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Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 164015 : February 26, 2009
RAMON A. ALBERT, Petitioner, vs. THE SANDIGANBAYAN,
and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO, J.:
The Case

This is a petition for certiorari[1]
of the Resolutions dated 10 February
2004[2]
and 3 May 2004[3]
of the Sandiganbayan. The 10 February 2004 Resolution
granted the prosecutions Motion to Admit the Amended Information. The 3 May
2004 Resolution denied the Motion For Reconsideration of petitioner Ramon A.
Albert (petitioner). chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Facts
On 24 March 1999, the Special Prosecution Officer (SPO) II of the Office of
the Ombudsman for Mindanao charged petitioner and his co-accused, Favio D.
Sayson and Arturo S. Asumbrado, before the Sandiganbayan with violation of
Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (RA 3019) or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act in Criminal Case No. 25231. The Information
alleged: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer II of the Office of
the Ombudsman for Mindanao hereby accuses RAMON A. ALBERT,
FAVIO D. SAYSON, and ARTURO S. ASUMBRADO for (sic) violation of
Section 3(e) R.A. 3019, as amended, committed as
follows: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
That in (sic) or about May 1990 and sometime prior
or subsequent thereto, in the City of Davao, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused RAMON A. ALBERT, a public officer, being then
the President of the National Home Mortgage and Finance
Corporation, occupying the said position with a salary
grade above 27, while in the performance of his official
function, committing the offense in relation to his office,
taking advantage of his official position, conspiring and
confederating with accused FAVIO D. SAYSON, then the
Project Director of CODE Foundation Inc. and accused
ARTURO S. ASUMBRADO, then the President of the
Buhangin Residents and Employees Association for
Development, Inc., acting with evident bad faith and
manifest partiality and or gross neglect of duty, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally cause undue
injury to the government and public interest, enter and
make it appear in Tax Declaration Nos. D-3-1-7691 and D-

3-1-7692 that two parcels of real property particularly
described in the Certificate of Titles Nos. T-151920 and T-
151921 are residential lands which Tax Declarations
accused submitted to the NHMFC when in truth and in fact,
as accused well knew, the two pieces of real property
covered by Certificate of Titles Nos. T-151920 and T-
151921 are agricultural land, and by reason of accuseds
misrepresentation, the NHMFC released the amount
of P4,535,400.00 which is higher than the loanable
amount the land could command being agricultural, thus
causing undue injury to the
government. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On 26 March 1999, a Hold Departure Order was issued by the Sandiganbayan
against petitioner and his co-accused. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On 25 May 1999, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss Criminal Case No. 25231 on
the following grounds: (1) the accused (petitioner) was denied due process of law;
(2) the Office of the Ombudsman did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the
accused; (3) the constitutional rights of the accused to a speedy disposition of
cases and to a speedy trial were violated; and (4) the resolution dated 26 February
1999 finding the accused guilty of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 is not
supported by evidence.[5]
On 18 December 2000, pending the resolution of the Motion to Dismiss, petitioner
filed a Motion to Lift Hold Departure Order and to be Allowed to Travel. The
prosecution did not object to the latter motion on the condition that petitioner
would be provisionally arraigned.[6]
On 12 March 2001, petitioner filed an Urgent
Motion to Amend Motion to Lift Hold Departure Order and to be Allowed to
Travel. The following day, or on 13 March 2001, the Sandiganbayan arraigned
petitioner who entered a plea of not guilty. In the Resolution dated 16 April 2001,
the Sandiganbayan granted petitioners Urgent Motion to Amend Motion to Lift Hold
Departure Order and to be Allowed to Travel. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On 26 November 2001, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioners Motion to Dismiss
and ordered the prosecution to conduct a reinvestigation of the case with respect to
petitioner. In a Memorandum dated 6 January 2003, the SPO who conducted the
reinvestigation recommended to the Ombudsman that the indictment against
petitioner be reversed for lack of probable cause.However, the Ombudsman, in an
Order dated 10 March 2003, disapproved the Memorandum and directed the Office
of the Special Prosecutor to proceed with the prosecution of the criminal
case.Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of the
Ombudsman. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In a Resolution promulgated on 16 May 2003, the Sandiganbayan scheduled the
arraignment of petitioner on 24 July 2003. However, in view of the pending motion
for reconsideration of the order of the Ombudsman, the arraignment was reset to 2
October 2003. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In a Manifestation dated 24 September 2003, the SPO informed the Sandiganbayan
of the Ombudsmans denial of petitioners motion for reconsideration. On even date,
the prosecution filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Admit Amended Information. During the
2 October 2003 hearing, this ex-parte motion was withdrawn by the prosecution
with the intention of filing a Motion for Leave to Admit Amended Information. The
scheduled arraignment of petitioner was reset to 1 December 2003.
[7]
On 7 October 2003, the prosecution filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Amended
Information. The Amended Information reads: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer I of the Office
of Special Prosecutor, hereby accuses RAMON A. ALBERT, FAVIO D.
SAYSON, and ARTURO S. ASUMBRADO for (sic) violation of Section
3(e) R.A. 3019, as amended, committed as follows: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
That in (sic) or about May 1990 and sometime prior
or subsequent thereto, in the City of Davao, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused RAMON A. ALBERT, a public officer, being then
the President of the National Home Mortgage and Finance

