Running head DATA MINING 1DATA MINING4Assignment 2 Inter.docx

Running head: DATA MINING 1
DATA MINING 4
Assignment 2: International Insecurity and the Use of Force
Due Week 6 and worth 200 points
Incorporate the professor’s feedback from Assignment 1 in
order to proficiently develop Assignment 2.
Use scholarly journal articles and/or Strayer academic databases
to complete additional research on your selected topic. Use the
major international political event that you selected for
Assignment 1 in order to complete this assignment.
Use the basic outline below to draft your paper. Organize your
responses to each question (except Question 5) under the
following section headings:
•Part II: International Insecurity and the Use of Force of [Name
of Select Major International Event]
•The Media, the People, and Public Opinion (for Question 1)
•The Impact of Foreign Policies (for Question 2)
•International Insecurity (for Question 3)
•Use of Force (for Question 4)
Write a four to six (4-6) page paper in which you separate the
content into sections:
1.Explain the fundamental manner in which transnational actors,
interest groups, public opinion, and the media have influenced
your chosen event. Provide relevant examples of such influence
in action to support your response.
2.Discuss which foreign policies developed by the main
participants played a role in your chosen event. Evaluate the
extent to which the chosen policies impacted your chosen event.
Provide examples of the impact to support your rationale.
3.Analyze the key role(s) that international insecurity played in
the development of your chosen event. Provide a rationale for
your response.
4.Analyze whether or not the use of force concept was used in
your chosen event. Argue whether or not the use or non-use of

force concept was justified. Provide examples where force was
used to support your rationale.
5.Use at least three (3) additional quality references. Note:
Wikipedia and other Websites do not qualify as academic
resources.
Your assignment must follow these formatting requirements:
•Be typed, double spaced, using Times New Roman font (size
12), with one-inch margins on all sides; citations and references
must follow APA or school-specific format. Check with your
professor for any additional instructions.
•Include a cover page containing the title of the assignment, the
student’s name, the professor’s name, the course title, and the
date. The cover page and the reference page are not included in
the required assignment page length.
The specific course learning outcomes associated with this
assignment are:
•Evaluate the theories and systems of international politics.
•Analyze how international politics influences the various
levels of public administration and its effects on groups and
individuals.
•Differentiate among international conflict, security, terrorism,
military force, weapons of mass destruction, and their effects on
war and peace.
•Analyze the major developments in international politics and
how they have evolved.Use technology and information
resources to research issues in international public
administration.
•Use technology and information resources to research issues in
international public administration
•Write clearly and concisely about international public
administration using proper writing mechanics.
Grading for this assignment will be based on answer quality,
logic/organization of the paper, and language and writing skills,
using the following rubric.
FOLLOW RUBRIC

Points: 200
Assignment 2: International Insecurity and the Use of Force
Criteria
Unacceptable
Below 70% F
Fair
70-79% C
Proficient
80-89% B
Exemplary
90-100% A
1. Explain the fundamental manner in which transnational
actors, interest groups, public opinion, and the media have
influenced your chosen event. Provide relevant examples of
such influence in action to support your response.
Weight: 20%
Did not submit or incompletely explained the fundamental
manner in which transnational actors, interest groups, public
opinion, and the media have influenced your chosen even. Did
not submit or incompletely provided relevant examples of such
influence in action to support your response.
Partially explained the fundamental manner in which
transnational actors, interest groups, public opinion, and the
media have influenced your chosen event. Partially provided
relevant examples of such influence in action to support your
response.
Satisfactorily explained the fundamental manner in which
media have influenced your chosen event. Satisfactorily
provided relevant examples of such influence in action to
support your response.
Thoroughly explained the fundamental manner in which
media have influenced your chosen event. Thoroughly provided
relevant examples of such influence in action to support your
response.

2. Discuss which foreign policies developed by the main
participants have played a role in your chosen event. Evaluate
the extent to which the policies in question impacted your
chosen event. Provide examples of the impact to support your
rationale.
Weight: 25%
Did not submit or incompletely discussed which foreign policies
developed by the main participants have played a role in your
chosen event. Did not submit or incompletely evaluated the
extent to which the policies in question impacted your chosen
event. Did not submit or incompletely provided examples of the
impact to support your rationale.
Partially discussed which foreign policies developed by the
main participants have played a role in your chosen event to
which the chosen policies impact your chosen event. Partially
evaluated the extent to which the policies in question impacted
your chosen event. Partially provided examples of the impact to
support your rationale.
Satisfactorily discussed which foreign policies developed by the
main participants have played a role in your chosen event.
Satisfactorily evaluated the extent to which the policies in
question impacted your chosen event. Satisfactorily provided
examples of the impact to support your rationale.
Thoroughly discussed which foreign policies developed by the
main participants have played a role in your chosen event.
Thoroughly evaluated the extent to which the policies in
question impacted your chosen event. Thoroughly provided
examples of the impact to support your rationale.
3. Analyze the key role(s) that international insecurity played in
the development of your chosen event. Provide a rationale for
your response.
Weight: 20%
Did not submit or incompletely analyzed the key role(s) that
international insecurity played in the development of your
chosen event. Did not submit or incompletely provided a
rationale for your response.

