This document summarizes an academic article about the relationship between realism and Arab nationalism. It discusses how Arab nationalism emerged in response to Turkish domination of the Ottoman Empire and focused on promoting the Arabic language. While realism views the state as the primary actor and discounts ideology, Arab nationalism defines identity through shared language and history across state borders. The document analyzes how Arab nationalism's rejection of the state and emphasis on pan-Arab unity contradict realism's concepts of anarchy and state sovereignty. In conclusion, while realism cannot account for Arab nationalism's ideological principles, it can help explain how nationalist ideas influenced Middle Eastern politics.

1. Realism and Arab Nationalism: An Uneasy Partnership
By Marina M. Elgawly
2017, Vol. 9 No. 12 | pg. 1/1
CiteReferencesPrint
IN THIS ARTICLE
· Roots of Arab Nationalism
· Realism and Nationalist Ideology
· Conflicting Conceptions of ‘The State’
· Coming to Terms With Anarchy and Sovereignty
· The Gap Between Ideology and Reality
· References
KEYWORDS
Keywords:International RelationsMiddle EastArab
NationalismRealismNationalismPan-Arabism
The relationship between realism and nationalism is not clearly
articulated in international relations literature. On one hand,
realism and nationalism are viewed as contradictory forces,
standing against one another as reason to emotion, reality to
identity. On the other, nationalism and power politics are
inherently intertwined; nationalism often significantly promotes
the escalation of war, thus affecting the balance of power. In the
context of the modern Middle East, the relationship between
realism and nationalism is obfuscated even further as Arab
nationalism, a neither particularistic nor singular strain of
nationalism, framed through multiple identity discourses and
transformations in the state system across time and space
(Kramer 1993; Woods 2004). This essay examines the extent to
which the history and role of Arab nationalism in the Middle
East supports or contradicts a realist account of the region.
Imprecise definitions and delineations of Arab nationalism
make research on the topic more difficult (Mabry 2015, 54).
Disagreement among Arabs themselves over how to define
strains of Arab nationalism, such as Pan-Arab nationalism
(‘qaymiyya’) and state-centric Arab nationalism (‘wataniyya’),

2. also explains why much of the research on Arab nationalism is
“discordant” (54). For these reasons, studies on Arab
nationalism often rely on interpretations of the concept by
different Arab nationalist leaders (54-55). In light of the
conflicting terminology that surrounds the topic, this essay will
discuss Arab nationalism of the ‘qaymiyya’ strain, the roots of
which lie in linguistic revolution.
As with all nationalisms, there are several strains of Arab
nationalism based on different guiding principles (Kramer 1993;
Bitar 2011, 52). According to Albert Hourani, among the three
forms of nationalism—religious nationalism, geographic
nationalism, linguistic nationalism—the latter is most
applicable to the Middle East context (qtd. in Bitar 2011, 52).
According to Hourani:
For better or worse, this became the dominant political idea in
the Middle East and superseded or absorbed the others; thus in
the Arabic-speaking countries the assertion that all who speak
Arabic formed a nation and should constitute one State or group
of States proved to be the strongest political force, even if it
had not yet embodied itself in a political form (qtd. in Bitar
2011, 53).
To Arab nationalist thinkers like Zakī Al-Arsūzī, race could not
stand as a force for unification (Woods 2004). Sati’ Al-Husri,
for instance, dismissed race as a foundation of an Arab nation,
characterised by diverse groups of people with separate origins
(Choueiri 2000, 122). To Al-Husri, the concept of race was not
only an inaccurate means of describing Arab peoples, but would
very well undermine Arab nationalism itself (Kramer 1993;
Woods 2004) Other Arab nationalists considered the notion of a
nationalism based on racial roots to be an imperialist
mechanism for division (Kramer 1993; Woods 2004). Shaykh
'Abdullah al-'Alayili believed that conceptualising race as a
foundation of nationalism reflected the desire of the state to
pursue its own selfish interests (Woods 2004).
Similarly, Michael 'Aflaq believed a nationalism based on racial
unity was nothing more than the product of Western imperialist

