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SECOND DIVISION
PEOPLE VS SB
The prosecution cannot appeal from a ruling granting the demurrer to evidence of the accused
as it is equivalent to an acquittal, unless the prosecution can sufficiently prove that the court’s action is
attended with grave abuse of discretion. Otherwise, the constitutional right of the accused against
double jeopardy will be violated.
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Court filed by the
People of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Ombudsman, assailing the July 23, 2004
Resolution1
[1] of the Sandiganbayan granting the accused’s respective demurrers to evidence filed with
prior leave of court.
THE FACTS:
1

2. On November 23, 1999, private respondents Victorino A. Basco, Romeo S. David and
Rogelio L. Luis were charged with having violated Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019,2
[2] as
amended, (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) before the Sandiganbayan.3
[3] The Information,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 25752, alleged:
That between November 15, 1996 to May 7, 1998 or some time prior
or subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of Mabalacat, Pampanga,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused
Victorino A. Basco, Romeo S. David and Rogelio L. Luis, all high ranking
public officers, being then Chairman and President/Presidents and Chief
Executive Officers of the Bases Conversion Development Authority [BCDA],
Clark Development Corporation/Clark International Airport, [CDC /CIAC]
and Philippine National Construction Corporation [PNCC], respectively,
while in the performance of their official functions, taking advantage of their
positions and committing the offenses in relation to their office,
confederating and conspiring with one another, with manifest partiality and
evident bad faith, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally
enter into contracts/transactions for the construction of the Mabalacat-Clark
Spur Road and the Clark Perimeter Road, without the benefit of public
bidding and at the price higher by 60 to 167% than the typical roadway
construction cost, thus, depriving the government of the opportunity of
obtaining the most advantageous construction cost, causing undue injury to
the same and giving unwarranted benefits, advantage and preference to their
preferred private contractors.
Before the arraignment, the accused filed a Motion for Leave of Court to File Motion for
Reconsideration/Re-investigation. Acting thereon, the Sandiganbayan required the Office of the
Special Prosecutor to comment and submit the final action taken by the Office of Ombudsman.
In a Memorandum, dated March 26, 2000, Special Prosecution Officer Roberto T. Agagon
recommended the withdrawal of the information without prejudice to the conduct of further
preliminary investigation to resolve the issue on overpricing by referring the matter to the Commission
on Audit (COA) “whose report shall serve as legal basis for indictment against the accused.”4
[4] Then
Ombudsman Aniano Desierto, however, disapproved the recommendation and directed the prosecutor
to “proceed with the trial.”
Upon arraignment, the three (3) respondents pleaded not guilty.
On August 23, 2002, the Sandiganbayan issued a Pre-trial Order identifying the issues as
follows: (i) whether or not the construction projects involved should have been subjected to a public
bidding as mandated by P.D. 1594,5
[5] as amended;6
[6] (ii) whether or not there was overpricing in the
construction costs of the projects; (iii) whether or not the government suffered undue injury or damage
as a consequence; (iv) whether or not the accused acted with evident bad faith and/or manifest
partiality; and (v) whether or not the accused conspired with each other in committing the offense
charged.
2
3
4
5
6

3. During the trial, the prosecution presented its lone witness, Atty. Emora C. Pagunuran, Legal
Counsel, Office of the Legal Affairs, Office of the Ombudsman. Thereafter, the prosecution filed its
Formal Offer of Evidence. After the evidence were admitted, the prosecution rested its case.
Instead of presenting their evidence, the respondents filed their respective motions for leave to file
their demurrer to evidence based substantially on the following grounds: (i) that Atty. Pagunuran had
no personal knowledge of the transactions involved and so her testimony was hearsay; (ii) that the
prosecution failed to prove that the questioned contracts were indeed overpriced as Atty. Pagunuran
merely relied on the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) table of “Typical
Construction Costs, 1999” without more; and (iii) that the ruling of the Court of Appeals in an
administrative case (C.A. G.R. SP No. 62084), which upheld the validity of the direct negotiated
contracts, even in the absence of a public bidding, was already the law of the case.
The motions were granted and the Sandiganbayan directed the prosecution to file its opposition.