Partially analyzed the key role(s) that international insecurity
played in the development of your chosen event. Partially
provided a rationale for your response.
Satisfactorily analyzed the key role(s) that international
insecurity played in the development of your chosen event.
Satisfactorily provided a rationale for your response.
Thoroughly analyzed the key role(s) that international
insecurity played in the development of your chosen event.
Thoroughly provided a rationale for your response.
4. Analyze whether or not the use of force concept was used in
your chosen event.Â Argue whether or not the use or non-use
of force concept was justified. Provide examples where force
was used to support your rationale.
Weight: 20%
Did not submit or incompletely analyzed whether or not the use
of force concept was used in your chosen event.Â Did not
submit or incompletely argued whether or not the use or non-use
of force concept was justified. Did not submit or incompletely
provided examples where force was used to support your
rationale.
Partially analyzed whether or not the use of force concept was
used in your chosen event. Partially argued whether or not the
use or non-use of force concept was justified. Partially provided
examples where force was used to support your rationale.
Satisfactorily analyzed whether or not the use of force concept
was used in your chosen event. Satisfactorily argued whether or
not the use or non-use of force concept was justified.
Satisfactorily provided examples where force was used to
support your rationale.
Thoroughly analyzed whether or not the use of force concept
was used in your chosen event. Thoroughly argued whether or
not the use or non-use of force concept was justified.
Thoroughly provided examples where force was used to support
your rationale.
5. 3 References
Weight: 5%

No references provided.
Does not meet the required number of references; some or all
references poor quality choices.
Meets number of required references; all references high quality
choices.
Exceeds number of required references; all references high
quality choices.
6. Clarity, writing mechanics, and formatting requirements
Weight: 10%
More than 6 errors present
5-6 errors present
3-4 errors present
0-2 errors present

As confirmed in an article in Foreign Policy, other states
quickly tried to counterbalance US hegemony:
[April 23, 1997] The fear of US unipolarity inspires China and
Russia to sign a “Joint Declaration on a Multipolar World and
the Establishment of a New International Order” in Moscow.
[February 2, 2000] Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, who
earlier dubbed the United States the ‘indispensable nation’,
claims the U.S. is not looking to establish and enforce a
unipolar world. Economic integration, she says, has already
created the kind of world that might even be called ‘multipolar.’
(Dickinson)
The contemporary order indeed shows that states are striving for
deeper integration into the world’s economy. China has recently
been ranked as the world’s second-largest economic power after
the United States, and many accountancy and consulting
agencies such as PricewaterhouseCoopers forecast that “it could
overtake the U.S. as soon as 2020 and that three other
developing economies—India, Brazil and Russia—will also
have made it into the top six by then” (Prosser). The American
superpower, which once existed, is no doubt fading away—
which shows the unstability of unipolarity.
Multipolar systems exist where three or more states have a
significant voice in the international political economy. As
Rotberg and Rabb explained, “interdependence of parties,
diffusion of dangers, confusion of responses: these are the
characteristics of great-power politics in a multipolar world.”
(48). The interdependence of parties comes from the fact that
actors tend to rely on others and create alliances in order to
balance against emerging states (Kegley, ed., 2010-2011: 319).
Although alliances may seek to foster economic growth (which
is the case of the European Union) or even military cooperation

(as with NATO), they also entrap member countries in support
of the decisions of another member state: when this decision is
“going to war”, then the alliance becomes a source of conflict
instead of stability as states enter in disputes with their allies’
enemies. Moreover, because international relations in
multipolar systems are very complex, it can become very
difficult for states to evaluate who their potential threats are
and to protect their wealth and economic positions (Kegley:
115). In other words, “who is a danger to whom and who can be
expected to deal with threats and problems are matters of
uncertainty” (Rotberg, Rabb.: 46). All these facts are therefore
responsible for making multipolar systems unstable.
The outbreak of World War I bears witness of the instability of
multipolar systems. Indeed, this bloody war resulted from the
decisions taken by the five great powers of the time: Austria-
Hungary, Germany, Russia, France, and Britain (Richard F.
Hamilton: 12). Before the outbreak of the war, many treaties
were signed and promises were made between those great
powers:
Austria-Hungary and Germany promised help and assistance
against any aggressor that threatened Romania (…) Russia
promised to attack Germany if France were attacked by
Germany or Italy supported by Germany (…) and in case one or
all of the powers of the Triple Alliance mobilized, France and
Russia would also mobilize. (Richard F. Hamilton: 16-19).
Eventually, the war started as Austria-Hungary supported by
Germany drew into conflict with Serbia and its ally Russia, and
France and Britain, bound by treaty to Russia, moved to counter
Germany (Kissane: 97). One can easily deduce that the alliance
structure and the interdependence of parties were catalysts of
the major global conflict of 1914. This case confirms therefore
that alliances do not guarantee balances of power between
states, and as a result, great powers in multipolar systems
cannot keep their power for long as they will eventually be
overthrown by another state feeling threatened. Multipolar
systems can therefore not endure or be stable.

