Totalitarian Cinema- The Utilisation of Ideological State Apparatuses Through Effective Power Relations By Totalitarian Regimes; The Case of North Korea

[ T y p e
t h e
c o m p a n y
a d d r e s s ]

TOTALITARIAN
CINEMA
THE

UTLISATION
OF
IDEOLOGICAL
STATE

APPARATUSES
THROUGH
EFFECTIVE

POWER
RELATIONS
BY
TOTALITARINAN

REGIMES:
THE
CASE
OF
NORTH

KOREA.By
Victor
McGowan

(V.M.G)M.A
2014

2

The thesis is submitted to University College Dublin for the
Degree of MA in Film Studies
August 2014
Head of School: Diane Negra
Supervisor: Emma Radley
Summary: This thesis will focus on the role Cinema played in 20th
century
Totalitarian propaganda. Cinema was a powerful tool used by dictatorial ruling
powers to perpetuate their agenda onto their citizens. The aim was to ensure that the
lower classes were exposed to the correct form of propaganda to ward off any notion
of dissent. A docile lower class guarantees that the ruling classes can maintain such
rule at the lower class’ expense. An effective means of perpetuating an agenda is
through the medium of film. Film as an art form allows for a high degree of
expressivity to a large spectatorship. What this thesis will be concerned with is how
far film went to meet the needs of these ruling classes i.e. how much control over
filmic expression did these ruling powers really have? The first chapter discusses the
broader question of Totalitarian Cinema with respect to the most notorious ruling
powers of the 20th
century: Hitler, Mussolini, Mao, Stalin, Franco and Kim Jong-Il.
Particular attention will be paid to Kim Jong-Il as his system is the only one to make
the transition into the 21st
century and not-to-mention his penchant for films. Kim
Jong-Il will serve as a case study to analyse how a regime utilises of film successfully
for the ruling powers benefit. This paper will also account for the only outsider
permitted to films for Kim Jong-Il, Shin Sang-Ok from South Korea. His story is an
interesting case for how one uses the foundations of propaganda against its
perpetrator i.e. Kim Jong-Il.

3

Table of contents:
1. Introduction
2. Chapter I: Totalitarian Cinema of 20th
Century Autocracies
3. Chapter II: The Cinema of Kim Jong-Il
4. Chapter III: Shin Sang-Ok and his North Korean Legacy
5. Conclusion
INTRODUCTION
Controlling the distribution and production of art is the number one priority of any
Totalitarian regime. To control forms of art, is to control representation, allowing a
regime to maintain an element of power over the individual’s perspective. This is
propaganda; which is an integral and necessary aspect of Totalitarianism. As is the
norm with the classic Totalitarian State structure, there is widespread control of
artistic expression and representation. This paper will discuss propaganda in art with
particular emphasis to Cinema. This period of reference will be dictatorial regimes of
the 20th
century, namely Benito Mussolini’s Italy, Adolf Hitler’s Germany, Francisco

4

Franco’s Spain, Josef Stalin’s Russia, Mao Zedong’s China and Kim Jong-Il’s North
Korea. The case of North Korea will be of particular attention, as it is a product of
20th
century totalitarianism that still applies that structure today despite its influences
being disbanded.
In Chapter One, I will trace the measures and polices of the Totalitarian States
mentioned above with regards to film production. I will use Louis Althusser’s
Ideological and Repressive State Apparatus for this analysis. I will trace
commonalities regarding how each ruling power utilized film with reference to certain
texts. The aim of which is to reveal how these films represented the States’ ideology.
In Chapter II, I will analyse the case of North Korea and its role in the phenomena of
Propaganda Cinema. Kim Jong-Il sought to boost his cult of personality and the ideal
state of North Korea by paying particular attention to the film industry. He sought to
perpetuate the notion that as well as being a born leader, he was a man of culture. In
this chapter, I will analyse the methods he applied to ensure the perpetuation of this
image drawing on films produced by the regime. To help analyse these methods, I
will apply Michel Foucault’s theory of ‘Power Relations’, with particular attention to
how ‘Pastoral Power’ plays a role in the State’s ideology.
In Chapter III, I use the account of the kidnapped South Korean director, Shin Sang-
Ok and his wife as a case study in our journey through the unique nature of
totalitarian cinema. Shin and his wife were kidnapped and used as glorified pawns for
Kim Jong-Il’s project of bolstering his film industry. Such an event can be considered
characteristic of totalitarianism as the medium of film is considered to exist only as
tool for state ideology and there can be no limit as to how and where resources can be
used to boost said ideology. Shin’s most famous in North Korea was a type of

5

Godzilla remake entitled Pulgasari (1985). This story is both fascinating and
revelatory in getting to the heart of what drives Kim Jong-Il in a cultural sense. It is
also reveals how a filmmaker like Shin was able to subtly subvert the ruling powers of
both North and South Korea through film, which was understood to serve only the
State’s interest.
CHAPTER I: Totalitarian Cinema of 20th
Century Autocracies
“Bertolt Brecht once observed that a country which needs heroes is an unfortunate
one. But even more unfortunate is the country that needs heroes and has none.” -
Evgeny Evtushenko, One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich, 2009
To elaborate why I chose propaganda art of 20th
century regimes (specifically
Cinema), I refer to Toby Clark who wrote in his book, Art and Propaganda in the
Twentieth Century that “negative and emotive connotations of the word “propaganda”
are relatively new and closely bound to the ideological struggles of the twentieth
century. The original use was to describe the systematic propagation of beliefs” (7). It
is these “negative connotations” which I will refer to throughout this paper when
discussing the policies and utilization of artistic expression by Totalitarian regimes.
The regimes in question are Hitler’s Third Reich, Mussolini’s Italy, Stalin’s Soviet
Union, Mao’s China and Franco’s Spain. When analysing how these regimes were
governed, one sees the various methods and attempts to control artistic representation
from literature to film, painting to music etc. The regimes may differ in their political
ideologies, for example there’s a stark contrast in political ideology between

6

Mussolini’s Fascist Italy and Stalin’s Communist Russia. However, one can link
together leaders such as Hitler and Stalin under certain commonalties such as their
decrees on artistic expression. As Clark wrote, “Soviet Communism and German
Nazism were both viewed by their leaders as movements with a cultural and not just a
political mission” (14). However, as Igor Golomstock stated in his book, Totalitarian
Art, “it is not only the final product that is identical: the means of preparation
(totalitarian aesthetics) and the technology of production (totalitarian organization)
turn out equally similar” (XII).
In this paper, I too, will trace similar patterns in these regimes in terms of their
policies towards art. Upon assuming power, these dictators understood the importance
of shaping a collective culture, mentality and identity that could be represented
through art. Golomstock wrote that “art performs the function of transforming the raw
material of dry ideology into the fuel of images and myths intended for general
consumption” (XII). For the above regimes, Cinema played an important role, as it
was a relatively new medium whose technology, aesthetics and narrative content was
developing every year. With Totalitarian Art, the art itself operates as a means of
communication within a systemic programme (totalitarian aesthetics) through a close
relationship with specific compatible images, such as film, that are acceptable to the
regime (totalitarian organisation) (Clark, p13). The regimes discussed in this paper
sought to dominate this new art form, the film industry, in a similar fashion as they
had done previously with the more established art forms. Although regimes discussed
in this paper left behind diverse cinematic legacies, they all adhered to common
principles of totalitarian polices.

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The regimes of Stalin, Hitler, Franco, Mussolini and Mao started their cultural
movements from scratch and used cinema as a product of that Louis Althusser called
the ‘Ideological State Apparatus’ (ISA). This is an apparatus that exists in a society
that is controlled by the ruling class utilising what Althusser calls the ‘Repressive
State Apparatuses’ (RSA). In his book, On the Reproduction of Capitalism, Althusser
suggests that those who represent the beliefs of a group of people are ‘Ideological
State Apparatuses’ (e.g. Teacher’s Unions) and those that monitor a group of people
(e.g. the police) represent that of the ‘Repressive State Apparatus’. It is the ruling
class that successfully utilises both the Ideological and Repressive State Apparatus at
the expense of the lower class1
(162). Using art as propaganda (Ideological State
Apparatus) was a heavily regulated process by the ruling powers that in turn used
Repressive State Apparatuses to implement their policies/ideologies. These had to be
carefully implemented in order to have effect. Golomstock lists two points on the
development of Totalitarian Art: “The State declares art to be an ideological weapon”
and “The State constructs an all embracing apparatus for the control of art” (XIII). In
this case, it is the ruling powers using the ISA through the RSA to control art.
The aim in this chapter is to expose how and why these States used Cinema as an
ideological tool. Simultaneously, I will draw on the case of North Korea in a general
sense before elaborating on it in Chapters II and III. I argue that Kim Il-Sung was
responsible for transferring the Ideological State Apparatus policies from the
aforementioned early 20th
century models right into his latter day regime, only for it
to be brought into the 21st
century by his son: Kim Jong-Il. I will add some specific
factors regarding Cinema to Golomstock’s points on art. Based on my research, there

1
Althusser cites this as a class struggle between the Bourgeoisie and the
Communist/Working Class.

8

are two patterns that Totalitarian Cinema follows. I will expand on them throughout
the text but in short, they are, ‘re-writing of history’ and ‘ perpetuation of an ideology
of happiness’. In some cases, such expectations of total control were futile in the face
of other external influences2
. These States were not without their difficulties in
establishing their own film industries. As these regimes were part of a new breed of
political system, they had to adapt and apply effective policies of disseminating
propaganda. The success of such polices influenced the later ruling powers of North
Korea, who paid close heed as to how these previous regimes used their Repressive
State Apparatuses to control the Ideological State Apparatuses to their benefit.
As Golomstock said, art was used as an ideological weapon. In 1936, Benito
Mussolini stood in front of a banner that read, “Cinema is the strongest weapon”
(Reich & Garofalo, p. VII). Despite such a proclamation, Mussolini could not acquire
as much control over Italy’s film industry as he would have liked. Upon assuming
power in 1922, he inherited what Steven Ricci called “an industry in shambles” (4).
This of course gave Mussolini a fresh start but he had to rely on foreign film
distribution (external factors) to survive, notably films from America. Such
circumstances echo with what occurred in Spain under Franco. His sentiments
towards Cinema corresponded with the views of the Falangist magazine (another ISA)
‘Primer Plano’ that the State should make films that “exalt the performance of duty
and the call to discipline” (Besas, p.18). This, of course, was an ideal situation rather
than a fully practiced one. Spain’s film industry, like Italy’s, was in economic turmoil,
except in Spain’s case it was due to the aftermath of the Spanish Civil War. American
films were the most popular amongst the Cinema going public (Besas, p.18).