It appears that accused Rogelio L. Luis and Victorino A. Basco (and several other BCDA
officers) were also charged administratively in the Office of the Ombudsman, docketed as OMB-
ADM-0-98-0430 and entitled Joseph M. Ocol//FFIB vs. Victorino A. Basco et. al., based on the same
act subject of the criminal indictment. The Office of the Ombudsman found one of the respondents
therein (Isaac Puno III) administratively liable for simple misconduct. In the case of Basco and Luis,
however, the complaint against them was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.7
[7]
Isaac Puno III then filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals (CA). After a study
of his case, the CA exonerated him on the ground that the failure to conduct a public bidding was
legally justified as “time was of the essence.” It likewise considered the absence of a prior written
approval from then President Ramos as merely confirmatory rather than curative in nature and, as a
consequence, did not render the negotiated contracts8
[8] invalid.
On April 15, 2004, Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution9
[9] denying the demurrers to evidence. It
opined that the prosecution’s evidence substantiated the essential elements charged in the Information.
For said reason, it was incumbent on the respondents to present controverting evidence. On the
exoneration in the administrative case, Sandiganbayan was of the view that there was disparity in the
nature of the two proceedings and in the quantum of evidence required, and so it did not necessarily bar
a successful criminal prosecution involving the same or similar acts.
7
8
9

4. The private respondents filed their motion for reconsideration which was granted in a
Resolution dated July 23, 2004. The fallo of the resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court is constrained to GRANT, as it hereby
GRANTS, the Motions for Reconsideration of accused Victorino A. Basco, Romeo S. David
and Rogelio L. Luis, as the evidence of the prosecution failed to sufficiently establish the
essential elements of the offense charged and to overcome the presumption of innocence in
favor of the said accused. Accordingly, the cases against accused Victorino A. Basco, Romeo S.
David and Rogelio L. Luis are hereby DISMISSED.
In making such a turnaround, the Sandiganbayan took into account the decision of the Court
of Appeals in the administrative case, which upheld the legality and validity of the subject contracts, as
a “persuasive ruling” considering that it involved the same issues, subject matter and parties. It
reasoned out that since the bases for the two (2) separate and distinct proceedings pertain to the same
evidence, then the principle that the dismissal of an administrative case does not necessarily bar the
filing of a criminal prosecution for the same or similar acts subject of the administrative complaint, on
which its previous resolution was anchored, no longer applies. It, thus, concluded that there being want
of substantial evidence to support an administrative charge, there could be no sufficient evidence to
warrant a conclusion that there is probable cause for a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.
The Sandiganbayan further stated that the prosecution failed to establish the fact of
overpricing. The prosecution witness was unable to justify her sole reliance on DPWH table of
“Typical Construction Costs, 1999” vis-à-vis the roadway construction cost of the projects involved to
prove overpricing. It noted that the Office of the Ombudsman itself was not firmly convinced of
respondents’ culpability as shown by (i) its issuance of two conflicting memoranda, viz: one in the
administrative case dated June 28, 2000 (OMB-ADM-0-98-0430) where it found that there was no
overpricing; and the other, in the criminal case (this case) dated June 19, 2000 (OMB-0-98-1629 and
OMB-0-99-0368), where it found evidence that the project was overpriced; and (ii) the
recommendation of Special Prosecutor Roberto Agagon that the contracts be reviewed by the COA, at
a time when the Information was already filed in court.
Hence, this petition.
In the petition, the Office of the Ombudsman raises the following:
ISSUES
I. WHETHER THE ACT OF THE RESPONDENTS IN ENTERING INTO
NEGOTIATED CONTRACTS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
MABALACAT-CLARK SPUR ROAD AND CLARK PERIMETER ROAD
PROJECTS WAS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF
P.D. 1594
II. WHETHER THE SANDIGANBAYAN CAN ADOPT THE FINDINGS OF
FACTS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS CONSIDERING THAT THE

5. CASE BEFORE THE FORMER COURT IS CRIMINAL IN NATURE,
WHILE IN THE LATTER IT IS ADMINISTRATIVE
In their respective comments on the petition, the respondents are one in questioning the
propriety of resorting to this present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 on the
ground that it places them in double jeopardy.
In its Reply, petitioner argued that the right of the accused against double jeopardy cannot be
invoked because the issues presented for resolution are purely legal.10
[10] In resolving the legal issues,
there is no need to reevaluate the evidence already adduced before the Sandiganbayan. Petitioners also
lament the fact that the Sandiganbayan ignored the legal dictum that the dismissal of the administrative
case does not bar the filing of a criminal prosecution for the same or similar act/s subject of the
criminal case. Under that doctrine, a criminal case already filed must proceed in the normal course of
litigation.