Bipolarity corresponds to the equal distribution of power
between two states dominating the international scene in terms
of political ideologies, economic system, technological and
military devices. Kenneth Waltz, the founder of structural
realism, argues that: “increased numbers of actors increase
levels of systemic uncertainty. Rising uncertainty heightens
potential miscommunication and conflict. Bipolarity is therefore
the most stable form of international power distribution.”
(Edward Cunningham: 2). He also argues that a bipolar system
enables two powers to continuously adjust their political
practices to prevent uncertainty and conflict, as indeed such a
system leaves the two actors with much clearer understanding of
the opponent’s perspective (Midlarsky: 46). Several other
studies provide support for this view; in particular, Thompson
(1986) found that “significantly less global warfare was
associated with bipolarity” and Levy (1985) carried out
extensive analyses leveling bipolarity as “the most stable
system for eight of nine indicators of stability involving great-
power war” (Midlarsky). As a matter of fact, the balance of
power generated by bipolar systems is a major element
explaining the system’s stability: in a bipolar world, leaders can
design strategies primarily to advance their own interests—
which is the principal concern of all states according to the
realistic view—but also to counter with their main adversary
(Midlarsky).
Following the Second World War the world was divided into
two armed camps led by the United States and the NATO
countries, and the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries.
Both sides protected themselves and prevented the other camp’s
expansion by adopting an international geopolitical strategy
based on the search for allies and the development of military
forces (Rourke, Boyer). This bipolar system, which lasted for
almost half a century (until 1990), is commonly viewed as an
intense struggle for power between the superpowers. This
period is known by the name of the Cold War, which refers to
the presence of factors that restrained the confrontation and

prevented a shooting war (Martin Griffiths: 41). These factors
will now be analyzed, with the aim of demonstrating that
bipolarity is the most stable distribution of power for three
principal reasons.
During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union
dominated the global system thanks to their military power and
particularly their possession of nuclear arms. Eventually, the
two superpowers entered into a nuclear arms race, which
escalated through time as both sought to maintain their
leadership (Kegley: p100-103). However, both knew that while
arms racing would continue to be a significant feature of the
competition […] because of the shared danger of nuclear
holocaust, a degree of control, which could only be exercised
through explicit diplomacy, was clearly necessary. (Sheehan:
191).
This situation between the United States and the Soviet Union
became known as Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), which
was the strategic reality that any use of nuclear weapons by any
of the two states would inevitably cause its own destruction, as
the one attacked would have enough nuclear weapons to inflict
destruction of the other in revenge (Shimko: 277). Accordingly,
neither the United States nor the Soviet Union ever used nuclear
weapons during their fifty years of leadership and competition,
as they knew that such an act would result in their own
destruction. Waltz and Mearsheimer explain that “nuclear
weapons [are] good because they increase the potential costs of
war, thereby decreasing the chances of war” (Shimko). In the
case of the Cold War, nuclear weapons served indeed as a
stabilizer between the United States and the Soviet Union as it
was an incentive to not start a shooting war; taking a step back,
it is the balance of military power in this bipolar system—the
fact that the two superpowers had equal possession of nuclear
weapons—which kept the system stable. Extrapolating,
bipolarity is therefore stable thanks to the balance of military
power that exists between two superpowers.
The Cold War is often defined as a period of political and

ideological confrontation between the two superpowers, while
the Soviet Union wanted to spread communism in the world, the
United States and its Western allies were capitalist economies
and democracies which wanted to protect their values (Kegley:
100-103). In the 1950s Nikita Khrushchev, the Soviet leader,
reintroduced the idea of “political coexistence”, which
suggested the “political necessity of promoting the co-presence
of conflicting ideologies and political systems in order to avoid
war with capitalist states” (Odysseos: 15). Although many
political commentators in the West considered political
coexistence with the USSR as inconceivable at the time,
coexistence of the diverging states was a fact of international
political life (Odysseos). Indeed, as Frantsev also noted,
“socialism and capitalism exist on the same planet and their
coexistence is historically inevitable” (Odysseos). The term
‘confrontation’, when talking about the conflicting ideologies
advocated by the two superpowers, may therefore correctly be
interpreted as a natural and unavoidable balance of political
ideologies between the two camps. This balance did not only
force cooperation between the two superpowers but it also
allowed others states to choose their side and commit to
convictions that best suited their interests. Khrushchev also
proposed in an article in Foreign Affairs a “peaceful
coexistence intended to keep the positions of the ideological
struggle, without resorting to arms in order to prove that one is
right” (Odysseos). Although this did not apply at the
international level as several proxy wars burst out in
Afghanistan, Angola, Korea, Vietnam, the Middle East and
Latin America, the two superpowers were still able to maintain
the balance of ideologies and kept the world relatively stable as
they never fought each other directly. Therefore, the balance of
political ideologies, encouraged by political coexistence,
permitted the stability of the bipolar system to endure.
In his book The Origins of Alliances, Stephen M. Walt argues
that the reason why regional powers seek to ally with stronger
actors is their will to balance against an external threat.