2
Which Shin Sang-Ok represents in Chapter III

9

However, the values and characteristics of the Americans onscreen were not to be
lauded or emulated.
As American Films contained no damning critique of their own culture, an article was
published in Primer in 1940 that declared American films to be “pornographic” and
produced a feeling of “surfeit”, (Besas, p.18). This highlighted Franco’s fear of
Spanish citizens being seduced by the alternative lifestyle represented by American
film narratives. Such disapproving declarations were to encourage his citizens to be
appalled by what they saw. The ideals promoted by the American ideology does not
(or should not) coincide with an individual’s sense of purpose i.e. their happiness3
.
Mussolini faced a similar compromise after he initially banned the American film,
The Adventures of Marco Polo (1938) through the Repressive State Apparatus of the
Censorship Board due to his dismay at an American (Gary Cooper) playing the title
character. It was subsequently released and renamed Uno Scozzese alla Corte del
Gran Khan or A Scotsman in the Court of the Great Khan (Ricci, p.64). In Italy, from
1920-31, although film attendance grew, production of Italian films remained low.
The State would later attempt to sway public favour towards Italian films by
presenting their film characters as ideal model citizens. Despite such dependence on
American films however, Mussolini would not permit foreign films that depicted
Italians in a bad light. He would not allow the constitution of the Italian individual be
dictated in any other way than how he saw fit. As a result, he used his RSA to ban
American films like Little Caser (1931) and Scarface (1932). The American

3
Almost whimsical compromises were even made with the exhibition of certain films
in Spain. For example, renaming of Mutiny on the Bounty (1962) to Tragedia de la
Bounty or Tragedy on the Bounty

10

‘Gangster Film’ genre as a whole was not censored despite the ban on such films from
being made in Italy. Perhaps the concept of ‘gangsters’ may have drawn parallels with
Mussolini’s regime and would have been too risky. The regime’s spin on this policy,
however, was that as long as these films showed crime and violence in America
perpetrated by non-Italians, it did not clash with the State’s ideals (Ricci, p.75). Such
compromising tactics may have undermined the authority of the State but there would
have been dire consequences had the ruling powers pulled all foreign distribution and
there is no doubt that the ISA of the film industry as a whole, would have been unable
to flourish.
Like Mussolini, Franco had to pick his battles with his RSAs, as to totally ban foreign
films in Spain would have consequences for his popularity as well as the country’s
economy due to the presence of American Distribution offices4
. Kim Jong-Il’s
success, in a dictatorially ideological sense, is in his control over the life of his
citizens. This is done in part by a complete blanket ban on all that is not North
Korean, to be shown in cinema. Therefore, there can be no external pressure or
external dependencies thus adhering to the DPRK’s policy of ‘Juche’. Juche is the
philosophy of so-called ‘self reliance’ that the DPRK prides itself on which is only
further legitimized by U.N sanctions. The philosophy has in practice for the citizen
become nothing more than blind obedience and adoration for the Kim Dynasty. This
policy also falls down in practice due to a lack of reference points for a legitimate
film study. This leaves said regime in a state of arrested development compared to the

4
Consequently, Spanish citizens endured somewhat inconsistent policies from the
RSA that served no other purpose other than reminding the citizens who is in charge
and how they should see themselves. One such policy in 1940, forbade the mention of
Charlie Chaplin in advertising and articles and yet, his films were not banned (Besas;
1985;p.18).

11

outside world, a world that Kim Jong-Il was aware of despite assuring his citizens
were not. As Kim Jong Il was quoted as saying to South Korean filmmaker Shin
Sang-Ok when asked why the DPRK does not host a film festival, “We really do not
have any films to present. What kind of North Korean film could we show to the
entire world? We do not have any films that will make the world laugh and cry.”
(P.29).
Mussolini was also concerned about foreign influences seeping into his society and
being adopted by his citizens. It was for Il Duce to use his ISAs to mandate what the
individual should aspire to. For this to succeed, he needed to influence their
appreciation of their potential as citizens. Mussolini, therefore, made/released films
that glorified the Italian way of life against that of the U.S without banning many of
films imported from the America. In his films, Mussolini’s actors portrayed the ‘ideal
Italian’, “Actors should be ideal types of the Italian race” (Ricci, p.121). Italy could
not afford to ban outright American films but they attempted to subvert and
undermine that culture where possible; in an article on the American actress Joan
Bennet, her elegance was described as being “artificial…it is very different from the
spontaneous elegance of our actresses” (Reich & Garafalo, p.324). This “spontaneous
elegance” spelt out what Italian men and women should consider attractive and try to
emulate it. This type of beauty, when contrasted with the American ideal, suggests
that American beauty the product of rampant consumerism. Italians were to take note
of these American film stars and not be in awe but in disgust, thus dictating a specific
attitude as to what is and should be desirable to Italians. Therefore ensuring that there
would be no evidence of an ‘American Look’ in his citizens. As George Orwell

12

wrote, “Human beings are not able to describe, nor perhaps to imagine happiness
except in terms of contrast” (Packer, p.207).
Vittorio DeSica’s title character in Mario Camerini’s Il Signor Max (1937) is a
newspaper vendor who desires to be elevated into the upper class. It is a film that acts
as a warning to people against succumbing to such ‘shallow’ aspirations and is
therefore supposed to give a sense as to what Italians should consider to beneficial in
life. It is interesting to note that this film is the only film of that period to feature any
foreign vernacular as it serves to, as Ricci puts it, “refer to the world of a decaying
bourgeoisie” (Ricci, 2008;p.117). This was to be the modus operandi for a State that
could not tackle their citizens’ fascination with the American way of life in a clear-cut
manner. Ricci writes that this structure “negotiates a certain ambivalence toward the
pervasiveness of American culture” (144)5
.
Franco had a reputation for being shrewd and opportunistic, which became evident in
his lingering rule until his death from natural causes. It can be identified in his
approach to his film industry ISA that was rife with RSA inconsistencies regarding
censorship. Certain films were approved, only to be un-expectantly pulled, such as
Carlos Arealo’s Rojo y Negro (1942) that was a love story between a Falangist and a
Communist. This film was approved in pre and post-production by censors but was
subsequently banned and destroyed after being screened for the Navy Ministry’s top
brass (Besas, p. 23). Kim Jong-Il, aside from Shin Sang-Ok’s presence, had no such

5
There was even a case made for exhibiting of Chaplin’s Modern Times (1936) when
it was initially banned. The case for it to be shown was that it’s its target was the
American capitalist system and that screening it therefore did not conflict with the
State’s ideology (Ricci; 2008;p. 76).

13

contradictory elements in his cinema industry. His regime’s adherence to self-reliance
was so strict that he never found himself in a position where he would have to give
any form of leeway to an external factor forcing him to backpedal on his ideology. Of
course this was to his citizens detriment, culturally. Despite Kim Jong-Il owning what
some have called the largest film collection in the world, his citizens were not
permitted to view international films as they would expose them to themes and
content that would ‘corrupt’ their minds (Suk, p.20).
What the Third Reich brought to the table were the best attempts to establish an ISA
that was a profound example of cinematic ingenuity set against the backdrop of
National Socialist propaganda. Hitler delegated Josef Goebbels with the job of
ensuring that the films produced would serve in the interests of the Third Reich. As a
result, the RSA of the Ministry for Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda was
established. It’s with the aim to root all ISA regarding art in “the soil of National
Socialism” (Leiser, p.11). Like Kim Jong-Il, Josef Goebbels was a film enthusiast.
Goebbels openly praised the effect certain films had, despite their contradictory
nature to the Nazi movement. He felt that the Third Reich cinema could learn from
Eisenstein’s Battleship Potemkin (1925), a film that features the glorification of a
mutiny on a ship by crew against the Tsar’s officers. It was this re-writing of history
that Goebbels wished to transfer to his industry, not necessarily the ideology. He
praised the film for its aesthetic qualities and effective narrative in communicating its
message, even though the message was ‘flawed’ (Leiser, p.10). Like Franco,
Goebbels understood the danger of praising the mutiny of a sub-ordinated class
against the ruling class. Goebbels however, being more culturally aware than most

14

despotic leaders, could therefore not resist praising the film’s aesthetics.6
. The
fundamental aim for Goebbels’ film industry ISA was to create the culture of National
Socialism with films depicting historical events that complimented the Nazi cause as
well as providing a shining example of the perfect citizen that the individual, should
he/she wish to be happy, should emulate.
What Goebbels achieved that Kim Jong-Il didn’t, was a policy of subtle-yet-effective
propaganda films for the benefit of the viewer. Goebbels understood the need for
escapism when it came to film whereas the DPRK essentially turned propaganda
performance into an everyday reality which explains how the isolated state still exists
today with little to no dissent from its citizens. Kim Jong-Il’s only concern regarding
quality Cinema was international recognition. The waking life of all North Korean
citizens is, in a sense, a performance. One need only look to YouTube for the
mourners at Kim Jong-Il’s funeral to fully comprehend the enthusiasm and conviction
the public had when displaying their grief. An act that is reminiscent of professional
mourners for ancient Roman funerals. Ironically, this would have been a state of
slavish existence that Goebbels could only have dreamed for the Third Reich.
Goebbels felt that it was important for the ISA of films to not be explicit in their
propaganda message. He saw the newsreel as more appropriate medium to perpetuate
the ‘Lie Direct’, as Hitler called it (Welch, p.36-37). As a result of such subtle
propagandistic measures, there was an inherent uncertainty in the mind of the Allies
as to what was dangerously propagandistic and what wasn’t. German filmmaker

6
Indeed when asked to name the best of German cinema, Goebbels referenced the
film Blue Angel (1930) which, as Leiser writes, is a film that “predates the Nazi
Seizure of power and which contradicts both the ideology and racial laws of the Third
Reich”.