THE COURT’S RULING
The petition fails.
Procedurally, the petitioner resorted to a wrong remedy. Section 1 of Rule 122
allows “any party” to appeal from a judgment or final order, unless the right of the accused against
double jeopardy will be violated. It is axiomatic that an appeal in criminal cases throws the whole case
wide open for review by an appellate court. As a consequence, an appeal by the prosecution from a
judgment of acquittal necessarily places the accused in double jeopardy.11
[11]
The rule barring an appeal from a judgment of acquittal is, however, not absolute. The following are
the recognized exceptions thereto: (i) when the prosecution is denied due process of law;12
[12] and (ii)
when the trial court commits grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
dismissing a criminal case by granting the accused’ demurrer to evidence.13
[13]
Such issues are brought to the attention of a reviewing court through the special civil action of
certiorari under Rule 65 on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. In assailing the resolution of the Sandiganbayan, the petitioner resorted to this petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45, purportedly raising pure questions of law. This is erroneous for
which reason this petition is dismissible outright. In People v. Laguio,14
[14] the same procedural
misstep was addressed by the Court in this wise:
By this time, it is settled that the appellate court may review dismissal
orders of trial courts granting an accused’ demurrer to evidence. This may be
done via the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 based on the
ground of grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Such dismissal order, being considered void judgment, does not
result in jeopardy. Thus, when the order of dismissal is annulled or set aside
10
11
12
13
14

6. by an appellate court in an original special civil action via certiorari, the right
of the accused against double jeopardy is not violated.
Unfortunately, what petitioner People of the Philippines, xxx filed
with the Court in the present case is an appeal by way of a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 raising a pure question of law, which is different
from a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
x x x
Also, in Madrigal, we stressed that the special civil action of
certiorari and appeal are two different remedies mutually exclusive; they are
neither alternative nor successive. Where appeal is available, certiorari will
not prosper. In the dismissal of a criminal case upon demurrer to evidence,
appeal is not available as such an appeal will put the accused in double
jeopardy. Certiorari, however, is allowed.
For being the wrong remedy taken by petitioner People of the
Philippines in this case, this petition is outrightly dismissible. The Court
cannot reverse the assailed dismissal order of the trial court by appeal
without violating private respondent’s right against double jeopardy.
[Emphasis Supplied]
Stated differently, although the dismissal order consequent to a demurrer to evidence is not
subject to appeal, it is still reviewable but only by certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. In
such a case, the factual findings of the trial court are conclusive upon the reviewing court, and the only
legal basis to reverse and set aside the order of dismissal upon demurrer to evidence is by a clear
showing that the trial court, in acquitting the accused, committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due process, thus, rendering the assailed judgment void.15
[15]
Petitioner attempts to justify its position by relying on our pronouncement in People v.
Villalon,16
[16] which reads:
As a general rule, the dismissal or termination of the case after arraignment and plea of the
defendant to a valid information shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged,
or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which
necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the complaint or information. However, an
appeal by the prosecution from the order of dismissal (of the criminal case) by the trial court
shall not constitute double jeopardy if (1) the dismissal is made upon motion, or with the
express consent, of the defendant, and (2) the dismissal is not an acquittal or based upon
consideration of the evidence or of the merits of the case; and (3) the question to be passed
upon by the appellate court is purely legal so that should the dismissal be found incorrect, the
case would have to be remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings, to determine
the guilt or innocence of the defendant. (emphasis supplied)
A cursory reading of the above judicial pronouncement readily betrays petitioner’s
posture on the matter. The use of the conjunctive word “and” which even originally17
[17]
appeared italicized suggests the concurrence of those three requisites to prevent double
jeopardy from attaching.
The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases, such as the one at bench, is “filed after the
prosecution had rested its case.” As such, it calls “for an appreciation of the evidence adduced by the
prosecution and its sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in a dismissal
15
16
17

7. of the case on the merits, tantamount to an acquittal of the accused.”18
[18] Judicial action on a motion
to dismiss or demurrer to evidence is best left to the exercise of sound judicial discretion. Accordingly,
unless the Sandiganbayan acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, its decision to
grant or deny the demurrer may not be disturbed.19
[19]
Not surprisingly, petitioner has not attributed any commission of grave abuse of discretion on the part
of Sandiganbayan in issuing the questioned resolution, on the mistaken assumption that it can assail the
resolution on purely legal questions. As explained above, it cannot do so. A judgment of acquittal
cannot be reopened or appealed because of the doctrine that nobody can be put twice in jeopardy for
the same offense.
