent of its
propertyrights over the patentedaerial fuze andcause it irreparable damages.
On November 9, 1994, the respondent court renderedthe now assaileddecisionreversingthe
trial court’s Order of December 29, 1993 and dismissing the complaint filed by petitioner.
The motionfor reconsideration wasalso deniedonJanuary 17, 1995.[11] Hence, this present
petition.
It is petitioner’s contentionthat it can file, under Section 42 of the Patent Law (R.A. 165), an
actionfor infringement not as a patentee but as an entityin possessionof a right, title or interest in
and to the patentedinvention. It advances the theory that while the absence of a patent may
prevent one from lawfullysuinganother for infringement of said patent, suchabsence does not bar
the first true and actual inventor of the patentedinventionfrom suing another who was granted a
patent ina suit for declaratoryor injunctive relief recognized under American patent laws. This
remedy, petitioner points out, maybe likenedto a civil actionfor infringement under Section 42 of
the Philippine Patent Law.
We find the above arguments untenable.
Section 42 of R.A. 165, otherwise known as the Patent Law, explicitly provides:
SECTION. 42. Civil action for infringement. – Anypatentee, or anyone possessing any right, title or
interest in and to the patentedinvention, whose rights have been infringed, maybring a civil action
before the proper Court of First Instance (nowRegional Trial court), to recover from the infringer
damages sustainedbyreason ofthe infringement and to secure aninjunction for the protection of
his right. x x x
Under the aforequotedlaw, onlythe patentee or hissuccessors-in-interest mayfile an action
for infringement. The phrase “anyone possessing any right, title or interest in and to the patented
invention” upon whichpetitioner maintains its present suit, refers onlyto the patentee’s successors-
in-interest, assignees or granteessince actions for infringement of patent may be brought in the
name ofthe personor persons interested, whether as patentee, assignees or grantees, of the
exclusive right.[12] Moreover, there canbe no infringement of a patent until a patent has been
issued, since whatever right one has to the invention covered bythe patent arises alone from the
grant of patent.[13] In short, a personor entity who has not been granted letters patent over an
inventionandhas not acquiredanyright or title theretoeither as assignee or as licensee, has no
cause of actionfor infringement because the right to maintainaninfringement suit depends on the
existence of the patent.[14]
Petitioner admits it hasno patent over its aerial fuze. Therefore, it has no legal basis or cause
of actionto institute the petition for injunctionand damages arising fromthe alleged infringement
byprivate respondent. While petitioner claims to be the first inventor of the aerial fuze, still it has no
right of propertyover the same uponwhichit can maintaina suit unless it obtains a patent therefor.
Under American jurisprudence, and inventor has no common-law right to a monopoly of his
invention. He has the right to make, use andvend his owninvention, but ifhe voluntarily discloses it,
such as byofferingit for sale, the worldis free to copyanduse it with impunity. A patent, however,
gives the inventor the right to exclude all others. As a patentee, he has the exclusive right ofmaking,
using or selling the invention.[15]
Further, the remedyof declaratoryjudgment or injunctive suit onpatent invalidityreliedupon
bypetitioner cannot be likenedto the civil actionfor infringement under Section 42 of the Patent
Law. The reasonfor this is that the said remedy is available only to the patent holder or his
successors-in-interest. Thus, anyone who hasno patent over aninventionbut claims to have a right
or interest thereto can not file an action for declaratory judgment or injunctive suit which is not
recognizedinthis jurisdiction. Said person, however, is not left without anyremedy. He can, under

3. Section28 of the aforementioned law, file a petitionfor cancellation of the patent within three (3)
years from the publicationof saidpatent withthe Director of Patents andraise as ground therefor
that the person to whom the patent was issued is not the true and actual inventor. Hence,
petitioner’s remedyis not to file an action for injunctionor infringement but to file a petition for
cancellationof private respondent’ patent. Petitioner however failed to do so. As such, it can not
now assailor impugnthe validityof the private respondent’s letters patent byclaiming that it is the
true and actual inventor of the aerial fuze.
Thus, as correctlyruledbythe respondent Court of Appeals inits assaileddecision: “since the
petitioner (private respondent herein) is the patentee of the disputed invention embraced by letters
of patent UM No. 6938 issued to it on January 23, 1990 by the Bureau of Patents, it has in its favor
not only the presumption of validity of its patent, but that of a legal and factual first and true
inventor of the invention.”
