Histroy of terrorism, background, terrorism in diffrent area of pakistan

2. Group Members
Syed M NaumanDainn khan
Shoaib NaiziAmna Nazir
SOHAIL
ESHA

4. WHAT IS TERRORISM ?
• THERE ARE DIFFERENT PRODPECTS AND DEFINATIONS OF TERRORISM. TO UNDERSTAND IT WE NEED A
PROPER SET OF DEFINATIONS
• THE TERM ‘TERRORISM’ ORIGINATES FROM LATIN WORD ‘TERRENE’THAT MEANS ‘TO FRIGHTEN’. IT
OBTAINED ITS MODERN FORM ‘TERRORISM’ DURING THE REIGN OF TERROR IN FRANCE FROM 1793–
1794. IN MAXIMILIEN ROBESPIERRE’S WORDS:
•
• “TERROR IS NOTHING OTHER THAN JUSTICE, PROMPT, SEVERE, INFLEXIBLE; IT IS THEREFORE, AN
EMANATION OF VIRTUE; IT IS NOT SO MUCH A SPECIAL PRINCIPLE AS IT IS A CONSEQUENCE OF THE
GENERAL PRINCIPLE OF DEMOCRACY APPLIED TO OUR COUNTRY'S MOST URGENT NEEDS’.”

5. The ‘academic consensus definition’ of terrorism is a case in point:
Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine individual,
group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby – in contrast to assassination – the
direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen
randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and
serve as message generators. Threat- and violence-based communication processes between terrorist
(organization), (imperiled) victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main target (audience(s)), turning
it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion,
or propaganda is primarily sought.

6. THE HISTORY OF TERRORISM
FIRST WAVE
THE HIGH POINT OF THE FIRST WAVE OF TERRORISM ARRIVED IN 1890S AND IT CONTINUED
EVEN BEYOND THE FIRST WAVE – UNTIL 1940. THIS PERIOD COULD BE CALLED THE ‘GOLDEN AGE OF
ASSASSINATIONS’ AND DURING THAT PERIOD ONE MAJOR EUROPEAN MINISTER OR HEAD OF STATE WAS
ASSASSINATED EVERY 18 MONTHS.10 THE FIRST PERIOD OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM ALSO
WITNESSED THE FIRST ATTEMPT BY STATES TO TACKLE TERRORISM GLOBALLY AFTER THE
ASSASSINATION OF THE US PRESIDENT WILLIAM MCKINLEY IN 1901. IT FAILED AS STATES WERE UNABLE
TO FORGE CONSENSUS FOR JOINT ACTION. THE ‘ANTICOLONIAL’ WAVE OF TERRORISM BEGAN WITH
SIGNING THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES ENDING THE FIRST WORLD WAR. THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-
DETERMINATION USED TO BREAK-UP DEFEATED EMPIRES PROVIDED A FOUNDATION FOR ASPIRATIONS
OF A NEW KIND OF TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS, FOR EXAMPLE, THE IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY AND
VARIOUS JEWISH ORGANIZATION’S THAT OPERATED AGAINST BRITISH FORCES IN THE PALESTINE.

7. THE SECOND WAVE
• THE SECOND WAVE OF TERRORISM RECEIVED EXTENSIVE SUPPORT FROM VARIOUS DIASPORAS
ABROAD AND RESORTED MUCH LESS TO ASSASSINATIONS. THE STRATEGY OF THE SECOND WAVE OF
TERROR WAS MORE COMPLICATED: THE PRIMARY GOAL OF TERRORISTS WAS THE ELIMINATION OF
THE LOCAL POLICE FORCE AND ACHIEVING ITS SUBSTITUTION BY OCCUPYING MILITARY FORCES THAT
WERE EXPECTED TO BE TOO CLUMSY IN DEALING WITH TERRORISTS, BUT POWERFUL ENOUGH TO
CAUSE GRIEVANCE AMONG THE POPULATION THROUGH THEIR DISPROPORTIONATE RESPONSES TO THE
ACTIONS OF TERRORISTS. DURING THE ‘ANTICOLONIAL’ WAVE OF TERRORISM IT BECAME A COMMON
PRACTICE TO CALL TERRORISTS FIGHTING AGAINST COLONIAL POWERS ‘FREEDOM FIGHTERS’.12 THE
OCCURRENCE OF ‘NEW LEFT’ TERRORISM WAS STIMULATED BY THE VIETNAM WAR, WHICH WAS SEEN
TO PROVE THAT MODERN STATES WERE VULNERABLE TO RELATIVELY UNSOPHISTICATED WEAPONS
AND TACTICS. MANY YOUNG PEOPLE BECAME DEEPLY DISSATISFIED WITH THE EXISTING SYSTEM AND
THEY GAVE RISE TO TERROR ORGANIZATIONS SUCH AS THE RED ARMY FACTION IN THE WEST
GERMANY, ITALIAN RED BRIGADES AND FRENCH ACTION DIRECT.

8. THR THIRD WAVE
• THE TARGET SELECTION OF THE THIRD WAVE OF TERRORISTS WAS REMARKABLY SIMILAR TO THOSE
OF THE FIRST WAVE OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: PROMINENT TARGETS BECAME VERY POPULAR
AGAIN. THE ‘NEW LEFT’ WAVE OF TERRORISM PRODUCED SOME 700 HIJACKINGS, THERE WERE 409
INTERNATIONAL KIDNAPPING INCIDENTS INVOLVING 951 HOSTAGES FROM 1968–1982, ASSASSINATED
HIGH-RANKING OFFICIALS INCLUDED THE PRIME MINISTERS OF SPAIN AND JORDAN, THE FORMER
PRIME MINISTER OF ITALY ALDO MORO AND OTHERS. HOWEVER, WHILE ANARCHISTS ASSASSINATED
OFFICIALS WITH THE AIM OF PROVOKING DISPROPORTIONATE RESPONSE, THE ‘NEW LEFT’
TERRORISTS RATHER ‘PUNISHED’ THEIR TARGETS FOR VARIOUS REASONS. IT IS SIGNIFICANT THAT 1/3
OF ALL TARGETS OF THE THIRD WAVE OF TERRORISM WERE US TARGETS. THE THIRD WAVE OF
TERRORISM WITNESSED MUCH MORE INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN COUNTERTERRORISM
ACTIVITIES. THE UN ADOPTED MAJOR CONVENTIONS THAT OUTLAWED HIJACKING, HOSTAGE TAKING,
AND FINANCING TERRORISTS