15

Arthur Rabenalt said that no matter how non-political you intended a film to be, the
film would be judged against a political milieu. He uses his own film Reitet für
Deutschland (1941) as an example (or defence, depending on how you look at it) of a
film with no political message being blacklisted by the Allies because it was a
successful film from the Third Reich7
. The Third Reich made a number of films that
were, in essence, propagandistic but not directly political. Out of 1,097 films made,
96 were of direct political content, or the ‘Lie Direct’ as Hitler referred it to.
Especially as the war dragged on, there was an even greater need for and output of
these so-called ‘escapist films’ for the audience to bask in. It was important that the
viewer could not be bombarded with overtly political content as Goebbels wrote in his
diaries: “Even entertainment can be politically of special value, because the moment a
person is conscious of propaganda, propaganda becomes ineffective” (Welch, p.38).
It was not unusual for these regimes to hijack another State’s history. A good example
is the film Mein Leben für Irland or My Life For Ireland (1941). The plot centres on
Ireland’s struggle against British Imperialism, thus bringing Ireland into the fold as a
symbolic ally to the Third Reich. This film is set between 1903-1921 in British
occupied Ireland. It follows the lives of young Irish schoolboys attending a British run
school. Together with fugitive rebels, they plan an uprising against their British
invaders. The film references British colonialism (some of the main British characters
were stationed in India) and depicts individual British oppression towards Irish
citizens (frequent depictions of British soldiers abusing civilians as well as elitist

7
Despite Rabenalt’s claims that his film was about a tournament rider and had no
political intentions it “assumed political proportions simply because of its success in
neutral and occupied countries as well as home…was awarded the ‘politically
distinguished category, was counted…among the most notorious Nazi films on the
blacklist” (Leiser; 1968;p.17).

16

academics claiming to be elevating the Irish people from that of the barbarians). It is a
film that manipulates Ireland’s struggle for independence in order to demonise
Germany’s enemies of World War Two8
. It is also a critique of what the Third Reich
would have considered a hypocritical British condemnation of ‘Lebensraum’ giving
their colonial track record. One cannot ignore the blatant parallels between the British
ruling in the film depicted and that of the Nazi Party in reality. Scenes that depict
trials without defence, book burnings, house raids and brutality towards citizens were
to convey the mercilessness and inhumanity of the British Empire. It is darkly ironic
that all of those characteristics were a matter of policy for the Nazi Party. What’s
more is that the actors playing the British (as well as the Irish) were German and
spoke German so one cannot help but make a subconscious reference towards the
Nazi Party however temporary.
The Soviet Union under Stalin was particularly active with re-writing history. Under
his rule, there were an abundance of biopics made about Russian historical figures to
promote the Soviet agenda. Stalin was less of an active participant and more of a test
audience for the filmmaker whereupon he could approve or disapprove a film9
. The
biopic was a fail-safe for many filmmakers as they would make films about renowned
Russian composers, authors etc. that would most definitely be approved by the state.
As it was, such nationalist films were never a strict policy per se but more of a
sycophantic tactic by filmmakers to the ruling powers (Belodubrovskaya, p.36-40).
Where Stalin profoundly took it upon himself to rewrite history was with Eisenstein’s
second ‘Ivan the Terrible’ film that chronicled the ‘Great Terror’. Aside from the

8
9
Despite official reports, Stalin only read 21 screenplays out of 560 that would have
been submitted to him. Even when reading them, he wrote comments on 11 out of that
21

17

character’s beard being too long and excessively kissing his wife, Stalin told
Eisenstein that “Tsar Ivan was a wise and a great ruler” and that the second film
dramatized his exploits in a less than favourable manner contrary to Stalin’s agenda
with this biopic (Maryamov, p.84-91). Here we see how powerful the medium of film
can be to dictators, if it can be utilised to improve the image of someone like Ivan the
Terrible.
Stalin, like the others dictators, disliked any influence of American culture. He had
such disdain for the ideology of the Cowboy Film, an ideology that typically glorified
the lone individual in lawless frontier. Such an ideology contradicts the Communist
ideology of happiness, a concept that George Orwell dismissed and rephrased as
“human brotherhood” i.e. glory of the collective that rally for a common cause
(Parker, p.208). In fact, Stalin reportedly wanted have John Wayne assassinated due
to his anti-Communist stance “Assassins were supposedly sent to LA but failed to kill
Wayne before Stalin's death. When Khrushchev met "Duke" in 1958, he told him
"that was the decision of Stalin in his last mad years. I rescinded the order."
(Montefiore, np). Regardless of the validity of the claim, it goes to show that Stalin
was reputed to have a high regard for the effectiveness regarding the ISA of film.
Furthermore, if someone like John Wayne, who was the poster-boy for the Western
genre, represent a film character he disliked; that person may as well be a threat to
him.
Stalin’s reshaping of history was due to a policy called the ‘friendship of the people’.
This was a policy that sought to unite all the peripheral nationalities to the Soviet
Union (Belodubrovskaya, p.37). Like Stalin, Kim Jong-Il wished to re-conceptualise

18

the history of his state. Such films like Pyongyang Nalpharam (2006) in particular,
glorify the capital Pyongyang as the epicentre of all Korean life to which all Koreans
should consider their Mecca. This policy was very important to Kim Jong-Il to create
an illustrious history for a relatively young state. In the DPRK, there exists a large
volume of films that glorify the past of North Korea. Films like Flower Girl (1972)
exalt the spirit of the North Korean people under Japanese imperialism. Stalin said
that “Writers are the engineers of the soul”, this was to be revised in the DPRK with:
“Performers are the trainers of political correctness” (Suk, p.51).
Mao also attempted a similar policy with his ISAs. In his case, it was to unite Han
and Non-Han people under the socialist cause. The Cinema of the 50s and 60s in
China contained un-ambiguous characters and events to ensure all received the
message i.e. the superiority of the Hans over the Non-Hans. In practice, this
conditioned the stereotype that non-Han people were primitive in the face of those
who belonged to the Han group. This fostered, as Dru Gladney stated, a sense of
“internal colonialism”. The portrayal of non-Han people as primitive and weak
reinforces the superiority of the Han group. In films like The Caravan (1954), the
depiction of non-Han, singing and dancing peasants in the face of the military Han
soldiers sent to protect their village from outside invaders re-enforces the notion that
one class of people is dependent on the other. This is not an attempt to demonise the
non-Hans, rather them ‘understanding their place’. (Frangville, p. 62-64). Such
parallels can be drawn between the Han people and the North Koreans of the DPRK.
However, in the People’s Republic of China, it was a case of it being one nationality
but different ethnicities that determined superiority reinforced by film. In the DPRK it
is a matter of the same ethnicity (Korean) yet different nationalities (North vs. South)

19

that determine superiority in film. This was a philosophy that was directly
contradicted by Kim Jong-Il with his endorsement of Shin Sang-Ok, which I will
elaborate on in Chapter III
Chinese and Soviet approaches to the ISAs of art and propaganda remain the main
influences for the DPRK (Portal, p.8). Mussolini and Franco’s policies can be
considered too open and compromising for Kim Jong-Il. One element of Goebbels’
policy that Kim Jong-Il eventually adhered to was the idea of subtly portraying
propaganda behind a film that the audience would find entertaining. This is
exemplified with Pulgasari (1985) and Hong Gil Dong (1986), which I will focus on
in Chapter III. Kim Jong-Il came to power during a time when similar political
systems were collapsing all around him, particularly after the fall of the Berlin Wall.
Balina and Dobrenko attribute the downfall of these regimes, in part, to the fact that
the regimes’ “desire to present ideologically acceptable models to the individual for
the realisation of each person’s inherent yearning for happiness; this yearning always
begets discontent, dooming the Totalitarian Regime to ultimate defeat” (Balina &
Dobrenko, p. XXIV). ISAs are made up of people at the end of the day and it requires
the ruling powers to take a consistently active role with ISAs to ensure passive
obedience by the citizens. Should there be ‘dissent’, the RSA steps in to supress it on
behalf of the ruling powers. Citizens are to be “happy and grateful” as Balina and
Dobrenko put it, “but not carefree” (XXI). There is no better example than the DPRK
for this statement.
In Kim Jong-Il’s case, he inherited a state that was already out of date whose citizens
that were out of synch with the world around them, despite being a man who was well

20

aware of the world around him. To acknowledge this, would make him party to his
downfall. To continue his father’s State, he must continue to shape its reality and
there was no better tool than cinema to wield such an existence. Balina and
Dobrenko’s comments may be known to the Dear Leader which can explain why the
DPRK is as isolated and repressive as it is, even to this day. This State sees itself as a
so-called ‘Socialist Utopia’. It may fall one day but for now it exists with little to no
dissent from its citizens. To counter the ‘Socialist Utopia’ point, I refer to yet another
comment by Balina and Dobrenko, “A utopia has no place in reality” (XXI). Reality
is what one does not think of regarding the state of life in North Korea. Negation of
‘reality’ is precisely its mandate when it comes to the governing of its citizens. In the
next chapter, I will analyse the methods put in place to ensure such obedience from its
citizens: rigid and thorough monopolization of art unseen in previous autocracies.