3. forces (Woods 2004). The Arab nationalists’ predilection of the
linguistic form, thus, was a decision based a rejection of ethno-
nationalism. To that end, Arab nationalism, a socially
constructed nationalism based on elements of language and
history, will define what is meant by ‘Arab nationalism’ for the
remainder of this essay.
To make sense of the relationship between realism and Arab
nationalism, it is necessary to explore the background to which
Arab nationalism emerges in the Middle East and then examine
the ways in which it is incorporated into political thought across
the region. This brief historical analysis sets the context for
examining whether Arab nationalism can be rationalised
accordingly to assumptions of realist theory, as set out by
Kenneth Waltz, Hans Morgenthau and E.H. Carr, among others
realist theorists. This paper will conclude by arguing that while
realism cannot account for the ideological tenets of Arab
nationalism, it is an adequate framework forf explaining the
political reality of Arab nationalist thought.
Roots of Arab Nationalism
The intellectual roots of Arab nationalism can be traced back to
the Arabic speaking populations of a weakening Ottoman
Empire (Shlaim 2003; Grafton 2003, 91). Traditional wisdom on
the formulation of national identity in the Middle East by
historian George Antonius points to language as the
foundational concept of Arab nationalism (Shlaim 2003).
Antonius distinguishes the linguistic revival as a response to
Turkification; after the 1909 Young Turk Revolution, the call to
return of Standard Arabic to education and administration grew
in popularity and intensity among Arab nationalist thinkers
(Grafton 2003, 91; Suleiman 1994, 10).
The promotion of the standardisation of the Arabic language
across provinces of the Ottoman Empire took the form of a
number of cultural societies, which aimed to popularise the use
of Arabic among Arab schools and society. These societies, all
formed between 1907 and 1913, included Al-Muntada Al-Adabi,
Al-Arabiyya Al-Fata, Al-Ifsāh, Al-Ahd and Al-Nahda (Suleiman

4. 1994, 8). The most active of these societies, Al-Nahda, went to
great measures to formulate a number of policy statements in its
constitution dedicated to the active promotion of the Arabic
language, some of which included replacing Turkish numbers in
backgammon with Arabic numbers and refusing to give alms
unless beggars asked for in in Arabic (Suleiman 1994, 9).
The promotion of Standard Arabic did not remain exclusive to
small groups of cultural intellectual societies. In 1913, a group
of Syrian and Lebanese Arab nationalist activists joined
Ottoman authorities in an organised conference in Paris to
demand Turkish be replaced with Arabic in schools (Grafton
2003, 91). Syrian classical linguist Sa’id Al-Afghānī illustrates
the first two decades of the twentieth century in Syria by the
emergence of locally-funded Arabic-language schools. The shift
from symbolic to practical applicability of Arab nationalist
ideals is perhaps most apparent in the classroom, where pupils
were required to answer teachers in the classical ‘labbayka’
rather than the Turkish form, ‘afandim’; pupils speaking in
Turkish were likewise subject to punishment by school
administrators (Suleiman 1994, 9).
Arabisation took form at the university level in 1919 when
Damascus University’s law and medicine departments ado fpted
Arabic as its official language of teaching. The decision to
instill Arabic in the educational system can indeed be
considered a political one: that the Faculty of Medicine in
Damascus University became a pioneer in producing
dictionaries of terms in Arabic from French and Turkish stood
as proof that the Arabic language was just as sufficient as
Turkish and Western languages (18). In this way, the promotion
of Arabic was meant to counter a sense of national deficiency
generated by feeling of “inferiority” in students who felt that
their language was somehow inadequate (18).
It is important to note that the for many Arab nationalist
thinkers, Arabic was not the primary language. For instance,
Sati’ Al-Husri’s primary language was Turkish. His linguistic
transition to Standard Arabic followed the collapse of the