9. THE RELIGIOUS WAVE (ISLAMIC)
• THE ‘RELIGIOUS’ WAVE OF TERRORISM HAS ISLAM AT ITS HEART. IT BEGAN IN 1979 WHEN THREE EVENTS
OCCURRED: THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION, THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN AND A NEW ISLAMIC
CENTURY BEGAN. IRAN CALLED THE US THE ‘GREAT SATAN’ AND THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN HELPED TO
CREATE A TRAINING AND ISLAMIC INDOCTRINATION SYSTEM FOR VOLUNTEERS FROM ALL OVER THE ARAB
WORLD.14 THE ‘RELIGIOUS’ WAVE OF TERRORISM HAS GIVEN PROMINENCE TO SUICIDE TERRORISM AND
WITNESSED AN ATTEMPT TO CAUSE MASS CASUALTIES BY THE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS BY THE AM
SHINRIKYO SECT IN TOKYO IN 1995. IN 1983 THE SHIA ORGANIZATION HEZBOLLAH SUPPORTED BY IRAN
CARRIED OUT MASSIVE SUICIDE TERRORIST ATTACKS ON THE POSITIONS OF THE US MARINES AND FRENCH
PARATROOPERS IN LEBANON. THESE ATTACKS RESULTED IN SERIOUS CASUALTIES AND STRONGLY
INFLUENCED THE RESPECTIVE GOVERNMENTS TO WITHDRAW THEIR TROOPS FROM LEBANON. THESE
SUICIDE ATTACKS INFLUENCED THE TAMIL TIGERS SO MUCH SO THAT FROM 1980–2001
• THEY CARRIED OUT 75 OUT OF THE 186 (MORE THAN 40%) OF SUICIDE TERRORIST ATTACKS IN THE WORLD.15
THE END OF SOVIET OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN AND THE GULF WAR BROUGHT ABOUT A CHANGE IN
THE MAIN ENEMY OF ISLAMIC TERRORISTS. OSAMA BIN LADEN FOUND IT UNACCEPTABLE THAT SINCE THE
1991 GULF WAR THERE WERE LARGE NUMBERS OF US TROOPS IN SAUDI ARABIA WHOM HE FEARED WERE
THERE TO STAY INDEFINITELY.

10. TERRORISM IN PAKISTAN
• TERRORISM IN PAKISTAN HAS BECOME A MAJOR AND HIGHLY DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON
IN RECENT YEARS. THE ANNUAL DEATH TOLL FROM TERRORIST ATTACKS HAS RISEN FROM
164 IN 2003 TO 3318 IN 2009, WITH A TOTAL OF 35,000 PAKISTANIS KILLED BETWEEN 11
SEPTEMBER 2001 AND MAY 2011. ACCORDING TO THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN, THE
DIRECT AND INDIRECT ECONOMIC COSTS OF TERRORISM FROM 2000–2010 TOTAL $68
BILLION. PRESIDENT ASIF ALI ZARDARI, ALONG WITH FORMER PRESIDENT EX-PAKISTAN
ARMY HEAD PERVEZ MUSHARRAF, HAVE ADMITTED THAT TERRORIST OUTFITS WERE
"DELIBERATELY CREATED AND NURTURED" BY PAST GOVERNMENTS "AS A POLICY TO
ACHIEVE SOME SHORT-TERM TACTICAL OBJECTIVES" THE TREND BEGAN WITH HAQQ’S
CONTROVERSIAL "ISLAMIZATION" POLICIES OF THE 1980S, UNDER WHICH CONFLICTS WERE
STARTED AGAINST SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN. ZIA'S TENURE AS PRESIDENT
SAW PAKISTAN'S INVOLVEMENT IN THE SOVIET–AFGHAN WAR, WHICH LED TO A GREATER
INFLUX OF IDEOLOGICALLY DRIVEN MUSLIMS (MUJAHIDEEN) TO THE TRIBAL AREAS AND
INCREASED AVAILABILITY OF GUNS SUCH AS THE AK-47 AND DRUGS FROM THE GOLDEN
CRESCENT.

11. • THE STATE AND ITS INTER-SERVICES INTELLIGENCE, IN ALLIANCE WITH THE CIAAND THE KINGDOM
OF SAUDI ARABIA, ENCOURAGED THE "MUJAHIDEEN" TO FIGHT A PROXY WAR AGAINST SOVIET
FORCES PRESENT IN AFGHANISTAN. MOST OF THE MUJAHIDEEN WERE NEVER DISARMED AFTER THE
WAR ENDED IN AFGHANISTAN.
• FROM THE SUMMER OF 2007 UNTIL LATE 2009, MORE THAN 1,500 PEOPLE WERE KILLED IN SUICIDE AND
OTHER ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS FOR REASONS ATTRIBUTED TO A NUMBER OF CAUSES – SECTARIAN
VIOLENCE BETWEEN SUNNI AND SHIA MUSLIMS; EASY AVAILABILITY OF GUNS AND EXPLOSIVES; THE
EXISTENCE OF A "KALASHNIKOV CULTURE"; AN INFLUX OF IDEOLOGICALLY DRIVEN MUSLIMS
BASED IN OR NEAR PAKISTAN, WHO ORIGINATED FROM VARIOUS NATIONS AROUND THE WORLD AND
THE SUBSEQUENT WAR AGAINST THE PRO-SOVIET AFGHANS IN THE 1980S WHICH BLEW BACK INTO
PAKISTAN; THE PRESENCE OF ISLAMIST INSURGENT GROUPS AND FORCES SUCH AS THE TALIBAN AND
LASHKAR-E-TAIBA.] PAKISTAN IS THE 10TH MOST DANGEROUS COUNTRY BY CRIMINALITY INDEX

12. CAUSES
• TERRORISM IN PAKISTAN ORIGINATED WITH SUPPORTING THE SOVIET–AFGHAN WAR, AND THE
SUBSEQUENT CIVIL WAR THAT CONTINUED FOR AT LEAST A DECADE. THE CONFLICT BROUGHT
NUMEROUS FIGHTERS FROM ALL OVER THE WORLD TO SOUTH ASIA IN THE NAME OF JIHAD.
THE MUJAHIDEEN FIGHTERS WERE TRAINED BY PAKISTAN'S MILITARY, AMERICAN CIA AND
OTHER WESTERN INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES WHO CARRIED OUT INSURGENT ACTIVITIES INSIDE
AFGHANISTAN WELL AFTER THE WAR OFFICIALLY ENDED.
• FORMER PAKISTAN'S ARMY CHIEF, GEN RAHEEL SHAREEF ACCUSED LONGTIME REGIONAL RIVAL
INDIA, ILL-FOCUSED ON PAKISTAN, OF SEEKING TO UNDERMINE HIS COUNTRY'S $46 BILLION
GWADAR PROJECT TO BUILD AN ECONOMIC CORRIDOR TO TRANSPORT GOODS FROM CHINA'S
WESTERN REGIONS THROUGH PAKISTAN. THOUGH, IT IS NOT UNCOMMON FOR PAKISTAN AND
INDIA TO ACCUSE ONE ANOTHER ON ALL TROUBLESOME ISSUES.