According to him, alliances may take two distinct forms: either
regional states seek to counter threats by adding the power of
another state to their own, or the superpowers will try to
manipulate their own image and the image of their rivals in
order to attract as many allies as possible and to portray
themselves as leaders (Walt). Common to both cases is the
desire to acquire support from others in response to an external
threat (Waltz: 149). This explanation is very useful to
understand the patterns of Cold War alliances and the reason
why it contributed to the system’s stability: certain states allied
with the United States as they felt threatened by the communist
invasion and others allied with the Soviet Union as they feared
the Americans would impose their ideologies upon them.
Allying to the ‘right’ side was facilitated by the fact that threat
is easier to evaluate in a bipolar system than in a multipolar
system as the number of actors is reduced. States in both camps
used their alliance with one of the two superpowers as an
umbrella against their enemy’s potential attack. As a result, the
balance of threats naturally adjusted thanks to the creation of
two strong alliances—the Warsaw Pact and the NATO states—
and this allowed the maintenance of stability between the two
major camps as they felt safer and ready to counter an attack if
necessary (Walt: 156-157). Bipolarity is thus the most stable
system because the balance of threat is such that two camps will
rather first evaluate the strength of their enemies and look for
protecting themselves by seeking for allies than attacking
enemies at first sight.
This paper has demonstrated that stability, being the endurance
of the distribution of power between great powers, is better
achieved in bipolar systems thanks to both the balance of power
and balance of threat which explain the creation of alliances
that permit states to feel safer as they ensure the protection of
their own interests and fight for their survival. Moreover, the
inevitable existence of different political ideologies compels
superpowers to cooperate and tolerate their mutual existence,
which thus slows down the occurrence of armed conflicts.

Although tolerating an enemy is very difficult for states to
accept as their quest for power will rather incite them to
eliminate a rival, it is possible in a bipolar system because
superpowers can easily grasp the source of the conflicting
political ideology and, therefore, have the time and the means to
protect themselves against it. Finally, it has been shown that
although the race for nuclear weapons created a very tense
atmosphere during the Cold War, it was also an effective means
to maintain stability because both superpowers had the
incentive to avoid using their weapons knowing it would lead to
their mutual destruction. Such conditions and incentives do not
exist in either unipolar or multipolar systems. Should we expect
the actual multipolar system to result in a period of violence
and destructive conflict comparable to the one that the world
experienced between 1648 and 1945? Are we ever going to miss
the Cold War? The future will tell, but as Mearsheimer
suggests,
the next forty-five years in Europe are not likely to be so
violent as the forty-five years before the Cold War, but they are
likely to be substantially more violent than the past forty-five
years, the era that we may someday look back upon not as the
Cold War but as the Long Peace (Mearsheimer, The Atlantic
Monthly: 35).
Works Cited
Martin Griffiths, Terry O’Callaghan and Steve Roach. 2002.
“International Relations: The Key Concepts”. 2nd edition.
Routledge: London.
John J. Mearsheimer. “Structural Realism”.
<http://www.oup.com/uk/orc/bin/9780199298334/dunne_chap04
.pdf>.
Charles W. Kegley, Shannon L. Blanton. “World Politics:
Trends and Transformation”. 2010-2011 edition. p 70-71.
Cunningham, Edward.
<http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~goodrich/IRnotes/Week09
/Deutsch_Singer_summary.pdf>.
Layne, Christopher. “The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great

Powers Will Rise”. International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4.
(Spring, 1993), p 50-51.
Wohlforth, William C. “The Stability of a Unipolar World”. The
MIT Press Journals. International Security, Vol. 24, No. 1
(Summer 1999), p 5-41.
Prosser, David. The Independent. “China Overtakes Japan as
World’s Second-Largest Economic Power”. 17 Aug 2010.
Robert I. Rotberg, Theodore K. Rabb. “The Origin and
Prevention of Major Wars”. 1989.
Kegley, Charles W. “World Politics: Trend and
Transformation”. 12th Edition.
Richard F. Hamilton, Holger H. Herwig. “Origins of World War
One”. 2003.
Kissane, Dylan. “The Balkan Bullet with Butterfly Wings”. Oct
2006.
<http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&co
ntext=dylankissane>.
Midlarsky, Manus I. “The Onset of World War”. 1988.
John T. Rourke, Mark A. Boyer. “An Age of Bipolarity: The
Cold War ca. 1970”. World Politics: International Politics on
the World Stage, Brief, 4/e. University of Connecticut.
Sheehan, Michael J. “The Balance of Power: History and
Theory”. 1996. <http://books.google.fr
Shimko, Keith L. “International Relations: Perspectives and
Controversies”. 3rd Edition. 2010.
Odysseos, Louiza. “The Subject of Coexistence: Otherness in
International Relations”. 2007.
Walt, Stephen M. “The Origins of Alliances”. 1987.
Mearsheimer, John J. “Why We Will Soon Miss The Cold War”.
Volume 266, No. 2. p 35-50. The Atlantic Monthly. Aug 1990.
Which new world order: unipolar? bipolar? multipolar? non-