Corporation, occupying the said position with a salary
grade above 27, while in the performance of his official
function, committing the offense in relation to his office,
taking advantage of his official position, conspiring and
confederating with accused FAVIO D. SAYSON, then the
Project Director of CODE Foundation Inc. and accused
ARTURO S. ASUMBRADO, then the President of the
Buhangin Residents and Employees Association for
Development, Inc., acting with evident bad faith and
manifest partialityand/or gross inexcusable
negligence, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
criminally cause undue injury to the government and
public interest, enter and make it appear in Tax
Declaration Nos. D-3-1-7691 and D-3-1-7692 that two
parcels of real property particularly described in the
Certificate of Titles Nos. T-151920 and T-151921 are
residential lands which Tax Declarations accused
submitted to the NHMFC when in truth and in fact, as
accused well knew, the two pieces of real property covered
by Certificate of Titles Nos. T-151920 and T-151921 are
agricultural land, and by reason of accuseds
misrepresentation, the NHMFC released the amount
of P4,535,400.00 which is higher than the loanable
amount the land could command being agricultural, thus
causing undue injury to the
government. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
CONTRARY TO LAW.[8]
Petitioner opposed the motion, alleging that the amendment made on the
information is substantial and, therefore, not allowed after
arraignment. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
In its Resolution of 10 February 2004,[9]
the Sandiganbayan granted the
prosecutions Motion to Admit Amended Information. At the outset,
the Sandiganbayan explained that gross neglect of duty which falls under Section
3(f) of RA 3019 is different from gross inexcusable negligence under Section 3(e),
and held thus: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In an information alleging gross neglect of duty, it is not a
requirement that such neglect or refusal causes undue injury
compared to an information alleging gross inexcusable negligence
where undue injury is a constitutive element. A change to this effect
constitutes substantial amendment considering that the possible
defense of the accused may divert from the one originally
intended. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
It may be considered however, that there are three modes by
which the offense for Violation of Section 3(e) may be committed in
any of the following: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
1. Through evident bad faith; chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
2. Through manifest partiality; chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
3. Through gross inexcusable negligence. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Proof of the existence of any of these modes in connection with
the prohibited acts under said section of the law should suffice to
warrant conviction.[10]
However, the Sandiganbayan also held that even granting that the amendment of
the information be formal or substantial, the prosecution could still effect the same
in the event that the accused had not yet undergone a permanent
arraignment. And since the arraignment of petitioner on 13 March 2001 was merely
provisional, then the prosecution may still amend the information either in form or
in substance. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the
Sandiganbayan in its Resolution of 3 May 2004. Hence this
petition. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Issues