13. • IMPOSITION OF MARTIAL LAW IN 1958, PAKISTAN'S POLITICAL SITUATION SUDDENLY
CHANGED AND THEREAFTER SAW DICTATORSHIP TYPE BEHAVIOR AT DIFFERENT LEVELS
APPEARING IN THE CIVIL SERVICE, THE ARMY AND POLITICAL FORCES
OR ZAMINDARS (LANDLORDS CREATED BY THE BRITISH) WHO CLAIMED POWER, PROBABLY
BECAUSE THE BRITISH ORIGINALLY DID NOT CONSIDER PAKISTAN AN INDEPENDENT STATE,
YET DID NOT WANT TO INTERVENE; THIS TREND CONTINUED INTO THE 21ST CENTURY,
WHEN FINALLY, THE US PERSUADED GENERAL PERVEZ MUSHARRAF TO HOLD ELECTIONS.
• OTHER CAUSES, SUCH AS POLITICAL RIVALRY AND BUSINESS DISPUTES, ALSO TOOK THEIR
TOLL. IT WAS ESTIMATED IN 2005 THAT MORE THAN 4,000 PEOPLE HAD DIED IN PAKISTAN IN
THE PRECEDING 25 YEARS DUE TO SECTARIAN STRIFE

14. THE COLD WAR

15. COLD WAR HISTORY
• DURING WORLD WAR II, THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION FOUGHT TOGETHER AS
ALLIES AGAINST THE AXIS POWERS. HOWEVER, THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO NATIONS
WAS A TENSE ONE. AMERICANS HAD LONG BEEN WARY OF SOVIET COMMUNISM AND
CONCERNED ABOUT RUSSIAN LEADER JOSEPH STALIN’S TYRANNICAL, BLOOD-THIRSTY RULE
OF HIS OWN COUNTRY. FOR THEIR PART, THE SOVIETS RESENTED THE AMERICANS’ DECADES-
LONG REFUSAL TO TREAT THE USSR AS A LEGITIMATE PART OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY AS WELL AS THEIR DELAYED ENTRY INTO WORLD WAR II, WHICH RESULTED IN THE
DEATHS OF TENS OF MILLIONS OF RUSSIANS. AFTER THE WAR ENDED, THESE GRIEVANCES
RIPENED INTO AN OVERWHELMING SENSE OF MUTUAL DISTRUST AND ENMITY. POSTWAR
SOVIET EXPANSIONISM IN EASTERN EUROPE FUELED MANY AMERICANS’ FEARS OF A RUSSIAN
PLAN TO CONTROL THE WORLD. MEANWHILE, THE USSR CAME TO RESENT WHAT THEY
PERCEIVED AS AMERICAN OFFICIALS’ BELLICOSE RHETORIC, ARMS BUILDUP AND
INTERVENTIONIST APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. IN SUCH A HOSTILE ATMOSPHERE,
NO SINGLE PARTY WAS ENTIRELY TO BLAME FOR THE COLD WAR; IN FACT, SOME HISTORIANS
BELIEVE IT WAS INEVITABLE

16. CONTAINMENT:
• BY THE TIME WORLD WAR II ENDED, MOST AMERICAN OFFICIALS AGREED THAT THE BEST
DEFENSE AGAINST THE SOVIET THREAT WAS A STRATEGY CALLED “CONTAINMENT.” IN 1946, IN
HIS FAMOUS “LONG TELEGRAM,” THE DIPLOMAT GEORGE KENNAN (1904-2005) EXPLAINED THIS
POLICY:
• THE SOVIET UNION, HE WROTE, WAS “A POLITICAL FORCE COMMITTED FANATICALLY TO THE
BELIEF THAT WITH THE U.S. THERE CAN BE NO PERMANENT MODUS VIVENDI [AGREEMENT
BETWEEN PARTIES THAT DISAGREE]”; AS A RESULT, AMERICA’S ONLY CHOICE WAS THE “LONG-
TERM, PATIENT BUT FIRM AND VIGILANT CONTAINMENT OF RUSSIAN EXPANSIVE TENDENCIES.”
PRESIDENT HARRY TRUMAN (1884-1972) AGREED.
• “IT MUST BE THE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES,” HE DECLARED BEFORE CONGRESS IN 1947,
“TO SUPPORT FREE PEOPLES WHO ARE RESISTING ATTEMPTED SUBJUGATION…BY OUTSIDE
PRESSURES.”
• THIS WAY OF THINKING WOULD SHAPE AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE NEXT FOUR
DECADES

17. PAK-AFGAN RELATIONSHIP
• BILATERAL RELATION BETWEEN THE COUNTRIES HAVE
BEEN POOR, BEGINNING IMMEDIATELYAFTER PAKISTAN
BECAME INDEPENDENT IN AUGUST 1947. AFGHANISTAN'S
WAS THE SOLE VOTE AGAINST PAKISTAN'S ADMISSION TO
THE UNITED NATIONS IN 1947, DUE TO AFGHAN DISCONTENT
WITH THE PERMANENCY OF THE DURAND LINE.
AFGHANISTAN IMMEDIATELY LAID IRREDENTIST CLAIMS
OVER PASHTUN-DOMINATED TERRITORIES WITHIN PAKISTAN,
AND DEMANDED RENEGOTIATION OF THE BORDER WITH THE
AIM OF SHIFTING IT EASTWARDS TO THE INDUS RIVER, DEEP
WITHIN PAKISTANI TERRITORY. SHORTLYAFTER PAKISTANI
INDEPENDENCE, AFGHANISTAN MATERIALLY SUPPORTED
THE FAILED ARMED SECESSIONIST MOVEMENT HEADED
BY MIZRAHI KHAN AGAINST PAKISTAN. AFGHANISTAN'S
IMMEDIATE SUPPORT OF SECESSIONIST MOVEMENTS WITHIN
PAKISTAN PREVENTED NORMALIZED TIES FROM EMERGING
BETWEEN THE TWO STATES.