polar?
Towards the end of the George W. Bush Administration, a series
of essays by Richard Haass, former Head of Policy Planning of
the State Department of the Bush Administration, now Head of
the Council on Foreign Relations, marked a breathtaking change
in the analysis of America’s national interest in one or the
other conceivable structures of world order. Beginning with
America’s self-assessment as the anchor of a unipolar world
(Richard Haass, “The Case for Integration,” National Interest
online, January 9, 2005), he then shifted the focus to a multi-
polar model to be used actively by Washington in a
“Palmerstonian moment” (Richard Haass, “The Palmerstonian
Moment,” National Interest online, February 1, 2008), and
finally arrived at the preference for a non-polar world that
would ultimately be in America’s own best interest (Richard
Haass, “What follows American Dominion?” Financial Times,
April 16, 2008).
I. Thinking and Rethinking on Unipolarity, Bipolarity,
Multipolarity,
Today, world opinion is essentially unanimous about the end of
unipolar or bipolar ideology of the Neo-conservative spectrum.
Multi-polarity appears to many as the obvious alternative to
both. But before mistaking the multi-polar alternative for a
scientific certainty, it is worthwhile to retrace the thinking and
rethinking of an acknowledged pragmatic voice of the Bush
Administration about the sequence of changing world-views
between 2005 and 2008.
Not much needs to be said about the passage from unipolar to
multi-polar analysis. Unipolarity was empirically refuted by the
failure of the US-led “coalition of the willing” in the Iraq war.
The interesting aspect is the post-Iraq war, search for realist
alternative by the Head of Policy Planning of the State
Department of the Bush Administration. Almost inevitably, one
might say, the search resulted in finding the classical balance of
power prescription of the 18th and 19th centuries applied to the
perceived situation of the 21st century. Of course, it seemed

attractive for an US Statesman to be the “balancer” of such as
system like Metternich, Palmerston or Bismark in their times.
The history of those older balance of power plays shows
however, that multi-polarity is a structure that can easily turn
against the “balancer” if other players feel threatened by his
influence and coalesce against him.
This risk became immediately apparent in 2008 when neo-
conservatives called for a “league of democracies” that would
have challenged Chinese and Russian “autocracies” to enter a
new bipolar competition of systems. Russian and Chinese
political scientists quickly scrambled to counter the universalist
dissemination of Western values by asserting Confucian values
(Xiang Lanxin, “What Prospects for Normative Foreign Policy
in the New Multipolar World?” Paper presented at the 29th
session of the CEPS/IISS/DCAF/GCSP European Security
Forum, Brussels, May 26, 2008) values of the Russian Orthodox
Church (Andrey Makarychev, “Rebranding Russia, Norms,
Politics and Power,” CEPS Working Document No. 283,
February 2008). Such a league would also have to get by
without India, the world’s largest democracy. Despite bilateral
territorial conflicts, an influential segment of the Indian
political establishment feels greater cultural proximity to China
than to the West, or at least to its neo-conservative form based
on a violent, utopian idealism (Radha Kumar, “What Prospects
for Normative Foreign Policy?” Paper presented at the 29 th
session of the CEPS/IISS/DCAF/GCSP European Security
Forum, Brussels, May 26,2008).
Both realists and idealists in the traditional sense had
difficulties suppressing their dismay at how the Neo-
conservative rhetoric of a bipolar conflict between democracy
and autocracy misled Georgia into military action in South
Ossetia in August 2008, inviting massive Russian intervention
and certain Georgian defeat. Since the US was unable to come
to the rescue of Georgia, the final effect of the bellicose
rhetoric was to evidence the powerlessness of its authors.
Richard Haass’s words remained unheard. Barbara Tuchman’s

