Richard E. Bergeron III, the defendant, is requesting the dismissal of all charges against him due to the state's failure to provide a speedy trial, citing a 17-month delay since he last waived his right to a speedy trial. He argues that the extensive delays caused by the prosecution and judicial mismanagement have severely prejudiced his case and damaged his reputation, leaving him in a state of anxiety. Bergeron urges the court to either dismiss the charges with prejudice or hold a hearing on the matter, emphasizing that the delays are unjustifiable and detrimental to his rights.

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Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
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Richard Bergeron
107 Cotton Hill Road
Belmont, NH 03220
BELKNAP COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT
NEW HAMPSHIRE
State of New Hampshire
vs.
Richard E. Bergeron III
Defendant
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Case No. 211-2019-CR-163
MOTIO TO DISMISS
COMES NOW, the Defendant, Pro-Se Richard E. Bergeron III, and hereby moves the court to
dismiss all charges under the indictments in this case due to the State’s failure to provide a speedy
trial. Bergeron makes this request under the authority of the Superior Court Speedy Trial Policy (See
Exhibit 1).
This policy statement provides in part:
“Unless the court record establishes that there is no basis for believing a defendant’s speedy trial rights
may have been violated, where the defendant is not incarcerated, every misdemeanor case pending without
disposition after 6 months from the date of entry and every felony case pending without disposition after 9 months
from the date of an indictment shall be scheduled forthwith for a show cause hearing as to whether, under the
principles of Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S. Ct 2182, 33 L.Ed2d 101 (1972), the case should be dismissed for
lack of a speedy trial… When a defendant has filed a waiver of speedy trial rights, the case shall be rescheduled by
the Clerk and the foregoing periods shall run from the date of such waiver.”
BACKGROUD
Bergeron has continually and repeatedly voiced concerns over the delays involved in this
case. He signed only one waiver of his rights to a speedy trial on January 24th
, 2020 upon advice of
his standby counsel who had scheduling conflicts with the trial date set at the time. (See Exhibit 2,
Case Summary) The waiver was required as part of the assented to motion to continue filed by the
public defender serving as Bergeron’s Standby Counsel: Attorney Caroline Smith.

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Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
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The 24th
day of June, 2021 will mark 17 months from the date Bergeron signed that waiver.
There is no current date set for trial. Bergeron filed a formal objection to each motion to continue the
trial filed by the prosecution. The Belknap County Attorney Andrew Livernois filed for the state’s
first motion to continue the case on November 8, 2019. Bergeron filed a formal objection to the
Livernois motion on November 14th
, 2019. Judge O’Neill granted this motion on the same day of the
November 20th
hearing on the subject.
Bergeron’s request for a continuance was directly related to concerns raised by his standby
counsel. There was no scheduling conflict for Attorney Smith regarding the trial schedules that
Attorney Livernois convinced the judge to postpone (for excuses including routine law enforcement
training impacting multiple witnesses and a paternity leave issue with one witness).
Bergeron has repeatedly raised the issue of unexplained delays in more recent motions put
before the court, most notably his recent request for Judge James D. O’Neill III to recuse himself.
Since the last continuance filed by Livernois, the state has made no other formal request to continue
trial, but final pre-trial hearing and jury selection dates have still been re-scheduled and re-cancelled
twice (not including the cancellations related to the defendant’s one request to continue).
Despite the case being transferred to Deputy Grafton County Attorney Tara Heater, she
expressed no concerns with scheduling or workload upon accepting the case. She in fact steadfastly
insisted in communications with the defendant that she was ready for trial and had reviewed all the
relevant material. Shortly after she took the case on, Attorney Heater wrote in an email to Bergeron
on July 15, 2020: “I have every belief that this case is a solid one which will be very triable and I am
ready to do so.” (See Exhibit 3)
Attorney Heater has put very little effort into prosecuting this case since being assigned. She
made immediate efforts to withdraw the defective motion to prohibit pre-trial publicity filed by
Deputy Belknap County Attorney Keith Cormier. She then attempted to reduce the case to a single
charge of possession, a charge which the Defendant is not even facing.
The Defendant refused the conditions of that plea bargain agreement and told Heater he
would not be entertaining any further deals to end the case before trial. Other than some run of the
mill disclosures of discovery material, the only offensive action taken in this case by Attorney Heater
was a motion regarding voir dire questions for the jury that was tabled until a time closer to trial.
Even Attorney Heater’s defensive posture has been lax, as demonstrated by her response to the
Amended Motion for Sanctions filed by Bergeron on February 5, 2021. (See Exhibit 4) She has since