THESIS: CHAPTER II: The Cinema of Kim Jong-Il
“The North Korean State was founded in 1950/51, that was the year that 1984 was
published for the first time. You would think: could it be that someone handed a
Korean translation of that to Kim Il-Sung and said ‘Do you think we could make this
fly?’”- Christopher Hitchens, 2009
The utilisation of Ideological State Apparatuses by previous ruling powers constituted
the foundation of a future ruling power’s policies. In this case it is the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) under the late Kim Jong-Il or, as he’s referred to
in North Korea, The Dear Leader10
. In the DPRK, there is no foreign influence

10
Throughout this paper, I will use ‘Kim Jong-Il’ and ‘The Dear Leader’
interchangeably as one is his name and the other his title. It is a title in the same vein
as ‘Il Duce’ for Mussolini and ‘Der Fürher’ for Hitler.

21

evident in its film industry’s ISA, for better or worse. Indeed, there is little evidence
of any outside influence in the State as a whole. When I say ‘for better or worse’, I
make the case that Totalitarianism is at its fullest potential and in its purest form in
the DPRK. However, this form of Totalitarianism renders the DPRK a society that
exists more as a representation of an ideal State rather than a practical one. Since the
foundation of the DPRK in 194811
, the Kim dynasty made it their responsibility to
engulf their citizens in a hybrid existence of waking life and a dream world. This
‘dream world’ is best exemplified by Suk Young-Kim who wrote, “North Korea is a
theatrical state par excellence precisely because it forces a utopian illusion to mandate
conditions of real life” (14). This phenomenon was unseen from the ruling powers of
Chapter I. The DPRK applied a policy of stringent isolation of the State from the
outside world coupled with careful and rigorous control to what citizens are exposed
under the policy Juche. Suk Young Kim wrote that North Korean culture was an
invented tradition formed over a short period influenced by the Soviet Union.
However, the Kim cult went way beyond Stalinism or Maoism (134-135).
Specifically, this cult was further conditioned by the meticulous deployment and
patronage of artistic expression, rendering it a tool that deceived the viewer into
thinking it represented a ‘reality’. In this chapter I will analyse how this monopoly of
artistic expression can be recognized in the DPRK and furthermore, how it was
utilized to foster a degree of power over the individuals’ perspective as well as
conditioning the individuals’ sense of purpose to ultimately control their happiness.
Once again the tactics of rewriting history and the notion of happiness will play a role
when discussing the concept of Propaganda Cinema. Charles Murray gave a general

11
Hitchens’ dates refer to when the Korean War started rather the official creation of
the DPRK. The logic behind his analogy is still relevant, however.

22

definition of what he believes to be the popular perception of happiness, which is “a
lasting and justified satisfaction with one’s life as a whole” (Murray, p.239). Such a
broad definition is useful in this case as we are dealing with the concept of fulfilling
one’s potential as the key to happiness. In this case, it is the happiness of the DPRK
citizens due to the absence of an alternative. The State under Kim Jong-Il maintained
this power over the individuals’ sense of satisfaction via the production of film.
The overall concept of a North Korean citizen is so extraordinary in terms of their
conscious everyday obligation to show their praise of the Kim family. This set of
circumstances for citizens in a contemporary State is so astonishing, that Suk Young
Kim wrote that to be a citizen of the DPRK is to be a part of a permanent performance
as one is expected to emulate what is on-screen, all in the name of Juche. In her book
Illusive Utopia, she suggests that the intense application of State propaganda at the
expense of the citizen’s well being (such as the individual having no other role other
than playing a role for the benefit of the Kim regime) as well as the absence of any
source of information12
not approved by the State leaves the citizens in a bizarre
existence that oscillates between reality and fiction. She further states, in another
book on the matter entitled, U.S and R.O.K Policy Options that otherwise, “to watch,
to be watched, to make a presentable showcase through editing all represent major
principles of the North Korean way of life” (200).

12
What is considered by some to be basic knowledge is not afforded to citizens of the
DPRK by the State. In a BBC Documentary, Educating North Korea, we learn that an
elite group of Pyongyang students did not know who Michael Jackson was. One
student even suggested that he was the Prime Minister of the U.K.

23

George Orwell wrote that “Utopia means, merely, a ‘non-existent place’…utopias
seem to postulate perfection while being unable to suggest happiness” (Parker, p.203-
204). The State of North Korea encapsulates this statement profoundly. Reading her
work, one can’t help but feel that Pyongyang itself is like a film set. Pyongyang
as a
city is said to function as nothing more than a showcase city of a Socialist utopia
rather than one that caters for the day-to-day lives of its citizens. This is elaborated
with the fact that “images of immediately recognizable stage and film characters from
propaganda performances saturated the city, becoming an integral part of the
cityscape” (Suk, p.99). Her book is an interesting take on North Korean existence and
will serve as a point of reference throughout this chapter. Regarding images of film
characters “saturating the city”; the qualities of the protagonist in Flower Girl (1972)
were expressed with the intention of the viewer emulating it in one form or another,
resulting the aforementioned no-man’s-land between reality and fiction. In ‘Illusive
Utopia’, Kim writes, “Leading stars such as Hong Yeong-hui were known by their
character’s name (Kkot-bun in the film Flower Girl)” (Kim, p.51). Such an insistence
that the character be more noteworthy than the actor signifies the impact and power
that film is allowed to have in the DPRK, as well as the philosophy that no citizen
should achieve any fame. Yet, the characters they are associated with are often
immortalized in painting and murals that portray the actor’s likeness. Once again, this
is a bizarre bi-play of individualization and totalization. The attributes of Kkot-bun
were considered so iconic that the character, not the actress mind, featured on a North
Korean banknote (Kim, p.51). It would certainly appear that what her character
represented a standard for what is means to be citizen and how one should behave to
show gratitude for the State.

24

To fully understand the means in which ISA of film can be utilized as to exert power,
I will discuss how the film industry in the DPRK constitutes a power relationship
between the ruling powers and its citizens. For this analogy, I am drawing on Michel
Foucault’s piece in Critical Inquiry about power relationships. Applying Foucault’s
conceptionalization of how power can come to be exercised is a useful backdrop to
recognise how the DPRK’s ISA of the film industry constitute a power relationship on
behalf of the ruling powers to its citizens. In Chapter I, I discussed how the ruling
powers of Totalitarian States use ISAs to their benefit. These ISAs are made up of
citizens, and are kept in check with the presence of an effective RSA. Now, I will be
discussing the specific functions that ISAs serve for the ruling powers to guarantee
domination of the lower class. A key form of power that Foucault writes about that is
‘Pastoral Power’ which is “a form of power whose ultimate aim is to assure individual
salvation in the next world” (782). This is central to our understanding of the power
of the Kim clan. Originally, pastoral power was expressed through the institution of
religion e.g. the Catholic Church, which would offer the individual salvation in the
so-called ‘afterlife’. Nowadays, such salvation is offered to the individual in his/her
waking life. In the case of the DPRK, the State assumes a paternal role offering the
individual a sense of well being (784) e.g. protection from foreign invaders, a sense of
purpose, food, clothing etc.13
. This pastoral power is represented by both the
theoretical notion of the State and the physical embodiment of a paternal figure(s) i.e.
the Kim family and in this case: Kim Jong-Il.

13
All of which are provided at a very minimal level. It is no secret that the citizens of
North Korea are denied a substantial amount of food which critics attribute to
government mismanagement. This has rendered them six inches smaller than their
neighbours in the south. Christopher Hitchens remarked that is a unique slave system
as normally slaves are guaranteed food in return for their servitude. This is not the
case in North Korea as exemplified with a famine that saw the death of over three
million people.

25

Foucault also writes that the struggle of power relations today exist in a “ political
‘double-bind’, which is the simultaneous individualization and totalization of modern
power structures” (785). The DPRK, in this case, is founded on distinguishing its the
State and its citizens as individuals from the outside world and yet the citizens must
adhere to the totalizing power of the State. This double bind explains why it is vital
for Kim Jong-Il that his citizens see themselves as no more than pawns for the State’s
ideology. In Foucault’s article, he writes of a number of ways to analyse the system of
power relations in institutions. I will now apply these systems to how the film
industry ISA is structured. One system is that of differentiation which “permits one to
act upon the actions of others: differentiations determined by the law or by traditions
of privilege and status…(and) the types of objectives pursued by those who act upon
actions of others: the maintenance of privileges” (792). Kim Jong-Il’s status as ruler
of the people was established before he even came to power. The DPRK is a
hereditary state that mirrors that of a monarchy14
. Therefore, if one is not a member of
the Kim family there is no chance of elevating oneself to the privileged status that
they enjoy. Kim Jong-Il’s Father and predecessor, Kim Il-Sung, fought in the Korean
War and was credited by the Soviets and by Korean guerrillas as the main Korean
leader of the resistance. He was therefore, able to sustain credibility as a somewhat
skilled military strategist and a man whose exploits could be identified easily by the
public.
It was important that Kim Jong-Il belonged in a league of his own for this system of
differentiation. How could he then, distinguish his personality cult from that of his