“March of Folly” came to mind.
The fundamental problem of multi-polarity is that it only gains
attraction as the negation of unipolarity, as resistance to an
existing empire or hegemonic state. This was the case with the
Peace of Westphalia, which ended the universal claim of the
Holy Roman Empire and established the international system of
sovereign nation-states that henceforward bore its name. It was
once again the case with De Gaulle’s sensational recognition of
China in 1964, which he intended not only as a negation of the
bipolar system but also of Anglo-Saxon hegemony West of the
Iron Curtain.
The Westphalian system is the only historical example of a
multi-polar world order successfully established and
maintained over a prolonged period of time. But this says
nothing about its suitability as a positive strategy for preserving
the peace between states. While the European states in the
system endeavored to shape domestic peace, domestic economic
developments and social coexistence in a more or less beneficial
way, they regarded the international system as area in which
they were free to choose between diplomacy and war. They
used this freedom with gusto, and mostly with the aim to expand
their own power, state territory and access to economic
resources at the expense of other states in the system or
colonies not possessing statehood. The predominant state
practice was in keeping with Hobbesian political theory, in
which Hobbes’ Leviathan ensures order within the states but in
which the law of the jungle governs relations between states.
Respected realists such as Henry Kissinger and Richard Haass
have praised the European pentarchy (Great Britain, Russia,
France, Prussia and Austria) as an exemplary world order, but
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, there were no fewer
than 52 wars among the five members, not to mention wars with
other states or in territories outside Europe not recognized as
states. It appears doubtful that the willingness to switch
alliances at any time, which Lord Palmerston saw as in Great
Britain’s national interest, really contributed to preserving

In order to avoid wars at least part of the time, every system
based on a balance of power requires statesmen of extraordinary
analytic faculty, such as Palmerston, Bismarck and Kissinger.
As soon as these statesmen “leave the ship” – in the figure of
Bismarck in Punch’s 1890 cartoon -, the system threatens to
collapse. This is why the rest of the world could not find much
comfort in Richard Haass’ plea for a “Palmerstonian moment”
on the part of the US, not even as an alternative for the uni-
polarity associated with the political adventure of the Iraq war.
This is especially true of the EU, which has no foreign
policymaking authority of its own, despite the name given its
“Common Foreign and Security Policy”. Even after the adoption
of the Treaty of Lisbon, it can make no decisions concerning
war or peace without the approval of its member states.
Germany will always remain the biggest hurdle, since any
German consent for military missions needs prior democratic
legitimization by the Bundestag. Hence the EU cannot keep up
with China, India, Russia and other power centers organized as
nation-states. As a consequence, Richard Haass believed that
NATO was losing its value for the US and that changing
alliances like in Palmerton’s day were preferable. The EU is not
even included on most lists of a multi-polar global pentarchy in
the twenty-first century, least of all Kissinger’s. The most
dramatic implication of Richard Haass’ “Palmerstonian
Moment” was that the pentarchy had moved from Europe to the
Pacific region, and that the majority of the five power centers
was henceforth constituted by three Asian states—China, India
and Japan (Graph 2).
II. Beyond polarity
This does not mean, however, that a multipolar world order
along the lines of a globalized Westphalian system had won the
day. For the very nations considered by proponents of realism
as the three new Asian power centers are also the driving force
behind a renaissance of multilateralism and are pursuing a
forward-looking strategy of functional integration in Asia. The

more unilaterally the Bush Administration has acted, the more
China has championed multilateralism (see Henrik
Schmiegelow, “Asia’s International Order,” Internationale
Politik (IP) Global Edition, Fall2007, p. 17-22). The North
Korean nuclear crisis marked the first time China voted in favor
of sanctions in the UN Security Council—targeting a neighbor
that has long been considered its charge. In the six-way
negotiations on denuclearizing the North Korean end of the
“axis of evil”, Washington began relying on China to work out a
solution. It is therefore no surprise that Richard Haass
highlighted the North Korean settlement when he moved on to
argue in favor of a non-polar world in the last article of the
series cited above.
Like other Asian states, especially members of ASEAN, Japan
and China have closely observed Europe’s experience in
functional integration. They have drawn their own conclusions
from evidence of both the strengths and the weaknesses of the
European model. And they started a process with a sequence
suitable to Asia (see our post “Is Asia’s Integration less
Functional than Europe’s?”). As in Europe, the functional
integration of Asia produces such large advantages for one-time
warring parties that there is no reasonable cost-benefit
relationship to justify wars. It is the best example of today’s
opportunity for a world order surmounting the risks of the
Westphalian system.
Moreover, it is an example that cannot be criticized as an
outgrowth of Euro-centrism or an aggressive expansion of
western values. Fortunately, cost-benefit analysis can be
performed using trans-cultural math. The integration of the
Chinese national economy into the world economy, especially
the supply chains between Chinese, American and Japanese
companies, suggests that the Chinese see no contradiction of
such a process to Confucian norms. Russia, which thus far has
profited mainly from rich natural resource deposits and is much
less integrated into the world economy than China, is already
feeling challenged to learn lessons from this example. After