The issues raised in this petition are: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
1. WHETHER THE SANDIGANBAYAN GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
ADMITTING THE AMENDED INFORMATION; AND chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
2. WHETHER THE SANDIGANBAYAN GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
FURTHER PROCEEDING WITH THE CASE DESPITE THE VIOLATION OF
THE RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED TO A SPEEDY TRIAL. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On Whether the Sandiganbayan
Should Admit the Amended Information
Section 14 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Sec. 14. Amendment or Substitution.-- A complaint or information may
be amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any
time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the
trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and
when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the
accused. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
x x x chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Petitioner contends that under the above section, only a formal amendment of the
information may be made after a plea. The rule does not distinguish between a plea
made during a provisional or a permanent arraignment. Since petitioner already
entered a plea of not guilty during the 13 March 2001 arraignment, then the
information may be amended only in form. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
An arraignment is that stage where in the mode and manner required by the rules,
an accused, for the first time, is granted the opportunity to know the precise charge
that confronts him.[11]
The accused is formally informed of the charges against him,
to which he enters a plea of guilty or not guilty. As an indispensable requirement of
due process, an arraignment cannot be regarded lightly or brushed aside
peremptorily.[12]
The practice of the Sandiganbayan of conducting provisional or conditional
arraignments is not sanctioned by the Revised Internal Rules of the
Sandiganbayan or by the regular Rules of Court.[13]
However, in People v. Espinosa,
[14]
this Court tangentially recognized such practice, provided that the alleged
conditions attached thereto should be unmistakable, express, informed and
enlightened. Moreover, the conditions must be expressly stated in the Order
disposing of the arraignment; otherwise, the arraignment should be deemed simple
and unconditional.[15]
In the present case, the arraignment of petitioner is reflected in the Minutes of the
Sandiganbayan Proceedings dated 13 March 2001 which merely states that the
[a]ccused when arraigned entered a plea of not guilty. The Motion to Travel is
granted subject to the usual terms and conditions imposed on accused persons
travelling (sic) abroad.[16]
In the Resolution of 16 April 2001,[17]
the Sandiganbayan
mentioned the arraignment of petitioner and granted his Urgent Motion to Amend
Motion to Lift Hold Departure Order and to be Allowed to Travel, setting forth the
conditions attendant thereto which, however, were limited only to petitioners
itinerary abroad; the setting up of additional bailbond; the required appearance
before the clerk of court; and written advice to the court upon return to the
Philippines. Nothing on record is indicative of the provisional or conditional nature
of the arraignment. Hence, following the doctrine laid down in Espinosa, the

arraignment of petitioner should be deemed simple and
unconditional. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The rules mandate that after a plea is entered, only a formal amendment of the
Information may be made but with leave of court and only if it does not prejudice
the rights of the accused. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Petitioner contends that replacing gross neglect of duty with gross inexcusable
negligence is a substantial amendment of the Information which is prejudicial to his
rights. He asserts that under the amended information, he has to present evidence
that he did not act with gross inexcusable negligence, evidence he was not required
to present under the original information. To bolster his argument, petitioner refers
to the 10 February 2004 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan which ruled that the
change constitutes substantial amendment considering that the possible defense of
the accused may divert from the one originally intended.[18]
We are not convinced. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Petitioner is charged with violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 which provides as
follows: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or
omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the
following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are
hereby declared to be unlawful: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
x x x chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government,
or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial
functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers
andemployees of offices or government corporations charged with the
grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
This crime has the following essential elements:[19]

1. The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative,
judicial or official functions;
2. He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or
gross inexcusable negligence; and
3. His action caused any undue injury to any party, including the
government, or gave any private party unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his
functions. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The second element provides the different modes by which the crime may be
committed, that is, through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross
inexcusable negligence.[20]
In Uriarte v. People,[21]
this Court explained that Section
3(e) of RA 3019 may be committed either by dolo, as when the accused acted with
evident bad faith or manifest partiality, or by culpa, as when the accused
committed gross inexcusable negligence. There is manifest partiality when there is
a clear, notorious, or plain inclination or predilection to favor one side or person
rather than another.[22]
Evident bad faith connotes not only bad judgment but also
palpably and patently fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or
conscious wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill will.[23]
Evident bad faith
contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with
some motive or self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes.[24]
"Gross inexcusable
negligence" refers to negligence characterized by the want of even the slightest
care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not
inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with conscious indifference to
consequences insofar as other persons may be affected.[25]
The original information filed against petitioner alleged that he acted with evident
bad faith and manifest partiality and or (sic) gross neglect of duty. The amended
information, on the other hand, alleges that petitioner acted with evident bad faith
and manifest partiality and/or gross inexcusable negligence. Simply, the
amendment seeks to replace gross neglect of duty with gross inexcusable
negligence. Given that these two phrases fall under different paragraphs of RA