14
Which is ironic considering the regime’s propaganda that denounces the former
feudal system in Korea.

26

father’s? Jane Portal wrote that the significant difference between the two was due to
“the emphasis that Kim Jong-Il placed on culture, particularly the cinema and
performing arts…these areas represented his personal enthusiasms” (103). By
contrast, according to Charles Armstrong, Kim Il-Sung and his guerrilla fighters were
“the least educated of the communist ‘factions’ and the least involved in cultural
affairs [emphasis added]” (171). Therefore the acknowledgment of Kim Jong-Il’s
cultural pallet elevates him to a level from where his Father could not surpass him, let
along the citizens of the DPRK. The next analysis Foucault makes is “the means of
bringing power relations into being according to whether power is exercised by more
or less complex means of control” (792). This is where the formation of the
personality cult comes into play. The question then became, how can Kim Jong-Il
utilize his passion for Cinema to emulate what his father had, being the overwhelming
control over the hearts and minds of the DPRK citizens? To do so, Kim Jong-Il had to
ensure a particular status quo: he who controls cinema, controls reality. It was very
important, therefore, that Kim Jong-Il was perceived and promoted as the film critic.
This can be read as a result of his genuine love of film and his desire to be respected
as an expert as such. It can also be read as yet another method to elevate a dictator
into a heightened class of culture. It successfully became a reality because, as I said in
Chapter I, The Dear Leader was the only one who had exclusive access to
international films. Therefore it was a difficult for any filmmaker to surpass Kim
Jong-Il’s knowledge of film (Suk, p.198). As Suk Young Kim writes, “The inquiry
into how and why propaganda works as a tool of manipulation and persuasion is a
revelatory process through which the inner workings of North Korean society and
culture loom from behind the façade” (12). The ‘inner workings’ in this case is Kim
Jong-Il. “Film, in this sense, is not only an object of Kim Jong-Il’s personal interest

27

but also a highly effective apparatus to increase incrementally Kim’s political capital”
(203).
Such an aptitude of film critique was propagated to have been noticeable in Kim
Jong-Il from the early age of seven. In Johannes Schönherr’s book, Cinema in North
Korea, he emphasizes how The Dear Leader expressed his personal interest of
appearing well versed in this art by distributing a leaflet at the seventh Pyongyang
Film Festival to foreigners entitled Great Man and Cinema. The leaflet ‘documents’
an event where a seven-year-old Kim paid a visit to the set of the DPRK’s first feature
film, My Home Village (1949), and pointed out an inconsistency, much to the
embarrassment of the film studio official. This inconsistency in question was the
absence of snow on the head and shoulders of the actors during a scene in heavy snow
(np). Schönherr writes, “While it might be doubtful if this particular anecdote is true,
young Kim did indeed have an eye for cinema…” Indeed, it is irrelevant whether this
story is true or not. What matters is that the regime presented it as fact. The agenda of
this pamphlet was to highlight the Dear Leader’s prowess for film deduction was
therefore a very strategic move on behalf of Kim Jong-Il for his personality cult that
was needed when he took over, officially, from his Father in 1994. The title itself is
very telling: ‘Great Man in Cinema’. Such a declaration suggests that cinema is an
arena that has the potential to create a ‘great man’, alternatively it could mean that a
‘great man’ i.e. Kim Jong-Il is very much a part of the world of cinema and such a
world should acknowledge it.
Foucault’s next point is the analysis of forms of institutionalization and the degrees of
rationalization. He writes, “these may mix traditional pre-dispositions relating to

28

custom (in this case it is the already established institution of cinema)…and the
bringing into play of power relations as action in a field of possibilities…in
proportion to the possible cost” (792). Stephen Chung made an interesting point that
when he wrote, “As recently as the 1990s, North Koreans were likely to be watching
more films than any other people in the world” (np). What this reveals is that the
people of the DPRK were heavily exposed to films that were produced by the
DPRK’s film industry ISA (the pre-disposition) under Kim Jong-Il. These films were
not only intended to ‘educate’ the viewer into accepting whatever ideology the
narrative serves but to understand that what was onscreen was superior to what was
off-screen and that one should strive to practice the ideology of the film in everyday
life.
The virtues that I will discuss with these films are in adherence to the ‘Juche’
philosophy: reverence for the Kim clan by means of constant gratitude for all that is
considered ‘positive’ in one’s life, a strong work ethic that consisted mainly manual
labour in agricultural, construction and overall maintenance of state produced
architecture as per the state’s demand. There also had to be a distrust to all those who
are not citizens of the DPRK. Citizens had to be educated but educated within the
state’s acceptable parameters. There is an emphasis on all the citizens to skilled
labourers but their education consists of what is approved by the state in conjunction
with their policy of preventing any material that conveys a positive perspective on an
alternative ideology to their own. There had to be a Confucian sense of family, which
is a culture of family hierarchy with the elder males at the top down to the younger
females. One must never question the values of the State but the most important virtue
of all is the willing to sacrifice oneself for the state. Chung summed up Juche policy

29

in film as thus, “Juche in film was a political and heuristic apparatus that disciplined
North Korean films by radically narrowing the narrative and stylistic range through
which the predominant enlightenment modality could be realised” (np).
The film Flower Girl takes place in the 1930’s when Korea was ruled by Japan. The
viewer is exposed to a peasant girl, Kkot Bun, who sells flowers to buy medicine for
her ailing mother as she is a dutiful daughter that does not forget her place even in the
face of adversary i.e. foreign (Japanese) oppression. The fact that she is a peasant girl
fits into the DPRK’s glorification of the peasant class, a class that the ruling powers
wished to learn from intellectuals and vice versa. It was indeed this peasant class that
was the only class loyal Koreans could belong to during Japanese occupation whereas
the ‘traitorous’ Koreans were landlords for the Japanese. The predicaments Kkot Bun
faces can be traced it from the hardship she faces, the effect, to the wider problem of
being victim to colonization, the cause. Kkot Bun’s mother is ill and is not receiving
proper care as she continues to do manual labour, as she inherited her deceased
husband’s debt to their Korean landlord. The landlord Pae and his wife only exist in
the narrative to distribute acts of cruelty and humiliation to those in their employment
through verbal and physical abuse. As they are landlords in a Japanese occupied
country, their loyalty is to their superiors whom reap the rewards of Korean resources:
the Japanese Empire. Socialist Confucianism and Korean nationalism are two social
polices to be lauded and Kim Jong-Il expressed this through films produced under his
regime. As Kkot Bun’s father is dead, the only one to take his place as the stable force
of the family is her brother thus following the patrilineal Confucian ideology of
family. However, we learn that he is imprisoned and therefore the family unit is
weakened even further.

30

Her brother, Chol Ryong is imprisoned for taking setting fire to the landlord’s house
in retaliation for the abuse his sisters have suffered leaving his and Kkot Bun’s
youngest sibling blind. He is subsequently sent to a labour camp as a punishment15
for
standing up to oppressive, elitist forces that are in place because of the Japanese
Empire. The debt is down to the sick mother to burden as she slaves away grinding
rice grain for excessive banquets the landlord hosts. Once their mother dies, their
security as a stable family, which is key in Korean society, is jeopardized as is
expressed by the protagonist when she cries over her mother’s corpse, “Without father
and brother, we only relied on you”. Faced with this helpless situation, Kkot Bun sets
off to find the only living patriarchal member of the family in the hopes that her
brother can restore order to the family unit. Such a venture behoves the young girl, as
she knows that restoring the Confucian patrilineal element of the family is her only
hope. Indeed, in the DPRK, women are situated in a lower social category than men,
hence why there has been no female leader in any faction.16
However, he is nowhere
to be found as we later learn that he has joined the resistance movement against the
Japanese, a movement that Kim Il-Sung is credited for starting.
The films released for the North Koreans represent in some ways their development,
not only as viewers but also as performers for the State and vessels to suck in
propaganda. Pushing the self-sacrifice virtue as one that all citizens should aspire to,
once their lives becomes less important to them than the well being of the State, is

15
A punishment that the film depicts as barbaric which is darkly ironic given the
latest U.N report into the human rights violations by the regime through the use of
concentration camps.
16
There are some reports that claim women are not allowed ride bicycles.

31

when profound loyalty is guaranteed. Thus the exercising of is power, in Foucault’s
terms, is by controlling how an individual that is capable of acting, acts. These ‘acts’
should correspond to what citizens consider virtues. The individual must be prepared
to show gratitude to the State in the form of self-sacrifice, grateful and happy citizens
but not carefree as stated in Chapter I. If you are indebted to the State for your well
being then your life is less important to you than the State and therefore it is the
State’s well being that matters. This is the theme of Wolmi Island (1982). This is an
‘historical’ war film depicting the events of September 1950 when the American
forces took over the island of Wolmi of the coast of Korea in one morning, landing on
the Incheon coast, pushing back Kim Il-Sung’s army significantly. The film is an
historical rewrite of events to depict the defeat as one of a noble bravery by so few
against so many. The death of the soldiers defending the island is portrayed as a noble
self-sacrificing effort to ward off the Americans taking the coast just a bit longer so
that the Korean forces can regroup. One line of dialogue that was spoken by one
soldier to another to in the film is a perfect example of the how the regime wishes the
viewer to understand the events “Every hour you win here will rescue tens of
thousands saves tens of thousands of our soldiers on the Rakdong River Front”. The
strategy of ordering a small battalion on an island to hold off an army that outnumbers
them greatly not only seems like a reckless move but one that cannot be well received
by experienced military personnel. Yet, the film’s characters understand the duty of
their sacrifice for the greater good when they reflect what Korea was before Kim Il
Sung liberated it: “Was it (our ancestors land) of any significance before the General
liberated our country…What does our Motherland mean? It means precisely our
General”. This is a film, as Schönherr writes, that “hammered home the usual points

32

about reverence for the Leader, love for the Motherland and self-sacrifice as a noble
concept of life” (np).
On the other end of the spectrum, what the DPRK calls antagonists represent all that
North Koreans should despise and use as the foundation on what to value.
Antagonists in this case are categorized according to race and politics. Antagonists
range from the general such as feudalism and a ‘foreign’ threat to the specific such as
Japanese colonialists and American imperialists. The above mentioned are frequently
the subject of disdain in Korean films. On Chol Yong’s arrival back to the village, he
leads the villagers in a successful uprising against the ruling landlord class of the
village. When Sister and Brother are reunited in the end, Chol Yong delivers the most
profound line of the film that adheres to North Korean propaganda; “You don’t know
why were living in bitter tears. It’s because we lost our country and the Japs, landlord
Pae and other thugs are giving Koreans a hard time. This is the tragedy of the stateless
nation”. This lament was written to a be as a chronological segue for what was to
come next, the liberation of Korea by Kim Il-Sung which, once again, reinforces this
pastoral power relation that offers salvation to the individual. It was very common for
in North Korean films, set before 1945, to have un-climatic endings for the
protagonists. The films are therefore calling for a saviour who is yet to come that can
achieve what they cannot: liberation for the Korean lower classes from the oppression
of the ruling classes.