In the case of Aguas vs. De Leon,[16] we stated that:
“The validityof the patent issuedbythe Philippine Patent Office in favor of the private respondent
and the question over the investments, noveltyandusefulness of the improved process therein
specified and describedare matters whichare better determinedbythe Philippines patent Office,
composed ofexperts intheir field, have, bythe issuance of the patent in question, accepted the
thinness of the private respondent’s new tiles as a discovery. There is a presumption that the
Philippine Patent Office has correctly determined the patentability of the improvement by the
private respondent of the process in question.”
In fine, in the absence of error or abuse of power or lack or jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion, we sustain the assailed decision of the respondent Court of Appeal.
WHEREFORE, the decisionof the Court ofAppeals is herebyAFFIRMED. No pronouncement as
to costs.
G.R. No. 149907 April 16, 2009
ROMA DRUG and ROMEO RODRIGUEZ, as Proprietor of ROMA DRUG, Petitioners, vs.
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF GUAGUA, PAMPANGA, THE PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR OF
PAMPANGA, BUREAU OF FOOD & DRUGS (BFAD) and GLAXO SMITHKLINE, Respondents.
On 14 August 2000, a teamcomposedof the National Bureauof Investigation(NBI)operatives
and inspectors of the Bureauof FoodandDrugs (BFAD)conducted a raidonpetitioner Roma Drug,
adulyregisteredsole proprietorship of petitioner RomeoRodriguez (Rodriguez) operating a drug
store locatedat SanMatias, Guagua, Pampanga. The raid was conducted pursuant to a search
warrant[1] issuedbythe RegionalTrialCourt (RTC), Branch57, Angeles City. The raiding team seized
several imported medicines, including Augmentin (375mg.) tablets, Orbenin(500mg.)
capsules, Amoxil (250mg.) capsulesand Ampiclox (500mg.).[2] It appears that Roma Drug is one of six
drug stores which were raidedon or around the same time uponthe request ofSmithKline Beecham
ResearchLimited (SmithKline), a duly registered corporation which is the local distributor of
pharmaceutical products manufactured by its parent London-based corporation. The local
SmithKline has since merged with Glaxo Wellcome Phil. Inc to form Glaxo SmithKline, private
respondent inthis case. The seized medicines, which were manufactured by SmithKline, were
importeddirectlyfrom abroad and not purchased through the local SmithKline, the authorized
Philippine distributor of these products.
The NBI subsequentlyfileda complaint against Rodriguezfor violation ofSection4 (inrelation
to Sections 3 and 5) of Republic Act No. 8203, alsoknownas the Special Law on Counterfeit Drugs
(SLCD), with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor in San Fernando, Pampanga. The section
prohibits the sale ofcounterfeit drugs, which under Section 3(b)(3), includes “an unregistered
importeddrug product.” The term“unregistered” signifiesthe lackof registrationwith the Bureauof
Patent, Trademark andTechnologyTransfer of a trademark, tradename or other identification mark
of a drug inthe name ofa natural or juridicalperson, the process of whichis governedunder Part III
of the Intellectual Property Code.
In this case, there is nodoubt that the subject seizeddrugs are identical in content with their
Philippine-registeredcounterparts. There is no claim that they were adulterated in any way or
mislabeledat least. Their classificationas “counterfeit” is based solely on the fact that they were
importedfrom abroadandnot purchasedfrom the Philippine-registered owner of the patent or
trademark of the drugs.
During preliminaryinvestigation, Rodriguezchallengedthe constitutionality of the SLCD.
However, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Celerina C. Pineda skirted the challenge and issued a
Resolutiondated 17 August 2001 recommendingthat Rodriguez be charged withviolationof Section
4(a) of the SLCD. The recommendationwas approvedbyProvincial Prosecutor Jesus Y. Manarang
approved the recommendation.[3]
Hence, the present Petition for Prohibition questing the RTC-Guagua Pampanga and the
Provincial Prosecutor to desist fromfurther prosecuting Rodriguez, and that Sections 3(b)(3), 4 and5
of the SLCD be declaredunconstitutional. Ingist, Rodriguezasserts that the challenged provisions
contravene three provisions of the Constitution. The first is the equal protection clause of the Bill of
Rights. The twoother provisions are Section11, Article XIII, which mandates that the State make
“essential goods, health andother social services available to all the people at affordable cost;” and
Section15, Article II, which states that it is the policy of the State “to protect andpromote the right
to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them.”