3019specifically, gross neglect of duty is under Section 3(f) while gross inexcusable
negligence is under Section 3(e) of the statutethe question remains whether or not
the amendment is substantial and prejudicial to the rights of
petitioner. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The test as to when the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the amendment of a
complaint or information is when a defense under the complaint or information, as
it originally stood, would no longer be available after the amendment is made, and
when any evidence the accused might have, would be inapplicable to the complaint
or information as amended.[26]
On the other hand, an amendment which merely
states with additional precision something which is already contained in the original
information and which, therefore, adds nothing essential for conviction for the crime
charged is an amendment to form that can be made at anytime.
[27]
In this case, the amendment entails the deletion of the phrase gross neglect of duty
from the Information. Although this may be considered a substantial amendment,
the same is allowable even after arraignment and plea being beneficial to the
accused.[28]
As a replacement, gross inexcusable negligence would be included in
the Information as a modality in the commission of the offense. This Court believes
that the same constitutes an amendment only in form. In Sistoza v. Desierto,[29]
the
Information charged the accused with violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, but
specified only manifest partiality and evident bad faith as the modalities in the
commission of the offense charged. Gross inexcusable negligence was not
mentioned in the Information. Nonetheless, this Court held that the said section is
committed by dolo or culpa, and although the Information may have alleged only
one of the modalities of committing the offense, the other mode is deemed included
in the accusation to allow proof thereof.[30]
In so ruling, this Court applied by
analogy the pronouncement in Cabello v. Sandiganbayan[31]
where an accused
charged with willful malversation was validly convicted of the same felony of
malversation through negligence when the evidence merely sustained the latter
mode of perpetrating the offense. The Court held that a conviction for a criminal
negligent act can be had under an information exclusively charging the commission
of a willful offense upon the theory that the greater includes the lesser

offense. Thus, we hold that the inclusion of gross inexcusable negligence in the
Information, which merely alleges manifest partiality and evident bad faith as
modalities in the commission of the crime under Section 3(e) of RA 3019, is an
amendment in form. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On Whether Petitioners
Right to a Speedy Trial was Violated
Petitioner contends that the complaint-affidavit against him was filed on 15
June 1992, but it was resolved by the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao only on
26 February 1999, or after a period of almost seven (7) years. Four (4) years
thereafter, the SPO, upon reinvestigation of the case, recommended that the case
against petitioner be dismissed for lack of probable cause, but this recommendation
was denied by the Ombudsman. A Motion for Leave to Admit Amended Information
was later filed by the prosecution and granted by the Sandiganbayan in the
questioned Resolution of 10 February 2004. Thus, petitioner maintains that it took
the Office of the Ombudsman twelve (12) years since the initial filing of the
complaint-affidavit in 1992 to charge accused with the offense under the Amended
Information, in violation of petitioners right to a speedy trial. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Petitioners contentions are futile. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The right of an accused to a speedy trial is guaranteed under Section 16,
Article III of the Philippine Constitution which provides: All persons shall have the
right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or
administrative bodies. This right, however, is deemed violated only when the
proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when
unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured; or when without
cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the
party having his case tried.[32]
A simple mathematical computation of the period