5. Ottoman Empire, when many faced the dilemma of identity:
were they Turks or Arabs (Tibi 1997,145-146)? To Al-Husri,
the interaction between common language and common history
formed the main tenets of Arab nationalism. He stated, “[Arabic
language is] the most important non-material link between the
individual and the other members of a social group” (qtd. in
Tibi 1997, 145). Other nationalist theorists supported Al-
Husri’s elevation of Arabic in Arab nationalist ideology.
Nationalist cleric Shaykh Abdullah Al-'Alayili similarly called
Arabic the unifying force of nationalism, stating “[the land of
the Arabs] coincided with the historical and final expansion of
the Arabic language” and that “the Arabisation process left
behind a permanent imprint and a triumphant language” (qtd. in
Woods 2004). As the promotion of Standard Arabic was also a
means of transcending regional dialects that may render
division among local populations (Suleiman 1994, 10), the
Arabic language was a symbolic asset in the generation of an
‘Arab identity’, and in turn, an Arab nationalist ideology (Tibi
1997, 145-146). Al-Husri’s belief that an Arabic-speaking
person is intrinsically an Arab (Mabry 2015, 54) illustrates his
rejection of both notions of ‘the state’ and ‘common territory’
as basic elements of nationhood.
The interdependence between the elevation of nationalism via
Arabic and Islam as the dominant religion of the region is
important for a discussion of Arab nationalism. Construction of
this brand of social nationalism is based not only on language
but also on a set of normative values to accommodate the
multifaceted cultural nature of the Middle East (Woods 2004).
To Fred Halliday, the very rise of Standard Arabic necessitated
a close engagement with the Quran. Indeed, much of the
rhetoric of secular Arab nationalism was taken from the Quranic
lexicon, particularly words like umma (‘national community’),
watan (‘homeland’) and risala (‘mission’) (Halliday 2013, 444).
Even Christian Arabs arguably recognised the significance of
Islam in the place of secular Arab nationalist ideology (Choueiri
2000, 163). For Michel Aflaq, Islam and Arab nationalism were

6. two sides of the same coin as he considered Islam an inherent
part of Arabs’ “innermost personality” (163). Qustantin Zurayk,
another Christian Arab, similarly recognised Prophet
Muhammad and Islam as “valuable historical heritages for
Arabs of any faith” (Helms 1990, 23). Thus, Islam, like the
Arabic language, was seen as a unifying feature of Arab
nationalism. Indeed, among Arab nationalist thinkers, the
cultural history of Islam was, like Standard Arabic, emphasised
as a means of incorporating different forms of identities and
accommodating different social groups in the Middle East
(Kramer 1993).
Realism and Nationalist Ideology
Does nationalist ideology have a place in realism? In many
ways, an understanding of whether Arab nationalism can
support a realist account of the region needs to first examine the
basic elements which make up each theory. An examination of
Kenneth Waltz’s international political theoretical framework
reveals the centrality of power in the international system.
According to Waltz, power is able to provide states with four
necessary elements of survival in the international system:
First, power provides the means of maintaining one’s autonomy
in the face of force that others wield. Second, greater power
permits wider ranges of action, while leaving the outcomes of
action uncertain… Third, the more powerful enjoy wider
margins of safety in dealing with the less powerful and have
more to say about which games will be played…Fourth, great
power gives its possessors a big stake in their system and the
ability to act for its sake (194-195).
An emphasis on power is supplanted by Waltz with a means of
measuring it. Waltz’s list of elements of state power includes
those which can be measured empirically to other states.
Natural resources, strong economy, powerful military, and
stable political institutions are among the elements Waltz
recognises; ideology of any form is explicitly excluded (97-98).
Waltz’s dismissal of ideology or national identity is a consistent
theme throughout realism theory. Machiavelli, in his general

7. description of realism, determines power a more important
determinant of political events than ideology. Morgenthau
similarly undermines the role of ideology in understanding state
relations in his ‘Principles of Political Realism’. In
Morgenthau’s account, realism fundamentally chooses to ignore
the intellectual and moral bedrock of the statesman, the concept
of interests vis-à-vis power infuses rational explanation and
calculation into the realm of international relations in a way
which works to guard the theory against the significance of
understanding underlying motives and ideology (Morgenthau 4-
15).
The realist tendency to focus on state power limits the role of
national ideology and identity as means of altering the balance
of power. Likewise, and perhaps most telling, E.H. Carr’s
seminal text, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, presents a polemical
attack against inter-war utopian thought, which, according to
Carr, was characterised by “visionary projects” calling for
“national solidarity” (Carr 2016). To Carr, ideological
principles are not principles at all, but façades which allow
states to pursue their national interests. Therefore, realism’s
focus on rational theories to explain international phenomenon
presents a theoretical predisposition to underestimate or
ultimately reject the role of nationalist ideology, thus
suggesting a fundamental disparity between Arab nationalism
and realism.
Conflicting Conceptions of ‘The State’
It is difficult to then reconcile Al-Husri’s rejection of ‘the
state’ as a necessary condition for Arab nationalism with a
realist account. Considering that the state is the most dominant
unit of analysis in realism, the state would also be the main unit
of analysis in a realist account of nationalism. Al-Husri’s
rejection of the nation-state as a necessary condition for his
formulation of Arab nationalism presents a distinct account of
identity that is at odds with realism. While realism defines
identity in terms of the state, Arab nationalism defines the state
in terms of socially constructed identity, vis-à-vis a common