Granting arguendo that petitioner’s recourse under Rule 45 was proper, nevertheless,
petitioner failed to raise pure questions of law. For a question to be one of law, the same must not
involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented. There is a question of law in
a given case when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on certain state of facts.20
[20]
Contrary to petitioner’s contention, the determination of whether the established facts fall
squarely within the provisions of the law, that is, Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019, would require us to
reassess and reexamine the evidence, and essentially to supplant the lower courts’ finding. This is
beyond the province of Rule 45. Judicial review under Rule 45 does not envisage a re-evaluation of the
sufficiency of the evidence upon which respondent court’s action was predicated. It bears reiterating
that a judgment of acquittal, “even if seemingly erroneous,” is the final verdict.21
[21]
Similarly, the second issue posed by petitioner is a question of fact disguised as a question of
law. An affirmative ruling thereon would also require us to review the factual bases of the ruling of the
CA in the administrative case. In fact, as noted by respondent court, the same issue of legality or
validity of the subject contracts had already been passed upon by the CA, and the Ombudsman did not
even attempt to question the CA ruling, which could only mean its adherence thereto.
Petitioner would also make much of the principle in law that the dismissal of the
administrative case does not necessarily prevent a criminal prosecution from proceeding. Indeed, the
dismissal of an administrative case does not bar the filing of a criminal prosecution for the same or
similar acts subject of the administrative complaint. Neither does the disposition in one case inevitably
govern the resolution of the other case/s and vice versa. Administrative liability is one thing; criminal
liability for the same act is another.22
[22] The distinct and independent nature of one proceeding from
the other can be attributed to the following: first, the difference in the quantum of evidence required
and, correlatively, the procedure observed and sanctions imposed; and second, the principle that a
single act may offend against two or more distinct and related provisions of law, or that the same act
may give rise to criminal as well as administrative liability.23
[23]
Although the dismissal of the criminal case cannot be pleaded to abate the administrative
proceedings primarily on the ground that the quantum of proof required to sustain administrative
charges is significantly lower than that necessary for criminal actions, the same does not hold true if it
were the other way around, that is, the dismissal of the administrative case is being invoked to abate the
criminal case. The reason is that the evidence presented in the administrative case may not necessarily
be the same evidence to be presented in the criminal case. The prosecution is certainly not precluded
from adducing additional evidence to discharge the burden of proof required in the criminal cases.24
[24] However, if the criminal case will be prosecuted based on the same facts and evidence as that in
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

8. the administrative case, and the court trying the latter already squarely ruled on the absence of facts
and/or circumstances sufficient to negate the basis of the criminal indictment,25
[25] then to still burden
the accused to present controverting evidence despite the failure of the prosecution to present sufficient
and competent evidence, will be a futile and useless exercise.
Petitioner’s claim that the respondent court should not have adopted the Court of Appeal’s
findings and instead made its own separate finding on the matter deserves scant consideration.
WHEREFORE, petition is DISMISSED.
Political Law
PUBLIC OFFICERS
Q – Calixto Cataquiz, then General Manager of the Laguna Lake Development Authority was
charged with violation of the Anti-Graft Law. The case was dismissed. In the meantime an
administrative case was filed seeking his removal. He contended that because of the dismissal of the
criminal case, there was no more basis to hold him administratively liable. Is his contention correct?
Why?
Answer: No. It is a basic rule in administrative law that public officials are under a three-fold
responsibility for a violation of their duty or for a wrongful act or omission, such that they may be held
civilly, criminally and administratively liable for the same act. (Tecson v. SB, 376 Phil. 191 (1999)).
Obviously, administrative liability is separate and distinct from penal and civil liability. (Veloso v. SB,
187 SCRA 504, (1990)).
The distinct and independent nature of one proceeding from the other can be attributed to the
following: first, the difference in the quantum of evidence required and, correlatively, the procedure
observed and sanctions imposed; and second, the principle that a single act may offend against two or
more distinct and related provisions of law, or that the same act may give rise to criminal as well as
administrative liability. (People v. SB, G.R. No. 164577, July 5, 2010, 623 SCRA 147, citing People v.