involved is not sufficient. We concede that judicial proceedings do not exist in a
vacuum and must contend with the realities of everyday life.[33]
After reviewing the records of the case, we believe that the right of petitioner
to a speedy trial was not infringed upon. The issue on the inordinate delay in the
resolution of the complaint-affidavit filed against petitioner and his co-accused and
the filing of the original Information against petitioner was raised in petitioners
Motion to Dismiss, and was duly addressed by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution
denying the said motion. It appears that the said delays were caused by the
numerous motions for extension of time to file various pleadings and to reproduce
documents filed by petitioners co-accused, and that no actual preliminary
investigation was conducted on petitioner. The Sandiganbayan properly held that a
reinvestigation of the case as to petitioner was in order. Although the
reinvestigation inadvertently resulted to further delay in the proceedings, this
process could not have been dispensed with as it was done for the protection of the
rights of petitioner himself. It is well-settled that although the conduct of an
investigation may hold back the progress of a case, it is necessary so that the
accused's right will not be compromised or sacrificed at the altar of expediency.
[34]
The succeeding events appear to be parts of a valid and regular course of
judicial proceedings not attended by delays which can be considered vexatious,
capricious, oppressive, or unjustified. Hence, petitioners contention of violation of
his right to a speedy trial must fail. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. We AFFIRM the Resolutions dated 10
February 2004 and 3 May 2004 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No.
25231. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SO ORDERED. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson
RENATO C. CORONA TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions
in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
lawphil
Today is Tuesday, October 12, 2010
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SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 173480 February 25, 2009
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
RUIZ GARCIA y RUIZ, Accused-Appellant.
D E C I S I O N
BRION, J.:
We review in this Decision the conviction of accused-appellant Ruiz Garcia y Ruiz (Ruiz) by the Court of Appeals (CA)
in its Decision of May 10, 20061
for violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 or the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. The assailed CA decision fully affirmed the decision of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC),2
Branch 72, Malabon City.
Ruiz was formally charged and pleaded "not guilty" under an Information that reads:
That on or about the 27th day of February 2003, in the Municipality of Navotas, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being a private person, and without authority of
law, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously sell and deliver for consideration in the amount of P200.00
to poseur-buyer one (1) piece of printed paper with markings ‘RGR-1’ containing the following: one (1) small brick of
dried suspected Marijuana fruiting tops with a net weight 11.02 gram[s] and Thirteen (13) small white paper[s] with
markings ‘RGR-RPI’ through ‘RGR-RP13,’ respectively, which substance, when subjected to chemistry examination
gave positive result for Marijuana, a dangerous drug.3
In the pre-trial conference that followed, his counsel admitted the following: (1) the identity of Ruiz as the accused in
the case; (2) the jurisdiction of the RTC; and (3) Ruiz’ lack of authority to possess or sell shabu. 4
The defense
counsel also manifested that admissions could be made in the course of the trial concerning the manner and nature of
the testimony of the forensic chemist.5
lawphil.net
The prosecution presented a single witness, PO1 Samuel Garcia (PO1 Garcia), who, as poseur-buyer, testified that
Ruiz’ arrest was made pursuant to a legitimate buy-bust operation where Ruiz sold him marijuana. The parties
dispensed with the testimony of the forensic chemist, Jesse Abadilla Dela Rosa, after they entered into stipulations
concerning the manner and nature of his testimony.6
The prosecution also submitted the following evidence:
Exhibit "A" - INFOREP dated February 7, 2003 written by Police Senior
Superintendent Oscar F. Valenzuela;

Exhibit "B" - the Dispatch Order dated February 27, 2003;
Exhibit "C-1"
and "C-2"
- the photocopy of the recovered marked money;
Exhibit "D" - the Pre-Operation Report dated February 27, 2003 prepared by
PO2 Geoffrey Huertas;
Exhibit "E" - the Sinumpaang Salaysay of PO1Samuel Sonny Garcia;
Exhibit "F" - the corpus delicti;
Exhibit "H" - the Request for Laboratory Examination dated February 28,
2003 submitted by Ferdinand Lavadia Balgoa, Police Inspector
Chief SDEU and;
Exhibit "G" - the Physical Sciences Report No. D-250-03 prepared by forensic
chemist Jesse Abadilla Dela Rosa.
The defense relied solely on the testimony of Ruiz who claimed he was the victim of a police frame-up and extortion.
The RTC summarized the prosecution’s version of events as follows:
On February 27, 2003, at around 2:45 p.m., PO1 Samuel Garcia was with a confidential informer and two other
policemen at the back of San Roque Church, Navotas, Metro Manila, waiting for the accused with whom the
confidential informer arranged for him (Garcia) to buy marijuana. There were prior Informations [sic] from Camp
Crame and the NPDO about the selling of marijuana xxx For this reason, Garcia got in touch with the confidential
informer whom [sic] he learned could buy marijuana from the accused.
It did not take long after the arrival of Garcia and the others at the area of operation for the accused to arrive on board
a red scooter. Garcia told the accused that he will buy P200.00 worth of marijuana, as agreed upon between the
confidential informer and the accused. The accused in turn gave Garcia the marijuana wrapped in a yellow page of
the PLDT directory. Garcia verified the contents thereof and thereafter gave the P200.00, consisting of two P100.00
bills earlier given for him to use as buy-bust money xxx whose serial numbers were listed in the dispatch order xxx
Garcia then gave the signal to his companions for them to approach. He also arrested the accused whom he told of
his rights and brought him to a lying-in clinic and then to the police headquarters.
According to PO1 Garcia, after the arrest, they brought Ruiz to the DEU7
office for investigation. He (PO1 Garcia)
turned over the seized items to the investigator, who then placed markings on the wrapper.8
The seized items were
thereafter sent to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination; they tested positive for marijuana.9
The version of the defense, as summarized by the RTC, is as follows:
Accused Ruiz Garcia y Ruiz, on the other hand, maintained that he was riding on a hopper on his way [home] to his
wife at Daang Hari, Navotas, Metro Manila, when he saw a jeep with policemen on board. A policeman named Balais
stopped the accused and asked for the papers of the hopper which he, at the same time, searched with nothing illegal
found inside its compartment [sic].
The accused then heard someone remarked "ito pala si Ruiz," and he was told to go along with the policemen, who
initially brought him to the lying-in clinic, and then to the police headquarters where he was asked to make "tubos" or
to "ransom" the hopper; Garcia [Ruiz] was not able to do so because he cannot afford what the policemen were