8. language and history. The elevation of the Arabic language and
cultural Islam as identities was meant to transcend geographical
barriers across the region. The result: a latent consciousness
among Arabs which constrained state-centric behaviour.
The rhetoric of Arab nationalist ideology does not emphasise
state sovereignty or the centrality of autonomous states so much
as it did trans-regional unification. It is, therefore, the inherent
nature of the Arab nationalist ideology which reveals a
fundamental contradiction with realist theory. Unlike
nationalism in Europe, Arab nationalism of the qaumi strain is
not exclusive to a particular nation-state; the ‘nation’ was meant
to incorporate all Arabic-speakers, who were thus Arabs, while
‘states’ were merely viewed as parts of that whole (Rubin 1991,
535). The state was not of fundamental importance. The
universalistic nature of Arab nationalism (Kramer 1993) indeed
stands against the exclusive nature of realism.
Coming to Terms With Anarchy and Sovereignty
The relationship between the centrality of the nation-state and
concepts of anarchy and sovereignty is critical in realist theory
(Waltz 1979; Morgenthau). According to realist theorists like
Waltz, the anarchical system fosters antagonistic conditions in
which there is no central world government, setting nation-
states as the most important sovereign actors in a self-help
system (Carr 2016). Arab nationalism, however, dictates that
the interests of the broader Arab community, the ‘Arab nation’,
supersedes the self-serving interests of individual Arab states
(Halliday 2013, 235). According to tenets of the ideology, the
elevation of Standard Arabic, with its enduring relationship to
Islam, in particular, represents a solidarity among Arabs across
the region. Transnational recognition of a common Islamic
heritage and common language, which were meant to overcome
conflicting identities and competing tribal, ethnic and religious
interests, would achieve a national consciousness of political
unity and cooperation.
Therefore, the implications of Arabic language and Islam as
unifying forces in Arab nationalism—allegiance and loyalty to

9. the common Arab nation—contradict basic realist assumptions
of anarchy and sovereignty. A testament to its ideological
character, Arab nationalism stresses the construction of a
(symbolic) single sovereign entity which “ought to have a
common government” (Goldschmidt, Jr. 1979, 181-182). Hence
two fundamental beliefs of Arab nationalism which contradict
realism: (1) the reality of trans-national cooperation over chaos
and (2) the fallacy of state sovereignty. Arab nationalism and
realism possess irreconcilably different understandings of
anarchy and sovereignty.
The Gap Between Ideology and Reality
Despite a number of fundamental disparities between Arab
nationalism and realism, a realist examination is able to reveal a
sizable gap between ideology and reality in the role of Arab
nationalism in the Middle East. Arab nationalist solidarity
envisaged a community of individual Arabs linked through
transnational, rather than intergovernmental, institutions. This
belief materialises via the formation of a number of short-lived
Arab Federations, including the union between Jordan and Iraq
(1958); the United Arab Republic (1958), which involved Egypt
and Syria; and the Federation of Arab Republics (1972), which
involved Egypt, Libya and Syria (Macdonald 1965, 229).
Likewise, the Arab League Collective Security Pact establishes
inter-Arab cooperation over anarchy as the definitive guiding
force. Insofar it acknowledges that states establish institutions
that may encourage cooperation, a constructivist framework
may thus better account for Pan-Arab nationalism than realism.
Nonetheless, an empirical examination of these institutions
exposes a number of realist assumptions in application;
particularly the notion that states pursue their own interests at
the expense of other states’ interests.
A realist analysis of Arab nationalism in practice reveals
realpolitik and the pursuit of national interests by Arab state
leaders. In many cases, the political reality of Middle Eastern
states in the twentieth century reveals that sweeping nationalist
calls for leaders to pursue the interests of the Arab nation over