33

“Film must be realistic” proclaimed Kim Jong-Il (Schönherr, np)17
and each of these
films acts as an informal social and historical lesson for viewers about what it means
to be a North Korean i.e. what is the history of their state, what their State should
mean to them, who are the enemies of the State and what they should do in the name
of the State. In practice: The state of the DPRK is the creation and gift that Kim Il-
Sung bestowed to its citizens. It is not relevant as to what degree the citizens of the
DPRK believe what they are fed, what matters is how the regime exhibits its agenda
of what their citizens should consider happiness. Touching on Murray’s point again
when he wrote that it is related to a justified satisfaction with your life. This
satisfaction can be construed as fulfilling one’s potential, which in the DPRK means
to live your life in gratitude to the Kim clan and be prepared to sacrifice yourself. I
argue that the Kim dynasty took that into account when they produced films ensuring
that their narratives contained ‘relatable’ characters whose motivation/happiness is in
tune with the Juche ideology. Such glorification for these fictional characters creates,
as Suk writes “a seamless continuum between the illusory world of theater and the
real world of everyday life, especially in the way in which these fictional characters
are presented as exemplary models of “non-fictional” North Korean revolutionary
history” (99).
I used the phrase ‘for better or worse’ at the beginning of this chapter when describing
the effectiveness of totalitarianism in the DPRK. The Kim Dynasty has achieved
almost unprecedented total control in contemporary times over its citizens with
successful power relations afforded to the ISA. There is, however, always a downside
that is can be recognized even by the ruling powers. Kim Jong-Il may have enjoyed

17
Realistic according to the Juche philosophy

34

carte blanche power of his citizens through his film industry but it clashed with his
real passion: to create a respectable film industry that could be recognised as such
abroad. This could not be achieved within the strict parameters of State control, as
there was virtually no room for artistic innovation. The Dear Leader therefore looked
elsewhere which resulted in the kidnapping of an acclaimed South Korean filmmaker.
Therein lies the suggestion that the ideology of Juche may be good enough for his
citizens in his mind but it isn’t enough to satisfy its perpetrator. As George Orwell
noted, “Whoever tries to imagine perfection, simply reveals his own emptiness”
(Parker, 209).
Chapter Three: Shin Sang Ok and his North Korean Legacy
“In socialist society the director is an independent and creative artist who is
responsible to the Party and the people for the cinema…the commander, the chief
who assumes full responsibility for everything ranging from the film itself to the
political and ideological life of those who take part in film-making”- Kim Jong-Il, On
the Art of Cinema, 1989.
1978 saw the beginning of a new wave in North Korean cinema. Specifically, it saw a
different and more sophisticated approach by the State in regards to propaganda. Kim
Jong-Il’s father had not yet died and was therefore still the official Head of State. The
Dear Leader, therefore, was in the process of cultivating his image to that of an
aficionado of arts. 1978 revealed his new plans for his film industry, new plans that
were embodied by a ‘foreign’ influence. This foreign influence was the presence of
the South Korean filmmaker Shin Sang-Ok and his wife, Choi Eun-Hee. Shin was a

35

famous filmmaker in the ROK that worked his way up from an assistant production
designer to owning his own studio, Shin Studios, before it was shut down. He met
Choi on the set of his film, The Evil Night (1952) in which she had a minor role
(Schönherr, np). Before I continue, it must be said that there are two versions of
events behind the couple’s arrival in North Korea, both version are not without their
sceptics. They claim that were lured and kidnapped in Hong Kong whereas the DPRK
claim that they arrived by their own free will. There are plausible arguments for both
versions of events but the purpose of this chapter is not to confirm or deny either one.
While one may wonder why Shin Sang-Ok would willingly defect to the DPRK, one
must consider the fact that his production company in South Korea went bankrupt.
Not to mention that he was locked in a bitter dispute with the President of the ROK,
Park Chung Hee over the content of Rose and Wild Dog (1975). The fact of the matter
is that this celebrity film couple lived in the DPRK for eight years and were
responsible for the production of over twenty films seven of which Shin directed with
some featuring Choi.
All of this came to end in 1986, when Shin and Choi went with their DPRK minders
to Vienna to acquire funding for a future production. They subsequently gave their
minders the slip and sought amnesty from the American Embassy. Their reasons for
doing so were for them to flee their abductors. The DPRK’s version was that Shin and
his planned to escape with government money that was to go towards the DPRK’s
film budget18
. Regardless of the version events, Shin’s presence in the DPRK was
significant in the development of its film industry and for what one can accomplish
under such tight restrictions. Shin’s presence’s and influence over the film industry

18

This claim could have merit. Kim Jong-Il had offices set up for Shin in Austria
where some money would be wired.

36

exposes a rare example of favouritism by Kim Jong-Il towards someone not of the
ruling class, which in turn subtly reveals his acknowledgment of the limitations of his
film industry under ‘Juche’. The naming of a Studio after Shin and not a member of
the ruling class was another unprecedented move by Kim.
In this chapter I will draw on testimony regarding conversations Shin had with Kim
Jong-Il as detailed in his memoirs and stated in interviews. One of these conversations
can be heard via a tape recorder that Shin’s wife made of a conversation between the
couple and the Dear Leader whereupon he outlined his plans for Shin and Choi in his
film industry. The tapes have been played and translated by people like Suk Young
Kim who believe that the voice of Kim Jong-Il is indeed genuine. As stated
previously, I am not going to be weighing up the two sides of the argument regarding
Shin’s arrival to the DPRK. I will use such anecdotal evidence in this chapter
however, as it carries weight when I measure it against the films Shin produced in
North Korea and the legacy he left behind. What will be of concern in this chapter is
how Shin played a role under Kim Jong-Il to manipulate reality and to what effect? I
argue that Shin Sang-Ok was another specific product of Althusser’s Ideological State
Apparatus under two ruling powers (North and South Korea) both of which controlled
him with their Repressive State Apparatuses. Shin’s skills and efforts as a filmmaker
were exploited by the DPRK to produce films that conveyed a State approved
ideology. The didactic came first and the aesthetics second. What is significant about
Shin’s duties in North Korea is that it represents an emphasis in regard to the aesthetic
thus suggesting that the didactic need not be emphasized as much or progress any
further. Althusser makes the point in his book that for a successful revolution over
any ruling class to occur, it cannot be through either the Ideological or Repressive

37

State Apparatuses. The ruling class dominates such systems and there is “no
parliamentary road to socialism. Revolutions are made by the masses, not by
parliamentary deputies, even if the communists and their allies should fleetingly, by
some miracle, attain a majority in the parliament” (155).
What Shin was able to accomplish however, was giving the Ideological State
Apparatuses (in this case, cinema) new, sophisticated tools that elevated that allowed
the medium achieve a new level of expression. I argue that this expression is
represented by a level of subversion towards the ruling class that, on the grander
scheme of things, does not dismantle their power but is able to subvert the restrictions
placed on the medium of film thus allowing it to have a greater level of autonomy.
Although the film industry is an ISA of the ruling powers, Shin saw film the way
Vladimir Lenin saw the Trade Unions. Althusser writes that although Lenin saw the
Trade Unions as a product of the ruling classes, they could in turn be used as a school
for the proletariat. Rather than getting sucked into the State’s ideology, one must
make use of the political Ideological State Apparatus (153). In Shin’s case he is using
the film industry ISA. The DPRK exists to this day with little change in regards to
how the citizens are oppressed but Shin’s legacy is one that perhaps set a precedent
that allowed for a more sophisticated mode of expression in film. This expression is
still used by the State to perpetuate their ideology but perhaps the filmmakers
themselves will develop skills to include elements of resistance in propaganda films.
Shin’s films do allow for subversive interpretation and it is very possible that he was
not the only one who was ‘in on it’, so to speak.