Through its Resolutiondated 15 October 2001, the Court issueda temporary restraining
order enjoining the RTCfrom proceeding withthe trial against Rodriguez, andthe BFAD, the NBI and
Glaxo Smithkline from prosecuting the petitioners.[4]
Glaxo Smithkline andthe Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)have opposedthe petition, the
latter inbehalf of public respondents RTC, Provincial Prosecutor and Bureau of Food and Drugs
(BFAD). On the constitutional issue, GlaxoSmithkline asserts the rule that the SLCD is presumed
constitutional, arguing that both Section 15, Article II and Section 11, Article XIII “are not self-
executingprovisions, the disregardof which can give rise to a cause ofactioninthe courts.” It adds
that Section 11, Article XIII inparticular cannot be work “to the oppression and unlawful of the
propertyrights of the legitimate manufacturers, importers or distributors, who take pains in having
importeddrug products registeredbefore the BFAD.” Glaxo Smithkline further claims that the SLCD
does not infact conflict with the aforementionedconstitutional provisions and infact are in accord
with constitutional precepts in favor of the people’s right to health.
The Office of the Solicitor Generalcasts the questionas one of policywisdomof the law that is,
beyond the interference of the judiciary.[5] Again, the presumptionof constitutionalityof statutes is
invoked, and the assertionis made that there is noclear and unequivocal breachof the Constitution
presented by the SLCD.
II.

4. The constitutionalaspect of this petitionraises obviouslyinteresting questions. However, such
questions have infact beenmootedwiththe passage in2008 of Republic Act No. 9502, also known
as the “Universally Accessible Cheaper and Quality Medicines Act of 2008”.[6]
Section7 of Rep. Act No. 9502 amends Section72 of the Intellectual PropertyCode in that the
later law unequivocallygrants thirdpersons the right to import drugs or medicines whose patent
were registered in the Philippines by the owner of the product:
Sec. 7. Section72 of Republic Act No. 8293, otherwise known as the Intellectual
Property Code of the Philippines, is hereby amended to read as follows:
“Sec. 72. Limitations of Patent Rights. – The owner of a patent has no right to
prevent thirdparties fromperforming, without his authorization, the acts referred to
in Section 71 hereof in the following circumstances:
“72.1. Using a patented product which has been put on the market in the
Philippines bythe owner ofthe product, or withhis expressconsent, insofar as such
use is performed after that product has been so put on the said market:
Provided, That, with regard to drugs and medicines, the limitation on patent rights
shall apply after a drug or medicine has been introduced in the Philippines or
anywhere else in the world by the patent owner,
or by any party authorized to use the invention: Provided,
further, That the right to import the drugs and medicines contemplated in this
section shall be available to any government agency or any private third party;
“72.2. Where the act is done privatelyandona non-commercial scale or for a non-
commercial purpose: Provided, That it doesnot significantlyprejudice the economic
interests of the owner of the patent;
“72.3. Where the act consists of making or using exclusivelyfor experimental use of
the inventionfor scientific purposesor educational purposesandsuchother activities
directly related to such scientific or educational experimental use;
“72.4. In the case ofdrugs andmedicines, where the act includes testing, using,
making or sellingthe inventionincludinganydata related thereto, solelyfor purposes
reasonablyrelatedto the development andsubmissionof information and issuance
of approvals by government regulatory agencies required under any law of the
Philippines or of another countrythat regulates the manufacture, construction, use or
sale of anyproduct:Provided, That, in order to protect the data submitted by the
originalpatent holder from unfair commercial use provided in Article 39.3 of the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS
Agreement), the Intellectual PropertyOffice, in consultation with the appropriate
government agencies, shall issue the appropriate rules and regulations necessary
therein not later thanone hundredtwenty(120) days after the enactment of this law;
“72.5. Where the act consists of the preparation for individual cases, in a pharmacy
or by a medicalprofessional, of a medicine inaccordance witha medical shall apply
after a drugor medicine hasbeen introducedin the Philippines or anywhere else in
the worldbythe patent owner, or by any party authorized to use the invention:
Provided, further, That the right to import the drugs andmedicinescontemplated in
this section shall be available to anygovernment agency or any private third party;
xxx[7]
The unqualified right of private third parties such as petitioner to import or possess
“unregisteredimported drugs” inthe Philippines is further confirmed bythe “Implementing Rules to
Republic Act No. 9502” promulgated on4 November 2008.[8] The relevant provisions thereof read:
Rule 9. Limitations on Patent Rights. The owner of a patent hasno right to prevent
third parties fromperforming, without his authorization, the acts referred to in
Section 71 of the IP Code as enumerated hereunder:
(i) Introduction in the Philippines or Anywhere Else in the World.