10. the interests of their separate states being put aside (Macdonald
1965, 228-230). Indeed, when Arab leaders perceived their
individual states’ sovereignty to be at risk, they would
consistently sacrifice the survival of any notion of Arab unity
for collective national security (229). At the same time, many
institutions designed under the banner of promoting Arab
nationalism were, in reality, superficially created to maximise a
state’s individual interests or the personal interests of a leader
or regime (229).
A cursory examination of the United Arab Republic reveals
realist assumptions at work. Egypt’s attempt to maximise its
breadth of power in the region. Egypt’s political control of the
Republic left little room for Syria to provide input regarding the
affairs of the union. Military leaders and other leading figures
from the Syrian were strategically transferred to Cairo by
Nasser’s regime as a means of ensuring they were isolated from
their power bases. Egypt essentially sought to control Syria like
a colony, as it took control of Syria’s security forces and
bureaucracy. Despite initial commitments, Iraq then refused to
join the Republic. Iraq’s decision to refuse U.A.R. membership
reflects a primacy of national interests; to the detriment of Arab
nationalist ideals, Iraq deemed it better to ensure its sovereignty
after witnessing Egypt’s behaviour toward Syria (Macdonald
1965, 229).
In this case, the national interest of the Iraqi state trumped Arab
nationalist ideology. Though sympathetic to Pan-Arab
nationalism, Iraq’s actions of not joining the U.A.R. shows a
policy towards self-determination as it sought to protect itself
against foreign intervention by Nasser’s regime. This claim
connects to the description of realism as set out by Wayman and
Diehl’s, who state that state scepticism towards transnational
ideals will often replace or transcend nationalism (Wayman and
Diehl 1994, 8). Egypt’s self-interested behaviour supports this
claim as its conduct reinforces the role of power politics as a
fundamental feature of Middle Eastern politics, thus supporting
a realist account of the region.

11. Nationalist Arab regimes have often hijacked nationalist
rhetoric to pursue power politics. According to Robert
Macdonald, the signing of the Arab League Collective Security
Pact “was an astute political gesture designed to convey the
impression of Arab solidarity in the face of aggression”
(MacDonald 1965, 229). That Arab leaders pursued balance of
power politics under the guise of calls for Arab solidarity
reveals a primacy of power over idealist nationalist rhetoric,
thus supporting a realist account of Arab nationalism. The gap
between ideology and reality is further unravelled when we
consider that Arab nationalism was installed at the behest of the
domestic government. Similarly, Margaret Law shows that King
Faisal, among other leaders, was “motivated by personal or
dynastic ambitions…rather than for more ideological reasons”
to pursue Pan-Arab nationalism as policy (Law 1996, 125).
Finally, Arab nationalism is often considered to be a balancing
mechanism against Western power (Nugent et. al. 2016, 8)
Although Bernard Lewis writes, “there is no lack of individual
policies and actions, pursued and taken by individual Western
governments that have aroused the passionate anger of Middle
Eastern and other Islamic peoples,” Nugent, Masoud and Jamal
believe the occupation of Palestine a geopolitical form of
Western dominance in the region (qtd. in Nugent et. al. 2016,
5). Solidarity as characterised by common language and history
is often interpreted as defensive retreats into linguistic and
ethnic identity (Nugent et. al. 2016, 2). According to Nugent,
Masoud and Jamal, early twentieth-century Arab nationalists
were driven by a “desire to counter the spread of Western
culture with their own, indigenous, Arab variant” (6).
A root motive behind these ambitions was the emergence of a
disquieting realisation among a number of Arab intellectuals
who recognised that Arab societies were significantly weaker
than those of the West. While many thinkers blamed imperialist
forces, many suggested an inherent weakness in Arab culture
and society. Consider that in response to a 1930s article
entitled, “Why are Muslims Lagging Behind the Christians,”

12. Arab nationalist Adil Arslan concluded that Arabs must unite
under a single government (Rubin 1991, 535). Under these
considerations, balance of power politics is able to provide a
more coherent account of Arab nationalism than constructivist
notions of cooperation.
While not wholly irreconcilable, realism and Arab nationalism
qualify a shaky relationship. Arab nationalism’s non-
particularistic nature denies an account of the primacy of the
state. Consequently, realism’s rational ontology rejects the
ideological foundations of Arab nationalism. Nonetheless, Arab
nationalism has often reinforced the realist assumption that
states must balance against states whom they share an
ideological affinity. To that end, the history and role of Arab
nationalism in the Middle East is able to support an account of
realism, insofar that the ideological foundations of Arab
nationalism break down.
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