18. THE 1952 ACT
• THE GOVERNMENT OF AFGHANISTAN PUBLISHED A TRACT IN WHICH IT LAID CLAIM NOT ONLY
TO PASHTUN TERRITORY WITHIN PAKISTAN, BUT ALSO TO THE PAKISTANI PROVINCE
OF BALUCHISTAN. DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WERE CUT OFF BETWEEN 1961 AND 1963 AFTER
AFGHANISTAN SUPPORTED MORE ARMED SEPARATISTS IN PAKISTAN, LEADING TO SKIRMISHES
BETWEEN THE TWO STATES EARLIER IN 1960, AND PAKISTAN'S SUBSEQUENT CLOSURE OF THE
PORT OF KARACHI TO AFGHAN TRANSIT TRADE. MOHAMMED ADOUR KHAN BECAME PRESIDENT
OF AFGHANISTAN IN 1973, AFGHANISTAN—WITH SOVIET SUPPORT—AGAIN PURSUED A POLICY
OF ARMING PASHTUN SEPARATISTS WITHIN PAKISTAN.
• THE PAKISTANI MILITARY HAVE ACCUSED AFGHANISTAN OF SHELTERING VARIOUS TERRORIST
GROUPS WHICH LAUNCH ATTACKS INTO PAKISTAN, WHILE AFGHAN AUTHORITIES HAVE BLAMED
PAKISTAN'S INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE ISI, FOR FUNDING WARLORDS AND THE TALIBAN, AND
FOR BASING TERRORIST CAMPS WITHIN PAKISTANI TERRITORY TO TARGET
AFGHANISTAN. THERE IS CONSIDERABLE ANTI-PAKISTAN SENTIMENT IN AFGHANISTAN, WHILE
NEGATIVE SENTIMENT TOWARDS THE AFGHAN REFUGEES IS WIDESPREAD IN PAKISTAN, EVEN IN
PASHTUN-DOMINATED REGIONS.

19. • AFGHAN PRESIDENT HAMID KARZAI (IN OFFICE 2004–2014)
HAS DESCRIBED PAKISTAN AND
AFGHANISTAN AS "INSEPARABLE BROTHERS", WHICH IS DUE TO THE HISTORICAL,
RELIGIOUS, AND ETHNIC LINGUISTIC CONNECTIONS BETWEEN
THE PASHTUN PEOPLE AND OTHER ETHNIC GROUPS OF BOTH COUNTRIES, AS WELL
AS TO TRADE AND OTHER TIES. EACH OF THE TWO COUNTRIES FEATURES
AMONGST THE OTHER'S LARGEST TRADING PARTNERS, AND PAKISTAN SERVES AS A
MAJOR CONDUIT FOR TRANSIT TRADE INVOLVING LANDLOCKED AFGHANISTAN

20. CREATION OF AL QAEDA AND TALIBAN
• AL OAEDA
THE MUJAHEDEEN'S, WHO FOUGHT AGAINST USSR, WERE VOLUNTEERS FROM
PAKISTAN, AFGHANISTAN AND OTHER MUSLIM COUNTRIES. THE OSAMA BIN LADEN, BEING
THE RICH PERSON WAS A MAJOR SOURCE OF PROVIDING AND COLLECTING FINANCIAL
SUPPORT FROM ALL OVER THE WORLD FOR THE MUJAHEDEEN. IN 1988, A YEAR BEFORE THE
WITHDRAWAL OF USSR FROM AFGHANISTAN, OSAMA BIN LADEN WITH HIS GROUP OF
MUJAHEDEEN FORMED AN ORGANIZATION CALLED "AI-QAEDA". AL-QAEDA'S
HEADQUARTERS WAS ESTABLISHED IN PESHAWAR AND AFGHANISTAN WITH MISSION TO
WAGE WAR AGAINST THE APOSTATE MUSLIM GOVERNMENTS, THE USAAND ISRAEL THE
CORE OBJECTIVES OF AI-QAEDA WERE TO UNITE ALL MUSLIMS AND ESTABLISH THE
CALIPHATE TO IMPLEMENT THE TRUE ISLAM, AS THEY UNDERSTOOD IT, WHICH WAS BEING
PRACTICES DURING THE TIME OF HOLY PROPHET MUHAMMAD (PEACE BE UPON HIM

21. • TALIBAN.
THE TALIBAN WERE THE STUDENTS OF THE MADRASAS' (THE RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS),
WHO WERE ORGANIZED BY THE MULLAH UMAR TO BRING PEACE AND PROVIDE JUSTICE TO THE
WAR RUINED NATION OF THE AFGHANISTAN. AFTER THE WITHDRAWAL OF USSR, THE CORRUPTION
AND ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES WERE THE NORMAL FOR THE MUJAHEDEEN. AFGHANISTAN WAS
DEPRIVED OF ANY RELIEF AFTER EVEN FIGHTING THE PROLONGED WAR OF INDEPENDENCE WITH
THE USSR. AFTER THE FALL OF SOVIET BACKED AFGHAN GOVERNMENT IN APRIL 1992, IN HANDS
OF TAJIK MUJAHEDEEN, THE COUNTRY CAME UNDER ANOTHER CIVIL WAR AMONG THE
MUJAHEDEEN TO ESTABLISH PASHTUN GOVERNMENT IN KABUL. IN LATE 1994, WHEN
AFGHANISTAN WAS IN A STATE OF DISORDER AND DISINTEGRATION, TALIBAN EMERGED AS A NEW
POWER TO PROVIDE RELIEF TO THE AFGHAN PEOPLE. ON APRIL 4, 1996, MULLAH UMAR DECLARED
HIMSELF AS AMIR UL MOMINEEN (THE LEADERS OF FAITHFUL) AND ESTABLISHED A PROPER
ISLAMIC GOVERNMENT WITH ITS CAPITAL IN KANDAHAR. INITIALLY, THE TALIBAN ACHIEVED
SUCCESS THROUGH THEIR EXEMPLARY CHARACTER AND ACTIONS, WHICH HELPED THEM TO GAIN
THE FAVORS AND SYMPATHIES OF THE MAJORITY IN AFGHANISTAN. THE TALIBAN OCCUPIED THE
MAJOR PART OF AFGHANISTAN INCLUDING KABUL, BY LATE 1996. THEY ESTABLISHED A
GOVERNMENT AND IMPLEMENTED THE TRUE AND RIGID FORM OF ISLAM