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Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
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made no objection or response at all to a motion to recuse Judge O’Neill and a motion to reconsider
the denial of that motion to recuse.
LEGAL AALYSIS
“Because the Court broadly assays the factors going into constitutional judgments under the
speedy trial provision, it is appropriate to emphasize that one of the major purposes of the
provision is to guard against inordinate delay between public charge (February, 2019 in the instant
case) and trial (date still not determined in the instant case), which, wholly aside from possible
prejudice to a defense on the merits, may seriously interfere with the defendant's liberty, whether
he is free on bail or not, and that may disrupt his employment, drain his financial resources, curtail
his associations, subject him to public obloquy, and create anxiety in him, his family and his
friends. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320 (1971).
These factors are more serious for some than for others, but they are inevitably present in every
case to some extent, for every defendant will either be incarcerated pending trial or on bail subject
to substantial restrictions on his liberty. It is also true that many defendants will believe that time
is on their side and will prefer to suffer whatever disadvantages delay may entail. But, for those
who desire an early trial, these personal factors should prevail if the only countervailing
considerations offered by the State are those connected with crowded dockets and prosecutorial
caseloads.
To turn the tide against the corruption and misconduct impacting his case, the Defendant
employed a unique legal strategy. He relied on publication efforts to expose this questionable
behavior by law enforcement officers, prosecutors and even the judge. Bergeron wrote multiple
letters to the editor that were published in local and regional newspapers. He additionally produced a
blog (www.nhdrugtaskforce.com) to tell his own story of dealing with a corrupt justice system that is
seemingly intent on ruining his life for his alleged participation in a victimless “crime” the state
manufactured against him.
The Union Leader and Laconia Daily Sun also wrote their own independent stories about issues
involved in the case. The act of working so hard to defend his reputation and present the real facts of
this case put the Defendant in the very difficult position of having to publicly broadcast his

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Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
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predicament of being charged with 6 felonies. This genuinely and irreparably damaged his reputation
within the community and among his friends and family.
As a writer and investigative reporter, being charged with six felonies makes it very challenging to
work in traditional publishing circles while charges are pending. Bergeron’s father (now deceased)
was a central figure in the major international news story surrounding FBI Informant and Irish
Gangster James “Whitey” Bulger. Bergeron has been working to produce a comprehensive book on
his father’s time as a Quincy, Massachusetts Police Department detective investigating Bulger and
his associates. This instant case has been a massive distraction from that valuable work. This is
highly frustrating, because Bergeron knows this project will highlight the honorable service of
dedicated officers of the law to try to bring down a government protected thug and a killer. At a time
when law enforcement misconduct and corruption is under a microscope in this country, this book is
crucial to showing the true consequences of “looking the other way.”
“…even if an accused is not incarcerated prior to trial, he is still disadvantaged by restraints on
his liberty and by living under a cloud of anxiety, suspicion, and often hostility.” See United
States v. Ewell, 383 U. S., at 120; Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 377-378 (1969). In
Klopfer v. orth Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 221-222 (1967), the Supreme Court indicated that a
defendant awaiting trial on bond might be subjected to public scorn, deprived of employment, and
chilled in the exercise of his right to speak for, associate with, and participate in unpopular
political causes..”
Of course, cases will differ among themselves as to the allowable time between charge and trial
so as to permit prosecution and defense adequately to prepare their case. But unreasonable delay
in run-of-the-mill criminal cases cannot be justified by simply asserting that the public resources
provided by the State's criminal-justice system are limited and that each case must await its turn.
This approach also subverts the State's own goals in seeking to enforce its criminal laws.
The Sixth Amendment provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained
by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him;
to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defense.