38

In this paper, I have identified that there is a ruling class in North Korea (the Kim
Family and their associates) that is legitimized by the existence of the DPRK State
that in turn, maintains its status as the ruling class by exploiting those below them. As
Althusser writes, “The State is therefore…the Repressive State Apparatus and the
Ideological State Apparatuses. The unity of the State Apparatus and Ideological State
Apparatus is ensured by the class politics of those who hold State power” (Althusser;
2014p.185). As we have seen with the regimes mentioned in the first chapter, it is a
case of strategically manipulating an apparatus such as film to serve the interests of
the ruling class at the lower class’ expense. In Althusser’s book, he writes how ruling
class are adept at manoeuvring within its Ideological State Apparatus and this is
precisely what the DPRK attempted with Shin Sang-Ok (168). Kim Jong-Il intended
to change the direction of the film industry without directly violating the status quo
that he and his Father wished to maintain. As Suk Young Kim wrote in yet another
book on the matter entitled U.S and R.O.K Policy Options, Kim Jong-Il had to
“constantly mediate arts and politics without compromising either one” (203).
Without necessarily confirming Shin’s version of events, I will draw on his testimony
regarding Kim Jong-Il’s plans for cinema in the DPRK. At the end of the day, Shin
was in North Korea for eight years and both sides admit to being in each other’s
company significantly. Shin therefore had unprecedented access to Kim Jong-Il, for
an ‘outsider’. Shin’s crossing over to the North from the South signifies the
application of an Ideological State Apparatus from one ruling power to another. Shin
Sang-Ok was a prominent filmmaker in the South and was indeed a part of the
South’s Ideological State Apparatus on behalf of the ruling class of the ROK. Shin
was even commissioned to make a propaganda film for the (successful) re-election of

39

Rhee Syng-Man in 1959 entitled Rhee Syng-Man and the Independence Movement.
Subsequently, Rhee’s successor, Park Chung-Hee grew close to Shin before their
falling out, which I will mention later (Schönher, 2012, np). When reading about Shin
and the films he produced, it appears that he was an all rounder when it came to
genres as well as adapting very quickly to new technology. Schönherr wrote that Shin
worked in genres like the “historical epic…to gritty social realism, Shin left his mark
in all directions…stayed abreast with the developments in international cinema”.
However, Shin expressed his autonomy and his individualism with the displays of
eroticism in his films despite (or perhaps due to) Park’s censorship of what Schönherr
called “overt eroticism” (np).
It was not for the ‘eroticism’ per se that Kim Jong-Il wishes Shin to make films for
him but rather for his technical competence and understanding of cinema, as well as
his standing as a product of mainstream (South) Korean culture. Therein lies Shin’s
appeal to the Dear Leader as a filmmaker. Shin’s biographer Stephen Chung wrote,
“Shin was recruited by the North for his aptitude for bringing Korean cultural
sensibilities to film” (np). In Chung’s book, he conceptionalises this transition from
one State to another as an example of how similar art forms (in this case cinema) can
co-exist in cultures with opposing political beliefs (np). The principles of the
Ideological and State Apparatuses remain the same albeit approached in a different
with Shin. The appeal of Shin to the Dear Leader was not recognized in the same
capacity with his current stock of DPRK filmmakers. The recordings translated by
Suk Young-Kim, detail Kim Jong-Il’s opinion his film industry when Shin was living
there “We (the DPRK) have to know that we are lagging behind and make efforts to

40

raise a new generation of filmmakers” (20). Shin’s official task, as Schönherr put it,
was to not “make propaganda movies in the regular mole” (Schönherr; 2012, np).
What constitutes the DPRK’s regular mould? Kim Jong-Il defined it as thus, “The
North’s filmmakers are just doing perfunctory work. They don’t have any new
ideas…their works have the same expressions, redundancies, the same old plots…I
didn’t order them to portray that kind of thing.” (Goren Feld, article). This is an
interesting quote that reveals that: although Kim recognized that the content of his
films were becoming mundane, there was to be no admittance on his part of this
recognition to his subjects. Better to have an exceptional outsider brought in by the
wisdom of the Dear Leader to contribute to his Ideological State Apparatus rather
than improving it. It was also strategic of Kim Jong-Il to endorse a Korean to do so,
despite the fact that Shin was a citizen of the ROK. Suk Young- Kim wrote, “Kim
envisioned the couple functioning as a cultural buffer filtering and bringing in
Western cinema through the disguised forms of Korean ethnicity… This sentiment
implied Kim’s desire to improve (North) Korean film with the help of (South)
Koreans without any foreign cultural intervention; this aptly served the ideological
foundation of Juche” (206). I will now apply the most popular of Shin’s films from
North Korea (maybe even in his whole career due to its notoriety) as a testament to
his achievements. This film is called Pulgasari (1985) and is set during the Goryeo
Dynasty which was a Korean dynasty established in 918 by King Taejo. On the
surface, this film meets many of the conditions governing the content of cinema and
the arts in North Korea. Fundamentally, the didactic message of Pulgasari is another
condemnation of feudal Korea. This fits in with the DPRK’s narrative about how
destitute the country was before by Kim Il-Sung’s reforms. Shin met with the

41

approved requirements, hence the go-ahead for the production of the film and the
essential delight by Kim Jong-Il of what he saw when principle photography ended19
(Gorenfeld, article). What makes this film stand out, however, are the elements of
subversion by a product of the Ideological State Apparatus who has a history of
defying ruling powers and their Repressive State Apparatuses.
In the film, the tyrannical King decrees that the inhabitants of a small town use all the
metal at their disposal to be fashioned into weapons for the King’s army. They
protest, as they will be forsaking their farming and cooking utensils. When one of the
elder Blacksmiths resists the King’s orders, he is thrown in jail. Before dying in
prison, he moulds a figure from rice he is given by the guards. He refuses to eat due to
his hunger strike and instead creates the figure of a beast that, to the Blacksmith,
embodies what is just and righteous and what will overthrow tyranny. This spiritual
symbol is nicknamed ‘Pulgasari’. After his death, the Pulgasari figure comes into the
possession of his son (Takse) and his daughter (Ami). One day when Ami is sewing,
she pricks her finger and starts to bleed. Subsequently, the blood falls onto the
moulded figure and Pulgasari comes to life. He then lives day-to-day on a diet of
metal that allows for him to grow in size. Due to his physical presence and his diet of
metal (in this case weapons), he is used as a weapon by the peasants against the
Monarchy.
Once they successfully destroy all that exists of the Dynasty, Pulgasari looks

19
I say ‘principle photography’ because Shin defected before it could be finished. The
Dear Leader reportedly sent truckloads of pheasants, deer and wild geese to Shin
Studios for the crew to feast on.

42

elsewhere to satisfy his hunger i.e. the peasants iron supply. The peasants now realize
that they have literally created a monster. This leads Ami to sacrifice herself for the
good of the people, as it was her blood that brought Pulgasari to life. Shin here is
glorifying the notion of self-sacrifice, which we know the DPRK declares to be a
most noble virtue. In doing so, she hides inside a large copper bell and when Pulgasari
eats it; she pleads with him to disappear with her from the earth for the sake of the
farmers. This causes the beast to disintegrate into pieces with the Ami’s corpse lying
on top of them. What appears next is the infant version of Pulgasari appearing from
the pieces only to be subsumed into Ami’s corpse. The spirit of the revolt against
tyranny now rests with its creator. Where the film fundamentally differs from
previous DPRK films is with its protagonist: a monster. Suk wrote that, "the unusual
subject matter makes Pulgasari stand out from the rest of North Korean cinema and
even from Shin’s North Korean oeuvre, as there are no other films featuring similar
imaginary subject matter (39). Previous films centred on iconic legendary figures that
the viewer was supposed to emulate.
The transition from films being realistic to those that require a degree of
interpretation, suggests a somewhat growth from the DPRK citizens as film viewers.
Chung wrote, this film did not “diverge from his mandate to renovate the industry
toward greater global visibility and esteem” but he also wrote that it “was not
screened as resistance to mainstream political rhetoric” nor did it (np). This is true
that it was not screened as such but does it not have another effect? The parallels of
the Kim dynasty and that of Pulgasari are unavoidable. Pulgasari is a monster that eats
iron and therefore eats the weapons of the ruling powers that are exploiting the

43

citizens. Once the ruling class is destroyed, the monster continues to eat the peasants’
tools thus working against them for its own selfish reasons. In this case, Pulgasari
represents Kim Il-Sung and his forces when they fought against despotic Japanese
Imperialism. Upon overthrowing the forces that oppressed the Korean people, Kim Il-
Sung and his men took it upon themselves to subjugate those same citizens to install
themselves as the new ruling power, which is the status quo of the DPRK today: same
rule, different ruler. The difference with Pulgasari, is that the peasants managed to rid
themselves of this threatening force before it got out of hand. This can be interpreted
as Shin’s hindsight lament for the DPRK citizens or perhaps a call to arms.
Chung’s understanding of the potential subversive nature of the film can be defined
“as an attack of the ruling elite in North Korea, that is, a revolutionary force born of
the masses but becoming a cannibalistic and even suicidal exploitation of its labour,
livelihood and spirit”. He is also one of few scholars to not only compare Pulgasari to
the Godzilla franchise but to the Jewish ‘Golem’ folklore of which served a symbol of
Jewish resistance as well as being a lesson in hubris. One can say that that Shin
intended Pulgasari to be his symbolic ‘Golem’ represented by the film apparatus. In
this case Shin was to serve as propaganda messenger for the ruling powers through
‘quality’ filmmaking. This was achieved, however, Shin also used film as a tool to
subvert the oppressive powers that granted him the authority to make film. The
parallels between the DPRK and the tyrannical Kingdom are not too abstract. For
example, there is a scene where the King’s legions develop a medieval rocket to take
down Pulgasari, which can serve as a criticism of North Korea’s WMD capabilities.
Indeed Chung cites “the long wide shots of the tyrant’s palace, filmed at least partly
in the Forbidden City, and uncannily reminiscent of the monumental architecture of
contemporary Pyongyang” (np). This reading of the film can be applied to what

44

Pulgasari represents to Shin and to those that watch it. This subversion is only
strengthened by his departure before he even finished the film. Was this sudden
departure an opportunistic move or a strategic one? Shin may have left just before
making it in knowing that the ruling powers may comprehend the subversive message
he intended. He therefore left the film there to carry out its purpose while he defected
with his wife.
Pulgasari can be considered an attempt to deconstruct the personality cult of the Kim
family by emphasizing the danger of pledging faith and loyalty to a power that only
exists to destroy others. This, however, is conditional on the viewers interpreting that
from watching the film. Unfortunately, we will never know as this film was banned
for a period from being screened in the DPRK and the regime continued to exist
afterwards. Chung goes as far to suggest what whatever spectators saw it would “not
be duped by the duplicity of Shin’s works” (np). Indeed we can echo Althusser’s
sentiments that one cannot expect to overthrow the Repressive State Apparatus by
utilizing the Ideological State Apparatuses in place that already serve the state. This
subversion theory in Pulgasari is suggested and often de-constructed by scholars who
don’t believe Shin was that daring. Schönherr entertains such a theory but then
suggests what he says is a “more likely” scenario. He writes that North Korea has a
long history of showing failed medieval rebellions that “were doomed to fail because
they had no real leader-such a leader would only arrive with the appearance of Kim Il-
Sung. Seen from this point of view, the ending doesn’t appear so strange at all” (np).
I feel that Schönherr is setting the bar too high. He does not look at the bigger picture