Paredes, G.R. No. 169534, July 30, 2007, 528 SCRA 577; Office of the Pres. v. Calixto Cataquiz, G.R.
No. 183445, September 14, 2011).
25

9. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
Q – A resolution was issued by Samar II Electric Cooperative, Inc. (SAMELCO II) Board of Directors
removing a certain Setudo, Jr. as a member of the Board of Directors. A petition for prohibition was filed
with the RTC. Is the petition proper? Why?
Answer: No, because the National Electrification Administration has jurisdiction, under the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction. The NEA has the power of supervision and control over electric cooperatives under Secs. 5 & 7. PD No.
1645, hence, the resolution removing the Director within the power of NEA to review. The RTC has no jurisdiction
(Samar II Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Setudo, Jr., G.R. No. 173840, April 25, 2012, Peralta, J).
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts and comes into play
whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, has been
placed within the special competence of an administrative agency. (Baguna v. Sps. Aggabao, et al., G.R. No. 18487,
August 15, 2011). In such a case, the court in which the claim is sought to be enforced may suspend the judicial
process pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view or, if the parties would not be
unfairly disadvantaged, dismiss the case without prejudice. (Baguna v. Sps. Aggabao, et al.,
supra.).
Action for damages against a school for refusal to release transcript of records is within the
jurisdiction of the regular courts. Exhaustion of administrative remedy to CHED, not necessary.

10. Q – A school refused to release the transcript of records of a student. The school contended that the
student failed to enroll during the second semester of the school year 2000-2001, hence, the school
contended that the complaint failed to state a cause of no action, hence, a motion to dismiss was
filed. It was further contended that there was failure to exhaust administrative remedy to CHED.
Rule on the contention.
Answer: The contention is not correct as the action essentially is one for mandamus and damages. The
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that where a remedy before an
administrative agency is provided, the administrative agency concerned must be given the opportunity
to decide a matter within its jurisdiction before an action is brought before the courts. Failure to
exhaust administrative remedies is a ground for dismissal of the action.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies admits of numerous exceptions, one of which is
where the issues are purely legal and well within the jurisdiction of the trial court. Petitioners’ liability
– if any – for damages will have to be decided by the courts, since any judgment inevitably calls for the
application and the interpretation of the Civil Code. As such, exhaustion of administrative remedies
may be dispensed with. As held in Regino v. Pangasinan Colleges of Science and Technology:
x x x exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable when there is competence on the part of the
administrative body to act upon the matter complained of. Administrative agencies are not courts; x x
x neither are they part of the judicial system, or deemed judicial tribunals.
Specifically, the CHED does not have the power to award damages. Hence, petitioner could not have
commenced her case before the Commission. (485 Phil. 446 (2004); UST, et al. v. Danes Sanchez,
G.R. No. 165569, July 29, 2010).
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. NO. 161067 March 14, 2008
DOMINADOR C. FERRER, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, HON. EDILBERTO G. SANDOVAL, HON. FRANCISCO H.
VILLARUZ, JR., and HON. RODOLFO G. PALATTAO, as Members of the Sandiganbayan,
Second Division, ANNA MARIA L. HARPER, ESPERANZA G. GATBONTON, and PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Does a finding of lack of administrative liability of a respondent government official bar the filing of a
criminal case against him for the same acts?
Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to annul the
Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan, Second Division (public respondent) dated July 2, 20031
and
October 22, 20032
in Criminal Case No. 26546. The Resolution of July 2, 2003 denied the Motion for
Re-determination of Probable Cause filed by accused Dominador G. Ferrer (petitioner), while the
Resolution of October 22, 2003 denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration and/or Motion to
Quash.

11. The following are the factual antecedents:
On January 29, 2001, an Information3
for violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019
was filed against petitioner, as follows:
That on or about August 20, 1998 or for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Manila, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, DOMINADOR C. FERRER, JR., being the
Administrator of the Intramuros Administration (IA), Manila, while in the performance of his official
and administrative functions as such, and acting with manifest partiality, evident bad faith and gross
inexcusable negligence, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally give unwarranted
benefits to Offshore Construction and Development Company, by causing the award of the Lease
Contracts to said company, involving Baluarte de San Andres, Ravellin de Recolletos, and Baluarte de
San Francisco de Dilao, Intramuros, Manila, without conducting any public bidding as required under
Joint Circular No. 1 dated September 30, 1989 of the Department of Budget and Management,
Department of Environment and Natural Resources and Department of Public Works and Highways,
and by allowing the construction of new structures in said leased areas without any building permit or
clearance required under the Intramuros Charter (P.D. 1616) and the National Building Code, to the
damage and prejudice of public interest.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Manila, Philippines, January 29, 2001.4
and assigned to the Sandiganbayan's Second Division.