lawphil
Today is Tuesday, October 12, 2010
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SUPREME COURT
Manila
G.R. No. 177741 August 27, 2009
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
WILLIE RIVERA, Appellant.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
By Decision of August 14, 2006,1
the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of Willie Rivera (appellant) by the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 154 for violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (R.A.
9165), the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002."
The Information against appellant reads:
On or about March 13, 2003, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused (appellant),
not being authorized by law, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver and give away to PO3

Amilassan M. Salisa, a police poseur-buyer, two (2) heat-sealed transparent sachets each containing four centigrams
(0.04 gram) of white crystalline substance, which were found positive to the test of methylamphetamine hydrochloride,
a dangerous drug, in violation of the said law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
From the documentary and testimonial evidence for the prosecution, particularly the testimony of its principal witness
PO3 Amilassan Salisa (PO3 Salisa), the following version is culled:
On March 13, 2003, upon the request of the Pasig City Mayor’s Special Action Team which had received information
from a civilian agent that a certain "Kirat" was engaged in open selling of prohibited drugs in Villa Reyes St., Barangay
Bambang, Pasig City, P/Insp. Rodrigo E. Villaruel of the Pasig Philippine National Police formed a team to conduct a
buy-bust operation in the area. The team which was composed of SPO4 Manuel Buenconsejo as leader, PO2 Arturo
San Andres, PO1 Roland Panis, PO1 Janet Sabo, and PO3 Salisa as poseur buyer, was given control number NOC-
1303-03-04 by the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA).
P/Insp. Villaruel gave PO3 Salisa two one hundred peso (P100) bills on which the latter wrote his initials "AMS" above
the serial numbers ZK801664 and JT972090 printed on the top right portion of the bills. To signal consummation of
the sale, it was agreed that PO3 Salisa would remove his cap.
At 12:55 o’clock in the afternoon of March 13, 2003, the buy-bust team proceeded to the place where "Kirat" was
reportedly peddling prohibited drugs.
Upon arrival at the target area, the buy-bust team parked the van that carried them to the "other side of the street."
PO3 Salisa and the informant thereupon alighted from the van and, from a distance of about five (5) meters, on
seeing appellant who was wearing short pants and a cap, the informant pointed to and identified him as "Kirat" to PO3
Salisa.1avvphi1
As the informant approached appellant, he introduced PO3 Salisa as a buyer of shabu worth P200. PO3 Salisa at
once handed the marked bills to appellant who in turn handed him two heat-sealed plastic sachets containing white
crystalline substance. At that instant, PO3 Salisa removed his cap.
The members of the buy-bust team thus closed in, and PO3 Salisa held appellant’s arm and introduced himself as a
police officer and informed him of his violation and his constitutional rights. PO3 Salisa then placed the markings
"EXH-1 AMS" and "EXH-B AMS 03/13/03" on the two sachets.
The buy-bust team brought appellant to the Rizal Medical Center for physical check-up, and later to the Pasig City
Police Station. In a memorandum, accomplished at 3:00 p.m. also on March 13, 2003, addressed to the Chief of the
Physical Science Division of the Eastern Police District-Philippine National Police (EPD-PNP) Laboratory Service,
P/Insp. Villaruel requested for the conduct of laboratory examination on the seized items to determine the presence of
dangerous drugs and their weight.
Still on the same day, March 13, 2003, at 3:55 P.M., the plastic sachets were delivered to Police Inspector Lourdeliza
M. Gural, Forensic Chemist at the EPD-PNP Crime Laboratory Office who examined them and recorded at 5:55 p.m.
of even date her findings and conclusion in Chemistry Report No. D-455-03-E, viz:

SPECIMEN SUBMITTED:
Two (2) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets with markings "EXH-1 AMS and EXH-B AMS 03/13/03" each
containing 0.04 gram of white crystalline substance and marked as A and B respectively.
x x x x
F I N D I N G S:
Qualitative examination conducted on the above-stated specimen gave POSITIVE result to the tests for
Methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
x x x x
C O N C L U S I O N:
Specimens A and B contain Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.3
(Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
x x x x
Hence, the filing of the Information against appellant.
Denying the charge against him, appellant claimed that he was framed up and gave the following version:
On March 13, 2003, as he was walking towards his mother’s house in SPS Compound, Barangay Bambang, Pasig
City, two police officers accosted him, in the presence of "kibitzers," for allegedly selling shabu. He was dragged and
brought inside a parked van wherein the police officers, under threats, tried to elicit from him information on the
whereabouts of a certain "Ebot" and "Beng" whom he did not personally know, however. The police officers tried to
extort from him P200,000, which was reduced to P20,000, for his release but he did not come across as he could not
afford it, hence, they charged him with violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165.
Appellant presented Lourdes Sanchez, his mother’s neighbor, who declared that at the time of the incident, while she
was outside her nipa hut in the field waiting for her son, she saw appellant come out of "the alley" upon which two
police officers approached and handcuffed him, and "[w]hen there were many kibitzers around," they dragged him
"near the van."
Finding for the prosecution, the trial court, by Decision of January 23, 2004, convicted appellant, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused WILLIE RIVERA
GUILTYbeyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of Section 5, Article II, R.A. 9165 for selling of shabu as
charged in the information, and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to pay a
fine of P500,000.00.
Considering the penalty imposed by the Court, his immediate commitment to the National Penitentiary is hereby
ordered.

SO ORDERED.4
(Emphasis in the original)
The case was forwarded to the Court after appellant filed a notice of appeal. Per People v. Mateo,5
however, this
Court referred the case to the Court of Appeals by Resolution of August 3, 2005.6
As earlier stated, the Court of Appeals upheld appellant’s conviction.
Hence, the present appeal, appellant faulting the appellate court
I. . . . IN NOT FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS ILLEGALLY ARRESTED.
II. . . . IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF
VIOLATION OF SECTION 5, ARTICLE II OF REPUBLIC ACT 9165.7
(Underscoring supplied)
Appellant questions his arrest without warrant, not any of the instances when a warrantless arrest – the person to be
arrested must have committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense8
–having been allegedly
present when he was arrested.
Buenaventura v. People,9
citing People v. Bagsit,10
teaches, however:
x x x It is long settled that where the accused, by his voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court, as shown by
the counsel-assisted plea he entered during the arraignment and his active participation in the trial
thereafter,voluntarily waives his constitutional protection against illegal arrests and searches. We have consistently
ruled that any objection concerning the issuance or service of a warrant or a procedure in the acquisition by the court
of jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise, the objection is
deemed waived. (Citations omitted; underscoring supplied)
The records do not show that appellant raised any question on the legality of his arrest before he was arraigned or in
his petition for bail. By submitting himself to the jurisdiction of the court and presenting evidence in his defense,
appellant voluntarily waived his constitutional protection against illegal arrest.
In any event, appellant forgets that from the evidence for the prosecution, he was arrested while committing a crime –
peddling of illegal drugs, a circumstance where warrantless arrest is justified under Rule 113, Section 5(a) of the
Rules of Court which reads:
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. – A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense.
x x x x
Appellant’s other assigned error delves on the reliance by the lower courts on the prosecution evidence in finding him
guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