45

with this film or give enough credit to Shin. Of course the film had to adhere to the
limits and regulations set out by the ruling powers if he wished to produce a film with
their support. However, this does not negate the possibility of subversive elements
being present in the film. Films prior to this did indeed contain quashed rebellions by
noble individuals seeking to liberate their fellow man from oppressive forces. The
films Flower Girl and Wolmi Island are good examples of this. Never before,
however, had there been a protagonist in North Korean film that turned on the people
he/she/it was helping to liberate. This is an important factor, however subtle the
details may be. The fact that a monster is the protagonist in the film not only bends
towards the Western blockbuster but it acts as an artistic vehicle that allows for
shrewd resistances come in under the radar. I argue that the conditions set by Kim
Jong-Il, although relatively looser for Shin, were more authoritarian than most and
were maintained by his firm Repressive State Apparatus (military, police,
concentration camps) on pain of imprisonment, exile or even death (sometimes whole
families of offending individuals were wiped out). Therefore, blatant hostility that can
be easily conveyed by a layman is simply not an option nor should be expected,
unless one desires to be persecuted. In Shin’s case, he had to look out for himself, his
wife and his privileged career in the DPRK20
.
Chung allows for a greater possibility of subversion in Pulgasari, stating that if such
elements are recognized “they are not only the sly manipulations of the author but the
consequence of the contradictions of Shin’s (and Kim Jong-Il’s) cinematic project

20
Regardless as to whether or not he was kidnapped, Shin and Choi were given
special treatment especially when one considers the life afforded to the average
DPRK citizen.

46

(np)21
. Also, this is the last film that Shin made as he fled before it was fully
completed. This is significant for a number of reasons. As previously stated, this is the
first and only film that contains a not-of-this-world protagonist of Shin’s North
Korean stock. If there were no ‘real life’ characters to emulate then we must see the
monster as the signifier for an ideology. All of the DPRK films, including Shins,
feature characters that embody the ‘spirit’ of the DPRK. This figure was in particular,
was created by an oppressed member of the peasant class to carry out justice.
It is interesting to also note the scale of the film as many Japanese special effects
experts worked on the film. Satsuma Kenpachiro, who played the title character in a
number of Godzilla films, donned the Pulgasari outfit. It even saw a Japanese release
(Chung, np). This film was destined to become one that would turn a profit, so why
escape then? Was Vienna the only opportunity for them to ‘escape’ after eight years?
This is certainly the story Shin and Choi have maintained since they left. However, I
find it interesting to note that they shot two films outside the DPRK prior to escaping.
An Emissary of No Return (1984) was filmed in, what was then, Czechoslovakia and
The Tale of Shim Chong (1985) was filmed in Munich (Schönherr, np). Not to
mention the frequent trips they made to Russia and Czechoslovakia to attend film
festivals. It may be the case that the opportunity wasn’t there or that they would only
be guaranteed asylum in a US embassy and Vienna was located on the west side of
the bloc but surely there could have been a number of countries that would have
granted them such asylum.

21
The contradiction in this case being Kim Jong-Il’s unofficial recognition of the
futility of an internationally successful and innovative film industry operating under
within the narrow parameters of an autocratic regime.

47

I argue that Pulgasari can be read as Shin’s swansong to a regime that he regarded d
as oppressive. Although he may have gone to the DPRK voluntarily, we have seen
that he conveys disdain towards those he considers unjust22
. Shin does have a record
of clashing with the ruling powers and their Repressive State Apparatuses. He also
seems to have a penchant for notoriety. Before he left the ROK, he was locked in a
dispute between the government’s Repressive State Apparatus (Censorship Board)
and the ruling power of Park Chung Hee. It could very well be the case that Shin got
what needed from the DPRK i.e. a good salary ($3,000,000 a year) and the
opportunity to run a studio and oversee the production of a wide variety of films.
These privileges he was not receiving in the ROK. Plus, this would give him a degree
of notoriety that compliments his image.
Before he left South Korea, Shin had a personal relationship with President Park.
Despite this friendship, Shin is said to have been increasingly dismayed at the level of
oppression Park to which he was subjecting his citizens. Shin acted in defiance
against the RSA of censorship by including censored erotic scenes in Shin’s Rose and
Wild Dog. The final nail in the coffin was Shin’s announcement that the next film his
studio would produce would focus on Kim Dae-Jung, a dissident in Park’s regime.
Kim Dae-Jung23
was kidnapped by Park’s secret service from Japan whilst in exile.
The announcement caused Park to revoke the Shin’s studio license (Schönherr, np).
Shin, therefore, was a man who enjoyed pushing the envelope when it came it his

23
Who would later become President of ROK

48

films24
. What then, can be said of Pulgasari? Shin defected before the film could be
finished in post-production and there are doubts that the film was even shown
publically in North Korea until years later (Chung, np)25
. Why then would the film
not be shown? Was it out of disdain for the filmmaker who claims to have been
kidnapped? Or were there subversive elements recognized in the film that were only
recognized against the backdrop of his defection?
The legacy he left behind was a precedent for more ‘enjoyable’ feature films. As
Schönherr wrote, “Within the parameters of Juche, a lot had almost overnight become
possible. Fun had become possible, fantasy had become possible, wild imagination
even…as long as the films promoted the correct official line of propaganda of course”
(np). Films like The Separation (1985) were filmed in Paris and Prague and two films,
The Silver Hairpin (1985) and Thaw (1985) were filmed in Japan which Schönherr
claims “could only have been made during the times of a more liberalized and
adventurous North Korean Cinema inspired by Shin” (np). The Separation as
Schönherr wrote, contained “heavy duty propaganda…still, the film did give its home
audience some rare exposure to what the contemporary world looked like-both in
Paris and in Prague” (np). The Silver Hairpin and Thaw contained raunchier material
unseen before in North Korean cinema (np). Those two films were allowed be more
raunchy as they were filmed and set in Japan thus suggesting that such erotic themes
belonged abroad and not home, “There is copious kissing among young folks in the
movie, which was still an usual sight for North Korean audiences at the time”

24
Indeed, he had a penchant for making erotic films when in the ROK and is credited
for including the first onscreen kiss in North Korean cinema
25
Although there is some indication that it was screened for Kim Jong-Il and party
officials

49

(Schönherr, 2012, np).
The other element of his legacy was, for the first time, the possibility of interpreting
subversive features in the film. One noteworthy film that continued with Shin’s
legacy of subversion interpretation was Hong Gil-Dong (1986). This was a pipeline
production of Shin Studios before he defected and is adapted from a novel written and
set during the Joseon dynasty in Korea. The title character is the illegitimate son of an
aristocratic father and his concubine. Cast out of society, he returns years later to
bring justice to the peasant class in Korea who are at the mercy of exploitative, greedy
governors. A scene that can be said to convey such resistance to the regime is when
Gil-Dong comes face-to-face with the governor of Soson village telling him, “People
of Sosan village are starving now but you eat your fill and have girls as spoils. You
deserve death”. Again, we have the negative critique of feudalism in Korea and yet
we may have a subtle reference to the suffering of the North Korean people due to
over consumption of resources by the ruling class. It is difficult to say, as this was not
a film made by Shin but perhaps this film serves as yet another stepping-stone for
greater subversion by those represented by the Ideological State Apparatus by the
ruling powers with their Repressive State Apparatus. The film ends with the exile of
Hong Gil-Dong and his associates by boat to another land. As the film ends, the
narrator says they are off to find “a land where all can enjoy equal rights and live
harmoniously, free from poverty”. However, the narrator adds, “Could there ever be
such an ideal land waiting for them?” Is this yet another reference to the salvation
offered by Kim Il-Sung or a subtle plea by citizens for a State that that offers freedom
from poverty and oppression? Perhaps it is too optimistic to suggest such an idea.

50

What we have learned however in this chapter is that no matter what institutions the
ruling powers set up, as long as they are comprised of individuals there will always be
opportunities to subvert. It may not result in a ‘revolution’ but what it does suggest is
that there is no absolute guarantee of passivity. Shin Sang-Ok, worked within what
can be considered the most restrictive boundaries afforded to a mainstream filmmaker
whose sole purpose was to be an artistic mouthpiece for the DPRK. His efforts
resulted in utilizing the apparatuses bestowed on him to deliver a degree of
oppositional expression. This was not the intention of Kim Jong-Il and unlike Franco;
the Dear Leader’s drawbacks were not appreciating the larger potentials of cinematic
expression by those who make them.
Conclusion
For a Totalitarian regime to maintain its power, it must successfully utilise the
Ideological State Apparatuses that exits in their State. This is done by facilitating
these apparatuses, such as Cinema, to benefit the ruling powers’ agenda, often at the
expense of the lower classes. Cinema is a powerful tool to propagate the ideology of a
Totalitarian regime, as it is medium that has proven to be capable of effective visual
representation. The DPRK is a State that continues to cease resembling a functioning
society and more of a ‘living model’ of what a pure Totalitarian State looks like. This
is sustained by the ruling powers effective use of ISA of Cinema as their propaganda
tool as well as ensuring that the Repressive State Apparatuses monitor the process
effectively to quell any dissent. Through film, the Kim family are presented as a
pastoral power to the citizens. It is they that gave them their freedom and is
responsible for their fulfilment in life. The DPRK has suffered many hardships, such

Totalitarian Cinema- The Utilisation of Ideological State Apparatuses Through Effective Power Relations By Totalitarian Regimes; The Case of North Korea

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