22. TERRORISM IN PAKISTAN-PRE 9/11
• AFTER THE COLD WAR, THE GUN RUNNING AND DURING CULTURE WAS ON THE RISE IN
PAKISTAN. IT HELPED TO ARM THE RELIGIOUS, ETHNIC AND POLITICAL GROUPS TO
ELIMINATE THEIR RIVALS. ESPECIALLY IN 1990, THE LAW AND ORDER SITUATION IN
KARACHI, THE ECONOMICAL CAPITAL OF PAKISTAN, BECAME WORSE THAT WHOLE CITY
WAS HANDED OVER TO ARMY TO ESTABLISH THE WRIT OF GOVERNMENT. ALTHOUGH THE
SITUATION WAS BROUGHT UNDER CONTROL AFTER MASSIVE MILITARY OPERATIONS AND
RECOVERY OF HUGE ILLEGAL WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION, A CLEAN SWEEP WAS NOT
POSSIBLE

23. TERRORISM IN PAKISTAN- POST 9/11:
• AFTER THE INCIDENT OF 9/11, THE US DECLARED A WAR AGAINST TERRORISM, SPECIFICALLY
TARGETED THE AL-QAEDA AND THE TALIBAN. US SECRETARY OF STATE MR. COLIN POWELL
TOOK THE CONSENT OF THE PRESIDENT OF PAKISTAN ON TELEPHONE BY THE FAMOUS
SENTENCE THAT “YOU ARE EITHER WITH US OR AGAINST.” IN RESPONSE, PAKISTAN OPTED TO
JOIN US, BEING THE VICTIM OF TERRORISM OF MANY YEARS. IT WAS CONSIDERED AN
APPROPRIATE OPTION TO FIGHT TERRORISM TOGETHER WITH US. THE STRATEGIC LOCATION
AND THE NEIGHBOR COUNTRY TO AFGHANISTAN, PAKISTAN BECAME THE FRONT-LINE STATE TO
THE US ALLIANCE ONCE AGAIN AFTER THE COLD WAR.
• ALTHOUGH PAKISTAN’S GOVERNMENT FACED HEAVY RESISTANCE FROM ITS PUBLIC ON THIS
ALLIANCE, IT WAS PROVED TO BE IN THE BEST INTEREST OF PAKISTAN. THE PRO-TALIBAN
ELEMENT IN PAKISTAN DIDN’T FAVOR THIS ALLIANCE AND IN RETALIATION BEGAN TERRORIST
ACTIVITIES TO SHOW THEIR GRIEVANCES TO THE GOVERNMENT.

24. • IT WAS ALSO OBSERVED THAT SINCE THEN, TALIBAN CAME INTO POWER IN AFGHANISTAN;
PAKISTAN’S WRIT WEAKENED IN ITS TRIBAL REGION. THE MAJORITY OF THE TRIBAL PEOPLE
ALONG WITH TALIBAN WERE FIGHTING THE NORTHERN ALLIANCE. NOW, THE SITUATION WAS
MUCH WORSE THAN IN THE PAST, PAKISTAN SUPPORT TO THE US IN THE WAR ON TERROR WAS
TAKEN SERIOUSLY BY THE TRIBAL PEOPLE DUE TO SECURITY CONCERNS AND CLOSE RELATIONS
WITH THE TALIBAN.
• AL-QAEDA, THE TALIBAN AND TRIBAL LEADERS LAUNCHED AN ANTI-US CAMPAIGN TO
MOTIVATE THE YOUTH OF AFGHANISTAN AND TRIBAL AREAS TO JOIN THEM IN THEIR FIGHT
AGAINST THE US AND IS ALLIES. THE ACTIVISTS FROM THESE ORGANIZATIONS UNDER TOOK
SERIOUS TERRORIST ATTACK AT PUBLIC AND GOVERNMENTAL INFRA-STRUCTURE TO
DESTABILIZE AND WEAKEN THE WRIT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN. EVEN SERIOUS
ATTEMPTS WERE MADE TO ASSASSINATE THE PRESIDENT MUSHARRAF TWICE THROUGH
SUICIDAL ATTACKS BUT NEVER SUCCEEDED. ULTIMATELY, PAKISTAN DEPLOYED ITS MILITARY IN
TRIBAL AREAS FOR THE FIRST TIME AFTER THE INDEPENDENCE TO ESTABLISH THE WRIT OF
GOVERNMENT AND TO CURB THE TERRORIST NETWORK.

25. PAKISTAN – US RELATIONS: THE ENVIRONMENT OF MISTRUST.
• IN THE POST-COLD WAR PERIOD, WHEN US BECAME THE SOLE HEGEMONIC POWER HAD CHANGED ITS
POLICIES. THE MAIN FOCUS WAS ABOUT THE ROLE OF USA IN THE NEW UNILATERAL WORLD. THE US POLICY
WAS BASED ON THE CONCEPT OF POWER, SECURITYAND OF COURSE ITS NATIONAL INTERESTS. IN THE
SOUTH ASIAN REGION,
• PAKISTAN WAS THE ONLY STATE WHICH PROMOTED US AGENDA DURING COLD WAR PERIOD AND WAS THE
ALLY OF US GOVERNMENT NOT ONLY LOST ITS FORMER STATUS BUT INDIA THE TRADITIONALALLY OF
MOSCOW, APPARENTLY WELCOMED WASHINGTON AND BECAME THE FOCUS OF US INTEREST AS THE
DOMINANT POWER IN SOUTH ASIA5. IN THIS SCENARIO PAKISTAN NOT ONLY RELEGATED THE STATUS OF A
FRONT-LINE STATE BUT ALSO TO THE CATEGORY OF UNFAVORABLE NATIONS AND ALLEGED TO HAVE A
TENDENCY TOWARDS HOSTILITY FROM THE UNITED STATES AND ITS INTERESTS.
• IT HAS BEEN SAID THAT THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BOTH THE COUNTRIES IS ISSUE BOUND AND
WHENEVER THE “ISSUE” LOST ITS IMPORTANCE, IT LOST ALL ITS VITALITYAND VIGOR AND AS DENNIS CRUX
OBSERVED IN HIS BOOK, THAT THE COMMON STRUGGLE DURING COLD WAR AGAINST THE SOVIET
OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN NO LO