2006, Russia’s renewed power led to Putin’s deliberately sharp-
edged foreign policy, but a “Medvedev moment” was supposed
to convey a somewhat softer image of this reemerging power.
The new president was quoted as saying that, in the end, Russia
will not earn the world’s respect “through strength but through
responsible action” (Nikolai Petro, “Seizing the Medvedev
Moment,” International Herald Tribune, March 14, 2008).
Unfortunately, the “moment” seemed abruptly suspended in the
“bipolar” derailment of Georgia’s South Ossetian adventure.
But eventually, cultural relativism will not stand in opposition
to a functional understanding of national interests in Russia
either, however nationalist the tradition of the Russian-
Orthodox Church be. Much depends on the West’s recovery of
its own capacity of functional calculation of interests in relation
to Russia.
As we shall discuss in our next post, the global economic
meltdown of 2008/2009, the worst since the Great Depression
contributed to a new awareness of the world having no other
choice than working as a problem solving community.
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•Recommend at least two (2) strategies that any country could
use in the effort to reduce the risk of war and armed conflict.
Provide specific examples to support your rationale.
Unipolar, Bipolar or Multipolar world: What is most stable?
Jacque Chirac strongly believed that a multipolar world was
best: for France, certainly, but also for the world. Was he right?
What is the best global system, in terms of stability?
My initial thoughts on the pros and cons of each:

Multipolar
Pro: Geopolitics is no longer a zero-sum game: the gains of
another power are no longer an automatic loss for other powers,
as the gaining power is a current or potential ally of the other
powers. Thus, each other individual power is less threatening,
and there is less incentive to respond with force to the actions
of others.
Con: History. The multipolar European system of 1500-1945
was a series of wars broken up by rests to rebuid populations
for the next slugging match. OTOH, I am not certain whether
the historical model still applies in the era of (at least potential)
total war.
Bipolar
Pro: Adventurism is risky, as it may spiral into total war. To put
it simply, MAD (either conventional or nuclear) enhances
stability.
Con: Zero-sum run amok. Every gain by the other power is a
loss for you, to be prevented if at all possible.
Unipolar
Pro: The status quo benefits the hyperpower, which has an
interest in preventing any conflicts.
Con: Continual resentment and challenges by aspiring powers,
leading to potential conflicts at almost any time.
That's a thought-provoking question.
A world with several regional powers could suffer from
imperialist adventures without some kind of resistance to that,
such as prohibitive cost. A rough parity between great regional
powers would help, but of course there are no guarantees. Hot
wars could still explode. And balance of power would continue
to shift both within & between regions, sometimes violently.
Unipolar & bipolar worlds, on the other hand, could have
constant tensions. This could be insurrectionist resentment

against the pole(s), as we see now against the USA. Bipolarity
without collusion between the poles could mean "cold" war
between the poles, which would, if the 20th Century is a guide,
actually be hot in places, where proxy wars are fought over
places not solidly in either pole's bloc.
All global power distributions are "unstable" in that those with
less power covet the power of the stronger & vie for higher
status. History never really ends.
So, do I have any conclusions? Well, there is this:
Offhand, I think Chirac may be right for worlds with more than
three poles, in that global power is more distributed, so the
whole world need not choose between marching with one of two
major camps or claiming an especial variety of "neutrality."
That's a thought-provoking question.
A world with several regional powers could suffer from
imperialist adventures without some kind of resistance to that,
such as prohibitive cost. A rough parity between great regional
powers would help, but of course there are no guarantees. Hot
wars could still explode. And balance of power would continue
to shift both within & between regions, sometimes violently.
Unipolar & bipolar worlds, on the other hand, could have
constant tensions. This could be insurrectionist resentment
against the pole(s), as we see now against the USA. Bipolarity
without collusion between the poles could mean "cold" war
between the poles, which would, if the 20th Century is a guide,
actually be hot in places, where proxy wars are fought over
places not solidly in either pole's bloc.
All global power distributions are "unstable" in that those with
less power covet the power of the stronger & vie for higher
status. History never really ends.

So, do I have any conclusions? Well, there is this:
Originally Posted by foolsguinea
Sorry, that was unclear; I'm thinking this out as I type, & I
changed what I was saying midsentence.
A tripolar world can likely be stable, but if one pole becomes
weak, it may be treated as a weaker cousin to the two major
poles, or even carved up between them. If multipolarity is more
stable than bipolarity, than the more poles the better for total
global stability, in the sense of avoiding a world war.
However, more poles mean more points of potential collapse, so
that hypothesis seems to come with a caveat. More poles mean
closer to continual flux, so there will be instability everywhere,
but it may be localized. I don't feel confident that multipolarity
is more stable, but I think it is necessarily more desirable, due
to a less concentrated allocation of power.
I think that they are all unstable. Including the unipolar world;
you have people/nations trying to rebel against or rise to the
stature of the hyperpower, and you have the hyperpower
crushing them preemptively or in it's own interests or as an
example to others. As in Iraq. Even at it's best, a unipolar world
only brings peace if the unipower wants peace.
As well, there's more to stability than "no war" ( which our
unipolar world hasn't managed anyway ); there's the problem of