On April 4, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion for Reinvestigation, alleging that the Office of the
Ombudsman disregarded certain factual matters which, if considered, will negate the finding of
probable cause.5
On July 13, 2001, public respondent issued a Resolution denying petitioner's Motion for
Reinvestigation.6
It held that petitioner's contentions are all evidentiary in nature and may be properly
considered only in a full-blown trial.
On September 12, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration.7
Shortly thereafter, he filed a
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, asserting that the complainants were guilty of forum
shopping, due to the earlier dismissal of the administrative case against him.8
On December 11, 2001, public respondent issued a Resolution denying the Motion for
Reconsideration.9
Petitioner filed a Motion for Leave to File a Second Motion for Reconsideration.10
Again, he cited as
his ground the alleged forum shopping of the private complainants.
On April 29, 2002, public respondent issued a Resolution denying the Motion for Leave to File a
Second Motion for Reconsideration.11
It held that there was no forum shopping since the administrative
and criminal cases are two different actions, so neither resolution on the same would have the effect of
res judicata on the other. The public respondent dismissed the second motion for reconsideration as a
pro forma and prohibited motion.
Petitioner then filed a Petition for Certiorari with this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 153592, which
assailed the Resolution of public respondent dated April 29, 2002 as having been issued with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. On July 1, 2002, the Court dismissed the petition
for having been filed out of time and for failure to pay the required docket fees.12
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration13
which the Court denied with finality in its Resolution
dated September 4, 2002.14

12. On May 19, 2003, before he can be arraigned, petitioner filed yet another motion with public
respondent, this time a Motion for Re-determination of Probable Cause,15
invoking the ruling of the
Office of the President (OP), dated February 29, 2000,16
which absolved petitioner of administrative
liability. The OP reviewed the administrative case filed against petitioner with the Presidential
Commission Against Graft and Corruption (PCAGC) and held that petitioner acted in good faith and
within the scope of his authority.
On July 2, 2003, the Sandiganbayan issued herein assailed Resolution denying the Motion for Re-
determination of Probable Cause, stating as follows:
The Court resolves to deny the motion for re-determination of probable cause, the argument advanced
therein having been passed upon and resolved by this Court in accused's motion to dismiss as well as
motion for reconsideration and where the resolution of this Court was sustained by the Supreme
Court.17
On August 4, 2003, upon his receipt of the Resolution, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration
and/or to Quash Information,18
arguing that the Supreme Court's dismissal of his petition for certiorari
was based on a mere technicality.1avvphi1 He reiterated his argument that since he has been cleared of
administrative liability, the criminal case that was pending against him should likewise be dismissed.
The public respondent denied the motion in the other assailed Resolution dated October 22, 2003,
stating as follows:
Finding no merit in the accused [sic] Motion for Reconsideration and/or Motion to Quash dated August
4, 2003 and considering the Opposition of the prosecution, the same is DENIED.
Indeed, the dismissal of the administrative complaint does not negate the existing criminal case
pending before the Court. Moreover the grounds and arguments raised thereat could be considered
matter of defense that is more and properly to be considered during a full blown trial.
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration and/or Motion to Quash by the accused is denied for
lack of merit.
x x x x
SO ORDERED.19
Hence, the present Petition for Certiorari, seeking to annul the Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan for
having been issued with grave abuse of discretion and in excess of and/or without jurisdiction.
Petitioner insists that the Sandiganbayan should have dismissed the criminal case filed against him,
since the alleged wrongful acts complained of in the case are the same as those alleged in the
administrative case against him which have been dismissed.
Both the public and private prosecutors contend that the issues raised by petitioner have already been
raised and passed upon; and that the assailed Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan merely reiterate its
earlier Resolutions denying petitioner's motion for reinvestigation and various motions for
reconsideration questioning the Ombudsman's finding of probable cause.20
They claim that the issue
became settled and final as early as the December 11, 2001 Resolution of the public respondent, which
denied petitioner's motions for reinvestigation.21
They further argue that this Court's denial of
petitioner's earlier petition for certiorari (G.R. No. 153592) barred petitioner from filing the present
petition.