26. REFLECTIONS OF PAKISTAN’S ECONOMY
• IN SPITE OF THIS UNCERTAIN AND UNRELIABLE ENVIRONMENT PAKISTAN GAVE A WARM
WELCOME NOT ONLY TO THE US ASSISTANCE BUT THE US POLICIES TOWARDS PAKISTAN ALSO.
THE MAIN REASON WAS THE DISABLE AND FRAGILE ECONOMY OF PAKISTAN THAT WAS THE
FRUIT OF A DISABLE POLITICAL SYSTEM. THE FOLLOWING TABLE, GROWTH PERFORMANCE OF
REAL SECTOR IN PAKISTAN WOULD BE HELPFUL TO EVALUATE THE ECONOMIC SITUATION OF
PAKISTAN AT THAT TIME.
• NIGER CEMENTED U.S PAKISTAN RELATION AND IN THE ABSENCE OF A “SHARED SIGNIFICANT
NATIONAL INTERESTS”, TENSION BETWEEN THE TWO NATIONS WAS BECOMING APPARENT
• BILATERAL RELATIONS FURTHER WORSENED WHEN PAKISTAN DETONATED ITS NUCLEAR
EXPLOSIONS ON MAY 28, 1998 AND EXPEDITED ITS NUCLEAR AND MISSILE PROGRAMMED. IT WAS
CONSIDERED THAT PAKISTAN IS A THREAT TO UNITED STATES NONPROLIFERATION MOTIVES IN
THE REGION

27. SOCIAL IMPACT OF THE WAR
INCIDENCE OF TERRORISM AND HUMAN COST:
• THE INTENSITY OF TERRORISM INCREASED IN PAKISTAN IN 2009 AS
THE COUNTRY EXPERIENCED MEGA TERRORIST’S ATTACKS ON THE GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
OF PAKISTAN ARMY, SRI LANKAN CRICKET TEAM IN LAHORE AND ON MANAWA POLICE
TRAINING CENTER, LAHORE. PIPS DATA ALSO SHOWS THAT FIFTY FOUR POLITICAL LEADERS
AND ACTIVISTS WERE ASSASSINATED IN FATA AND KPK. IN FATA, 559 TERRORIST ATTACKS TOOK
PLACE WHICH KILLED 644 PEOPLE AND INJURED 1046. IN KPK, IN 1137 ATTACKS 1438 PEOPLE
WERE KILLED. FURTHER, IN 2010, 459 ATTACKS KILLED 836 PEOPLE IN KPK. IN FATA, 904 PEOPLE
WERE KILLED AND ARMY CONVOYS CHECK POSTS AND PRO - GOVERNMENT ELDERS WERE
FREQUENTLY ATTACKED. PIPS DATA SHOWS THAT IN 2012, 1577 TERRORIST ATTACKS KILLED 2050
PEOPLE. IN KPK, 456 ATTACKS KILLED 401 PEOPLE WHILE IN FATA, 388 TERRORIST ATTACKS
KILLED 631 PEOPLE. FREQUENT TERRORIST ATTACKS BROUGHT NEGATIVE ECONOMIC,
POLITICAL, SOCIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES FOR PAKISTAN BY DESTRUCTION OF
PROPERTY, INFRASTRUCTURE AND SLUGGISH ECONOMIC GROWTH.

28. Rate of Unemployment:
In 2007, Greenbaum, Dugan & LAFree examined the impact of terrorism on employment and business
outcomes in Italy from 1985 to 1997 and found that terrorist attacks decrease employment opportunities. Employment is
more of a social issue than an economic one as it affects the lives of all people alike. In Pakistan unemployment increased
from 3.12 million in 2009-10 to 3.40 million in 2010-11. Table 2 shows that due to increased terrorist activities in the urban
areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, unemployment increased from 0.10 million in 2009- 10 to 0.12 million 2010-2011.
However, the data for FATA is not available. It can be easily predicted, from the intensity of terrorism, that thousands of
people would have become jobless in FATA. Pakhtunkhwa economy remained 3 percentage points less than the national
economy, which remained less than 3 percent in 2007- 08. He further found that the counter terrorism campaigns led to
massive unemployment in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA during 2009 to 2011.

29. Impact on Education
Education is the key to progress for any nation of the world. Militants attacked and destroyed a
number of boys and girls schools in FATA and KPK as a strategy to imbue the youth of the area with militant values.
Militants attacked 119 schools in 2008; 188 in 2009; 129 in 2010 and 142 in 2011. In 2011, 79 attacks were witnessed in
KPK and 56 in FATA. Girls’ schools suffered 62 attacks against 51 attacks on boys’ schools. Militants destroyed almost
1,000 schools, mostly girls’ schools, in FATA and KPK. Only in Swat valley, 401 schools were destroyed in 2010-11.
According to KPK Education Department, militants destroyed a total of 758 schools in various parts of the province
including 640 schools in Malakand division. Militants destroyed local culture, banned listening to music and recreational
activities.

30. Displacement and its Impact:
Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies found that due to military operations in various parts
of the KPK and FATA, 2.7 million to 3.5 million people were displaced which is considered as the largest displacement in
the history of Pakistan. The displaced people left their homes for safety and security and went to the urban areas of the
country to support their families. Largest displacement took place in South Waziristan Agency in FATA where
approximately 4, 28,000 people were displaced. In Orakzai Agency, 4, 00,000 people and in Malakand division 3, 83,190
people were uprooted out of which 3, 82,950 returned home while 20,777 are still in the camps. In Khyber Agency,
between 84,000 and 100,000 people were uprooted while the number of people who fled Mohmand and Bajau agencies is
estimated as 7, 50,000.22 Due to increased militancy and subsequent military operations, the local residents, particularly
women and children, of the conflict areas suffered from physical and psychological abuse and traumas. The fear of death
and feelings of helplessness further traumatized their lives

31. Political Impact of the War
High incidents of terrorism lead to increased political instability in a country.24 Similarly,
war on terror has left significant political impact on Pakistan at domestic, regional and international level. Militants
destroyed the local social, political and judicial structures in FATA and Malakand division. The tribal areas of Pakistan are
governed by Frontier Crime Regulation (FCR) and local disputes are settled in Jirgas that work in collaboration with
political agents, appointed by the federal government. During crisis, militants killed hundreds of local elders which
disturbed the political balance in FATA.25 She further found, “The presence of the military in FATA in post 9/11 scenario
also undermined the authority of political agents. The power of the jirga and political agents has been assumed by Taliban
commanders” (P-41). This also reduced the influence of political parties in FATA and Malakand division. Women
politicians were harassed and an active women councilor from Dir district of KPK was murdered. Pakistan decision to
join war on terror has weakened the federation as the fighting is getting longer. This has also created gap between the
masses and the Pakistan military as the pro-Taliban section of the people opine that Pakistan army is fighting a war of US
while pro-US section of people say that Pakistan military is the biggest hurdle in eliminating terrorism and supporting
militants in Afghanistan.