The matter of assigning values to declarations on the witness stand is best and most competently performed by the
trial judge who, unlike appellate magistrates, can weigh such testimony in light of the witness’ demeanor, conduct and
position to discriminate between truth and falsehood. That is a time-tested doctrine. Thus, appellate courts will not
disturb the credence, or lack of it, accorded by the trial court to the testimonies of witnesses. This is especially true
when the trial court’s findings have been affirmed by the appellate court as in the present case, because they are
generally conclusive and binding upon the Court, unless it be manifestly shown, and appellant has not in the present
case, that the lower courts had overlooked or disregarded arbitrarily the facts and circumstances of significance in the
case.11
Given the penalty imposed on appellant, however, the Court just the same assiduously evaluated the evidence for the
prosecution but found nothing to warrant a reversal of the lower courts’ evaluation.
Appellant has not even proffered any credible motive why the police officers would falsely charge him. His alleged
refusal to divulge the whereabouts of those two persons mentioned above fails to impress. Neither does his claim that
the police officers wanted him to pay off his liberty. For, inter alia, if he were just a house painter, as he claimed, and
not a drug dealer, the police would not expect him to come up with such amount (P20,000). Besides, since, by his and
his witness’ information, there were "kibitzers" around, including neighbors, when he was arrested, why no timely
succor to him, or any form of protest by anyone of them against his arrest was lodged, if he were indeed innocent,
does not speak well of his defense.
In consonance with the hornbook precept that an appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case for review on any
question including one not raised by the parties, the Court went on to determine whether the requirements of Section
21.112
of R.A. 9165 was complied with.
The buy bust operation in the present case was coordinated with the PDEA. After the sachets of shabu were
confiscated from appellant and PO3 Salisa marked them, a spot report was submitted to the PDEA detailing the items
seized from appellant and the procedure undertaken.13
P/Sr. Inspector Villaruel14
soon after issued a memorandum
transmitting the sachets to, which were received at 3:55 P.M. by, the EPD-PNP Crime Laboratory for examination.15
While PO3 Salisa’s testimony did not indicate if he made a list of the sachets as well as the buy-bust money in the
presence of appellant or if photographs thereof were taken, the defense did not propound questions suggesting doubt
as to the integrity of the sachets.
People v. Pringas teaches that non-compliance with Section 21 is not necessarily fatal as long as there is justifiable
ground therefor, what is important being the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items:
Non-compliance by the apprehending/buy-bust team with Section 21 is not fatal as long as there is justifiable ground
therefor, and as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the confiscated/seized items, are properly preserved
by the apprehending officer/team. Its non-compliance will not render an accused's arrest illegal or the items
seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of
the accused.16
(Citation omitted, emphasis supplied)
Appellant, as in Pringas, has not questioned at any stage of the case the custody and disposition of the items taken
from him.

At all events, the Court appreciates no showing that the integrity of the seized items has been compromised.
WHEREFORE, the August 14, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Footnotes
1
Rollo, pp. 3-16, penned by Associate Justice Fernanda Lampas-Peralta with the concurrence of
Associate Justices Eliezer R. Delos Santos and Myrna Dimaranan-Vidal.

2
Records, p. 1
3
Id. at 12.
4
Id. at 67- 72, Decision of January 23, 2004 by the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 154.
5
G.R. Nos. 147678-87, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 640. The case modified the pertinent provisions of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, more particularly Section 3 and Section 10 of Rule 122, Section
13 of Rule 124, Section 3 of Rule 125 insofar as they provide for direct appeals from the Regional Trial
Courts to the Supreme Court in cases where the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment and allowed intermediate review by the Court of Appeals before such cases are elevated
to the Supreme Court.
6
CA rollo, pp. 83-84.
7
Id. at 38-51, Brief for the Accused-Appellant filed before the Court of Appeals.
8
Rules of Court, Rule 113, Section 5 par.(a).
9
G.R. No. 171578, August 8, 2007, 529 SCRA 500, 513.
10
G.R. No. 148877, August 19, 2003, 409 SCRA 350, 354.
11
William Ching v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 177237, October 17, 2008.
12
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs,
Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. – The PDEA shall take charge and have
custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources or dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential
chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized
and or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately
after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of
the accused or the persons/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be
given a copy thereof; x x x
13
Records, p. 9.
14
Id. at 11.
15
Id. at 12.

16
G.R. No. 175928. August 31, 2007, 531 SCRA 828, 842-843.
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