Using a patentedproduct whichhasbeen put onthe market inthe Philippines by
the owner of the product, or with his express consent, insofar as such use is
performed after that product has been so put on the said market: Provided, That,
with regardto drugs andmedicines, the limitationon patent rights shall applyafter a
drug or medicine hasbeen introducedin the Philippines or anywhere else in the
world bythe patent owner, or byanypartyauthorized to use the invention: Provided,
further, That the right to import the drugs andmedicinescontemplated inthis section
shall be available to any government agency or any private third party. (72.1)
The drugs andmedicinesare deemed introduced when they have been sold or
offered for sale anywhere else in the world. (n)
It maybe that Rep. Act No. 9502 did not expressly repeal any provision of the SLCD.
However, it is clear that the SLCO’s classificationof “unregisteredimported drugs” as “counterfeit
drugs,” andof corresponding criminal penaltiestherefore are irreconcilablyinthe impositionconflict
with Rep. Act No. 9502 since the latter indubitably grants private thirdpersons the unqualified right
to import or otherwise use such drugs. Where a statute of later date, such as Rep. Act No. 9502,
clearlyrevealsanintention onthe part of the legislature to abrogate a prior act on the subject that
intention must be giveneffect.[9] When a subsequent enactment covering a field of operation
coterminus with a prior statute cannot byanyreasonable construction be given effect while the
prior law remains inoperative existence because of irreconcilable conflict betweenthe two acts, the
latest legislative expression prevails and the prior law yields to the extent of the
conflict.[10] Irreconcilable inconsistencybetween twolaws embracing the same subject may exist
when the later lawnullifies the reasonor purpose of the earlier act, so that the latter loses a ll
meaning and function.[11] Legis posteriors priores contrarias abrogant.
For the reasons above-stated, the prosecution ofpetitioner is nolonger warrantedandthe
quested writ of prohibition should accordingly be issued.
III.
Had the Court proceeded to directly confront the constitutionality of the assailed
provisions ofthe SLCD, it is apparent that it wouldhave at least placedin doubt the validity of the
provisions. As written, the law makes a criminal of anyperson who imports an unregistered drug
regardless of the purpose, evenifthe medicine can spell life or deathfor someone in thePhilippines.
It does not accommodate the situation where the drug is out of stockinthe Philippines, beyond the
reach of a patient whourgentlydepends on it. It does not allowhusbands, wives, children, siblings,
parents to import the druginbehalf oftheir lovedones toophysicallyill to travel and avail of the
meager personal use exemptionallotted bythe law. It discriminates, at the expense of health,
against poor Filipinos without means to travel abroadto purchase lessexpensive medicines in favor

5. of their wealthier brethren able to do so. Less urgently perhaps, but still within the range of
constitutionallyprotected behavior, it deprives Filipinos to choose a less expensive regime for their
healthcare bydenying thema plausible andsafe means of purchasing medicines at a cheaper cost.
The absurd results fromthis far-reaching ban extends to implications that deny the ba sic
decencies of humanity. The law would make criminals of doctors from abroadonmedical missions
of such humanitarian organizations such as the International Red Cross,
the International Red Crescent, Medicin Sans Frontieres, and otherlike-minded groups who
necessarilybring their ownpharmaceutical drugs when they embark on their missions of mercy.
After all, theyare disabledfrom invoking the bare “personal use” exemption afforded by the SLCD.
Even worse is the fact that the law is not content with simply banning, at civil costs, the
importationof unregistereddrugs. It equates the importers of suchdrugs, manyof whom motivated
to do so out of altruismor basic humanlove, withthe malevolents who would alter or counterfeit
pharmaceutical drugs for reasons of profit at the expense of public safety. Note that the SLCD is a
speciallaw, andthe traditional treatment of penal provisions of special laws is that of malum
prohibitum–or punishable regardless ofmotive or criminal intent. For a law that is intended to help
save lives, the SLCD has revealed itself as a heartless, soulless legislative piece.