32. War on terror suffered Pakistan politically at regional and international level. After the fall of Taliban regime
in 2001, Northern Alliance dominated government was installed in Kabul which is anti-Pakistan and pro
India. Taking advantage of this, India opened more than thirty consulates and missions alongside the
Pakistani border. India gained three major advantages out of this situation. It declared Kashmiri freedom
fighters as terrorists. Second, it obtained access to civil nuclear energy from various countries including
United States. Third, India increased her role in Afghanistan by supporting Northern Alliance government.
At international level Pakistani citizens have been denied US visas and subjected to humiliation at American
airports through special search and screening. Pakistan has been captioned as a failing state and maps are
published showing its balkanization. Further, regular anti Pakistan sessions are held in US Congress with
Indian cooperation

33. IMPACT OF THE ECONOMIC WAR
TERROR:
• POVERTY REDUCTION STRATEGY PAPER (PRSP-II) OF THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE, GOVERNMENT OF
PAKISTAN HAS IDENTIFIED FIVE INDIRECT COSTS OF THE WAR ON TERROR, IN ADDITION TO THE DIRECT COSTS.
THE FIRST ONE IS THE SLOWING DOWN OF DOMESTIC ECONOMIC ACTIVITY. IT MEANS THAT FOREIGN DIRECT
INVESTMENT, INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT, TAX COLLECTION AND EXPORTS DECREASED. OVERALL GDP GROWTH
SUFFERED DUE TO INTENSIVE TERRORISM. THE SECOND ONE IS THE INCREASE IN THE CREDIT RISK OF THE
COUNTRY WHICH MEANS THAT PAKISTAN SUFFERED FROM THE FINANCIAL LOSSES BY FAILING TO REPAY THE
LOANS IT OBTAINED FROM FINANCIAL ORGANIZATIONS ESPECIALLY IMF. THE THIRD INDIRECT COST IS THE
ENORMOUS INCREASE IN UNEMPLOYMENT IN TERRORISM AFFECTED AREAS LIKE KPK AND FATA. DUE TO LOSSES
TO AGRICULTURE SECTOR, DAMAGE TO BUSINESSES AND TOURIST RESORTS THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE LOST THEIR
JOBS. THE FOURTH ONE IS THE HEAVY COSTS OF DISPLACEMENT OF LOCAL POPULATION. DUE TO INSURGENCY
AND COUNTER MILITARY OPERATIONS, MILLIONS OF PEOPLE WERE DISPLACED FROM MALAKAND DIVISION AND
FATA. IN THE FIFTH PLACE, DUE TO FREQUENT TERRORIST ATTACKS IMPLEMENTATION OF DEVELOPMENT
PROJECTS GOT DELAYED IN KPK & FATA. THIS DELAY INCREASED THE COST OF THE PROJECTS MANIFOLD.28 WITH
THE INCREASE IN TERRORISM THE BENEFITS OF PARTICIPATION IN THE WAR FELL AS IN 2007-08, THE UNITED
STATES ASSISTED PAKISTAN WITH $1.9 BILLION, WHEREAS THE COST OF THE WAR WAS OVER THREE TIMES HIGHER
AT $ 6 BILLION.29

34. GDP GROWTH IN PAKISTAN (2001-2011)

35. Agriculture
Agriculture sector is the source of employment for 44.7 percent of labor force in Pakistan,
contributes 21.8 percent to GDP and has large impact in balance of payment.41 Agriculture is the main
source of revenue for the people in the terrorism affected areas like the FATA and KPK. Only Swat district
has arable land of 98,100 hectares and agriculture is the primary source of livelihood for almost 80 percent
of the population. From 2007- 2009, in Swat valley the loss to agriculture has been amounted to Rs.35
billion and 55 to 70 percent of the total fruit produced was wasted. This was the result of various hostilities,
artillery shelling, blowing of bridges in bomb blasts and imposition of frequent curfews by the army. As a
result of the precarious law and order situation of the area the local farmers, landowners and dealers had to
face losses of billions of rupees

36. Tourism sector
A number of studies have sought to calculate the impact of terrorism on tourism industry and found that it
has negative impact on the economy of a country. In 1991, Enders and Sandler using monthly data from 1970 to 1988 found
that a single terrorist attack in Spain decreases the number of tourists by 140,000.43 In 1992, Enders, Sandler and Parise
studied the impact of terrorism on tourism industry and found that between 1974 and 1988 Austria suffered $4.5 billion,
Italy lost $1.1 billion and Greece lost $0.8 billion in lost revenue. They also found that continental Europe as a whole
suffered losses of $16.1 billion. 44 There is a high correlation between terrorism and decline of tourism. One study has
concluded that due to terrorism Israel also faced sharp decline in foreign tourist activities from 2000 to 2003 period. People
like to visit those places which are safe and secure.
In Pakistan, the attractive tourist places are located in the northern part and there was significant decrease in the number of
tourists visiting Pakistan due to intense acts of terrorism after 2007-08. Pakistan Hotels Association in 2008 indicated a
sharp decrease in hotel occupancy rates especially after the bombing of Marriot hotel Islamabad. The security threat also led
to decrease in the hotel events like marriages and conventions etc. The occupancy rates in 2007-08 declined from 60 percent
to almost 40 percent. The indirect cost of less travel to Pakistan and downstream

37. Defense Expenditures
In 2007-08, when militancy increased and terrorists started getting control of settled districts of
Pakistan like Swat district, the Pakistan army conducted military operations against the terrorists to flush them out.
For security and civil relief operations up to US $ 4 billion (2.4 percent of average GDP) additional expenditures incurred on
the annual budget. More than 3 million people were displaced which resulted in a budgetary outlay of US $ 600 million in
fiscal year 2009 alone for relief and rehabilitation process of the internally displaced persons. Cumulatively, the potential
GDP loss due to terrorism for the period 2008-09 has been estimated as US $ 11.7 billion.
During this period, Pakistan also suffered diversion of development funds to the security budget, capital flight and brain
drain.48 In 2008-09, defense budget was 3, 11,303 million and in 2009- 10 it increased to 3, 42,914 million. In 2008-09
25,421 million budgets was allocated to the police and in 2009-10 it increased to 32,169 million. This allocation was higher
by 28.5 percent as compared with the budget estimates of 2008-09. In 2008-09 total budget for public order and safety
affairs (including police) was 27,343 million which was increased to 34,641 million in 2009-10

38. COUNTER TERRORISM
•TERRORIST NETWORK ACROSS THE COUNTRY AND REDUCE THE RESOURCES
LEGACIES OF THE REBEL GROUPS. ANY PREEMPTIVE STRATEGY THAT
REDUCES TERRORIST ACTIVITIES AND ATTACKS BY DECREASING THEIR
RESOURCES IS INCAPACITATION OR BREAKDOWN EFFECT (REHMAN ET AL.,
2017). FURTHER, THE BREAKDOWN EFFECT HAS MEASURED BY COUNTER-
INSURGENT AND DOMESTIC OPERATIONS BY MILITARY AUTHORITIES. THE
GATHERED INFORMATION ON CARROT-AND-STICK COUNTER-TERRORISM
STRATEGIES AND OPERATIONS ACROSS THE COUNTRY BY MILITARY STATED
BELOW.