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Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
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We hold here that the right to a speedy trial is as fundamental as any of the rights secured by
the Sixth Amendment. 386 U.S., at 223.
As a circuit judge, Justice Blackmun wrote: The government and, for that matter, the trial
court are not without responsibility for the expeditious trial of criminal cases. The burden for trial
promptness is not solely upon the defense. The right to `a speedy . . . trial' is constitutionally
guaranteed and, as such, is not to be honored only for the vigilant and the knowledgeable.
Hodges v. United States, 408 F.2d 543, 551 (CA8 1969).
The First Circuit also ruled that a delay of nine months is overly long, absent a good reason, in
a case that depended on eyewitness testimony. United States v. Butler, 426 F.2d 1275, 1277
(1970). Courts typically apply a four-part test first enunciated in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530-
33 (1972), for determining whether a defendant's speedy trial right under part I, article 14 of the State
Constitution has been violated. State v. Colbath, 130 N.H. 316, 319, 540 A.2d 1212, 1213 (1988).
These factors are: (1) the length of the pretrial delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the
defendant's assertion of his right to a speedy trial; and (4) the prejudice to the defendant caused by the
delay. Bernaby, 139 N.H. at 422, 653 A.2d at 1126.
No inquiry as to the remaining three Barker factors is required, however, unless the length of the
delay is presumptively prejudicial. Humphrey v. Cunningham, Warden, 133 N.H. 727, 734, 584
A.2d 763, 767 (1990). For purposes of a speedy trial analysis in adult criminal proceedings the length
of the pretrial delay is calculated beginning when the defendant is arrested or indicted, whichever
comes first. State v. Quinlan, 122 N.H. 51, 53, 440 A.2d 13, 14 (1982). A delay of less than nine
months in an adult felony case is not considered presumptively prejudicial. State v. Panzera, 139
N.H. 235, 239, 652 A.2d 136, 138 (1994).
Bergeron was arrested at the end of February, 2019. He has been waiting for trial for nearly 2.5
years. Covid-19 restrictions are not a sufficient excuse for these incessant delays. A severe lack of
efficient judicial oversight and prosecutorial misconduct are more culpable for the excessively long
pre-trial period. Bergeron voiced his concerns about delays and insisted repeatedly in his pleadings
and court remarks that he wanted to go to trial as soon as possible to show how flawed this case
really is. The prejudice caused by the delay is manifested in the constant anxiety the Defendant must
face in battling a wholly corrupt court system that is intent on railroading him simply because he did
not agree to cooperate against a protected suspect.

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Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
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Bergeron has done everything he possibly can to expose the truth of these circumstances he finds
himself in. His opposition continues to cloud the record with lies, misrepresentations of the law, and
bare denials of misconduct with no testimony-backed authenticity. Engaging in this kind of effort is
beyond challenging, especially when dealing with such pronounced bias demonstrated by Judge
James D. O’Neill III. Bergeron knows that this reality means a trial could be dangerous for the state,
because that means this case goes into the hands of a jury of people who will not be as biased and
helpful to the state as Judge O’Neill has been.
These delays obviously represent severe prejudice to the defendant’s case, as it keeps him in the
constant position of being threatened by what this biased judge might do next to deprive him of his
rights. Bergeron’s repeated calls to get this trial underway have been ignored by the same judge. The
courts have fully re-opened, and there is no excuse for there to be no trial date in place at this point in
the proceedings.
The decision reached in State v. Cole, 118 N.H. 829 provides the remedy for denial of speedy trial
rights: “Considering all the facts and circumstances, we hold that the Defendant’s right to a speedy
trial under the New Hampshire Constitution, part I, Article 14 was denied, and his convictions are
therefore vacated and the charges against him are dismissed.” Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434
(1973). This court should reach the same conclusion in this instant case.
COCLUSIO
WHEREFORE, Defendant formally requests that this court acknowledge the same rigid adherence
to technical rules of procedure and court policies that have been relied upon to favor the prosecution
thus far. As such, this court should dismiss all charges with prejudice, or in the alternative hold a
show-cause hearing as to why charges should not be dismissed for failure to provide a speedy trial.
Bergeron has been very patient to this point, allowing nearly twice the proscribed amount of time
to pass that would ordinarily make this motion feasible. The pandemic that shut down the courts
briefly cannot justify the delay tactics employed in this case. The defendant has clearly raised issues
that the prosecution is uncomfortable with. It is in the best interest of Belknap County (which Heater
is acting as a “special” prosecutor for) to keep the intricate facts of this case from being exposed to
the public by way of trial.

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Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
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Bergeron’s best defense is the truth that will emerge through direct and cross examination of
witnesses at trial. Prosecutors and the judge continue to deny Bergeron his day in court by neglecting
to even schedule a new trial date at this point in the case. These delays cannot be adequately
explained as justifiable or even remotely necessary. This case should be immediately dismissed with
prejudice in the interest of justice.
Dated this 14th day of June, 2021.
Respectfully submitted,
Richard E. Bergeron III
Attorney Pro-Se
107 Cotton Hill Rd.
Belmont, NH 0322004