The challenged provisions of the SLCD apparently proscribe a range of constitutionally
permissible behavior. It is laudable that with the passage of Rep. Act No. 9502, the State has
reversed course andallowed for a sensible and compassionate approach with respect to the
importationof pharmaceuticaldrugs urgentlynecessaryfor the people’s constitutionally-recognized
right to health.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED in part. A writ of prohibition is
herebyISSUED commanding respondents fromprosecuting petitioner Romeo Rodriguez for violation
of Section 4 or Rep. Act No. 8203. The Temporary Restraining Order dated 15 October 2001 is
hereby made PERMANENT. No pronouncements as to costs. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-22773 March 29, 1974
PITTSBURG PLATE GLASS COMPANY, petitioner, vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF PATENTS and CHUA TUA HIAN AND COMPANY, doing business as "SIN TECK
HENG & CO.", respondents.
CASTRO, J.:p
Before us is a petitionfor review oftwo resolutions of the Director of Patents in Inter Partes Case
283, dismissingthe oppositionof the Pittsburg Plate GlassCompany(hereinafter referred to as the
petitioner) to the registration ofa trademark applied for by Chua TuaHian Company (hereinafter
referred to as the respondent).
On November 5, 1962, the lawfirm of Lichauco, Picazo and Agcaoili filed withthe Philippine Patent
Office a petition for extensionof 30 days from November 8, 1962 withinwhichto file inbehalfof the
petitioner a notice of oppositionto the respondent's applicationfor registrationof "SolexBluepane"
as trademarkfor its glass products. The plea was made pursuant to a cablegram from Langner, Parry,
Card and Langner International Patent andTrademark Agents, USA, asking that the respondent's
applicationbe opposed. A copyof the cablegramwas attached to the request. 1 The extension was
granted.
On December 7, 1962 an unverifiednotice ofopposition to the trademarkapplication was filed by
Lichauco, PicazoandAgcaoili, pursuant to Rule 187(c) of the Rules of Practice before the Patent
Office which authorizes the filingof sucha notice providedit is verified by the opposer within 60
days thereafter. 2 On the same day, the same counsel fileda dulyauthenticated power of attorney
executedbythe petitioner on November 12, 1962 in favor of the former for the prosecution of its
opposition. On February5, 1963 the petitioner's verifiedopposition to the respondent's application
was filed.
On October 14, 1963 the Director of Patents, acting upon a motion of the respondent, issued a
resolution dismissing the petitioner's oppositionon the groundthat on November 5, 1962 when the
petitioner's counsel asked for an extensionof time to file a notice of opposition, the said counsel
was not yet authorizedbythe petitioner to file the saidpleadingas the aforementioned power of
attorney was executed only on November 12, 1962. 3
On November 14, 1963 the petitioner's counselfileda motionfor reconsideration of the Director's
resolution, attaching thereto anaffidavit of the petitioner which states that the cablegram from
Langner, et al. was dulyauthorized, as the latter has beenentrusted the task of handling foreign
trademarkmatters involving the petitioner. The motionwas, however, deniedina resolution dated
April 29, 1964.
The mainissue before this Court is whether the law firm of Lichauco, Picazo and Agcaoili was
authorized to represent the petitioner before the Philippine Patent Office on November 5, 1962
when the former pleadedfor an extensionof time to register the petitioner's opposition to the
respondent's application.
It is our consideredview that the saidlaw firm was so properly authorized by the petitioner. It
should be notedthat the petitioner does not deny, as in fact it asserted inwriting, that the said law
firm was authorizedto represent it byvirtue of the powers it had vested upon Langner, et al., a
correspondent of Lichauco, Picazo and Agcaoili, to handle all foreigntrademarkmatters affecting the
petitioner. It bears emphasis that the relationship betweencounsel and client is strictly a personal
one. It is a relationship the creation of which courts and administrative tribunals ca nnot but
recognize onthe faith ofthe client's word, especially when no substantial prejudice is thereby
caused to any third party.
In the case at bar, the petitioner, which claims to be adversely affected by the respondent's
trademarkapplication, seasonably informed the Director of Patents that its counsel had the
authorityto represent it before the latter's office. We see novalidreason to interpose chevaux-de
frise upon that claim and deny the petitioner its basic right to be heard.
ACCORDINGLY, the questioned resolutions ofthe Director of Patents of October 14, 1963 and April
29, 1964 are set aside, and the Director of Patents is hereby directed to proceed with the
determinationof the applicationandthe opposition thereto with costs against Chua TuaHian&
Company.
Makalintal, C.J., Teehankee, Makasiar, Esguerra and Muñoz Palma, JJ., concur.

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