The respondents cite jurisprudence, which states that the dismissal of an administrative case does not
necessarily bar the filing of a criminal prosecution for the same or similar acts.22

13. The petition is devoid of merit.
In Paredes, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan,23
the Court denied a similar petition to dismiss a pending criminal
case with the Sandiganbayan on the basis of the dismissal of the administrative case against the
accused. The Court ratiocinated, thus:
Petitioners call attention to the fact that the administrative complaint against petitioner Honrada
was dismissed. They invoke our ruling in Maceda v. Vasquez that only this Court has the power to
oversee court personnel's compliance with laws and take the appropriate administrative action against
them for their failure to do so and that no other branch of the government may exercise this power
without running afoul of the principle of separation of powers.
But one thing is administrative liability. Quite another thing is the criminal liability for the same
act. Our determination of the administrative liability for falsification of public documents is in no
way conclusive of his lack of criminal liability. As we have held in Tan v. Comelec, the dismissal of
an administrative case does not necessarily bar the filing of a criminal prosecution for the same
or similar acts which were the subject of the administrative complaint.24
(Emphasis supplied.)
It is clear from Paredes that the criminal case against petitioner, already filed and pending with the
Sandiganbayan, may proceed despite the dismissal of the administrative case arising out of the same
acts.
The same rule applies even to those cases that have yet to be filed in court. In Tan v. Commission on
Elections,25
it was held that an investigation by the Ombudsman of the criminal case for falsification
and violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and an inquiry into the administrative charges
by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) are entirely independent proceedings, neither of which
results in or concludes the other. The established rule is that an absolution from a criminal charge is not
a bar
to an administrative prosecution, or vice versa.26
The dismissal of an administrative case does not
necessarily bar the filing of a criminal prosecution for the same or similar acts which were the subject
of the administrative complaint.27
The Court finds no cogent reason to depart from these rules.
Petitioner argues that the criminal case against him requires a higher quantum of proof for conviction --
that is, proof beyond reasonable doubt -- than the administrative case, which needs only substantial
evidence. He claims that from this circumstance, it follows that the dismissal of the administrative case
should carry with it the dismissal of the criminal case.
This argument, however, has been addressed in jurisprudence. In Valencia v. Sandiganbayan,28
the
administrative case against the accused was dismissed by the Ombudsman on a finding that the contract
of loan entered into was in pursuance of the police power of the accused as local chief executive,29
and
that the accused had been re-elected to office.30
The Ombudsman, however, still found probable cause
to criminally charge the accused in court.31
When the accused filed a petition with the Supreme Court
to dismiss the criminal case before the Sandiganbayan, the Court denied the petition, thus:
In the final analysis, the conflicting findings of the Ombudsman boil down to issues of fact which,
however, are not within our province to resolve. As has been oft-repeated, this Court is not a trier of
facts. This is a matter best left to the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioners argue that the dismissal by the Ombudsman of the administrative case against them
based on the same subject matter should operate to dismiss the criminal case because the
quantum of proof in criminal cases is proof beyond reasonable doubt, while that
in administrative cases is only substantial evidence. While that may be true, it should likewise be
stressed that the basis of administrative liability differs from criminal liability. The purpose of

14. administrative proceedings is mainly to protect the public service, based on the time-honored
principle that a public office is a public trust. On the other hand, the purpose of the criminal
prosecution is the punishment of crime.
Moreover, one of the grounds for the dismissal of the administrative case against petitioners is the fact
that they were re-elected to office. Indeed, a re-elected local official may not be held administratively
accountable for misconduct committed during his prior term of office. The rationale for this holding is
that when the electorate put him back into office, it is presumed that it did so with full knowledge of his
life and character, including his past misconduct. If, armed with such knowledge, it still re-elects him,
then such re-election is considered a condonation of his past misdeeds.
