Plutonium Recycle: international security, economics and waste disposal by Victor Gilinsky

1. Plutonium Recycle: international
security, economics and waste disposal
Victor Gilinsky
Tokyo
November 6, 2015

2. Treat plutonium as fuel—or explosive?
• The original goal of the world’s nuclear community was
eventual reliance on advanced reactors fueled with plutonium
• It’s an attractive concept, but it ignored (1) economics, and
(2) the international dangers of relying on a nuclear explosive
• We don’t have adequate protection against countries using
their plutonium for nuclear weapons, if they later so decide
• IAEA inspection can’t warn in time because separated
plutonium can be put to weapon use too quickly
• For this reason, US President Ford concluded in 1976 that use
of plutonium fuel should stop until the world “can effectively
overcome the associated risks of proliferation”
• We are still not able to “effectively overcome” the risks
• We need restrictions, but they can gain acceptance only if
they apply to all, including advanced and weapons countries

3. Plutonium: unfavorable economics
• Today, even eminent Japanese scientists and former officials
who support Rokkasho concede that plutonium recycle is not
economic (see CSIS interviews on vimeo.com)
• For example, Professor Atsuyuki Suzuki (Emeritus, Tokyo
University) maintains it is important to prove plutonium
recycle technology, but says it is “economically unnecessary”
to operate the plutonium fuel cycle commercially
• Rokkasho has become a “white elephant”
• Nevertheless, its nuclear supporters see it as a link to their
original dream of plutonium-fueled advanced reactors
• But the objective of a plutonium-fueled future now appears
less and less realistic economically
• And, more importantly, it is incompatible with international
security, which should be the overriding consideration

4. Does reprocessing aid waste disposal?
• A pro-reprocessing argument is that it reduces waste volume
and simplifies waste disposal in costly geologic repositories
• In reality, reprocessing complicates radioactive waste storage
and disposal, and increases risks of accidents and leaks
• It is also doubtful that there will even be any geologic
repositories, at least in democratic countries like the US,
Japan, and Britain—because of public resistance
• Despite many promises by nuclear agencies, none of these
countries has even started building a geologic repository
• Realistically, radioactive waste—either spent fuel or
reprocessing waste—will stay in surface facilities indefinitely
• The simplest, cheapest, and safest approach is to put spent
fuel in “dry casks” (about 100 casks per reactor lifetime)