the hyperpower trying to maintain it's position by preventing
change, which can prevent the solution of problems. Which in
turn leads to long term decay, not stability. US hegemony hasn't
lasted long enough for this to happen much of course, but given
long enough I think it would. The stability of a culture in the
long term is like the homeostatic stability of an ecology, not a
rock or machine; stasis leads to decay, not stability
A bipolar world is inherently unstable, but treatable with
lithium.
As well, there's more to stability than "no war" ( which our
unipolar world hasn't managed anyway ); there's the problem of
the hyperpower trying to maintain it's position by preventing
change, which can prevent the solution of problems. Which in
turn leads to long term decay, not stability.
A corollary to this point is the question of whether a unipolar
world is even sustainable in the medium or long term; Paul
Kennedy's concept of "strategic overreach" teaches us (if we
believe him) that a hyperpower's interests will inevitably exceed
that power's available resources to address those interests.
Given that, is my "unipolar" option a mirage? Assuming that the
Iraq war has either exposed or caused America's inability to act
as the hyperpower, the only period in world history that was
unipolar lasted roughly eleven years.
For France I would have to say...sure, he's probably right.
France can still pretend to be a world power in a multipolar
world after all.
For the world? I'm unsure if this is the case. Historical
examples abound where eventually multipolar powers
clashed...with pretty devastating effect. I think we can look at
the multipolar world of Europe in the past and see how the
conflicts got more and more vicious and the toll in death kept
rising.
As for bipolar, I think the historic example of the Soviet Union
vs the US (including the Warsaw Pact in the Soviet sphere and

NATO and the western powers in the US)...well, while it may
have been a precarious balance, judged by the previous 100
years prior to the Cold War, the world was a relatively peaceful
place. The wars were smaller and the death toll was much
lighter.
I'm not sure when there has ever been a true unipolar world.
Maybe at times during the British Empire days...but even then
I'm not seeing it. Rome maybe? If we count 'the world' as
essentially the greater mediterranian region. I don't think that
kind of hegemony is possible for ANY power...not in absolute
terms. Influence wise, the US is about as unipolar as anyone has
gotten...and I'd have to say, despite things like Iraq the world
seems to be a MUCH more peaceful place than the previous
century...even the period of the cold war. Compare Vietnam and
Korea to the death toll in Iraq/Afghanistan...let alone WWI/II
during the European multipolar period. Compare, say, the Punic
wars or the period before true Roman hegemony in the Med to
the Pax period after Rome became dominant. Look at China as a
local hegemonic power in Asia and compare that to when China
was less dominant and other powers were in more parity (i.e. a
unipolar vs multipolar period)...I think historically things are
less stable and wars more vicious, wide spread and wider in
scale when you have a true multipolar world.
#9 Old 11-15-2007, 03:03 PM
Alex_Dubinsky Alex_Dubinsky is offline
BANNED Join Date: Jan 2003
Location: New York City
Posts: 2,859
I think all the responses were on the mark, especially Der
Trihs'. The very concept of "poles," ie concentrations of power
and wealth, leads to instabilitiy. Actually, everything leads to
instability, and it's the more small-scale mechanics (eg
economies, relationships, powerful individuals with power to
lose) that really determine what happens. Der Trihs also pointed

out that it's not just about war, there's all sorts of other
components (social, economic, cultural, or that catch-all:
change) that are at stake.
Frankly, the question strikes me a bit as in-the-box thinking
from an era that's passed. It's maybe even no surprise that
France should be asking it.
p.s. the concept of "poleness" is highly depenent on scale. A
country whose policy deals solely with its neighbor might be
living in a two-pole world. A region with many powers may be
multipolar. Whatever the "pole effects" may be, they are doing
their magic, simultaneously and in parallel, on the scale of US
vs World, Red states vs Blue, Iran vs all the countries that are
next to Iran, etc. Perhaps this idea has value, but applying it
would be as subtle as anything else
Under different circumstances different setups may be more
desirable. At the current time I believe a multi polar world
consisting of the U.S., Japan, China, India, Russia, the EU, the
U.K, and (in time) some confederation of South American states
would be ideal. This is chiefly due to:
1. Oppenheimer's children.
2. Economic interdependencies.
3. The high cost of violence.
Point three refers to the fact that it’s a post colonial world.
Classic imperialism is dead. The enormous amount of resources
it requires can not be shouldered and sustained by even the most
powerful of states. The perceived bounties don’t exist anymore
and are chased behind the scenes nowadays in deals which,
however immoral, are really boring to read about.
Imperialism is also not good for your image, an important
consideration in the modern age. The zeitgeist has moved
rapidly since the late ‘60s. People demonstrate against France’s

hijinks in Africa, China in Tibet, Russia in Chechnya, etc.
Millions of people around the world, including here in the U.S.,
demonstrated against the invasion of Iraq months before it even
happened. That’s unprecedented.
One problem with this setup is that the various poles can take
advantage of areas which have no effective poles of their own.
Various powers are and have been picking at the carcasses of
the Middle East and Africa for some time.
The biggest problem is entangling alliances. Any actual hot war,
however unlikely, could be catastrophic for humanity. What do
you do when the enemy of your friend is your other friend? A
world war but with every continent having nuclear arsenals isn’t
a pretty picture.

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