However, the re-election of a public official extinguishes only the administrative, but not the criminal,
liability incurred by him during his previous term of office x x x.
x x x x
There is, thus, no reason for the Sandiganbayan to quash the Information against petitioners on
the basis solely of the dismissal of the administrative complaint against them.32
To sustain petitioner's arguments will be to require the Sandiganbayan and the Ombudsman to merely
adopt the results of administrative investigations which would not only diminish the powers and duties
of these
constitutional offices, but also violate the independent nature of criminal and administrative cases
against public officials. This will also amount to untold delays in criminal proceedings before the
Sandiganbayan and Ombudsman, as every criminal trial and investigation before these bodies will be
made to await the results of pending administrative investigations. Such is not the intent of the framers
of the Constitution and the laws governing public officers.
Petitioner cites Larin v. Executive Secretary33
to support his arguments. That case, however, is not on
all fours with the present case.
In Larin, the accused was first convicted by the Sandiganbayan for violation of the National Internal
Revenue Code and Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019. On the basis of this conviction, an
administrative case was filed against him. On appeal of the criminal conviction to the Supreme Court,
however, he was acquitted upon a finding that the acts he had committed were neither illegal nor
irregular. When the accused sought a similar dismissal of the administrative case, the Supreme Court
sustained him and ruled that since the same acts for which he was administratively charged had been
found neither illegal nor irregular, his acquittal in the criminal case should entail the dismissal of the
administrative case.
The present case differs from Larin because here, the administrative case was filed independently of
the criminal case. The administrative case was not filed on the basis of a criminal conviction, as in fact,
the administrative case was dismissed without regard for the results of the criminal case. This is in
contrast with Larin, where the administrative case was dismissed only after its basis, the criminal
conviction, was overturned on appeal.
We cannot reverse Larin by ruling that petitioner's discharge from the administrative action should
result in the dismissal of the criminal case. The argument cannot be sustained without violating settled
principles.lawphi1 The rule is that administrative liability is separate and distinct from penal and civil
liabilities.34
In Larin, no less than the Supreme Court acquitted the accused of charges of wrongdoing;
in the case at bar, no court of justice has yet declared petitioner not guilty of committing illegal or
irregular acts.
The independent nature of a criminal prosecution dictates that the Sandiganbayan must determine
petitioner's criminal liability without its hands being tied by what transpired in the administrative case.
The court is duty-bound to exercise its independent judgment.35
It is not ousted of its jurisdiction by the

15. ruling in the administrative proceeding. It is axiomatic that when the court obtains jurisdiction over a
case, it continues to retain it until the case is terminated.36
Under the Rules of Court, petitioner's absolution from administrative liability is not even one of the
grounds for a Motion to Quash.37
Moreover, petitioner lacked the right to file the instant petition.1avvphi1 Petitioner already raised the
issue of his discharge from administrative liability in his supplemental motion for reconsideration of
the Sandiganbayan's Resolution dated July 13, 2001.38
When the motion was denied, he again alleged
such fact in his motion for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration.39
Both motions have
already been denied by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolutions dated December 11, 200140
and April 29,
2002.41
Petitioner's argument on private respondents' alleged forum shopping was not sustained by the
Sandiganbayan, since administrative and criminal cases are two independent actions. It correctly held
that neither action barred the filing of the other, and that both cases did not pray for a common relief or
share the same parties.42
Thus, the question on the effect of the administrative case on the criminal case before the
Sandiganbayan was settled as early as the Resolution dated December 11, 2001. When petitioner
questioned this ruling before the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 153592, he again raised the issue of
forum-shopping, but his efforts failed because he filed his petition out of time. With the dismissal of
G.R. No. 153592, the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated December 11, 2001 has become final.
Such finality was evident in the public respondent's Resolution dated July 2, 2003,43
which denied
petitioner's Motion for the Re-determination of Probable Cause. In it, the public respondent aptly
stated:
The Court resolves to deny the motion for re-determination of probable cause, the argument advanced
therein having been passed upon and resolved by this Court in accused's motion to dismiss as
well as motion for reconsideration and where the resolution of this Court was sustained by the
Supreme Court.44
(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the petition now before the Court, which raises the same issues, must necessarily fail.
Petitioner's tactics to delay his arraignment and trial cannot be countenanced. In utter contempt of the
Court's efforts to expedite all judicial
proceedings, he has filed a petition which merely raises issues that have long been resolved with
finality. By so doing, petitioner has gone beyond merely
exhausting his available remedies and trodden in the realm of abusing legal processes.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Sandiganbayan is ordered to
proceed with the arraignment and trial of Criminal Case No. 26546. Petitioner and his counsel are
ADMONISHED not to engage further in delaying tactics.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