Congressional Policy and Budget Research DepartmentHouse of Representatives presentation for the online course "Localizing Poverty Reduction Targets"

1. The Role of Legislation in National Development:
Significant Policies & Policy Reforms Aimed at Poverty
Poverty Reduction
Director Novel V. Bangsal
Congressional Policy and Budget Research Department
House of Representatives
Development Discussion on Localizing Poverty Reduction Targets
Silliman University, Dumaguete City
June 9, 2015
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2. Functions of the legislature
 Representative - represent the will of the people, the
legitimate source of authority in democratic countries
 Legislative - amend, approve or reject government bills or
introduce legislation on their own; includes the “the
power of the purse”
 Oversight - oversee the preparation of a given policy (ex
ante oversight) and/or the execution and implementation
of a given policy (ex post oversight)
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3. Parliament & the PRS
Policy Process
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Source: WBI 2008

4. Perceptions of Congress
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5. Parliamentary engagement
in practice
 The people do not easily recognize the beneficial effects of laws
on their lives.
 The people value more the representation and oversight functions
of Congress more than legislation.
 People look up to the legislators to facilitate their access to
government services that directly impact on their lives.
 People consider legislators as acting on their behalf when they
investigate and demand accountability on the use of government
funds.
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6. Legislative Priorities of the
16th Congress
 The legislative agenda of Congress should resonate with
the needs of the time.
 Must be able to package and present legislative priorities
in relation to the Philippines’ socio-economic situation.
 Given the limited time, should Congress focus on a
shorter list of priority bills?
 Which bills should be given priority attention and get
enacted in 2015?
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7. Rate of Poverty Reduction by
Administration, 1985-2014
7Monsod, Inquirer, June 6, 2015

8. 8

9. 9

10. 10

11. Status of Legislative Measures of PDP
2011-2016
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12. The budget cycle
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Congress often restricts its role
in the overall budget cycle.
Spending/revenue
approval stage
often hurried, very
internalized within
Congress

13. NEP Priorities, 2015
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14. NEP Priorities, 2015
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15. NEP Priorities, 2015
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16. Improving budget oversight
 Congress need to relate to the budget cycle
process at earlier stages of analysis (budget prep),
enforce accountability on financial reporting, on
evaluation of programs (budget implementation),
on policy implementation, and on timely follow-up
of financial abuses uncovered by audit.
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17. 17
No. of
findings
Amount
(in mil)
1. Unauthorized/irregular/unncessary expenses 1,642 18,653,516
2. Unliquidated cah advances 1,003 7,534,153
3. No bidding/not in accordance with Procurement law 692 15,163,353
4. Underassessment/undercollection 157 20,813,224
5. Unutilized/ineffective projects 104 13,583,533
6. Lack of appropriation 100 525,363
7. Unliquidated fund transfer 77 6,800,313
8. Delayed remittance premiums of employees 73 750,910
9. Non-existence cash/unaccounted assets 49 1,199,753
10. Unimplemented projects/unulitized funds 47 3,276,235
11. Shortages and malversion of funds 42 282,327
12. Delayed implementation of projects 36 2,554,056
13. Unremitted/uncollected income receivables 34 3,511,810
14. Overpricing/excessive contract cost 34 1,117,419
15. Unsettled suspensions/disallowances/charges 32 203,750
16. Fictitious claims/expenses 26 5,198,772
17. Untitled land purchased/owned 17 390,671
18. Undeposited collections 9 149,658
19. Unrecouped advances/mobilization 6 107,860
TOTAL 101,816,676
Particular
Total
Common Audit Findings with Pecuniary Loss, 2011
COA, 2011

18. However, it is the executive and not
Congress that, by law and practice,
actually wields effective power over the
purse (PHDR 2008/2009).
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19. Diminishing power of the purse
The Executive can override the mandate of the GAA:
 By not releasing or by delaying the release of authorized
appropriations;
 By transferring “unused” (unreleased) appropriations to “savings”
and using this amount for other purposes within the executive
branch;
 Through the use of discretionary, intelligence, or confidential
funds—over which the legislature has no oversight—as well as
“unprogrammed” funds in the budget (PIDS 2009).
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20. Weak congressional oversight (1)
The Philippine Human Development Report 2008/2009
notes that:
 Congress fails to adequately validate the performance of
agencies or the consistency of budgets with state policy
 Cost estimates of budget proposals are rarely challenged
 COA audit findings are largely ignored
 Weak congressional oversight, combined with inherently
powerful spending powers of the executive, has
unfortunately invited corruption
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21. Weak congressional oversight (2)
Other observations:
 Congress has no systematic way of conducting budget
oversight
 While COA regularly submits reports to Congress,
submissions are usually not timely for the conduct of
oversight
 The use of said reports is not maximized due to a host of
factors, e.g. reports are technical, lack of capacity among
legislative staff and committees to undertake scrutiny of
public accounts
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22. Critical Success Factors
 Political will and commitment to the process of budget
oversight;
 Impartiality of the budget oversight committee;
 The timeliness of financial statements and audit reports on
them;
 Strengthened links between CoA and Congress; greater
emphasis on performance audits;
 Involvement of CSOs in the budget oversight process;
 Capacity building for all stakeholders in the process.
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23. MARAMING SALAMAT!
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