39. National Internal Security Policy (NISP 2014-2018)
The first-ever “National Internal Security Policy6 (NISP)” has been exposed by the
Government of Pakistan after 67 years of Independence. The three main objectives of
NISP includes, negotiation with all shareholders, separation of terrorist from their funding
system and deterrence augmentation by capacity structure of the security gear to
deactivate threats of inside security of Pakistan. For implementing the aims of NISP, all
the security and law enforcement agencies works together under Counter-Terrorism
Departments (CTDs).

40. National Action Plan (NAP)
Political and military authorities of Pakistan have learned from previous counterinsurgency
strategies that undertaking the control of one region does not reduce the terrorist attacks
and provide deterrence. In response of counterinsurgency operations, the well-established
militants move their networks from one place to another. Therefore, the new inclusive
counterinsurgency strategy implemented by Government in January 2015 was “National
Action Plan”. The plan was hallmark of on ongoing operation Zarb-e-Azb in NWA (North
Waziristan Agency). It was addressed as a main coordinated state revenge following the
backlash attack of militants on army public school Peshawar in December 2014. Both NAP
and Operation Zarb-e-Azb are the solid evidence of counter-terrorism effectiveness in
reducing terrorist attacks on significant level

41. Military Operations (2001-2016)
The Pakistan Military Forces has been engaged in confirming internal stability and
security through tackling militancy and insurgency in FATA (Federally Administered Tribal
Areas), the PATA (Provincially Administered Tribal Areas) and across the country since
2001 (Khan, Z.A., 2012). In order to look challenges, Pakistan army has decided to bring
variations in its motivation, orientation, strategies and thinking from the last sixteen years.
In this regard, military has conducted seven major operations along with various smaller
operations against the terrorists and insurgents. Finally, the study analyzes briefly the
military operations launched by Pakistan Army

42. Operation Enduring Freedom (2001-2002)
To some extent, it was a successful operation in its purposes of overthrowing the Terrorists
regime and arrested some followers of Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan (Khan, Z.A., 2012). However,
both Pakistan and United States forces futile to arrest main leaders of Al-Qaeda.
Operation Al-Mizaan (2002-2006)
This Operation was conducted against the foreign militants in FATA under the compression of
Washington (Khan, Z.A., 2012). It was contained various smaller operations, like Operation
Kalosha-II in Waziristan. For this operation, government deploys frontier forces in between
70,000 to 80,000 in FATA (PIPS, 2016).

43.  Operation Zalzala (2008)
The Sararogha fort was captured by the men of Baitullah Mehsud in South Waziristan agency
and killed security personnel of Pakistan army (Khan, Z.A., 2012). The Pakistan Military forces
launched three main operations against TTP (Baitullah Mehsud) after the failure of Sararogha
Peace deal. Operation Zalzala (Earthquake) was the main component and security forces cleared
most area of South Waziristan and interrupted some strategic suicide attacks. It was successful
operation of Pakistan army
 Operation Rah-e-Haqq (2007-2009)
At the request of provisional government Operation Rah-e-Haqq was conducted with the prime
objective of „Shoot-on-sight” and curfews in main areas of Swat valley against major groups of
militants. It was comprised on three phases which launched respectively from (2007-2009). And
the battle ended with Malakand accord
 Operation Sherdil (2008-2009)
Pakistan army began operations in different places of country after the partial success in southern
areas of FATA against militants (Khan, Z.A., 2012). The major target of Operation Sherdil was
to capture the militant’s organizations, it‟s known as “Battle-of- Bajour” (2008-2009). Over 1000

44.  Operation Rah-e- Nijaat (2009)
In the center of increasing violence, ground operation was initiated by the Pakistani air force and
military in South Waziristan, known as Operation Rah-e-Nijaat In 2009
(Khan, Z.A., 2012; Rehman et al., 2017). Pakistani armed forces conducted “search-andclearance”
operations beside numerous key roads and places in South Waziristan. They
successfully disrupted the TTP control and command system in the major Mehsud areas in South
Waziristan. Hence, the preliminary targets of these operations were to abolish the TTP
stranglehold in northern and southern areas of Waziristan. These operations were conclusive
victories of Pakistan military against militants (PIPS, 2016).
 Operation Brekhna (2009)
Pakistan military forces launched “Operation Brekhna (meaning Thunder)” against TTP (Tehriki-
Taliban Pakistan) in Momand agency (Rehman et al., 2017). It began in 2009 and converted in
continuing operation “Zarb-e-Azb” in 2014.

45.  Operation Khwakh Ba De Sham (2009-2010)
The counterinsurgency operation against TTP conducted by military in Orakazai agency and
Kurram agency called operation “Operation Khwakh Ba Da Sham (will teach you a lesson). It
started in March 2010 and ended in June 2010. However, in September 2009
 Operation Zarb-e-Azb (2014-2017)
Operation Zarb-e-Azb intended as “eliminating terrorists regardless of the hue and color”. It was
joint military offensive launched by Pakistan military forces against terrorist in NWA (North
Waziristan Agency) without any distinction/discrimination of bad or good Taliban (Rehman et
al., 2017). It is a successful operation and still ongoing in NWA. Operation Zarb-e-Azb
successfully brings the number of terrorist’s incidents on minimum level and upgrade the image of Pakistan

46. Conclusion
Over the years, terrorism has become both more widespread and more lethal in Pakistan. There are spatial and temporal
patterns within this trend that correlate with domestic and international political and geostrategic adventures. Events in
Afghanistan directly impact the occurrence of violence in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The violence in Karachi is typically
between ethnic communities. It draws from deep historical roots and erupts when the delicate balance between the
communities is disturbed.
The insurgency in Baluchistan is nationalistic in nature in response to fears of lost resource wealth, which is attested to by
the fact that most of attacks in the provinces are mounted against utilities and natural resource distribution mechanisms.
Historically, non-sectarian violence has been deadlier than sectarian, yet in recent years this pattern has reversed and
sectarian violence has become deadlier.
Terrorists have responded to crackdowns by adopting tactics with a higher probability of mass casualties, for example,
suicide bombing. We have seen the number of events decline, but the number of casualties increase dramatically. Karachi
and Peshawar remain the two major victims of terrorist violence. Both cities are prime targets for both types of terrorism –
sectarian and non-sectarian.